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Friedrich Nietzsche

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Nachlass, Late Notebooks 1886

Friedrich Nietzsche

Original English edition

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Nietzsche Source, eKGWB NF-1886, notebooks 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (German original)

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Posthumous Fragments, Late Notebooks 1886

Notebook 3: Beginning of 1886 — Spring 1886

1.

On the Natural History

of the Free

Spirit.

2.

On the

Natural History of the Free Spirit.

Thoughts and Dashes of Thought

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

3.

Dedication and Closing Song.

"To him who makes all heavens bright

And makes all oceans roar — "

4.

The Will to Power.

Portents

of a Philosophy of the Future.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

5.

Misunderstanding of the lust for domination.

Cheerfulness as redemption.

The dance.

Mockery of the "divine" — symptom of convalescence.

The craving for "solid facts" — theory of knowledge: how much pessimism lies in it!

Zarathustra creating for himself his *adversary*

6.

Love of fatherland is something young in Europe and still stands on weak legs: it easily topples over! One must not let oneself be deceived by the noise it makes: little children scream the loudest.

7.

"Stupid to the point of holiness," they say in Russia.

8.

Toward New Seas.

All Manner of Questions and Questionable Things.

for good Europeans.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

9.

Beyond Good and Evil.

Prelude

to a philosophy of the future.

First Book:

Second Book:

Third Book:

Fourth Book:

Fifth Book:

Morality and Knowledge.

Morality and Religion.

Morality and Art.

Our Virtues.

on the order of rank.

10.

Our Virtues.

All Manner of Questions for the Questionable.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

11.

Human, All Too Human.

A Book for Free Spirits.

New Series.

And if this book is a mirror and consequently an occasion for self-mirroring: well then, you good Europeans, what do you think of our vanity? Does it like to see itself — "in the mirror"? —

12.

From the Natural History of the Free Spirit.

The Philosophy of the Future.

Scientific Laborers.

Artists.

On the Philosophy of the Higher Man.

On the Darkening of Europe.

13.

It is this solitude that we *guard* when we speak up for the religious organization of mankind: — and perhaps nothing distinguishes us so decisively from those herd animals and apostles of equality wrongly called "freethinkers": — who one and all *could* not endure solitude. Religion conceived as the continuation and deepening of the fundamental political doctrine, which is always the doctrine of unequal rights, of the necessity of a social edifice with high and low, with those who command and those who obey: religion means to us the doctrine of the difference in rank among souls, of the breeding and making possible of the higher souls at the expense of the lower.

14.

The world is not worth *that* which we believed: we have found it out. The pessimist even gives us to understand that this very thing is the

remnant of value it retains for us, *that* we are able to find it out — and that it is not worth *that* which we believed. The world would thus be a means of spoiling the world for oneself, of "unworlding" oneself as best one can; a nonsense that, after unhappy detours, at last begins to comprehend itself, a somewhat long-drawn-out comedy of errors that loses itself, ashamed, in nothingness

15.

Enough remains to be objected against a long infirmity; least of all, perhaps, would I concede to the Christian moralists that it improves a man, especially when he is visited by protracted pains which one watches with cold composure — neither that oriental, mute, deaf self-extinguishing, self-surrendering, nor that overstraining of willpower and bravery which sets against such an enemy as pain is pride, scorn, — — —

In the midst of long torment, burned as it were over green wood and without the boon which fevers, swoons — — —

16.

Manzoni

Stifter

(G. Keller)

17.

"Maledetto colui —

che contrista un spirto immortal!"

Manzoni (Act 2 of the Conte di Carmagnola)

18.

gangasrotogati "flowing along like the current of the Ganges"

=

presto

kurmagati "with the gait of the tortoise"

=

lento

mandeikagati "with the gait of the frog"

=

staccato

19.

We philosophers of the beyond — of Beyond Good and Evil, if you please!, who are in truth shrewd interpreters and readers of signs — we, for whom fate reserved the lot of being placed, as spectators of European affairs, before a mysterious and *unread* text: which betrays itself to us more and more — what need we have to keep silent and press our lips together, while ever more and ever rarer things crowd and pile up within us and crave light, air, freedom, *word*!

But the word — — —

Notebook 4: Beginning of 1886 — Spring 1886

1.

A philosopher: what a modest creature, if he truly remains faithful to his *name*! — which does not designate a "friend of wisdom", forgive an old philologist! but only "one who is fond of wise men". So if you want there to be philosophers, in the Greek sense and understanding of the word, bring on your "wise men" first! — But, it seems to me, my friends, *we* in the end love the unwise men more than the wise, supposing even that there were wise men — ? And perhaps there is more wisdom in that, precisely in that? What? Might even the wise themselves — seen from close up, perhaps — be no "philosophers"? But rather "philasophers"? Friends of folly, good company for minstrels and foolish folk? And not for — themselves? —

2.

On the problem of the mask. „Une croyance presque instinctive chez moi, c'est que tout homme puissant ment, quand il parle et à plus forte raison, quand il écrit." Stendhal, vie de Napoléon, préface p. XV.

3.

„Je sais, quel est le pouvoir des hommes, said Napoleon on Saint Helena; les plus grands ne peuvent exiger d'être aimés." — Let us add at once what may be surmised on all too good grounds: they do not even demand it of themselves, — and they do not love themselves either!

4.

"You seem to me to be up to something wicked; one might think you wanted to bring man to ruin?" — I once said to the god Dionysus. "Perhaps, answered the god, but in such a way that something comes of it for him." — "What, then? I asked curiously. — *Who*, then? you ought to ask." Thus spoke Dionysus, and thereupon fell silent in the manner peculiar to him, namely temptingly. You should have seen him then! — It was spring, and all the wood stood in young sap.

5.

There is a part of the night of which a hermit will say: "hark, now time stops!" In all night watches, especially when one finds oneself on unusual nocturnal journeys and wanderings, one has, with regard to this part of the night (I mean the hours from one to three), a strange, astonished feeling, a kind of "Much too short!" or "Much too long!", in short the impression of a time-anomaly. Might we, as exceptional wakers in those hours, have to atone for the fact that at that time we usually find ourselves in the time-chaos of the dream world? Enough: at night from one to three we have "no clock in our heads". It seems to me that the ancients too expressed precisely this with "intempestiva nocte" and „ἐν ἀωρονυκτί" (Aeschylus), that is, "there in the night where there is no time"; and I also interpret etymologically, in accordance with this thought, an obscure word of Homer's designating the deepest, stillest part of the night, however much the translators may believe they render it with "time of the night-milking" —: where in all the world was anyone ever so foolish as to milk the cows at night between one and three! — But to whom are you telling your night thoughts? —

6.

In marriages in the *bourgeois* sense of the word, understood, mind you, in the most respectable sense of the word "marriage", it is not at all a matter of love, any more than it is a matter of money — no institution can be made out of love —: but of the social permission granted to two persons for sexual satisfaction with one another, under conditions, as goes without saying, but such conditions as have the *interest of society* in view. That some mutual liking on the part of those concerned and a great deal of good will — will to patience, compatibility, care for one another — will belong to the preconditions of such a contract is obvious; but one ought not to misuse the word love for it! For two lovers in the whole and strong sense of the word, sexual satisfaction is precisely nothing essential and really only a symbol: for the one party, as has been said, a symbol of unconditional submission, for the other a symbol of consent to it, a sign of taking possession. — In marriage in the noble, the old-noble sense of the word, it is a matter of the *breeding* of a race (is there still a nobility today? Quaeritur), — that is, of the maintenance of a fixed, definite type of ruling men: to this point of view man and woman were sacrificed. It goes without saying that here love was *not* the first requirement, on the contrary! and not even that measure of good will toward one another which the good bourgeois marriage presupposes. The interest of a family decided first, and above it — the estate. We would shiver a little before the coldness, severity and calculating clarity of such a noble conception of marriage, as it has prevailed in every healthy aristocracy, in ancient Athens as still in the Europe of the eighteenth century, we warm-blooded animals with ticklish hearts, we "moderns"! Precisely for this reason was love as passion, in the grand understanding of the word, *invented* for the aristocratic world and within it, — there, where constraint and privation were precisely greatest…

7.

