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Friedrich Nietzsche

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Human, All Too Human

Friedrich Nietzsche

A Book for Free Spirits, Volume I

Faithful translation

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Contents

In Place of a Preface. 4
Preface. 5
Of First and Last Things. 14
On the History of the Moral Sensations. 43
The Religious Life. 87
From the Soul of Artists and Writers. 118
Signs of Higher and Lower Culture. 160
Man in Society. 205
Woman and Child. 228
A Glance at the State. 246
Man Alone with Himself. 275
An Epilogue. 319

Human, All Too Human

A Book for Free Spirits

Friedrich Nietzsche

Human, All Too Human.

A Book for Free Spirits

Volume One

In Place of a Preface.

- for a time I weighed the various occupations to which men give themselves over in this life, and made the attempt to choose the best of them. But there is no need to relate here what sort of thoughts came to me in doing so: enough that, for my part, nothing seemed better to me than that I should hold strictly to my purpose, that is to say: that I should devote the whole span of my life to cultivating my reason and to following the traces of truth in the manner I had set before myself. For the fruits I had already tasted upon this path were of such a kind that, in my judgement, nothing more agreeable, nothing more innocent can be found in this life; moreover, every day since I took that manner of contemplation to my aid let me discover something new, which was always of some weight and by no means generally known. Then at last my soul became so full of joyfulness that all other things could no longer do it any harm.

From the Latin of Cartesius.

Preface.

1.

It has been put to me often enough, and always with great surprise, that there is something common and distinguishing in all my writings, from "The Birth of Tragedy" to the most recently published "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future": they all contain, I have been told, snares and nets for incautious birds, and an almost constant, unnoticed invitation to overturn habitual valuations and valued habits. What? Everything only — human, all too human? With this sigh, they say, one comes away from my writings, not without a kind of shyness and mistrust even towards morality, indeed not a little tempted and emboldened for once to play the advocate of the worst things: as if they were perhaps only the best slandered? My writings have been called a school of suspicion, still more of contempt, fortunately also of courage, indeed of audacity. And in truth, I myself do not believe that anyone has ever looked into the world with an equally profound suspicion, and not merely as an occasional devil's advocate, but just as much, to speak theologically, as an enemy and challenger of God; and whoever divines something of the consequences that lie in every profound suspicion, something of the chills and anxieties of isolation to which every unconditional difference of outlook condemns the one afflicted with it, will also understand how often, to recover from myself, as if to forget myself for a while, I sought shelter somewhere — in some reverence or enmity or scholarliness or frivolity or stupidity; and also why, where I did not find what I needed, I had to obtain it by force and artifice, to falsify it into shape, to invent it into shape (— and what else have poets ever done? and to what end would all the art in the world exist?). But what I needed most of all, again and again,

for my cure and self-restoration, was the belief that I was not so solitary, did not see so solitarily, — an enchanting suspicion of kinship and likeness in eye and desire, a resting in the trust of friendship, a blindness shared by two without suspicion or question marks, a delight in foregrounds, surfaces, what is near, what is nearest, in everything that has colour, skin and semblance. Perhaps in this regard I might be reproached with a good deal of "art", a good deal of subtler counterfeiting: for example, that I knowingly and willingly shut my eyes to Schopenhauer's blind will to morality, at a time when I was already clear-sighted enough about morality; likewise that I deceived myself about Richard Wagner's incurable romanticism, as if it were a beginning and not an end; likewise about the Greeks, likewise about the Germans and their future — and there might perhaps be a whole long list of such likewises? — but supposing all this were true and rightly held against me, what do you know of it, what could you know of it, how much cunning of self-preservation, how much reason and higher guardianship is contained in such self-deception, — and how much falsehood I still require so that I may permit myself, again and again, the luxury of my truthfulness?... Enough, I am still alive; and life, after all, was not devised by morality: it wants deception, it lives on deception... but is it not so? there I am beginning again and doing what I have always done, I old immoralist and bird-catcher — and speaking immorally, extra-morally, "beyond good and evil"? —

2.

— Thus, once upon a time, when I needed them, I also invented for myself the "free spirits" to whom this melancholy-courageous book with the title "Human, All Too Human" is dedicated: such "free spirits" do not exist, did not exist, — but at that time, as I said, I needed them for company, to keep in good spirits in the midst of bad things (sickness, isolation, foreign places, acedia, inactivity): as brave companions

and phantoms with whom one chatters and laughs when one feels like chattering and laughing, and whom one sends to the devil when they become tedious, — as compensation for the friends I lacked. That such free spirits might one day exist, that our Europe will have such lively and audacious companions among its sons of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, in the flesh and palpable, and not merely, as in my case, as phantoms and a hermit's shadow-play: this I should be the last to doubt. I already see them coming, slowly, slowly; and perhaps I am doing something to hasten their coming if I describe in advance under what fates I see them arise, by what paths I see them come? —

3.

One may surmise that a spirit in whom the type "free spirit" is one day to ripen and sweeten to perfection has had its decisive event in a great liberation, and that before it was all the more a fettered spirit and seemed chained for ever to its corner and its pillar. What binds most fast? which cords are well-nigh unbreakable? In human beings of a high and select kind it will be their duties: that reverence which belongs to youth, that shyness and tenderness before all that is anciently revered and worthy, that gratitude for the soil from which they grew, for the hand that led them, for the sanctuary where they learned to worship, - their very highest moments will bind them most fast, oblige them most lastingly. For those so bound the great liberation comes suddenly, like an earthquake: the young soul is all at once shaken, torn loose, torn out, - it does not itself understand what is happening. An impulse and urge holds sway and masters it like a command; a will and wish awakens to go away, anywhere, at any price; a violent, dangerous curiosity for an undiscovered world flames and flickers in all its senses. "Better to die than to live here" - so sounds the imperious voice and seduction: and this "here", this "at

home" is everything it had loved until then! A sudden terror and suspicion against what it loved, a lightning-flash of contempt for what it called "duty", a rebellious, arbitrary, volcanically thrusting craving for wandering, for foreign parts, estrangement, chilling, sobering, freezing, a hatred of love, perhaps a sacrilegious grasp and glance backward, to where it had until then worshipped and loved, perhaps a glow of shame at what it has just done, and at the same time an exultation that it did it, a drunken, inward, exultant shudder in which a victory betrays itself - a victory? over what? over whom? an enigmatic, question-laden, questionable victory, but the first victory nonetheless: - such bad and painful things belong to the history of the great liberation. It is at the same time a sickness that can destroy a man, this first outbreak of strength and will to self-determination, to self-appointed valuation, this will to free will: and how much sickness is expressed in the wild experiments and oddities by which the freed, the liberated one now seeks to prove to himself his mastery over things! He roams about cruelly, with an unsatisfied lasciviousness; whatever he seizes as booty must pay for the dangerous tension of his pride; he tears apart what entices him. With a wicked laugh he turns over whatever he finds veiled, spared by some shame or other: he tries out how these things look when one turns them upside down. There is caprice and delight in caprice in it, if he now perhaps bestows his favour on what has hitherto stood in ill repute, - if he creeps curious and tempting around what is most forbidden. In the background of his doings and roamings - for he is restless and aimless on his way as in a desert - stands the question mark of an ever more dangerous curiosity. "Can one not turn all values around? and is good perhaps evil? and God only an invention and refinement of the devil? Is everything perhaps false in the final analysis? And if we are the deceived, are we not by that very fact deceivers too? must we not be deceivers too?" - such thoughts lead and mislead him, ever further on, ever further astray. Solitude encircles and encoils him, ever more menacing, more

strangling, more heart-constricting, that terrible goddess and mater saeva cupidinum - but who today knows what solitude is?...

4.

From this morbid isolation, from the desert of such years of experiment, the road is still long to that tremendous, overflowing certainty and health which cannot do without sickness itself, as a means and fish-hook of knowledge, to that mature freedom of the spirit which is just as much self-mastery and discipline of the heart and permits the paths to many and opposing ways of thought -, to that inner spaciousness and pampering of superabundance which rules out the danger that the spirit might lose itself in its own paths and fall in love with them and remain sitting intoxicated in some corner or other, to that surplus of plastic, healing, imitative and restorative forces which is precisely the sign of the great health, that surplus which gives the free spirit the dangerous privilege of being permitted to live by way of experiment and to offer itself to adventure: the master's privilege of the free spirit! In between may lie long years of convalescence, years full of many-coloured, painfully enchanting transformations, governed and led by the rein by a tenacious will to health, which often already ventures to clothe and disguise itself as health. There is a middle state therein which a man of such a destiny later recalls not without emotion: a pale, delicate light and sunshine-happiness is his own, a feeling of bird's freedom, bird's outlook, bird's high spirits, a third thing in which curiosity and tender contempt have bound themselves together. A "free spirit" - this cool word does one good in that state, it almost warms. One lives, no longer in the fetters of love and hatred, without yes, without no, voluntarily near, voluntarily far, preferably slipping away, evading, fluttering off, gone again, flying aloft again; one is spoiled, like everyone who has once seen a tremendous multiplicity beneath him, - and one has become the counterpart of those

who concern themselves with things that do not concern them. In fact, the free spirit is now concerned with nothing but things - and how many things! - which no longer trouble him...

5.

One step further in convalescence: and the free spirit draws near to life again, slowly, to be sure, almost reluctantly, almost mistrustfully. It grows warmer around him again, yellower, as it were; feeling and fellow-feeling gain depth, thaw-winds of every kind pass over him. He almost feels as though his eyes were only now opening to what is near. He is astonished and sits still: where had he been? These near and nearest things: how transformed they seem to him! what down and magic they have acquired in the meantime! He looks back gratefully, - grateful to his wandering, his hardness and self-estrangement, his far glances and bird-flights into cold heights. How good that he did not, like a tender, dull loafer in the corner, always stay "at home", always "by himself"! he was beside himself: there is no doubt of it. Only now does he see himself -, and what surprises he finds in doing so! What untried shudders! What happiness even in the weariness, the old sickness, the relapses of the convalescent! How he likes to sit still and suffer, to spin patience, to lie in the sun! Who understands as he does the happiness of winter, the patches of sunlight on the wall! They are the most grateful animals in the world, the most modest too, these convalescents and lizards half turned toward life again: - there are some among them who let no day leave them without hanging a little song of praise on its trailing hem. And speaking in earnest: it is a thorough cure for all pessimism (the cancer of old idealists and arch-liars, as is well known -) to become sick in the manner of these free spirits, to remain sick for a good while and then, for longer, still longer, to become healthy, I mean "healthier". There is wisdom in it,

the wisdom of life, to prescribe health itself to oneself for a long time only in small doses.

6.

Around that time it may at last come to pass, under the sudden flashes of a health still turbulent, still changeable, that the riddle of that great liberation begins to unveil itself to the free, ever freer spirit, the riddle which until then had waited in his memory dark, questionable, almost untouchable. If for a long time he scarcely dared to ask himself "why so apart? so alone? renouncing everything I revered? renouncing reverence itself? why this hardness, this suspicion, this hatred of my own virtues?" - now he dares to ask it aloud and already hears something like an answer. "You were to become master over yourself, master also over your own virtues. Formerly they were your masters; but they may only be your tools alongside other tools. You were to gain power over your For and Against and learn how to hang them out and hang them up again, according to your higher purpose. You were to learn to grasp the perspectival in every valuation - the displacement, distortion and apparent teleology of horizons and whatever else belongs to the perspectival; also the bit of stupidity with regard to opposed values and the whole intellectual loss with which every For, every Against has to be paid for. You were to learn to grasp the necessary injustice in every For and Against, injustice as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by the perspectival and its injustice. Above all you were to see with your own eyes where injustice is always greatest: namely there where life is developed in its smallest, narrowest, neediest, most rudimentary form and yet cannot help taking itself as the end and measure of things and, for the sake of its own preservation, secretly and pettily and ceaselessly crumbling away at and calling into question what is higher, greater, richer, - you were to see with your own eyes the problem of order of rank, and how

power and right and the comprehensiveness of perspective grow upward together. You were to" - enough, the free spirit now knows which "thou shalt" he has obeyed, and also what he now can do, what only now he - may...

7.

In this fashion the free spirit gives himself an answer concerning that riddle of liberation and ends, by generalizing his case, in deciding thus about his experience. "As it went with me, he tells himself, so must it go with everyone in whom a task wants to become flesh and 'come into the world'." The secret power and necessity of this task will hold sway beneath and within his individual destinies like an unconscious pregnancy, - long before he has fixed his eye on this task itself and knows its name. Our destiny disposes of us even when we do not yet know it; it is the future that gives the rule to our today. Supposing that it is the problem of order of rank of which we may say that it is our problem, we free spirits: only now, in the midday of our life, do we understand what preparations, detours, trials, temptations, disguises the problem needed before it was permitted to rise up before us, and how we first had to experience the most manifold and contradictory states of distress and happiness in soul and body, as adventurers and circumnavigators of that inner world called "man", as surveyors of every "higher" and "one above another" which is likewise called "man" - pressing in everywhere, almost without fear, disdaining nothing, losing nothing, savouring everything, cleansing everything of the accidental and, as it were, sifting it out - until at last we were permitted to say, we free spirits: "Here - a new problem! Here a long ladder, on whose rungs we ourselves have sat and climbed, - which we ourselves at some time have been! Here a higher, a deeper, a beneath-us, a tremendously long order, an order of rank, which we see here - our problem!" -

8.

- To no psychologist and reader of signs will it remain hidden for a moment at what point in the development just described the present book belongs (or has been placed -). But where are there psychologists today? In France, certainly; perhaps in Russia; surely not in Germany. There is no lack of reasons why present-day Germans might even count this to their honour: bad enough for one who in this respect is of un-German nature and making! This German book, which has known how to find its readers in a wide circle of lands and peoples - it has been about ten years on its way - and must understand some kind of music and art of the flute by which even coy foreign ears are seduced into listening, - precisely in Germany has this book been read most carelessly, heard most poorly: what is the reason? - "It demands too much, I have been answered, it addresses itself to people free from the hardship of coarse duties, it wants fine and pampered senses, it needs superfluity, superfluity of time, of brightness of sky and heart, of otium in the most audacious sense: - nothing but good things which we Germans of today do not have and therefore cannot give either." - After so polite an answer my philosophy counsels me to keep silent and ask no further; especially since in certain cases, as the proverb intimates, one remains a philosopher only by - keeping silent.

Nice, in the spring of 1886.

First Chapter.

Of First and Last Things.

1.

Chemistry of concepts and sensations. - Philosophical problems now once again assume, in almost every respect, the same form of question as two thousand years ago: how can something arise from its opposite, for example the rational from the irrational, the sentient from the dead, logic from illogic, disinterested contemplation from covetous willing, living for others from egoism, truth from errors? Metaphysical philosophy has hitherto helped itself over this difficulty by denying that the one arises from the other and by assuming for the more highly valued things a miraculous origin, directly out of the core and essence of the "thing in itself". Historical philosophy, on the other hand, which can no longer be conceived of as separate from natural science, the very youngest of all philosophical methods, has ascertained in individual cases (and presumably this will be its result in all of them) that there are no opposites, except in the customary exaggeration of the popular or metaphysical view, and that an error of reason lies at the root of this antithesis: according to its explanation there exists, strictly speaking, neither an unegoistic action nor a wholly disinterested contemplation; both are merely sublimations, in which the basic element appears almost to have evaporated and reveals itself as still present only to the most refined observation. - All that we need, and what can be given us only now, at the present height of the individual sciences, is a chemistry of moral, religious and aesthetic representations and sensations, as well as of all those stirrings which we experience within ourselves in the great and small commerce of culture and society, indeed even in solitude: what if this chemistry

were to conclude with the result that in this domain too the most magnificent colours are obtained from base, indeed despised materials? Will many have the desire to pursue such investigations? Mankind likes to put questions of origin and beginnings out of its mind: must one not be almost dehumanized to feel the opposite inclination within oneself? -

2.

Hereditary defect of philosophers. - All philosophers share the common defect of starting from present-day man and believing that they can reach their goal through an analysis of him. Involuntarily "man" hovers before them as an aeterna veritas, as something that remains constant amid every whirlpool, as a sure measure of things. Everything the philosopher asserts about man, however, is at bottom no more than a testimony about the man of a very limited span of time. Lack of historical sense is the hereditary defect of all philosophers; some even unwittingly take the very latest shape of man, such as has arisen under the impress of particular religions, indeed of particular political events, as the fixed form from which one must start. They will not learn that man has become, that the faculty of knowledge too has become; while some of them even have the whole world spun out of this faculty of knowledge. - Now everything essential in human development took place in primeval times, long before those four thousand years with which we are more or less acquainted; during these, man may not have changed very much more. But the philosopher sees "instincts" in present-day man and assumes that these belong to the unalterable facts of man and can to that extent furnish a key to the understanding of the world in general; all of teleology is built upon speaking of the man of the last four millennia as of an eternal one, towards whom all things in the world have had a natural direction from their very beginning. But everything has become; there are no

eternal facts: just as there are no absolute truths. - Accordingly, historical philosophizing is necessary from now on, and with it the virtue of modesty.

3.

Esteem for inconspicuous truths. - It is the mark of a higher culture to esteem more highly the little, inconspicuous truths which have been found by rigorous method than the gladdening and dazzling errors which stem from metaphysical and artistic ages and men. At first one has scorn on one's lips for the former, as though nothing here could stand against each other on equal terms: so modest, plain, sober, indeed seemingly discouraging do the former stand there, so beautiful, resplendent, intoxicating, indeed perhaps beatifying do the latter. Yet what has been laboriously won, what is certain, lasting and therefore still fruitful of consequences for every further knowledge, is nonetheless the higher thing; to hold to it is manly and shows bravery, plainness, self-restraint. Gradually not only the individual but all mankind will be raised up to this manliness, once it has at last grown accustomed to esteeming more highly the durable, lasting knowledge and has lost all faith in inspiration and in the miraculous communication of truths. - The worshippers of forms, to be sure, with their standard of the beautiful and the sublime, will at first have good reason to mock as soon as the esteem for inconspicuous truths and the scientific spirit begin to gain dominion: but only because either their eye has not yet opened itself to the charm of the plainest form, or because the men brought up in that spirit are still far from being wholly and inwardly permeated by it, so that they still thoughtlessly imitate old forms (and do so badly enough, as anyone does who no longer much cares about a thing). Formerly the mind was not occupied by rigorous thinking; then its seriousness lay in spinning out symbols and forms. That has changed; that seriousness about the

symbolic has become the hallmark of a lower culture; just as our arts themselves are becoming ever more intellectual, our senses more spiritual, and as, for example, one now judges quite differently from a hundred years ago what is sensuously euphonious: so the forms of our life too are becoming ever more spiritual, uglier perhaps to the eye of earlier times, but only because it is unable to see how the realm of inner, spiritual beauty is continually deepening and widening, and to what extent the spirited glance may now count for more with all of us than the most beautiful frame of limbs and the most sublime edifice.

4.

Astrology and the like. - It is probable that the objects of religious, moral and aesthetic feeling likewise belong only to the surface of things, while man likes to believe that here at least he touches the heart of the world; he deceives himself because those things make him so deeply blissful and so deeply unhappy, and thus displays here the same pride as in astrology. For astrology supposes that the starry heavens revolve around the fate of man; the moral man, however, presupposes that what lies essentially close to his heart must also be the essence and heart of things.

5.

Misunderstanding of the dream. - In the dream, man in the ages of crude, primordial culture believed he was coming to know a second, real world; here is the origin of all metaphysics. Without the dream one would have found no occasion for a division of the world. The separation into soul and body, too, is connected with the most ancient conception of the dream, as is the assumption of a phantom body of the soul, hence the origin of all belief in spirits, and probably also of the belief in gods. "The dead man lives on; for he appears to the living

in dreams": so men reasoned in former times, throughout many thousands of years.

6.

The spirit of science powerful in the part, not in the whole. - The separated, smallest domains of science are treated purely objectively: the general great sciences, on the other hand, considered as a whole, put the question - a rather unobjective question, to be sure - upon our lips: to what end? to what use? Because of this regard for use, they are treated less impersonally as a whole than in their parts. Now in the case of philosophy above all, as the apex of the entire pyramid of knowledge, the question of the use of knowledge as such is involuntarily raised, and every philosophy unconsciously has the intention of ascribing to it the highest use. That is why there is in all philosophies so much high-flying metaphysics and such a shyness before the seemingly insignificant solutions of physics; for the significance of knowledge for life is supposed to appear as great as possible. Here lies the antagonism between the individual scientific domains and philosophy. The latter wants what art wants, to give life and action the greatest possible depth and meaning; in the former one seeks knowledge and nothing further, - whatever may come of it. There has as yet been no philosopher under whose hands philosophy did not become an apology for knowledge; on this point at least each one is an optimist, that the highest utility must be ascribed to it. They are all tyrannized by logic: and logic is by its very nature optimism.

7.

The troublemaker in science. Philosophy parted from science when it posed the question: which is that knowledge of the world and of life with which man lives most happily? This happened in the Socratic

schools: through the standpoint of happiness the arteries of scientific inquiry were tied off - and still are today.

8.

Pneumatic explanation of nature. - Metaphysics explains the scripture of nature, as it were, pneumatically, as the Church and its scholars once did with the Bible. It takes a great deal of understanding to apply to nature the same kind of stricter art of interpretation that philologists have now created for all books: with the intention of plainly understanding what the text means to say, but not of scenting, indeed presupposing, a double sense. But just as even with regard to books the bad art of interpretation has by no means been fully overcome, and one still continually comes upon remnants of allegorical and mystical exegesis in the best educated society: so it stands with regard to nature as well - indeed far worse.

9.

Metaphysical world. - It is true, there could be a metaphysical world; the absolute possibility of it can hardly be contested. We see all things through the human head and cannot cut this head off; while the question nonetheless remains, what of the world would still be there if one had indeed cut it off. This is a purely scientific problem and not very apt to cause people worry; but everything that has hitherto made metaphysical assumptions valuable, terrifying, delightful to them, that has begotten them, is passion, error and self-deception; the very worst methods of knowledge, not the very best, have taught belief in them. Once one has uncovered these methods as the foundation of all existing religions and metaphysics, one has refuted them. Then that possibility still always remains; but one can do nothing whatever with it, let alone allow happiness, salvation and life to hang from the spider's threads of such a possibility. - For one could assert nothing at

all of the metaphysical world except an otherness, an otherness inaccessible and incomprehensible to us; it would be a thing with negative properties. - Were the existence of such a world ever so well proven, it would still be certain that the most indifferent of all knowledge would be precisely the knowledge of it: more indifferent even than the knowledge of the chemical analysis of water must be to the sailor in peril of a storm.

10.

Harmlessness of metaphysics in the future. - As soon as religion, art and morality are so described in their origins that one can explain them completely without taking refuge in the assumption of metaphysical interventions at the beginning and in the course of their path, the strongest interest in the purely theoretical problem of the "thing in itself" and "appearance" ceases. For however matters may stand here: with religion, art and morality we do not touch upon the "essence of the world in itself"; we are in the realm of representation, no "intimation" can carry us further. With complete calm one will leave the question of how our picture of the world can differ so greatly from the inferred essence of the world to physiology and to the history of the development of organisms and concepts.

11.

Language as putative science. - The significance of language for the development of culture lies in this, that in it man set up a world of his own beside the other, a place he took to be so firm that from it he could lift the rest of the world off its hinges and make himself its master. Insofar as man has, through long stretches of time, believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates, he has appropriated that pride with which he raised himself above the animal: he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the

world. The shaper of language was not so modest as to believe that he was merely giving things designations; rather, as he fancied, he was expressing the highest wisdom about things with words; in fact language is the first stage of the striving for science. Here too it is the belief in found truth from which the mightiest sources of strength have flowed. Very belatedly - only now - is it dawning on men that in their belief in language they have propagated a monstrous error. Fortunately it is too late for this to be able to undo the development of reason, which rests upon that belief. - Logic too rests on presuppositions to which nothing in the real world corresponds, for example on the presupposition of the equality of things, of the identity of the same thing at different points in time: but that science arose through the opposite belief (that such things do indeed exist in the real world). So it is too with mathematics, which would certainly not have arisen had it been known from the beginning that in nature there is no exactly straight line, no real circle, no absolute measure of magnitude.

12.

Dream and culture. - The brain function most impaired by sleep is memory: not that it pauses altogether, - but it is brought back to a state of imperfection such as it may have been for everyone, by day and in waking, in the primeval ages of humanity. Arbitrary and confused as it is, it constantly mistakes things for one another on the basis of the most fleeting similarities: but it was with the same arbitrariness and confusion that peoples composed their mythologies, and even now travellers are wont to observe how strongly the savage inclines to forgetfulness, how his mind, after a brief exertion of memory, begins to reel to and fro, and how, out of sheer slackness, he brings forth lies and nonsense. But in dreams we all resemble this savage; poor recognition and erroneous equation are the ground of

the poor reasoning of which we are guilty in dreams: so that, when we clearly call a dream to mind, we are frightened at ourselves, because we harbour so much folly within us. - The perfect clarity of all dream-representations, which presupposes unconditional belief in their reality, reminds us once again of the conditions of earlier humanity, in which hallucination was extraordinarily frequent and at times seized whole communities, whole peoples at once. Thus: in sleep and in dreams we go once more through the lesson-task of earlier mankind.

13.

Logic of the dream. - In sleep our nervous system is continually excited by manifold inner causes, almost all the organs are secreting and active, the blood makes its tumultuous circuit, the position of the sleeper presses upon individual limbs, his coverings influence sensation in various ways, the stomach digests and disquiets other organs with its movements, the bowels writhe, the position of the head brings with it unaccustomed postures of the muscles, the feet, unshod, not pressing the ground with their soles, cause the feeling of something unaccustomed, just as does the different clothing of the whole body, - all this, according to its daily change and degree, excites by its unusualness the entire system up into the very function of the brain: and so there are a hundred occasions for the mind to wonder and to seek the reasons for this excitation: the dream, however, is the seeking and representing of the causes of those excited sensations, that is to say of the supposed causes. Whoever, for example, girds his feet with two straps may well dream that two snakes are coiling about his feet: this is first a hypothesis, then a belief, with an accompanying pictorial representation and embellishment: "these snakes must be the causa of that sensation which I, the sleeper, have", - so judges the mind of the sleeper. The immediate past thus inferred becomes for him, through his excited fancy, the present. So everyone knows from

experience how quickly the dreamer weaves a loud sound that presses in upon him, for example the ringing of bells or the firing of cannon, into his dream, that is to say explains it after the fact from the dream, so that he believes he experiences first the occasioning circumstances and then that sound. - But how does it come about that the mind of the dreamer always goes so far astray, while the same mind in waking is wont to be so sober, cautious, and so sceptical in regard to hypotheses? so that the first hypothesis that comes along suffices it for the explanation of a feeling, for it at once to believe in its truth? (for in dreams we believe in the dream as if it were reality, that is to say we take our hypothesis to be fully proven). - I think: as man still reasons now in dreams, so mankind reasoned in waking too through many thousands of years: the first causa that occurred to the mind to explain anything that needed explaining sufficed it and passed for truth. (So, according to the accounts of travellers, savages still proceed today.) In the dream this primeval piece of humanity continues to exercise itself in us, for it is the foundation upon which higher reason developed and still develops in every human being: the dream carries us back into distant conditions of human culture and puts into our hands a means of understanding them better. Dream-thinking comes so easily to us now because through immense stretches of humanity's development we have been drilled so well in precisely this form of fantastic and cheap explanation out of the first random notion. To that extent the dream is a recreation for the brain, which by day has to satisfy the stricter demands upon thinking that are imposed by higher culture. - A kindred process we can examine directly, as the gate and vestibule of the dream, while our understanding is still awake. If we close our eyes, the brain produces a host of impressions of light and colours, probably as a kind of after-play and echo of all those effects of light that press in upon it by day. But now the understanding (in league with fancy) at once works up these play of colours, formless in themselves, into definite figures, shapes, landscapes, animated

groups. The actual process here is again a kind of inference from effect to cause; in that the mind asks: whence these impressions of light and colours, it supposes those figures and shapes as their causes: they count for it as the occasions of those colours and lights, because by day, with open eyes, it is accustomed to find an occasioning cause for every colour, every impression of light. Here, then, fancy continually pushes images before it, leaning in its production upon the visual impressions of the day, and the dream-fancy does just the same: - that is to say, the supposed cause is inferred from the effect and represented after the effect: all this with extraordinary rapidity, so that here, as with a conjuror, a confusion of judgement can arise and a succession can appear as something simultaneous, even as a reversed succession. - We can gather from these processes how late sharper logical thinking, the strict treatment of cause and effect, was developed, if our functions of reason and understanding still now involuntarily reach back to those primitive forms of inference, and we live roughly half our lives in this condition. - The poet, too, the artist, foists upon his moods and states causes which are by no means the true ones; to that extent he recalls older humanity and can help us to an understanding of it.

14.

Sympathetic resonance. - All stronger moods bring with them a sympathetic resonance of kindred sensations and moods; they stir up memory, as it were. Something in us remembers on their account and becomes conscious of similar states and their origin. Thus habitual rapid connections of feelings and thoughts are formed, which at last, when they follow one upon another with lightning speed, are no longer felt even as complexes but as unities. In this sense one speaks of the moral feeling, of the religious feeling, as though these were nothing but unities: in truth they are streams with a hundred sources

and tributaries. Here too, as so often, the unity of the word vouches for nothing as to the unity of the thing.

15.

No inside and outside in the world. - Just as Democritus transferred the concepts of above and below to infinite space, where they have no meaning, so philosophers in general have transferred the concept "inside and outside" to the essence and appearance of the world; they suppose that with deep feelings one penetrates deep into the interior, draws near to the heart of nature. But these feelings are deep only insofar as, scarcely noticeably, certain complicated groups of thoughts are regularly aroused along with them, which we call deep; a feeling is deep because we hold the accompanying thought to be deep. But the deep thought can nonetheless be very far from the truth, as, for example, every metaphysical one is; if one subtracts from the deep feeling the admixed elements of thought, what remains is the strong feeling, and this vouches for nothing in the way of knowledge but itself, just as strong faith proves only its strength, not the truth of what is believed.

16.

Appearance and thing in itself. - Philosophers are wont to place themselves before life and experience - before what they call the world of appearance - as before a painting that has been unrolled once and for all and shows, unalterably fixed, the same scene: this scene, they suppose, must be correctly interpreted in order thereby to draw a conclusion about the being that produced the painting: that is, about the thing in itself, which is customarily regarded as the sufficient ground of the world of appearance. Against this, stricter logicians, having rigorously established the concept of the metaphysical as that of the unconditioned, and consequently also the unconditioning, have

denied any connection between the unconditioned (the metaphysical world) and the world known to us: so that in appearance it is precisely not the thing in itself that appears, and any conclusion from the former to the latter is to be rejected. Both sides, however, have overlooked the possibility that that painting - what we humans now call life and experience - has gradually become what it is, indeed is still wholly in the process of becoming, and therefore ought not to be regarded as a fixed quantity from which one might draw a conclusion about its author (the sufficient ground), or even reject such a conclusion. Because for thousands of years we have looked upon the world with moral, aesthetic, religious demands, with blind inclination, passion or fear, and have thoroughly wallowed in the bad habits of illogical thinking, this world has gradually become so marvellously motley, terrible, deep in meaning, full of soul; it has acquired colour - but we have been the colourists: the human intellect has made appearance appear and has carried its erroneous fundamental conceptions into things. Late, very late - it comes to reflect: and now the world of experience and the thing in itself seem to it so extraordinarily different and separate that it rejects any conclusion from the former to the latter - or, in an eerily mysterious fashion, calls for the surrender of our intellect, of our personal will: so as to attain to the essential by becoming essential. Others again have gathered together all the characteristic features of our world of appearance - that is, of the representation of the world spun out of intellectual errors and inherited by us - and, instead of indicting the intellect as the guilty party, have accused the essence of things as the cause of this actual, very uncanny character of the world, and have preached redemption from existence. - With all these conceptions the steady and laborious process of science, which will one day at last celebrate its highest triumph in a history of the genesis of thought, will deal decisively; its result might perhaps amount to this proposition: What we now call the world is the result of a multitude of errors and fantasies which

arose gradually in the overall development of organic beings, grew into one another, and are now bequeathed to us as the accumulated treasure of the entire past - as a treasure: for the value of our humanity rests upon it. From this world of representation strict science can in fact release us only to a slight degree - nor is that at all to be wished - inasmuch as it cannot essentially break the power of age-old habits of sensation: but it can very gradually and step by step illuminate the history of the genesis of that world as representation - and lift us, at least for moments, above the whole proceeding. Perhaps we shall then recognize that the thing in itself is worthy of Homeric laughter: that it seemed so much, indeed everything, and is actually empty, namely empty of meaning.

17.

Metaphysical explanations. - The young person prizes metaphysical explanations because they reveal to him something supremely meaningful in things he found unpleasant or contemptible: and if he is dissatisfied with himself, this feeling is relieved when he recognizes the innermost riddle or misery of the world in that which he so greatly disapproves of in himself. To feel less accountable and at the same time to find things more interesting - that counts for him as the double benefit he owes to metaphysics. Later, to be sure, he grows mistrustful of the whole metaphysical mode of explanation; then perhaps he comes to see that those effects can be achieved just as well and more scientifically by another route: that physical and historical explanations bring about that feeling of unaccountability at least as much, and that the interest in life and its problems is perhaps kindled even more thereby.

18.

Fundamental questions of metaphysics. - Once the history of the genesis of thinking has been written, the following proposition of an eminent logician will also stand illuminated by a new light: "The original universal law of the knowing subject consists in the inner necessity of knowing every object in itself, in its own essence, as something identical with itself, hence self-existent and at bottom always remaining the same and unchangeable, in short as a substance." This law too, which is here called "original", has come to be: it will one day be shown how gradually, in the lower organisms, this propensity arises, how the dim mole's eyes of these organizations at first see nothing but always the same thing, how then, when the various stirrings of pleasure and displeasure become more noticeable, different substances are gradually distinguished, but each with one attribute, that is to say, a single relation to such an organism. - The first stage of the logical is judgement; its essence consists, according to the finding of the best logicians, in belief. At the root of all belief lies the sensation of the pleasant or the painful in relation to the sensing subject. A new, third sensation as the result of two preceding single sensations is judgement in its lowest form. - Originally nothing in any thing interests us organic beings except its relation to us with respect to pleasure and pain. Between the moments in which we become conscious of this relation, the states of sensing, lie states of rest, of nonsensing: then the world and every thing is without interest for us, we notice no change in it (just as even now someone intensely absorbed does not notice that someone is walking past him). For the plant all things are usually at rest, eternal, every thing identical with itself. From the period of the lower organisms man has inherited the belief that there are identical things (only experience trained by the highest science contradicts this proposition). The primal belief of everything organic from the very beginning is perhaps even that the whole rest of

the world is one and unmoved. - Farthest removed from that primal stage of the logical lies the thought of causality: indeed even now we fundamentally believe that all sensations and actions are acts of free will; when the feeling individual regards itself, it takes every sensation, every change for something isolated, that is to say unconditioned, unconnected: it rises up out of us without any link to what came before or after. We are hungry, but originally do not think that the organism wants to be preserved; rather, that feeling seems to assert itself without ground or purpose, it isolates itself and takes itself to be arbitrary. Thus: the belief in the freedom of the will is an original error of everything organic, as old as the stirrings of the logical within it; the belief in unconditioned substances and in identical things is likewise an original, equally old error of everything organic. But inasmuch as all metaphysics has concerned itself principally with substance and the freedom of the will, one may designate it as the science that treats of the fundamental errors of man, yet as though they were fundamental truths.

19.

Number. - The invention of the laws of number was made on the basis of the error, already prevailing from the beginning, that there are several identical things (but in fact there is nothing identical), or at least that there are things (but there is no "thing"). The assumption of plurality always presupposes that there is something which occurs many times: but precisely here error already reigns, already here we feign beings, unities, which do not exist. - Our sensations of space and time are false, for, consistently examined, they lead to logical contradictions. In all scientific determinations we inevitably always reckon with some false magnitudes: but because these magnitudes are at least constant, as for example our sensation of time and space, the results of science nonetheless acquire a perfect rigour and certainty in

their coherence with one another; one can build further upon them - up to that final end where the erroneous basic assumption, those constant mistakes, come into contradiction with the results, for example in atomic theory. There we still feel compelled to assume a "thing" or material "substratum" that is moved, whereas the whole scientific procedure has pursued precisely the task of dissolving everything thing-like (material) into motions: here too we still separate, with our sensation, the mover and the moved, and cannot get out of this circle, because the belief in things has been knotted into our being from time immemorial. - When Kant says "the understanding does not draw its laws from nature, but prescribes them to her", this is entirely true with regard to the concept of nature which we are compelled to connect with her (nature = world as representation, that is, as error), but which is the summation of a host of errors of the understanding. - To a world which is not our representation the laws of number are wholly inapplicable: they hold only in the human world.

20.

A few rungs back. - One, certainly very high, stage of cultivation is reached when man gets beyond superstitious and religious concepts and fears and, for example, no longer believes in the dear little angels or in original sin, and has also unlearned speaking of the salvation of souls: once he is at this stage of liberation, he still has, with the utmost exertion of his reflection, to overcome metaphysics. Then, however, a retrograde movement is necessary: he must grasp the historical justification, and likewise the psychological, in such ideas, he must recognize how the greatest advancement of mankind has come from that quarter and how, without such a retrograde movement, one would rob oneself of the best results of mankind hitherto. - With regard to philosophical metaphysics, I now see ever more people who have arrived at the negative goal (that every positive metaphysics is

error), but still few who climb a few rungs back down; for one should indeed look out beyond the last rung of the ladder, but not want to stand upon it. The most enlightened get only so far as to free themselves from metaphysics and look back upon it with superiority: whereas here too, as in the hippodrome, it is needful to turn round the end of the track.

21.

Presumable victory of scepticism. - Let us for once grant the sceptical starting point: supposing there were no other, metaphysical world and all explanations drawn from metaphysics of the only world known to us were useless to us, with what eyes would we then look upon men and things? This one can think out; it is useful, even if the question whether anything metaphysical has been scientifically proved by Kant and Schopenhauer were for once set aside. For it is, according to historical probability, very possible that men will one day become sceptical in this respect, on the whole and in general; and so the question runs: how will human society then take shape under the influence of such a disposition? Perhaps the scientific proof of any metaphysical world is already so difficult that mankind will never again be rid of a mistrust of it. And if one mistrusts metaphysics, then by and large the same consequences follow as if it had been directly refuted and one were no longer permitted to believe in it. The historical question regarding an unmetaphysical disposition of mankind remains the same in both cases.

22.

Disbelief in the "monumentum aere perennius". - An essential disadvantage that the cessation of metaphysical views brings with it lies in this: that the individual keeps his brief lifetime too strictly in view and receives no stronger incentives to build at durable institutions

laid out for centuries; he wants to pluck the fruit himself from the tree he plants, and therefore he no longer cares to plant those trees which require a century's long, even tending and which are destined to overshadow long successions of generations. For metaphysical views give the belief that in them the last, definitive foundation has been given, upon which all the future of mankind is henceforth compelled to settle and build; the individual furthers his salvation when, for example, he founds a church or a monastery; it will, so he thinks, be credited to him and requited in the eternal afterlife of the soul; it is work on the eternal salvation of the soul. - Can science, too, awaken such belief in its results? In fact it needs doubt and mistrust as its most faithful allies; nevertheless, in the course of time the sum of unassailable truths, that is, of truths outlasting all the storms of scepticism, all decompositions, can become so great (for example in the dietetics of health) that on the strength of it one resolves to found "eternal" works. For the time being the contrast between our agitated, ephemeral existence and the long-breathed repose of metaphysical ages still acts too strongly, because the two times are still placed too close together; the individual human being himself now passes through too many inner and outer developments to dare to settle himself durably and once and for all even merely for his own lifetime. An entirely modern man who wants, for example, to build himself a house has the feeling as he does so of wanting to wall himself up alive in a mausoleum.

23.

Age of comparison. - The less men are bound by tradition, the greater becomes the inner movement of motives, and the greater again, correspondingly, the outer unrest, the flooding to and fro of men, the polyphony of strivings. For whom is there now still any stricter compulsion to bind himself and his descendants to one place? For whom

is there anything at all still strictly binding? Just as all styles of the arts are imitated side by side, so too are all stages and kinds of morality, of customs, of cultures. - Such an age obtains its significance from the fact that in it the various views of the world, customs, cultures can be compared and lived through side by side; which formerly, given the always localized dominion of every culture, was not possible, corresponding to the bondage of all artistic styles to place and time. Now an increase in aesthetic feeling will decide definitively among so many forms offering themselves for comparison: it will let most of them - namely all those which it rejects - die out. In the same way a selection is now taking place among the forms and habits of higher morality, whose goal can be none other than the downfall of the lower moralities. It is the age of comparison! That is its pride - but, in fairness, also its suffering. Let us not be afraid of this suffering! Rather, let us understand the task which the age sets us as greatly as ever we are able: then posterity will bless us for it - a posterity which knows itself to be beyond the self-contained, original national cultures as well as beyond the culture of comparison, but looks back upon both kinds of culture with gratitude, as upon venerable antiquities.

24.

Possibility of progress. - When a scholar of the old culture swears no longer to associate with people who believe in progress, he is right. For the old culture has its greatness and goodness behind it, and historical education compels one to admit that it can never again become fresh; it takes an insufferable obtuseness or an equally intolerable fanaticism to deny this. But men can consciously resolve to develop themselves onward to a new culture, whereas formerly they developed unconsciously and by chance: they can now create better conditions for the coming into being of men, their nourishment, upbring-

ing, instruction, administer the earth economically as a whole, weigh the powers of men generally against one another and put them to use. This new, conscious culture kills the old, which, regarded as a whole, led an unconscious animal and vegetable life; it kills also the mistrust of progress - progress is possible. I mean: it is premature and almost nonsensical to believe that progress must necessarily ensue; but how could one deny that it is possible? On the other hand, progress in the sense and by the path of the old culture is not even conceivable. Even if romantic fantasy does use the word "progress" of its goals (e.g. self-contained, original national cultures): in any case it borrows the image of it from the past; its thinking and imagining in this domain is without any originality.

25.

Private and world morality. - Since the belief has ceased that a God guides the destinies of the world on the whole and, despite all apparent windings in the path of mankind, nonetheless leads it gloriously onward, men must themselves set themselves ecumenical goals, spanning the whole earth. The older morality, namely Kant's, demands of the individual actions that one would wish of all men: that was a fine, naive thing; as if everyone knew without further ado by which mode of action the whole of mankind would fare well, and thus which actions were desirable at all; it is a theory like that of free trade, presupposing that universal harmony must result of itself according to innate laws of betterment. Perhaps a future survey of the needs of mankind will make it appear by no means desirable that all men should act alike; rather, in the interest of ecumenical goals, special tasks, perhaps under certain circumstances even evil ones, might have to be set for whole stretches of mankind. - In any case, if mankind is not to ruin itself through such a conscious overall government, there must first be found a knowledge of the conditions of culture surpass-

ing all previous degrees, as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. Herein lies the tremendous task of the great spirits of the next century.

26.

Reaction as progress. - Now and then there appear rugged, violent and sweeping, yet nonetheless backward spirits, who conjure up once more a bygone phase of mankind: they serve as proof that the new tendencies they oppose are not yet strong enough, that something is lacking in them: otherwise they would offer those conjurers a better resistance. Thus, for example, Luther's Reformation bears witness that in his century all the stirrings of freedom of spirit were still uncertain, tender, youthful; science could not yet raise its head. Indeed, the whole Renaissance appears like a first spring that is almost snowed under again. But in our century too, Schopenhauer's metaphysics proved that even now the scientific spirit is not yet strong enough: thus the whole medieval Christian view of the world and feeling about man could celebrate a resurrection once more in Schopenhauer's teaching, despite the long since accomplished destruction of all Christian dogmas. Much science resounds in his teaching, but it is not science that rules it, but rather the old, well-known "metaphysical need". It is certainly one of the greatest and quite inestimable advantages we gain from Schopenhauer that he temporarily forces our sensibility back into older, mighty ways of regarding the world and man, to which no path would otherwise so easily lead us. The gain for history and for justice is very great: I believe that no one today would so easily succeed, without Schopenhauer's assistance, in doing justice to Christianity and its Asiatic kindred: which, in particular, is impossible from the ground of the Christianity that still exists. Only after this great success of justice, only after we have corrected the historical way of seeing that the age of the Enlightenment brought

with it on so essential a point, may we carry onward anew the banner of the Enlightenment - the banner with the three names: Petrarch, Erasmus, Voltaire. We have made of reaction a progress.

27.

Substitute for religion. - One believes one is speaking well of a philosophy when one presents it as a substitute for religion for the people. In fact, the economy of the spirit does occasionally require transitional circles of thought; thus the passage from religion to scientific contemplation is a violent, dangerous leap, something to be advised against. To that extent one is right in that recommendation. But at last one ought also to learn that the needs which religion has satisfied and which philosophy is now to satisfy are not unchangeable; these themselves can be weakened and rooted out. Think, for example, of Christian distress of soul, the sighing over inner corruption, the anxiety for salvation - all notions that arise solely from errors of reason and deserve not satisfaction at all, but annihilation. A philosophy can be useful either by satisfying those needs too or by removing them; for they are acquired, temporally limited needs, resting upon presuppositions that contradict those of science. Here, to make a transition, art is far rather to be employed, in order to relieve a mind overladen with feelings; for those notions are far less nourished by it than by a metaphysical philosophy. From art one can then more easily pass over into a truly liberating philosophical science.

28.

Words in ill repute. - Away with the words optimism and pessimism, worn out to the point of nausea! For the occasion to use them is lacking more with every day: only the chatterers still have such indispensable need of them. For why in all the world should anyone wish to be an optimist, unless he has a God to defend who must have created the

best of worlds, if he himself is the good and the perfect - but what thinking person still has need of the hypothesis of a God? - But there is also no occasion whatever for a pessimistic confession of faith, unless one has an interest in annoying the advocates of God, the theologians or the theologizing philosophers, and in vigorously setting up the counter-assertion: that evil reigns, that displeasure is greater than pleasure, that the world is a botched piece of work, the appearance of an evil will to life. But who still troubles himself about the theologians now - except the theologians? - Quite apart from all theology and the struggle against it, it is obvious that the world is not good and not evil, let alone the best or the worst, and that these concepts "good" and "evil" have meaning only in relation to men, indeed perhaps are not justified even here, in the way they are commonly used: in any case we must rid ourselves of both the reviling and the glorifying view of the world.

29.

Intoxicated by the scent of the blossoms. - The ship of mankind, people think, draws ever deeper the more heavily it is laden; one believes that the more deeply man thinks, the more tenderly he feels, the more highly he esteems himself, the farther his distance from the other animals becomes - the more he appears as the genius among the animals - the nearer he will come to the real essence of the world and to knowledge of it: this he does in fact do through science, but he believes he does it still more through his religions and arts. These are indeed a blossom of the world, but in no way nearer to the root of the world than the stalk is: from them one can understand the essence of things not one whit better, although almost everyone believes so. Error has made man so deep, tender, inventive as to put forth such a blossom as religions and arts. Pure knowing would have been incapable of it. Whoever unveiled to us the essence of the world would

cause us all the most unpleasant disappointment. Not the world as thing in itself, but the world as representation (as error) is so rich in meaning, deep, wonderful, bearing happiness and unhappiness in its womb. This result leads to a philosophy of the logical denial of the world: which, by the way, can be united just as well with a practical affirmation of the world as with its opposite.

30.

Bad habits in drawing conclusions. - The most common false conclusions of men are these: a thing exists, therefore it has a right to exist. Here one infers from capacity for life to fitness, from fitness to legitimacy. Then: an opinion makes happy, therefore it is the true one; its effect is good, therefore it is itself good and true. Here one attributes to the effect the predicate gladdening, good, in the sense of useful, and now furnishes the cause with the same predicate good, but here in the sense of logically valid. The reversal of these propositions runs: a thing cannot prevail, cannot maintain itself, therefore it is wrong; an opinion torments, agitates, therefore it is false. The free spirit, who comes to know the faultiness of this kind of reasoning all too often and has to suffer from its consequences, frequently succumbs to the temptation to draw the opposite conclusions, which in general are of course just as much false conclusions: a thing cannot prevail, therefore it is good; an opinion causes distress, disquiets, therefore it is true.

31.

The illogical necessary. - Among the things that can drive a thinker to despair is the knowledge that the illogical is necessary for man, and that much good arises from the illogical. It is lodged so firmly in the passions, in language, in art, in religion, and in general in everything that lends value to life, that one cannot pull it out without thereby

damaging these beautiful things beyond repair. It is only the all too naive who can believe that the nature of man could be transformed into a purely logical one; but if there should be degrees of approximation to this goal, what would not have to be lost along this way! Even the most rational man has need, from time to time, of nature again, that is to say, of his illogical fundamental attitude towards all things.

32.

Being unjust necessary. - All judgements about the value of life have developed illogically and are therefore unjust. The impurity of the judgement lies, first, in the way the material is present, namely very incompletely; secondly, in the way the sum is formed from it; and thirdly, in the fact that every single piece of the material is in turn the result of impure knowing, and this with complete necessity. No experience of a person, for example, however close he may stand to us, can be complete, such that we would have a logical right to an overall assessment of him; all assessments are rash and must be so. Finally, the measure with which we measure, our own being, is no unalterable quantity; we have moods and fluctuations, and yet we would have to know ourselves as a fixed measure in order to assess justly the relation of any thing to ourselves. Perhaps it will follow from all this that one ought not to judge at all; if only one could live without assessing, without having aversion and inclination! - for all aversion is bound up with an assessment, and likewise all inclination. A drive towards something or away from something, without a feeling that one wants what is beneficial and avoids what is harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing assessment of the value of the goal, does not exist in man. We are from the outset illogical and therefore unjust beings, and can know this: this is one of the greatest and most irresolvable disharmonies of existence.

33.

Error about life necessary for life. - Every belief in the value and worthiness of life rests on impure thinking; it is possible solely because fellow-feeling for the universal life and suffering of mankind is very weakly developed in the individual. Even those rarer people who think beyond themselves at all keep in view not this universal life but delimited portions of it. If one knows how to direct one's attention chiefly to exceptions, I mean to the high talents and the pure souls, if one takes their coming into being as the goal of the whole development of the world and delights in their working, then one may believe in the value of life, because one thereby overlooks the other people: that is, one thinks impurely. And likewise if one does keep all people in view, but in them allows only one kind of drive, the less egoistic, to count, and excuses them with regard to the other drives: then one can again hope something of mankind as a whole and to that extent believe in the value of life: thus in this case too through impurity of thinking. But whether one behaves in this way or that, with this behaviour one is an exception among men. Now it is precisely the great majority of people who endure life without grumbling much, and thus believe in the value of existence, but precisely because each one wills and asserts himself alone, and does not step out of himself as those exceptions do: everything beyond the personal is not noticeable to them at all, or at most as a faint shadow. So the value of life for the ordinary, everyday man rests on this alone, that he takes himself to be more important than the world. The great lack of imagination from which he suffers makes him unable to feel his way into other beings, and he therefore shares as little as possible in their lot and suffering. Whoever, on the other hand, could truly share in it would have to despair of the value of life; were he to succeed in grasping and feeling within himself the collective consciousness of mankind, he would collapse with a curse upon existence, - for man-

kind as a whole has no goals, and consequently man, in contemplating the whole course of things, cannot find in it his comfort and support, but only his despair. If in everything he does he looks to the ultimate aimlessness of men, then his own activity takes on in his eyes the character of squandering. But to feel oneself as mankind (and not merely as an individual) squandered just as we see the single blossom squandered by nature is a feeling beyond all feelings. - But who is capable of it? Surely only a poet: and poets always know how to console themselves.

34.

By way of reassurance. - But does our philosophy not thus become a tragedy? Does truth not become hostile to life, to what is better? A question seems to weigh upon our tongue and yet not to want to be spoken aloud: whether one can consciously remain in untruth? or, if one must, whether death would not then be preferable? For there is no longer any "ought"; morality, insofar as it was an "ought", has indeed been annihilated by our way of looking at things just as religion has. Knowledge can allow only pleasure and displeasure, benefit and harm, to persist as motives: but how will these motives come to terms with the sense for truth? They too, after all, are bound up with errors (inasmuch as, as has been said, inclination and aversion and their very unjust measurements essentially determine our pleasure and displeasure). The whole of human life is sunk deep in untruth; the individual cannot draw it up out of this well without growing grieved at his past from the very depths, without finding his present motives, such as those of honour, absurd, and without meeting with scorn and contempt the passions that urge him on towards the future and towards a happiness within it. Is it true, would there then remain only one way of thinking, which would bring in its train despair as its personal outcome and a philosophy of destruction as its theoretical

one? - I believe that the decision as to the after-effect of knowledge is given by the temperament of a man: I could just as well imagine, besides that after-effect described above, which is possible in individual natures, another, by virtue of which a life would arise much simpler and purer of passions than the present one: so that at first, to be sure, the old motives of more vehement desire would still have strength, out of old inherited habit, but would gradually grow weaker under the influence of purifying knowledge. In the end one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproaches, heated zeal, feasting one's eyes on many things as on a spectacle of which one had hitherto only been afraid. One would be rid of emphasis and would no longer feel the goad of the thought that one is not merely nature or is more than nature. To this, of course, as has been said, would belong a good temperament, a steadfast, gentle and at bottom cheerful soul, a disposition that would not need to be on guard against malice and sudden outbursts and would carry in its utterances nothing of that growling tone and that sullen doggedness - those well-known tiresome qualities of old dogs and men who have long lain on the chain. Rather, a man from whom the ordinary fetters of life have fallen away to such a degree that he goes on living only in order to know ever better must be able to renounce, without envy or vexation, much, indeed almost everything, that has value for other men; for him that free, fearless hovering over men, customs, laws and the traditional valuations of things must suffice as the most desirable condition. The joy in this condition he gladly shares, and perhaps he has nothing else to share - wherein, to be sure, there lies one more privation, one more renunciation. But if one nevertheless wants more of him, he will, with a benevolent shake of the head, point to his brother, the free man of deeds, and perhaps not conceal a little mockery: for with that man's "freedom" there is a peculiar story.

Second Main Division.

On the History of the Moral Sensations.

35.

Advantages of psychological observation. - That reflection on the human, all too human - or, as the more learned expression has it, psychological observation - belongs among the means by which one may lighten the burden of life; that practice in this art lends presence of mind in difficult situations and entertainment in the midst of tedious surroundings; indeed, that from the thorniest and most disagreeable stretches of one's own life one may pluck maxims and feel a little better for it: this was believed, this was known - in earlier centuries. Why has this century forgotten it, when at least in Germany, indeed in Europe, the poverty of psychological observation betrays itself through many signs? Not exactly in the novel, the novella and philosophical contemplation - these are the work of exceptional human beings; more so already in the judging of public events and personalities: but above all the art of psychological dissection and computation is lacking in the society of all classes, where one speaks a great deal about men, but not at all about man. Why on earth does one let slip the richest and most harmless material for conversation? Why does one no longer even read the great masters of the psychological maxim? - for, speaking without any exaggeration: the cultivated person in Europe who has read La Rochefoucauld and those kindred to him in spirit and art is rarely to be found; and far rarer still is he who knows them and does not disparage them. Probably, however, even this unusual reader will take much less pleasure in them than the form of those artists ought to give him; for even the finest mind is not capable of duly appreciating the art of polishing maxims unless he has himself

been trained in it and has competed in it. Without such practical instruction one takes this creating and shaping to be easier than it is; one does not sense keenly enough what is successful and charming. That is why present-day readers of maxims take a relatively insignificant pleasure in them, indeed scarcely a mouthful of enjoyment, so that it goes with them just as with the ordinary viewers of cameos: who praise because they cannot love, and are quick to admire, but quicker still to run away.

36.

Objection. - Or might there be a counter-reckoning against that proposition that psychological observation belongs among the stimulants, remedies and palliatives of existence? Might one have become sufficiently convinced of the unpleasant consequences of this art to now deliberately divert the gaze of those in the process of cultivating themselves away from it? In truth, a certain blind faith in the goodness of human nature, an implanted aversion to the dissection of human actions, a kind of modesty with regard to the nakedness of the soul may really be more desirable things for the overall happiness of a human being than that quality of psychological perspicacity which is helpful in individual cases; and perhaps faith in the good, in virtuous men and actions, in an abundance of impersonal benevolence in the world, has made men better, inasmuch as it made them less mistrustful. When one imitates Plutarch's heroes with enthusiasm and feels an abhorrence at tracing doubtfully the motives of their actions, then it is not truth, to be sure, but the welfare of human society that profits thereby: psychological error and, in general, dullness in this domain help humanity forward, whereas the knowledge of truth perhaps gains more through the stimulating power of a hypothesis such as La Rochefoucauld placed at the head of the first edition of his "Sentences et maximes morales": "Ce que le monde nomme vertu n'est

d'ordinaire qu'un fantôme formé par nos passions, à qui on donne un nom honnête pour faire impunément ce qu'on veut." La Rochefoucauld and those other French masters of the examination of souls (to whom a German has lately been added, the author of the "Psychological Observations") resemble sharp-aiming marksmen who again and again hit the black of the target - but the black of human nature. Their skill arouses astonishment, but in the end a spectator who is guided not by the spirit of science but by love of humankind curses an art that seems to plant in the souls of men the sense for belittlement and suspicion.

37.

Nevertheless. - However the matter may stand with reckoning and counter-reckoning: in the present state of one particular individual science the reawakening of moral observation has become necessary, and the cruel sight of the psychological dissecting table with its knives and forceps cannot be spared mankind. For here that science commands which inquires into the origin and history of the so-called moral sensations and which, as it advances, has to pose and solve the intricate sociological problems: - the older philosophy knows nothing at all of the latter and has always evaded, with paltry excuses, the investigation of the origin and history of the moral sensations. With what consequences: that can now be surveyed very clearly, since it has been demonstrated in many instances how the errors of the greatest philosophers usually have their point of departure in a false explanation of certain human actions and sensations; how on the basis of an erroneous analysis, for example of the so-called unegoistic actions, a false ethics is erected; how, for its sake, religion and mythological mischief are then in turn called to its aid; and how finally the shadows of these murky spirits fall also into physics and the whole contemplation of the world. But if it is established that the superficiality of

psychological observation has laid the most dangerous snares for human judging and reasoning, and continually lays them anew, then what is needed now is that perseverance in labour which does not tire of heaping stone upon stone, pebble upon pebble; what is needed is the abstemious courage not to be ashamed of such modest labour and to defy every disdain of it. It is true: countless individual remarks about the human and all too human were first discovered and uttered in circles of society that were accustomed to offering every kind of sacrifice not to scientific knowledge but to a witty coquetry; and the scent of that old homeland of the moralistic maxim - a very seductive scent - has clung almost inextricably to the whole genre: so that on its account the scientific man involuntarily betrays a certain mistrust towards this genre and its seriousness. But it suffices to point to the consequences: for already it is beginning to show what results of the most serious kind are growing up on the soil of psychological observation. What, after all, is the principal proposition at which one of the boldest and coldest of thinkers, the author of the book "On the Origin of the Moral Sensations", arrives by virtue of his incisive and penetrating analyses of human action? "The moral man," he says, "stands no nearer to the intelligible (metaphysical) world than the physical man." This proposition, grown hard and keen-edged under the hammer-blow of historical knowledge, may perhaps one day, in some future or other, serve as the axe that is laid to the root of the "metaphysical need" of men - whether more to the blessing than to the curse of the general welfare, who could say? - but in any case as a proposition of the most considerable consequences, fruitful and fearful at once, and looking out into the world with that double face which all great insights have.

38.

In what respect useful. - So then: whether psychological observation brings more benefit or more harm upon mankind may remain undecided; but this much is certain, that it is necessary, because science cannot do without it. Science, however, knows no regard for ultimate purposes, any more than nature knows it: rather, just as nature now and then brings about things of the highest purposiveness without having willed them, so too genuine science, as the imitation of nature in concepts, will now and then, indeed often, further the benefit and welfare of mankind and attain what is purposive, - but likewise without having willed it. Yet whoever, at the breath of such a way of looking at things, feels all too wintry at heart has perhaps only too little fire within him: let him meanwhile look about him, and he will perceive illnesses in which ice packs are needed, and men so "kneaded together" out of glow and spirit that they can scarcely find anywhere an air cold and cutting enough for themselves. Moreover: just as all too earnest individuals and peoples have a need for frivolities, just as others, all too excitable and restless, at times require heavy, oppressive burdens for their health: should not we, the more spiritual men of an age that is visibly catching fire more and more, have to reach for every extinguishing and cooling means there is, so that we may at least remain as steady, harmless and moderate as we still are, and so perhaps one day become fit to serve this age as a mirror and as its reflection upon itself? -

39.

The fable of intelligible freedom. - The history of the sensations by virtue of which we hold someone accountable, that is, of the so-called moral sensations, runs its course in the following principal phases. At first one calls individual actions good or evil without any regard for their motives, but solely on account of their useful or harmful con-

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sequences. Soon, however, one forgets the origin of these designations and imagines that the quality "good" or "evil" inheres in actions in themselves, without regard for their consequences: by the same error according to which language designates the stone itself as hard, the tree itself as green - that is, by taking what is effect for cause. Then one places the being-good or being-evil in the motives and regards deeds in themselves as morally ambiguous. One goes further and bestows the predicate good or evil no longer upon the single motive but upon the whole nature of a man, out of which the motive grows as the plant grows out of the soil. Thus one holds man accountable in turn for his effects, then for his actions, then for his motives and finally for his nature. Now at last one discovers that this nature, too, cannot be accountable, inasmuch as it is altogether a necessary consequence and concresces out of the elements and influences of things past and present: that is, that man can be held accountable for nothing, neither for his nature, nor his motives, nor his actions, nor his effects. With this one has arrived at the knowledge that the history of the moral sensations is the history of an error, the error of accountability: which rests upon the error of the freedom of the will. -Schopenhauer, on the contrary, reasoned thus: because certain actions bring displeasure ("consciousness of guilt") in their train, there must be an accountability; for there would be no ground for this displeasure if not only all man's acting proceeded with necessity - as it does in fact proceed, and in the view of this philosopher too -, but man himself acquired his whole nature with the same necessity, - which Schopenhauer denies. From the fact of that displeasure Schopenhauer believes he can prove a freedom which man must somehow have had, not indeed in respect of his actions, but in respect of his nature: freedom, that is, to be thus or thus, not to act thus or thus. From the esse, the sphere of freedom and accountability, there follows in his opinion the operari, the sphere of strict causality, necessity and unaccountability. That displeasure, he holds, does

indeed seem to refer to the operari - and insofar it is erroneous -, but in truth it refers to the esse, which is the deed of a free will, the fundamental cause of the existence of an individual; man becomes that which he wills to become, his willing is prior to his existence. - Here the fallacy is committed of inferring from the fact of the displeasure its justification, its rational admissibility; and from that fallacy Schopenhauer arrives at his fantastic consequence of so-called intelligible freedom. But displeasure after the deed need not be rational at all: indeed it certainly is not, for it rests upon the erroneous presupposition that the deed need not necessarily have ensued. Thus: it is because man holds himself to be free, not because he is free, that he feels remorse and the stings of conscience. - Moreover, this displeasure is something one can break oneself of; in many men it is not present at all in respect of actions over which many other men feel it. It is a very changeable thing, bound up with the development of custom and culture, and perhaps present only during a relatively short span of world history. -No one is accountable for his deeds, no one for his nature; to judge is as much as to be unjust. This holds also when the individual judges himself. The proposition is as clear as sunlight, and yet here everyone prefers to retreat into shadow and untruth: out of fear of the consequences.

40.

The super-animal. - The beast in us wants to be lied to; morality is a white lie of necessity, so that we are not torn to pieces by it. Without the errors that lie in the assumptions of morality, man would have remained an animal. As it is, however, he has taken himself for something higher and imposed stricter laws upon himself. He therefore harbours a hatred against the stages that have remained nearer to animality: which explains the former contempt for the slave as a non-human, as a thing.

41.

The unchangeable character. - That character is unchangeable is not true in the strict sense; rather, this favourite proposition means only that during the short lifespan of a man the motives acting upon him usually cannot scratch deeply enough to destroy the characters engraved by many millennia. But if one imagined a man of eighty thousand years, one would have in him even an absolutely changeable character: so that an abundance of different individuals would gradually develop out of him. The brevity of human life misleads us into many erroneous assertions about the qualities of man.

42.

The order of goods and morality. – The once accepted order of rank of goods, according as a lower, higher or highest egoism desires the one thing or the other, now decides what is moral or immoral. To prefer a lower good (for example, sensual pleasure) to one more highly esteemed (for example, health) counts as immoral, as does preferring comfortable living to freedom. The order of rank of goods, however, is not fixed and the same at all times; if someone prefers revenge to justice, he is moral by the standard of an earlier culture, immoral by that of the present one. "Immoral" thus signifies that someone does not yet feel, or does not yet feel strongly enough, the higher, subtler, more spiritual motives which each new culture has brought with it: it signifies one who has lagged behind, but always only by a difference of degree. – The order of rank of goods itself is not set up and rearranged according to moral points of view; but once it has in each case been fixed, it is then decided whether an action is moral or immoral.

43.

Cruel men as those who have lagged behind. – The men who are cruel now must count for us as stages of earlier cultures that have been left over: here the mountain range of humanity for once lays bare the deeper formations which otherwise lie hidden. They are men who have lagged behind, whose brain, through all manner of accidents in the course of inheritance, has not been developed so delicately and many-sidedly. They show us what we all were, and they frighten us: but they themselves are as little accountable as a piece of granite is for being granite. In our brain, too, there must be grooves and convolutions corresponding to that disposition, just as in the form of certain human organs there are said to be memories of the fish stage. But these grooves and convolutions are no longer the bed in which the stream of our feeling now rolls.

44.

Gratitude and revenge. – The reason why the powerful man is grateful is this. His benefactor, through his benefaction, has as it were laid hands upon the sphere of the powerful man and intruded into it: now, in requital, the powerful man in turn lays hands upon the sphere of the benefactor through the act of gratitude. It is a milder form of revenge. Without having the satisfaction of gratitude, the powerful man would have shown himself powerless and would henceforth be regarded as such. That is why every society of the good, which originally means of the powerful, places gratitude among the first of duties.

– Swift tossed off the remark that men are grateful in the same proportion as they harbour revenge.

45.

Twofold prehistory of good and evil. – The concept of good and evil has a twofold prehistory: namely, first in the soul of the ruling tribes and castes. He who has the power to requite, good with good, evil with evil, and also actually practises requital, who is thus grateful and vengeful, is called good; he who is powerless and cannot requite counts as bad. As a good man one belongs to the "good", a community which has a communal feeling, because all the individuals are bound up with one another through the sense of requital. As a bad man one belongs to the "bad", to a heap of subjugated, powerless men who have no communal feeling. The good are a caste, the bad a mass like dust. Good and bad is for a time the same as noble and base, master and slave. On the other hand, one does not regard the enemy as evil: he can requite. In Homer the Trojan and the Greek are both good. Not he who inflicts harm on us, but he who is contemptible counts as bad. In the community of the good, goodness is inherited; it is impossible that a bad man should grow out of such good soil. If, nevertheless, one of the good does something unworthy of the good, one resorts to evasions; one pushes the blame, for example, onto a god, saying that he struck the good man with blindness and madness. – Then, in the soul of the oppressed, the powerless. Here every other man counts as hostile, ruthless, exploiting, cruel, cunning, be he noble or base; evil is the characteristic word for man, indeed for every living being whose existence one presupposes, for example for a god; human, divine mean the same as devilish, evil. The signs of goodness, helpfulness, pity, are received with fear as malice, as the prelude to a terrible outcome, as stupefaction and outwitting, in short as refined wickedness. With such a disposition in the individual, a commonwealth can scarcely arise, at most its crudest form: so that wherever this conception of good and evil prevails, the downfall of the individuals, of their

tribes and races, is near. – Our present morality has grown up on the soil of the ruling tribes and castes.

46.

Pity stronger than suffering. – There are cases where pity is stronger than the actual suffering. We feel it more painfully, for example, when one of our friends is guilty of something shameful than when we do it ourselves. For one thing, we believe more in the purity of his character than he does; for another, our love for him, probably precisely because of this belief, is stronger than his love for himself. Even if his egoism really suffers more by it than our egoism, inasmuch as he has to bear the ill consequences of his offence more heavily, the unegoistic in us – this word is never to be understood strictly, but only as a convenience of expression – is nonetheless more strongly affected by his guilt than the unegoistic in him.

47.

Hypochondria. – There are men who become hypochondriac out of sympathy and concern for another person; the kind of pity that arises in this way is nothing other than a sickness. So too there is a Christian hypochondria, which befalls those solitary, religiously stirred people who continually set before their eyes the suffering and death of Christ.

48.

Economy of goodness. – Goodness and love, as the most healing herbs and powers in human intercourse, are such precious finds that one might well wish these balsamic remedies to be used as economically as possible: but this is impossible. The economy of goodness is the dream of the most audacious utopians.

49.

Benevolence. – Among the small but countlessly frequent and therefore very efficacious things to which science ought to pay more attention than to the great, rare things, benevolence too is to be reckoned; I mean those expressions of friendly disposition in intercourse, that smile of the eye, those clasps of the hand, that easy contentment with which almost all human doing is ordinarily interwoven. Every teacher, every official adds this ingredient to what is his duty; it is the continual exercise of humanity, the waves of its light, as it were, in which everything grows; especially in the narrowest circle, within the family, life grows green and blossoms only through that benevolence. Good nature, friendliness, courtesy of the heart are ever-flowing emanations of the unegoistic drive and have built far more powerfully at culture than those much more famous expressions of it which are called pity, mercy and self-sacrifice. But people tend to think little of them, and in fact there is not exactly much that is unegoistic about them. The sum of these small doses is nonetheless enormous; their combined force is among the strongest of forces. – Likewise one finds much more happiness in the world than gloomy eyes see: that is, if one reckons correctly and does not forget all those moments of ease in which every day of every human life, even the most hard-pressed, is rich.

50.

Wanting to arouse pity. - La Rochefoucauld, in the most remarkable passage of his self-portrait (first printed in 1658), certainly hits upon the truth when he warns all those who possess reason against pity, when he advises leaving it to the common people, who stand in need of the passions (because they are not determined by reason) in order to be brought to the point of helping the sufferer and intervening vigorously in a misfortune; whereas pity, in his (and Plato's) judge-

ment, enfeebles the soul. To be sure, one ought to display pity, but beware of having it: for the unfortunate are, after all, so stupid that for them the display of pity constitutes the greatest good in the world. - Perhaps one can warn still more strongly against this having of pity if one conceives that need of the unfortunate not precisely as stupidity and intellectual deficiency, as a kind of mental disturbance that misfortune brings with it (and this indeed seems to be how La Rochefoucauld conceives it), but understands it as something quite different and more questionable. Rather, observe children who weep and cry in order to be pitied, and who therefore wait for the moment when their condition can catch the eye; live in the company of the sick and the mentally oppressed and ask yourself whether the eloquent lamenting and whimpering, the putting of misfortune on display, does not at bottom pursue the aim of hurting those present: the pity which these then express is a consolation for the weak and suffering insofar as they recognize by it that they still possess at least One power, in spite of all their weakness: the power to hurt. The unfortunate man gains a kind of pleasure in this feeling of superiority which the display of pity brings to his consciousness; his imagination is exalted, he is still important enough to cause the world pain. Thus the thirst for pity is a thirst for self-enjoyment, and indeed at the expense of one's fellow men; it shows man in the whole ruthlessness of his own dearest self: but not precisely in his "stupidity", as La Rochefoucauld thinks. - In social conversation three quarters of all questions are asked, of all answers given, in order to hurt the interlocutor a little; that is why so many people thirst so for society: it gives them the feeling of their strength. In such countless but very small doses, in which malice makes itself felt, it is a powerful stimulant of life: just as benevolence, spread in the same form throughout the human world, is the ever-ready remedy. - But will there be many honest people who admit that it gives pleasure to hurt? that one not infrequently amuses oneself - and amuses oneself well - by inflicting injuries on other people, at

least in thought, and firing at them the buckshot of petty malice? Most are too dishonest, and a few people are too good, to know anything of this pudendum; these may therefore go on denying that Prosper Mérimée is right when he says: "Sachez aussi qu'il n'y a rien de plus commun que de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le faire."

51.

How seeming becomes being. - The actor in the end cannot stop thinking, even in the deepest grief, of the impression made by his person and of the overall scenic effect, for example even at the funeral of his child; he will weep over his own grief and its expressions, as his own spectator. The hypocrite who always plays one and the same role ceases in the end to be a hypocrite; for example priests, who as young men are usually hypocrites, consciously or unconsciously, become natural in the end and are then really, without any affectation, simply priests; or if the father does not get so far, then perhaps the son, who makes use of his father's head start and inherits his habituation. If someone wants to seem something for a very long time and with obstinacy, it becomes hard for him in the end to be anything else. The vocation of almost every man, even of the artist, begins with hypocrisy, with an imitating from the outside, with a copying of what is effective. He who always wears the mask of friendly looks must in the end gain a power over benevolent moods without which the expression of friendliness cannot be forced, - and in the end these in turn gain power over him, he is benevolent.

52.

The point of honesty in deception. — In all great deceivers a process is noteworthy to which they owe their power. In the actual act of deception, amid all the preparations, the thrilling and awful in voice, expression, gesture, in the midst of the effective scenery, they are

overcome by belief in themselves: it is this that then speaks so miraculously and compellingly to those around them. The founders of religions differ from those great deceivers in that they never emerge from this state of self-deception: or else they have, very rarely, those clearer moments when doubt overpowers them; usually, however, they console themselves by ascribing these clearer moments to the evil adversary. Self-deception must be present if the one and the other are to produce a grand effect. For men believe in the truth of whatever is visibly believed with strength.

53.

Alleged stages of truth. — One of the common false inferences is this: because someone is truthful and sincere towards us, he speaks the truth. Thus the child believes the judgements of its parents, the Christian the assertions of the founder of the church. In the same way people refuse to admit that all that which men in earlier centuries defended at the sacrifice of happiness and life was nothing but errors: perhaps, they say, these were stages of truth. But at bottom they mean that if someone honestly believed in something and fought for his belief and died, it would surely be all too unfair if what had inspired him were in truth only an error. Such an occurrence seems to contradict eternal justice; therefore the heart of feeling men decrees again and again, against their head, the proposition: between moral actions and intellectual insights there must absolutely be a necessary bond. Alas, it is otherwise; for there is no eternal justice.

54.

The lie. — Why is it that in everyday life men for the most part tell the truth? — Certainly not because a god has forbidden lying. But firstly: because it is more convenient; for the lie demands invention, dissimulation and memory. (Which is why Swift says: he who tells a

lie seldom notices the heavy burden he takes on; for in order to maintain one lie he must invent twenty others.) Then: because in simple circumstances it is advantageous to say directly: I want this, I have done this, and the like; that is, because the way of compulsion and authority is surer than that of cunning. — But if a child has once been brought up in complicated domestic circumstances, it handles the lie just as naturally and involuntarily always says that which corresponds to its interest; a sense for truth, an aversion to the lie as such, is quite foreign and inaccessible to it, and so it lies in all innocence.

55.

Casting suspicion on morality on account of belief. — No power can maintain itself when it is represented by nothing but hypocrites; however many "worldly" elements the Catholic Church may possess, its strength rests on those priestly natures, still numerous even now, who make life hard and deeply meaningful for themselves, and whose gaze and careworn body speak of night vigils, fasting, ardent prayer, perhaps even of scourging; these shake men and make them afraid: what if it were necessary to live thus? — this is the dreadful question that the sight of them lays upon the tongue. By spreading this doubt they lay again and again a pillar of their power; even the freethinking do not dare to oppose one so selfless with a hard sense of truth and to say: "Deceived one, do not deceive!" — Only the difference of insights separates them from him, by no means any difference of goodness or badness; but what one does not like, one is usually wont to treat unjustly as well. Thus people speak of the cunning and the infamous art of the Jesuits, but overlook what self-overcoming each individual Jesuit imposes upon himself, and how the eased practice of life which the Jesuit textbooks preach is meant to benefit not them at all but the laity. Indeed one may ask whether we enlightened ones, with exactly

the same tactics and organization, would be such good instruments, just as admirable in self-conquest, tirelessness, devotion.

56.

Victory of knowledge over radical evil. — It brings a rich gain to him who wishes to become wise to have held for a time the notion of man as thoroughly evil and depraved: it is false, like the opposite one; but for whole stretches of time it held dominion, and its roots have branched out even into us and our world. To comprehend ourselves we must comprehend it; but then, in order to climb higher, we must climb beyond it. We then recognize that there are no sins in the metaphysical sense; but, in the same sense, no virtues either; that this whole realm of moral notions is perpetually in flux, that there are higher and deeper concepts of good and evil, moral and immoral. He who desires not much more of things than knowledge of them easily brings his soul to rest and will at most go astray (or sin, as the world calls it) out of ignorance, but hardly out of covetousness. He will no longer wish to brand the desires as heretical and root them out; but his one goal, which wholly governs him, to know as well as possible at all times, will make him cool and soothe all the wildness in his disposition. Moreover, he has rid himself of a host of tormenting notions; he no longer feels anything at the words punishments of hell, sinfulness, incapacity for good: he recognizes in them only the vanishing shadow-images of false views of the world and of life.

57.

Morality as man's self-division. — A good author who truly has his heart in his subject wishes that someone would come and annihilate him himself by presenting the same subject more clearly and answering the questions contained in it without remainder. The girl in love wishes that she might prove the devoted faithfulness of her love

against the faithlessness of her beloved. The soldier wishes that he might fall on the battlefield for his victorious fatherland: for in the victory of his fatherland his highest wish is victorious too. The mother gives the child what she withholds from herself, sleep, the best food, under certain circumstances her health, her fortune. — But are all these unegoistic states? Are these deeds of morality miracles because they are, in Schopenhauer's phrase, "impossible and yet real"? Is it not clear that in all these cases man loves something of himself, a thought, a longing, a creation, more than something else of himself, that he therefore divides his being and sacrifices the one part to the other? Is it something essentially different when a stubborn fellow says: "I would rather be shot down than step one pace out of the way for that man there"? — The inclination towards something (wish, drive, longing) is present in all the cases named; to yield to it, with all its consequences, is in any case not "unegoistic". — In morality man treats himself not as individuum but as dividuum.

58.

What one can promise. - One can promise actions, but not feelings; for these are involuntary. Whoever promises someone to love him always, or always to hate him, or always to be faithful to him, promises something that does not lie in his power; but he can well promise such actions as are, to be sure, usually the consequences of love, of hatred, of faithfulness, but which can also spring from other motives: for several paths and motives lead to an action. The promise to love someone always therefore means: as long as I love you, I shall show you the actions of love; if I no longer love you, you will nonetheless continue to receive the same actions from me, though from other motives: so that the semblance persists in the heads of our fellow men that the love is unchanged and still the same. - One therefore

promises the continuance of the semblance of love when, without self-deception, one vows everlasting love to someone.

59.

Intellect and morality. - One must have a good memory to be able to keep the promises one has given. One must have a strong power of imagination to be able to feel pity. So closely is morality bound to the quality of the intellect.

60.

Wanting to take revenge and - taking revenge. - To have a thought of revenge and to carry it out means to suffer a violent attack of fever, which, however, passes: but to have a thought of revenge without the strength and courage to carry it out means to carry about with one a chronic ailment, a poisoning of body and soul. Morality, which looks only to intentions, assesses both cases alike; ordinarily one assesses the first case as the worse (because of the evil consequences that the deed of revenge may perhaps bring in its train). Both estimations are short-sighted.

61.

Being able to wait. - Being able to wait is so hard that the greatest poets have not disdained to make the inability to wait the motif of their poetry. So Shakespeare in Othello, Sophocles in Ajax: whose suicide would no longer have seemed necessary to him had he let his feeling cool for just one more day, as the oracle's pronouncement intimates; probably he would have snapped his fingers at the terrible whisperings of wounded vanity and said to himself - who, in my situation, has not at some time taken a sheep for a hero? is it then something so monstrous? On the contrary, it is only something universally

human: Ajax might have consoled himself in this way. Passion will not wait; the tragic element in the lives of great men lies frequently not in their conflict with their age and the baseness of their fellow men, but in their inability to postpone their work by a year, by two years; they cannot wait. - In all duels the advising friends have to establish this one thing: whether the persons involved are still able to wait: if this is not the case, then a duel is reasonable, inasmuch as each of the two says to himself: "either I go on living, and then that man must die at once, or the reverse." To wait would in such a case mean to suffer still longer that fearful torment of wounded honour in the face of the one who wounded it; and this can indeed be more suffering than life as a whole is worth.

62.

Revelling in revenge. - Coarse people who feel themselves insulted are wont to take the degree of the insult as high as possible and to recount its cause in greatly exaggerated words, only so that they may revel to their heart's content in the feeling of hatred and revenge once it has been aroused.

63.

Value of belittlement. - Not a few, perhaps the very great majority of men, in order to maintain in themselves their self-respect and a certain capability in action, have absolute need to disparage and belittle in their imagination all the people they know. But since the lesser natures are in the majority, and since a very great deal depends on whether they possess or lose that capability, therefore -

64.

The hot-tempered man. - One should be on one's guard against someone who flares up at us, as against someone who has once sought our life: for that we are still alive is due to the absence of the power to kill; if looks sufficed, it would long since have been all over with us. It is a piece of crude culture to reduce someone to silence by letting physical savagery become visible, by inspiring fear. - Likewise that cold look which persons of rank have towards their servants is a remnant of those caste-like demarcations between man and man, a piece of crude antiquity; women, the preservers of the old, have preserved this survival too more faithfully.

65.

Where honesty can lead. - Someone had the bad habit of occasionally speaking quite honestly about the motives from which he acted, and which were as good and as bad as the motives of all men. He aroused first offence, then suspicion, was gradually downright proscribed and declared an outlaw of society, until at last justice remembered so depraved a creature on occasions when it otherwise had no eye, or shut that eye. The lack of reticence about the general secret and the irresponsible inclination to see what no one wants to see - oneself - brought him to prison and an early death.

66.

Punishable, never punished. - Our crime against criminals consists in our treating them like scoundrels.

67.

Sancta simplicitas of virtue. - Every virtue has privileges: for example this one, of contributing its own little bundle of wood to the pyre of one condemned.

68.

Morality and success. - It is not only the spectators of a deed who frequently measure what is moral or immoral in it by its success: no, the doer himself does so. For motives and intentions are seldom clear and simple enough, and at times even memory seems clouded by the success of the deed, so that one foists false motives upon one's own deed or treats the inessential motives as essential. Success often gives a deed the full honest lustre of a good conscience; failure lays the shadow of remorse over the most estimable action. From this follows the well-known practice of the politician who thinks: "only give me success: with it I have also brought all honest souls over to my side - and made myself honest in my own eyes." - In a similar way success is supposed to take the place of better grounds. Even now many educated people believe that the victory of Christianity over Greek philosophy is a proof of the greater truth of the former, - although in this case it was merely the coarser and more violent that triumphed over the more spiritual and delicate. How matters stand with the greater truth may be seen from the fact that the awakening sciences have connected themselves point by point with Epicurus' philosophy, but have rejected Christianity point by point.

69.

Love and justice. - Why does one overrate love to the disadvantage of justice and say the most beautiful things about it, as though it were a far higher being than the latter? Is it not plainly more stupid than

justice? - Certainly, but precisely for that reason so much the more agreeable to everyone. It is stupid and possesses a rich cornucopia; from it it distributes its gifts to everyone, even if he does not deserve them, indeed does not even thank it for them. It is impartial like the rain, which, according to the Bible and to experience, soaks to the skin not only the unjust but, in certain circumstances, the just as well.

70.

Execution. - How is it that every execution offends us more than a murder? It is the coldness of the judges, the painstaking preparation, the realization that here a human being is being used as a means to deter others. For it is not the guilt that is punished, even if there were any: that lies in educators, parents, surroundings, in us, not in the murderer, - I mean the occasioning circumstances.

71.

Hope. - Pandora brought the jar containing the evils and opened it. It was the gift of the gods to men, outwardly a beautiful, seductive gift, and named the "jar of good fortune". Then out flew all the evils, living winged creatures: from that time on they roam about and do harm to men by day and night. One single evil had not yet slipped out of the jar: then, by the will of Zeus, Pandora slammed the lid shut, and so it remained inside. Forever now man has the jar of good fortune in his house and thinks what a marvellous treasure he has in it; it stands at his service, he reaches for it whenever he feels the desire; for he does not know that the jar Pandora brought was the jar of evils, and he takes the evil that remained behind for the greatest of blessings, - it is hope. - For Zeus wanted man, however much tormented by the other evils, nevertheless not to throw his life away, but to go on letting himself be tormented again and again. To that end he gives man hope:

in truth it is the most evil of evils, because it prolongs the torment of men.

72.

Degree of moral inflammability unknown. - Whether our passions reach white heat and steer our whole life or not depends on whether we have or have not had certain shattering sights and impressions, for example of a father unjustly sentenced, killed or tortured, of an unfaithful wife, of a cruel enemy attack. No one knows to what circumstances, pity, indignation may drive him; he does not know the degree of his inflammability. Wretched petty conditions make one wretched; it is usually not the quality of experiences but their quantity on which the lower and the higher man depend, in good and in evil.

73.

The martyr against his will. - In a party there was a man who was too anxious and cowardly ever to contradict his comrades: he was used for every service, everything was obtained from him, because he feared a bad opinion among his fellows more than death; he was a wretched, weak soul. They recognized this, and on the strength of the qualities mentioned they made a hero of him and finally even a martyr. Although the cowardly man always said No inwardly, with his lips he always said yes, even on the scaffold, as he died for the views of his party: for beside him stood one of his old comrades, who so tyrannized him by word and look that he actually suffered death in the most decent manner and has since been celebrated as a martyr and a great character.

74.

Everyday yardstick. - One will seldom go wrong if one traces extreme actions back to vanity, mediocre ones to habit, and petty ones to fear.

75.

Misunderstanding about virtue. - Whoever has come to know vice in connection with pleasure, like one who has a pleasure-seeking youth behind him, imagines that virtue must be connected with displeasure. Whoever, on the other hand, has been sorely plagued by his passions and vices longs to find in virtue the peace and happiness of the soul. Hence it is possible that two virtuous people do not understand each other at all.

76.

The ascetic. - The ascetic makes a necessity of virtue.

77.

Honour transferred from the person to the cause. - Acts of love and sacrifice for the benefit of one's neighbour are generally honoured, wherever they appear. In this way one increases the esteem for the things which are loved in that manner or for which one sacrifices oneself: although perhaps in themselves they are not worth much. A brave army convinces people of the cause for which it fights.

78.

Ambition a surrogate for moral feeling. - Moral feeling must not be lacking in those natures which have no ambition. The ambitious manage even without it, with almost equal success. - That is why sons

from modest families averse to ambition, once they lose their moral feeling, usually turn by rapid degrees into complete scoundrels.

79.

Vanity enriches. - How poor the human spirit would be without vanity! As it is, however, it resembles a well-stocked and ever-replenished warehouse that lures buyers of every kind: almost everything they can find, everything they can have, provided that they bring with them the valid currency (admiration).

80.

Old man and death. - Leaving aside the demands made by religion, one may well ask: why should it be more glorious for a man grown old, who feels his powers declining, to await his slow exhaustion and dissolution than to set himself a term in full consciousness? Suicide is in this case an entirely natural and obvious action, which, as a victory of reason, ought in fairness to awaken reverence: and did awaken it, in those times when the heads of Greek philosophy and the most valiant Roman patriots were wont to die by suicide. The craving, on the other hand, to eke out one's existence from day to day with anxious consultation of physicians and the most painstaking manner of living, without the strength to come any closer to the actual goal of life, is far less worthy of respect. - Religions are rich in evasions of the demand for suicide: by this means they ingratiate themselves with those who are in love with life.

81.

Errors of the sufferer and of the doer. - When the rich man takes a possession from the poor man (for example, a prince takes the beloved of a plebeian), an error arises in the poor man; he thinks the

other must be utterly wicked to take from him the little he has. But the other does not feel the value of a single possession nearly so deeply, because he is accustomed to having many: thus he cannot put himself in the soul of the poor man and does not do nearly so great a wrong as the latter believes. Each has a false idea of the other. The injustice of the powerful, which most provokes indignation in history, is not nearly so great as it seems. The inherited feeling alone of being a higher being with higher claims makes one rather cold and leaves the conscience at rest: indeed all of us, when the difference between ourselves and another being is very great, no longer feel anything at all of injustice, and kill a gnat, for example, without any pang of conscience. So it is no sign of wickedness in Xerxes (whom even all the Greeks portray as outstandingly noble) when he takes from a father his son and has him cut to pieces because the father had expressed an anxious, ominous mistrust of the whole expedition: the individual in this case is disposed of like an unpleasant insect; he stands too low to be permitted to arouse tormenting feelings any longer in a ruler of the world. Indeed, no cruel man is cruel to the degree that the one he mistreats believes; the idea of pain is not the same as the suffering of it. It is the same with the unjust judge, with the journalist who leads public opinion astray with small dishonesties. Cause and effect are in all these cases surrounded by quite different groups of feelings and thoughts; whereas one involuntarily presupposes that doer and sufferer think and feel alike, and in accordance with this presupposition measures the guilt of the one by the pain of the other.

82.

Skin of the soul. - As the bones, pieces of flesh, entrails and blood vessels are enclosed in a skin that makes the sight of man bearable, so the stirrings and passions of the soul are wrapped in vanity: it is the skin of the soul.

83.

Sleep of virtue. - When virtue has slept, it will rise up fresher.

84.

Subtlety of shame. - People are not ashamed of thinking something filthy, but they are indeed ashamed when they imagine that others credit them with these filthy thoughts.

85.

Malice is rare. - Most people are far too occupied with themselves to be malicious.

86.

The tongue of the balance. - We praise or blame according as the one or the other gives more opportunity to let our power of judgement shine.

87.

Luke 18:14 improved. - He that humbleth himself wishes to be exalted.

88.

Prevention of suicide. - There is a right by which we take a man's life, but none by which we take from him his dying: this is mere cruelty.

89.

Vanity. - We care about the good opinion of people, first because it is useful to us, and then because we wish to give them joy (children their parents, pupils their teachers, and benevolent people in general

all other people). Only where someone sets store by the good opinion of people apart from advantage or from his wish to give joy do we speak of vanity. In this case the person wishes to give himself a joy, but at the expense of his fellow men, either by seducing them into a false opinion about himself or even by aiming at a degree of "good opinion" at which it must become painful to all others (by arousing envy). The individual usually wishes, through the opinion of others, to authenticate the opinion he has of himself and to confirm it before himself; but the powerful habituation to authority - a habituation as old as man - also leads many to rest their own belief in themselves upon authority, that is, to receive it first from the hand of others: they trust the judgement of others more than their own. - Interest in oneself, the wish to please oneself, reaches such a height in the vain man that he seduces others into a false, all too high valuation of himself and then nonetheless holds to the authority of others: thus he brings about the error and yet puts faith in it. - One must therefore admit that vain people wish to please not so much others as themselves, and that they go so far as to neglect their own advantage in doing so; for they are often concerned to dispose their fellow men unfavourably, hostilely, enviously, and thus harmfully towards them, merely in order to have joy in themselves, self-enjoyment.

90.

Limit of love of mankind. - Everyone who has declared that another is a blockhead, a bad fellow, is annoyed when the latter finally shows that he is not.

91.

Moralité larmoyante. - How much pleasure morality gives! Only think what a sea of agreeable tears has already flowed at the telling of noble,

magnanimous deeds! - This charm of life would vanish if belief in complete unaccountability were to gain the upper hand.

92.

Origin of justice. - Justice (equity) has its origin among those of roughly equal power, as Thucydides (in the terrible dialogue between the Athenian and Melian envoys) rightly grasped; where there is no clearly recognizable superior force and a struggle would turn into fruitless mutual damage, there arises the thought of coming to an understanding and negotiating over the claims of both sides: the character of exchange is the original character of justice. Each satisfies the other, in that each receives what he values more than the other does. One gives to each what he wants to have as henceforth his own, and receives in return what one desires. Justice is therefore requital and exchange under the presupposition of a roughly equal position of power: thus revenge originally belongs within the domain of justice; it is an exchange. Likewise gratitude. - Justice naturally goes back to the standpoint of a prudent self-preservation, that is, to the egoism of that reflection: "why should I harm myself uselessly and perhaps not reach my goal after all?" - So much for the origin of justice. Because men, in accordance with their intellectual habit, have forgotten the original purpose of so-called just, equitable actions, and especially because for thousands of years children have been trained to admire and imitate such actions, there has gradually arisen the appearance that a just action is an unegoistic one: upon this appearance, however, rests the high esteem in which it is held, which moreover, like all esteem, is still continually growing: for something highly esteemed is striven for with sacrifice, imitated, multiplied, and grows through the fact that the value of the effort and zeal expended by each individual is added on to the value of the esteemed thing. - How little moral the world would look without forgetfulness! A poet might say that God

had set forgetfulness down as doorkeeper at the temple threshold of human dignity.

93.

On the right of the weaker. – When someone submits on conditions to one more powerful, a besieged city for example, the counter-condition is that one can destroy oneself, burn the city, and so inflict a great loss upon the powerful one. Hence there arises here a kind of equalization, on the basis of which rights can be established. The enemy has his advantage in preservation. – To this extent there are also rights between slaves and masters, that is to say, precisely in the measure in which the possession of the slave is useful and important to his master. Right originally extends as far as one appears to the other valuable, essential, not to be lost, invincible and the like. In this respect the weaker one, too, still has rights, but lesser ones. Hence the famous unusquisque tantum juris habet, quantum potentia valet (or more precisely: quantum potentia valere creditur).

94.

The three phases of morality hitherto. – It is the first sign that the animal has become man when his actions no longer relate to momentary well-being but to lasting well-being, when man, that is, becomes useful, purposive: – there for the first time the free dominion of reason breaks forth. A still higher stage is reached when he acts according to the principle of honour; by virtue of it he takes his place in an order, submits to common sensations, and that raises him high above the phase in which he was guided only by usefulness understood personally: he respects and wishes to be respected, that is to say: he comprehends advantage as dependent upon what he thinks of others and what others think of him. Finally, at the highest stage of morality hitherto, he acts according to his own standard of things and

men; he himself determines for himself and for others what is honourable, what is useful; he has become the lawgiver of opinions, in accordance with the ever more highly developed concept of the useful and the honourable. Knowledge enables him to place the most useful, that is, the general lasting advantage, before the personal, and honouring recognition of general lasting validity before the momentary; he lives and acts as a collective individual.

95.

Morality of the mature individual. – Hitherto the impersonal has been regarded as the true distinguishing mark of the moral action; and it has been shown that in the beginning it was out of regard for the general utility that all impersonal actions were praised and distinguished. Should not a significant transformation of these views be imminent, now that it is ever better understood that it is precisely in the most personal possible regard that the advantage for the general is also greatest: so that precisely strictly personal action corresponds to the present concept of morality (as a general usefulness)? To make of oneself a whole person and in all that one does to keep that person's highest good in view – this gets one further than those pitying impulses and actions on behalf of others. We all, to be sure, still suffer from far too little attention to what is personal in us; it is poorly developed – let us admit it to ourselves: rather, our minds have been forcibly drawn away from it and offered up as a sacrifice to the state, to science, to those in need of help, as though it were the bad that had to be sacrificed. Even now we are willing to work for our fellow men, but only so far as we find our own highest advantage in this work, no more, no less. Everything depends only on what one understands by one's advantage; precisely the immature, undeveloped, crude individual will also understand it most crudely.

96.

Custom and moral. – To be moral, ethical, to act according to custom means to render obedience to a law or tradition founded of old. Whether one submits to it with difficulty or gladly is a matter of indifference here; it is enough that one does so. "Good" is the name given to him who, as if by nature, after long inheritance, hence easily and gladly, does what is moral, whatever that may be (for example, takes revenge, when taking revenge, as among the older Greeks, belongs to good custom). He is called good because he is good "for something"; but since benevolence, pity and the like have, amid the changing of customs, always been felt to be "good for something", to be useful, it is now chiefly the benevolent, the helpful man who is called "good". Evil is to be "not moral" (immoral), to practise what is against custom, to resist tradition, however reasonable or foolish it may be; harming one's neighbour, however, has in all the moral laws of the various ages been felt above all to be harmful, so that now at the word "evil" we think chiefly of the voluntary harming of one's neighbour. It is not the "egoistic" and the "unegoistic" that is the fundamental antithesis which has brought men to distinguish between moral and immoral, good and evil, but rather: being bound to a tradition, a law, and being released from it. How the tradition arose is a matter of indifference here, at all events without regard for good and evil or any immanent categorical imperative, but above all for the purpose of preserving a community, a people; every superstitious usage that has arisen on the basis of some misinterpreted chance event compels a tradition which it is moral to follow; for to release oneself from it is dangerous, still more harmful for the community than for the individual (because the deity punishes the sacrilege and every violation of its prerogatives upon the community, and only to that extent upon the individual as well). Now every tradition grows continually more venerable the further its origin lies back, the more this is forgotten;

the veneration paid to it accumulates from generation to generation, the tradition at last becomes holy and awakens awe; and thus in any case the morality of piety is a far older morality than that which demands unegoistic actions.

97.

Pleasure in custom. – An important species of pleasure, and thereby of the source of morality, arises from habit. What is habitual one does more easily, better, hence more gladly; one feels a pleasure in it, and knows from experience that the habitual has proved itself, is therefore useful; a custom with which one can live has been proven salutary, beneficial, in contrast to all new attempts not yet proven. Custom is accordingly the union of the agreeable and the useful; moreover it requires no reflection. As soon as man can exercise compulsion, he exercises it in order to enforce and introduce his customs, for to him they are proven wisdom of life. Likewise a community of individuals compels each one of them to the same custom. Here lies the false conclusion: because one feels well with a custom, or at least because by means of it one secures one's existence, this custom is necessary, for it counts as the sole possibility under which one can feel well; the sense of well-being in life seems to grow out of it alone. This conception of the habitual as a condition of existence is carried through down to the smallest details of custom: since insight into real causality is very slight among peoples and cultures standing at a low level, they watch with superstitious fear that everything should go its same course; even where custom is heavy, harsh, burdensome, it is preserved for the sake of its apparently supreme usefulness. One does not know that the same degree of well-being can also exist under other customs, and that even higher degrees can be attained. But one does perceive that all customs, even the harshest, become more agree-

able and milder with time, and that even the strictest way of life can become habit and thereby pleasure.

98.

Pleasure and social instinct. - From his relations with other men, man gains a new kind of pleasure in addition to those sensations of pleasure which he takes from himself; whereby he makes the realm of the sensation of pleasure as a whole considerably more extensive. Perhaps he has already inherited a good deal of what belongs here from the animals, which visibly feel pleasure when they play with one another, especially mothers with their young. Then let one bear in mind the sexual relations, which make roughly every female appear interesting to every male with regard to pleasure, and vice versa. The sensation of pleasure on the basis of human relations makes man better on the whole; shared joy, pleasure enjoyed together, heightens it, gives the individual security, makes him more good-natured, dissolves mistrust and envy: for one feels well oneself and sees the other feeling well in the same way. Similar expressions of pleasure awaken the fantasy of fellow-feeling, the feeling of being something alike: the same is done by shared sufferings, by the same storms, dangers, enemies. Upon this, then, the oldest alliance is presumably built: whose meaning is the common removal and warding off of a threatening displeasure for the benefit of each individual. And thus the social instinct grows out of pleasure.

99.