— "Sickness makes man better": this famous assertion, which one encounters through all the centuries, and indeed in the mouth of the wise just as in the mouth and maw of the people, gives food for thought. One might, with a view to its validity, for once allow oneself to ask: is there perhaps a causal bond between morality and sickness in general? The "improvement of man", viewed on the large scale, for example the undeniable softening, humanizing, good-naturing of the European within the last millennium — is it perhaps the consequence of a long, secret-uncanny suffering and failing, privation, stunting? Has "sickness" "made the European better"? Or, asked differently: is our morality — our modern tender morality in Europe, with which one may compare the morality of the Chinese — the expression of a physiological *decline*?… For one would hardly be able to deny that every place in history where "man" has shown himself in special splendour and mightiness of type at once takes on a sudden, dangerous, eruptive character in which humaneness fares badly; and perhaps in those cases where it *would seem otherwise*, there was merely a lack of courage or subtlety to drive psychology into the depths and to draw out the general proposition even there: "the healthier, the stronger, the richer, more fruitful, more enterprising a man feels, the more 'immoral' he also becomes". A painful thought! one which one should by no means dwell upon! But supposing one runs forward with it for a small, brief little moment, how astonished one gazes then into the future! What then would be more dearly paid for on earth than precisely that which we demand with all our strength — the humanizing, the "improvement", the growing "civilizing" of man? Nothing would be more costly than virtue: for in the end one would have, with it, the earth as a hospital: and "Everyone everybody's nurse" would be wisdom's final conclusion. To be sure: one would then also have that much-coveted "peace on earth"! But also so little "good will toward

one another"! So little beauty, high spirits, daring, danger! So few "works" for whose sake it would still be worth living on earth! Alas! and no "deeds" at all any more! All *great* works and deeds that have remained standing and were not washed away by the waves of time — were they not all, in the deepest understanding, great immoralities?…

8.

That the mere strength of a faith vouches for nothing whatsoever as regards its truth, indeed is even capable of slowly, slowly distilling a thick folly out of the most reasonable matter: this is our real European insight, — in it, if in anything, we have become experienced, burnt, made shrewd, made *wise*, through much damage, so it seems… "Faith makes blessed": good! At times at least! But faith makes *stupid* under all circumstances, even in the rarer case that it *is* not so, that it is from the outset a clever faith. Every long faith *becomes* stupid in the end, which means, expressed with the clarity of our modern psychologists, its reasons sink "into the unconscious", they vanish therein, — henceforth it no longer rests on reasons but on affects (that is to say, in case it needs help, it lets the affects fight for it and *no longer* the reasons). Supposing one could find out which is the best-believed, longest, most undisputed, most honest faith there is among men, one might conjecture with a high degree of probability that it is at the same time also the deepest, stupidest, most "unconscious" faith, the one best defended against reasons, the one longest abandoned by reasons. —

Granted; but which is this faith? — Oh you curious ones! But since I have once let myself in for setting riddles, I will go about it humanely and come out quickly with the answer and solution, — no one will so easily anticipate it.

Man is above all a *judging* animal; but in judgment lies hidden our oldest and most constant faith, in all judging there is an underlying holding-for-true and asserting, a certainty that something is thus and not otherwise, that here man has really "known": *what* is it that is unconsciously believed as true in every judgment? — That we have a right to *distinguish* between subject and predicate, between cause and effect — that is our strongest faith; indeed at bottom even the faith in cause and effect, in conditio and conditionatum, is only a particular case of the first and general faith, our primal faith in subject and predicate (namely as the assertion that every effect is an activity and that every conditioned thing presupposes a conditioning one, every activity a doer, in short a subject) Should this faith in the concept of subject and predicate not be a great stupidity?

9.

Epilogue.

— But here you interrupt me, you free spirits. "Enough! Enough! I hear you shout and laugh, we can bear it no longer! Oh, this dreadful tempter and disturber of consciences! Do you want to ruin our reputation before the whole world? To blacken our good name? To pin nicknames on us that eat their way not only into the skin? — And why, in broad blue daylight, these gloomy ghosts, these moral gurglings, all this tragic raven-black music! If you speak truths: to such truths no feet can *dance*, and so they are far from being truths for *us*! Ecce nostrum veritatis sigillum! And here is turf and soft ground: what could be better than to chase your whims away quickly and, after your night, give us a good day? It would at last be time for a rainbow to stretch over this land again, and for someone to give us gentle mad songs to hear and milk to drink: — we all thirst again for a pious, heartily foolish and milky way of thinking." — My friends, I see it, you are losing my patience, — and who tells you that I have not

long been waiting for precisely *that*? But I am at your bidding; and I also have what you need. Do you not see my herds leaping over there, all my tender, sunny, windless thought-lambs and thought-rams? And here a whole pail of milk already stands ready for you; but once you have drunk — for you all thirst after *virtue*, I see it — there shall be no lack of songs such as you want! To begin with a dance song for the merriest legs and hearts: and verily, whoever sings it does so in honour of one who deserves honour, one of the freest among free spirits, who makes all the heavens bright again and all the seas roar. —

Notebook 5: Summer 1886 — Autumn 1887

1.

Books *Ziegler*

History of Ethics

2.

Daybreak

and

The Gay Science

3.

We set down a word where our ignorance begins, — where we can see no further, e.g. the word "I", the word "do", the word "suffer": these are perhaps the horizon lines of our knowledge, but not "truths".

4.

The rotten spot in Kantian criticism has gradually become visible even to coarser eyes: Kant no longer had any right to his distinction between "appearance" and "thing in itself" — he had cut himself off from the right to go on distinguishing in this old customary way, inasmuch as he rejected as impermissible the inference from the appearance to a cause of the appearance — in accordance with his conception of the concept of causality and its purely intra-phenomenal validity: a conception which, on the other hand, already anticipates that distinction, as though "the thing in itself" were not merely inferred but *given*.

5.

The Origin of the Moral Sensations by Dr. Paul Rée: a clever, slow little book without enthusiasm or virtuous attitudes, which on the whole lacks, in an agreeable way, the character of *youth*. The words with which, in this place, I sought to drive its young and sidelined author into the domain of science — strong words, for which I have even been reproached — perhaps really belong among my follies; at least they have so far been spoken in vain… (I recall with vexation, as one notices, a disappointed hope, of that kind of hopes which the gifts of Jews in particular have repeatedly aroused in me, — as the kind of man who in present-day Europe has by far the soonest inherited spirituality, but at the same time also a tempo of development which drives fatefully fast toward *maturity* (and unfortunately even beyond it…))

6.

And if you seriously want to be rid of "*the* beyond": I fear there is no other means, you must first resolve upon *my* "beyond".

7.

Happiness, whose true name on earth, the modest believe, is "So! So!"