The innocence in so-called evil actions. - All "evil" actions are motivated by the drive for preservation or, more precisely still, by the individual's aim at pleasure and avoidance of displeasure; motivated in this way, but not evil. "Causing pain in itself" does not exist, except in the brains of philosophers, any more than "causing pleasure in

itself" (pity in the Schopenhauerian sense). In the condition before the state we kill the creature, be it ape or man, that wants to snatch a fruit of the tree from us just when we are hungry and running towards the tree: as we would still do today with an animal when wandering through inhospitable regions. - The evil actions which now outrage us most rest on the error that the other who inflicts them upon us has free will, that is, that it lay within his discretion not to do us this harm. This belief in discretion arouses hatred, the lust for revenge, malice, the whole deterioration of the imagination, whereas we are far less angry with an animal, because we regard it as unaccountable. To do harm not from the drive for preservation but for requital - is the consequence of a false judgement and therefore likewise innocent. In the condition that lies before the state, the individual can treat other creatures harshly and cruelly in order to deter them: to secure his existence through such deterrent proofs of his power. Thus acts the violent man, the mighty man, the original founder of states, who subjugates the weaker. He has the right to do so, as the state still takes it for itself today; or rather: there is no right that can prevent it. The ground for all morality can only be prepared once a greater individual or a collective individual, for example society, the state, subjugates the individuals, that is, draws them out of their isolation and orders them into an association. Compulsion precedes morality, indeed morality itself is for a time still compulsion, to which one submits in order to avoid displeasure. Later it becomes custom, later still free obedience, finally almost instinct: then, like everything long accustomed and natural, it is bound up with pleasure - and is now called virtue.

100.

Shame. - Shame exists everywhere there is a "mystery"; but this is a religious concept which, in the older age of human culture, had a

great range. Everywhere there were bounded domains to which divine right denied access, except under certain conditions: first of all quite spatially, inasmuch as certain places were not to be trodden by the foot of the uninitiated, who felt shudders and dread in their vicinity. This feeling was in many ways transferred to other relations, for example to sexual relations, which, as a privilege and adyton of maturer age, were to be withdrawn from the gaze of youth, to its advantage: relations for whose protection and sanctification many gods were thought to be active and to be posted as guardians in the marriage chamber. (In Turkish, therefore, this chamber is called harem, "sanctuary", and is thus designated by the same word that is customary for the forecourts of mosques.) Thus kingship, as a centre from which power and splendour radiate, is for the subject a mystery full of secrecy and shame: many after-effects of which can still be felt today among peoples who otherwise by no means belong to the bashful. Likewise the whole world of inner states, the so-called "soul", is even now a mystery for all non-philosophers, after it had for endless ages been believed to be of divine origin, worthy of intercourse with the divine: it is accordingly an adyton and awakens shame.

101.

Judge not. - One must beware, in contemplating earlier periods, of falling into unjust abuse. The injustice in slavery, the cruelty in the subjugation of persons and peoples, is not to be measured by our standard. For at that time the instinct for justice was not yet so far developed. Who may reproach Calvin of Geneva for the burning of the physician Servetus? It was a consistent action flowing from his convictions, and the Inquisition likewise had good right; only the prevailing views were false and yielded a consequence which seems harsh to us because those views have become foreign to us. Besides, what is the burning of a single person compared with eternal punishments of

hell for almost everyone! And yet this notion at that time ruled all the world, without doing any essential damage, with its far greater terribleness, to the notion of a God. Among us too political sectarians are treated harshly and cruelly, but because people have learned to believe in the necessity of the state, the cruelty is not felt here so much as there, where we reject the views. The cruelty towards animals in children and Italians goes back to a lack of understanding; the animal has been set too far back behind man, chiefly through the interests of church doctrine. - Much, too, that is terrible and inhuman in history, which one would scarcely wish to believe, is mitigated by the consideration that the one who commands and the one who carries out are different persons: the former does not have the sight and therefore not the strong impression on the imagination, the latter obeys a superior and feels himself unaccountable. Most princes and military chiefs, from lack of imagination, easily appear cruel and harsh without being so. - Egoism is not evil, because the notion of the "neighbour" - the word is of Christian origin and does not correspond to the truth - is very weak in us; and we feel ourselves almost as free and unaccountable towards him as towards plant and stone. That the other suffers has to be learned: and it can never be fully learned.

102.

"Man always acts well." – We do not accuse nature of being immoral when it sends us a thunderstorm and makes us wet: why do we call the man who does harm immoral? Because here we assume a free will ruling arbitrarily, there necessity. But this distinction is an error. Furthermore: even intentional harm we do not call immoral under all circumstances; one kills a gnat, for example, without scruple and on purpose, merely because its singing displeases us; one punishes the criminal on purpose and inflicts suffering on him, in order to protect ourselves and society. In the first case it is the individual who inten-

tionally inflicts suffering in order to preserve himself, or even merely to spare himself displeasure; in the second it is the state. All morality admits intentional harm-doing in self-defence: that is, when it is a matter of self-preservation! But these two points of view suffice to explain all evil actions practised by men against men: one wants pleasure for oneself, or wants to ward off displeasure; in some sense it is always a matter of self-preservation. Socrates and Plato are right: whatever man does, he always does the good, that is to say: that which seems to him good (useful), according to the degree of his intellect, the measure of his rationality at the time.

103.

The harmlessness in malice. – Malice does not have as its goal the suffering of the other in itself, but our own enjoyment, for example as a feeling of revenge or as a stronger excitement of the nerves. Every bit of teasing already shows what pleasure it gives to vent our power upon another and to attain the pleasurable feeling of superiority. Is it, then, the immoral element in this to have pleasure on the basis of the displeasure of others? Is gloating devilish, as Schopenhauer says? Now, in nature we give ourselves pleasure by breaking off branches, loosening stones, fighting with wild animals, and indeed in order thereby to become conscious of our strength. Is the knowledge that another suffers through us supposed here to make immoral the very same thing with regard to which we otherwise feel ourselves unaccountable? But if one did not know this, one would not have the pleasure in one's own superiority either; this can make itself known only in the suffering of the other, for example in teasing. All pleasure in oneself is neither good nor evil; whence should come the stipulation that, in order to have pleasure in oneself, one may not arouse displeasure in others? Solely from the point of view of utility, that is, out of regard for the consequences, for possible displeasure, if the

injured party or the state acting in his stead gives reason to expect punishment and revenge: only this can originally have furnished the reason for denying oneself such actions. – Pity has just as little the pleasure of the other as its goal as, as has been said, malice has the pain of the other in itself. For it harbours within it at least two (perhaps more) elements of a personal pleasure and is in this way self-enjoyment: first as the pleasure of emotion, of which kind is pity in tragedy, and then, when it drives to action, as the pleasure of satisfaction in the exercise of power. If, moreover, a suffering person stands very close to us, then by performing acts of pity we relieve ourselves of a suffering. – Apart from a few philosophers, men have always placed pity rather low in the order of moral sensations: rightly so.

104.

Self-defence. – If one admits self-defence as moral at all, then one must also admit almost all the expressions of so-called immoral egoism: one inflicts suffering, robs or kills in order to preserve oneself or to protect oneself, to forestall personal calamity; one lies where cunning and dissimulation are the right means of self-preservation. Intentional harm, when it is a matter of our existence or security (the preservation of our well-being), is conceded to be moral; the state itself does harm from this point of view when it imposes punishments. In unintentional harm the immoral can of course not lie; there chance rules. Is there, then, a kind of intentional harm where it is not a matter of our existence, of the preservation of our well-being? Is there harm-doing out of pure malice, for example in cruelty? If one does not know how much an action hurts, then it is no act of malice; thus the child is not malicious, not evil towards the animal: it examines and destroys it like its toy. But does one ever know completely how much an action hurts another? As far as our nervous system

reaches, we guard ourselves against pain: if it reached further, namely into our fellow men, we would do no harm to anyone (except in those cases where we do it to ourselves, that is, where we cut ourselves for the sake of healing, toil and exert ourselves for the sake of health). We infer by analogy that something hurts someone, and through memory and the strength of imagination we ourselves may be made ill by it. But what a difference always remains between the toothache and the pain (pity) which the sight of the toothache calls forth! Thus: in harm-doing out of so-called malice the degree of the pain produced is in any case unknown to us; but insofar as there is pleasure in the action (the feeling of one's own power, of one's own strong excitement), the action takes place in order to preserve the well-being of the individual and so falls under a point of view similar to that of self-defence, of the white lie of necessity. Without pleasure, no life; the struggle for pleasure is the struggle for life. Whether the individual fights this struggle in such a way that men call him good, or in such a way that they call him evil, is decided by the measure and the constitution of his intellect.

105.

Rewarding justice. – Whoever has fully grasped the doctrine of complete unaccountability can no longer fit so-called punishing and rewarding justice under the concept of justice at all: if that consists in giving to each his own. For he who is punished does not deserve the punishment: he is merely used as a means to deter henceforth from certain actions; likewise he who is rewarded does not deserve this reward: he could not, after all, have acted otherwise than he did act. Thus the reward has only the meaning of an encouragement for him and for others, so as to furnish a motive for later actions; praise is shouted to the runner on the course, not to him who has reached the goal. Neither punishment nor reward is something that falls to one as

one's own; they are given to him for reasons of utility, without his having any just claim to them. One must say "the wise man does not reward because good has been done" just as one has said "the wise man does not punish because evil has been done, but so that evil may not be done". If punishment and reward fell away, then the most powerful motives that drive away from certain actions and towards certain actions would fall away; the utility of mankind demands their continuance; and inasmuch as punishment and reward, blame and praise act most sensitively upon vanity, the same utility demands also the continuance of vanity.

106.

At the waterfall. - At the sight of a waterfall we think we see in the countless bendings, windings and breakings of the waves freedom of the will and caprice; but everything is necessary, every movement mathematically calculable. So it is with human actions too; one would have to be able to calculate every single action in advance, if one were omniscient, likewise every advance of knowledge, every error, every piece of malice. The one who acts is himself, to be sure, caught in the illusion of free choice; if for one moment the wheel of the world were to stand still and an omniscient, calculating intellect were there to make use of this pause, it could go on to narrate the future of every being into the most distant ages and mark out every track along which that wheel will yet roll. The deception of the one who acts concerning himself, the assumption of free will, itself belongs within this calculable mechanism.

107.

Unaccountability and innocence. - The complete unaccountability of man for his actions and his nature is the bitterest drop which the man of knowledge must swallow, if he was accustomed to seeing in ac-

countability and duty the patent of nobility of his humanity. All his valuations, distinctions, aversions are thereby devalued and become false: his deepest feeling, which he offered to the sufferer, to the hero, was bestowed upon an error; he may no longer praise, no longer blame, for it is absurd to praise and blame nature and necessity. Just as he loves the good work of art but does not praise it, because it can do nothing for itself, just as he stands before the plant, so must he stand before the actions of men, before his own. He may admire strength, beauty, abundance in them, but he may find no merits therein: the chemical process and the strife of the elements, the torment of the sick man who thirsts for convalescence, are as little merits as those struggles of the soul and states of distress in which one is torn this way and that by various motives until one finally decides for the most powerful - as one says (but in truth, until the most powerful motive decides about us). All these motives, however, whatever lofty names we give them, have grown out of the same roots in which we believe the evil poisons dwell; between good and evil actions there is no difference of kind, but at most of degree. Good actions are sublimated evil ones; evil actions are coarsened, stupefied good ones. The individual's sole desire for self-enjoyment (together with the fear of being deprived of it) satisfies itself under all circumstances, let a man act as he can, that is, as he must: be it in deeds of vanity, revenge, pleasure, utility, malice, cunning, be it in deeds of sacrifice, of pity, of knowledge. The degrees of the capacity for judgement decide whither someone lets himself be drawn by this desire; to every society, to every individual, an order of rank of goods is continually present, according to which he determines his actions and judges those of others. But this standard is continually changing; many actions are called evil and are merely stupid, because the degree of intelligence which decided for them was very low. Indeed, in a certain sense all actions are even now still stupid, for the highest degree of human intelligence which can now be attained will surely yet be sur-

passed: and then, looking back, all our acting and judging will appear as limited and rash as the acting and judging of backward savage tribes now seems to us limited and rash. - To see all this can cause deep pain, but afterwards there is a consolation: such pains are birth pangs. The butterfly wants to break through its covering, it tugs at it, it tears it apart: then the unknown light, the realm of freedom, dazzles and bewilders it. In such men as are capable of that sadness - how few they will be! - the first attempt is made to see whether mankind can transform itself from a moral into a wise mankind. The sun of a new gospel casts its first ray upon the highest peaks in the souls of those individuals: there the mists gather more densely than ever, and side by side lie the brightest radiance and the gloomiest twilight. Everything is necessity - so says the new knowledge: and this knowledge itself is necessity. Everything is innocence: and knowledge is the path to insight into this innocence. If pleasure, egoism, vanity are necessary for the generation of the moral phenomena and of their highest flowering, the sense for truth and justice of knowledge; if error and the aberration of fantasy were the only means by which mankind was able gradually to raise itself to this degree of self-illumination and self-redemption - who could disdain those means? Who could be sad on becoming aware of the goal to which those paths lead? Everything in the domain of morality has become, is changeable, wavering, everything is in flux, it is true: - but everything is also in the stream: towards One goal. Let the inherited habit of erroneous valuing, loving, hating continue to hold sway in us all the same; under the influence of growing knowledge it will grow weaker: a new habit, that of comprehending, not-loving, not-hating, surveying, is gradually planting itself in us upon the same soil, and in thousands of years will perhaps be powerful enough to give mankind the strength to bring forth the wise, innocent (conscious of innocence) man as regularly as it now brings forth the unwise, unjust, guilt-conscious man - that is, the necessary preliminary stage, not the opposite, of that other.

Third Main Division.

The Religious Life.

108.

The twofold struggle against evil. - When an evil befalls us, we can get over it either by removing its cause or by altering the effect it produces on our feelings: that is, by reinterpreting the evil as a good whose usefulness will perhaps only become evident later. Religion and art (and metaphysical philosophy too) endeavour to bring about a change of feeling, partly by changing our judgement of our experiences (for example, with the help of the maxim: "whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth"), partly by awakening a pleasure in pain, in emotion as such (which is where the art of the tragic takes its point of departure). The more a man is inclined to reinterpret and to rationalize, the less will he keep in view the causes of the evil and do away with them; the momentary soothing and narcotization, such as is customary for toothache, for instance, suffices him even in more serious sufferings. The more the dominion of religions and of all the art of narcosis declines, the more rigorously do men keep in view the actual removal of evils, which, to be sure, turns out badly for the writers of tragedy - for there is less and less material for tragedy, since the realm of inexorable, invincible fate grows ever narrower - but worse still for the priests: for these have hitherto lived on the narcotization of human ills.

109.

Sorrow is knowledge. - How gladly one would exchange the false assertions of the priests, that there is a God who demands the good of

us, who is the guardian and witness of every action, every moment, every thought, who loves us and in every misfortune wills what is best for us - how gladly one would exchange these for truths that would be just as salutary, soothing and beneficent as those errors! But such truths do not exist; philosophy can at most set against them metaphysical plausibilities of its own (at bottom likewise untruths). Now, however, the tragedy is that one cannot believe those dogmas of religion and metaphysics if one carries the rigorous method of truth in heart and head, while on the other hand, through the development of mankind, one has become so tender, irritable and suffering as to stand in need of remedies and consolations of the highest kind; whence arises the danger that man may bleed to death from the truth he has come to know. Byron expresses this in immortal verses:

Sorrow is knowledge: they who know the most must mourn the deepst o'er the fatal truth, the tree of knowledge is not that of life.

Against such cares no remedy helps better than to summon up the solemn light-heartedness of Horace, at least for the worst hours and eclipses of the soul, and to say to oneself with him:

quid aeternis minorem consiliis animum fatigas? cur non sub alta vel platano vel hac pinu jacentes -

But certainly light-heartedness or melancholy of any degree is better than a romantic return and desertion of the colours, an approach to Christianity in any form whatever: for, given the present state of knowledge, one simply can no longer have dealings with it without hopelessly soiling one's intellectual conscience and abandoning it before oneself and others. Those pains may be grievous enough: but without pains one cannot become a leader and educator of mankind; and woe to him who would attempt this and no longer possessed that clean conscience!

110.

The truth in religion. – In the period of the Enlightenment, the significance of religion was not done justice, of that there can be no doubt: but it is equally certain that in the reaction to the Enlightenment that followed, people once again went a good way beyond justice, treating religions with love, even with infatuation, and granting them, for example, a deeper, indeed the very deepest understanding of the world; which science had only to strip of its dogmatic garb in order then to possess the "truth" in unmythical form. Religions, then – such was the contention of all the opponents of the Enlightenment – were supposed to utter sensu allegorico, out of consideration for the understanding of the masses, that age-old wisdom which was wisdom in itself, inasmuch as all true science of more recent times had always led towards it rather than away from it: so that between the most ancient sages of mankind and all later ones there reigned harmony, indeed identity of insight, and any progress of knowledge – should one wish to speak of such a thing – concerned not its essence but the communication of it. This entire conception of religion and science is erroneous through and through; and no one would still dare to profess it today had not Schopenhauer's eloquence taken it under its protection: that loudly resounding eloquence which nevertheless reached its listeners only after a generation had passed. As certainly as one can gain a very great deal for the understanding of Christianity and other religions from Schopenhauer's religious-moral interpretation of man and the world, just as certain is it that he erred concerning the value of religion for knowledge. In this he himself was an all too docile pupil of the scientific teachers of his age, who one and all paid homage to Romanticism and had forsworn the spirit of the Enlightenment; had he been born into our present age, he could not possibly have spoken of the sensus allegoricus of religion; he would rather have done honour to the truth, as was his wont, with the words: nev-

er yet has a religion, neither indirectly nor directly, neither as dogma nor as parable, contained a truth. For every one of them was born of fear and need, and crept into existence along the byways of reason; perhaps at some time, when imperilled by science, it lied some philosophical doctrine or other into its system, so that it might later be found there: but this is a theologian's trick, from the time when a religion already doubts itself. These tricks of theology, which were of course practised very early in Christianity, as the religion of a learned age steeped in philosophy, led to that superstition of the sensus allegoricus, but still more did the habit of philosophers (especially of the half-breeds, the poetic philosophers and the philosophizing artists) of treating all the sensations they found within themselves as the fundamental nature of man in general, and thus also of allowing their own religious sensations a significant influence on the conceptual edifice of their systems. Because philosophers often philosophized under the tradition of religious habits, or at least under the age-old inherited power of that "metaphysical need", they arrived at doctrines which did indeed look very similar to Jewish or Christian or Indian religious opinions – similar, that is, in the way children tend to resemble their mothers, except that in this case the fathers were not clear about that motherhood, as does sometimes happen – but in the innocence of their astonishment spun fables about a family resemblance of all religion and science. In truth there exists between religion and genuine science neither kinship, nor friendship, nor even enmity: they live on different stars. Every philosophy that lets a religious comet's tail gleam out into the darkness of its ultimate prospects renders suspect everything in itself that it presents as science: all of this is presumably religion as well, albeit in the finery of science. – Moreover: if all peoples agreed about certain religious matters, for example the existence of a God (which, incidentally, is not the case as regards this point), this would nonetheless be merely a counter-argument against those asserted things, for example the existence of a God: the con-

sensus gentium, and indeed hominum generally, can in fairness only pertain to a folly. By contrast, there is no consensus omnium sapientium at all, with regard to not a single thing, with that one exception of which Goethe's verse speaks:

All the wisest of all of the ages smile and they nod and in chorus agree: Foolish, to wait for the fools to grow better! Children of prudence, oh, make of the fools merely fools in their turn, as is fitting!

Spoken without verse and rhyme and applied to our case: the consensus sapientium consists in this, that the consensus gentium pertains to a folly.

111.

Origin of religious cult. - If we transport ourselves back to the times in which religious life flourished most vigorously, we find a fundamental conviction which we no longer share and on account of which we see the gates to religious life closed to us once and for all: it concerns nature and our dealings with it. In those times nothing is yet known of laws of nature; neither for the earth nor for the heavens is there any must; a season, the sunshine, the rain may come or may also fail to come. Every concept of natural causality is lacking altogether. When one rows, it is not the rowing that moves the ship; rather, rowing is merely a magical ceremony by which one compels a demon to move the ship. All illnesses, death itself, are the result of magical influences. Falling sick and dying never come about naturally; the whole notion of a "natural course of events" is lacking, - it first dawns among the older Greeks, that is to say in a very late phase of humanity, in the conception of Moira enthroned above the gods. When someone shoots with a bow, there is still always an irrational hand and force at work in it; if the springs suddenly run dry, one

thinks first of subterranean demons and their malice; it must be the arrow of a god under whose invisible working a man suddenly sinks to the ground. In India (according to Lubbock) a carpenter is accustomed to offer sacrifices to his hammer, his axe and his other tools; a Brahmin treats the stylus with which he writes, a soldier the weapons he uses in the field, a mason his trowel, a labourer his plough in the same manner. The whole of nature is, in the conception of religious men, a sum of actions of conscious and willing beings, a tremendous complex of arbitrary acts. With regard to everything that is outside us, no inference is permitted that anything will be thus and so, must come about thus and so; what is roughly certain and calculable is we ourselves: man is the rule, nature the absence of rule, - this proposition contains the fundamental conviction that dominates crude, religiously productive primitive cultures. We men of today feel precisely the reverse: the richer man now feels himself inwardly, the more polyphonic his subject, the more powerfully does the evenness of nature work upon him; we all, with Goethe, recognize in nature the great means of appeasement for the modern soul, we listen to the pendulum-beat of the greatest of clocks with a longing for rest, for becoming at home and still, as though we could drink this evenness into ourselves and only thereby come to the enjoyment of ourselves. Formerly it was the reverse: if we think back to crude, early conditions of peoples, or look closely at present-day savages, we find them determined in the strongest degree by law, by tradition: the individual is bound to it almost automatically and moves with the uniformity of a pendulum. To him nature - uncomprehended, terrible, mysterious nature - must appear as the realm of freedom, of caprice, of the higher power, indeed as it were as a superhuman stage of existence, as God. But now every single individual of such times and conditions feels how his existence, his happiness, that of his family, of the state, the success of all undertakings depend upon those caprices of nature: certain natural events must occur at the right time, others must fail to

occur at the right time. How can one exert an influence upon these fearful unknowns, how can one bind the realm of freedom? so he asks himself, so he anxiously inquires: are there then no means of making those powers just as regular through a tradition and law as you yourself are regular? - The reflection of men who believe in magic and miracles tends towards imposing a law upon nature -: and, in short, religious cult is the outcome of this reflection. The problem which those men set themselves is most closely related to this one: how can the weaker tribe nevertheless dictate laws to the stronger, determine it, guide its actions (in its conduct towards the weaker)? One will first recall the most harmless kind of compulsion, that compulsion which one exercises when one has won someone's affection. Through entreaty and prayer, through submission, through the obligation to regular tributes and gifts, through flattering glorifications it is thus also possible to exercise a compulsion upon the powers of nature, inasmuch as one makes them well disposed towards oneself: love binds and is bound. Then one can conclude contracts, whereby one mutually pledges oneself to definite conduct, gives pledges and exchanges oaths. But far more important is a species of more violent compulsion, through magic and sorcery. Just as man, with the help of the sorcerer, knows how to harm even a stronger enemy and keep him in fear of him, just as the love-charm works at a distance, so the weaker man believes that he can determine even the mightier spirits of nature. The chief means of all sorcery is that one gets into one's power something that belongs to someone, hair, nails, a little food from his table, indeed even his image, his name. With such apparatus one can then work magic; for the fundamental presupposition runs: to everything spiritual there belongs something corporeal; with its help one is able to bind the spirit, to harm it, to destroy it; the corporeal provides the handle by which one can grasp the spiritual. Now just as man determines man, so he also determines some spirit of nature; for this too has its corporeal part by which it may be grasped. The tree

and, compared with it, the seed from which it arose, - this enigmatic juxtaposition seems to prove that in both forms one and the same spirit has embodied itself, now small, now great. A stone that suddenly rolls is the body in which a spirit is at work; if a boulder lies on a lonely heath and it seems impossible to think of human strength having brought it there, then the stone must have moved itself thither, that is to say: it must harbour a spirit. Everything that has a body is accessible to sorcery, and so too the spirits of nature. If a god is quite directly bound to his image, one can also exercise entirely direct compulsion against him (by withholding sacrificial food, by scourging, by putting him in fetters and the like). The common people in China, in order to extort the missing favour of their god, wind ropes around the image of the one who has left them in the lurch, tear it down, drag it through the streets through heaps of mud and dung; "you dog of a spirit," they say, "we let you dwell in a splendid temple, we gilded you prettily, we fed you well, we brought you sacrifices, and yet you are so ungrateful." Similar violent measures against images of saints and of the Mother of God, when, say, in times of pestilence or drought they would not do their duty, have occurred even during this century in Catholic countries. - Through all these magical relations to nature countless ceremonies have been called into being: and finally, when the confusion of them has grown too great, one endeavours to order them, to systematize them, so that one believes oneself to guarantee the favourable course of the entire progress of nature, especially of the great cycle of the year, through a corresponding course of a system of procedures. The meaning of religious cult is to determine and to spellbind nature to human advantage, that is, to impress upon it a lawfulness which it does not possess from the outset; whereas in the present age one wants to know the lawfulness of nature in order to accommodate oneself to it. In short, religious cult rests upon the notions of sorcery between man and man; and the sorcerer is older than the priest. But it rests equally upon other and nobler notions; it

presupposes the sympathetic relation of man to man, the existence of benevolence, gratitude, the hearing of petitioners, of contracts between enemies, of the granting of pledges, of the claim to protection of property. Even on very low stages of culture man does not stand over against nature as a powerless slave, he is not necessarily its will-less servant: on the Greek stage of religion, especially in relation to the Olympian gods, one may even think of a living together of two castes, a nobler, mightier one and a less noble one; but both belong together somehow by their origin and are of one kind, they need not be ashamed before one another. That is what is noble in Greek religiosity.

112.

At the sight of certain ancient sacrificial implements. — How some feelings are lost to us can be seen, for example, in the union of the farcical, even the obscene, with religious feeling: the feeling for the possibility of this mixture is vanishing; we now grasp only historically that it existed, at the festivals of Demeter and Dionysus, in the Christian Easter plays and mysteries: but we too still know the sublime in league with the burlesque and the like, the touching fused with the ridiculous: which perhaps a later age will likewise no longer understand.

113.

Christianity as antiquity. — When of a Sunday morning we hear the old bells droning, we ask ourselves: can it really be! all this is for a Jew crucified two thousand years ago, who said he was the Son of God. The proof for such an assertion is lacking. — Certainly, within our times the Christian religion is an antiquity jutting in from the distant past, and that this assertion is believed — while otherwise one is so strict in the examination of claims — is perhaps the oldest piece

of this inheritance. A god who begets children with a mortal woman; a sage who bids men work no more, sit in judgement no more, but heed the signs of the impending end of the world; a justice that accepts the innocent as a vicarious sacrifice; someone who bids his disciples drink his blood; prayers for miraculous interventions; sins committed against a god, atoned for by a god; fear of a beyond to which death is the gateway; the figure of the cross as a symbol in the midst of an age that no longer knows the purpose and the ignominy of the cross — how eerily all this breathes upon us, as if from the grave of an age-old past! Should one believe that such a thing is still believed?

114.

The un-Greek in Christianity. — The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods above them as masters, nor themselves beneath them as servants, as the Jews did. They saw, as it were, only the mirror image of the most successful specimens of their own caste, hence an ideal, not an opposite of their own nature. They feel akin to one another, there exists a mutual interest, a kind of symmachy. Man thinks nobly of himself when he gives himself such gods, and places himself in a relationship like that of the lesser nobility to the higher; whereas the Italic peoples have a proper peasant religion, with constant anxiety towards evil and capricious holders of power and tormenting spirits. Where the Olympian gods receded, there Greek life too was gloomier and more anxious. — Christianity, on the other hand, crushed and shattered man completely and sank him as if into deep mire: into the feeling of utter depravity it then, all at once, let the radiance of a divine mercy shine, so that the one thus surprised, stunned by grace, let out a cry of rapture and for a moment believed he carried all of heaven within himself. Towards this morbid excess of feeling, towards the deep corruption of head and heart required for it, all the psycholo-

gical inventions of Christianity are directed: it wants to annihilate, shatter, stun, intoxicate; there is only one thing it does not want: measure, and therefore it is, in the deepest sense, barbaric, Asiatic, ignoble, un-Greek.

115.

Being religious to advantage. — There are sober and industrious people on whom religion is embroidered like a hem of higher humanity: these do very well to remain religious; it beautifies them. — All people who are not versed in some trade of arms — mouth and pen counted as weapons — become servile: for such people the Christian religion is very useful, for in it servility takes on the semblance of a Christian virtue and is astonishingly beautified. — People to whom their daily life seems too empty and monotonous easily become religious: this is understandable and forgivable; only they have no right to demand religiosity of those whose daily life does not flow by empty and monotonous.

116.

The everyday Christian. — If Christianity, with its tenets of an avenging God, of universal sinfulness, of election by grace and of the danger of eternal damnation, were right, it would be a sign of feeblemindedness and lack of character not to become a priest, apostle or hermit and to work with fear and trembling solely at one's own salvation; it would be senseless to lose sight of eternal advantage for the sake of temporal comfort in this way. Supposing that there is belief at all, the everyday Christian is a pitiful figure, a man who really cannot count to three, and who moreover, precisely because of his mental incompetence, would not deserve to be punished as harshly as Christianity promises him.

117.

Of the cleverness of Christianity. — It is a trick of Christianity to teach so loudly the utter unworthiness, sinfulness and contemptibleness of man in general that contempt for one's fellow men is thereby no longer possible. "Let him sin as he will, he still does not differ essentially from me: it is I who am unworthy and contemptible in every degree," so the Christian tells himself. But even this feeling has lost its sharpest sting, because the Christian does not believe in his individual contemptibleness: he is evil as man in general and calms himself a little with the tenet: we are all of one kind.

118.

Change of persons. — As soon as a religion rules, it has as its opponents all those who would have been its first disciples.

119.

The fate of Christianity. — Christianity arose to lighten the heart; but now it would first have to burden the heart in order afterwards to be able to lighten it. Consequently it will perish.

120.

The proof of pleasure. — The agreeable opinion is accepted as true: this is the proof of pleasure (or, as the Church says, the proof of power), of which all religions are so proud, whereas they ought rather to be ashamed of it. If faith did not bring blessedness, it would not be believed: how little, then, will it be worth!

121.

Dangerous game. — Whoever now gives room in himself once more to religious feeling must then also let it grow; he cannot do otherwise. Then his nature gradually changes; it favours what clings to and neighbours the religious element; the whole circumference of his judging and feeling becomes clouded over, overcast with religious shadows. Feeling cannot stand still; so let one beware.

122.

The blind disciples. — So long as someone knows very well the strength and the weakness of his teaching, his kind of art, his religion, its power is still slight. The disciple and apostle who has no eye for the weakness of the teaching, the religion and so forth, blinded by the authority of the master and by his reverence for him, therefore usually has more power than the master. Never yet has the influence of a man and his work grown great without blind disciples. To help a piece of knowledge to victory often means only: to make it so much the sister of stupidity that the dead weight of the latter forces victory for the former as well.

123.

Demolition of churches. — There is not enough religion in the world even to destroy the religions.

124.

Sinlessness of man. - Once one has grasped "how sin came into the world", namely through errors of reason, by virtue of which men take one another, indeed the individual man takes himself, to be far blacker and more evil than is actually the case, then one's whole feeling is greatly relieved, and men and world appear at times in such a glory of

harmlessness that one feels well at ease to the very depths. Man in the midst of nature is always the child in itself. This child may now and then dream a heavy, frightening dream, but when it opens its eyes, it always finds itself once more in Paradise.

125.

Irreligiousness of artists. - Homer is so much at home among his gods, and as a poet takes such delight in them, that he must in any case have been deeply irreligious; with what popular belief offered him - a meagre, crude, in part gruesome superstition - he dealt as freely as the sculptor with his clay, that is, with the same unselfconsciousness that Aeschylus and Aristophanes possessed and by which, in more recent times, the great artists of the Renaissance, as well as Shakespeare and Goethe, distinguished themselves.

126.

Art and power of false interpretation. - All the visions, terrors, exhaustions and raptures of the saint are well-known states of illness, which he, on the basis of deep-rooted religious and psychological errors, merely interprets quite otherwise, namely not as illnesses. - So too, perhaps, the daimonion of Socrates is an ailment of the ear, which he, in keeping with his prevailing moral cast of mind, merely explains to himself otherwise than would happen now. It is no different with the madness and mad speech of the prophets and oracle-priests; it is always the degree of knowledge, imagination, aspiration, morality in the head and heart of the interpreters that has made so much of it. Among the greatest effects of the men whom one calls geniuses and saints is this: that they compel for themselves interpreters who misunderstand them for the salvation of mankind.

127.

Veneration of madness. - Because it was noticed that an excitement often made the head clearer and called forth happy ideas, it was supposed that through the highest excitements one would partake of the happiest ideas and inspirations: and so the madman was venerated as the sage and the giver of oracles. A false inference lies at the bottom of this.

128.

Promises of science. - Modern science has as its goal: as little pain as possible, as long a life as possible, - thus a kind of eternal bliss, admittedly a very modest one in comparison with the promises of the religions.

129.

Forbidden generosity. - There is not enough love and goodness in the world to be permitted to give any of it away to imaginary beings.

130.

Survival of the religious cultus in the soul. - The Catholic Church, and before it all the cultus of antiquity, commanded the whole range of means by which man is transported into unusual moods and torn away from the cold calculation of advantage or from pure rational thought. A church trembling with deep tones, the muffled, regular, restrained invocations of a priestly band, which involuntarily transmits its tension to the community and makes it listen almost fearfully, as though a miracle were just then preparing itself, the breath of the architecture, which, as the dwelling of a deity, stretches up into the indefinite and in all its dark spaces makes one fear its stirring, - who would wish to bring such proceedings back to men once the presup-

positions for them are no longer believed? But the results of all this are nevertheless not lost: the inner world of sublime, moved, intimation-filled, deeply contrite, hope-blissful moods has been bred into men chiefly through the cultus; what of it now exists in the soul was raised to greatness back then, when it sprouted, grew and blossomed.

131.

Religious after-pains. - However much one believes oneself to have weaned oneself from religion, it has nevertheless not happened to such a degree that one would not feel joy in encountering religious sensations and moods without conceptual content, for example in music; and when a philosophy shows us the justification of metaphysical hopes, of the deep peace of soul to be attained from them, and speaks, for example, of "the whole sure gospel in the gaze of Raphael's Madonnas", we meet such utterances and expositions with a particularly warm-hearted mood: the philosopher has an easier time proving his case here, for with what he wishes to give he answers to a heart that gladly wishes to take. From this one notices how the less circumspect free spirits really take offence only at the dogmas, but know very well the magic of religious sensation; it pains them to let the latter go for the sake of the former. - Scientific philosophy must be very much on its guard not to smuggle in errors on the grounds of that need - a need that has come into being and is consequently also transient: even logicians speak of "intimations" of truth in morality and art (for example of the intimation "that the essence of things is one"): which ought, after all, to be forbidden them. Between carefully deduced truths and such "intimated" things there remains the unbridgeable chasm that the former are owed to the intellect, the latter to need. Hunger does not prove that there exists a food to satisfy it, but it wishes for the food. To "intimate" does not mean to know the existence of a thing to any degree, but to consider it possible insofar as

one wishes for it or fears it; "intimation" carries one not a single step into the land of certainty. - One involuntarily believes that the religiously tinged sections of a philosophy are better proved than the others; but at bottom it is the reverse, one merely has the inner wish that it might be so, - that is, that what makes blissful should also be what is true. This wish leads us to buy bad reasons as good ones.

132.

Of the Christian need for redemption. - With careful reflection it must be possible to win from the process in the soul of a Christian that is called the need for redemption an explanation that is free of mythology: that is, a purely psychological one. Up to now, to be sure, psychological explanations of religious states and processes have been in some disrepute, insofar as a theology calling itself free carried on its unprofitable business in this field: for with it, from the very outset, as the spirit of its founder, Schleiermacher, leads one to suspect, the aim was the preservation of the Christian religion and the continued existence of Christian theologians; who were to gain in the psychological analysis of religious "facts" a new anchorage and above all a new occupation. Undeterred by such predecessors, we venture the following interpretation of the phenomenon described. Man is conscious of certain actions which stand low in the customary order of rank of actions, indeed he discovers in himself an inclination towards such actions which seems to him almost as unalterable as his whole nature. How gladly would he try his hand at that other kind of actions which in general estimation are recognized as the uppermost and highest, how gladly would he feel himself full of the good consciousness which is supposed to follow upon a selfless way of thinking! But unfortunately it remains just this wish: the dissatisfaction at not being able to satisfy it is added to all the other kinds of dissatisfaction which his lot in life as a whole, or the consequences of those actions

called evil, have aroused in him; so that a deep ill-humour arises, with a looking-out for a physician who might be able to remove it and all its causes. - This state would not be felt so bitterly if man compared himself only, without prejudice, with other men: for then he would have no reason to be dissatisfied with himself in any special measure, he would merely bear his share of the general burden of human dissatisfaction and imperfection. But he compares himself with a being which alone is capable of those actions that are called unegoistic, and which lives in the perpetual consciousness of a selfless way of thinking, with God; by gazing into this bright mirror, his own nature appears to him so murky, so unusually distorted. Then the thought of that same being frightens him, insofar as it hovers before his imagination as punishing justice: in every possible experience, small and great, he believes he recognizes its wrath, its threat, indeed he believes he already feels in advance the scourge-strokes of its office as judge and executioner. Who will help him in this danger, which, through the prospect of an immeasurable duration of punishment, surpasses in hideousness all the other terrors of the imagination?

133.

Before we set before ourselves the further consequences of this state, let us at least admit that man has fallen into this state not through his "guilt" and "sin", but through a series of errors of reason; that it was the fault of the mirror if his nature appeared to him dark and hateful to such a degree; and that this mirror was his own work, the very imperfect work of human imagination and judgement. In the first place, a being capable solely of purely unegoistic actions is more fabulous still than the phoenix; it cannot even be clearly imagined, if only because the whole concept "unegoistic action" scatters into thin air under rigorous examination. Never has a man done anything that was done solely for others and without any personal motive whatsoever;

indeed, how should he be able to do anything that bore no relation to himself, that is, without inner compulsion (which must after all have its ground in a personal need)? How could the ego act without the ego? - A God, on the other hand, who is wholly love, as is occasionally assumed, would be incapable of a single unegoistic action: in this connection one ought to recall a thought of Lichtenberg's, taken, to be sure, from a lower sphere: "We cannot possibly feel for others, as the saying goes; we feel only for ourselves. The proposition sounds harsh, but it is not, if only it is rightly understood. One loves neither father, nor mother, nor wife, nor child, but the pleasant sensations they cause us", or as La Rochefoucauld says: "si on croit aimer sa maîtresse pour l'amour d'elle, on est bien trompe'." As to why actions of love are esteemed more highly than others, namely not on account of their nature but on account of their usefulness, one may compare the investigations "on the origin of the moral sensations" already mentioned earlier. But should a man wish to be, wholly like that God, love, to do and to will everything for others and nothing for himself, then the latter is impossible if only because he must do a very great deal for himself in order to be able to do anything at all for the sake of others. Furthermore, it presupposes that the other is egoist enough to accept those sacrifices, that life lived for him, again and again: so that the people of love and self-sacrifice have an interest in the continued existence of the loveless egoists incapable of self-sacrifice, and the highest morality, in order to be able to subsist, would positively have to compel the existence of immorality (whereby, to be sure, it would cancel itself out). - Further: the idea of a God disquiets and humbles for as long as it is believed; but how it arose can, in the present state of comparative ethnological science, no longer be in doubt; and with insight into that origin, that belief falls away. The Christian who compares his nature with God fares like Don Quixote, who underrates his own valour because his head is full of the miraculous deeds of the heroes of the romances of chivalry; the standard by which measure-

ment is made in both cases belongs to the realm of fable. But if the idea of God falls away, so too does the feeling of "sin" as a transgression against divine precepts, as a stain upon a creature consecrated to God. What then probably still remains is that dejection which is very closely entwined and akin with fear of the punishments of worldly justice, or of the contempt of men; the dejection of the pangs of conscience, the sharpest sting in the feeling of guilt, is at any rate broken off once one sees that through one's actions one may well have transgressed against human tradition, human statutes and orders, but has not thereby yet endangered the "eternal salvation of the soul" and its relation to the deity. If man finally succeeds in gaining, and taking into his flesh and blood, the philosophical conviction of the unconditional necessity of all actions and of their complete unaccountability, then that remnant of the pangs of conscience vanishes as well.

134.

Now if the Christian, as has been said, has fallen into the feeling of self-contempt through certain errors, that is, through a false, unscientific interpretation of his actions and sensations, he must notice with the utmost astonishment how that state of contempt, of the pangs of conscience, of displeasure in general, does not last, how hours come now and then when all this is blown away from his soul and he feels free and courageous once more. In truth, pleasure in himself, contentment in his own strength, allied with the necessary weakening of every deep excitement, has carried off the victory; man loves himself again, he feels it, - but precisely this love, this new self-esteem, seems incredible to him; he can see in it only the wholly undeserved down-streaming of a radiance of grace from on high. Whereas earlier he believed he beheld in all occurrences warnings, threats, punishments and every kind of sign of divine wrath, he now reads divine goodness into his experiences: this event seems to him loving,

that one like a helpful hint, a third, and above all his whole joyful mood, like proof that God is gracious. Just as earlier, in his state of dejection, he chiefly misinterpreted his actions, so now he chiefly misinterprets his experiences; he takes his comforted mood to be the effect of a power ruling outside himself; the love with which at bottom he loves himself appears as divine love; that which he calls grace and prelude to redemption is in truth self-pardon, self-redemption.

135.

Thus: a certain false psychology, a certain kind of fantasticality in the interpretation of motives and experiences, is the necessary precondition for someone becoming a Christian and feeling the need for redemption. With insight into this aberration of reason and imagination, one ceases to be a Christian.

136.

Of Christian asceticism and holiness. - However much individual thinkers have striven to present the rare appearances of morality that are customarily called asceticism and holiness as a marvel, to hold the lamp of a rational explanation up to whose face is almost sacrilege and profanation already: just as strong, on the other hand, is the temptation to this sacrilege. A powerful impulse of nature has at all times led men to protest against those appearances altogether; science, insofar as it is, as was said earlier, an imitation of nature, permits itself at least to raise objection against their alleged inexplicability, indeed unapproachability. To be sure, it has not succeeded so far: those appearances are still unexplained, to the great delight of the aforementioned worshippers of the morally miraculous. For, generally speaking: the unexplained must absolutely be inexplicable, the inexplicable absolutely unnatural, supernatural, miraculous, - so runs the

demand in the souls of all the religious and of all metaphysicians (artists too, if they are at the same time thinkers); whereas the man of science sees in this demand the "evil principle". - The general first probability one arrives at when contemplating asceticism and holiness is this, that their nature is a complex one: for almost everywhere, within the physical world as well as in the moral, the supposedly miraculous has successfully been traced back to the complex and multiply conditioned. Let us venture, then, first to isolate individual impulses in the soul of saints and ascetics, and in conclusion to think of them as grown into one another.

137.

There is a defiance of oneself, among whose most sublimated expressions certain forms of asceticism belong. For certain people have so strong a need to exercise their power and lust for dominion that, for want of other objects, or because they have always failed elsewhere, they finally hit upon tyrannizing certain parts of their own being, as it were segments or stages of themselves. Thus many a thinker professes views which plainly do not serve to increase or improve his reputation; many a one positively calls down upon himself the contempt of others, when he could easily have remained a respected man by keeping silent; others recant earlier opinions and do not shrink from being called inconsistent henceforth: on the contrary, they strive for it and behave like reckless riders who like their horse best only once it has grown wild, is covered in sweat, and has been made skittish. Thus a man climbs by perilous paths into the highest mountains in order to laugh scornfully at his own timidity and his trembling knees; thus the philosopher professes views of asceticism, humility and sanctity in whose radiance his own image is made ugly in the worst possible way. This breaking of oneself, this mockery of one's own nature, this spernere se sperni, of which religions have made so

much, is in truth a very high degree of vanity. The whole morality of the Sermon on the Mount belongs here: man takes a veritable voluptuous delight in doing violence to himself through excessive demands and afterwards deifying this tyrannically demanding something in his soul. In every ascetic morality man worships one part of himself as God and for this needs to diabolize the remaining part. -

138.

Man is not equally moral at all hours, this is well known: if one judges his morality by his capacity for great self-sacrificing resolve and self-denial (which, when lasting and become habit, is sanctity), then he is most moral in a state of passion; the heightened excitement offers him entirely new motives of which, sober and cold as he otherwise is, he perhaps did not even believe himself capable. How does this come about? Probably from the proximity of everything great and highly exciting; once a man has been brought into an extraordinary tension, he can just as well resolve upon a terrible revenge as upon a terrible breaking of his need for revenge. Under the influence of the mighty emotion he wants, in any case, the great, the mighty, the monstrous, and if he happens to notice that the sacrifice of himself satisfies him just as much as, or even more than, the sacrifice of the other, he chooses it. Really, then, all he cares about is the discharge of his emotion; and so, to relieve his tension, he may well gather up the spears of his enemies and bury them in his own breast. That there is something great in self-denial, and not only in revenge, had first to be bred into mankind through long habituation; a deity who sacrifices itself was the strongest and most effective symbol of this kind of greatness. As the conquest of the enemy hardest to conquer, the sudden mastering of a passion, - as this is how such denial appears; and in so far it counts as the summit of the moral. In truth what is involved in it is the exchange of one idea for another, while the temper

retains its same height, its same flood-level. Men who have sobered down, resting from passion, no longer understand the morality of those moments, but the admiration of all who shared in them sustains it; pride is their consolation when the passion and the understanding of their deed recede. Thus: at bottom even those acts of self-denial are not moral, inasmuch as they are not done strictly with regard to others; rather, the other merely gives the highly strung temper an occasion to relieve itself, through that denial.

139.

In many respects the ascetic too seeks to make life easy for himself, and indeed usually through complete subordination to a foreign will or to an extensive law and ritual; somewhat in the way the Brahmin leaves absolutely nothing to his own determination and lets himself be determined at every minute by a holy precept. This subordination is a powerful means of becoming master over oneself; one is occupied, hence without boredom, and yet has no stimulation of self-will and passion in it; once the deed is done, the feeling of responsibility is absent, and with it the torment of remorse. One has renounced one's own will once and for all, and this is easier than renouncing only now and then; just as it is also easier to forswear a desire entirely than to keep it within measure. If we recall the present position of man towards the state, we find there too that unconditional obedience is more comfortable than conditional. The saint, then, eases his life through that complete surrender of personality, and one deceives oneself if one admires in that phenomenon the highest heroic feat of morality. It is in any case harder to assert one's personality without wavering and unclarity than to free oneself from it in the manner described; moreover it demands far more spirit and reflection.

140.

Having found, in many of the actions harder to explain, expressions of that pleasure in emotion as such, I should like also, in regard to the self-contempt which belongs among the marks of sanctity, and likewise in the acts of self-torment (through hunger and scourging, dislocation of the limbs, feigning of madness), to recognize a means by which those natures fight against the general weariness of their will to live (of their nerves): they employ the most painful stimulants and cruelties in order, for periods at least, to emerge from that dullness and boredom into which their great spiritual indolence and that subordination to a foreign will described above so frequently let them sink.

141.

The most common means which the ascetic and the saint employ to make life still bearable and entertaining for themselves consists in occasional warfare and in the alternation of victory and defeat. For this he needs an adversary, and he finds one in the so-called "inner enemy". Above all he exploits his inclination to vanity, to ambition and the lust for dominion, and then his sensual desires, so that he may regard his life as a continuous battle and himself as a battlefield on which good and evil spirits wrestle with changing fortune. As is well known, the sensual imagination is moderated, indeed almost suppressed, by regularity of sexual intercourse, whereas, conversely, it is unchained and runs wild through abstinence or disorder in intercourse. The imagination of many Christian saints was filthy to an unusual degree; by virtue of that theory according to which these desires were real demons raging within them, they did not feel too greatly responsible for it; to this feeling we owe the so instructive candour of their testimonies about themselves. It was in their interest that this struggle should always be sustained to some degree, because

through it, as was said, their desolate life was sustained. But in order that the struggle should appear important enough to arouse lasting sympathy and admiration among the non-saints, sensuality had to be ever more branded as heretical and stigmatized; indeed, the danger of eternal damnation was bound so closely to these things that, in all likelihood, for whole ages Christians begot children with a bad conscience; whereby great harm has certainly been done to mankind. And yet here truth is standing altogether on its head: which is especially unseemly for truth. Christianity had indeed said that every man is conceived and born in sin, and in the insufferable superlative-Christianity of Calderón this thought had once more knotted and twisted itself together, so that it ventured the most perverse paradox there is, in the well-known verse:

man's greatest guilt is that he was born.