Whoever is something that breaks easily is afraid of children's hands and of everything that cannot love without destroying.

Whoever grasps into thorns spares his fingers less than whoever wields a dagger.

horned Wagnerians

8.

The psychological feat of these years was to walk over a terrible abyss and not look *down*; but rather to take step after step cheerfully, as though it were a matter of crossing a colourful meadow at whose end a great danger perhaps awaits us: in short, to walk courageously over a danger in the belief that one is walking toward a danger.

9.

Exoteric — esoteric

1.

— everything is will against will

2

There is no will at all

1

Causalism

2

There is no such thing as cause and effect.

1.

All causality goes back, psychologically, to the belief in *intentions*:

Precisely the effect of *an* intention is unprovable.

(Causa efficiens is a tautology with finalis) viewed psychologically —

10.

What is "knowing"? Tracing something strange back to something known, familiar. First principle: whatever we have grown *accustomed* to no longer counts for us as a riddle, as a problem. Blunting of the feeling for the new, the disconcerting: everything that happens *regularly* no longer seems questionable to us. Hence *seeking the rule* is the first instinct of the knower: whereas of course with the establishing of the rule nothing at all has yet been "known"! — Hence the superstition of the physicists: where they can come to rest, i.e., where the regularity of appearances permits the application of abbreviating formulas, they think something has been *known*. They feel "security": but behind this intellectual security stands the soothing of fearfulness: *they want the rule* because it strips the world of its fearsomeness. *Fear of the incalculable* as the *back-instinct* of science.

Regularity lulls to sleep the questioning (i.e., fearing) instinct: "to explain" i.e., to point out a rule of what happens. Belief in "law" is belief in the dangerousness of the arbitrary. The good *will* to believe in laws has helped science to victory (especially in democratic ages)

11.

The intellect cannot criticize itself, precisely because it cannot be compared with intellects of a different kind and because its capacity for knowing would come to light only in the face of "true reality," i.e.,

because, in order to criticize the intellect, we would have to be a higher being with "absolute knowledge." This would already presuppose that, apart from all perspectival modes of viewing and of sensory-spiritual appropriation, *there were something*, an "in-itself" — But the psychological derivation of the belief in *things* forbids us to speak of "things in themselves."

12.

Fundamental question: whether the *perspectival* belongs to *essence*? And is not merely a form of viewing, a relation between different beings? Do the various forces stand in relation, such that this relation is bound to an optics of perception? This would be possible *if all being were essentially something perceiving*.

13.

That similarity of form points to kinship, to descent from a common form, — that similarity of sound in words points to the kinship of the words, is a way of inferring in which inertia does the prompting: as if it were *more probable* that a form arose once than that it arose several times…

The succession of appearances, however precisely described, cannot give the *essence* of the process — but the *constancy* of the falsifying medium (our "I" —) is at least there. It is as if rhymes were lost in translating from one language into another: yet the *belief* is called forth *that* in that original language it was a poem in rhyme. Thus the sequence, the succession, awakens the belief in a kind of "connection" *beyond* the change we see.

14.

The development of science dissolves the "known" more and more into an unknown: but what it *wants* is precisely the *reverse*, and it proceeds from the instinct to trace the unknown back to the known.

In summa, science is preparing a *sovereign ignorance*, a feeling that "knowing" does not occur at all, that it was a kind of arrogance to dream of it, more still, that we have not the slightest concept left by which to admit even "knowing" as a *possibility* — that "knowing" itself is a self-contradictory notion. We *translate* an age-old mythology and vanity of man into hard fact: as little as the thing in itself, so little is "knowledge in itself" still *permitted* as a concept.

The seduction

by "number and logic"

— —

by the "laws"

"*Wisdom*" as the attempt to get *beyond* perspectival valuations (i.e., beyond the "will to power"): a principle hostile to life and dissolving, a symptom as among the Indians etc. *Weakening* of the power of appropriation.

15.

Just as the attempt is made to translate everything into the dead, the unliving in our senses (thus, e.g., to dissolve it into motions etc.), so it is permitted to dissolve everything seen, heard, whatever our senses offer, into our *vital* functions, thus as desiring, perceiving, feeling etc.

16.

Scientific exactitude is soonest attainable with the *most superficial* appearances, thus where things can be counted, calculated, touched, seen, where quantities can be *ascertained*. Thus the paltriest realms of existence were the first to be fruitfully cultivated. The demand that everything must be explained mechanistically is the instinct that the most valuable and fundamental pieces of knowledge would have succeeded *first* precisely there: which is a naïveté. In fact everything that can be counted and grasped is of little worth to us: what one *cannot* reach with "comprehending" counts with us as "higher." Logic and mechanics are applicable only to the *most superficial*: really only an art of schematizing and abbreviating, a mastering of multiplicity by an art of expression, — no "understanding," but a designating for the purpose of *communication*. To think the world reduced to its surface means first of all to make it "comprehensible."

Logic and mechanics *never* touch causality — —

17.

How sceptical ages, *suffering* from uncertainty, pass over into a rigid faith: on the other hand, men with an aversion to premature dogmas and constrictions only slowly and late *let a comprehensive faith be wrung from them* (because they do not *suffer* from uncertainty but take pleasure in it) This latter kind of wrung-out comprehensive faith and generalization has decisive *value*: it has grown in spite of the contrary inclination. On the *origin* of *systematic conceptions*: a) from schematic heads b) from suffering at uncertainty c) a rarer case, in those who are loath to schematize and are incerti amici.

18.

"What can be proved is true" This is an arbitrary stipulation of the concept "true," one that *cannot be proved*! It is a simple "this *shall* count as true, shall be called 'true'!" In the background stands the utility of such a validity of the concept "true": for the provable appeals to what is most common in heads (to logic): which is why it is naturally no more than a standard of usefulness in the interest of the majority. "True" "proved" i.e., derived from inferences, presupposing that the judgments brought to a conclusion are already "true" (i.e., *generally conceded*) Thus "true" is something that, by a generally conceded manner of inferring, is traced back to generally conceded truths. *This therefore means:* "what can be proved is true" already *presupposes truths as given - - -*

19.

The world that concerns us is only apparent, is unreal. — But the concept "real, truly present" we first drew from the "concerning-us"; the more our interest is touched, the more we believe in the "reality" of a thing or being. "It exists" means: I feel myself existent in contact with it. — Antinomy.

As much life as comes from that feeling, so much *meaning* do we place in what we believe to be the cause of this excitation. The "existent" is thus grasped by us as that which acts upon *us*, that which *proves itself through its acting*. — "Unreal" "apparent" would be that which is unable to produce effects, yet seems to produce them. —

Suppose, however, we put certain values into things, then these values act *back* upon us, after we have forgotten that we were the givers.

Suppose I take someone for my father, then much follows from this for each of his utterances toward me: they are *interpreted* differently. — Thus, given our conceptions and construings of things, our interpretation of things, it follows that all "real" effects of these things upon us appear differently in consequence, are newly interpreted, in short *act differently*.

Now if all conceptions of things were false, it follows that all effects of things upon us are felt and interpreted on the basis of *a false causality*: in short, that we measure value and unvalue, use and harm on the basis of error, that the world which *concerns us* is false.

20.

The air moves cool and pure

— I would gladly

the day looks grieved

In the evening, when even the bravest heart doubts and looks weary.

the flame with its white-grey belly, whose neck bends and twists covetously toward pure heights

21.

The problems before which I am placed seem to me of such radical importance that almost every year, a couple of times, I rose to the fancy that the spiritual men to whom I made these problems visible would have to lay aside their own work on that account, in order to devote themselves for the time being entirely to *my* concerns. What *happened* instead, each time, was in so comical and uncanny a way the opposite of what I had expected that I, an old judge of men, learned to be ashamed of myself and had ever anew to unlearn from the begin-

ner's lesson — that men take their habits a hundred thousand times more seriously than even — their advantage…

22.

Fundamental solution:

we believe in reason: but this is the philosophy of grey *concepts*; language is built according to the most naive of all prejudices

now we read disharmonies and problems into things, because we *think only* in linguistic form — and thus believe in the „eternal truth" of „reason" (e.g. subject predicate etc.

we cease to think when we refuse to do so under the constraint of language; we barely arrive at the doubt that sees a limit here as a limit.

Rational thought is an interpreting according to a schema which we cannot throw off.

23.

voluntarily apart, composed, affable toward thing and chance, grateful for the smallest glimpses of the sun of health, accepting pain as a rule, as a condition, as something self-willed, and exploiting it with cunning constraint for our ends, questioning it —

24.

Men in whose bodies the inner beast constantly grunts and rumbles

25.

not only morality as prejudice, but living through and beyond the most highly honoured type of morality hitherto

to stand still with an ironic omniscience over the whole vita contemplativa hitherto

With a very bad will to remain sitting in any one of the world-viewing corners hitherto, however deeply curiosity once drove me into each of them: with an all the sterner will to experience for myself, at some point, the condition out of which each single one of these world-corner perspectives, which one calls a philosophy or a „religion", arose

26.

the lived intimation of something infinite which we are free to conquer

27.

To understand this book, one must grant me a few presuppositions

28.

That someone can take even morality as prejudice, and afterward even enjoy in this victory of skepticism a happiness like the dawn —

29.

One must want to *experience* the great problems with body and soul

30.

The people, fairly enough, have the falsest concept of the condition from which they are most remote, of wisdom

31.

Every great problem is a symptom: a man with a certain quantum of strength, subtlety, comprehensiveness, with this danger, with this audacity, has driven it forth out of himself

32.

The people need men who go before them with a good example: and since, out of all that they have to overcome in themselves, they have worked out the ideal of a victorious overcomer, they have gained a kind of criterion for their kind of *highest men*. Therein lies a great danger. Let us be honest and admit to ourselves why Christ, for example, is only an ideal of the „common man".

33.

The people are wont to ask themselves, with honest seriousness, whether a philosopher really *lived* as he *taught*: they judge within themselves that preaching morality is easy and of little significance, but that there is something to *living* morality, some kind of morality. This is a naivety: for how else should one come to knowledge if one has not lived in the land of which one speaks!

Supposing that a philosophy — — —

The people demand of a philosopher that he not lie: for they believe that only the truthful know the truth. Likewise that he live without sensual pleasure, renouncing

34.

The most spiritual men feel the charm and magic of sensuous things in a way that other men, those with „hearts of flesh", cannot imagine at all — nor should they be permitted to imagine: — they are sensual-

ists in the best of faith, because they grant the senses a more fundamental value than those fine sieves, those thinning and diminishing apparatuses, or whatever one may call what, in the language of the people, is called „spirit“. The strength and power of the senses — this is the most essential thing in a well-constituted and whole man: the magnificent „animal“ must be given first — what else matters all „humanization“!

35.

NB The whole morality of Europe has the utility of the herd at its ground: the affliction of all higher, rarer men lies in this, that everything which distinguishes them comes to their consciousness with a feeling of diminution and disparagement. The *strengths* of present-day man are the causes of the pessimistic darkening: the mediocre are, as the herd is, without much questioning and conscience, — cheerful. On the darkening of the strong: Schopenhauer Pascal

NB. *The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more thoroughly is it outlawed.*

36.

Our „knowing“ limits itself to establishing quantities, i.e.

but we can by nothing prevent ourselves from feeling these differences of quantity as qualities. *Quality* is a *perspectival* truth for *us*; not one „in itself“.

Our senses have a definite quantum as mediator, within which they function, i.e. we feel large and small in relation to the conditions of our existence. If we sharpened or dulled our senses tenfold, we would perish. I.e. we also feel *relations of magnitude*, with reference to what makes our existence possible, as *qualities*.

37.

To describe how one goes about it in epistemological thinking, physiologically. *Primitives*, — how?

38.

The antinomy of my existence lies in this, that everything I *need* as philosophus radicalis — freedom from profession, wife, child, friends, society, fatherland, homeland, faith, freedom almost from love and hate — I feel as so many privations, insofar as I am, fortunately, a living being and no mere apparatus of abstraction. I must add that in any case I lack *solid health* — and that only in moments of health do I *feel* the burden of those privations *less harshly*. Nor do I yet know how to bring together the five conditions on which a tolerable mean of my unstable health might be based. Nevertheless it would be a fateful mistake if, in order to create the 5 conditions for myself, I were to rob myself of those 8 freedoms: that is an *objective* view of my situation. —

The matter grows complicated insofar as I am, besides, a poet, as is only fitting, with the needs of all poets: to which belong sympathy, a splendid household, quiet and the like (with regard to which needs I have no other designation for my life than a dog-kennel existence). The matter grows complicated once more insofar as I am, besides, a musician: so that really nothing in life — — —

39.

— that I speak the language of the popular moralists and "holy men," and do so without constraint, originally as enthusiastically as merrily, but at the same time with an artist's enjoyment in it that is not too far from irony — enjoyment, namely, over the fact that here the most refined form of modern thought is constantly translated back into the

language of naivety — thus with a secret triumph over the vanquished difficulty and apparent impossibility of such an undertaking

40.

On the Genealogy

of Morality.

First Treatise

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

2. the ascetic ideal

3. Responsibility.

4. “I” and “he”.

41.

Prelude to Parsifal, the greatest benefaction that has been shown me in a long time. The power and severity of feeling, indescribable; I know nothing that takes Christianity so in its depth and brings it so sharply to fellow-feeling. Wholly elevated and moved — no painter has painted so indescribably melancholy and tender a *gaze* as Wagner

the greatness in grasping a terrible certainty, from which something of pity wells forth:

the greatest masterpiece of the sublime that I know, the power and severity in grasping a terrible certainty, an indescribable expression of greatness *in* the pity over it; no painter has painted such a dark, melancholy, tender gaze as Wagner in the last part of the prelude. Not Dante either, not Leonardo either.

As though, after many years, someone were at last speaking to me about the problems that trouble me, not of course with the answers that I hold ready for them, but with the Christian ones — which, after all, have been the answer of stronger souls than our last two centuries have brought forth. While hearing this music, to be sure, one lays the Protestant aside like a misunderstanding: just as Wagner's music in Monte Carlo brought me — I will not deny it — to lay aside likewise the *very good* music I otherwise heard (Haydn Berlioz Brahms Reyer's Sigurd overture) as a misunderstanding of music. Strange! As a boy I had destined myself for the mission of bringing the mystery to the stage; — — —

42.

Critique

of the

Christian ideal

of

Poverty,

of

Chastity,

of

Humility.

The European aspirations toward *fakirdom*.

43.

„ce jeune Juif, à la fois doux et terrible, fin et impérieux, naïf et profond, rempli du zèle désintéressé d'une moralité sublime et de l'ardeur d'une personnalité exaltée"

(„les évangiles") Renan.