In all pessimistic religions the act of procreation is felt to be bad in itself, but this feeling is by no means common to all mankind; not even the judgement of all pessimists agrees on this point. Empedocles, for example, knows nothing whatever of anything shameful, devilish, sinful in erotic matters; on the contrary, upon the great meadow of calamity he sees one single appearance full of healing and of hope, Aphrodite; she is for him the pledge that strife will not rule eternally but will one day hand over the sceptre to a gentler demon. The Christian pessimists of practice had, as was said, an interest in another opinion remaining dominant; they needed, for the solitude and the spiritual desert of their life, an enemy ever alive: and a universally acknowledged enemy, by fighting and overpowering whom they could again and again present themselves to the non-saint as half-incomprehensible, supernatural beings. When this enemy at last, in consequence of their way of life and their ruined health, took flight for ever, they knew at once how to see their inner selves peopled with new demons. The rising and sinking of the scales of pride and humil-

ity entertained their brooding heads just as well as the alternation of desire and peace of soul. In those days psychology served not merely to cast suspicion on everything human but to blaspheme it, to scourge it, to crucify it; one wanted to find oneself as bad and evil as possible, one sought anxiety for the salvation of the soul, despair of one's own strength. Everything natural to which man attaches the notion of the bad, the sinful (as he is still accustomed to do today, for instance, with regard to the erotic), burdens and darkens the imagination, gives a shy look, sets man at odds with himself and makes him uncertain and distrustful; even his dreams acquire an aftertaste of the tormented conscience. And yet this suffering from the natural is utterly without foundation in the reality of things: it is only the consequence of opinions about things. It is easy to see how men become worse by calling the unavoidably natural bad and afterwards always feeling it to be so constituted. It is the artifice of religion, and of those metaphysicians who would have man evil and sinful by nature, to make him suspicious of nature and so to make him himself bad: for thus he learns to feel himself bad, since he cannot take off the garment of nature. Gradually, after a long life in the natural, he feels himself oppressed by such a burden of sins that supernatural powers become necessary to be able to lift this burden; and with this the need for redemption already discussed has stepped upon the stage, a need which corresponds to no real sinfulness whatever, but only to an imagined one. Go through the individual moral propositions of the documents of Christianity, and you will find everywhere that the demands are overstrained, so that man may not be able to satisfy them; the intention is not that he should become more moral, but that he should feel himself as sinful as possible. If this feeling had not been pleasant to man, - why would he have engendered such a notion and clung to it so long? Just as in the ancient world an immeasurable force of spirit and inventiveness was expended in order to increase the joy of life through festive cults: so in the age of Christianity, likewise, an

immeasurable amount of spirit was sacrificed to another endeavour: man was to feel himself sinful in every way and thereby to be stirred, quickened, animated at all. To stir, to quicken, to animate at any price - is that not the watchword of a slackened, overripe, overcultivated age? The circle of all natural sensations had been run through a hundred times, the soul had grown weary of them: then the saint and the ascetic invented a new kind of stimulus to life. They set themselves before the eyes of all, not really as a model for many to imitate, but as a dreadful and yet ravishing spectacle, performed at those borders between world and over-world where in those days everyone believed he glimpsed now heavenly gleams of light, now uncanny tongues of flame blazing up from the depths. The eye of the saint, directed upon the meaning, fearful in every respect, of the brief life on earth, upon the nearness of the final decision over endless new stretches of life, this charring eye, in a half-annihilated body, made the men of the ancient world tremble to their very depths; to look, to look away shuddering, to feel anew the lure of the spectacle, to yield to it, to sate oneself on it until the soul quivers in fire and fever-chill, - that was the last pleasure which antiquity invented, after it had itself grown dull even to the sight of combats of beasts and men.

142.

To sum up what has been said: that state of soul which the saint, or one becoming a saint, enjoys is composed of elements we all know quite well, except that under the influence of ideas other than religious ones they appear differently coloured and then commonly incur men's censure just as strongly as, in that trimming of religion and ultimate significance of existence, they may count on admiration, indeed worship — or at least could count on it in earlier times. Now the saint practises that defiance of himself which is a close relative of the lust for power and gives even the loneliest man the feeling of

might; now his swollen feeling leaps from the desire to let his passions run free over into the desire to make them collapse like wild horses beneath the mighty pressure of a proud soul; now he wants a complete cessation of all disturbing, tormenting, stimulating sensations, a waking sleep, a lasting repose in the lap of a dull, animal- and plant-like indolence; now he seeks battle and kindles it within himself, because boredom holds up its yawning face to him: he scourges his self-deification with self-contempt and cruelty, he takes delight in the wild uproar of his desires, in the sharp pain of sin, indeed in the idea of being lost, he knows how to lay a snare for his affect, for instance that of the utmost lust for power, so that it passes over into that of the utmost abasement and his goaded soul is wrenched out of all its joints by this contrast; and finally: when he even lusts after visions, conversations with the dead or with divine beings, it is at bottom a rare kind of voluptuousness that he craves, but perhaps that voluptuousness in which all the others are tied together in one knot. Novalis, one of the authorities on questions of saintliness by experience and instinct, once utters the whole secret with naive joy: "It is wondrous enough that the association of voluptuousness, religion and cruelty has not long since made men attentive to their intimate kinship and common tendency."

143.

Not what the saint is, but what he signifies in the eyes of the non-saints, gives him his world-historical value. Because men erred about him, because they misinterpreted his states of soul and separated him from themselves as sharply as possible, as something utterly incomparable and strangely superhuman: thereby he gained the extraordinary power with which he could dominate the imagination of whole peoples, whole ages. He himself did not know himself; he himself read the handwriting of his moods, inclinations and actions according

to an art of interpretation that was just as overstrained and artificial as the pneumatic interpretation of the Bible. What was warped and sick in his nature, with its coupling of spiritual poverty, poor knowledge, ruined health and overexcited nerves, remained as hidden from his own gaze as from that of his beholders. He was not a particularly good man, still less a particularly wise one: but he signified something that was supposed to exceed human measure in goodness and wisdom. Faith in him supported faith in the divine and the miraculous, in a religious meaning of all existence, in an impending last day of judgement. In the evening glow of a world's-end sun that shone out over the Christian peoples, the shadowy figure of the saint grew to monstrous size: indeed to such a height that even in our age, which no longer believes in God, there are still thinkers enough who believe in the saint.

144.

It goes without saying that against this portrait of the saint, which is sketched after the average of the whole species, many a portrait may be set that might produce a more agreeable feeling. Individual exceptions within that species stand out, whether through great gentleness and love of mankind, or through the magic of unusual energy; others are attractive in the highest degree because certain delusions pour streams of light over their whole being: as is the case, for instance, with the famous founder of Christianity, who held himself to be the only-begotten Son of God and therefore felt himself sinless; so that through a fancy — which one should not judge too harshly, since the whole of antiquity swarms with sons of gods — he reached the same goal, the feeling of complete sinlessness, complete unaccountability, which now anyone can acquire through science. — I have likewise disregarded the Indian saints, who stand on an intermediate level between the Christian saint and the Greek philosopher and to that

extent represent no pure type: knowledge, science — so far as there was such a thing —, elevation above other men through the logical discipline and schooling of thought, were demanded among the Buddhists as a mark of saintliness just as the same qualities are rejected and branded heretical in the Christian world as marks of unsaintliness.

Fourth Chapter.

From the Soul of Artists and Writers.

145.

The perfect is not supposed to have become. - We are accustomed, in the case of everything perfect, to forgo the question of its becoming: and instead to rejoice in what is present, as though it had risen up out of the ground at the stroke of a magic wand. Probably we still stand here under the after-effect of an age-old mythological sensation. We still feel almost as if (for example, in a Greek temple such as that at Paestum) a god one morning had playfully built his dwelling out of such enormous loads: at other times as if a soul had suddenly been conjured into a stone and now wished to speak through it. The artist knows that his work has its full effect only when it arouses the belief in an improvisation, in a miraculous suddenness of origin; and so he no doubt assists this illusion and introduces into art those elements of inspired restlessness, of blindly groping disorder, of listening dreaming at the beginning of creation, as means of deception, in order to attune the soul of the beholder or listener in such a way that it believes in the sudden springing forth of the perfect. - The science of art must, as goes without saying, contradict this illusion in the most decided manner and point out the false conclusions and bad habits of the intellect by virtue of which it runs into the artist's net.

146.

The artist's sense of truth. - With regard to the knowing of truths, the artist has a weaker morality than the thinker; he will by no means let himself be deprived of the brilliant, profound interpretations of life,

and he resists sober, plain methods and results. Seemingly he is fighting for the higher dignity and significance of man; in truth he does not want to give up the presuppositions most effective for his art, that is, the fantastic, the mythical, the uncertain, the extreme, the sense for the symbolic, the overestimation of the person, the belief in something miraculous in genius: he thus holds the continuance of his kind of creating to be more important than scientific devotion to the true in every form, however plain this may appear.

147.

Art as necromancer. - Art performs, among other things, the task of conserving, and also of colouring up a little again extinguished, faded representations; when it fulfils this task, it weaves a band around different ages and makes their spirits return. True, it is only a semblance of life, as over graves, that arises in this way, or like the return of beloved dead in a dream; but at least for moments the old sensation stirs once more and the heart beats to an otherwise forgotten measure. Now, on account of this general utility of art, one must forgive the artist himself if he does not stand in the foremost ranks of enlightenment and of the progressive masculinization of mankind: he has remained a child or a youth all his life and has been held back at the standpoint at which he was overcome by his artistic drive; the sensations of the first stages of life, however, admittedly stand nearer to those of earlier epochs than to those of the present century. Involuntarily it becomes his task to make mankind childlike; this is his glory and his limitation.

148.

Poets as lighteners of life. - Poets, insofar as they too wish to lighten the life of men, either turn their gaze away from the toilsome present or help the present to new colours by means of a light which they

cause to radiate from the past. To be able to do this, they must themselves in many respects be backward-turned beings: so that one can use them as bridges to quite distant times and representations, to dying or dead religions and cultures. They are in fact always and necessarily epigones. There is, to be sure, something unfavourable to be said of their means of lightening life: they soothe and heal only provisionally, only for the moment; they even hold men back from working at a real improvement of their conditions, in that they suspend and palliatively discharge precisely the passion of the dissatisfied, which urges them to action.

149.

The slow arrow of beauty. - The noblest kind of beauty is that which does not carry us away all at once, which makes no stormy and intoxicating assaults (such beauty easily awakens disgust), but rather that slowly seeping kind which one carries along with one almost unnoticed and which one meets again once in a dream, but which finally, after having long lain modestly upon our heart, takes complete possession of us, fills our eyes with tears, our heart with longing. - What do we long for at the sight of beauty? To be beautiful: we fancy that much happiness must be bound up with it. - But that is an error.

150.

The ensouling of art. - Art raises its head where religions decline. It takes over a multitude of feelings and moods engendered by religion, lays them upon its heart, and now itself becomes deeper, more soulful, so that it is able to communicate exaltation and enthusiasm, which before it could not yet do. The wealth of religious feeling, swollen into a torrent, breaks forth again and again and seeks to conquer new realms for itself: but growing enlightenment has shaken the dogmas of religion and instilled a thorough mistrust: so the feel-

ing, driven out of the religious sphere by enlightenment, throws itself into art; in some cases also into political life, indeed even directly into science. Wherever one perceives in human endeavours a higher, gloomier colouring, one may suppose that the dread of spirits, the scent of incense and the shadows of churches have remained clinging to them.

151.

How metre beautifies. - Metre lays a veil over reality; it occasions some artificiality of speech and impurity of thought; by the shadow it casts upon the thought, it now conceals, now brings into relief. As shadow is necessary in order to beautify, so the "dim" is necessary in order to make clear. - Art makes the sight of life bearable by laying over it the veil of impure thought.

152.

Art of the ugly soul. - One sets far too narrow bounds to art when one demands that only the ordered soul, hovering in moral equilibrium, may express itself in it. As in the plastic arts, so too in music and poetry there is an art of the ugly soul alongside the art of the beautiful soul; and the mightiest effects of art, the breaking of souls, the moving of stones and the humanizing of beasts, have perhaps been achieved most of all by precisely that art.

153.

Art makes the thinker's heart heavy. - How strong the metaphysical need is, and how nature makes the parting from it hard even at the very last, can be gathered from the fact that even in the free spirit, when he has rid himself of everything metaphysical, the highest effects of art easily produce a sympathetic resounding of the long-silent,

indeed broken, metaphysical string; it may be, for example, that at a certain passage of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony he feels himself floating above the earth in a dome of stars, with the dream of immortality in his heart: all the stars seem to glimmer around him and the earth to sink ever deeper below. - If he becomes conscious of this state, he no doubt feels a deep pang in his heart and sighs for the man who would lead back to him his lost beloved, whether one calls her religion or metaphysics. In such moments his intellectual character is put to the test.

154.

Playing with life. – The lightness and levity of the Homeric imagination was necessary in order to soothe and at times to suspend the excessively passionate temperament and the over-keen understanding of the Greek. When the understanding speaks among them: how harsh and cruel life then appears! They do not deceive themselves, but they deliberately play about life with lies. Simonides counselled his countrymen to take life as a game; earnestness was all too familiar to them as pain (the misery of men is, after all, the theme the gods so love to hear sung of), and they knew that through art alone could misery itself become enjoyment. But as punishment for this insight they were so plagued by the lust for fabling that in everyday life it was hard for them to keep themselves free of lies and deceit, just as all the poet-folk take such a delight in lying and have, into the bargain, innocence in doing so. The neighbouring peoples no doubt found this at times enough to drive them to despair.

155.

Belief in inspiration. – Artists have an interest in people believing in sudden flashes, the so-called inspirations; as if the idea of the work of art, of the poem, the fundamental thought of a philosophy, shone

down from heaven like a ray of grace. In truth the imagination of the good artist or thinker produces continually, good, mediocre and bad, but his power of judgement, sharpened and practised to the highest degree, rejects, selects, joins together; as one now sees from Beethoven's notebooks that he gathered the most glorious melodies gradually and, as it were, culled them out of manifold beginnings. He who discriminates less strictly and readily gives himself over to imitative memory may, under certain circumstances, become a great improviser; but artistic improvisation stands low in relation to the artistic idea earnestly and laboriously chosen. All the great were great workers, untiring not only in inventing but also in rejecting, sifting, reshaping, ordering.

156.

Inspiration once more. – When the productive power has been dammed up for a time and been prevented from flowing out by some obstacle, then at last there comes so sudden an outpouring that it seems as though an immediate inspiration, without any preceding inner working, and thus a miracle, were taking place. This constitutes the familiar illusion in whose persistence, as has been said, the interest of all artists is a little too deeply invested. The capital has simply been accumulating; it did not fall from heaven all at once. There is, moreover, such apparent inspiration elsewhere too, for example in the domain of goodness, of virtue, of vice.

157.

The sufferings of genius and their value. – The artistic genius wants to give joy, but when he stands on a very high level he easily lacks those who can enjoy; he offers dishes, but no one wants them. This lends him a pathos that is, under certain circumstances, ludicrously touching; for at bottom he has no right to compel men to pleasure. His pipe

sounds, but no one will dance: can that be tragic? – Perhaps it can. In the end, as compensation for this privation, he has more pleasure in creating than other men have in all other kinds of activity. His sufferings are felt to be exaggerated because the tone of his lament is louder, his mouth more eloquent; and at times his sufferings really are very great, but only because his ambition, his envy are so great. The knowing genius, like Kepler and Spinoza, is usually not so covetous and makes no such fuss about his really greater sufferings and privations. He may count with greater certainty upon posterity and dispense with the present; whereas an artist who does this always plays a desperate game, at which his heart cannot but ache. In quite rare cases – when in the same individual the genius of ability and of knowledge and the moral genius are fused – there is added to the pains mentioned that kind of pain which must be taken as the most singular exception in the world: those feelings that are extra- and supra-personal, turned toward a people, toward mankind, toward the whole of culture, toward all suffering existence: feelings which acquire their value through their connection with particularly difficult and remote knowledge (pity in itself is worth little). – But what standard, what gold-scale is there for their genuineness? Is it not almost a duty to be mistrustful of all who speak of having feelings of this kind?

158.

The fatality of greatness. – Every great appearance is followed by degeneration, especially in the domain of art. The example of the great provokes the vainer natures to outward imitation or to outdoing; besides this, all great gifts have about them the fateful quality of crushing many weaker powers and seeds and, as it were, laying waste to nature all around them. The happiest case in the development of an art is that in which several geniuses hold one another in check; in this

struggle the weaker and more delicate natures are usually granted air and light as well.

159.

Art dangerous to the artist. – When art seizes an individual powerfully, it draws him back to the views of those times when art flourished most vigorously; it then works regressively. The artist comes more and more to revere sudden excitements, believes in gods and demons, ensouls nature, hates science, becomes changeable in his moods like the men of antiquity, and longs for an overthrow of all conditions that are not favourable to art, and this, indeed, with the vehemence and unreasonableness of a child. Now the artist is in himself already a backward being, because he stops short at play, which belongs to youth and childhood: added to this is the fact that he is gradually formed back into other times. Thus there arises at last a violent antagonism between him and the men of his own age and period, and a gloomy end; just as, according to the tales of the ancients, Homer and Aeschylus at last lived and died in melancholy.

160.

Created human beings. - When it is said that the dramatist (and the artist in general) really creates characters, this is a fine deception and exaggeration, in whose existence and spread art celebrates one of its unintended, as it were superfluous triumphs. In fact we understand very little of a real living human being and generalize very superficially when we ascribe to him this or that character: to this very imperfect relation of ours to human beings the poet now corresponds, in that he makes sketches of human beings (in this sense "creates") just as superficial as our knowledge of human beings is superficial. There is much illusion in these created characters of the artists; they are by no means natural products of flesh and blood, but, like painted

people, a little all too thin; they do not bear being looked at from close up. And when it is even said that the character of the ordinary living human being often contradicts itself, whereas the one created by the dramatist is the archetype that nature had in mind, this is entirely false. A real human being is something wholly and utterly necessary (even in those so-called contradictions), but we do not always recognize this necessity. The invented human being, the phantasm, means to signify something necessary, yet only before those who understand even a real human being only in a crude, unnatural simplification: so that a few strong, often repeated traits, with a great deal of light upon them and a great deal of shadow and half-darkness around them, fully satisfy their demands. They are therefore readily prepared to treat the phantasm as a real, necessary human being, because they are accustomed, with the real human being, to take a phantasm, a silhouette, an arbitrary abbreviation for the whole. - That the painter and the sculptor should even express the "idea" of the human being is sheer fantasy and deception of the senses: one is being tyrannized by the eye when one says such a thing, since of the human body itself it sees only the surface, the skin; but the inner body belongs just as much to the idea. The plastic arts want to make characters visible on the skin; the art of speech takes up the word for the same purpose, it depicts character in sound. Art proceeds from the natural ignorance of human beings about their interior (in body and character): it does not exist for physicists and philosophers.

161.

Overestimation of self in the belief in artists and philosophers. - We all think the quality of a work of art, of an artist, is proven if he seizes us, shakes us. But for that our own quality in judgement and sensation would first have to be proven: which is not the case. Who in the realm of the plastic arts has seized and enraptured more than Bernini,

who has had a mightier effect than that post-Demosthenean rhetor who introduced the Asiatic style and brought it to dominance for two centuries? This dominance over whole centuries proves nothing for the quality and lasting validity of a style; therefore one should not be too sure in one's good faith in any artist: such faith is, after all, not only faith in the truthfulness of our sensation, but also in the infallibility of our judgement, whereas judgement or sensation or both may themselves be too coarse or too fine in kind, overstrained or crude. Nor do the blessings and beatitudes of a philosophy, of a religion, prove anything for their truth: just as little as the happiness which the madman enjoys from his fixed idea proves anything for the rationality of that idea.

162.

Cult of the genius out of vanity. - Because we think well of ourselves, yet by no means expect of ourselves that we could ever make the sketch of a Raphaelite painting or such a scene as that of a Shakespearean drama, we persuade ourselves that the capacity for it is quite excessively wonderful, an altogether rare accident, or, if we still feel religiously, a grace from above. Thus our vanity, our self-love, promotes the cult of the genius: for only when he is thought of as quite remote from us, as a miraculum, does he not wound (even Goethe, the unenvious, called Shakespeare his star of the farthest height; whereby one may recall that verse: "the stars, one does not covet them"). But apart from those whisperings of our vanity, the activity of the genius by no means appears as something fundamentally different from the activity of the mechanical inventor, of the scholar of astronomy or history, of the master of tactics. All these activities explain themselves if one pictures to oneself human beings whose thinking is active in one direction, who use everything as material, who always watch their own inner life and that of others with

zeal, who everywhere perceive models, incitements, who never tire in combining their means. The genius too does nothing but first learn to lay stones, then to build, always seeking material and always shaping it. Every activity of human beings is astonishingly complicated, not only that of the genius: but none is a "miracle." - Whence, then, the belief that genius exists only in the artist, orator and philosopher? that only they have "intuition"? (whereby one ascribes to them a kind of miraculous eyeglass with which they see directly into "essence"!) People evidently speak of genius only where the effects of the great intellect are most agreeable to them and where, again, they do not wish to feel envy. To call someone "divine" means "here we need not compete". Furthermore: everything finished, perfect is marvelled at, everything in the process of becoming is underestimated. Now no one can watch in the artist's work how it came to be; that is his advantage, for wherever one can see the becoming, one is somewhat cooled. The consummate art of representation wards off all thought of becoming; it tyrannizes as present perfection. That is why the artists of representation are chiefly considered to have genius, but not the men of science. In truth, that esteem and this underestimation are only a childishness of reason.

163.

The seriousness of craft. – Do not speak of giftedness, of inborn talents! One could name great men of every kind who were little gifted. But they acquired greatness, became "geniuses" (as people say), through qualities whose lack no one who is conscious of it likes to speak of: they all had that sturdy craftsman's seriousness which first learns to form the parts perfectly before it ventures to make a great whole; they gave themselves time for it, because they took more pleasure in doing the small, incidental thing well than in the effect of a dazzling whole. The recipe, for example, for how one may become a

good novella-writer is easy to give, but carrying it out presupposes qualities that one is accustomed to overlook when one says "I have not enough talent". Let one only make a hundred or more sketches for novellas, none longer than two pages, yet of such clarity that every word in them is necessary; let one write down anecdotes every day until one learns to find their most pregnant, most effective form; let one be untiring in collecting and depicting human types and characters; let one above all relate things as often as possible and listen to things being related, with a keen eye and ear for the effect upon the others present; let one travel like a landscape painter and costume designer; let one excerpt for oneself from the individual sciences everything that produces artistic effects when it is well presented; let one, finally, reflect upon the motives of human actions, disdain no hint of instruction on this matter, and be a collector of such things by day and by night. In this manifold practice let some ten years pass: what is then created in the workshop may also go out into the light of the street. – But how do most people go about it? They begin not with the part but with the whole. They perhaps once make a lucky strike, arouse attention, and from then on make ever worse strikes, for good, natural reasons. – Sometimes, when reason and character are lacking to shape such an artistic plan of life, fate and necessity take their place and lead the future master step by step through all the conditions of his craft.

164.

Danger and gain in the cult of genius. – The belief in great, superior, fruitful spirits is not necessarily, but still very frequently, bound up with that wholly or half religious superstition that those spirits are of superhuman origin and possess certain miraculous faculties by means of which they partake of their knowledge by an entirely different path from the rest of mankind. One ascribes to them, it seems, an immedi-

ate view into the essence of the world, as it were through a hole in the cloak of appearance, and believes that without the toil and rigour of science, by virtue of this miraculous seer's gaze, they could communicate something final and decisive about man and world. So long as the miracle in the domain of knowledge still finds believers, one may perhaps concede that some benefit results from it for the believers themselves, inasmuch as through their unconditional subordination to the great spirits they procure for their own spirit, during the period of its development, the best discipline and schooling. On the other hand it is at least questionable whether the superstition about genius, about its privileges and special faculties, is of benefit to the genius himself when it takes root in him. It is in any case a dangerous sign when a man is overcome by that shudder before himself, be it the famous Caesarean shudder or the genius-shudder here under consideration; when the fragrance of sacrifice, which in fairness one offers to a god alone, rises into the brain of the genius, so that he begins to totter and to hold himself to be something superhuman. The slow consequences are: the feeling of unaccountability, of exceptional rights, the belief that he confers grace merely by his company, insane rage at any attempt to compare him with others or even to rate him lower and to bring to light what is botched in his work. Because he ceases to practise criticism upon himself, at last one pinion after another falls from his plumage: that superstition gnaws at the roots of his strength and perhaps even makes him a hypocrite after his strength has departed from him. For great spirits themselves, therefore, it is probably more useful if they come to an insight into their strength and its origin, if they thus comprehend which purely human qualities have flowed together in them, which fortunate circumstances were added – that is, on the one hand sustained energy, resolute turning towards particular goals, great personal courage, and on the other the good fortune of an upbringing which early offered the best teachers, models, methods. To be sure, if their aim is to produce

the greatest possible effect, then unclarity about themselves and that accompaniment of half-madness have always accomplished much; for in every age it is precisely that power in them which has been admired and envied by virtue of which they render men will-less and sweep them away into the delusion that supernatural leaders were going before them. Indeed, it elevates and inspires men to believe someone to be in possession of supernatural powers: in this respect madness, as Plato says, has brought the greatest blessings upon mankind. – In individual rare cases this portion of madness may well also have been the means by which such a nature, excessive in every direction, was held firmly together: in the life of individuals too, delusions often have the value of remedies which are in themselves poisons; yet in the end, with every "genius" who believes in his own divinity, the poison shows itself in proportion as the "genius" grows old: one may recall, for example, Napoleon, whose being surely grew together into the mighty unity that raises him out from among all modern men precisely through his belief in himself and his star and through the contempt for men that flowed from it, until at last, however, this same belief passed over into an almost insane fatalism, robbed him of his quickness and sharpness of sight, and became the cause of his downfall.

165.

Genius and the void. – Precisely the original minds among artists, those who draw from themselves, can under certain circumstances bring forth what is utterly empty and stale, whereas the more dependent natures, the so-called talents, are full of recollections of every possible good thing and produce something tolerable even in a state of weakness. But when the original ones are forsaken by themselves, recollection gives them no help: they become empty.

166.

The public. - From tragedy the people really desire no more than to be properly moved, so that for once they can have a good cry; the artist, by contrast, who sees the new tragedy, takes his delight in the ingenious technical inventions and artifices, in the handling and distribution of the material, in the new turn given to old motifs, old thoughts. His stance is the aesthetic stance towards the work of art, that of the creator; the one first described, with sole regard to the material, is that of the people. Of the man in between there is nothing to say: he is neither people nor artist and does not know what he wants; and so his delight, too, is vague and slight.

167.

Artistic education of the public. - Unless the same motif is treated a hundredfold by different masters, the public does not learn to get beyond interest in the subject matter; but in the end it will itself grasp and enjoy the nuances, the delicate new inventions in the treatment of this motif, once, that is, it has long known the motif from numerous treatments and no longer feels in it any charm of novelty or suspense.

168.

Artist and following must keep in step. - The progress from one stage of style to the next must be so slow that not only the artists but also the listeners and spectators join in this progress and know exactly what is going on. Otherwise there suddenly opens that great gulf between the artist, who creates his works on remote heights, and the public, which can no longer climb up to those heights and at last, out of sorts, descends again lower still. For when the artist no longer raises his public, it quickly sinks downward, and indeed it falls the

deeper and the more perilously the higher a genius has carried it, like the eagle from whose talons the tortoise, carried up into the clouds, falls down to its ruin.

169.

Origin of the comic. - If one considers that man was for many hundreds of thousands of years an animal susceptible to fear in the highest degree, and that everything sudden and unexpected bade him be ready to fight, perhaps ready to die; that indeed even later, in social conditions, all security rested upon the expected, upon tradition in opinion and activity: then one need not wonder that at everything sudden and unexpected in word and deed, when it breaks in without danger or harm, man becomes exuberant, passes over into the opposite of fear: the being that trembled with dread, hunched together, springs upright, unfolds itself wide - man laughs. This transition from momentary dread to short-lived high spirits is called the comic. In the phenomenon of the tragic, on the other hand, man passes swiftly from great, lasting high spirits into great dread; but since among mortals great lasting high spirits are far rarer than occasion for dread, there is much more of the comic than of the tragic in the world; one laughs far more often than one is shaken.

170.

Artist's ambition. - The Greek artists, the tragedians for example, wrote in order to win; their whole art is unthinkable without contest: the good Eris of Hesiod, ambition, gave their genius its wings. Now this ambition demanded above all that their work should attain the highest excellence in their own eyes, as they themselves understood excellence, without regard to a prevailing taste and the general opinion as to what is excellent in a work of art; and so Aeschylus and Euripides long remained without success, until at last they had edu-

cated for themselves judges of art who assessed their work by the standards that they themselves applied. Thus they strive for victory over rivals by their own estimation, before their own tribunal; they wish really to be more excellent; then they demand from outside agreement with this estimation of their own, confirmation of their judgement. To strive for honour here means "to make oneself superior and to wish that it should also appear so publicly". If the former is lacking and the latter is nonetheless desired, one speaks of vanity. If the latter is lacking and is not missed, one speaks of pride.

171.

The necessary in the work of art. - Those who talk so much of the necessary in a work of art exaggerate, if they are artists, in majorem artis gloriam, or, if they are laymen, out of ignorance. The forms of a work of art which make its thoughts speak, and are thus its manner of speaking, always have something dispensable about them, like every kind of language. The sculptor can add or leave out many small touches: so too the performer, be he an actor or, where music is concerned, a virtuoso or conductor. These many small touches and refinements give him pleasure today, not tomorrow; they are there more for the artist's sake than for art's, for he too, amid the rigour and self-mastery that the presentation of the main thought demands of him, occasionally needs his sweetmeats and toys, lest he grow sullen.

172.

Making one forget the master. - The pianist who performs the work of a master will have played best when he has made us forget the master, and when it seemed as though he were telling a story from his own life or were experiencing something at this very moment. To be sure: if he is nothing of significance, everyone will curse the garrulousness with which he tells us about his life. So he must know how to win the

listener's imagination over to himself. And from this, in turn, all the weaknesses and follies of "virtuosity" are explained.

173.

Corriger la fortune. - There are evil accidents in the lives of great artists which compel the painter, for example, to sketch his most significant picture only as a fleeting thought, or which compelled Beethoven, for example, to leave us in several great sonatas (as in the great B-flat major) only the inadequate piano reduction of a symphony. Here the artist who comes later should seek to correct the lives of the great after the fact: as would be done, for example, by one who, as a master of all orchestral effects, awakened to life for us that symphony which had fallen into the apparent death of the piano.

174.

Diminishing. - Many things, events or persons do not bear being treated on a small scale. One cannot diminish the Laocoön group into a knick-knack; it needs grandeur. But far rarer is it that something small by nature bears enlargement; which is why biographers will always sooner succeed in presenting a great man as small than a small man as great.

175.

Sensuality in the art of the present. - Artists nowadays often miscalculate when they work towards a sensual effect for their works of art; for their spectators or listeners no longer have their full senses and, quite contrary to the artist's intention, are brought by his work of art into - a "holiness" of feeling closely akin to boredom. - Their sensuality perhaps begins just where the artist's leaves off; at most, then, they meet at a single point.

176.

Shakespeare as moralist. - Shakespeare reflected a great deal on the passions and, by his temperament, probably had very close access to many of them (dramatists are in general rather wicked men). But he was not able, like Montaigne, to discourse upon them; instead he put his observations on the passions into the mouths of passionate characters: which is indeed contrary to nature, but makes his dramas so full of thought that they make all others seem empty and easily arouse a general aversion to them. - Schiller's maxims (which are almost always grounded in false or insignificant notions) are precisely theatre maxims and as such have a very strong effect: whereas Shakespeare's maxims do honour to his model Montaigne and contain wholly serious thoughts in polished form, but are for that very reason too remote and too subtle for the eyes of the theatre public, and thus ineffective.

177.

Making oneself heard well. - One must know not only how to play well, but also how to make oneself heard well. The violin in the hand of the greatest master gives off nothing but a chirping if the room is too large; there one may confuse the master with any bungler.

178.

The incomplete as the effective. - Just as figures in relief act so strongly upon the imagination because they are, as it were, on the point of stepping out of the wall and suddenly, checked by something or other, come to a halt: so at times the incomplete, relief-like presentation of a thought, of an entire philosophy, is more effective than its exhaustive elaboration: more is left to the work of the beholder, he is stirred to develop further what stands out before him in such

strong light and shadow, to think it through to the end, and himself to overcome that obstacle which until then had hindered its stepping wholly forth.

179.

Against the original ones. - When art clothes itself in the most threadbare material, one recognizes it best as art.

180.

Collective spirit. - A good writer has not only his own spirit, but also the spirit of his friends.

181.

Twofold misjudgement. - The misfortune of acute and lucid writers is that they are taken for shallow and therefore no effort is spent on them: and the good fortune of the unclear ones is that the reader toils away at them and credits them with the joy he takes in his own zeal.

182.

Relation to science. - None of those have any real interest in a science who only begin to warm to it once they themselves have made discoveries in it.

183.

The key. - The one thought on which a significant man, to the laughter and mockery of the insignificant, sets great value is for him a key to hidden treasure-chambers, for them no more than a piece of old iron.

184.

Untranslatable. - What is untranslatable in a book is neither the best nor the worst in it.

185.

Paradoxes of the author. - The so-called paradoxes of the author, at which a reader takes offence, are frequently not in the author's book at all, but in the reader's head.

186.

Wit. - The wittiest authors produce the barely noticeable smile.

187.

The antithesis. - The antithesis is the narrow gate through which error most likes to steal its way to truth.

188.

Thinkers as stylists. - Most thinkers write badly because they communicate to us not only their thoughts but also the thinking of the thoughts.

189.

Thoughts in a poem. - The poet conducts his thoughts along in festive procession, on the chariot of rhythm: usually because they cannot walk on foot.

190.

Sin against the spirit of the reader. - When the author denies his talent merely to put himself on a level with the reader, he commits

the one deadly sin which the latter never forgives him: provided, that is, he notices something of it. One may otherwise say every evil thing of a man: but in the manner in which one says it, one must know how to raise up his vanity again.

191.

Limit of honesty. - Even the most honest writer lets slip one word too many when he wants to round off a period.

192.

The best author. - The best author will be the one who is ashamed to become a writer.

193.

Draconian law against writers. - One ought to regard a writer as a malefactor who only in the rarest cases deserves acquittal or pardon: that would be a remedy against the proliferation of books.

194.

The fools of modern culture. - The fools of the medieval courts correspond to our feuilletonists; it is the same species of men, half-rational, witty, exaggerated, silly, sometimes there only to soften the pathos of the mood with notions and chatter and to drown out with clamour the all too heavy, solemn pealing of the bells of great events; formerly in the service of princes and nobles, now in the service of parties (just as in party spirit and party discipline a good part of the old submissiveness in the people's dealings with the prince still lives on). The whole modern class of literati, however, stands very close to the feuilletonists; they are the "fools of modern culture", whom one judges more mildly if one takes them as not wholly accountable. To

regard authorship as a vocation for life ought in fairness to count as a kind of madness.

195.

After the Greeks. - What greatly stands in the way of knowledge at present is that all words have become vaporous and inflated through a century of exaggerated feeling. The higher stage of culture, which places itself under the rule (though not under the tyranny) of knowledge, has need of a great sobering of feeling and a strong concentration of all words; in which the Greeks in the age of Demosthenes went before us. Extravagance marks all modern writings; and even when they are simply written, the words in them are still felt too eccentrically. Rigorous reflection, compression, coldness, plainness, even deliberately carried down to the limit, in general a holding-back of feeling and taciturnity - that alone can help. - Incidentally, this cold manner of writing and feeling is, as a contrast, very alluring now: and therein, to be sure, lies a new danger. For sharp cold is as much a stimulant as a high degree of heat.

196.

Good narrators bad explainers. - In good narrators an admirable psychological sureness and consistency, so far as these can emerge in the actions of their characters, often stands in downright ludicrous contrast to the unpractisedness of their psychological thinking: so that their culture appears in one moment as eminently high as in the next it appears lamentably low. It happens all too frequently that they explain their own heroes and their actions in a manifestly wrong way - there is no doubt about it, however improbable the matter sounds. Perhaps the greatest pianist has reflected but little on the technical conditions and on the particular virtue, vice, usefulness and educabil-

ity of each finger (dactylic ethics), and makes gross mistakes when he speaks of such things.

197.

The writings of acquaintances and their readers. - We read the writings of acquaintances (friends and enemies) doubly, inasmuch as our knowledge continually whispers alongside: "this is by him, a mark of his inner nature, of his experiences, of his gifts", while another kind of knowledge at the same time seeks to establish what the yield of that work is in itself, what estimation it deserves in general, apart from its author, what enrichment of knowledge it brings with it. These two kinds of reading and weighing disturb each other, as goes without saying. A conversation with a friend, too, will only ripen good fruits of knowledge when both at last think only of the matter and forget that they are friends.

198.

Rhythmic sacrifices. - Good writers alter the rhythm of many a period merely because they do not credit ordinary readers with the capacity to grasp the measure which the period followed in its first version: therefore they make it easier for them by giving preference to more familiar rhythms. - This consideration for the rhythmic incapacity of present-day readers has drawn many a sigh, for much has already fallen victim to it. - Might it not fare similarly with good musicians?

199.

The incomplete as an artistic stimulant. - The incomplete is often more effective than completeness, especially in the eulogy: for its purposes one needs precisely an enticing incompleteness, as an irrational element which conjures up before the listener's imagination a

sea and, like a mist, conceals the opposite shore, that is, the limitedness of the object to be praised. If one mentions the known merits of a man and is detailed and expansive in doing so, this always gives rise to the suspicion that these are his only merits. He who praises completely places himself above the one praised; he seems to survey him. Therefore the complete has a weakening effect.

200.

Caution in writing and teaching. - Whoever has once written and feels the passion for writing within himself learns from almost everything he does and experiences only that which can be communicated in writing. He no longer thinks of himself, but of the writer and his public; he wants insight, but not for his own use. Whoever is a teacher is for the most part incapable of pursuing anything of his own for his own good any longer; he always thinks of the good of his pupils, and every piece of knowledge gladdens him only in so far as he can teach it. In the end he regards himself as a thoroughfare of learning and altogether as a means, so that he has lost all seriousness on his own account.

201.

Bad writers necessary. - There will always have to be bad writers, for they answer to the taste of the undeveloped, immature age groups; these have their need just as well as the riper ones. Were human life longer, the number of individuals who have grown ripe would turn out to be preponderant or at least equal to that of the unripe; as it is, however, by far the most die too young, that is to say, there are always many more undeveloped intellects with bad taste. These, moreover, crave the satisfaction of their need with the greater vehemence of youth, and they compel bad authors into being for themselves.

202.

Too near and too far. - Reader and author often fail to understand each other because the author knows his theme too well and finds it almost tedious, so that he spares himself the examples which he knows by the hundred; the reader, however, is a stranger to the matter and readily finds it ill-founded when the examples are withheld from him.

203.

A vanished preparation for art. - Of all that the Gymnasium pursued, the most valuable was the exercise in Latin style: this was in fact an exercise in art, whereas all other occupations had only knowledge as their aim. To put the German essay first is barbarism, for we have no exemplary German style grown up out of public eloquence; but if one wishes to promote practice in thinking by means of the German essay, then it is certainly better for the time being to disregard style in it altogether, that is, to separate practice in thinking from practice in presentation. The latter ought to concern itself with the manifold framing of a given content, and not with the independent invention of a content. Mere presentation of a given content was the task of Latin style, for which the old teachers possessed a fineness of ear long since lost. Whoever formerly learned to write well in a modern language owed it to this exercise (now one must perforce send oneself to school with the older Frenchmen); but more than that: he gained a notion of the loftiness and difficulty of form and was prepared for art in general in the only right way, through practice.

204.

The obscure and the over-bright side by side. - Writers who in general do not know how to give their thoughts clarity will, in particulars, by preference choose the strongest, most exaggerated designations and

superlatives: thereby arises an effect of light like torchlight on tangled forest paths.

205.

Writerly painting. - One will best depict a significant subject if one takes the colours for the painting from the subject itself, like a chemist, and then uses them like an artist: so that one lets the drawing grow out of the boundaries and transitions of the colours. Thus the painting acquires something of the enthralling natural element that makes the subject itself significant.

206.

Books that teach how to dance. - There are writers who, by presenting the impossible as possible and by speaking of the moral and the genius-like as if both were only a whim, a matter of choice, produce a feeling of exuberant freedom, as if a man were rising on the tips of his toes and simply had to dance for inner delight.

207.

Thoughts that have not been finished. - Just as not only manhood but also youth and childhood have a value in themselves and are not to be esteemed merely as passages and bridges, so too unfinished thoughts have their value. One must therefore not torment a poet with subtle interpretation, but take pleasure in the uncertainty of his horizon, as though the way to several thoughts still stood open. One stands at the threshold; one waits as at the digging up of a treasure: it is as if a lucky find of profundity were just about to be made. The poet anticipates something of the thinker's delight in finding a cardinal thought and thereby makes us covetous, so that we snatch at it; but it flutters

past our head and shows the loveliest butterfly wings - and yet it slips away from us.

208.

The book become almost a human being. - Every writer is surprised anew at how the book, as soon as it has detached itself from him, goes on living a life of its own; he feels as though one part of an insect had been severed and now went on its own way. Perhaps he forgets it almost entirely, perhaps he rises above the views set down in it, perhaps he even no longer understands it and has lost those wings on which he flew when he devised that book: meanwhile it seeks out its readers, kindles life, gladdens, terrifies, engenders new works, becomes the soul of resolutions and actions - in short: it lives like a being endowed with spirit and soul, and yet is no human being. - The happiest lot has fallen to the author who, as an old man, can say that all the life-engendering, strengthening, elevating, enlightening thoughts and feelings that were in him live on still in his writings, and that he himself signifies only the grey ash, while the fire has been rescued and carried onward everywhere. - If one now goes so far as to consider that every action of a human being, not only a book, in some way becomes the occasion for other actions, decisions, thoughts, that everything that happens is knotted inextricably fast to everything that will happen, then one recognizes the real immortality that exists, that of motion: what has once moved is enclosed and eternalized in the total union of all that is, like an insect in amber.

209.

Joy in old age. - The thinker, and likewise the artist, who has taken refuge with his better self in works, feels an almost malicious joy when he sees how his body and spirit are slowly broken into and destroyed by time, as if from a corner he were watching a thief at work

on his strongbox, while knowing that it is empty and all the treasures are safe.

210.

Quiet fruitfulness. - The born aristocrats of the spirit are not too zealous; their creations appear and fall from the tree on a quiet autumn evening, without being hastily craved, hurried on, or displaced by something new. The ceaseless will to create is vulgar and betrays jealousy, envy, ambition. If one is something, one actually need make nothing - and yet does a great deal. Above the "productive" human being there is yet a higher species.

211.

Achilles and Homer. - It is always as between Achilles and Homer: the one has the experience, the sensation, the other describes it. A true writer merely gives words to the passion and experience of others; he is an artist in order to divine much from the little he has felt. Artists are by no means the people of great passion, but they frequently pass themselves off as such, from the unconscious feeling that their painted passion will be trusted more if their own life speaks for their experience in this domain. One need only let oneself go, not master oneself, grant open scope to one's anger, one's desire, and at once all the world cries: how passionate he is! But there is something peculiar about the deep-burrowing passion that gnaws at the individual and often devours him: whoever lives through it certainly does not describe it in dramas, in music or in novels. Artists are frequently unbridled individuals, insofar as they are precisely not artists: but that is something else.

212.

Old doubts about the effect of art. - Are pity and fear really, as Aristotle would have it, to be discharged by tragedy, so that the listener returns home colder and calmer? Are ghost stories supposed to make one less fearful and superstitious? It is true of certain physical processes, for example of the enjoyment of love, that with the satisfaction of a need there comes an alleviation and temporary abatement of the drive. But fear and pity are not in this sense needs of particular organs which want to be relieved. And in the long run every drive is in fact strengthened by practice in its satisfaction, despite those periodic alleviations. It would be possible that pity and fear were in each individual case mitigated and discharged by tragedy: nevertheless they might on the whole grow greater through the tragic influence altogether, and Plato would after all be right when he holds that through tragedy one becomes, all in all, more anxious and more sentimental. The tragic poet himself would then necessarily acquire a gloomy, fearful view of the world and a soft, irritable, tearful soul; it would likewise accord with Plato's opinion if the tragic poets, and likewise entire civic communities which take particular delight in them, degenerated into ever greater immoderation and unbridledness. - But what right has our age at all to give an answer to Plato's great question concerning the moral influence of art? Even if we had art, - where do we have the influence, any influence whatever, of art?

213.

Joy in nonsense. - How can man take joy in nonsense? For wherever in the world there is laughter, this is the case; indeed one may say that almost everywhere there is happiness, there is joy in nonsense. The overturning of experience into its opposite, of the purposive into the purposeless, of the necessary into the arbitrary, yet in such a way that this process does no harm and is merely imagined once out of

high spirits, delights us, for it frees us for a moment from the compulsion of the necessary, the purposive and the empirical, in which we ordinarily see our inexorable masters; we play and laugh, then, when the expected (which ordinarily makes us anxious and tense) discharges itself without doing harm. It is the joy of slaves at the feast of the Saturnalia.

214.

Ennoblement of reality. — Because men saw a divinity in the aphrodisiac drive and felt it working within them with worshipful gratitude, that affect has in the course of time been shot through with higher trains of ideas and has thereby in fact been greatly ennobled. Thus some peoples, by virtue of this art of idealizing, have created out of illnesses great auxiliary powers of culture: for example the Greeks, who in earlier centuries suffered from great nervous epidemics (of the kind of epilepsy and St. Vitus' dance) and out of them fashioned the glorious type of the bacchante. — For the Greeks possessed anything but a foursquare, robust health; — their secret was to revere even illness as a god, provided only that it had power.

215.

Music. — Music is not in and of itself so full of significance for our inner being, so profoundly stirring, that it might count as the immediate language of feeling; rather, its ancient union with poetry has laid so much symbolism into rhythmic movement, into the loudness and softness of tone, that we now fancy it speaks directly to the inner being and comes from the inner being. Dramatic music becomes possible only once the art of sound has conquered for itself an enormous realm of symbolic means, through song, opera and a hundredfold attempts at tone-painting. "Absolute music" is either form in itself, in the raw state of music, where sounding in measured time and with

varying loudness gives pleasure as such, or else the symbolism of forms that speaks to the understanding even without poetry, after the two arts have been joined through a long development and the musical form has at last been entirely interwoven with threads of concept and feeling. People who have lagged behind in the development of music can feel the same piece in a purely formalistic way, where the advanced understand everything symbolically. In itself no music is profound and significant; it does not speak of the "will", of the "thing in itself"; the intellect could fancy that only in an age which had conquered the whole compass of the inner life for musical symbolism. The intellect itself first laid this significance into sound, just as it has likewise laid significance into the proportions of lines and masses in architecture, a significance which, however, is in itself wholly foreign to mechanical laws.

216.

Gesture and language. — Older than language is the imitation of gestures, which takes place involuntarily and is even now, despite a general suppression of the language of gesture and a cultivated mastery of the muscles, so strong that we cannot look upon a moving face without innervation of our own face (one can observe that feigned yawning in one person calls forth natural yawning in another who sees it). The imitated gesture led the one who imitated back to the sensation which it expressed in the face or body of the one imitated. Thus men learned to understand one another: thus the child still learns to understand its mother. In general, painful sensations may well have been expressed by gestures which in their turn cause pain (for example by tearing out one's hair, beating one's breast, violent contortions and tensings of the facial muscles). Conversely: gestures of pleasure were themselves pleasurable and were thereby readily suited to the communication of understanding (laughter, as the ex-

pression of being tickled, which is pleasurable, served in turn to express other pleasurable sensations). — As soon as men understood one another in gestures, a symbolism of gesture could in turn arise: I mean, men could come to an understanding through a language of tonal signs, in such a way that at first they produced sound and gesture (to which the sound was symbolically added), later only the sound. — It seems that in early times the same thing often happened there which now takes place before our eyes and ears in the development of music, especially of dramatic music: whereas music at first, without explanatory dance and mime (language of gesture), is empty noise, through long habituation to that juxtaposition of music and movement the ear is schooled in the immediate interpretation of tonal figures and at last attains a height of swift understanding at which it no longer needs the visible movement at all and understands the tone-poet without it. One then speaks of absolute music, that is, of music in which everything is at once understood symbolically without further aid.

217.

The desensualization of higher art. — Our ears, by virtue of the extraordinary exercise of the intellect through the artistic development of modern music, have grown ever more intellectual. That is why we now endure far greater volume of sound, far more "noise", than our forefathers, because we are far better practised in listening for the reason within it. Indeed all our senses have, precisely because they immediately ask after the reason, that is, after the "it means" and no longer after the "it is", become somewhat blunted: as such a blunting betrays itself, for example, in the unconditional dominion of tempered tuning; for nowadays ears that still make the finer distinctions, for example between C sharp and D flat, are among the exceptions. In this respect our ear has grown coarser. Furthermore, the ugly side of

the world, originally hostile to the senses, has been conquered for music; its domain of power, especially for the expression of the sublime, the terrible, the mysterious, has thereby been astonishingly enlarged; our music now brings things to speech which formerly had no tongue. In a similar way some painters have made the eye more intellectual and have gone far beyond what was formerly called delight in colour and form. Here too the side of the world originally deemed ugly has been conquered by the artistic understanding. — What is the consequence of all this? The more capable of thought eye and ear become, the closer they come to the boundary where they become unsensuous: delight is transferred into the brain, the sense organs themselves grow dull and weak, the symbolic steps more and more into the place of what is, — and so by this path we arrive at barbarism as surely as by any other. For the time being it is still said: the world is uglier than ever, but it signifies a more beautiful world than has ever been. But the more the ambergris fragrance of meaning disperses and evaporates, the rarer become those who still perceive it: and the rest at last stop short at the ugly and seek to enjoy it directly, in which, however, they must always fail. Thus there is in Germany a twofold current of musical development: here a band of ten thousand with ever higher, more delicate demands, listening ever more for the "it means", and there the enormous majority, which year by year grows ever more incapable of understanding the significant even in the form of sensuous ugliness, and therefore learns to reach with ever more relish for what is in itself ugly and disgusting, that is, for the lowly sensuous, in music.

218.

The stone is more stone than before. - On the whole we no longer understand architecture, at least not by a long way in the manner in which we understand music. We have outgrown the symbolism of

lines and figures, just as we have been weaned from the sonorous effects of rhetoric, and have no longer drunk in this kind of mother's milk of cultivation from the very first moment of our lives. In a Greek or Christian building everything originally meant something, and indeed with reference to a higher order of things: this mood of an inexhaustible significance lay about the building like an enchanted veil. Beauty entered the system only incidentally, without essentially impairing the fundamental feeling of the uncanny-sublime, of that which is consecrated by the nearness of the gods and by magic; beauty at most softened the dread, - but this dread was everywhere the presupposition. - What is the beauty of a building to us now? The same as the beautiful face of a mindless woman: something mask-like.

219.

Religious origin of more recent music. - Soulful music arises in the restored Catholicism after the Council of Trent, through Palestrina, who helped the newly awakened, fervent and deeply moved spirit to find its sound; later, with Bach, in Protestantism too, in so far as this had been deepened by the Pietists and released from its originally dogmatic fundamental character. The presupposition and necessary preliminary stage for both births is the engagement with music such as was proper to the age of the Renaissance and pre-Renaissance, namely that learned occupation with music, that at bottom scientific pleasure in the artifices of harmony and voice-leading. On the other hand, opera too must have gone before: in which the layman made known his protest against a cold music that had grown too learned, and sought to give Polyhymnia a soul once more. - Without that deeply religious change of mood, without the resounding of the most inwardly stirred heart, music would have remained learned or operatic; the spirit of the Counter-Reformation is the spirit of modern music (for that Pietism in Bach's music is also a kind of Counter-Reforma-

tion). So deeply are we indebted to religious life. - Music was the Counter-Renaissance in the domain of art; to it belongs the later painting of Murillo, to it perhaps also the Baroque style: more so, at any rate, than the architecture of the Renaissance or of antiquity. And even now one might ask: if our more recent music could move stones, would it assemble them into an antique architecture? I very much doubt it. For that which reigns in this music, the affect, the pleasure in heightened, widely stretched moods, the will to come alive at any price, the rapid change of sensation, the strong relief-effect in light and shadow, the juxtaposition of ecstasy and the naive, - all this has already reigned once before in the plastic arts and created new laws of style: - but it was neither in antiquity nor in the time of the Renaissance.

220.

The beyond in art. - Not without deep pain does one admit to oneself that the artists of all ages, in their highest flights, have borne aloft to a heavenly transfiguration precisely those representations which we now recognize as false: they are the glorifiers of the religious and philosophical errors of mankind, and they could not have been this without belief in the absolute truth of those errors. If, now, belief in such a truth declines altogether, if the rainbow colours about the outermost ends of human knowing and imagining grow pale: then that kind of art can never blossom again which, like the divina commedia, the pictures of Raphael, the frescoes of Michelangelo, the Gothic minsters, presupposes not only a cosmic but also a metaphysical significance in the objects of art. It will become a touching legend that there once was such an art, such an artist's faith.

221.

The revolution in poetry. - The strict constraint which the French dramatists imposed upon themselves with regard to unity of action, of place and of time, to style, to the construction of verse and sentence, to the choice of words and thoughts, was as important a school as that of counterpoint and fugue in the development of modern music, or as the Gorgian figures in Greek eloquence. To bind oneself in such a way may appear absurd; nonetheless there is no other means of getting out of naturalizing than first to restrict oneself in the very strongest (perhaps the very most arbitrary) fashion. One thus gradually learns to step with grace even upon the narrow footbridges that span dizzying abysses, and brings home as one's spoils the highest suppleness of movement: as the history of music proves before the eyes of all now living. Here one sees how, step by step, the fetters grow looser, until at last they can seem to have been thrown off entirely: this seeming is the highest result of a necessary development in art. In modern poetry there was no such fortunate gradual unwinding out of self-imposed fetters. Lessing made the French form, that is to say the only modern art form, a laughing-stock in Germany and pointed to Shakespeare, and so the steadiness of that unfettering was lost and a leap was made into naturalism - that is to say, back into the beginnings of art. From this Goethe tried to rescue himself by knowing how to bind himself again and again in different ways; but even the most gifted gets no further than continual experimenting once the thread of development has been broken. Schiller owes the approximate assurance of his form to the involuntarily revered, if also disowned, model of French tragedy, and kept himself fairly independent of Lessing (whose dramatic attempts, as is well known, he rejected). The French themselves, after Voltaire, were all at once lacking the great talents who might have carried the development of tragedy forward out of constraint to that semblance of freedom; later, following

the German example, they too made the leap into a kind of Rousseauian state of nature in art, and experimented. One need only read Voltaire's Mahomet from time to time in order to set clearly before one's soul what was lost to European culture once and for all through that break in tradition. Voltaire was the last of the great dramatists who tamed by Greek measure his many-formed soul, equal even to the greatest tragic thunderstorms - he was capable of what no German was yet capable of, because the nature of the Frenchman is far more akin to the Greek than is the nature of the German -; just as he was also the last great writer who, in the handling of prose speech, possessed a Greek ear, Greek artistic conscientiousness, Greek simplicity and grace; indeed, just as he was one of the last men able to unite within himself the highest freedom of spirit and an utterly unrevolutionary disposition without being inconsistent and cowardly. Since then the modern spirit, with its restlessness, its hatred of measure and limit, has come to dominion in every domain, first unbridled by the fever of the Revolution and then again putting a bridle on itself whenever fear and horror of itself came over it - but the bridle of logic, no longer of artistic measure. True, through that unfettering we enjoy for a time the poetries of all peoples, everything that has grown up in hidden places, the primal, the wild-blossoming, the strangely beautiful and the gigantically irregular, from the folk song all the way up to the "great barbarian" Shakespeare; we taste the joys of local colour and period costume, which were hitherto foreign to all artistic peoples; we make ample use of the "barbaric advantages" of our age, which Goethe urged against Schiller in order to set the formlessness of his Faust in the most favourable light. But for how much longer? The inrushing flood of poetries of all styles of all peoples must surely gradually wash away the soil upon which a quiet, hidden growth would still have been possible; all poets must surely become experimenting imitators, daredevil copyists, however great their strength may have been from the outset; the public, finally, which has un-

learned how to see the genuinely artistic deed in the taming of the power of representation, in the organizing mastery of all the means of art, must more and more value power for the sake of power, colour for the sake of colour, the thought for the sake of the thought, indeed inspiration for the sake of inspiration; it will accordingly not enjoy the elements and conditions of the work of art at all unless in isolation, and will in the end make the natural demand that the artist must also offer them to it in isolation. Yes, the "irrational" fetters of French-Greek art have been thrown off, but imperceptibly one has grown accustomed to finding all fetters, all limitation irrational; - and so art moves towards its dissolution and in doing so passes through - which is, to be sure, highly instructive - all the phases of its beginnings, its childhood, its imperfection, its onetime ventures and excesses: in going to ruin it interprets its origin, its becoming. One of the great, upon whose instinct one may well rely and whose theory lacked nothing more than thirty years' more practice - Lord Byron once declared: "As regards poetry in general, the more I reflect upon it, the more firmly I am convinced that we are all of us on the wrong path, one as much as another. We all follow an inwardly false revolutionary system - our generation or the next will yet arrive at the same conviction." This is the same Byron who says: "I regard Shakespeare as the worst of models, though the most extraordinary of poets." And does not Goethe's matured artistic insight from the second half of his life say, at bottom, precisely the same? - that insight with which he gained such a lead over a whole series of generations that one may, by and large, maintain that Goethe has not yet had any effect at all and that his time is yet to come? Precisely because his nature held him fast for a long time upon the course of the poetic revolution, precisely because he savoured most thoroughly everything that had been indirectly discovered through that break in tradition by way of new finds, prospects, resources, and dug up, as it were, from beneath the ruins of art, his later transformation and conversion weighs so much: it

signifies that he felt the deepest longing to regain the tradition of art and, with the imagination of the eye at least, to invest the ruins and colonnades of the temple left standing with their ancient perfection and wholeness, should the strength of the arm prove far too weak to build where such tremendous forces had been needed merely to destroy. Thus he lived in art as in the remembrance of true art: his poetry had become an aid to remembrance, to the understanding of ancient, long-departed ages of art. His demands were indeed unfulfillable with regard to the strength of the new age; but the pain of this was richly outweighed by the joy that they had once been fulfilled and that we too can still partake in this fulfilment. Not individuals, but more or less idealized masks; no reality, but an allegorical universality; characters of the age, local colours muted to near invisibility and made mythical; present-day feeling and the problems of present-day society compressed into the simplest forms, stripped of their stimulating, exciting, pathological qualities, rendered ineffectual in every sense but the artistic; no new subjects and characters, but the old, long-familiar ones in ever-continuing re-animation and transformation: that is art as Goethe later understood it, as the Greeks, and indeed the French too, practised it.

222.

What remains of art. - It is true that, given certain metaphysical presuppositions, art possesses far greater value, for example if the belief holds that character is unchangeable and that the essence of the world continually expresses itself in all characters and actions: then the work of the artist becomes the image of what eternally endures, whereas by our conception the artist can only ever give his image validity for a time, because man as a whole has come to be and is changeable, and even the individual man is nothing fixed and enduring. - The same holds for another metaphysical presupposition: sup-

posing that our visible world were only appearance, as the metaphysicians assume, then art would come to stand rather close to the real world: for between the world of appearance and the dream-image world of the artist there would then be all too much that is alike; and the difference that remained would even set the significance of art higher than the significance of nature, because art would represent the uniform, the types and models of nature. - Those presuppositions, however, are false: what place, after this knowledge, now still remains for art? Above all, for thousands of years it has taught us to look upon life in every form with interest and pleasure, and to carry our feeling so far that we at last cry out: "however it may be, life, it is good." This teaching of art, to take pleasure in existence and to regard human life as a piece of nature, without too violent an emotional involvement, as an object of lawful development, - this teaching has grown into us, it now comes to light again as an all-powerful need for knowledge. One could give up art, but one would not thereby forfeit the capacity learned from it: just as one has given up religion, but not the heightenings and exaltations of the soul acquired through it. As the plastic arts and music are the measure of the wealth of feeling truly acquired and gained through religion, so, after a disappearance of art, the intensity and manifoldness of the joy of life planted by it would still demand satisfaction. The scientific man is the further development of the artistic.

223.

Evening glow of art. - Just as in old age one remembers one's youth and celebrates festivals of remembrance, so humanity will soon stand towards art in the relation of a touching remembrance of the joys of youth. Perhaps never before has art been grasped so deeply and soulfully as now, when the magic of death seems to play about it. Think of that Greek city in southern Italy which on one day of the year still

celebrated its Greek festivals, amid melancholy and tears that foreign barbarism was triumphing ever more over the customs they had brought with them; never, surely, has the Hellenic been so enjoyed, nowhere has this golden nectar been sipped with such voluptuousness, as among these dying Hellenes. The artist will soon be regarded as a glorious relic, and to him, as to a wondrous stranger on whose strength and beauty the happiness of earlier times depended, honours will be paid such as we do not readily grant to our own kind. The best in us is perhaps inherited from the feelings of earlier times, which we can now scarcely reach any longer by a direct path; the sun has already gone down, but the sky of our life still glows and shines from it, even though we no longer see it.

Fifth Division.

Signs of Higher and Lower Culture.

224.

Ennoblement through degeneration. - From history one may learn that the stock of a people preserves itself best when most of its members have a living communal sense as a consequence of the sameness of their habitual and indisputable principles, that is, as a consequence of their common faith. Here good, sturdy custom grows strong, here the subordination of the individual is learned, and firmness is given to character already as a birth-gift and afterwards further instilled by upbringing. The danger of these strong communities, founded upon individuals of like kind and full of character, is the stupefaction gradually heightened through inheritance, which follows all stability like its shadow. It is upon the less fettered, far more uncertain and morally weaker individuals that intellectual progress in such communities depends: they are the men who attempt new things and, in general, many things. Countless men of this kind perish on account of their weakness without any very visible effect; but on the whole, especially when they have descendants, they loosen things up and from time to time inflict a wound upon the stable element of a community. Precisely at this wounded and weakened spot something new is, as it were, inoculated into the whole being; its strength as a whole, however, must be great enough to take this new thing into its blood and assimilate it. Deviating natures are of the utmost importance wherever progress is to take place. Every progress on a large scale must be preceded by a partial weakening. The strongest natures hold fast to the type, the weaker help to develop it further. - Something similar holds for the individual human being; rarely is a degen-

eration, a mutilation, even a vice and in general a bodily or moral loss without an advantage on some other side. The sicklier man, for example, will perhaps, in the midst of a warlike and restless tribe, have more occasion to be by himself and thereby to grow calmer and wiser; the one-eyed man will have one stronger eye; the blind man will see deeper within and in any case hear more keenly. To this extent the famous struggle for existence does not seem to me the only point of view from which the progress or strengthening of a man, of a race, can be explained. Rather, two things must come together: first, the increase of the stable force through the binding of spirits in faith and communal feeling; then, the possibility of attaining higher goals through the occurrence of degenerating natures and, in consequence of them, partial weakenings and woundings of the stable force; it is precisely the weaker nature, as the more delicate and freer, that makes all progress possible at all. A people that crumbles somewhere and grows weak, but on the whole is still strong and healthy, is able to take in the infection of the new and incorporate it to its advantage. In the case of the individual man, the task of education runs thus: to set him so firmly and securely upon his feet that, as a whole, he can no longer be diverted from his course at all. But then the educator must inflict wounds upon him, or make use of the wounds that fate deals him, and when pain and need have thus arisen, something new and noble can also be inoculated into the wounded places. His whole nature will take it into itself and later, in its fruits, allow the ennoblement to be felt. - As regards the state, Machiavelli says that "the form of governments is of very slight importance, although half-educated people think otherwise. The great aim of statecraft should be duration, which outweighs all else, inasmuch as it is far more valuable than freedom." Only where the greatest duration is securely founded and guaranteed is steady development and ennobling inoculation possible at all. To be sure, the dangerous companion of all duration, authority, will usually resist it.

225.

Free spirit a relative concept. - One calls a free spirit him who thinks otherwise than would be expected of him on the basis of his origin, surroundings, his rank and office, or on the basis of the prevailing views of the age. He is the exception, the fettered spirits are the rule; these reproach him that his free principles either have their origin in a craving to attract attention or even give grounds to infer free actions, that is to say, such as are incompatible with fettered morality. Sometimes it is also said that this or that free principle is to be derived from eccentricity and overexcitement of the head; but only malice speaks thus, which does not itself believe what it says but wishes to do harm thereby: for the testimony to the greater goodness and keenness of his intellect is usually written on the free spirit's face, so legibly that the fettered spirits understand it well enough. But the two other derivations of free-spiritedness are honestly meant; indeed many free spirits do come into being in the one way or the other. For all that, however, the propositions they arrived at by those paths could still be truer and more reliable than those of the fettered spirits. In the knowledge of truth what matters is that one has it, not from what impulse one sought it, by what path one found it. If the free spirits are right, then the fettered spirits are wrong, regardless of whether the former came to truth out of immorality and the latter have hitherto held fast to untruth out of morality. - Moreover, it does not belong to the essence of the free spirit that he holds more correct views, but rather that he has freed himself from what is traditional, whether with success or with failure. As a rule, however, he will nonetheless have truth, or at least the spirit of the search for truth, on his side: he demands reasons, the others demand faith.

226.

Origin of faith. - The fettered spirit takes up his position not on the basis of reasons but out of habit; he is a Christian, for example, not because he had insight into the various religions and a choice among them; he is an Englishman not because he decided for England, but he found Christianity and Englishness already there and adopted them without reasons, as someone born in a wine-growing country becomes a wine-drinker. Later, when he was a Christian and an Englishman, he perhaps also discovered a few reasons in favour of his habit; one may overturn these reasons, but one does not thereby overturn him in his whole position. Compel a fettered spirit, for example, to bring forward his reasons against bigamy, and you will learn whether his holy zeal for monogamy rests upon reasons or upon habituation. Habituation to intellectual principles without reasons is called faith.

227.

Reasoning back from consequences to grounds and groundlessness. - All states and orders of society: the estates, marriage, education, law, all this has its strength and permanence solely in the faith the fettered spirits have in them, - that is, in the absence of grounds, or at least in the warding off of any asking after grounds. This the fettered spirits are loath to admit, and they feel well enough that it is a pudendum. Christianity, which was very innocent in its intellectual notions, noticed nothing of this pudendum, demanded faith and nothing but faith, and passionately rejected the demand for grounds; it pointed to the success of faith: you will soon feel the advantage of faith, it intimated, through it you shall be saved. In fact the state proceeds in just the same way, and every father brings up his son in like manner: only hold this to be true, he says, and you will feel how much good it does you. But this means that the truth of an opinion is to be proved

from the personal benefit it yields, that the wholesomeness of a doctrine is to vouch for its intellectual certainty and well-foundedness. It is as if the accused were to say before the court: my counsel is telling the whole truth, for only look at what follows from his speech: I shall be acquitted. - Because the fettered spirits hold their principles for the sake of their usefulness, they suppose of the free spirit too that he likewise seeks his own advantage with his views and holds only that to be true which happens to profit him. But since what seems to profit him is the very opposite of what profits his compatriots or the members of his estate, these assume that his principles are dangerous to them; they say or feel: he must not be right, for he is harmful to us.

228.

The strong, good character. - Fetteredness of views, become instinct through habit, leads to what is called strength of character. When someone acts from few motives, but always the same ones, his actions acquire great energy; if these actions are in harmony with the principles of the fettered spirits, they are acknowledged and, besides, produce in the one who performs them the sensation of a good conscience. Few motives, energetic action and a good conscience make up what is called strength of character. The man of strong character lacks knowledge of the many possibilities and directions of action; his intellect is unfree, fettered, because in any given case it shows him perhaps only two possibilities; between these he must now, in accordance with his whole nature, choose of necessity, and he does so easily and quickly because he does not have to choose among fifty possibilities. The educating environment seeks to make every human being unfree by always placing before his eyes the smallest number of possibilities. The individual is treated by his educators as though he were indeed something new, but ought to become a repetition. If the human being first appears as something unknown, something that has

never been before, he is to be made into something known, something that has been before. What is called good character in a child is the visible emergence of its fetteredness by what has been before; by placing itself on the side of the fettered spirits, the child first manifests its awakening public spirit; and on the basis of this public spirit it will later become useful to its state or its estate.

229.

The measure of things among the fettered spirits. - Of four kinds of things the fettered spirits say that they are in the right. First: all things that have permanence are in the right; second: all things that are not burdensome to us are in the right; third: all things that bring us advantage are in the right; fourth: all things for which we have made sacrifices are in the right. The last explains, for example, why a war that was begun against the will of the people is carried on with enthusiasm as soon as sacrifices have once been made. - The free spirits who plead their cause before the forum of the fettered spirits must demonstrate that there have always been free spirits, that is, that free-spiritedness has permanence; next, that they do not wish to be burdensome; and finally, that on the whole they bring advantage to the fettered spirits; but because they cannot convince the fettered spirits of this last point, it avails them nothing to have proved the first and second.

230.

Esprit fort. - Compared with one who has tradition on his side and needs no grounds for his actions, the free spirit is always weak, especially in action; for he knows too many motives and points of view and therefore has an uncertain, unpractised hand. What means are there, then, to make him relatively strong after all, so that he at least asserts himself and does not perish without effect? How does the

strong spirit (esprit fort) arise? This is, in a single instance, the question of the production of genius. Whence comes the energy, the unbending strength, the endurance with which the individual, in opposition to tradition, strives to acquire an entirely individual knowledge of the world?

231.

The origin of genius. - The ingenuity of the prisoner as he searches for means to free himself, the most cold-blooded and long-drawn-out exploitation of every smallest advantage, can teach us what instrument nature sometimes makes use of in order to bring genius into being - a word which I ask be understood without any mythological or religious flavour: she shuts it up in a dungeon and goads its desire to free itself to the utmost. - Or, to use another image: someone who has completely lost his way in the forest, but strives with uncommon energy to reach open country in some direction or other, sometimes discovers a new path that no one knows: thus arise the geniuses who are praised for originality. - It has already been mentioned that a mutilation, a crippling, a considerable deficiency in one organ often gives occasion for another organ to develop unusually well, because it has to perform its own function and another besides. From this the origin of many a brilliant talent may be guessed. - Let these general hints about the origin of genius be applied to the special case, the origin of the perfect free spirit.

232.

Conjecture on the origin of free-spiritedness. - Just as the glaciers grow when in the equatorial regions the sun burns down upon the seas with greater heat than before, so too a very strong, far-spreading free-spiritedness may well be testimony that somewhere the heat of feeling has grown extraordinarily.

233.

The voice of history. - In general, history seems to give the following instruction concerning the production of genius: mistreat and torment men, - so it cries to the passions of envy, hatred and rivalry - drive them to extremes, one against another, people against people, and that through centuries on end; then perhaps, as from a spark flying off to one side of the fearful energy thereby kindled, the light of genius will suddenly blaze up; the will, like a horse maddened by the rider's spur, then breaks out and leaps over into another domain. - Whoever came to consciousness of how genius is produced and wished also to carry out in practice the way nature usually proceeds would have to be just as evil and ruthless as nature. - But perhaps we have misheard.

234.

Value of the middle of the way. - Perhaps the production of genius is reserved only for a limited span of mankind's time. For one may not expect from the future of mankind all that at once which only quite definite conditions of some past or other were able to bring forth; not, for example, the astonishing effects of religious feeling. This itself has had its time, and much that is very good can never grow again, because it could grow only out of that feeling. Thus there will never again be a religiously bounded horizon of life and culture. Perhaps even the type of the saint is possible only with a certain confinement of the intellect, which, as it seems, is over and done with for all the future. And so the height of intelligence has perhaps been reserved for a single age of mankind: it emerged - and is emerging, for we are still living in this age - when an extraordinary, long-accumulated energy of the will was, by way of exception, transferred through heredity to intellectual goals. That height will be past once this wildness and energy are no longer bred to greatness. Mankind per-

haps comes nearer to its actual goal in the middle of its way, in the middle period of its existence, than at the end. Forces by which art, for example, is conditioned might die out altogether; delight in lying, in the imprecise, in the symbolic, in intoxication, in ecstasy might fall into disrepute. Indeed, once life is ordered in the perfect state, no motive for poetry whatever is any longer to be drawn from the present, and it would be only those who had remained behind who would still long for poetic unreality. These would then in any case look back with yearning to the times of the imperfect state, of half-barbarous society, to our times.

235.

Genius and the ideal state in contradiction. - The socialists desire to establish a life of comfort for as many as possible. If the lasting home of this life of comfort, the perfect state, were really attained, then by this life of comfort the soil out of which the great intellect, and indeed the powerful individual in general, grows would be destroyed: I mean strong energy. Mankind would have become too feeble, once this state is attained, to be able any longer to produce genius. Ought one not, then, to wish that life should keep its violent character, and that wild forces and energies should be called forth ever anew? Now the warm, sympathizing heart wants precisely the removal of that violent and wild character, and the warmest heart one can imagine would long for exactly this most passionately of all: whereas it is precisely from that wild and violent character of life that its passion has taken its fire, its warmth, indeed its very existence; the warmest heart therefore wants the removal of its own foundation, the annihilation of itself, which surely means: it wants something illogical, it is not intelligent. The highest intelligence and the warmest heart cannot dwell together in one person, and the sage who passes judgement upon life sets himself above goodness too, and regards it only as something to be reckoned

in along with everything else in the total account of life. The sage must resist those extravagant wishes of unintelligent goodness, because he is concerned for the survival of his type and for the eventual emergence of the highest intellect; at the least he will not further the founding of the "perfect state", inasmuch as only enfeebled individuals have a place in it. Christ, on the other hand, whom we will for once think of as the warmest heart, furthered the stupefaction of men, took the side of the poor in spirit and held back the production of the greatest intellect: and this was consistent. His counter-image, the perfect sage - this may well be foretold - will just as necessarily stand in the way of the production of a Christ. - The state is a prudent contrivance for the protection of individuals against one another: if one carries its ennoblement too far, the individual is in the end weakened by it, indeed dissolved, - and thus the original purpose of the state is most thoroughly thwarted.

236.

The zones of culture. - One may say, by way of simile, that the ages of culture correspond to the belts of the various climates, only that these lie one behind another and not, like the geographical zones, side by side. Compared with the temperate zone of culture, into which it is our task to pass over, the past one gives, by and large, the impression of a tropical climate. Violent contrasts, abrupt change of day and night, glowing heat and splendour of colour, the veneration of everything sudden, mysterious, terrible, the swiftness of storms breaking in, everywhere the lavish overflowing of nature's horns of plenty: and, by contrast, in our culture a bright yet not radiant sky, pure air remaining fairly constant, sharpness, indeed at times cold: thus do the two zones stand out against each other. When we see there how the most furious passions are wrestled down and broken with uncanny force by metaphysical conceptions, we feel as though

before our very eyes, in the tropics, wild tigers were being crushed in the coils of monstrous serpents; our spiritual climate lacks such occurrences, our imagination is temperate, not even in dreams does there come to us what earlier peoples saw while waking. But should we not be allowed to be glad of this change, even granting that artists are essentially harmed by the disappearance of tropical culture and find us non-artists a little too sober? In this respect artists may well have the right to deny "progress", for in truth: whether the last three millennia show a course of progress in the arts may at the least be doubted; likewise a metaphysical philosopher such as Schopenhauer will have no occasion to recognize progress when he surveys the last four millennia with regard to metaphysical philosophy and religion. - To us, however, the very existence of the temperate zone of culture counts as progress.

237.

Renaissance and Reformation. - The Italian Renaissance bore within itself all the positive forces to which we owe modern culture - that is, liberation of thought, disregard of authorities, the victory of education over the arrogance of lineage, - enthusiasm for science and for the scientific past of mankind, the unfettering of the individual, a fervour of truthfulness and an aversion to mere show and effect (a fervour which blazed forth in a whole abundance of artistic characters, who demanded of themselves, with the highest moral purity, perfection in their works and nothing but perfection); indeed, the Renaissance possessed positive forces which in our modern culture up to now have not yet again become so mighty. It was the golden age of this millennium, despite all its stains and vices. Against it there now stands out the German Reformation, as an energetic protest of backward spirits who had by no means yet grown weary of the world-view of the Middle Ages, and who felt the signs of its dissolution, the extraordin-

ary shallowing and externalizing of religious life, not with jubilation, as was fitting, but with deep resentment. With their northern strength and stiff-neckedness they threw men back again, forced the Counter-Reformation, that is, a Catholic Christianity of self-defence, with all the violences of a state of siege, and delayed by two or three centuries the complete awakening and dominion of the sciences, just as they made the complete growing-together into one of the ancient and the modern spirit perhaps forever impossible. The great task of the Renaissance could not be brought to completion; the protest of the German character, which had meanwhile fallen behind (and which in the Middle Ages had had sense enough to cross the Alps again and again for its salvation), prevented it. It lay in the chance of an extraordinary political constellation that Luther was preserved at that time and that his protest gained strength: for the Emperor protected him in order to use his innovation as an instrument of pressure against the Pope, and likewise the Pope secretly favoured him in order to use the Protestant princes of the Empire as a counterweight against the Emperor. Without this strange interplay of intentions Luther would have been burned like Huss - and the dawn of the Enlightenment would perhaps have risen somewhat earlier, and with a fairer radiance than we can now imagine.

238.

Justice toward the God who is becoming. - When the whole history of culture opens up before one's gaze as a tangle of evil and noble, true and false ideas, and one feels almost seasick at the sight of this surging of the waves, then one understands what a consolation lies in the idea of a God who is becoming: this God reveals himself more and more in the transformations and destinies of mankind; it is not all blind mechanism, a senseless and purposeless interplay of forces. The deification of becoming is a metaphysical outlook - as though from a

lighthouse looking down upon the sea of history - in which an all too historicizing generation of scholars found its consolation; one must not be angry at this, however erroneous that idea may be. Only he who, like Schopenhauer, denies development feels nothing of the misery of this historical surging of the waves, and therefore, because he knows nothing and feels nothing of that God who is becoming and of the need to assume him, may fairly let loose his mockery.

239.

The fruits according to the season. - Every better future that one wishes for mankind is necessarily also in many respects a worse future: for it is mere enthusiasm to believe that a new, higher stage of mankind will unite within itself all the advantages of earlier stages and must, for example, also produce the highest form of art. Rather, each season has its own advantages and charms and excludes those of the others. That which grew out of religion and in its neighbourhood cannot grow again once religion is destroyed; at most, stray, late-coming offshoots may lead one into deception about this, just as may the memory of the old art that breaks out from time to time: a condition which no doubt betrays the feeling of loss, of privation, but which is no proof of the strength from which a new art could be born.

240.

Increasing severity of the world. - The higher a man's culture rises, the more domains withdraw themselves from jest and mockery. Voltaire was heartily grateful to heaven for the invention of marriage and the Church: inasmuch as it had thereby provided so well for our amusement. But he and his age, and before him the sixteenth century, mocked these themes to the end; everything that anyone still jokes about in this domain now is belated and above all far too cheap to make buyers covetous. Now one asks after causes; this is the age of

seriousness. Who still cares now to see in a jesting light the differences between reality and pretentious appearance, between what a man is and what he wishes to represent? The feeling of these contrasts at once has quite a different effect when one seeks the reasons. The more thoroughly someone understands life, the less he will mock, except that at last he may perhaps still mock at the "thoroughness of his understanding."

241.

Genius of culture. - If someone wished to imagine a genius of culture, what would it be like? It handles lies, violence, the most ruthless self-interest so surely as its instruments that it could only be called an evil, demonic being; but its goals, which shine through here and there, are great and good. It is a centaur, half beast, half man, and moreover has angel's wings upon its head.

242.

Miracle-education. - Interest in education will acquire great strength only from the moment when one gives up belief in a God and his providential care: just as the art of healing could only flourish when belief in miracle-cures ceased. Up to now, however, all the world still believes in miracle-education: out of the greatest disorder, confusion of aims, unfavourable circumstances, one has indeed seen the most fruitful, most powerful men grow up: how could this possibly come about by natural means? - now people will soon look more closely in these cases too, examine more carefully: miracles they will never discover in doing so. Under the same circumstances numerous men continually perish; the single individual who is saved has, in return, usually grown stronger, because he endured these evil circumstances by virtue of an indestructible innate strength and has further exercised and increased this strength: thus the miracle is explained. An

education which no longer believes in miracles will have to pay heed to three things: first, how much energy is inherited? second, by what means can new energy still be kindled? third, how can the individual be adapted to those exceedingly manifold demands of culture without their disturbing him and splintering his singularity, - in short, how can the individual be set into the counterpoint of private and public culture, how can he at once lead the melody and accompany it as melody?

243.

The future of the physician. - There is at present no profession that would admit of so great an enhancement as that of the physician; especially now that the spiritual physicians, the so-called curers of souls, may no longer ply their arts of conjuration amid public applause, and an educated person steers clear of them. The highest intellectual training of a physician is not attained today when he knows the best and newest methods and is practised in them, and understands how to draw those swift inferences from effects to causes for which diagnosticians are famous: he must in addition possess an eloquence that adapts itself to every individual and draws the heart out of his body, a manliness whose mere sight scatters faint-heartedness (the canker of all the sick), a diplomat's suppleness in mediating between those who need joy for their convalescence and those who for reasons of health must (and can) give joy, the subtlety of a police agent and an advocate in understanding the secrets of a soul without betraying them, - in short, a good physician now needs the artifices and artistic privileges of every other professional class: thus equipped, he is then in a position to become a benefactor to the whole of society, by multiplying good works, intellectual joy and fruitfulness, by preventing evil thoughts, intentions and villainies (whose loathsome source is so often the abdomen), by establishing an aristocracy of

mind and body (as maker and preventer of marriages), by benevolently cutting away all so-called torments of soul and pangs of conscience: only thus does he turn from a "medicine man" into a saviour, and yet need perform no miracles, nor is it necessary for him to let himself be crucified.

244.

In the neighbourhood of madness. - The sum of sensations, knowledge and experiences, the whole burden of culture, that is, has grown so great that an overstimulation of the nervous and mental powers is the general danger; indeed, the cultivated classes of the European countries are neurotic throughout, and almost every one of their larger families has, in one member, drawn near to insanity. Now, to be sure, health is today accommodated in every way; but in the main what remains needful is a diminution of that tension of feeling, of that oppressive burden of culture, which, even if it should have to be purchased with heavy losses, would nonetheless give us room for the great hope of a new Renaissance. We owe to Christianity, to the philosophers, poets and musicians, a superabundance of deeply stirred sensations: lest these overgrow us, we must conjure up the spirit of science, which on the whole makes one somewhat colder and more sceptical, and in particular cools the glowing stream of faith in final, definitive truths; it is chiefly through Christianity that this stream has grown so wild.

245.

The bell-casting of culture. - Culture came into being like a bell, within a mould of coarser, commoner stuff: untruth, violence, the boundless expansion of every single ego, of every single people, were this mould. Is it time now to remove it? Has the liquid set, have the good, useful drives, the habits of the nobler disposition, become so

secure and so general that there is no longer any need to lean upon metaphysics and the errors of the religions, no need of harshness and violence as the mightiest bonds between man and man, people and people? - In answering this question no sign from a god can help us any longer: our own insight must decide. Man must take into his own hands the governance of the earth on the grand scale; his "omniscience" must keep watch with a sharp eye over the further destiny of culture.

246.

The Cyclopes of culture. - Whoever sees those furrowed basins in which glaciers once lay scarcely thinks it possible that a time will come when in the very same place a valley of meadow and wood, with brooks running through it, will stretch out. So it is, too, in the history of mankind; the wildest forces break a path, destructive at first, yet their activity was nonetheless necessary so that later a gentler civilization might pitch its house here. The terrible energies - that which is called evil - are the Cyclopean architects and road-builders of humanity.

247.

The cycle of humankind. - Perhaps the whole of humankind is only a phase in the development of a particular animal species of limited duration, so that man has come from the ape and will become ape again, while there is no one present to take any interest whatever in this curious ending to the comedy. Just as, with the decline of Roman culture and its most important cause, the spread of Christianity, a general uglification of man gained the upper hand within the Roman Empire, so too, through an eventual decline of the general culture of the earth, a far more intensified uglification and at last bestialization of man, down to the apelike, might be brought about. - Precisely be-

cause we are able to fix this prospect in our gaze, we are perhaps in a position to forestall such an end in the future.

248.

Consoling speech of a desperate progress. - Our age gives the impression of an interim state; the old views of the world, the old cultures, are still partly present, the new ones not yet secure and habitual, and hence without cohesion and consistency. It looks as though everything were becoming chaotic, the old being lost, the new worth nothing and growing ever feebler. But so it goes with the soldier who is learning to march; for a while he is more unsure and clumsier than ever, because his muscles are moved now according to the old system, now according to the new, and neither has yet decisively won the day. We waver, but it is necessary not to grow fearful on that account and perhaps abandon what has been newly won. Besides, we cannot go back to the old; we have burned our ships; nothing remains but to be brave, let this or that come of it. - Let us only stride on, let us only move from the spot! Perhaps our conduct will one day look like progress after all; but if not, then let the words of Frederick the Great be spoken to us as well, and indeed by way of consolation: Ah, mon cher Sulzer, vous ne connaissez pas assez cette race maudite, à laquelle nous appartenons.

249.

Suffering from the past of culture. - Whoever has made the problem of culture clear to himself then suffers from a feeling similar to that of one who has inherited wealth acquired by unlawful means, or of the prince who rules by virtue of his forefathers' deeds of violence. He thinks with sorrow of his origin and is often ashamed, often irritable. The whole sum of strength, will to live and joy that he bestows upon his possession is often balanced by a deep weariness: he cannot forget

his origin. He looks upon the future with melancholy; his descendants, he knows in advance, will suffer from the past as he does.

250.

Manners. - Good manners disappear in the measure that the influence of the court and of a closed aristocracy declines: one can clearly observe this decrease from decade to decade if one has an eye for public acts, which are visibly becoming ever more vulgar. No one any longer understands how to pay homage and to flatter in a witty way; from this results the ridiculous fact that in cases where one must at present offer homage (for example to a great statesman or artist), one borrows the language of the deepest feeling, of trusty, honourable uprightness - out of embarrassment and a lack of wit and grace. Thus the public festive meeting of human beings seems ever clumsier, but more full of feeling and more upright, without being so. - But are manners to go on declining forever? It seems to me rather that manners are describing a deep curve and that we are approaching their lowest point. Once society has become more certain of its aims and principles, so that these take effect in forming manners (whereas now the acquired manners of earlier form-giving conditions are ever more weakly inherited and acquired), there will be manners of intercourse, gestures and expressions of social dealing which must appear as necessary and as plainly natural as these aims and principles are. The better distribution of time and work, gymnastic exercise transformed into the companion of every beautiful hour of leisure, increased and more rigorous reflection, which gives prudence and suppleness even to the body - all this brings it about. - Here, to be sure, one might think with some mockery of our scholars and ask whether they, who after all wish to be the forerunners of that new culture, do in fact distinguish themselves by better manners? This is probably not the case, though their spirit may be willing enough: but their flesh is

weak. The past is still too powerful in their muscles: they still stand in an unfree position and are half secular clergymen, half dependent tutors of eminent people and classes, and moreover crippled and made lifeless by the pedantry of science, by antiquated, spiritless methods. They are therefore, at any rate as regards their bodies and often for three-quarters of their spirit as well, still the courtiers of an old, indeed senile culture, and as such themselves senile; the new spirit that occasionally rumbles about in these old dwellings serves for the time being only to make them more unsure and more anxious. In them walk both the ghosts of the past and the ghosts of the future: what wonder if they do not put on the best face about it, do not have the most pleasing bearing?

251.

Future of science. - Science gives much enjoyment to him who works and searches in it, very little to him who learns its results. But since all the important truths of science must gradually become everyday and common, even this little enjoyment ceases: just as we have long since ceased to take delight in learning the so admirable multiplication table. Now if science provides ever less joy in itself and takes away ever more joy by casting suspicion on consoling metaphysics, religion and art, then that greatest source of pleasure, to which mankind owes almost its entire humanity, becomes impoverished. Therefore a higher culture must give man a double brain, as it were two brain-chambers, one to feel science, the other to feel non-science: lying side by side, without confusion, separable, able to be closed off; this is a demand of health. In the one domain lies the source of power, in the other the regulator: one must heat with illusions, one-sidednesses, passions, and with the help of knowing science one must prevent the malignant and dangerous consequences of overheating. - If this demand of higher culture is not satisfied, then the further

course of human development can be predicted almost with certainty: interest in the true ceases the less pleasure it affords; illusion, error, the fantastic, because they are bound up with pleasure, win back step by step the ground they formerly held: the ruin of the sciences, the sinking back into barbarism, is the next consequence; mankind must begin anew to weave its web, after having, like Penelope, unravelled it by night. But who will vouch to us that it will always find the strength for it again?

252.

The pleasure in knowing. - Why is knowing, the element of the researcher and the philosopher, bound up with pleasure? First and above all, because in it one becomes conscious of one's strength, thus for the same reason that gymnastic exercises are pleasurable even without spectators. Secondly, because in the course of knowledge one gets beyond older notions and their representatives, becomes victor or at least believes oneself to be so. Thirdly, because through a new piece of knowledge, however small, we feel ourselves exalted above all others and feel ourselves the only ones who know what is right in this matter. These three grounds for pleasure are the most important, yet there are, depending on the nature of the knower, many subsidiary grounds besides. - A not inconsiderable list of these is given, in a place where one would not look for it, by my paraenetic essay on Schopenhauer: with its enumerations every experienced servant of knowledge can be content, even if he will wish away the ironic tinge that seems to lie upon those pages. For if it is true that for the scholar to come into being "a host of very human drives and little drives must be poured together", that the scholar is indeed a very noble metal but not a pure one, and "consists of a tangled web of very different impulses and stimuli": then the same holds equally of the origin and nature of the artist, the philosopher, the moral genius - and whatever

the great names glorified in that essay may be. Everything human deserves, with regard to its origin, ironic consideration: that is why irony is so superfluous in the world.

253.

Fidelity as proof of soundness. - It is a perfect sign of the goodness of a theory if its originator for forty years conceives no mistrust of it; but I maintain that there has never yet been a philosopher who did not at last look down with disdain - at the least with suspicion - on the philosophy his youth invented. - Perhaps, however, he did not speak publicly of this change of mind, out of ambition or - as is more probable with noble natures - out of tender consideration for his followers.

254.

Increase of the interesting. - In the course of higher education everything becomes interesting to a man; he knows how to find quickly the instructive side of a thing and to indicate the point where a gap in his thinking can be filled by it or a thought confirmed by it. With this, boredom disappears more and more, and with it also excessive excitability of temperament. In the end he goes about among human beings as a naturalist goes among plants, and perceives himself as a phenomenon that strongly stimulates only his drive for knowledge.

255.

Superstition about the simultaneous. – Things that happen at the same time are connected, people think. A relative dies far away, at the same time we dream of him – there you are! But countless relatives die and we do not dream of them. It is as with the shipwrecked who make vows: one does not afterwards see in the temple the votive tab-

lets of those who perished. – A man dies, an owl screeches, a clock stops, all in one and the same hour of the night: should there not be a connection here? Such an intimacy with nature as this intimation presupposes flatters human beings. – This species of superstition is found again in a refined form among historians and painters of culture, who are accustomed to have a kind of hydrophobia towards all senseless juxtaposition, in which the life of individuals and of peoples is nonetheless so rich.

256.

Ability, not knowledge, trained by science. – The value of having for a time pursued a rigorous science rigorously does not rest precisely on its results: for these, in relation to the ocean of things worth knowing, will be a vanishingly small drop. But it yields an increase in energy, in the capacity for drawing conclusions, in tenacity of endurance; one has learned to attain an end by fitting means. To this extent it is very valuable, with regard to everything one does later, to have once been a man of science.

257.

The youthful charm of science. – The search for truth still has the charm, at present, that truth everywhere stands out sharply against error, which has grown grey and tedious; this charm is steadily being lost; for now, to be sure, we are still living in the youthful age of science and are accustomed to pursue truth as one would a beautiful girl; but what if one day she has become an elderly woman with a sullen look? In almost all the sciences the fundamental insight has either been found only very recently or is still being sought; how differently this entices than when everything essential has been found and nothing remains for the researcher but a meagre autumn gleaning (a feeling one can come to know in certain historical disciplines).

258.

The statue of humanity. – The genius of culture proceeds as Cellini did when he was casting his statue of Perseus: the molten mass threatened not to suffice, but suffice it must: so he threw in dishes and plates and whatever else came to hand. And in just the same way that genius throws in errors, vices, hopes, delusions and other things of baser as well as of nobler metal, for the statue of humanity must come out and be completed; what does it matter that here and there inferior material was used?

259.

A culture of men. – Greek culture of the classical age is a culture of men. As far as women are concerned, Pericles says everything in the funeral oration with the words: they are at their best when as little as possible is said of them among men. – The erotic relationship of men to youths was, to a degree inaccessible to our understanding, the necessary and sole presupposition of all male education (rather as, for a long time among us, all higher education of women was brought about only through love affairs and marriage); all the idealism of the strength of the Greek nature threw itself upon that relationship, and probably young people have never again been treated so attentively, so lovingly, so entirely with regard to their best (virtus) as in the sixth and fifth centuries – in keeping, that is, with Hölderlin's beautiful saying, "for loving, the mortal gives of his best". The more highly this relationship was regarded, the lower sank intercourse with woman: the point of view of begetting children and of sensual pleasure – nothing further came into consideration here; there was no intellectual intercourse, not even a real love affair. If one further considers that women were excluded even from contests and spectacles of every kind, then the religious cults remain as the sole higher entertainment of women. – If, admittedly, Electra and Antigone were presented in

tragedy, this was tolerated precisely in art, though it was not liked in life: just as we now cannot bear anything pathetic in life but like to see it in art. – Women had no further task than to bring forth beautiful, powerful bodies in which the character of the father lived on as unbroken as possible, and thereby to counteract the spreading nervous overstimulation of so highly developed a culture. This is what kept Greek culture young for a relatively long time; for in the Greek mothers the Greek genius again and again returned to nature.

260.

The prejudice in favour of greatness. – Human beings plainly overestimate everything great and conspicuous. This comes from the conscious or unconscious insight that they find it very useful when someone throws all his strength into one domain and makes of himself, as it were, one monstrous organ. Certainly for the man himself an even development of his powers is more useful and more conducive to happiness; for every talent is a vampire that sucks blood and strength from the other powers, and an excessive productivity can drive even the most gifted man almost to madness. Within the arts, too, the extreme natures attract far too much attention; but then a much lower culture is needed to let oneself be captivated by them. Human beings submit out of habit to everything that wants to have power.

261.

The tyrants of the spirit. - Only where the ray of myth falls does the life of the Greeks shine; elsewhere it is gloomy. Now the Greek philosophers rob themselves of precisely this myth: is it not as if they wished to move out of the sunshine into the shade, into gloom? But no plant shuns the light; at bottom those philosophers were only seeking a brighter sun; myth was not pure enough, not luminous

enough for them. They found this light in their knowledge, in what each of them called his "truth". In those days, however, knowledge still had a greater lustre; it was still young and knew as yet little of all the difficulties and dangers of its paths; it could still hope then to reach the midpoint of all being with a single leap and from there to solve the riddle of the world. These philosophers had - a robust faith in themselves and their "truth", and with it they struck down all their neighbours and predecessors; each of them was a combative, violent tyrant. Perhaps the happiness of believing oneself in possession of the truth was never greater in the world, but neither, too, were the harshness, the arrogance, the tyrannical and evil element of such a belief. They were tyrants, that is to say, that which every Greek wanted to be and which every one was, if he could be. Perhaps Solon alone is an exception; in his poems he tells how he disdained personal tyranny. But he did so out of love for his work, for his lawgiving; and to be a lawgiver is a more sublimated form of tyranny. Parmenides too gave laws, probably Pythagoras and Empedocles also; Anaximander founded a city. Plato was the incarnate wish to become the supreme philosophical lawgiver and founder of states; he appears to have suffered terribly from the non-fulfilment of his nature, and towards his end his soul became full of the blackest gall. The more Greek philosophy lost in power, the more it suffered inwardly from this bitterness and lust for abuse; once the various sects were championing their truths in the streets, the souls of all these suitors of truth were utterly mired in jealousy and venom, and the tyrannical element now raged as poison in their bodies. These many petty tyrants would have liked to devour one another raw; not a spark of love remained in them, and all too little joy in their own knowledge. - In general, the proposition that tyrants are mostly murdered and that their posterity is short-lived holds true of the tyrants of the spirit as well. Their history is short, violent; their influence breaks off suddenly. Of almost all the great Hellenes one can say that they seem to have come too late, so of Aes-

chylus, of Pindar, of Demosthenes, of Thucydides; one generation after them - and then it is always completely over. That is what is tempestuous and uncanny in Greek history. Nowadays, to be sure, people admire the gospel of the tortoise. To think historically now means almost the same as believing that in all ages history had been made according to the maxim: "as little as possible in as long a time as possible!" Alas, Greek history runs so swiftly! Never since has life been lived so lavishly, so beyond all measure. I cannot persuade myself that the history of the Greeks took that natural course for which it is so praised. They were far too manifoldly gifted to be gradual in that step-by-step manner, as the tortoise is in its race with Achilles: and that, after all, is what is called natural development. With the Greeks things go forward quickly, but just as quickly downward; the motion of the whole machine is so intensified that a single stone thrown into its wheels makes it burst apart. Such a stone, for example, was Socrates; in a single night the development of philosophical science, hitherto so wonderfully regular, though admittedly all too hasty, was destroyed. It is no idle question whether Plato, had he remained free of the Socratic enchantment, might not have found a still higher type of philosophical man, one lost to us for ever. One looks into the ages before him as into a sculptor's workshop of such types. The sixth and fifth centuries, however, seem to promise still more and higher things than they themselves brought forth; but it remained at promising and announcing. And yet there is scarcely a graver loss than the loss of a type, of a new, hitherto undiscovered highest possibility of the philosophical life. Even of the older types most have been poorly handed down; all the philosophers from Thales to Democritus seem to me extraordinarily hard to make out; but whoever succeeds in re-creating these figures walks among forms of the mightiest and purest type. This ability is admittedly rare; it was lacking even in the later Greeks who occupied themselves with the lore of the older philosophy; Aristotle especially seems not to have his

eyes in his head when he stands before those we have named. And so it seems as though these glorious philosophers had lived in vain, or as though they had been meant merely to prepare the quarrelsome and talkative hosts of the Socratic schools. Here, as has been said, there is a gap, a break in the development; some great misfortune must have happened, and the one statue in which one would have recognized the meaning and purpose of that great sculptural rehearsal broke or miscarried: what really happened has remained for ever a secret of the workshop. - That which occurred among the Greeks - that every great thinker, in the belief that he possessed the absolute truth, became a tyrant, so that the history of the spirit among the Greeks, too, took on that violent, precipitate and dangerous character which their political history displays - this kind of event was not thereby exhausted: much of the same has happened right into most recent times, though gradually more rarely and now hardly any longer with the pure, naive conscience of the Greek philosophers. For on the whole the counter-doctrine and scepticism now speak too powerfully, too loudly. The period of the tyrants of the spirit is over. In the spheres of higher culture there will, to be sure, always have to be a dominion, - but this dominion lies from now on in the hands of the oligarchs of the spirit. Despite all spatial and political separation, they form a society that belongs together, whose members recognize and acknowledge one another, whatever estimations of favour or disfavour public opinion and the judgements of the daily and periodical writers who work upon the masses may put into circulation. Intellectual superiority, which formerly divided and set at enmity, now tends to bind: how could individuals hold their own and swim through life on their own course, against all currents, if they did not see their equals here and there living under equal conditions and grasp their hands, in a struggle as much against the ochlocratic character of half-intellect and half-education as against the occasional attempts to set up a tyranny with the help of mass effect? The oligarchs need one another, they take their

best delight in one another, they understand one another's insignia, - but in spite of this each of them is free; he fights and conquers at his own post, and would rather perish than submit.

262.

Homer. – The greatest fact in Greek cultivation remains, after all, that Homer became panhellenic so early. All the spiritual and human freedom which the Greeks attained goes back to this fact. But at the same time it has been the real fatality of Greek cultivation, for Homer flattened as he centralized, and dissolved the more serious instincts of independence. From time to time, out of the deepest ground of the Hellenic, there arose opposition to Homer; but he always remained victorious. All great spiritual powers exert, alongside their liberating effect, an oppressive one as well; but it certainly makes a difference whether it is Homer or the Bible or science that tyrannizes over men.