C'est du régime féodal et non de sa chute, que sont nés l'égoïsme, l'avidité, les violences et la cruauté, qui conduisirent aux terreurs des massacres de septembre

v. Sybel!!

44.

Let us thus honor the blind, the trusting, the simple, the peaceable, the asses; let us protect and defend them against ourselves, all these guileless, questionless cow-warm milk-hearts who have nothing of life but its most insidious distinction, *not to know it*… let us save them for ourselves, with this art of swift falling-silent, for our own evil days — for we too at times have need of oases, human oases, in which one forgets, trusts, falls asleep, dreams again, loves again, becomes "human" again…

45.

Meanwhile a very peculiar gentleman, by the name of Theodor Fritsch of Leipzig, has been corresponding with me: since he was importunate, I could not help giving him a couple of friendly kicks. These present-day "Germans" disgust me more and more.

46.

We Hyperboreans.

Neither by sea nor by land canst thou find the way to the Hyperboreans

Pindar.

Beyond the north, the ice, hardness, death — *our life! Our* happiness!

47.

How should they make up our proper auditorium, these moral ones, who with a shameful importunity listen only for what comes of it *for them*, and in general *whether* anything comes of it for them. For the preface.

"What do *I* get out of it?

How do I come off in it?

"What liberties do I take thereby?"

— the impermissible spirits.

48.

NB "German youths" and other rapturous horned cattle — cow-warm milk-hearts

49.

Morality as man's *greatest danger*

Virtue, e.g. as truthfulness, as *our* noble and dangerous luxury; we must not reject the disadvantages it brings with it.

50.

1)

That typical transformation of which, among the French, G. Flaubert, among the Germans, R. Wagner furnishes the clearest example: between 1830 and 1850 the romantic faith in love and the future changes into the longing for nothingness.

2)

the tragic age for Europe: conditioned by the struggle against nihilism.

Perhaps *title* of *No. 10*.

3)

What does the sense for *color* among the French, for tone (and *"harmony"* in particular) among the Germans signify? Stimulants partly for a *coarser* kind of man, partly for a *more jaded* kind of man.

4)

Pessimism and aesthetic theory

5)

Greek philosophy from Socrates onward as a symptom of sickness and consequently a preparation for Christianity.

6)

Anarchism

7)

Against causalism. Conditions for a cause.

8)

the educative lie. Plato. All "ideals" belong to it. But education *for what*? To create *lasting* structures in which something long can grow.

9)

How does the *fame* of a moral quality arise?

10)

Morality tends toward mediocritization, a lowering of the level. To what extent an instinct of *preservation* speaks here.

10)

In the *great man* the specific qualities of life — injustice, lie, exploitation — are greatest. But insofar as they have had an *overwhelming* effect, their essence has been best misunderstood and interpreted into the good. The Carlyle type as interpreter.

11)

Antagonism between strengthening and improvement.

12)

Against atomism.

13)

Faith in the I

14)

to devise a new perfection against which our whole human distress and uncertainty does not revolt.

15)

How does the *strong man* arise? v. — — —

16)

The kinds of intoxication?

17)

What does our sense for high mountains, desert, campagna Romana, nationalism *signify*?

18)

Diminution of man since Copernicus.

19)

Valuations as cause and as consequence

20)

Succession, too, is only *description*.

21)

Agnostics

22)

On the indiscipline of the spirit —

what is viciousness of the intellect?

23)

What does the dominion of music *signify*?

24)

Devotion to the person as an easing of morality. (Father, ancestor, prince, priest, God)

25)

Mysteries ("drama").

26)

Punishment: maintenance of a higher type.

27)

The scientific "semblance." On play-acting

28)

On the physiology of power

29)

our European culture — what is it *pressing* toward, in contrast to the Buddhist solution in Asia?

30)

Interpretation, *not* explanation.

31)

On logic: the will to equality as will to power.

32)

"Thing in itself"

33)

against mechanism

34)

The *moral* prejudice in the faith in

dialectic

35)

The slanderous element in ideals.

36)

Psychology of the scientific need.

37)

modern darkening

38)

play-acting

39)

the demagogic element in the arts

40)

Hedonism in present-day Christianity.

41)

Kant as well as Hegel as well as Schopenhauer determined by a fundamental *moral* judgment. Likewise Plato, Spinoza.

42)

Misunderstanding of cheerfulness, of irony.

43)

"Sting of conscience"

44)

Reversals of moral judgment

45)

Doctrine of the milieu

46)

Popular ideals, Fr. of Assisi.

47)

"We immoralists."

48)

Feeling of freedom.

49)

What is noble? (*red-marbled book*)

50)

all great men evil men

51)

Tartuffery of scientificness

52)

just as Descartes grounded the truth of sense perception in the nature of *God*, one could reject Kant's doctrine of reason as creating illusion. To this extent even the theory of knowledge is dependent on a *prior* decision about the moral character of existence.

The English believe that one will obey only a moral God. — The atheists are precisely in moral questions the most prejudiced.

53)

the feeling of well-being as the feeling of *power* discharged against slight resistances: for in the whole organism there is continually an overcoming of countless inhibitions — this feeling of *victory* comes to consciousness as a *total feeling*, as lightness, "freedom"

conversely: if there are severe inhibitions, then the feeling of power is not discharged either:

NB.

Thus the feeling of displeasure is fundamentally different from the feeling of pleasure; the latter is a feeling of power, which, in order to be aroused, requires as its precondition small hindrances and feelings of displeasure

51.

Order of rank

Retribution.

Truth and truthfulness.

Right, punishment, etc.

Pity

52.

Maxim: to associate with no one who has any part in the mendacious race-swindle.

(How much mendacity and swamp it takes to stir up racial questions in today's hodgepodge Europe!)

53.

The century as heir of the *previous one*

1)

sensualistic, hedonistic

(or pessimistic)

2)

enthusiastic — moral

Freedom, knowledge, happiness

in league

3)

— — —

54.

The principle of the conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence*.

55.

Chief error of the psychologists: they take the less distinct representation to be a lower kind of representation as against the clear one: but what withdraws from our consciousness and therefore *becomes dark can* for all that be perfectly clear in itself. *Becoming dark is a matter of the perspective of consciousness*.

"Darkness" is a consequence of the optics of consciousness, not *necessarily* something inherent in the "dark."

56.

Everything that enters consciousness as a "unity" is already tremendously complicated: we only ever have a *semblance of unity*.

The phenomenon of the *body* is the richer, more distinct, more graspable phenomenon: to be placed first methodically, without settling anything about its ultimate significance.

NB. Even if the *centre of* "*consciousness*" does not coincide with the *physiological centre*, it would nevertheless be possible that the *physiological* centre is also the *psychic* centre.

The *intellectuality of feeling* (pleasure and pain), i.e. it is *governed* from that centre.

57.

The problem of nihilism (as against pessimism, etc.)

The struggle against it strengthens it.

All the *positive* forces of the century seem only

to prepare it

e.g. natural science

Explanation: *the decline of a valuation of things* which gives the impression that no other valuation is possible.

58.

Morality as an *illusion of the species*, to spur the individual on to sacrifice himself to the future: seemingly granting him himself an infinite value, so that, with this *self-consciousness*, he tyrannizes and holds down other sides of his nature and is hard to satisfy with himself.

Deepest gratitude for what morality has accomplished hitherto: but *now only a pressure* that would become a doom! *It itself compels*, as probity, the negation of morality.

59.