263.

Endowment. – In a humanity so highly developed as that of the present day, everyone receives from nature access to many talents. Everyone has innate talent, but only in few is that degree of tenacity, perseverance and energy innate and instilled by upbringing which makes him really become a talent, that is, become what he is, which means: discharge it in works and actions.

264.

The man of wit either overrated or underrated. – Unscientific but gifted people prize every sign of wit, whether it be on a true or a false track; above all they want the man who associates with them to entertain them well with his wit, to spur them on, to set them aflame, to sweep them along into earnestness and jest, and in any case to protect

them, as the most potent amulet, against boredom. Scientific natures, on the other hand, know that the gift of having all manner of ideas must be most strictly reined in by the spirit of science; not that which glitters, shines, excites, but the often inconspicuous truth is the fruit which he wishes to shake from the tree of knowledge. Like Aristotle, he may make no distinction between the "boring" and the "witty"; his daemon leads him through the desert just as through tropical vegetation, so that everywhere he may take his delight only in what is real, durable, genuine. – From this there arises, among insignificant scholars, a disdain and suspicion of wit in general, and conversely witty people frequently have an aversion to science: as, for example, almost all artists do.

265.

Reason in school. – The school has no more important task than to teach rigorous thinking, cautious judging, consistent reasoning: therefore it must disregard all things that are not suited to these operations, religion for example. It can, after all, count on human unclarity, habit and need later unbending the bow of all-too-taut thinking once again. But as far as its influence extends, it should enforce that which is the essential and distinguishing thing in man – "Reason and science, man's very highest power" – as Goethe at least judges. – The great naturalist von Baer finds the superiority of all Europeans over Asians to lie in the schooled ability to give reasons for what they believe, of which the latter are wholly incapable. Europe has gone to the school of consistent and critical thinking; Asia still does not know how to distinguish between truth and poetry, and is not aware whether its convictions stem from its own observation and proper thinking or from fantasies. – Reason in school has made Europe Europe: in the Middle Ages it was on the way to becoming once more a piece and ap-

pendage of Asia – that is, to forfeiting the scientific sense which it owed to the Greeks.

266.

Underrated effect of gymnasium teaching. – One seldom seeks the value of the gymnasium in the things which are really learned there and carried home from it never to be lost, but in those which are taught, yet which the pupil appropriates only with reluctance, so as to shake them off as quickly as he may. The reading of the classics – every cultivated person admits this – is, as it is everywhere practised, a monstrous procedure: before young people who are in no respect ripe for it, by teachers who with every word, often by their mere appearance, lay a mildew over a good author. But herein lies the value that is usually overlooked – that these teachers speak the abstract language of higher culture, ponderous and hard to understand as it is, yet a lofty gymnastics of the head; that concepts, technical terms, methods, allusions constantly occur in their language which young people almost never hear in the conversation of their relatives and in the street. If the pupils merely listen, their intellect is involuntarily preformed for a scientific mode of viewing things. It is not possible to emerge from this discipline wholly untouched by abstraction, as a pure child of nature.

267.

Learning many languages. – Learning many languages fills the memory with words instead of with facts and thoughts, whereas memory is a receptacle which in every person can take in only a definitely limited quantity of content. Further, learning many languages is harmful insofar as it awakens the belief that one possesses skills, and actually lends a certain seductive prestige in social intercourse; it then also does harm indirectly, by working against the acquisition of thor-

ough knowledge and against the intention of earning people's respect in an honest way. Finally, it is the axe laid to the root of the finer feeling for language within one's mother tongue: this is thereby incurably damaged and ruined. The two peoples who produced the greatest stylists, the Greeks and the French, learned no foreign languages. – But because human intercourse must become ever more cosmopolitan, and a proper merchant in London, for example, must already now make himself understood in eight languages, in writing and in speech, the learning of many languages is admittedly a necessary evil; which, however, coming at last to the extreme, will compel mankind to find a remedy: and in some distant future there will be a new language, first as a language of commerce, then as the language of intellectual intercourse in general, for all, as surely as there will one day be aerial navigation. For to what end else would the science of language have studied the laws of language for a century, and assessed what is necessary, valuable and successful in each individual language!

268.

On the war history of the individual. – We find compressed into a single human life that passes through several cultures the struggle which is otherwise played out between two generations, between father and son: the closeness of kinship sharpens this struggle, because each party mercilessly drags in the inner nature of the other party, which it knows so well; and so this struggle will be most bitter within the single individual; here each new phase strides over the earlier ones with cruel injustice and misapprehension of their means and ends.

269.

A quarter of an hour earlier. – One occasionally finds someone who stands above his time in his views, yet only by so much that he anti-

cipates the vulgar views of the next decade. He has public opinion before it is public, that is to say: he has fallen into the arms of a view that deserves to become trivial a quarter of an hour sooner than others. His fame, however, is usually much louder than the fame of the truly great and superior.

270.

The art of reading. - Every strong direction is one-sided; it approaches the direction of the straight line and, like the latter, is exclusive, that is to say, it does not touch many other directions, as weak parties and natures do in their wave-like going to and fro: so one must also forgive the philologists for being one-sided. The restoration and keeping pure of texts, together with their explanation, pursued within a guild for centuries, has at last now allowed the right methods to be found; the whole of the Middle Ages was profoundly incapable of a strictly philological explanation, that is to say, of the simple wish to understand what the author says, - it was something, to find these methods; let no one underestimate it! All science first gained continuity and steadiness through the art of right reading, that is to say philology, reaching its height.

271.

The art of drawing conclusions. - The greatest progress that men have made lies in their learning to draw conclusions correctly. This is by no means so natural a thing as Schopenhauer supposes when he says: "all are capable of drawing conclusions, few of judging"; rather, it was learned late and has not yet even now attained to dominion. False reasoning is the rule in earlier times: and the mythologies of all peoples, their magic and their superstition, their religious cult, their law are the inexhaustible sites where proofs of this proposition are to be found.

272.

Annual rings of individual culture. - The strength and weakness of intellectual productivity depends far less on inherited talent than on the measure of elasticity one has been endowed with. Most young educated men of thirty turn back at this early solstice of their lives and from then on are disinclined to new intellectual turns. That is why, for the sake of a culture that grows on and on, a new generation is at once needed again, which, however, likewise does not get far: for in order to catch up with the culture of the father, the son must almost use up the inherited energy which the father himself possessed at that stage of life when he begot the son; with the small surplus he gets further (for because the road is here being travelled for the second time, progress is a little quicker; the son, in order to learn the same as the father knew, does not consume quite so much strength). Men of very great elasticity, such as Goethe, for example, traverse as much as scarcely four generations in succession are capable of; but for that very reason they get ahead too quickly, so that other men only catch up with them in the next century, perhaps not even completely, because through the frequent interruptions the unity of culture, the consistency of development, has been weakened. - The ordinary phases of intellectual culture which have been attained in the course of history are caught up with by men ever more quickly. At present they begin to enter culture as religiously stirred children, and perhaps in their tenth year bring these sensations to their highest liveliness, then pass over into weakened forms (pantheism) as they draw near to science; they get quite beyond God, immortality and the like, but fall prey to the enchantments of a metaphysical philosophy. This too at last becomes unbelievable to them; art, on the other hand, seems to grant ever more, so that for a time metaphysics barely survives and lives on, transformed into art or as a mood of artistic transfiguration. But the scientific sense grows ever more imperious and leads the man to nat-

ural science and history and especially to the strictest methods of knowledge, while to art there falls an ever milder and more modest significance. All this now tends to take place within the first thirty years of a man's life. It is the recapitulation of a task at which mankind has perhaps toiled for thirty thousand years.

273.

Gone back, not left behind. - Whoever at present still begins his development from religious sensations, and perhaps for a long time afterwards goes on living in metaphysics and art, has indeed set himself a good way back and begins his race with other modern men under unfavourable conditions: he apparently loses space and time. But because he lingered in those realms where ardour and energy are unleashed and power continually flows as a volcanic stream from an inexhaustible source, he then, as soon as he has parted from those domains at the right time, goes forward all the more quickly; his foot is winged, his breast has learned to breathe more calmly, longer, more enduringly. - He has only drawn back in order to have room enough for his leap: thus there may even be something fearful, menacing in this retreat.

274.

A section of our self as an artistic object. - It is a sign of superior culture to hold fast consciously to certain phases of development which lesser men live through almost thoughtlessly and then wipe from the tablet of their soul, and to sketch a faithful picture of them: for this is the higher kind of the painter's art, which only few understand. For this it becomes necessary to isolate those phases artificially. Historical studies cultivate the capacity for this kind of painting, for they continually summon us, on the occasion of a piece of history, of the life of a people or of a man, to imagine a quite definite horizon of

thoughts, a definite strength of sensations, the predominance of these, the receding of those. The historical sense consists in being able swiftly to reconstruct such systems of thought and feeling from given occasions, as one reconstructs the impression of a temple from a few columns and remnants of wall that have chanced to remain standing. Its next result is that we understand our fellow men as quite definite systems of this kind and as representatives of different cultures, that is to say as necessary, but as changeable. And again, that we can separate out pieces of our own development and set them up on their own.

275.

Cynic and Epicurean. - The Cynic recognizes the connection between the multiplied and stronger pains of the more highly cultivated man and the abundance of his needs; he thus grasps that the multitude of opinions about the beautiful, the seemly, the becoming, the delightful must have caused rich sources of enjoyment but equally of displeasure to spring forth. In accordance with this insight he educates himself backwards, by giving up many of these opinions and withdrawing from certain demands of culture; thereby he gains a feeling of freedom and of invigoration; and gradually, once habit makes his way of life bearable to him, he does in fact have rarer and weaker sensations of displeasure than cultivated men, and approaches the domestic animal; moreover he feels everything with the charm of contrast and - he can also rail to his heart's content; so that by this he again rises high above the animal's world of sensation. - The Epicurean has the same point of view as the Cynic; between him and the latter there is usually only a difference of temperament. Then, the Epicurean uses his higher culture to make himself independent of the prevailing opinions; he raises himself above them, whereas the Cynic remains merely in negation. He walks, as it were, in windless, well-sheltered, half-dark

avenues, while above him, in the wind, the treetops roar and betray to him how violently agitated the world is out there. The Cynic, on the other hand, walks about outside, as it were, naked in the blowing of the wind, and hardens himself to the point of insensibility.

276.

Microcosm and macrocosm of culture. - The best discoveries about culture a man makes within himself, when he finds two heterogeneous powers holding sway there. Suppose someone lives just as much in the love of the plastic arts or of music as he is carried away by the spirit of science, and he regards it as impossible to resolve this contradiction by annihilating the one power and wholly unfettering the other: then nothing remains for him but to shape out of himself so great an edifice of culture that those two powers, even if at different ends of it, can dwell within him, while between them reconciling intermediate powers, of superior strength, have their lodging, so as to settle the quarrel should it break out. Such an edifice of culture in the single individual will, however, bear the greatest resemblance to the building of culture in whole periods of time and will afford a continuing instruction by analogy concerning it. For wherever the great architecture of culture has unfolded, its task has been to compel the mutually opposing powers into harmony by means of an overwhelming accumulation of the remaining, less incompatible powers, without on that account suppressing them and casting them into fetters.

277.

Happiness and culture. - The sight of the surroundings of our childhood shakes us: the summer-house, the church with the graves, the pond and the wood - these we always see again as sufferers. Pity for ourselves seizes us, for what have we not suffered through since then! And here everything still stands so still, so eternally: only we are so

different, so moved; we even find again certain people on whom time has whetted its tooth no more than on an oak tree: peasants, fishermen, woodland folk - they are the same. - Emotion, self-pity in the face of lower culture is the sign of higher culture; from which it follows that happiness has at any rate not been increased by the latter. Whoever wishes to reap happiness and comfort from life, let him simply always steer clear of higher culture.

278.

Parable of the dance. - It is now to be regarded as the decisive sign of great culture if someone possesses that strength and suppleness to be just as pure and rigorous in knowing as, at other moments, to be capable of giving poetry, religion and metaphysics a hundred paces' start, as it were, and of feeling their power and beauty after them. Such a position between two such different demands is very difficult, for science presses for the absolute dominion of its method, and if this pressure is not yielded to, there arises the other danger of a feeble wavering up and down between different impulses. Meanwhile: in order at least to open, with a parable, a view onto the solution of this difficulty, let us remember that the dance is not the same thing as a languid reeling to and fro between different impulses. High culture will look like a daring dance: which is why, as has been said, much strength and suppleness is needed.

279.

On the easing of life. - One chief means of easing life for oneself is the idealizing of all its events; but one should make quite clear to oneself, from painting, what idealizing means. The painter demands that the spectator not look too closely, too sharply; he forces him back to a certain distance, so that he may contemplate from there; he is obliged to presuppose a quite definite distance of the beholder from the pic-

ture; indeed he must even assume an equally definite degree of sharpness of eye in his beholder; in such things he must on no account waver. Everyone, therefore, who wishes to idealize his life must not want to see it too closely and must always banish his gaze back to a certain distance. This trick Goethe, for example, understood.

280.

Aggravation as alleviation and vice versa. - Much that at certain stages of man is an aggravation of life serves a higher stage as an alleviation, because such men have come to know stronger aggravations of life. The reverse likewise occurs: thus religion, for example, has a double face, according to whether a man looks up to it, so as to have it relieve him of his burden and distress, or looks down upon it, as upon the fetter put on him so that he may not climb too high into the air.

281.

Higher culture is necessarily misunderstood. - He who has strung his instrument with only two strings, like the scholars who, besides the drive for knowledge, have only an acquired religious one besides, does not understand those people who can play on more strings. It lies in the nature of the higher, many-stringed culture that it is always misinterpreted by the lower; as happens, for example, when art is taken for a disguised form of the religious. Indeed people who are only religious understand even science as a seeking of the religious feeling, just as the deaf and dumb do not know what music is, if not visible movement.

282.

Lament. - It is perhaps the advantages of our times that bring with them a retreat and an occasional undervaluing of the vita contem-

plativa. But one must admit to oneself that our time is poor in great moralists, that Pascal, Epictetus, Seneca, Plutarch are little read any more, that work and industry - formerly in the train of the great goddess Health - sometimes seem to rage like a disease. Because time for thinking and calm in thinking are lacking, one no longer weighs divergent views: one contents oneself with hating them. With the tremendous acceleration of life, mind and eye grow accustomed to a half or false seeing and judging, and everyone resembles the travellers who come to know land and people from the railway. An independent and cautious attitude of knowledge is esteemed almost as a kind of madness; the free spirit has been brought into disrepute, chiefly by scholars, who miss in his art of contemplating things their own thoroughness and ant-like industry and would gladly banish him into a single corner of science: whereas he has the quite different and higher task of commanding, from a solitary standpoint, the whole host of scientific and learned men and of showing them the paths and goals of culture. - Such a lament as the one just sung will probably have its time and will one day fall silent of its own accord, upon a mighty return of the genius of meditation.

283.

Chief deficiency of active men. - The active usually lack the higher activity: I mean the individual kind. They are active as officials, merchants, scholars, that is, as generic beings, but not as quite definite, single and unique human beings; in this respect they are lazy. - It is the misfortune of the active that their activity is almost always a little irrational. One must not, for example, ask the money-amassing banker the purpose of his restless activity: it is irrational. The active roll as the stone rolls, in accordance with the stupidity of mechanics. - All men are divided, at all times and so still today, into slaves and free men; for he who does not have two thirds of his day to himself is a

slave, be he otherwise who he may: statesman, merchant, official, scholar.

284.

In favour of the idle. - As a sign that the esteem for the contemplative life has declined, scholars now vie with men of action in a kind of hasty enjoyment, so that they seem to value this manner of enjoying more highly than the one that properly belongs to them and that is in fact far more enjoyment. Scholars are ashamed of otium. Yet leisure and idling are a noble thing. - If idleness truly is the beginning of all vices, then it dwells at least in the closest neighbourhood of all virtues; the idle man is still always a better man than the active one. - You do not suppose, surely, that in speaking of leisure and idling I am aiming at you, you sloths? -

285.

Modern restlessness. - The further west one goes, the greater modern agitation becomes, so that to the Americans the inhabitants of Europe as a whole present themselves as peace-loving and pleasure-taking creatures, whereas they themselves nonetheless fly about in a jumble like bees and wasps. This agitation is growing so great that higher culture can no longer ripen its fruits; it is as though the seasons followed one another too swiftly. For lack of rest our civilization is running out into a new barbarism. At no time have the active, that is to say the restless, counted for more. Among the necessary corrections, therefore, that must be made to the character of mankind is to strengthen the contemplative element in great measure. Yet even now every individual who is calm and steady in heart and head has the right to believe that he possesses not merely a good temperament but a generally useful virtue, and that by preserving this virtue he is even fulfilling a higher task.

286.

In what way the active man is lazy. - I believe that everyone must have an opinion of his own about every thing concerning which opinions are possible, because he himself is a thing of his own, occurring only once, which takes up a new, never previously existing position towards all other things. But the laziness that lies at the bottom of the active man's soul prevents a person from drawing water from his own well. - It is with freedom of opinions as with health: both are individual, and of neither can a universally valid concept be set up. What one individual needs for his health is for another already a cause of falling ill, and many means and ways to freedom of spirit may count, for more highly developed natures, as ways and means to unfreedom.

287.

Censor vitae. The alternation of love and hate marks, for a long time, the inner condition of a person who wishes to become free in his judgement of life; he does not forget, and holds everything against things, good and evil alike. At last, when the whole tablet of his soul is written full with experiences, he will neither despise and hate existence nor yet love it, but will lie above it, now with the eye of joy, now with that of sorrow, and, like nature, be now of a summery, now of an autumnal mind.

288.

Incidental success. - Whoever earnestly wishes to become free will, without any compulsion, lose along the way the inclination to faults and vices; anger and vexation too will assail him ever more rarely. For his will wills nothing more urgently than knowing and the means to it, that is to say: the enduring condition in which he is most fit for knowing.

289.

Value of illness. - The man who lies sick in bed sometimes discovers that he is ordinarily sick of his office, his business or his society, and through them has lost all thoughtful awareness of himself: he gains this wisdom from the leisure to which his illness compels him.

290.

Feeling in the countryside. - If one has no firm, calm lines on the horizon of one's life, lines of mountain and forest, as it were, then a person's innermost will itself becomes restless, distracted and covetous, like the nature of the town-dweller: he has no happiness and gives no happiness.

291.

Caution of free spirits. - Free-minded people, living for knowledge alone, will soon find that they have reached their outward goal in life, their definitive position towards society and state, and will gladly content themselves, for instance, with a small office or a fortune that just suffices to live on; for they will arrange to live in such a way that a great transformation of outward goods, indeed an overthrow of political orders, does not overturn their life along with it. On all these things they expend as little energy as possible, so that with the whole of their gathered strength, and as it were with a long breath, they may dive down into the element of knowing. Thus they may hope to dive deep and perhaps even to see the bottom. - Of an event such a spirit will gladly take only a corner; he does not love things in the whole breadth and prolixity of their folds: for he does not want to get entangled in them. - He too knows the weekdays of unfreedom, of dependence, of servitude. But from time to time a Sunday of freedom must come to him, or else he will not endure life. - It is likely that

even his love for men will be cautious and somewhat short of breath, for he wishes to involve himself with the world of inclinations and of blindness only so far as is necessary for the purpose of knowledge. He must trust that the genius of justice will say something on behalf of its disciple and ward should accusing voices call him poor in love. - There is in his manner of living and thinking a refined heroism, which disdains to offer itself to the great veneration of the masses, as its coarser brother does, and is wont to go quietly through the world and out of the world. Whatever labyrinths he wanders through, beneath whatever rocks his stream has at times tormented its way - when he comes into the light, he goes his way bright, light and almost without a sound, and lets the sunshine play down to his very depths.

292.

Forward. - And so, forward on the path of wisdom, with a good stride, with good confidence! However you may be, serve yourself as a source of experience! Throw off your discontent with your nature, forgive yourself your own self, for in any case you have in yourself a ladder with a hundred rungs on which you can climb to knowledge. The age into which you feel yourself flung with sorrow calls you blessed on account of this good fortune; it cries out to you that there still falls to your share now, in experiences, what people of a later time will perhaps have to do without. Do not despise having once been religious; fathom completely how you once had a genuine access to art. Can you not, precisely with the help of these experiences, follow with greater understanding immense stretches of the path of earlier humanity? Is it not precisely on the soil that at times so displeases you, on the soil of impure thinking, that many of the most glorious fruits of older culture have grown up? One must have loved religion and art as mother and nurse - otherwise one cannot become wise. But one must be able to see beyond them, to outgrow them; if one remains under

their spell, one does not understand them. Likewise history must be familiar to you, and the cautious game with the scales: "on the one hand - on the other". Walk back, treading in the footsteps in which humanity made its sorrowful great journey through the desert of the past: thus you will be most surely taught where all later humanity cannot or may not go again. And in that you seek with all your strength to spy out in advance how the knot of the future is yet to be tied, your own life acquires the value of an instrument and means to knowledge. It is in your hands to bring it about that all you have lived through: the attempts, wrong turnings, mistakes, delusions, passions, your love and your hope, are absorbed without remainder into your goal. This goal is to become yourself a necessary chain of rings of culture and, from this necessity, to infer the necessity in the course of culture in general. When your gaze has become strong enough to see the bottom of the dark well of your nature and your knowledge, then perhaps in its mirror the distant constellations of future cultures will also become visible to you. Do you believe that such a life with such a goal is too toilsome, too bare of all comforts? Then you have not yet learned that no honey is sweeter than that of knowledge, and that the hanging clouds of affliction must yet serve you as an udder from which you will milk the milk for your refreshment. When old age comes, only then will you truly notice how you have lent your ear to the voice of nature, that nature which rules the whole world through pleasure: the same life that has its summit in old age has its summit also in wisdom, in that gentle sunshine of an abiding spiritual joyfulness; both of them, old age and wisdom, you meet upon one ridge of life - so nature willed it. Then it is time, and no cause for anger, that the mist of death draws near. Toward the light - your last movement; a shout of joy of knowledge - your last sound.

Sixth Division.

Man in Society.

293.

Benevolent dissimulation. - In dealings with people a benevolent dissimulation is often necessary, as though we did not see through the motives of their actions.

294.

Copies. - Not infrequently one encounters copies of significant people; and most people, as with paintings, so here too, like the copies better than the originals.

295.

The orator. - One can speak most fittingly and yet in such a way that all the world cries out the contrary: namely, when one is not speaking to all the world.

296.

Lack of intimacy. - Lack of intimacy among friends is a fault that cannot be reproached without becoming incurable.

297.

On the art of giving. - To be obliged to refuse a gift merely because it was not offered in the right way embitters one against the giver.

298.

The most dangerous party man. - In every party there is one who, through his all too faithful profession of the party's principles, provokes the rest to defect.

299.

Advisers of the sick. Whoever gives a sick man his advice acquires a feeling of superiority over him, whether it is accepted or rejected. That is why irritable and proud sick people hate their advisers even more than their sickness.

300.

Twofold kind of equality. - The craving for equality can express itself in such a way that one wishes either to draw all others down to oneself (by belittling, excluding, tripping up) or to raise oneself up together with all (by acknowledging, helping, rejoicing in others' success).

301.

Against embarrassment. - The best means of coming to the aid of very embarrassed people and calming them consists in praising them decidedly.

302.

Preference for particular virtues. - We do not set any special value on the possession of a virtue until we perceive its complete absence in our opponent.

303.

Why one contradicts. - One often contradicts an opinion when what is really disagreeable to us is only the tone in which it was put forward.

304.

Trust and intimacy. - Whoever deliberately seeks to force intimacy with another person is usually not sure whether he possesses his trust. Whoever is sure of trust sets little value on intimacy.

305.

Equilibrium of friendship. - Sometimes, in our relationship to another person, the right equilibrium of friendship returns when we lay a few grains of wrong in our own scale.

306.

The most dangerous physicians. - The most dangerous physicians are those who, as born actors, imitate the born physician with a perfect art of deception.

307.

When paradoxes are in place. - To win clever people over to a proposition, one sometimes needs only to present it to them in the form of a monstrous paradox.

308.

How courageous people are won over. - Courageous people are persuaded to an action by representing it as more dangerous than it is.

309.

Courtesies. - The courtesies shown us by people we dislike we count against them as offences.

310.

Keeping people waiting. - A sure means of provoking people and putting evil thoughts into their heads is to keep them waiting a long time. This makes one immoral.

311.

Against the confiding. - People who bestow their full confidence upon us believe they thereby have a right to ours. This is a false inference; one does not acquire rights through gifts.

312.

Means of reconciliation. - It is often enough, when one has done another some harm, to give him the opportunity for a joke at our expense in order to give him personal satisfaction, indeed to dispose him favourably towards us.

313.

Vanity of the tongue. - Whether a man conceals his bad qualities and vices or confesses them with openness, in both cases his vanity wishes to gain some advantage from it: one need only observe how finely he distinguishes before whom he conceals those qualities and before whom he becomes honest and candid.

314.

Considerate. - Wishing to offend no one, to wrong no one, can as well be the mark of a just disposition as of a timid one.

315.

Required for disputation. - He who does not know how to put his thoughts on ice should not enter into the heat of argument.

316.

Society and presumption. - One unlearns presumption when one knows oneself always among people of merit; being alone breeds arrogance. Young people are presumptuous, for they associate with their like, who are all nothing but would gladly signify much.

317.

Motive of attack. - One attacks not only in order to hurt someone, to defeat him, but perhaps also merely in order to become conscious of one's own strength.

318.

Flattery. - People who seek to numb our caution in dealing with them by means of flatteries are employing a dangerous means, a sleeping draught as it were, which, if it does not put us to sleep, only keeps us all the more awake.

319.

Good letter-writer. - He who writes no books, thinks much and lives in inadequate company will usually be a good letter-writer.

320.

Ugliest of all. - It may be doubted whether a much-travelled man has found anywhere in the world uglier regions than in the human face.

321.

The compassionate. - Compassionate natures, ever helpful in misfortune, are seldom at the same time those who share in others' joy: in the good fortune of others they have nothing to do, are superfluous, do not feel themselves in possession of their superiority, and therefore readily show displeasure.

322.

Relatives of a suicide. - The relatives of a suicide hold it against him that he did not stay alive out of consideration for their reputation.

323.

Ingratitude to be foreseen. - He who gives something great finds no gratitude; for the recipient already bears too great a burden in accepting it.

324.

In spiritless company. - No one thanks the man of wit for his courtesy when he puts himself on a level with a company in which it is not courteous to show wit.

325.

Presence of witnesses. - One leaps after a man who has fallen into the water twice as gladly when people are present who do not dare to.

326.

Silence. - The most unpleasant way, for both parties, of responding to a polemic is to be vexed and keep silent: for the attacker usually explains the silence to himself as a sign of contempt.

327.

The friend's secret. - There will be few who, when at a loss for matter for conversation, do not give away the more secret affairs of their friends.

328.

Humanity. - The humanity of the celebrities of the mind consists in obligingly allowing themselves to be in the wrong in their dealings with the uncelebrated.

329.

The self-conscious man. - People who do not feel sure of themselves in company use every opportunity to show publicly, before the company, their superiority over someone close to them to whom they are superior, for example by teasing.

330.

Gratitude. - A refined soul is oppressed to know that someone is obliged to it in gratitude; a coarse soul, to know itself obliged to someone.

331.

Sign of estrangement. - The strongest indication of an estrangement of views between two people is this: that each says something ironical to the other, but neither of them feels the irony in it.

332.

Presumption with merit. - Presumption accompanied by merit offends even more than the presumption of people without merit: for merit itself already offends.

333.

Danger in the voice. - Sometimes in conversation the sound of our own voice embarrasses us and misleads us into assertions that do not at all correspond to our opinion.

334.

In conversation. - Whether in conversation one chiefly agrees with the other or disagrees is entirely a matter of habit: the one as well as the other makes sense.

335.

Fear of one's neighbour. - We fear the hostile mood of our neighbour because we are afraid that through this mood he will get behind our secrets.

336.

Distinguishing through censure. - Very eminent persons bestow even their censure in such a way that they mean to distinguish us by it. It is meant to make us aware how earnestly they concern themselves

with us. We misunderstand them entirely if we take their censure at face value and defend ourselves against it; we thereby annoy them and estrange ourselves from them.

337.

Annoyance at the benevolence of others. - We are mistaken about the degree to which we believe ourselves hated or feared: because we ourselves know well enough the degree of our divergence from a person, a tendency, a party, whereas those others know us very superficially and therefore also hate us only superficially. We often encounter a benevolence that is inexplicable to us; but once we understand it, it offends us, because it shows that we are not taken seriously, not taken as important enough.

338.

Crossing vanities. - Two persons who meet and whose vanity is equally great retain a bad impression of each other afterwards, because each was so occupied with the impression he wanted to produce on the other that the other made no impression on him; both at last notice that their efforts have failed, and each pushes the blame onto the other.

339.

Bad manners as good signs. - The superior spirit takes pleasure in the tactlessness, the presumption, indeed the hostility of ambitious youths towards him; these are the bad manners of fiery horses that have not yet carried a rider and yet in a short while will be so proud to carry him.

340.

When it is advisable to remain in the wrong. - One does well to accept accusations made against us without refutation, even when they do us wrong, in case the accuser would see an even greater wrong on our part if we contradicted him and perhaps even refuted him. To be sure, in this way someone can always be in the wrong and always remain in the right, and in the end, with the best conscience in the world, become the most unbearable tyrant and tormentor; and what holds for the individual can also occur among whole classes of society.

341.

Too little honoured. - Very conceited persons who have been shown signs of less regard than they expected try for a long time to mislead themselves and others about it, and become subtle psychologisers in order to make out that the other did after all honour them sufficiently: if they do not reach their goal, if the veil of illusion tears, then they abandon themselves to an all the greater fury.

342.

Primeval conditions echoing in speech. - In the way men now put forward assertions in social intercourse one often recognizes an echo of the times when they understood weapons better than anything else: now they handle their assertions as marksmen taking aim handle their guns, now one thinks one hears the whistling and clashing of blades; and with some men an assertion comes crashing down like a stout cudgel. - Women, on the other hand, speak like beings who for thousands of years sat at the loom or plied the needle or were childish with children.

343.

The narrator. - Whoever tells something readily lets it be noticed whether he is telling it because the fact interests him or because he wants to interest others by the telling. In the latter case he will exaggerate, use superlatives and do the like. He then usually tells it worse, because he is thinking not so much of the matter as of himself.

344.

The reader aloud. - Whoever reads dramatic poetry aloud makes discoveries about his character: he finds his voice more natural for certain moods and scenes than for others, say for everything pathetic or for the scurrilous, whereas in ordinary life he perhaps simply had no opportunity to show pathos or scurrility.

345.

A comedy scene that occurs in life. - Someone thinks up a witty opinion on a subject in order to present it in company. Now in a comedy one would hear and watch how he tries with all sails set to reach the point and to embark the company there where he can make his remark: how he continually pushes the conversation towards a single goal, occasionally loses his bearings, regains them, at last reaches the moment: his breath almost fails him - and then someone in the company takes the remark right out of his mouth. What will he do? Oppose his own opinion?

346.

Impolite against one's will. - When someone against his will treats another impolitely, for example does not greet him because he does not recognize him, this rankles with him, although he cannot reproach his own disposition; he is grieved by the bad opinion he has

produced in the other, or he fears the consequences of an ill feeling, or it pains him to have hurt the other, - thus vanity, fear or pity may be stirred, perhaps all of them together.

347.

A traitor's masterpiece. - To voice to a fellow conspirator the wounding suspicion that one may be betrayed by him, and to do so precisely at the moment when one is oneself committing betrayal, is a masterpiece of malice, because it occupies the other personally and compels him for a time to behave very unsuspiciously and openly, so that the real traitor has gained a free hand.

348.

Offending and being offended. - It is far more pleasant to offend and later ask forgiveness than to be offended and grant forgiveness. He who does the first gives a sign of power and afterwards of goodness of character. The other, if he does not wish to be thought inhuman, simply must forgive; the enjoyment of the other's humiliation is slight on account of this compulsion.

349.

In dispute. - When one contradicts another opinion and at the same time develops one's own, the constant regard for the other opinion usually displaces the natural posture of one's own: it appears more deliberate, sharper, perhaps somewhat exaggerated.

350.

Artifice. - Whoever wants to obtain something difficult from another must not conceive the matter as a problem at all, but simply lay out his plan as though it were the only possibility; he must know how,

when objection, contradiction begins to dawn in his opponent's eye, to break off quickly and give him no time.

351.

Pangs of conscience after social gatherings. - Why do we have pangs of conscience after ordinary social gatherings? Because we have taken important things lightly, because in discussing persons we have not spoken with full fidelity, or because we kept silent where we ought to have spoken, because now and then we did not jump up and run away, in short because we behaved in company as if we belonged to it.

352.

One is judged falsely. - Whoever is always listening for how he is judged always has vexation. For we are judged falsely even by those who stand closest to us ("know us best"). Even good friends sometimes vent their ill humour in a grudging word; and would they be our friends if they knew us exactly? - The judgements of the indifferent hurt very much, because they sound so unprejudiced, almost objective. But if we notice that someone who is our enemy knows us, on some point we keep secret, as well as we know ourselves, how great then is our annoyance!

353.

Tyranny of the portrait. - Artists and statesmen, who quickly combine the whole picture of a person or an event out of individual traits, are most unjust in that they demand afterwards that the event or the person must really be as they painted it; they downright demand that someone be as gifted, as cunning, as unjust as he lives in their imagination.

354.

The relative as the best friend. - The Greeks, who knew so well what a friend is, - they alone of all peoples have a profound, manifold philosophical discussion of friendship; so that to them first, and until now last, the friend appeared as a problem worth solving - these same Greeks designated relatives with an expression that is the superlative of the word "friend". This remains inexplicable to me.

355.

Misjudged honesty. - When someone quotes himself in conversation ("I said at the time", "I am in the habit of saying"), this makes an impression of presumption, whereas it more often springs from precisely the opposite source, or at least from honesty, which does not wish to adorn and deck out the moment with notions that belong to an earlier moment.

356.

The parasite. - It betokens a complete lack of noble disposition when someone would rather live in dependence, at the expense of others, merely so as not to have to work, usually with a secret bitterness towards those on whom he depends. - Such a disposition is far more frequent among women than among men, and also far more pardonable (for historical reasons).

357.

On the altar of reconciliation. - There are circumstances in which one can obtain a thing from a person only by insulting him and making him one's enemy: this feeling of having an enemy torments him so much that he gladly uses the first sign of a milder mood for reconciliation, and sacrifices on the altar of this reconciliation that very thing

which formerly mattered so much to him that he would not give it up at any price.

358.

Demanding pity as a sign of presumption. - There are people who, when they fly into a rage and insult others, demand first that one should take nothing amiss from them, and secondly that one should have pity on them because they are subject to such violent paroxysms. So far does human presumption go.

359.

Bait. - "Every man has his price" - that is not true. But there is surely for everyone a bait at which he must bite. Thus, to win many persons over to a cause, one need only lend that cause the lustre of the philanthropic, the noble, the charitable, the self-sacrificing - and to what cause could one not lend it? - It is the confectionery and the sweetmeat of their soul; others have others.

360.

Behaviour when praised. - When good friends praise the gifted nature, it will often show itself pleased by it out of politeness and benevolence, but in truth it is indifferent to it. Its real being is quite sluggish in the face of it, and cannot be rolled by it a single step out of the sun or the shade in which it lies; but people wish to give pleasure by their praise, and one would grieve them if one did not rejoice at their praise.

361.

The experience of Socrates. - If one has become a master in one thing, one has usually, precisely thereby, remained a complete bungler in

most other things; but people judge exactly the other way round, as Socrates already discovered. This is the drawback that makes association with masters unpleasant.

362.

Means of brutalization. - In the struggle with stupidity the fairest and gentlest people at last become brutal. In this they are perhaps on the right path of defence; for against the stupid brow the clenched fist belongs, by rights, as argument. But because, as has been said, their character is gentle and fair, they suffer more from these means of self-defence than they inflict suffering.

363.

Curiosity. - Were it not for curiosity, little would be done for the welfare of one's neighbour. But curiosity creeps, under the name of duty or of pity, into the house of the unfortunate and the needy. - Perhaps even in the much-vaunted love of mothers there is a good deal of curiosity.

364.

Miscalculation in society. - This one wishes to be interesting through his judgements, that one through his likings and dislikings, the third through his acquaintances, a fourth through his isolation - and they all miscalculate. For he before whom the spectacle is performed believes himself to be the only spectacle worth considering.

365.

Duel. - In favour of all affairs of honour and duels it may be said that if someone has so sensitive a feeling that he does not wish to live if so-and-so says or thinks such-and-such about him, he has a right to

let the matter be settled by the death of the one or the other. That he is so sensitive is not to be disputed at all; in this we are the heirs of the past, of its greatness as well as of its excesses, without which there never was any greatness. Now if there exists a canon of honour that allows blood to stand in place of death, so that after a regular duel the mind is relieved, this is a great boon, since otherwise many human lives would be in danger. - Such an institution, moreover, educates people to be cautious in their utterances and makes association with them possible.

366.

Nobility and gratitude. - A noble soul will gladly feel itself bound to gratitude and will not anxiously avoid the occasions on which it becomes bound; likewise it will afterwards be composed in its expressions of gratitude; whereas baser souls resist every obligation, or afterwards are exaggerated and all too zealous in the expressions of their gratitude. The latter, incidentally, also occurs among persons of lowly origin or oppressed position: a favour shown to them seems to them a miracle of grace.

367.

The hours of eloquence. - One man, in order to speak well, needs someone who is decidedly and acknowledgedly superior to him; another can find complete freedom of speech and happy turns of eloquence only before one whom he surpasses: in both cases the reason is the same; each of them speaks well only when he speaks sans gêne, the one because before the higher he does not feel the spur of rivalry, of competition, the other likewise for this reason in the presence of the lower. - Now there is quite another species of people, who speak well only when they speak in emulation, with the intention of winning. Which of the two species is the more ambitious: the one that

speaks well out of excited ambition, or the one that, from these very motives, speaks badly or not at all?

368.

The talent for friendship. - Among people who have a special gift for friendship, two types stand out. The one is in a continual ascent and finds for every phase of his development a friend exactly belonging to it. The series of friends he acquires in this way is seldom connected among themselves, at times in discord and contradiction: quite in keeping with the fact that the later phases of his development cancel or impair the earlier phases. Such a person may in jest be called a ladder. - The other type is represented by one who exercises a power of attraction over very different characters and talents, so that he wins a whole circle of friends; these, however, are thereby themselves brought into friendly relations with one another, despite all their differences. Let such a person be called a circle: for in him that belonging-together of such different dispositions and natures must somehow be prefigured. - Incidentally, the gift of having good friends is in many a person far greater than the gift of being a good friend.

369.

Tactics in conversation. - After a conversation with someone, one is best disposed towards one's interlocutor when one has had the opportunity to display one's wit and amiability before him in their full splendour. Clever people who wish to put someone in a favourable mood towards them make use of this by pushing towards him, during the conversation, the best opportunities for a good witticism and the like. One could imagine an amusing conversation between two very clever people, each wishing to put the other in a favourable mood and therefore tossing the fine opportunities in the conversation back and forth, while neither takes them up: so that the conversation as a

whole would pass off witless and unamiable, because each allotted to the other the opportunity for wit and amiability.

370.

Venting ill humour. – A man who fails at something would rather ascribe this failure to another's ill will than to chance. His irritated feelings are eased by thinking of a person rather than a thing as the cause of his failure; for one can take revenge on persons, whereas the injuries of chance must simply be choked down. The entourage of a prince is therefore accustomed, when something has failed for him, to point out to him a single individual as the supposed cause and to sacrifice him in the interest of all the courtiers; for otherwise the prince's ill humour would vent itself on all of them, since he can, after all, take no revenge on the goddess of fate herself.

371.

Taking on the colour of one's surroundings. – Why are inclination and aversion so contagious that one can scarcely live in the vicinity of a person of strong feelings without being filled, like a vessel, with his for and against? First, complete abstention from judgement is very difficult, at times downright unbearable to our vanity; it then bears the same colour as poverty of thought and feeling, or as timidity, unmanliness: and so we are at least swept along into taking sides, perhaps against the direction of our surroundings, if this position gives our pride more pleasure. Usually, however – and this is the second point – we do not become conscious at all of the transition from indifference to inclination or aversion; rather, we gradually grow accustomed to the way of feeling of those around us, and because sympathetic agreement and mutual understanding are so agreeable, we soon wear all the badges and party colours of these surroundings.

372.

Irony. – Irony is in place only as a pedagogical means, on the part of a teacher in dealing with pupils of any kind: its purpose is humiliation, shaming, but of that salutary kind which awakens good resolutions and bids us bring to him who treated us thus reverence and gratitude, as to a physician. The ironist feigns ignorance, and does so so well that the pupils conversing with him are deceived and, in their good faith in their own superior knowledge, grow bold and expose themselves in every way; they lose their caution and show themselves as they are – until, in a single moment, the lamp they were holding up to the teacher's face lets its rays fall back upon themselves, very humiliatingly. – Where no such relationship as that between teacher and pupil obtains, it is an ill-breeding, a vulgar affect. All ironic writers count on that foolish species of men who like to feel themselves superior to everyone else together with the author, whom they regard as the mouthpiece of their presumption. – Habituation to irony, moreover, like that to sarcasm, spoils the character; it gradually confers the quality of a gloating superiority: in the end one is like a snappish dog that has learned to laugh as well as to bite.

373.

Presumption. – Against nothing should one guard so carefully as against the growth of that weed called presumption, which spoils every good harvest for us; for there is presumption in cordiality, in marks of honour, in benevolent familiarity, in caresses, in friendly counsel, in the confession of faults, in pity for others, and all these fine things arouse repugnance when that weed grows in among them. The presumptuous man, that is, he who wants to signify more than he is or is reckoned to be, always makes a false calculation. True, he has momentary success on his side, inasmuch as the people before whom he is presumptuous usually pay him the measure of honour he

demands, out of fear or convenience; but they take a nasty revenge for it, inasmuch as they subtract from the value they had hitherto attributed to him precisely as much as he demanded beyond the measure. There is nothing for which men make others pay more dearly than humiliation. The presumptuous man can so cast suspicion upon his real and great merit in the eyes of others, and so belittle it, that they tread upon it with dusty feet. Even a proud bearing one should permit oneself only where one can be quite certain of not being misunderstood and regarded as presumptuous, for example before friends and wives. For in dealings with men there is no greater folly than to incur the reputation of presumption; it is worse even than not having learned to lie politely.

374.

Dialogue. – The dialogue is the perfect conversation, because everything that the one says receives its particular colour, its tone, its accompanying gesture in strict regard to the other with whom he is speaking, thus corresponding to what happens in correspondence by letter, where one and the same person displays ten kinds of expression of soul according as he writes now to this one, now to that. In dialogue there is only a single refraction of thought: it is produced by the interlocutor, as the mirror in which we wish to behold our thoughts again as beautifully as possible. But how is it with two, with three or more interlocutors? There the conversation necessarily loses in individualizing subtlety; the various considerations cross one another and cancel each other out; the turn of phrase that pleases one does not suit the disposition of another. Therefore a man dealing with several people is compelled to withdraw into himself, to set forth the facts as they are, but to strip things of that playful ether of humanity which makes a conversation one of the most agreeable things in the world. Just listen to the tone in which men are accustomed to speak

when dealing with whole groups of men; it is as if the ground bass of all their speech were: "This is what I am, this is what I say, now make of it what you will!" This is the reason why witty women mostly leave a disconcerting, painful, off-putting impression on one who has come to know them in society: it is speaking to many, before many, that robs them of all intellectual charm and shows in a glaring light only their conscious reliance upon themselves, their tactics and their aim at public victory: whereas the same women in dialogue become women again and recover their intellectual grace.

375.

Posthumous fame. – To hope for the recognition of a distant future makes sense only if one assumes that mankind will remain essentially unchanged and that everything great must be felt as great not for one age but for all ages. This, however, is an error; mankind, in all its feeling and judging about what is beautiful and good, transforms itself very greatly; it is fantasy to believe of oneself that one is a mile ahead and that the whole of mankind is travelling our road. Besides: a scholar who is unappreciated may now count with certainty on his discovery being made by others as well, and on its being granted him at best, some time later, by a historian, that he too already knew this and that, but was not in a position to win belief for his proposition. Not being recognized is always interpreted by posterity as a lack of strength. – In short, one should not so readily speak in favour of haughty isolation. There are, by the way, exceptional cases; but for the most part it is our faults, weaknesses and follies that hinder the recognition of our great qualities.

376.

Of friends. - Just reflect for once, by yourself, how different the feelings are, how divided the opinions, even among the closest ac-

quaintances; how even the same opinions hold quite another place or strength in the heads of your friends than in your own; how manifold are the occasions for misunderstanding, for hostile flight from one another. After all this you will say to yourself: how unsure is the ground on which all our alliances and friendships rest, how near are cold downpours or foul weather, how solitary is every human being! If someone sees this, and sees moreover that all the opinions of his fellow men, and their kind and strength, are just as necessary and unaccountable as their actions; if he gains an eye for this inner necessity of opinions, arising from the indissoluble intertwining of character, occupation, talent, surroundings, - then perhaps he will be rid of the bitterness and sharpness of that feeling with which that sage cried: "Friends, there are no friends!" He will rather confess to himself: yes, there are friends, but it was error, deception about you, that brought them to you; and they must have learned to keep silent in order to remain your friends; for almost always such human relationships rest on this, that a certain few things are never said, indeed that they are never touched upon; but should these little stones once start rolling, friendship follows after them and breaks. Are there people who could not be mortally wounded if they were to learn what their most intimate friends at bottom know about them? - By knowing ourselves, and by regarding our very nature as a shifting sphere of opinions and moods, and thus learning to esteem it a little less, we bring ourselves back into balance with the rest. It is true, we have good reasons to hold each of our acquaintances in low esteem, were they even the greatest; but just as good reasons to turn this feeling against ourselves. - And so let us bear with one another, since after all we bear with ourselves; and perhaps to each of us there will also come one day the more joyful hour in which he says:

"Friends, there are no friends!" so cried the dying sage; "Enemies, there is no enemy!" - cry I, the living fool.

Seventh Division.

Woman and Child.

377.

The perfect woman. - The perfect woman is a higher type of human being than the perfect man: also something far rarer. - The natural science of animals offers a means of making this proposition probable.

378.

Friendship and marriage. - The best friend will probably get the best wife, because a good marriage rests upon the talent for friendship.

379.

The parents live on. - The unresolved dissonances in the relation between the character and the disposition of the parents go on sounding in the nature of the child and make up the history of its inner suffering.

380.

From the mother. - Everyone carries within him an image of woman that comes from his mother: by this he is determined to revere women in general, or to think little of them, or to be on the whole indifferent towards them.

381.

Correcting nature. - If one has no good father, one should procure oneself one.

382.

Fathers and sons. - Fathers have much to do to make amends for having sons.

383.

Error of noble ladies. - Noble ladies think that a thing does not exist at all if it is not possible to speak of it in society.

384.

A male malady. - Against the male malady of self-contempt the surest help is to be loved by a clever woman.

385.

A kind of jealousy. - Mothers are easily jealous of their sons' friends when these have particular successes. As a rule a mother loves herself in her son more than she loves the son himself.

386.

Reasonable unreason. - In the ripeness of life and of understanding, a man is overcome by the feeling that his father was wrong to beget him.

387.

Motherly goodness. - Many a mother needs happy, honoured children, many a one unhappy ones: otherwise her goodness as a mother cannot show itself.

388.

Different sighs. - Some men have sighed over the abduction of their wives; most, over the fact that no one wanted to abduct them.

389.

Love matches. - Marriages that are contracted out of love (the so-called love matches) have error for their father and need (want) for their mother.

390.

Women's friendship. - Women can very well form a friendship with a man; but to keep it up - for that a little physical antipathy must surely lend a hand.

391.

Boredom. - Many people, especially women, do not feel boredom, because they have never learned to work properly.

392.

An element of love. - In every kind of womanly love something of motherly love also comes to light.

393.

The unity of place and the drama. - If husband and wife did not live together, good marriages would be more frequent.

394.

Usual consequences of marriage. - Every association that does not raise us drags us down, and vice versa; that is why men usually sink

somewhat when they take wives, while the wives are somewhat raised. Overly spiritual men need marriage just as much as they resist it like a repugnant medicine.

395.

Teaching to command. - Children of modest families must be taught to command through education just as much as other children must be taught to obey.

396.

Wanting to fall in love. - Betrothed couples whom convenience has joined together often strive to fall in love, in order to get past the reproach of cold, calculating utility. In the same way those who turn to Christianity for the sake of their own advantage strive to become truly pious; for thus the religious play of countenance comes easier to them.

397.

No standstill in love. - A musician who loves the slow tempo will take the same pieces ever more slowly. Thus in no love is there a standing still.

398.

Modesty. - With the beauty of women their modesty generally increases.

399.

A marriage that lasts well. - A marriage in which each wishes to attain an individual goal through the other holds together well, for example

when the wife wishes to become famous through the husband, the husband to become well liked through the wife.

400.

Protean nature. - Out of love, women become entirely that as which they live in the imagination of the men by whom they are loved.

401.

Loving and possessing. - Women mostly love a significant man in such a way that they want to have him to themselves. They would gladly put him under lock and key, did not their vanity counsel against it: this wants him to appear significant before others as well.

402.

Test of a good marriage. - The goodness of a marriage proves itself in its being able to bear an "exception" for once.

403.

Means of bringing everyone to anything. - One can so wear down and weaken anyone through disquiet, anxieties, an overload of work and thoughts that he no longer resists a matter that has the appearance of being complicated, but yields to it, - this the diplomats know, and the women.

404.

Respectability and honesty. - Those girls who mean to owe their provision for the whole of life to their youthful charms alone, and whose cunning is further prompted by their shrewd mothers, want exactly the same as the hetaerae, except that they are cleverer and less honest than these.