The precondition of *scientific work*: a faith in the association and continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may work at any place, however small, in the confidence of *not working in vain*. This — — —

There is one *great paralysis*: *to work in vain, to struggle in vain*. — —

The *accumulating* ages, in which force and means of power are found that the future will one day make use of: *science as an intermediate station*, at which the middling, more manifold, complicated beings have their most natural discharge and satisfaction: *all those to whom the deed advises against itself.*

60.

The dogmatic spirit in Kant

61.

A point in time when man has *force* at his service in superabundance: science aims at bringing about this *enslavement of nature*.

Then man gains *leisure*: to *cultivate* himself into something new, higher. *New aristocracy*

Then a multitude of *virtues* will be *outlived* that were till now *conditions of existence*.

No longer needing qualities, *consequently* losing them.

We no longer need the virtues: consequently we lose them: as well the morality of "One thing is needful," of the salvation of the soul, of immortality: a means of *making possible* for man a tremendous *self-mastery* (through the affect of a tremendous *fear:::*

the various kinds of *need*, through whose discipline man has been formed: need teaches to work, to think, to rein oneself in

The *physiological* purification and strengthening

the *new aristocracy* needs an opposite against which it struggles: it must have a terrible urgency to preserve itself.

the two futures of mankind:

1) the consequence of mediocritization

2) conscious setting-apart, self-shaping

a doctrine that creates a *chasm*: it preserves the *highest and the lowest kind* (it destroys the middle one)

the aristocrats hitherto, spiritual and worldly, prove *nothing* against the necessity of a new aristocracy.

Theory of *structures of domination* instead of: *sociology*

62.

One may grant oneself the truth only so far as one is already *elevated* enough no longer to need the *compulsory school of error*.

If one judges existence morally, *it disgusts*.

63.

One should not invent false persons, e.g. not say "nature is cruel." Precisely to see *that there is no* such *central being of responsibility brings relief*!

Development of mankind. A. To gain power over nature and, *to that end*, a certain power over oneself. Morality was necessary *in order* to make man prevail in the struggle with nature and the "wild beast."

B. Once power over nature *has* been won, one can use this power to go on cultivating *oneself* freely: will to power as self-elevation and strengthening.

64.

What is "passive"?

to resist and react. To be *hindered* in the forward-reaching movement: thus an action of resistance and reaction

What is "active"?

reaching out for power

"Nourishment"

is only derivative; the original thing is wanting to enclose everything within oneself

"Procreation"

sun | *Intelligent Audio*



sunapp.ai/download

only derivative: originally, where one will is not sufficient to organize the whole of what has been appropriated, a *counter-will* comes into force which carries out the separation, a new centre of organization, after a struggle with the original will

Pleasure

as feeling of power (presupposing displeasure)

65.

All thinking, judging, perceiving, as *comparing*, has as its precondition an "*equating*", and earlier still a "*making equal*". Making equal is the same thing as the incorporation of appropriated matter in the amoeba.

Memory comes late, inasmuch as here the equalizing drive already appears *tamed*: the difference is preserved. Remembering as a classifying and pigeonholing, active — who?

66.

The value of *irrational inclinations*

e.g. mother-love, love of the "work," etc.

not "altruistic"!

67.

No "moral education" of the human race: rather, the compulsory school of errors is necessary, because "truth" disgusts and spoils life, provided that man has not already been inescapably thrust onto his *path* and takes his honest *insight* upon himself with a tragic pride.

68.

The physiologists, like the philosophers, believe that *consciousness*, in the measure that it *increases* in brightness, grows in *value*: that the brightest consciousness, the most logical, coldest thinking is of the *first* rank. And yet — by what is this value determined? The most superficial, *most simplified* thinking is, with regard to the *release of the will*, the most useful (because it leaves few motives remaining) — it could therefore etc. NB.

the *precision of action* stands in antagonism to *far-sighted* and often uncertainly judging *foresight*: the latter guided by the *deeper* instinct.

NB. *To measure value* by the *breadth* of

usefulness.

69.

Our passions and inclinations want *their* satisfaction and, *to that end*, dominion over the intellect as well

70.

1.

Philosophy of history.

2.

Psychology.

3.

Culture of the Greeks.

4.

Philosophy of morality.

5.

History of Greek philosophy.

Nihilism: downfall of a total valuation (namely the moral one) the new interpretive forces are lacking.

On the history of values.

The will to power and its metamorphoses.

(what the will to morality has been hitherto: a school)

The eternal recurrence as hammer.

71.

European Nihilism.

Lenzer Heide

10 June 1887

1.

What *advantages* did the Christian moral hypothesis offer?

1)

it conferred upon man an absolute *value*, in contrast to his smallness and contingency in the stream of becoming and passing away

2)

it served the advocates of God, inasmuch as it left the world, despite suffering and evil, the character of *perfection*, — including that "freedom" — evil appeared full of *meaning*.

3)

it posited in man a *knowing* of absolute values and thus gave him *adequate knowledge* precisely of what matters most

it prevented man from despising himself as man, from taking sides against life, from despairing of knowing: it was a *means of preservation* — in sum: morality was the great *antidote* to practical and theoretical *nihilism*.

2.

But among the forces that morality reared was *truthfulness: this* at last turns against morality, discovers its *teleology*, its *interested* way of seeing — and now the *insight* into this long-ingrained mendacity, which one despairs of ever shedding, acts precisely as a stimulus. Toward nihilism. We now ascertain in ourselves needs, implanted by the long moral interpretation, which now appear to us as needs for the untrue: on the other hand, they are the very ones on which value seems to hang, for whose sake we endure living. This antagonism — *not* to es-

teem what we know, and no longer to be *permitted* to esteem what we would like to lie to ourselves: — yields a process of dissolution.

3.

In fact we no longer have such need of an antidote to the *first* nihilism: life is no longer so uncertain, accidental, senseless in our Europe. Such a tremendous *intensification* of the *value* of man, of the value of evil, etc., is not so necessary now; we can bear a considerable *reduction* of this value, we may concede much nonsense and chance: the *power* man has attained now permits a *lowering* of the means of discipline, of which the moral interpretation was the strongest. "God" is far too extreme a hypothesis.

4.

But extreme positions are not relieved by moderate ones, but again by extreme ones, only *reversed*. And so belief in the absolute immorality of nature, in purposelessness and meaninglessness, is the psychologically necessary *affect* once belief in God and an essentially moral order can no longer be held. Nihilism appears now *not* because displeasure in existence is greater than before, but because one has grown altogether mistrustful of any "meaning" in evil, indeed in existence. *One* interpretation has perished; but because it counted as *the* interpretation, it seems as though there were no meaning at all in existence, as though everything were *in vain*.

5.

That this "In vain!" is the character of our present nihilism remains to be shown. Mistrust of our former valuations mounts to the question: "are not all 'values' lures by which the comedy is drawn out, without ever coming any nearer to a resolution?" *Duration*, with an "in vain",

without goal or purpose, is the most *paralysing* thought, above all when one grasps that one is being made a fool of and yet lacks the power not to let oneself be made a fool of.

6.

Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence as it is, without meaning or goal, yet inevitably recurring, without a finale into nothingness: "the eternal recurrence".

That is the most extreme form of nihilism: nothingness (the "meaningless") eternally!

European form of Buddhism: the energy of matter and of force *compels* such a belief. It is the most *scientific* of all possible hypotheses. We deny final goals: if existence had one, it would have to have been reached.

7.

Then one understands that what is aimed at here is an opposite to pantheism: for "everything perfect, divine, eternal" *likewise compels a belief in the* "*eternal recurrence*". Question: has this pantheistic stance of saying Yes to all things also been made impossible together with morality? At bottom, after all, only the moral God has been overcome. Does it make sense to think of a God beyond "good and evil"? Would a pantheism in *this* sense be possible? Do we remove the idea of purpose from the process and *nevertheless* affirm the process? — That would be the case if something within that process were *attained* at every moment of it — and always the same thing

Spinoza won such an affirming stance, inasmuch as every moment has a *logical* necessity: and with his fundamental logical instinct he triumphed over *such* a constitution of the world.

8.

But his case is only a single case. *Every fundamental trait of character* that underlies *every* event, that expresses itself in every event, would, if an individual felt it to be *his own* fundamental trait, have to drive this individual to approve triumphantly of every moment of universal existence. Everything would depend precisely on one's feeling this fundamental trait in oneself as good, valuable, with pleasure.

9.

Now *morality* protected life from despair and from the leap into nothingness in those men and classes who were violated and oppressed by *men*: for impotence against men, *not* impotence against nature, produces the most desperate embitterment against existence. Morality treated the holders of power, the violent, the "masters" in general, as the enemies against whom the common man must be protected, *that is, first of all encouraged, strengthened*. Morality has consequently taught men to *hate* and *despise* most deeply what is the fundamental trait of the rulers: *their will to power*. To abolish, deny, decompose this morality: that would mean endowing the best-hated drive with a *reversed* feeling and valuation. If the sufferer, the oppressed, *lost the belief that he had a right* to his contempt for the will to power, he would enter the stage of hopeless desperation. This would be the case if this trait were essential to life, if it turned out that even in that "will to morality" only this "will to power" lay disguised, that even that hating and despising is still a will to power. The oppressed would see that he stands *on the same ground* as the oppressor and that he has no *prerogative*, no *higher rank* over him.

10.

Rather the *reverse*! There is nothing in life that has value except the degree of power — granted, precisely, that life itself is the will to power. Morality guarded the *ill-constituted* against nihilism by attributing to *each* an infinite value, a metaphysical value, and by placing him in an order that did not accord with that of worldly power and order of rank: it taught resignation, humility, etc. *Supposing that belief in this morality perishes*, the ill-constituted would no longer have their consolation — and would *perish*.

11.

This *perishing* presents itself as a — *bringing-oneself-to-ruin*, as an instinctive selecting of that which *must destroy*. *Symptoms* of this self-destruction of the ill-constituted: self-vivisection, poisoning, intoxication, romanticism, above all the instinctive compulsion to actions by which one makes the powerful into *mortal enemies* (— as it were breeding one's own executioners) the *will to destruction* as the will of a still deeper instinct, the instinct of self-destruction, the *will into nothingness*.

12.

Nihilism, as a symptom that the ill-constituted no longer have any consolation: that they destroy in order to be destroyed, that, detached from morality, they no longer have any reason "to resign themselves" — that they take their stand on the ground of the opposite principle and for their part also *will power*, by *compelling* the powerful to be their executioners. This is the European form of Buddhism, the *doing No*, after all existence has lost its "meaning".

13.

The "distress" has by no means grown greater; on the contrary! "God, morality, resignation" were remedies at terribly deep stages of misery: *active nihilism* appears under relatively far more favourably shaped conditions. The very fact that morality is felt to have been overcome presupposes a considerable degree of spiritual culture; and this in turn a relative well-being. A certain spiritual weariness, brought by the long struggle of philosophical opinions to a hopeless scepticism *against* philosophers, likewise marks the by no means *low* standing of those nihilists. Consider the situation in which Buddha appeared. The doctrine of eternal recurrence would have *learned* presuppositions (as the teacher Buddha had such, e.g. the concept of causality etc.).

14.

What does "ill-constituted" mean now? Above all *physiologically?* no longer politically. The *unhealthiest* kind of man in Europe (in all classes) is the soil of this nihilism: it will feel the belief in eternal recurrence as a *curse*, struck by which one no longer shrinks from any action: not to extinguish passively, but to *make* everything be extinguished that is to this degree without meaning or goal: although it is only a spasm, a blind raging at the insight that everything has been there for eternities — even this moment of nihilism and lust for destruction. — The *value of such a crisis* is that it *purifies*, that it presses the kindred elements together and makes them ruin one another, that it assigns common tasks to men of opposed ways of thinking — bringing to light among them too the weaker, the more uncertain, and so giving the impulse *toward an order of rank of forces*, from the standpoint of health: recognizing those who command as those who command, those who obey as those who obey. Naturally apart from all existing orders of society.

15.

Which will prove to be the *strongest* in this? The most moderate, those who have no *need* of extreme articles of faith, those who not only concede but love a good portion of chance, of nonsense, those who can think of man with a considerable reduction of his value without thereby becoming small and weak: the richest in health, who are equal to most misfortunes and therefore are not so afraid of misfortunes — men who are *sure of their power*, and who represent with conscious pride the *attained* strength of man.

16.

How would such a man think of eternal recurrence? —

72.

Self-overcoming of morality

probity

Justice, punishment, pity etc.

73.

Beyond Good

and Evil

17 sheets the 2nd*

half*

74.

On the

Genealogy of Morality.

A Polemic.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Unconcerned, mocking, violent

— thus wisdom wants *us*: she is a woman,

she only ever loves a warrior.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Leipzig

Published by C. G. Naumann.

75.

The Will to Power.

Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.

1.

On the Value of Truth.

2.

What Follows from It.

3.

On the History of European Nihilism.

4.

The Eternal Recurrence.

76.

Morality as Will

77.

Sayings and Arrows.

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Gleaned from his writings

and brought home by E. V. W.

78.

Sayings

of an Immoralist.

79.

To give this mesquin age, with which I must after all somehow come to terms, a sample of what psychology *in the grand style* is, really makes no sense; — who would meet me with even a thousandth part of the passion and suffering needed to grasp *where* one comes by the knowledge of such strange and decisive things?…

And what must a man have lived through within himself to conceive The Birth of Tragedy at the age of 25!

I have never complained of the indescribable nature of my deprivation: never to hear a kindred sound, never one of the same suffering and willing.

I myself know of no books in any literature that possess this wealth of experiences of the soul, and this from the greatest down to the smallest and most refined. That at bottom no one but me sees and knows this hangs upon the fact that I am condemned to live in an age in which the rhinoceros flourishes, and moreover among a people that still lacks all preliminary schooling whatever in psychological matters (a people that took Schiller and Fichte seriously!!). When I think that men such as Rohde have at bottom behaved toward me like horned cattle: what really should — — —

80.

8.

Finally, that I may at least point with a single word to an enormous and still wholly undiscovered state of affairs, which has established itself only slowly, slowly: there have hitherto been no more fundamental problems than the moral ones; it is *their* driving force from which all the great conceptions in the realm of values hitherto have taken their origin (— for example, everything commonly called

"philosophy"; and this down to its ultimate epistemological presuppositions). *But there are problems still more fundamental than the moral ones:* these first come into view when one has the moral prejudice *behind* one…

81.

a)

The *grand style*

The *naked*: psychological purification of taste.

b)

synthetic men *cannot* grow out of the "ant"

.

Our society merely *represents* culture; the "cultured man" is *lacking*.

c)

self-killing, the harakiri of Japan

d)

to win back the right to *affects* for the *knower*

82.