405.

Masks. - There are women who, however one searches them, have no inner being but are pure masks. The man is to be pitied who involves himself with such almost ghostly, necessarily unsatisfying creatures; yet it is precisely they who are able to arouse a man's desire most strongly: he searches for their soul - and goes on searching for ever.

406.

Marriage as a long conversation. - On entering into a marriage one should put to oneself the question: do you believe you will converse well with this woman right into old age? Everything else in marriage is transitory, but most of the time spent together belongs to conversation.

407.

Girls' dreams. - Inexperienced girls flatter themselves with the notion that it lies in their power to make a man happy; later they learn that it amounts to thinking little of a man to suppose that it needs only a girl to make him happy. - The vanity of women demands that a man be more than a happy husband.

408.

The dying out of Faust and Gretchen. - According to the very perceptive remark of a scholar, the educated men of present-day Germany resemble a mixture of Mephistopheles and Wagner, but by no means Faust: whom their grandfathers (in their youth at least) felt rumbling within them. To them, therefore - to carry that proposition further - the Gretchens are unsuited for two reasons. And because they are no longer desired, they are, it seems, dying out.

409.

Girls as grammar-school pupils. - For all the world, let us not on top of everything transfer our grammar-school education to girls! That education which so often turns spirited, inquisitive, fiery young people - into copies of their teachers!

410.

Without rivals. - Women easily perceive in a man whether his soul has already been taken possession of; they want to be loved without rivals and hold against him the goals of his ambition, his political tasks, his sciences and arts, if he has a passion for such things. Unless he shines through them, - then, in the event of a love union with him, they hope at the same time for an increase of their own lustre; if that is how matters stand, they favour the lover.

411.

The female intellect. - The intellect of women shows itself as perfect self-command, presence of mind, the exploitation of every advantage. They bequeath it to their children as their fundamental trait, and the father adds the darker background of the will. His influence determines, as it were, the rhythm and harmony to which the new life is to be played; but its melody comes from the woman. - Said for those who know how to make sense of a thing: women have the understanding, men the heart and passion. This is not contradicted by the fact that men in practice get so much further with their understanding: they have the deeper, mightier drives; it is these that carry their understanding, which in itself is something passive, so far. Women often marvel in secret at the great reverence men pay to their heart. If in choosing a spouse men seek above all a deep, warm-hearted nature, while women seek a clever, quick-witted and brilliant one, then one

sees plainly at bottom that the man seeks the idealized man, the woman the idealized woman, and thus not a complement but the perfection of their own excellences.

412.

A judgement of Hesiod's confirmed. - It is a sign of the cleverness of women that almost everywhere they have known how to get themselves fed, like drones in the beehive. Let one consider, though, what this originally signifies, and why men do not let themselves be fed by women. Surely because male vanity and ambition are greater than female cleverness; for women have known how, through subordination, to secure for themselves nonetheless the preponderant advantage, indeed dominion. Even the nursing of children may originally have been used by the cleverness of women as a pretext for evading work as far as possible. Even now, when they are genuinely active, for instance as housekeepers, they know how to make a bewildering fuss about it: so that the merit of their activity is usually overrated tenfold by men.

413.

The short-sighted are in love. - Sometimes a stronger pair of spectacles is enough to cure the lover; and whoever had the power of imagination to picture a face, a figure, twenty years older, would perhaps go through life quite undisturbed.

414.

Women in hatred. - In a state of hatred women are more dangerous than men; first because they are held back by no regard for fairness in their hostile feeling once it has been aroused, but let their hatred grow undisturbed to its ultimate consequences; and secondly because

they are practised at finding sore spots (which every person, every party has) and stabbing into them: in which their dagger-pointed understanding renders them excellent service (whereas men, at the sight of wounds, become restrained, often magnanimous and conciliatory).

415.

Love. - The idolatry that women practise with love is at bottom and originally an invention of cleverness, inasmuch as through all those idealizations of love they enhance their power and present themselves in the eyes of men as ever more desirable. But through being accustomed for centuries to this exaggerated estimation of love, it has come about that they have run into their own net and forgotten that origin. They themselves are now even more the deceived than men are, and therefore also suffer more from the disillusionment which will almost necessarily occur in the life of every woman - provided she has imagination and understanding enough to be capable of being deceived and disillusioned at all.

416.

On the emancipation of women. - Can women be just at all, when they are so accustomed to love, to feel at once for or against? That is also why they are more rarely taken with causes, more with persons: but if they are taken with causes, they at once become their partisans and thereby spoil their pure, innocent effect. Thus there arises no small danger when politics and certain parts of science (history, for example) are entrusted to them. For what would be rarer than a woman who really knew what science is? The best of them even nourish in their bosom a secret disdain for it, as though they were in some way superior to it. Perhaps all this can change; for the time being it is so.

417.

Inspiration in the judgement of women. - Those sudden decisions for and against which women are wont to give, those lightning-swift illuminations of personal relationships through their eruptive inclinations and aversions, in short the proofs of female injustice, have been surrounded by men in love with a lustre, as though all women had inspirations of wisdom even without the Delphic cauldron and the laurel fillet: and their pronouncements are interpreted and construed long afterwards like Sibylline oracles. But if one considers that for every person, for every thing, something can be said in its favour, but just as well something against it, that all things are not merely two-sided but three- and four-sided, then it is almost difficult to go entirely wrong with such sudden decisions; indeed one might say: the nature of things is so arranged that women are always in the right.

418.

Letting oneself be loved. - Because of two persons in love one is usually the loving and the other the loved person, the belief has arisen that in every love affair there is a constant quantity of love: the more of it one seizes for oneself, the less remains for the other person. Exceptionally it happens that vanity persuades each of the two persons that he or she is the one who must be loved; so that both want to let themselves be loved: from which, especially in marriage, there arise all manner of half droll, half absurd scenes.

419.

Contradictions in female heads. - Because women are so much more personal than objective, tendencies that logically contradict one another can coexist within the circle of their thoughts: they are wont, namely, to grow enthusiastic for the representatives of these tenden-

cies one after another and to accept their systems wholesale; yet in such a way that a dead spot arises wherever a new personality later gains the upper hand. It may perhaps happen that the whole philosophy in the head of an old woman consists of nothing but such dead spots.

420.

Who suffers more? - After a personal discord and quarrel between a woman and a man, the one party suffers most at the thought of having caused the other pain; while the other suffers most at the thought of not having caused the other enough pain, and therefore strives, through tears, sobs and distraught looks, to make the other's heart heavy even after the fact.

421.

Occasion for female magnanimity. — If one sets aside, for once and in thought only, the claims of custom, one might well consider whether nature and reason do not direct man to several marriages in succession, perhaps in such a form that, at the age of twenty-two, he first marries an older girl who is his superior intellectually and morally and can become his guide through the perils of his twenties (ambition, hatred, self-contempt, passions of every kind). Her love would later pass over entirely into the maternal, and she would not only bear it but would further it in the most salutary manner if the man, in his thirties, were to enter into a union with a quite young girl whose education he would take into his own hands. — For one's twenties marriage is a necessary institution, for one's thirties a useful but not a necessary one: for later life it is often harmful and promotes the intellectual regression of the man.

422.

Tragedy of childhood. — It perhaps happens not infrequently that noble and high-aspiring people have to endure their hardest struggle in childhood: for instance, by having to assert their disposition against a base-minded father given over to show and lying, or by living, like Lord Byron, in continual combat with a childish and wrathful mother. Whoever has experienced such a thing will never, his whole life long, get over knowing who his greatest, his most dangerous enemy has actually been.

423.

Parental folly. — The grossest errors in judging a person are made by his parents: this is a fact, but how is it to be explained? Do the parents have too much experience of the child, and can they no longer bring it together into a unity? One notices that travellers among foreign peoples correctly grasp the general distinguishing features of a people only in the early period of their stay; the better they come to know the people, the more they unlearn how to see what is typical and distinctive in it. As soon as they become near-sighted, their eyes cease to be far-sighted. Might parents judge the child falsely for this reason, that they have never stood far enough away from it? — A quite different explanation would be the following: people are wont no longer to reflect upon what is nearest and surrounds them, but merely to accept it. Perhaps the habitual thoughtlessness of parents is the reason why, once compelled to judge their children, they judge so crookedly.

424.

From the future of marriage. — Those noble, free-minded women who set themselves the task of educating and elevating the female sex

ought not to overlook one point of view: marriage conceived in its higher sense, as the friendship of soul between two people of different sexes, thus as it is hoped for from the future, contracted for the purpose of begetting and educating a new generation — such a marriage, which uses the sensual, as it were, only as a rare, occasional means to a greater end, probably requires, as one must fear, a natural auxiliary, concubinage; for if, for reasons of the man's health, the wife is also to serve as the sole satisfaction of his sexual need, then in the choice of a wife a false point of view, one opposed to the aims indicated, will already be decisive: the obtaining of offspring will become a matter of chance, their successful education highly improbable. A good wife, who is to be friend, helpmate, child-bearer, mother, head of the family, manager, and who perhaps even has to attend, apart from her husband, to her own business and office, cannot at the same time be a concubine: that would, in general, be asking too much of her. Thus in the future the reverse might come to pass of what happened in Athens in the time of Pericles: the men, who at that time had in their wives little more than concubines, turned on the side to the Aspasias, because they longed for the charms of a sociability that freed head and heart, such as only the grace and intellectual suppleness of women is able to create. All human institutions, such as marriage, permit only a moderate degree of practical idealization, failing which crude remedies at once become necessary.

425.

The Sturm und Drang period of women. — In the three or four civilized countries of Europe one can, through a few centuries of education, make out of women anything one likes, even men — not, to be sure, in the sexual sense, but in every other sense. Under such an influence they will one day have taken on all the male virtues and strengths, though in doing so they will also have to accept their weak-

nesses and vices into the bargain: this much, as I said, can be compelled. But how shall we endure the intermediate state thereby brought about, which may itself last a couple of centuries, during which the female follies and injustices, their age-old birthday gift, still maintain the upper hand over everything newly gained and learned? This will be the time in which anger constitutes the truly male affect: anger that all arts and sciences are flooded and silted up by an unheard-of dilettantism, philosophy talked to death by bewildering chatter, politics more fantastical and partisan than ever, society in full dissolution, because the guardians of the old custom have become ridiculous to themselves and strive in every respect to stand outside custom. For if women had their greatest power in custom, what will they have to reach for in order to regain a similar fullness of power once they have given up custom?

426.

Free spirit and marriage. — Will free spirits live with women? In general I believe that, like the prophesying birds of antiquity, as the true-thinking, truth-speaking ones of the present, they must prefer to fly alone.

427.

Happiness of marriage. — Everything habitual draws an ever tighter web of spider-threads around us; and presently we notice that the threads have become cords and that we ourselves sit in the middle as the spider, which has caught itself here and must feed on its own blood. That is why the free spirit hates all habits and rules, everything enduring and definitive; that is why, painfully, he tears the web around him apart again and again: although in consequence he will suffer from numerous small and great wounds — for he must tear those threads from himself, from his body, from his soul. He must

learn to love where hitherto he hated, and the reverse. Indeed, nothing may be impossible for him, not even to sow dragons' teeth upon the very field over which he previously let the horns of plenty of his kindness pour forth. — From this one may gather whether he is made for the happiness of marriage.

428.

Too near. — If we live too near to a person, it goes with us as when we handle a good copperplate engraving again and again with bare fingers: one day we have nothing more in our hands than poor, soiled paper. A person's soul, too, is finally worn by constant handling; at least it finally appears so to us — we never again see its original design and beauty. — One always loses through all too intimate association with women and friends; and sometimes one loses the pearl of one's life in the process.

429.

The golden cradle. - The free spirit will always breathe more freely once he has finally resolved to shake off that motherly caring and watching over with which women hover about him. What harm, after all, does a rougher draught of air do him, which was so anxiously kept from him; what does one real disadvantage, loss, mishap, illness, debt, infatuation more or less in his life signify, compared with the unfreedom of the golden cradle, of the peacock-tail fan, and of the oppressive feeling of having, on top of it all, to be grateful because he is tended and pampered like an infant? That is why the milk which the motherly disposition of the women around him offers can so easily turn to gall.

430.

Voluntary sacrificial animal. - By nothing do notable women make life so much easier for their husbands, if these are famous and great, as by becoming, as it were, the vessel of the general disfavour and occasional ill humour of the rest of mankind. Contemporaries are wont to overlook in their great men many blunders and follies, indeed acts of gross injustice, so long as they find someone whom they may maltreat and slaughter as the true sacrificial animal for the relief of their feelings. Not seldom a woman finds within herself the ambition to offer herself for this sacrifice, and then indeed the man may be very content, - provided, that is, he is egoist enough to tolerate such a voluntary lightning-, storm- and rain-conductor near him.

431.

Agreeable adversaries. - The natural inclination of women towards a quiet, even, happily harmonious existence and intercourse, the oil-like and soothing quality of their effects upon the sea of life, works involuntarily against the more heroic inner urge of the free spirit. Without noticing it, women act as if one were to remove the stones from the path of the wandering mineralogist so that his foot should not strike against them, - whereas he has set out precisely in order to strike against them.

432.

Dissonance of two consonances. - Women want to serve and find their happiness in that: and the free spirit does not want to be served and finds his happiness in that.

433.

Xanthippe. - Socrates found a wife such as he needed, - but even he would not have sought her had he known her well enough: so far even the heroism of this free spirit would not have gone. In fact Xanthippe drove him ever further into his peculiar calling by making his house and home unhomely and uncanny to him: she taught him to live in the streets and wherever one could chatter and be idle, and thereby trained him into the greatest Athenian street-dialectician: who in the end had to compare himself to an importunate gadfly which a god had set upon the neck of the beautiful horse Athens, so as not to let it come to rest.

434.

Blind to what is distant. - Just as mothers really have sense and eye only for those pains of their children that are evident to eye and sense, so the wives of highly aspiring men cannot bring themselves to see their spouses suffering, in want, and even scorned, - whereas perhaps all this is not merely the token of a right choice of their way of life, but already the guarantee that their great goals must at some time be attained. Women always intrigue in secret against the higher soul of their husbands; they want to cheat it of its future for the sake of a painless, comfortable present.

435.

Power and freedom. - However highly women honour their husbands, they honour still more the powers and notions recognized by society: for millennia they have been accustomed to go about bowed before everything that rules, their hands folded upon their breasts, and they disapprove of all rebellion against public authority. That is why, without even intending it, rather as if from instinct, they hang them-

selves like a drag-shoe on the wheels of free-spirited, independent striving, and in certain circumstances make their husbands impatient in the highest degree, especially when these still persuade themselves that it is love which at bottom drives the women in this. To disapprove of women's means and magnanimously to honour the motives of these means, - that is the way of men and often enough the despair of men.

436.

Ceterum censeo. - It is laughable when a society of have-nots decrees the abolition of the right of inheritance, and it is no less laughable when the childless work at the practical legislation of a country: - for they have not enough ballast in their ship to be able to sail safely out into the ocean of the future. But it seems just as absurd when he who has chosen as his task the most universal knowledge and the appraisal of the whole of existence burdens himself with personal considerations for a family, for the feeding, security and respect of wife and child, and stretches before his telescope that murky veil through which scarcely a few rays of the distant starry world are able to penetrate. So I too arrive at the proposition that in matters of the highest philosophical kind all married men are suspect.

437.

At the last. - There are many kinds of hemlock, and fate usually finds an occasion to set a cup of this poisonous drink to the lips of the free spirit, - in order to "punish" him, as all the world then says. What do the women about him do then? They will cry out and lament and perhaps disturb the sunset calm of the thinker: as they did in the prison at Athens. "O Crito, do bid someone lead these women away!" said Socrates at last. -

Chapter Eight.

A Glance at the State.

438.

Asking to speak. - The demagogic character and the intention to work upon the masses are at present common to all political parties: all of them are compelled, on account of this intention, to transform their principles into great al fresco stupidities and to paint them thus upon the wall. Nothing can be changed about this any longer; indeed it is superfluous even to lift a finger against it; for in this domain what Voltaire says holds true: quand la populace se mêle de raisonner, tout est perdu. Since this has happened, one must submit to the new conditions, as one submits when an earthquake has shifted the old boundaries and contours of the land and altered the value of property. Moreover: if all politics is, after all, a matter of making life bearable for as many as possible, then these as-many-as-possible may as well determine what they understand by a bearable life; if they trust themselves to have the intellect to find the right means to this end as well, what would it help to doubt it? They want, once and for all, to be the smiths of their own fortune and misfortune; and if this feeling of self-determination, this pride in the five or six concepts which their heads harbour and bring to light, really makes life so pleasant for them that they gladly bear the fatal consequences of their narrowness: then there is little to object, provided that the narrowness does not go so far as to demand that everything should become politics in this sense, that everyone should live and act according to such a standard. For first of all, it must be permitted to some, more than ever, to abstain from politics and to step a little aside: they too are driven to this by the pleasure in self-determination, and a little pride may also be

bound up with it, the pride of keeping silent when too many, or indeed merely many, are talking. Then one must indulge these few if they do not take the happiness of the many, whether one understands by this peoples or strata of the population, so seriously, and now and then are guilty of an ironic expression; for their seriousness lies elsewhere, their happiness is a different concept, their goal is not to be grasped by every clumsy hand that has just five fingers. Finally there comes - what will certainly be conceded to them with the greatest difficulty, but must likewise be conceded - from time to time a moment when they step out of their silent solitudes and try the strength of their lungs once again: for then they call out to one another like people lost in a forest, in order to make themselves known to one another and to give one another courage; whereby, to be sure, many a thing becomes audible that sounds ill to the ears for which it is not intended. - Well, soon afterwards it is still again in the forest, so still that one once more distinctly hears the whirring, humming and fluttering of the countless insects that live in, above and beneath it. -

439.

Culture and caste. - A higher culture can come into being only where there are two distinct castes of society: that of the working and that of the idle, those capable of true leisure; or, to put it more strongly: the caste of forced labour and the caste of free labour. The point of view of the distribution of happiness is not essential when it is a matter of producing a higher culture; in any case, however, the caste of the idle is the one more capable of suffering, the one that suffers more; its delight in existence is less, its task greater. If, now, there should even take place an exchange between the two castes, such that the duller, less spiritual families and individuals of the upper caste are set down into the lower, and in turn the freer men of the latter gain access to

the higher: then a state is reached beyond which one sees only the open sea of indefinite wishes. - Thus speaks to us the fading voice of the olden time; but where are there still ears to hear it?

440.

Of noble blood. - That which men and women of noble blood have over others, and which gives them an undoubted claim to higher esteem, are two arts ever more heightened through inheritance: the art of being able to command, and the art of proud obedience. - Now wherever commanding belongs to the business of the day (as in the great world of commerce and industry), something arises similar to those lineages "of noble blood", but they lack the distinguished bearing in obedience which in the former is an inheritance from feudal conditions and which will no longer grow in our climate of culture.

441.

Subordination. - The subordination which is so highly prized in the military and bureaucratic state will soon become as incredible to us as the closed tactics of the Jesuits have already become; and when this subordination is no longer possible, a host of the most astonishing effects can no longer be achieved, and the world will be poorer. It must vanish, for its foundation is vanishing: faith in unconditional authority, in definitive truth; even in military states physical compulsion is not sufficient to produce it, but rather the inherited adoration of the princely as of something superhuman. - In freer circumstances one subordinates oneself only on conditions, in consequence of mutual contract, and thus with all the reservations of self-interest.

442.

National armies. - The greatest disadvantage of the national armies now so glorified consists in the squandering of men of the highest civilization; it is only through the favour of all circumstances that there are any such at all, - how sparingly and anxiously one ought to deal with them, since great spans of time are needed to create the chance conditions for the production of such delicately organized brains! But as the Greeks raged in Greek blood, so the Europeans now rage in European blood: and indeed, relatively speaking, it is always the most highly cultivated who are sacrificed in greatest numbers, those who guarantee an abundant and good posterity; for such men stand at the front in battle, as commanders, and moreover, on account of their higher ambition, expose themselves most to danger. - The crude Roman patriotism is now, when quite other and higher tasks are set than patria and honor, either something dishonest or a sign of backwardness.

443.

Hope as presumption. - Our social order will slowly melt away, as all earlier orders have done, as soon as the suns of new opinions shone out over mankind with a new glow. One can wish for this melting away only by hoping: and one may reasonably hope only if one credits oneself and one's like with more strength in heart and head than the representatives of what exists. Usually, then, this hope will be a presumption, an overestimation.

444.

War. - Against war one can say: it makes the victor stupid, the vanquished malicious. In favour of war: through both of the effects just named it barbarizes and thereby makes more natural; it is for culture

a sleep or a wintertime, and man emerges from it stronger for good and for evil.

445.

In the service of the prince. - A statesman, in order to be able to act entirely without scruple, will do best to carry out his work not for himself but for a prince. The eye of the beholder is dazzled by the splendour of this general disinterestedness, so that he does not see the cunning and the harshness which the statesman's work brings with it.

446.

A question of power, not of right. – For men who in every matter keep the higher utility in view, socialism, if it really is the uprising of those who for millennia have been oppressed and held down against their oppressors, poses no problem of right (with the ridiculous, effeminate question: "how far ought one to yield to its demands?") but only a problem of power ("how far can one make use of its demands?"); as, then, with a force of nature, steam for example, which is either compelled by man into his service as a machine-god or else, when there are faults in the machine, that is to say faults of human calculation in its construction, shatters both it and man along with it. To solve that question of power one must know how strong socialism is, in what modification it can still be used as a mighty lever within the present play of political forces; under certain circumstances one would even have to do everything to strengthen it. With every great force – be it the most dangerous – mankind must consider how to make of it an instrument of its own purposes. – Socialism gains a right for itself only when war seems to have broken out between the two powers, the representatives of the old and of the new, but when then the shrewd reckoning on the part of both parties as to the greatest pos-

sible preservation and advantage gives rise to the desire for a contract. Without contract, no right. Until now, however, there is in the domain indicated neither war nor contracts, and therefore also no rights, no "ought".

447.

Making use of the smallest dishonesty. – The power of the press consists in this, that each individual who serves it feels himself only very slightly obligated and bound. He usually says his opinion, but now and then he also does not say it, in order to be of use to his party or to the policy of his country or, finally, to himself. Such small offences of dishonesty, or perhaps only of a dishonest silence, are not hard for the individual to bear, yet the consequences are extraordinary, because these small offences are committed by many at the same time. Each of them says to himself: "for such trifling services I live better, I can make my living; by lacking such small considerations I make myself impossible." Because it seems almost morally indifferent whether one writes one line more, perhaps moreover without a signature, or does not write it, someone who has money and influence can make any opinion a public one. He who knows that most men are weak in small things, and wishes to attain his own ends through them, is always a dangerous man.

448.

Too loud a tone in complaints. – When a state of distress (for example the infirmities of an administration, corruption and arbitrary favouritism in political or learned bodies) is depicted in greatly exaggerated form, the depiction does indeed lose its effect upon the discerning, but it works all the more powerfully upon the undiscerning (who would have remained indifferent to a careful, measured exposition). But since these are by far the majority and harbour within themselves

stronger forces of will, a more impetuous desire to act, that exaggeration becomes the occasion for inquiries, punishments, promises, reorganizations. – To that extent it is useful to depict states of distress in exaggerated form.

449.

The apparent weather-makers of politics. – Just as the common people secretly assume of him who understands the weather and foretells it a day in advance that he makes the weather, so even the educated and the learned, with an expenditure of superstitious faith, ascribe to great statesmen all the important changes and conjunctures that occurred during their administration as their very own work, provided only that it is evident that they knew something of them sooner than others and made their calculations accordingly: they too, then, are taken for weather-makers – and this faith is not the least instrument of their power.

450.

New and old conception of government. – To distinguish between government and people as though two separate spheres of power, a stronger and higher with a weaker and lower, were here negotiating and coming to terms with each other, is a piece of inherited political sentiment which still corresponds exactly to the historical establishment of the relations of power in most states. When, for example, Bismarck describes the constitutional form as a compromise between government and people, he speaks in accordance with a principle that has its reason in history (and from that same source, to be sure, also the admixture of unreason without which nothing human can exist). As against this, one is now to learn – in accordance with a principle that has sprung purely from the head and has yet to make history – that government is nothing but an organ of the people, not a provid-

ent, venerable "above" in relation to a "below" accustomed to modesty. Before one accepts this hitherto unhistorical and arbitrary, if more logical, formulation of the concept of government, one should surely consider its consequences: for the relationship between people and government is the most powerful exemplary relationship, after whose pattern the intercourse between teacher and pupil, master of the house and servants, father and family, commander and soldier, master and apprentice involuntarily forms itself. All these relationships are now, under the influence of the prevailing constitutional form of government, being reshaped a little – they are becoming compromises. But how they must be inverted and displaced, change name and nature, once that very newest concept has everywhere taken possession of men's heads! – for which, however, another century may well be needed. In this, nothing is more to be wished for than caution and slow development.

451.

Justice as the decoy-cry of parties. – Noble (if not exactly very discerning) representatives of the ruling class may well vow to themselves: "we will treat men as equals, grant them equal rights"; to that extent a socialist way of thinking that rests upon justice is possible, but, as has been said, only within the ruling class, which in this case practises justice with sacrifices and renunciations. To demand equality of rights, on the other hand, as the socialists of the subjugated caste do, is never the outflow of justice but of covetousness. – If one shows the beast bloody pieces of meat close up and draws them away again until at last it roars: do you think that this roaring signifies justice?

452.

Property and justice. – When the socialists demonstrate that the distribution of property in present-day mankind is the consequence of

countless injustices and acts of violence, and, in summa, repudiate any obligation towards something so unjustly founded, they see only a single thing. The entire past of the old culture is built upon violence, slavery, deceit, error; but we cannot decree ourselves away, we the heirs of all these conditions, indeed the concrescences of all that past, and we must not wish to pull out a single piece. The unjust disposition dwells in the souls of the non-possessors too; they are no better than the possessors and have no moral prerogative, for at some time or other their forefathers were possessors. Not violent new distributions but gradual transformations of mind are needed; justice must grow greater in all, the violent instinct weaker.

453.

The helmsman of the passions. - The statesman generates public passions in order to reap the profit from the counter-passion thereby awakened. To take an example: a German statesman knows well that the Catholic Church will never share the same plans as Russia, indeed would far rather ally itself with the Turks than with Russia; he knows likewise that all danger to Germany threatens from an alliance of France with Russia. If he can now bring it about that France is made the hearth and stronghold of the Catholic Church, he has removed this danger for a long time. He therefore has an interest in displaying hatred against the Catholics and, through hostilities of every kind, in transforming those who profess the authority of the Pope into a passionate political power, one hostile to German policy and bound by its very nature to fuse with France, as the adversary of Germany: his goal is the Catholicization of France just as necessarily as Mirabeau saw the salvation of his fatherland in its de-Catholicization. - The one state, then, wants the darkening of millions of heads in another state, so as to draw its advantage from this darkening. It is the same disposition that supports the republican form of government of the neigh-

bouring state - le désordre organisé, as Mérimée calls it - for the sole reason that it assumes this form makes the people weaker, more divided and less fit for war.

454.

The dangerous ones among the subversive spirits. - Let us divide those who are bent upon an overthrow of society into those who wish to attain something for themselves and those who wish to attain something for their children and grandchildren. The latter are the more dangerous; for they have the faith and the good conscience of disinterestedness. The others can be fobbed off: for that the ruling society is still rich and clever enough. The danger begins as soon as the goals become impersonal; revolutionaries from impersonal interest may regard all defenders of the existing order as personally interested and may therefore feel themselves superior to them.

455.

Political value of fatherhood. - If a man has no sons, he has no full right to join in discussing the needs of a particular commonwealth. One must oneself, together with the others, have staked what is dearest to one upon it; that alone binds one fast to the state; one must keep the happiness of one's descendants in view, and so above all have descendants, in order to take a proper, natural part in all institutions and in their alteration. The development of the higher morality depends upon a man's having sons; this disposes him to be unegoistic, or more correctly: it extends his egoism in point of duration, and lets him pursue in earnest goals reaching beyond the length of his individual life.

456.

Pride in ancestry. - One may rightly be proud of an unbroken line of good ancestors reaching up to one's father, - but not of the line as such; for everyone has that. Descent from good ancestors constitutes the genuine nobility of birth; a single break in that chain, one evil forebear, therefore annuls the nobility of birth. Everyone who speaks of his nobility should be asked: have you no violent, avaricious, dissolute, malicious, cruel man among your forebears? If he can answer No to this in good knowledge and good conscience, then let one seek his friendship.

457.

Slaves and workers. - That we set more value on the gratification of vanity than on all other well-being (security, shelter, pleasure of every kind) is shown to a ludicrous degree by the fact that everyone (political reasons aside) desires the abolition of slavery and abhors in the extreme the bringing of human beings into this condition: whereas everyone must tell himself that slaves live in every respect more securely and more happily than the modern worker, that slave labour is very little labour in comparison with that of the "worker". One protests in the name of "human dignity": but that, put more plainly, is that dear vanity which feels not-being-placed-equal, being-publicly-esteemed-lower, to be the hardest lot. - The Cynic thinks otherwise about it, because he despises honour: - and so Diogenes was for a time a slave and a house tutor.

458.

Leading spirits and their instruments. - We see great statesmen, and in general all those who must make use of many people to carry out their plans, proceed now in one way, now in another: either they

choose, very subtly and carefully, the people suited to their plans and then allow them comparatively great freedom, because they know that the nature of these chosen ones drives them precisely to where they themselves would have them; or they choose badly, indeed take whatever comes to hand, but out of every clay they mould something serviceable to their purposes. This latter kind is the more violent, and it also demands more submissive instruments; its knowledge of men is usually much smaller, its contempt for men greater, than with the first-named spirits, but the machine it constructs generally works better than the machine from the workshop of the others.

459.

Arbitrary law necessary. - Jurists dispute whether the law most completely thought through or the law most easily understood should prevail in a people. The former, whose highest model is the Roman, appears to the layman unintelligible and therefore not as the expression of his sense of right. The laws of the peoples, as for example the Germanic ones, were crude, superstitious, illogical, in part foolish, but they corresponded to quite definite inherited native customs and sensations. - But where law is no longer tradition, as with us, it can only be commanded, be compulsion; none of us any longer has a traditional feeling for right, and therefore we must put up with arbitrary laws, which are the expression of the necessity that there must be law. The most logical is then in any case the most acceptable, because it is the most impartial: even granted that in every case the smallest unit of measure in the relation of offence and punishment is set arbitrarily.

460.

The great man of the masses. - The recipe for what the masses call a great man is easily given. Under all circumstances procure for them

something that is very agreeable to them, or first put it into their heads that this or that would be very agreeable, and then give it to them. But on no account at once: rather, one must win it by fighting with the greatest exertion, or seem to win it so. The masses must have the impression that a mighty, indeed invincible willpower is present; at the least it must seem to be present. Everyone admires the strong will, because no one has it and everyone tells himself that, if he had it, there would no longer be any limit for him and his egoism. If it now turns out that such a strong will brings about something very agreeable to the masses, instead of listening to the wishes of its own covetousness, then they admire once more and congratulate themselves. For the rest, let him have all the qualities of the masses: the less they are ashamed before him, the more popular he is. So: let him be violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, flattering, cringing, puffed up, everything according to circumstances.

461.

Prince and God. - Men often deal with their princes in a manner similar to that in which they deal with their God, just as indeed the prince was often the representative of the God, or at least his high priest. This almost uncanny mood of veneration and fear and shame has grown and is growing much weaker, but now and then it blazes up and fastens upon powerful persons in general. The cult of genius is an echo of this veneration of gods and princes. Wherever one strives to raise individual men up into the superhuman, there also arises the inclination to imagine whole strata of the people as coarser and lower than they really are.

462.

My utopia. - In a better ordering of society, the heavy labour and hardship of life will be allotted to him who suffers least from them,

that is, to the dullest, and so on step by step upward to him who is most sensitive to the highest and most sublimated kinds of suffering and who therefore suffers even when life has been eased to the greatest degree.

463.

A delusion in the doctrine of revolution. - There are political and social fantasists who ardently and eloquently call for an overthrow of every order, in the belief that the proudest temple of a beautiful humanity would then at once rise up, as it were, of its own accord. In these dangerous dreams there still echoes the superstition of Rousseau, who believes in a miraculous, primordial, but, as it were, buried goodness of human nature, and who ascribes all the blame for that burial to the institutions of culture, in society, state and education. Unfortunately we know from historical experience that every such overthrow brings back to resurrection the wildest energies, as the long-buried terrors and excesses of the most remote ages: that an overthrow may therefore well be a source of strength in a humanity grown feeble, but never an orderer, architect, artist, perfecter of human nature. - It was not Voltaire's moderate nature, inclined to ordering, purifying and rebuilding, but Rousseau's passionate follies and half-lies that called forth the optimistic spirit of the Revolution, against which I cry: "Ecrasez l'infame!" Through it the spirit of the Enlightenment and of progressive development has been frightened away for a long time - let us see - each one within himself - whether it is possible to call it back again!

464.

Measure. - Complete decisiveness of thought and inquiry, that is, free-spiritedness, once it has become a quality of character, makes one moderate in action: for it weakens covetousness, draws much of the

available energy to itself for the furtherance of intellectual ends, and reveals the half-usefulness or uselessness and the danger of all sudden changes.

465.

Resurrection of the spirit. - On its political sickbed a people usually rejuvenates itself and finds again its spirit, which it gradually lost in seeking and asserting power. Culture owes its very highest achievements to politically weakened ages.

466.

New opinions in the old house. - The overthrow of opinions is not immediately followed by the overthrow of institutions; rather, the new opinions dwell for a long time in the desolate and now uncanny house of their predecessors, and even preserve it, for want of lodging.

467.

Schooling. - In large states schooling will always be at best mediocre, for the same reason that in large kitchens the cooking is at best mediocre.

468.

Innocent corruption. - In all institutions into which the sharp air of public criticism does not blow, an innocent corruption grows up like a fungus (thus, for example, in learned bodies and senates).

469.

Scholars as politicians. - Scholars who become politicians are usually allotted the comical role of having to be the good conscience of a policy.

470.

The wolf hidden behind the sheep. - Almost every politician, under certain circumstances, at some point needs an honest man so badly that, like a ravenous wolf, he breaks into a sheepfold: not, however, in order then to devour the ram he has seized, but to hide behind its woolly back.

471.

Ages of happiness. - A happy age is quite impossible, for the reason that men only want to wish for it but do not want to have it, and every individual, when good days come to him, positively learns to pray for unrest and misery. The destiny of men is arranged for happy moments - every life has them - but not for happy ages. Nevertheless these will endure in the imagination of men as "that which lies beyond the mountains", as an heirloom of their forefathers; for the concept of an age of happiness was doubtless taken, since time immemorial, from that condition in which man, after mighty exertion in hunting and war, gives himself over to rest, stretches his limbs and hears the wings of sleep rustling about him. It is a false inference when man, in accordance with that old habit, imagines that now, after whole epochs of hardship and toil, he could likewise partake of a state of happiness of corresponding intensity and duration.

472.

Religion and government. - So long as the state or, more plainly, the government knows itself appointed as guardian on behalf of an immature multitude, and for the multitude's sake weighs the question whether religion is to be preserved or abolished, it will in all likelihood always decide for the preservation of religion. For religion satisfies the individual heart in times of loss, of privation, of terror, of

mistrust, that is, precisely where the government feels itself unable to do anything directly towards alleviating the private man's sufferings of soul: indeed, even in the face of general, inevitable and for the moment unavoidable evils (famines, financial crises, wars), religion ensures a calm, patient, trusting bearing in the multitude. Wherever the necessary or accidental shortcomings of the state's government, or the dangerous consequences of dynastic interests, make themselves noticed by the discerning man and put him in a rebellious mood, the undiscerning will believe they see the finger of God and will submit with patience to the ordinances from on high (a concept in which the divine and the human modes of government usually merge): thus inner civil peace and the continuity of development are preserved. The power which lies in the unity of popular feeling, in the same opinions and aims for all, is protected and sealed by religion, leaving aside those rare cases in which a priesthood cannot agree with the power of the state upon the price and enters into battle with it. As a rule the state will know how to win the priests over, because it has need of their most private, hidden education of souls and knows how to value servants who, seemingly and outwardly, represent quite another interest. Without the assistance of the priests no power can even now become "legitimate": as Napoleon understood. - Thus absolute tutelary government and the careful preservation of religion necessarily go together. In this it must be presupposed that the ruling persons and classes are enlightened as to the advantage which religion affords them, and consequently feel themselves to a certain degree superior to it, inasmuch as they use it as a means: which is why free-spiritedness has its origin here. - But what if that quite different conception of government, as it is taught in democratic states, begins to prevail? If one sees in it nothing but the instrument of the popular will, no Above in comparison with a Below, but merely a function of the sole sovereign, the people? Here too the government can only take up the same position towards religion that the people takes up; every spread-

ing of enlightenment will have to resound right into its representatives, and a use and exploitation of religious impulses and consolations for purposes of state will not be so easily possible (unless powerful party leaders for a time exercise an influence resembling that of enlightened despotism). But if the state may no longer draw any advantage from religion itself, or if the people thinks far too variously about religious matters to permit the government a uniform, unified procedure in religious measures, - then the way out will necessarily present itself of treating religion as a private matter and handing it over to the conscience and habit of each individual. The consequence is, first of all, that religious feeling appears strengthened, inasmuch as hidden and suppressed stirrings of it, which the state, involuntarily or deliberately, did not allow to breathe, now break forth and run riot to the extreme; later it turns out that religion is overgrown with sects, and that a profusion of dragon's teeth was sown at the moment when religion was made a private matter. The spectacle of strife, the hostile laying bare of all the weaknesses of religious confessions, finally leaves no other way out than that every better and more gifted man makes irreligion his private matter: a disposition which now gains the upper hand in the minds of the governing persons too and, almost against their will, gives their measures a character hostile to religion. As soon as this happens, the mood of those still moved by religion, who formerly adored the state as something half or wholly holy, turns into one decidedly hostile to the state; they lie in wait for the government's measures, seek to hinder, to thwart, to harass as much as they can, and thereby, through the heat of their opposition, drive the opposing party, the irreligious one, into an almost fanatical enthusiasm for the state; in which a further silent factor is that in these circles hearts, since their separation from religion, feel an emptiness and seek for the time being to create for themselves a substitute, a kind of filling, through devotion to the state. After these perhaps long-lasting transitional struggles it is finally decided whether the

religious parties are still strong enough to bring back an old condition and turn back the wheel: in which case enlightened despotism (perhaps less enlightened and more fearful than before) inevitably gets the state into its hands, - or whether the parties without religion prevail and, over several generations, undermine the propagation of their opposition, perhaps through school and education, and finally make it impossible. But then their enthusiasm for the state also abates: it becomes ever clearer that with that religious adoration, for which the state is a mystery, a supramundane institution, the reverent and pious relationship to it has also been shaken. Henceforth individuals see only that side of it where it can become useful or harmful to them, and press forward by every means to gain influence over it. But this competition soon becomes too great, men and parties change too quickly, hurl one another too wildly down the mountain again after they have scarcely reached the top. All measures carried through by a government lack the guarantee of their duration; men shrink from undertakings which would need a quiet growth over decades, over centuries, to bring forth ripe fruit. No one any longer feels any other obligation towards a law than that of bowing for the moment to the power which introduced the law: but at once one sets about undermining it by a new power, a majority yet to be formed. In the end - one may say it with certainty - mistrust of all that governs, insight into the uselessness and exhausting nature of these short-winded struggles, must drive men to an entirely new resolve: to the abolition of the concept of the state, to the suspension of the opposition "private and public". Private companies will step by step draw the business of the state into themselves: even the toughest remnant left over from the old work of governing (that activity, for example, which is meant to secure private persons against private persons) will at the very last some day be attended to by private contractors. The disregard, the decline and the death of the state, the unfettering of the private person (I take care not to say: of the individual) is the con-

sequence of the democratic concept of the state; here lies its mission. Once it has fulfilled its task - which, like everything human, bears much reason and unreason in its womb -, once all relapses into the old sickness have been overcome, a new page will be unrolled in the fable-book of mankind, on which one will read all manner of strange histories and perhaps also some good things. - To say once more, briefly, what has been said: the interest of tutelary government and the interest of religion go hand in hand, so that when the latter begins to die away, the foundation of the state too is shaken. The belief in a divine order of political things, in a mystery in the existence of the state, is of religious origin: if religion vanishes, the state will inevitably lose its old veil of Isis and awaken reverence no longer. The sovereignty of the people, seen close up, serves to scare away even the last magic and superstition in the domain of these feelings; modern democracy is the historical form of the decline of the state. - The prospect which this certain decline opens up is, however, not in every respect an unhappy one: the prudence and self-interest of men are, of all their qualities, the best developed; if the state no longer answers the demands of these forces, then chaos is the last thing that will ensue, but rather an invention still more expedient than the state was will gain the victory over the state. How many an organizing power mankind has already seen die away, - for example that of the kinship clan, which for thousands of years was far mightier than the power of the family, and indeed ruled and ordered long before the family existed. We ourselves see the significant idea of right and power of the family, which once held dominion as far as the Roman nature reached, growing ever paler and more impotent. So a later generation will also see the state become meaningless in particular stretches of the earth, - an idea which many people of the present can scarcely think of without fear and abhorrence. To work at the spreading and realization of this idea is, to be sure, another thing: one must think very presumptuously of one's reason and scarcely half understand history to

set one's hand to the plough already now, - while no one can yet show the seed-corns that are afterwards to be strewn upon the torn-up soil. Let us therefore trust to "the prudence and self-interest of men" that the state will yet endure a good while longer and that the destructive attempts of over-zealous and over-hasty half-knowers will be repulsed!

473.

Socialism with regard to its means. - Socialism is the fantastical younger brother of an almost expired despotism, whose heir it wishes to become; its strivings are therefore, in the deepest sense, reactionary. For it desires a plenitude of state power such as only despotism has ever possessed; indeed, it outbids everything past in that it strives for the formal annihilation of the individual: who appears to it as an unwarranted luxury of nature and is to be improved by it into a serviceable organ of the commonwealth. On account of its kinship it always appears in the vicinity of every excessive unfolding of power, as the old, typical socialist Plato appeared at the court of the Sicilian tyrant; it wishes for (and under certain circumstances furthers) the Caesarean state of violence of this century, because, as has been said, it would like to become its heir. But even this inheritance would not suffice for its purposes; it requires the most abjectly submissive prostration of all citizens before the absolute state, such as has never existed before; and since it can no longer even count on the old religious piety towards the state, but must rather, involuntarily, be working continually at its removal - namely because it is working at the removal of all existing states -, it can hope for existence only for brief periods here and there, by means of the most extreme terrorism. For this reason it is quietly preparing itself for reigns of terror, and drives the word "justice" like a nail into the heads of the half-educated masses, in order to rob them entirely of their understanding (after

this understanding has already suffered greatly through half-education) and to create in them a good conscience for the evil game they are to play. - Socialism can serve to teach, quite brutally and forcibly, the danger of every accumulation of state power, and to that extent to instil mistrust of the state itself. When its rough voice joins in the battle-cry "as much state as possible", this cry at first becomes louder than ever: but soon the opposite cry also breaks forth with all the greater force: "as little state as possible".

474.

The development of the spirit, feared by the state. - The Greek polis was, like every organizing political power, exclusive and mistrustful towards the growth of culture; its mighty fundamental drive showed itself almost solely as crippling and obstructive towards it. It would allow no history, no becoming, in culture; the education fixed in the law of the state was to bind all generations and hold them fast at one level. Plato, later on, still wanted it no differently for his ideal state. Culture thus developed in spite of the polis: indirectly, to be sure, and against its will, the polis helped too, because the ambition of the individual was stimulated in the polis to the highest degree, so that, once he had set out upon the path of intellectual cultivation, he pursued it to the uttermost extreme. One should not, against this, appeal to the panegyric of Pericles: for it is only a great optimistic phantasm concerning the allegedly necessary connection between the polis and Athenian culture; Thucydides lets it blaze up once more, immediately before night falls upon Athens (the plague and the rupture of tradition), like a transfiguring evening glow in which one is meant to forget the evil day that preceded it.

475.

European man and the annihilation of nations. - Trade and industry, the traffic of books and letters, the commonality of all higher culture, the rapid changing of place and landscape, the present nomadic life of all who do not own land, - these circumstances necessarily bring with them a weakening and at last an annihilation of nations, at least of the European ones: so that out of them all, in consequence of continual crossings, a mixed race, that of European man, must arise. This goal is at present being counteracted, consciously or unconsciously, by the closing-off of nations through the engendering of national hostilities, but the course of that mixing nonetheless slowly proceeds, in spite of those temporary counter-currents: this artificial nationalism is, moreover, as dangerous as artificial Catholicism has been, for it is in its essence a forcible state of emergency and siege imposed by the few upon the many, and it needs cunning, lies and violence to keep itself in esteem. It is not the interest of the many (of the peoples), as people are wont to say, but above all the interest of certain princely dynasties, and then that of certain classes of commerce and society, that drives towards this nationalism; once one has recognized this, one should simply declare oneself without fear a good European and work by deed at the fusion of nations: in which the Germans, through their old and proven quality of being interpreters and mediators among peoples, are able to help. - Incidentally: the whole problem of the Jews exists only within national states, inasmuch as here their energy and higher intelligence, their capital of spirit and will accumulated from generation to generation in a long school of suffering, must everywhere gain the upper hand to a degree that awakens envy and hatred, so that in almost all present-day nations - and the more so the more nationalistically they again comport themselves - the literary misconduct is gaining ground of leading the Jews to the slaughter as scapegoats for every possible public and internal ill. As soon as it is

no longer a matter of preserving nations, but of producing a European mixed race as vigorous as possible, the Jew is as useful and desirable an ingredient as any other national remnant. Every nation, every man, has unpleasant, even dangerous qualities; it is cruel to demand that the Jew should be an exception. In him those qualities may even be dangerous and repellent to a special degree; and perhaps the youthful stock-exchange Jew is the most repulsive invention of the human race altogether. Nevertheless I should like to know how much one must, in a total reckoning, forgive a people which, not without the guilt of all of us, has had the most sorrowful history of all peoples, and to which we owe the noblest human being (Christ), the purest sage (Spinoza), the mightiest book and the most effective moral law in the world. Moreover: in the darkest times of the Middle Ages, when the Asiatic cloud-bank had settled heavily over Europe, it was Jewish free-thinkers, scholars and physicians who held fast the banner of enlightenment and intellectual independence under the harshest personal coercion and defended Europe against Asia; it is not least to their efforts that we owe the fact that a more natural, more rational and in any event unmythical explanation of the world could at last triumph again, and that the ring of culture which now links us with the enlightenment of Graeco-Roman antiquity remained unbroken. If Christianity did everything to orientalize the Occident, Judaism has helped substantially to occidentalize it again and again: which in a certain sense means as much as making Europe's task and history a continuation of the Greek.

476.

Apparent superiority of the Middle Ages. - The Middle Ages present in the Church an institution with an altogether universal goal, embracing all of humanity, and one moreover that concerned its - supposedly - highest interests: seen against this, the goals of states and

nations that modern history displays make an oppressive impression; they appear petty, base, material, spatially confined. But this differing impression upon the imagination should by no means determine our judgement; for that universal institution corresponded to contrived needs resting on fictions, which, where they did not yet exist, it first had to create (the need for redemption); the new institutions relieve real states of distress; and the time is coming when institutions will arise to serve the common true needs of all men and to cast that fantastical archetype, the Catholic Church, into shadow and oblivion.

477.

War indispensable. - It is mere enthusiasm and beautiful-soulishness to expect much more (or even: a great deal more for the first time) from mankind once it has unlearned how to wage wars. For the time being we know of no other means by which that rough energy of the camp, that deep impersonal hatred, that murderer's cold-bloodedness with a good conscience, that common organizing ardour in the annihilation of the enemy, that proud indifference to great losses, to one's own existence and that of one's friends, that dull, earthquake-like convulsion of the soul could be communicated to nations growing weary as strongly and as surely as every great war does it: from the brooks and torrents that here break forth, which, to be sure, roll stones and refuse of every kind along with them and ruin the meadows of delicate cultures, the wheelworks in the workshops of the spirit are afterwards, under favourable circumstances, turned with new force. Culture can by no means do without the passions, vices and malices. - When the Romans, having become imperial, grew somewhat tired of wars, they tried to gain new strength from beast-baitings, gladiatorial combats and persecutions of Christians. The present-day English, who on the whole also seem to have renounced war, seize upon another means of generating anew those vanishing

forces: those dangerous voyages of discovery, navigations, climbings, undertaken for scientific purposes, as it is said, in truth to bring home surplus strength from adventures and dangers of every kind. Many more such surrogates for war will yet be discovered, but perhaps through them it will be seen more and more that such a highly cultivated and therefore necessarily weary humanity as that of present-day Europeans needs not only wars but the greatest and most terrible wars - that is, temporary relapses into barbarism - in order not to forfeit its culture and its very existence to the means of culture.

478.

Industriousness in the South and the North. - Industriousness arises in two quite different ways. The craftsmen in the South become industrious, not from an urge to acquire, but from the constant neediness of others. Because someone is always coming who wants a horse shod or a cart mended, the smith is industrious. If nobody came, he would loiter about the market-place. To feed himself is of little difficulty in a fertile land; for that he would need only a very small measure of work, at any rate no industriousness; in the end he would beg and be content. - The industriousness of English workers, on the other hand, has the acquisitive sense behind it: it is conscious of itself and of its aims, and with possessions it wants power, with power the greatest possible freedom and individual nobility.

479.

Wealth as the origin of a nobility of blood. - Wealth necessarily produces an aristocracy of race, for it permits one to choose the most beautiful women, to pay the best teachers; it grants a man cleanliness, time for bodily exercise and above all exemption from dulling bodily labour. To that extent it provides all the conditions for making men, in a few generations, move nobly and beautifully, indeed even act so: the

greater freedom of disposition, the absence of the wretchedly petty, of abasement before those who give one bread, of penny-pinching thrift. - It is precisely these negative qualities that are fortune's richest birthday gift to a young man; one who is quite poor usually ruins himself through nobility of sentiment; he makes no headway and acquires nothing; his race is not capable of life. - In this, however, it should be borne in mind that wealth exerts almost the same effects whether a man may spend three hundred thalers a year or thirty thousand: beyond that there is no further essential progression of favourable circumstances. But to have less, to beg as a boy and to abase oneself, is terrible: although for those who seek their fortune in the splendour of courts, in subordination to the powerful and influential, or who wish to become heads of the Church, it may be the right point of departure. (- It teaches one to creep, stooping, into the burrows of favour.)

480.

Envy and indolence in different directions. - The two opposing parties, the socialist and the national - or whatever their names may be in the various countries of Europe - are worthy of one another: envy and laziness are the moving powers in them both. In the one camp men wish to work as little as possible with their hands, in the other as little as possible with their heads; in the latter they hate and envy the outstanding individuals who grow out of themselves and will not willingly let themselves be placed in rank and file for the purpose of a mass effect; in the former, the better, outwardly more favourably placed caste of society, whose real task, the production of the highest goods of culture, makes life inwardly so much harder and more full of pain. If, to be sure, that spirit of mass effect should succeed in becoming the spirit of the higher classes of society, then the socialist hosts are quite in the right if they also seek to level outwardly

between themselves and those classes, since they are, after all, already levelled with one another inwardly, in head and heart. - Live as higher men and do continually the deeds of higher culture - then everything that lives will concede your right to you, and the order of society, whose summit you are, will be proof against every evil eye and every evil hand!

481.

Great politics and its losses. - Just as a nation suffers the greatest losses that war and readiness for war bring with them not through the costs of war, the stoppages in trade and traffic, nor through the maintenance of standing armies - however great these losses may be now, when eight states of Europe spend the sum of two to three milliards on them annually - but through the fact that year in, year out, the ablest, strongest, most industrious men are withdrawn in extraordinary numbers from their proper occupations and callings in order to be soldiers: so likewise a nation that sets about pursuing great politics and securing itself a decisive voice among the mightiest states suffers its greatest losses not where they are usually found. It is true that from this point onward it continually sacrifices a host of its most outstanding talents on the "altar of the fatherland" or of national ambition, whereas formerly other spheres of activity stood open to these talents which politics now devours. But apart from these public hecatombs, and at bottom far more horrible than they, a spectacle takes place which is continually being played out simultaneously in a hundred thousand acts: every able, industrious, intelligent, striving man of such a nation, lusting after the laurels of political glory, is dominated by this lust and no longer belongs wholly to his own cause, as formerly: the daily new questions and cares of the public weal devour a daily tribute from the capital of head and heart of every citizen: the sum of all these sacrifices and losses of individual energy

and labour is so enormous that the political flowering of a nation almost necessarily draws after it an intellectual impoverishment and enervation, a diminished capacity for works that demand great concentration and one-sidedness. Finally one may ask: is all this bloom and splendour of the whole really worth it (which, after all, only comes to light as the fear of other states before the new colossus and as favours for national trade and commercial welfare wrested from foreign lands), if to this coarse and gaudily iridescent flower of the nation all the nobler, more delicate, more spiritual plants and growths in which its soil was hitherto so rich must be offered up as sacrifice?

482.

And said once more. - Public opinions - private lazinesses.

Ninth Division.

Man Alone with Himself.

483.

Enemies of truth. - Convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.

484.

A world turned upside down. - We criticize a thinker more sharply when he puts forward a proposition that is unpleasant to us; and yet it would be more reasonable to do so when his proposition is pleasant to us.

485.

Full of character. - A man appears full of character far more often because he always follows his temperament than because he always follows his principles.

486.

The one thing needful. - One thing a man must have: either a disposition light by nature, or a disposition lightened by art and knowledge.

487.

The passion for things. - Whoever directs his passion towards things (the sciences, the welfare of the state, the interests of culture, the arts) withdraws much fire from his passion for persons (even when

they are representatives of those things, as statesmen, philosophers and artists are representatives of their creations).

488.

Calm in action. - Just as a waterfall grows slower and more suspended as it plunges, so the great man of action is wont to act with more calm than his stormy desire before the deed had led one to expect.

489.

Not too deep. - Persons who grasp a thing in all its depth seldom remain faithful to it for ever. They have, after all, brought the depth to light: and there is always much that is bad to be seen there.

490.

Delusion of the idealists. - All idealists imagine that the causes they serve are essentially better than the other causes in the world, and will not believe that if their cause is to flourish at all, it requires exactly the same foul-smelling manure which all other human undertakings need.

491.

Self-observation. - Man is very well defended against himself, against reconnaissance and siege by himself; as a rule he can perceive no more of himself than his outworks. The actual fortress is inaccessible to him, even invisible, unless friends and enemies play the traitor and lead him himself inside by a secret way.

492.

The right calling. - Men seldom endure a calling unless they believe, or persuade themselves, that it is at bottom more important than all others. Women fare likewise with their lovers.

493.

Nobility of mind. - Nobility of mind consists in great part of good-naturedness and lack of mistrust, and thus contains precisely that which grasping and successful people so love to treat with superiority and mockery.

494.

Goal and ways. - Many are obstinate with regard to the way once they have taken it, few with regard to the goal.

495.

What is outrageous about an individual way of life. - All very individual rules of life turn people against the one who adopts them; they feel themselves degraded, as ordinary beings, by the extraordinary treatment he accords himself.

496.

Privilege of greatness. - It is the privilege of greatness to bestow great happiness with small gifts.

497.

Involuntarily noble. - A man behaves nobly without willing it when he has grown accustomed to wanting nothing from men and always giving to them.

498.

Condition of heroism. - If someone wishes to become a hero, the serpent must first have become a dragon, otherwise he lacks his proper enemy.

499.

Friend. - Shared joy, not pity, makes the friend.

500.

Making use of ebb and flood. - For the purpose of knowledge one must know how to make use of that inner current which draws us towards a thing, and then again of that which, after a time, draws us away from it.

501.

Joy in oneself. - "Joy in the thing," so people say: but in truth it is joy in oneself by means of a thing.

502.

The modest man. - Whoever is modest towards persons shows his presumption all the more strongly towards things (city, state, society, age, mankind). That is his revenge.

503.

Envy and jealousy. - Envy and jealousy are the private parts of the human soul. The comparison can perhaps be carried further.

504.

The noblest hypocrite. - Not to speak of oneself at all is a very noble hypocrisy.

505.

Vexation. - Vexation is a bodily illness which is by no means cured merely because the occasion for the vexation is afterwards removed.

506.

Champions of truth. - Truth finds champions most rarely not when it is dangerous to tell it, but when it is boring.

507.

More troublesome even than enemies. - Those persons of whose sympathetic disposition towards us we are not convinced under all circumstances, while some reason (gratitude, for example) obliges us to keep up the appearance of unconditional sympathy on our part, torment our imagination far more than our enemies do.

508.

Open nature. - We like so much to be out in open nature because it has no opinion about us.

509.

Each superior in one thing. - In civilized conditions everyone feels himself superior to everyone else in at least one thing: on this rests the general benevolence, inasmuch as everyone is someone who can help under certain circumstances and may therefore let himself be helped without shame.

510.

Grounds for consolation. - Upon a death one mostly needs grounds for consolation, not so much to soften the force of the grief as to excuse the fact that one feels so easily consoled.

511.

Those faithful to their convictions. - Whoever has a great deal to do keeps his general views and standpoints almost unchanged. So too everyone who works in the service of an idea: he will never again examine the idea itself, he no longer has time for that; indeed it goes against his interest even to consider it still open to discussion.

512.

Morality and quantity. - The higher morality of one man compared with that of another often lies merely in the fact that his goals are quantitatively greater. The other is dragged down by occupying himself with small things within a narrow circle.

513.

Life as the yield of life. - A man may stretch himself out as far as he will with his knowledge, may seem to himself ever so objective: in the end he carries away nothing but his own biography.

514.

Iron necessity. - Iron necessity is a thing which, in the course of history, men come to see is neither iron nor necessary.

515.

From experience. - The unreason of a thing is no argument against its existence, but rather a condition of it.

516.

Truth. - Nobody dies of deadly truths nowadays: there are too many antidotes.

517.

Fundamental insight. - There is no pre-established harmony between the furtherance of truth and the welfare of mankind.

518.

Human lot. - Whoever thinks more deeply knows that he is always in the wrong, act and judge as he may.

519.

Truth as Circe. - Error has made men out of animals; might truth be capable of making an animal out of man again?

520.

Danger of our culture. - We belong to an age whose culture is in danger of perishing by the means of culture.

521.

Greatness means: giving direction. - No river is great and abundant of itself: it is the fact that it takes in and carries on so many tributaries that makes it so. So it is too with all greatnesses of the spirit. All that matters is that someone indicates the direction which so many afflu-

ents must then follow; not whether he is poorly or richly gifted from the outset.

522.

Weak conscience. - People who talk of their importance for mankind have a weak conscience with regard to common civic honesty in keeping contracts and promises.

523.

Wanting to be loved. - The demand to be loved is the greatest of presumptions.

524.

Contempt for men. - The most unambiguous sign of a low estimation of men is this: that one allows everyone to count only as a means to one's own end, or not at all.

525.

Adherents out of contradiction. - Whoever has driven people to fury against himself has always also won a party in his favour.

526.

Forgetting experiences. - Whoever thinks much, and thinks objectively, easily forgets his own experiences, but not so the thoughts that were called forth by them.

527.

Holding fast to an opinion. - One man holds fast to an opinion because he prides himself on having arrived at it by himself, another

because he learned it with effort and is proud of having grasped it: both, then, out of vanity.

528.

Shunning the light. - The good deed shuns the light just as anxiously as the evil deed: the latter fears that becoming known will bring pain (as punishment), the former fears that becoming known will make pleasure vanish (namely that pure pleasure in itself which ceases at once as soon as a gratification of vanity is added to it).

529.

The length of the day. - When one has a great deal to put into it, a day has a hundred pockets.

530.

Tyrant-genius. - When an unconquerable desire to assert oneself tyrannically is astir in the soul and keeps the fire constantly burning, then even a slight talent (in politicians, artists) gradually becomes an almost irresistible force of nature.

531.

The life of the enemy. - Whoever lives by fighting an enemy has an interest in his staying alive.

532.

More important. - One takes the unexplained, obscure matter as more important than the explained, clear one.

533.

Estimating services rendered. - We estimate services that someone renders us according to the value he places on them, not according to the value they have for us.

534.

Unhappiness. - The distinction that lies in unhappiness (as though it were a sign of shallowness, unpretentiousness, commonness to feel happy) is so great that when someone says to one: "But how happy you are!" one usually protests.

535.

Fantasy of fear. - The fantasy of fear is that wicked, apish goblin which leaps onto a man's back precisely when he already has the heaviest load to bear.

536.

Value of insipid opponents. - One sometimes remains faithful to a cause only because its opponents never cease to be insipid.

537.

Value of a profession. - A profession makes one thoughtless; therein lies its greatest blessing. For it is a bulwark behind which one may, with permission, withdraw when doubts and cares of a general kind assail one.

538.

Talent. - Many a man's talent appears smaller than it is because he has always set himself tasks that were too great.

539.

Youth. - Youth is disagreeable; for in it it is not possible, or not reasonable, to be productive in any sense.

540.

Too-great goals. - Whoever publicly sets himself great goals and afterwards realizes in secret that he is too weak for them usually lacks the strength, too, to retract those goals publicly, and then inevitably becomes a hypocrite.

541.

In the current. - Strong waters sweep much stone and brushwood along with them; strong spirits, many stupid and muddled heads.

542.

Dangers of spiritual liberation. - When a man earnestly sets about liberating his spirit, his passions and desires too quietly hope to spy out their own advantage in it.

543.

Embodiment of the spirit. - When someone thinks much and cleverly, not only his face but his body too acquires a clever look.

544.

Seeing badly and hearing badly. - Whoever sees little sees less and less; whoever hears badly always hears something more besides.

545.

Self-enjoyment in vanity. - The vain man wants not so much to be outstanding as to feel himself outstanding; therefore he disdains no means of self-deception and self-outwitting. It is not the opinion of others but his opinion of their opinion that lies close to his heart.

546.

Vain by exception. - He who is ordinarily self-sufficient becomes vain by exception, and susceptible to fame and praise, when he is physically ill. To the degree that he loses himself, he must seek to win himself back from the opinion of others, from outside.

547.

The "witty". - He has no wit who goes looking for wit.

548.

Hint for party leaders. - If one can drive people to declare themselves publicly for something, one has mostly also brought them to declare themselves for it inwardly; from then on they wish to be found consistent.

549.

Contempt. - Contempt from others is more painful to a man than contempt from himself.

550.

Cord of gratitude. - There are slavish souls who carry their appreciation for benefits received so far that they strangle themselves with the cord of gratitude.

551.

The prophet's trick. - To guess in advance how ordinary people will act, one must assume that they always expend the least amount of spirit to free themselves from a disagreeable situation.

552.

The only human right. - Whoever deviates from what is traditional is the victim of the extraordinary; whoever remains in what is traditional is its slave. One is ruined in either case.

553.

Down below the beast. - When man neighs with laughter, he surpasses all beasts in his vulgarity.

554.

Half-knowledge. - He who speaks a foreign language a little has more joy in it than he who speaks it well. Pleasure lies with the half-knowing.

555.

Dangerous helpfulness. - There are people who want to make life harder for men for no other reason than to offer them afterwards their recipes for making life easier, for example their Christianity.

556.

Diligence and conscientiousness. - Diligence and conscientiousness are often antagonists, in that diligence wants to take the fruit sour from the tree, while conscientiousness leaves it hanging too long, until it falls and is bruised.

557.

Casting suspicion. - People one cannot stand, one tries to make suspect to oneself.

558.

The circumstances are lacking. - Many people wait their whole lives for the opportunity to be good in their own way.

559.

Lack of friends. - A lack of friends suggests envy or presumption. Many a man owes his friends only to the fortunate circumstance that he gives no occasion for envy.

560.

Danger in multiplicity. - With one talent more one often stands less securely than with one less: just as a table stands better on three legs than on four.

561.

As a model for others. - Whoever wants to set a good example must add a grain of folly to his virtue: then people imitate him and at the same time raise themselves above the one imitated, - which people love.

562.

Being a target. - The evil things others say about us are often not really aimed at us, but are expressions of an annoyance, an ill humour arising from quite other causes.

563.

Easily resigned. - One suffers little from denied wishes if one has trained one's imagination to make the past ugly.

564.

In danger. - One is most in danger of being run over just when one has dodged a carriage.

565.

The role according to the voice. - Whoever is forced to speak louder than he is accustomed to (say, before someone half-deaf or before a large audience) usually exaggerates the things he has to communicate. - Many a man becomes a conspirator, a malicious slanderer, an intriguer, merely because his voice is best suited to a whisper.

566.

Love and hatred. - Love and hatred are not blind, but dazzled by the fire which they themselves carry with them.

567.

Advantageously opposed. - People who cannot make their merits wholly clear to the world seek to arouse a strong enmity against themselves. They then have the consolation of thinking that this enmity stands between their merits and their recognition - and that many others suspect the same: which is very advantageous to their standing.

568.

Confession. - One forgets one's guilt once one has confessed it to another, but usually the other does not forget it.

569.

Self-sufficiency. - The golden fleece of self-sufficiency protects against cudgel blows, but not against pinpricks.

570.

Shadow in the flame. - The flame is not so bright to itself as to the others for whom it gives light: so too the wise man.

571.

Opinions of one's own. - The first opinion that occurs to us when we are suddenly asked about some matter is usually not our own, but only the common one, belonging to our caste, station, descent; our own opinions seldom swim on the surface.

572.

Origin of courage. - The ordinary man is courageous and invulnerable like a hero when he does not see the danger, has no eyes for it. Conversely: the hero has his only vulnerable spot on his back, that is, where he has no eyes.

573.

Danger in the physician. - One must be born for one's physician, otherwise one perishes by one's physician.

574.

Curious vanity. - He who has three times boldly prophesied the weather and succeeded believes, in the bottom of his soul, a little in his gift of prophecy. We let the curious, the irrational pass when it flatters our self-esteem.

575.

Calling. - A calling is the backbone of life.

576.

Danger of personal influence. - He who feels that he exercises a great inner influence upon another must give him quite free rein, indeed must gladly welcome and even bring about occasional resistance: otherwise he will inevitably make himself an enemy.

577.

Granting the heir his due. - He who has founded something great in a selfless spirit takes care to raise heirs for himself. It is the sign of a tyrannical and ignoble nature to see one's adversaries in all the possible heirs of one's work and to live against them in a state of self-defence.

578.

Half-knowledge. - Half-knowledge is more victorious than whole knowledge: it knows things as simpler than they are, and therefore makes its opinion more graspable and more convincing.

579.

Not suited to be a party man. - He who thinks much is not suited to be a party man: he thinks his way through the party too soon.

580.

Bad memory. - The advantage of a bad memory is that one enjoys the same good things several times for the first time.

581.

Causing oneself pain. - Ruthlessness of thinking is often the sign of an unpeaceful inner disposition that craves numbing.

582.

Martyrs. - The disciple of a martyr suffers more than the martyr.

583.

Residual vanity. - The vanity of many people who would have no need to be vain is the leftover habit, grown large, from the time when they still had no right to believe in themselves and first had to beg this belief from others in small change.

584.

Punctum saliens of passion. - He who is on the point of falling into anger or into a violent fit of love reaches a point where the soul is full like a vessel: but still one more drop of water must be added, the good will to passion (which is commonly also called the evil one). Only this little point is needed, and then the vessel overflows.

585.

Thought of ill humour. - It is with men as with the charcoal kilns in the forest. Only when young men have burned out and are charred, like those, do they become useful. As long as they steam and smoke, they are perhaps more interesting, but useless and all too often troublesome. - Mankind ruthlessly uses every individual as material for heating its great machines: but what then is the purpose of the machines, if all individuals (that is, mankind) serve only to keep them running? Machines that are their own end, - is that the umana commedia?

586.

Of the hour hand of life. - Life consists of rare single moments of the highest significance and of countless intervals in which, at best, the shadow images of those moments hover about us. Love, spring, every beautiful melody, the mountains, the moon, the sea - all of it speaks wholly to the heart only once: if it ever comes wholly to speech at all. For many people do not have those moments at all, and are themselves intervals and pauses in the symphony of real life.

587.

Attacking or intervening. - We often make the mistake of vehemently opposing a tendency or party or age because we happen to see only its externalized side, its stunted growth, or the "faults of its virtues" that necessarily cling to it, - perhaps because we ourselves have chiefly taken part in these. Then we turn our backs on them and seek an opposite tendency; but the better thing would be to seek out their strong, good sides or to cultivate them in ourselves. Admittedly, it takes a more vigorous eye and a better will to further what is becom-

ing and imperfect than to see through it in its imperfection and disown it.

588.

Modesty. - There is a true modesty (that is, the knowledge that we are not our own works); and it very well befits the great spirit, because it is precisely he who can grasp the thought of complete unaccountability (even for the good he creates). One does not hate the immodesty of the great man insofar as he feels his strength, but because he wants to experience his strength only by wounding others, treating them imperiously, and watching how much they can bear. Usually this even proves a lack of a secure feeling of strength, and so makes people doubt his greatness. To that extent immodesty is very much to be advised against from the standpoint of prudence.

589.

The day's first thought. - The best means of beginning each day well is: on waking, to consider whether one could not give joy to at least one person on this day. If this might count as a substitute for the religious habit of prayer, one's fellow men would gain an advantage from the change.

590.

Presumption as the last means of consolation. - If one so arranges a misfortune, one's intellectual deficiency, one's illness, that one sees in it one's foreordained destiny, one's trial, or the mysterious punishment for things done before, one thereby makes one's own nature interesting and raises oneself in imagination above one's fellow men. The proud sinner is a familiar figure in all ecclesiastical sects.

591.

Vegetation of happiness. - Close beside the woe of the world, and often on its volcanic soil, man has laid out his little gardens of happiness; whether one regards life with the eye of him who wants nothing from existence but knowledge, or of him who yields and resigns himself, or of him who rejoices in difficulty overcome, - everywhere he will find some happiness sprung up beside the misfortune - and indeed the more happiness, the more volcanic the soil was only it would be ridiculous to say that suffering itself is justified by this happiness.

592.

The road of the forefathers. - It is reasonable for someone to develop further in himself the talent on which his father or grandfather spent pains, and not to switch over to something entirely new; otherwise he robs himself of the possibility of attaining perfection in any craft. That is why the proverb says: "Which road shalt thou ride? - that of thy forefathers."

593.

Vanity and ambition as educators. - As long as a man has not yet become an instrument of general human usefulness, let ambition torment him; but once that goal is reached, once he works of necessity like a machine for the good of all, then let vanity come; it will humanize him in small things, make him more sociable, more bearable, more indulgent, once ambition has completed the rough work (of making him useful) upon him.

594.

Philosophical novices. - When one has just taken in the wisdom of a philosopher, one walks through the streets with the feeling of having been remade and become a great man; for one finds nothing but people who do not know this wisdom, and so has a new, unknown verdict to deliver about everything: because one acknowledges a code of law, one now thinks one must also comport oneself as a judge.

595.

Pleasing by displeasing. - Those people who would rather attract notice and thereby displease, desire the same thing as those who wish not to attract notice and to please, only to a far higher degree and indirectly, by means of a step through which they seemingly move away from their goal. They want influence and power, and therefore display their superiority, even in such a way that it is felt as disagreeable; for they know that he who has at last attained power pleases in almost everything he does and says, and that even where he displeases, he still seems to please. - The free spirit too, and likewise the believer, want power, in order through it one day to please; when, on account of their doctrine, an evil fate threatens them, persecution, prison, execution, they rejoice at the thought that in this way their doctrine will be carved and branded into mankind; they accept it as a painful but potent, if late-working, means of attaining power after all.

596.

Casus belli and the like. - The prince who, having resolved to make war on his neighbour, hunts out a casus belli, resembles the father who foists upon his child a mother who is henceforth to be accounted as such. And are not almost all the publicly proclaimed motives of our actions just such foisted mothers?

597.

Passion and right. - No one speaks more passionately of his right than he who at the bottom of his soul harbours a doubt about his right. By drawing passion over to his side, he seeks to stupefy the understanding and its doubts: thus he gains a good conscience, and with it success among his fellow men.

598.

The renouncer's artifice. - He who protests against marriage after the manner of the Catholic priests will seek to understand it according to its lowest, most vulgar conception. Likewise he who rejects honour among his contemporaries will conceive of it in low terms; thus he makes the privation easier for himself, and the struggle against it. Moreover, he who on the whole denies himself much will readily grant himself indulgence in small things. It might be that he who is raised above the applause of his contemporaries is nonetheless unwilling to deny himself the satisfaction of small vanities.

599.

The age of presumption. - Between the twenty-sixth and thirtieth years lies, in gifted people, the true period of presumption; it is the time of first ripeness, with a strong residue of sourness. On the strength of what one feels within oneself, one demands honour and humility from people who see nothing or little of it, and, because these are at first not forthcoming, one takes revenge through that look, that gesture of presumption, that tone of voice, which a fine ear and eye recognize in all the productions of that age, be they poems, philosophies, or pictures and music. Older, experienced men smile at it, and with emotion they remember this lovely age of life, in which one is angry at fate for being so much and seeming so little. Later one

really does seem more - but one has lost the good faith of being much: unless one remains all one's life an incorrigible fool of vanity.

600.

Deceptive and yet firm. - Just as, in order to pass by an abyss or to cross a deep stream on a plank, one needs a railing, not to hold on to - for it would at once collapse together with one - but to awaken in the eye the notion of safety, so as a youth one needs such persons as unconsciously render us the service of that railing; it is true, they would not help us if, in great danger, we really wanted to lean on them, but they give the reassuring sensation of protection close by (for example fathers, teachers, friends, as all three usually are).

601.

Learning to love. - One must learn to love, learn to be kind, and this from youth onward; if upbringing and chance give us no opportunity to practise these feelings, our soul grows dry and becomes unfit even to understand those tender inventions of loving people. Likewise hatred must be learned and nourished if one wants to become a capable hater: otherwise the germ of it too will gradually wither away.

602.

The ruin as ornament. - Those who pass through many spiritual transformations retain some views and habits of earlier states, which then jut into their new thinking and acting like a piece of inexplicable antiquity and grey masonry: often to the adornment of the whole landscape.

603.

Love and honour. - Love desires, fear avoids. That is why one cannot be at once loved and honoured by the same person, at least within the same span of time. For he who honours acknowledges power, that is to say he fears it: his state is reverent awe. Love, however, acknowledges no power, nothing that separates, sets apart, places above and below. Because love does not honour, people greedy for honour are secretly or openly recalcitrant towards being loved.

604.

Prejudice in favour of cold people. - People who catch fire quickly grow cold quickly and are therefore on the whole unreliable. Hence there exists, for all those who are always cold or pretend to be so, the favourable prejudice that they are especially trustworthy, reliable people: they are confused with those who catch fire slowly and hold it long.

605.

The danger in free opinions. - Light dealings with free opinions give a stimulus, like a kind of itch; if one yields to it further, one begins to rub the spots; until at last an open, aching wound arises, that is to say: until the free opinion begins to disturb, to torment us in our position in life, in our human relationships.

606.

Craving for deep pain. - Passion, when it is over, leaves behind a dark longing for itself and, as it vanishes, still casts back a seductive glance. It must after all have afforded a kind of pleasure to have been struck by its scourge. The more moderate feelings seem stale by com-

parison; one still prefers, it seems, the more violent displeasure to the faint pleasure.

607.

Ill humour at others and at the world. - When, as so often, we vent our ill humour on others while we actually feel it about ourselves, what we are at bottom striving for is a clouding and deception of our judgement: we want to motivate this ill humour a posteriori through the oversights and shortcomings of others and so lose sight of ourselves. - Religiously strict people, who are inexorable judges of themselves, have at the same time spoken the most ill of humanity in general: a saint who reserves the sins for himself and the virtues for others has never lived: just as little as one who, according to Buddha's precept, hides his good from people and lets them see only his evil.

608.

Cause and effect confused. - We unconsciously seek out the principles and doctrines that are suited to our temperament, so that in the end it looks as though the principles and doctrines had created our character, had given it support and security: whereas exactly the reverse has taken place. Our thinking and judging, so it seems, are to be made after the fact into the cause of our nature: but in reality our nature is the cause of our thinking and judging thus and so. - And what moves us to this almost unconscious comedy? Indolence and love of ease, and not least the wish of vanity to be found consistent through and through, of a single kind in nature and in thought: for this earns respect, gives trust and power.

609.

Age and truth. - Young people love what is interesting and peculiar, regardless of how true or false it is. Riper spirits love that in truth which is interesting and peculiar about it. Fully matured minds, finally, love truth even where it appears plain and simple and bores the ordinary person, because they have noticed that truth is wont to utter the highest of spirit it possesses with an air of simplicity.

610.

Men as bad poets. - Just as bad poets, in the second part of the verse, seek the thought to fit the rhyme, so people in the second half of life, having grown more anxious, are wont to seek the actions, positions, relationships that fit those of their earlier life, so that outwardly everything harmonizes well: but their life is no longer governed and ever newly determined by a strong thought; in its place there enters the intention of finding a rhyme.

611.

Boredom and play. - Need compels us to work, with whose proceeds the need is satisfied; the ever-renewed awakening of needs accustoms us to work. But in the pauses, in which the needs are satisfied and, as it were, asleep, boredom overtakes us. What is it? It is the habituation to work as such, which now asserts itself as a new, additional need; it will be all the stronger the more strongly someone is accustomed to work, perhaps even the more strongly someone has suffered from needs. To escape boredom, man either works beyond the measure of his other needs or he invents play, that is to say work that is meant to satisfy no other need than that for work as such. He who has grown weary of play and has, through new needs, no reason to work, is at times overcome by the longing for a third state, which stands to play

as floating stands to dancing, as dancing to walking, for a blissful, tranquil motion: it is the vision of happiness held by artists and philosophers.

612.

Lesson from pictures. - If one looks at a series of pictures of oneself, from the time of late childhood to that of manhood's maturity, one finds with an agreeable astonishment that the man looks more like the child than the man looks like the youth: that, therefore, probably in keeping with this process, a temporary alienation from the fundamental character has occurred in the meantime, over which the gathered, concentrated strength of the man has once again become master. This perception corresponds to another, namely that all those strong influences of passions, teachers, political events, which pull us this way and that in the years of youth, later appear to be brought back again to a fixed measure: certainly, they live on and go on working within us, but the fundamental feeling and fundamental opinion nevertheless have the upper hand and use them, it may be, as sources of strength, but no longer as regulators, as indeed happens in one's twenties. Thus the thinking and feeling of the man also appear once more more in keeping with those of his childhood years, - and this inner fact expresses itself in the outer one mentioned.

613.

The sound of voice of the ages of life. - The tone in which youths speak, praise, blame, compose verses, displeases one who has grown older, because it is too loud and at the same time muffled and indistinct, like the sound in a vault, which acquires such resonance through emptiness; for most of what youths think has not streamed out of the fullness of their own nature, but is an echo, a reverberation of what has been thought, spoken, praised, blamed in their vicinity.

But because the feelings (of inclination and aversion) echo on in them much more strongly than the reasons for those feelings, there arises, when they let their feeling become loud again, that muffled, booming tone which is the distinguishing mark of the absence or scantiness of reasons. The tone of riper age is stern, curtly broken off, moderately loud, but, like everything distinctly articulated, carries very far. Old age, finally, often brings a certain mildness and indulgence into the sound and, as it were, sugars it: in many cases, to be sure, it also sours it.

614.

Backward and anticipatory men. - The disagreeable character who is full of mistrust, feels envy at every happy success of his competitors and neighbours, and is violent and hot-tempered towards divergent opinions, shows that he belongs to an earlier stage of culture, and is therefore a relic: for the way in which he deals with people was the right and fitting one for the conditions of an age of club-law; he is a backward man. Another character, who is rich in shared joy, wins friends everywhere, feels lovingly towards everything that grows and becomes, takes pleasure along with others in all their honours and successes, and claims no privilege of alone knowing the truth, but is full of a modest mistrust, - that is an anticipatory man, who strives towards a higher culture of mankind. The disagreeable character stems from the times when the rough foundations of human intercourse had first to be built; the other lives on its highest storeys, as far removed as possible from the wild beast which, shut up in the cellars, beneath the foundations of culture, rages and howls.

615.

Consolation for hypochondriacs. - When a great thinker is at times subject to hypochondriac self-torments, he may say to himself by way

of consolation: "it is your own great strength on which this parasite feeds and grows; were it smaller, you would have less to suffer." The statesman may speak likewise when jealousy and the feeling of revenge, in general the mood of the bellum omnium contra omnes, for which, as the representative of a nation, he must necessarily have a strong talent, occasionally forces its way into his personal relations as well and makes his life hard.

616.

Estranged from the present. - There are great advantages in estranging oneself for once to a greater degree from one's time and being driven, as it were, back from its shore into the ocean of past ways of viewing the world. Looking from there towards the coast, one surveys perhaps for the first time its entire configuration, and has, when one approaches it again, the advantage of understanding it better as a whole than those who have never left it.

617.

Sowing and reaping on personal shortcomings. - Men like Rousseau know how to use their weaknesses, deficiencies, vices as fertilizer, as it were, for their talent. When he laments the corruption and degeneration of society as a wretched consequence of culture, a personal experience lies at the bottom of it; its bitterness gives him the sharpness of his general condemnation and poisons the arrows with which he shoots; he relieves himself first of all as an individual and means to seek a remedy which directly benefits society, but indirectly, and by means of society, benefits him too.

618.

Being philosophically minded. - Usually one strives to acquire one attitude of mind, one kind of opinions, for all situations and events of life, - that is what is chiefly called being philosophically minded. But for the enrichment of knowledge it may be of higher value not to make oneself uniform in this way, but to listen to the soft voice of the different situations of life; these bring their own opinions with them. Thus one takes a knowing part in the life and nature of many, by not treating oneself as a rigid, constant, single individual.

619.

In the fire of contempt. - It is a new step towards becoming independent when one first dares to express opinions that are considered shameful for whoever holds them; then even friends and acquaintances tend to grow anxious. The gifted nature must pass through this fire too; afterwards it belongs to itself all the more.

620.

Self-sacrifice. - When there is a choice, the great sacrifice is preferred to a small one: because for the great one we compensate ourselves through self-admiration, which is not possible for us with the small one.

621.

Love as an artifice. - Whoever really wants to come to know something new (be it a person, an event, a book) does well to receive this new thing with all possible love, to turn his eye quickly away from everything in it that strikes him as hostile, offensive, false, indeed to forget it: so that one gives, for example, the author of a book the greatest head start and, just as in a race, positively longs with beating

heart for him to reach his goal. By this procedure, namely, one penetrates the new thing to its very heart, to its moving point: and this is precisely what it means to come to know it. Once one has got that far, the understanding afterwards makes its restrictions; that overestimation, that temporary unhooking of the critical pendulum, was merely the artifice for luring out the soul of a thing.

622.

Thinking too well and too ill of the world. - Whether one thinks too well or too ill of things, one always has the advantage of reaping a higher pleasure thereby: for with a preconceived opinion that is too good, we usually put more sweetness into things (experiences) than they actually contain. A preconceived opinion that is too bad causes an agreeable disappointment: the agreeableness that lay in the things in themselves receives an increase through the agreeableness of the surprise. - A gloomy temperament, moreover, will have the opposite experience in both cases.

623.

Deep men. - Those whose strength lies in the deepening of impressions - they are usually called deep men - are relatively composed and resolute in the face of everything sudden: for in the first moment the impression was still shallow; only afterwards does it become deep. Things or persons long foreseen and awaited, however, excite such natures most of all and make them almost incapable of retaining presence of mind when these finally arrive.

624.

Intercourse with the higher self. - Everyone has his good day, when he finds his higher self; and true humanity demands that one value a

person only by this state and not by the workdays of unfreedom and servitude. One should, for example, appraise and revere a painter by the highest vision he was able to see and to portray. But people themselves have very different dealings with this higher self of theirs, and are often their own actors, inasmuch as they later imitate again and again what they are in those moments. Some live in awe and humility before their ideal and would like to deny it: they fear their higher self because, when it speaks, it speaks demandingly. Moreover it has a ghostly freedom to come and to stay away as it pleases; for this reason it is often called a gift of the gods, whereas in truth everything else is a gift of the gods (of chance): that, however, is the man himself.

625.

Solitary people. - Some people are so accustomed to being alone with themselves that they do not compare themselves with others at all, but spin on their monological life in a calm, joyful mood, amid good conversations with themselves, indeed with laughter. But if one brings them to compare themselves with others, they incline to a brooding underestimation of themselves: so that they must be compelled to learn a good, just opinion of themselves once more from others: and even from this learned opinion they will always want to subtract and bargain something away again. - One must therefore grant certain people their being alone and not be so foolish, as often happens, as to pity them for it.

626.

Without melody. - There are people to whom a steady resting in themselves and a harmonious ordering of all their faculties is so much their own that every goal-setting activity is repugnant to them. They resemble a music consisting of nothing but long-drawn harmonious chords, without even the beginning of an articulated, moving melody

ever showing itself. Every movement from outside serves only to give the boat at once its new equilibrium again upon the lake of harmonious euphony. Modern people usually become extremely impatient when they meet such natures, of whom nothing becomes, without one being permitted to tell them that they are nothing. But in certain moods the sight of them arouses that unusual question: why melody at all? Why does it not suffice us when life is mirrored peacefully in a deep lake? - The Middle Ages were richer in such natures than our time. How rarely does one still come upon someone who can live on so truly peaceful and glad with himself even in the throng, saying to himself like Goethe: "the best is the deep stillness in which I live and grow against the world, and gain what they cannot take from me with fire and sword."

627.

Living and experiencing. - When one observes how some individuals know how to deal with their experiences - their insignificant everyday experiences - so that these become a field that bears fruit three times a year; while others - and how many! - are driven through the surging waves of the most stirring destinies, of the most manifold currents of their age and their people, and yet always remain light, always on top, like cork: then one is finally tempted to divide mankind into a minority (minimality) of those who know how to make much out of little, and a majority of those who know how to make little out of much; indeed one comes upon those inverted sorcerers who, instead of creating the world out of nothing, create a nothing out of the world.

628.

Earnest in play. - In Genoa, at the hour of evening twilight, I heard from a tower a long chiming of bells: it would not end, and rang out, as if insatiable of itself, over the noise of the streets into the evening

sky and the sea air, so eerie, so childlike at once, so full of melancholy. Then I remembered the words of Plato and felt them all at once in my heart: all human things together are not worth great earnestness; nevertheless--

629.

Of conviction and justice. - That a man should afterwards, in coldness and sobriety, stand by what he says, promises, resolves in passion - this demand belongs among the heaviest burdens that weigh upon mankind. To have to acknowledge for all future time the consequences of anger, of flaring revenge, of enthusiastic devotion - this can provoke an all the greater bitterness against these feelings, the more an idolatry is practised with precisely them everywhere, and especially by artists. These breed up the esteem of the passions and have always done so; to be sure, they also glorify the terrible satisfactions of passion which one takes upon oneself, those outbursts of revenge with death, mutilation, voluntary exile in their train, and that resignation of the broken heart. In any case: they keep curiosity about the passions awake; it is as if they meant to say: without passions you have experienced nothing at all. - Because one has sworn fidelity, perhaps even to a purely fictitious being such as a god, because one has given one's heart to a prince, a party, a woman, a priestly order, an artist, a thinker, in a state of blinded delusion that cast rapture over us and made those beings appear worthy of every veneration, every sacrifice - is one now inescapably and firmly bound? Did we not, then, deceive ourselves at that time? Was it not a hypothetical promise, under the presupposition, admittedly never spoken aloud, that those beings to whom we consecrated ourselves really are the beings they appeared to be in our imagination? Are we obliged to be faithful to our errors, even with the insight that through this fidelity we do harm to our higher self? - No, there is no law, no obligation of that kind; we

must become traitors, practise infidelity, abandon our ideals again and again. We do not step from one period of life into another without causing these pains of betrayal and suffering from them in turn. Would it be necessary, in order to escape these pains, that we guard ourselves against the surgings of our feeling? Would the world not then become too desolate, too ghostly for us? Rather let us ask ourselves whether these pains at a change of conviction are necessary, or whether they do not depend on an erroneous opinion and estimation. Why does one admire him who remains true to his conviction, and despise him who changes it? I fear the answer must be: because everyone presupposes that only motives of baser advantage or personal fear occasion such a change. That is to say: one believes at bottom that no one changes his opinions so long as they are advantageous to him, or at least so long as they bring him no harm. But if that is how matters stand, it constitutes a bad testimony to the intellectual significance of all convictions. Let us examine for once how convictions arise, and let us see whether they are not by far overestimated: it will then emerge that the change of convictions, too, is under all circumstances measured by a false standard, and that we have hitherto been wont to suffer too much from this change.

630.

Conviction is the belief that on some point of knowledge one is in possession of unconditional truth. This belief therefore presupposes that unconditional truths exist; likewise, that those perfect methods have been found by which to arrive at them; finally, that everyone who has convictions makes use of these perfect methods. All three propositions prove at once that the man of convictions is not the man of scientific thought; he stands before us in the age of theoretical innocence and is a child, however grown-up he may otherwise be. Whole millennia, however, have lived in those childlike presuppositions, and

out of them have streamed the mightiest sources of mankind's strength. Those countless people who sacrificed themselves for their convictions believed they were doing it for unconditional truth. All of them were wrong in this: probably no man has ever yet sacrificed himself for the truth; at the very least the dogmatic expression of his belief will have been unscientific or half-scientific. But in truth one wanted to be proved right, because one believed one had to be right. To let one's belief be torn from one meant perhaps to call one's eternal salvation into question. In a matter of such extreme importance the "will" was all too audibly the prompter of the intellect. The presupposition of every believer of every persuasion was that he could not be refuted; if the counter-arguments proved very strong, there still always remained to him the option of reviling reason altogether and perhaps even of planting the "credo quia absurdum est" as the banner of the most extreme fanaticism. It is not the struggle of opinions that has made history so violent, but the struggle of belief in opinions, that is to say, of convictions. If only all those who thought so grandly of their conviction, who brought it sacrifices of every kind and spared neither honour, body nor life in its service, had devoted but half their strength to investigating by what right they clung to this or that conviction, by what path they had arrived at it: how peaceable the history of mankind would look! How much more of the known there would be! All the cruel scenes in the persecution of heretics of every kind would have been spared us for two reasons: first, because the inquisitors would above all have inquired into themselves and got beyond the presumption of defending unconditional truth; secondly, because the heretics themselves would have granted no further interest to such ill-founded propositions as are the propositions of all religious sectarians and "orthodox believers", once they had examined them.

631.

From the times in which men were accustomed to believe in the possession of unconditional truth there stems a deep discomfort with all sceptical and relativistic positions towards any questions of knowledge; one generally prefers to surrender unconditionally to a conviction held by persons of authority (fathers, friends, teachers, princes), and if one does not do so, one has a kind of pang of conscience. This inclination is quite understandable, and its consequences give no right to vehement reproaches against the development of human reason. Gradually, however, the scientific spirit in man must bring to ripeness that virtue of cautious abstention, that wise moderation which is better known in the domain of practical life than in the domain of theoretical life, and which Goethe, for example, has portrayed in Antonio, as an object of exasperation for all Tassos, that is to say for natures that are unscientific and at the same time inactive. The man of conviction has in himself a right not to comprehend that man of cautious thought, the theoretical Antonio; the scientific man, in turn, has no right to censure him for that; he overlooks him and knows, moreover, in the particular case, that the other will yet cling to him, just as Tasso finally does with Antonio.

632.

Whoever has not passed through various convictions, but remains hanging in the faith in whose net he first became entangled, is under all circumstances, precisely because of this unchangeableness, a representative of backward cultures; in accordance with this lack of cultivation (which always presupposes cultivability) he is hard, injudicious, unteachable, without mildness, an eternal suspecter, an unscrupulous man who seizes upon every means to push his opinion through, because he cannot at all comprehend that there must be other opinions; he is, in this regard, perhaps a source of strength and, in

cultures that have grown all too free and slack, even salutary, but only because he provokes others powerfully to hold out against him: for in so doing the more delicate structure of the new culture, which is forced into struggle with him, itself grows strong.

633.

We are in essence still the same men as those of the age of the Reformation: and how could it be otherwise? But that we no longer permit ourselves certain means of helping our opinion to victory, this sets us apart from that age and proves that we belong to a higher culture. Whoever nowadays, after the fashion of the men of the Reformation, still combats and strikes down opinions with suspicions, with outbursts of rage, plainly betrays that he would have burned his opponents had he lived in other times, and that he would have resorted to all the means of the Inquisition had he lived as an opponent of the Reformation. That Inquisition was reasonable in its day, for it signified nothing other than the general state of siege that had to be proclaimed over the entire domain of the Church, and which, like every state of siege, justified the most extreme means, on the presupposition, namely (which we no longer share with those men), that one possessed the truth, in the Church, and must preserve it at any price, with every sacrifice, for the salvation of mankind. Now, however, one does not so readily concede to anyone that he possesses the truth: the rigorous methods of inquiry have spread enough mistrust and caution that everyone who champions opinions violently in word and deed is felt to be an enemy of our present culture, or at the very least a backward one. Indeed: the pathos of possessing the truth now counts for very little in comparison with that admittedly milder and toneless pathos of seeking the truth, which never tires of learning anew and testing afresh.

634.

Moreover, the methodical seeking of truth is itself the result of those times in which convictions were feuding with one another. Had the individual not cared about his "truth", that is to say about being in the right, there would be no method of inquiry at all; as it was, however, amid the eternal struggle of the claims of various individuals to unconditional truth, men advanced step by step in order to find irrefutable principles by which the justice of the claims might be tested and the dispute settled. At first one decided according to authorities; later, one criticized one another's ways and means by which the alleged truth had been found; in between there was a period when one drew the consequences of the opposing proposition and perhaps found them to be harmful and productive of unhappiness: from which it was then supposed to follow, for everyone's judgement, that the opponent's conviction contained an error. The personal struggle of thinkers has finally sharpened the methods to such a degree that truths really could be discovered and that the blind alleys of earlier methods have been laid bare before everyone's eyes.

635.

On the whole, scientific methods are at least as important a product of inquiry as any other result: for the scientific spirit rests upon insight into method, and all the results of science could not, were those methods to be lost, prevent a renewed rampant spread of superstition and nonsense. Clever people may learn as much as they please from the results of science: one still notices in their conversation, and especially in the hypotheses it contains, that they lack the scientific spirit: they do not have that instinctive mistrust of the wrong paths of thinking which, in consequence of long practice, has struck its roots in the soul of every scientific man. It is enough for them to find any hypothesis whatever about a matter, and then they are all fire and

flame for it and believe that this settles it. To have an opinion means for them already to grow fanatical about it and henceforth to lay it to heart as a conviction. Faced with an unexplained matter, they grow heated over the first notion that enters their head which looks like an explanation of it: from which the worst consequences continually arise, especially in the domain of politics. - For this reason everyone ought nowadays to have come to know at least one science thoroughly: then he will at least know what method means and how necessary the utmost circumspection is. This advice is to be given to women in particular; for they are now hopelessly the victims of every hypothesis, especially when it makes an impression of being witty, captivating, enlivening, invigorating. Indeed, on closer inspection one notices that by far the greatest part of all educated people still desire from a thinker convictions and nothing but convictions, and that only a small minority want certainty. The former want to be powerfully carried away, in order thereby to gain an increase of strength themselves; these few have that objective interest which disregards personal advantages, even that of the aforementioned increase of strength. It is upon that vastly predominant class that one counts wherever the thinker conducts himself as a genius and designates himself as such, and thus looks about him like a higher being to whom authority is due. Insofar as genius of that kind keeps alive the glow of convictions and awakens mistrust of the cautious and modest sense of science, it is an enemy of truth, however much it may believe itself to be truth's suitor.

636.

There is, to be sure, also an entirely different kind of genius, the genius of justice; and I can by no means bring myself to esteem it lower than any philosophical, political or artistic genius. Its way is to turn aside, with heartfelt aversion, from everything that blinds and

confuses judgement about things; it is consequently an adversary of convictions, for it wants to give to each, be it living or dead, real or imagined, its own - and to do so it must know it purely; it therefore sets every thing in the best light and walks around it with a careful eye. In the end it will give even to its adversary, blind or short-sighted "conviction" (as men call it: - among women it is called "faith"), what is due to conviction - for the sake of truth.

637.

Out of the passions grow opinions; the sluggishness of the spirit lets these stiffen into convictions. - But whoever feels himself to be of a free, restlessly living spirit can prevent this stiffening through constant change; and if he is altogether a thinking snowball, he will have in his head no opinions at all, but only certainties and precisely measured probabilities. - But we, who are of mixed nature and are now glowing through with fire, now chilled through by the spirit, wish to kneel before justice, as the only goddess whom we acknowledge above us. The fire in us usually makes us unjust and, in the sense of that goddess, impure; never may we grasp her hand in this state, never then does the earnest smile of her good pleasure rest upon us. We revere her as the veiled Isis of our life; ashamed, we offer up to her our pain as penance and sacrifice when the fire burns us and seeks to consume us. It is the spirit that saves us, so that we do not wholly burn out and turn to charcoal; it tears us away now and then from the sacrificial altar of justice, or wraps us in a web of asbestos. Redeemed from the fire, we then stride, driven by the spirit, from opinion to opinion, through the change of parties, as noble betrayers of all things that can ever be betrayed - and yet without any feeling of guilt.

638.

The wanderer. - Whoever has come even in some measure to the freedom of reason cannot feel himself on earth as anything other than a wanderer, - though not as a traveller towards a final goal: for there is none. But he does want to watch and keep his eyes open for all that is really going on in the world; therefore he may not attach his heart too firmly to any single thing; there must be within him something that wanders, that takes its joy in change and transience. To be sure, such a man will have bad nights, when he is weary and finds the gate of the city that should offer him rest shut; perhaps, besides, the desert reaches right up to the gate, as in the Orient, the beasts of prey howl now farther, now nearer, a strong wind rises, robbers lead away his beasts of burden. Then the dreadful night sinks down upon him like a second desert upon the desert, and his heart grows weary of wandering. When the morning sun then rises upon him, glowing like a deity of wrath, and the city opens, he sees in the faces of those who dwell there perhaps still more desert, filth, deceit, insecurity than outside the gates - and the day is almost worse than the night. So it may well go with the wanderer at times; but then there come, as recompense, the blissful mornings of other lands and days, when already in the grey of the light he sees the swarms of the Muses dance past close by him in the mist of the mountains, when afterwards, as he strolls quietly beneath trees in the equanimity of the morning soul, nothing but good and bright things are tossed down to him from their crowns and leafy hiding-places, the gifts of all those free spirits who are at home in mountain, forest and solitude, and who, like him, in their now merry, now pensive way, are wanderers and philosophers. Born of the mysteries of the early hour, they ponder how the day, between the tenth and the twelfth stroke of the bell, could have so pure, so light-filled, so transfigured and serene a face: - they seek the philosophy of the morning.

Among Friends.

An Epilogue.

1.

Fair it is to keep silent together, Fairer still to laugh together, - Under heaven's silken canopy, Leaning back on moss and beech, Sweetly, loudly laugh with friends And show each other our white teeth. If I did well, then let us be silent; If I did badly -, then let us laugh And make it ever worse and worse, Make it worse and laugh the worse, Till we go down into the grave. Friends! yes! So shall it be? - Amen! And till we meet again!

2.

No excusing! No forgiving! Grant, you glad ones, free of heart, To this unreasoning book Ear and heart and shelter! Believe me, friends, my unreason Never turned into a curse for me! What I find, what I seek - Was that ever in a book? Honour in me the guild of fools! Learn from this book of fools How reason comes - "to its senses"! So then, friends, shall it be? - Amen! And till we meet again!

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