Right arises only where there are contracts; but for there to be contracts, a certain *equilibrium of power* must be present. Where such an equilibrium is lacking, where two too disparate quanta of power collide, the stronger reaches over toward the weaker to weaken it further and further, until at last subjugation, adaptation, subordination, incorporation ensues: thus with the end that out of Two One has come. For Two to remain two, an equilibrium is, as was said, necessary: and therefore all right goes back to a preceding *weighing*. It is

therefore not to be approved — for it leads astray — when justice is depicted with a pair of scales in her hand: the right image would be to make justice stand upon a pair of scales in such a way that she *holds* the two pans *in equilibrium*. But justice is mostly depicted falsely: false words are also put into her mouth. Justice does not say: "to each his own", but always only "as you do to me, so I do to you". That two powers in relation to each other put a bridle on the reckless will to power and not only let each other be equal but also *will* each other as equal, that is the beginning of all "good will" on earth. For a contract contains not merely a bare affirmation with respect to an *existing* quantum of power, but at the same time also the will to affirm these quanta on both sides as something *lasting*, and thus to a certain degree to uphold them oneself: — therein lies, as was said, a *germ* of all "good will".

83.

Here, where for the present we are not yet sighting the problem of the *aesthetic* state from the side of the artist but from the perspective of the spectator, it is above all necessary to declare that it is *not* the problem "what is the contemplative state and how is it possible?" Philosophers have hitherto guilelessly *confused* the contemplative state with the aesthetic and reckoned them as one: but the former is only a presupposition of the second and not the thing itself: only its condition, but, as one must immediately add, not even this in the sense that it were, say, its actual causa and ground of becoming. This would be asserted entirely in error: the inner "must" out of which one becomes "aesthetic" is fundamentally different from the inner "must" whose consequence is the contemplative state, although the latter, as was said, is a presupposition for the former, and must be attained for the aesthetic state to be able to come into appearance. But just as well, once the ground has been cleared, can — — —

84.

As many *international* powers as possible — in order to *practise* the *world-perspective*.

85.

Each year 5 chapters

86.

And as the Bedouin says: "even smoke is good for something" — for it betrays to him who is on his way the nearness of a hospitable hearth.

87.

Pour qu'un homme soit au-dessus de l'humanité, il en coûte trop cher à tous les autres.

Montesquieu.

88.

History of the Jews typical of the genesis of the "idealist". "God and Israel" in covenant. 1st refinement: the righteous God remains in covenant only with righteous Israel. 2) but in the end he loves Israel even when it suffers, even still when it suffers on account of its guilt. *etc*.

Ancient Israel and the Germans of Tacitus alike: likewise the Arabs of the Bedouin lands and the Corsicans. The Genoese of the time when President de Brosses visited them, and those of today.

89.

Against the *great error* that our age (Europe) represents the *highest type man*. Rather: the men of the Renaissance were higher, and the Greeks likewise; indeed perhaps we stand *rather low*: "understanding" is no sign of the highest strength, but of a *thorough weariness*; *moralization* itself is a "*décadence*".

90.

A saying of Napoleon's (2 February 1809, to Röderer):

"J'aime le pouvoir, moi; mais c'est *en artiste* que je l'aime… Je l'aime *comme un musicien aime son violon*; je l'aime pour en tirer des sons, des accords, des harmonies."

91.

(Revue des deux mondes, 15 Feb. 1887. *Taine*.)

"Suddenly the faculté maîtresse unfolds: the *artist*, enclosed within the politician, comes forth de sa gaine; he creates dans l'idéal et l'impossible. One recognizes him again as what he is: the posthumous brother of Dante and of Michelangelo: and in truth, with regard to the firm contours of his vision, the intensity, coherence and inner logic of his dream, the depth of his meditation, the superhuman greatness of his conception, he is their like et leur égal: son génie a la même taille et la même structure; il est un de trois esprits souverains de la renaissance italienne."

Nota bene - - -

Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon — —

92.

On the Higher Man.

Or:

the Temptation of Zarathustra.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

93.

Dionysus philosophos.

A

Satura Menippea.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

94.

The Antagonisms: problems whose solutions depend in the end on the will (on strength —)

1.

between the *strength* of men and the *duration* of the race

2.

between the *creative force* and *"humaneness"*

3.

— — —

95.

To hear not a sound of answer after such a call from the innermost soul — that is a *terrible* experience, of which the toughest man may perish: it has lifted me out of all bonds with living men.

96.

Thoughts on the Greeks.

With a Preface

to

Jakob Burckhardt.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

97.

1.

European nihilism.

2.

Morality hitherto as hostile to life.

3.

Morality hitherto itself "immoral"

98.

1.

Whoever reflects on the way in which the type man can be raised to his greatest splendour and mightiness will grasp first of all that he must place himself outside morality: for morality was essentially bent on the opposite, on checking or annihilating that splendid development wherever it was under way. For in fact a development of this kind consumes such an enormous quantity of men in its service that a *reverse* movement is only too natural: the weaker, more delicate, middling existences need to take sides *against* that glory of life and strength, and for this they must acquire for themselves a new valuation by virtue of which they condemn life in this highest fullness and, if possible, destroy it. A tendency hostile to life is therefore peculiar to morality, insofar as it wants to overpower the strongest types of life.

99.

NB

1) Attempt to bring *aesthetics*, through the elimination of the "I", closer to *unegoistic ethics* (as its preparation)

2) Attempt to bring it closer to *knowledge* (pure subject, "pure mirror of the object")

— against this: the object, in aesthetic contemplation, is *falsified* through and through

"pure will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge"

— absolutely *not* "knowledge"!

— the will which *underlines* everything (and eliminates the rest) that serves it in an object for being *content with itself* and *in harmony*

the *invention and arrangement of a world* in which we *affirm ourselves* even in our innermost needs

colours, tones, shapes, movements — *unconscious memory* at work, in which useful properties of these qualities (or associations) are preserved

an *arrangement* of things that is interested in the highest degree, and ruthlessly interested

an essential falsification, an *exclusion* precisely of the merely ascertaining, knowing, *objective* sense

simplifying, bringing out the typical — pleasure in *overpowering* by *putting a meaning into* things

the *thinking away* of all harmful and hostile factors in what is beheld (e.g. a landscape, a thunderstorm)

the aesthetic spectator *permits* an *overpowering*, and does the opposite of what he otherwise does towards whatever comes from outside — he hangs up his mistrust, no defensive — a state of *exception*: *trusting, reverent, loving reception*

the will

? interest in the *causes* and the *typical* (the dominating)

100.

Towards the *critique of ideals*: begin it by abolishing the word "*ideal*": critique of *desirabilities*.

101.

to lend an ear to a poor anarchist screaming-devil who, spattering the whole of history with the poison of his hatred, would like to persuade us that he is thereby its historian.

102.

A life among horned cattle!

103.

What must one have lived through to be able to write The Birth of Tragedy at the age of 26!

104.

ma non si deve fischiar in presenza d'un professore: ciò pecca contro la buona creanza

105.

An action *good* because conscience has said Yes to it! as if a work were beautiful merely because it thoroughly pleases the artist! The "*value*" dependent on accompanying *feelings of pleasure* in the doer! (— who is to disentangle vanity, resting in the customary, etc.!)

On the other hand, all *decisive* and valuable actions have been done *without* that certainty…

One must see to it that one judges by *objective* values. Is "the utility" of the community such a value? Yes: only it is usually *confused* in turn with the "feelings of pleasure" of the community. A "wicked action" that acts as a stimulant for the community and at first arouses very unpleasant feelings would to that extent be a *valuable* action.

106.

Against herd morality. A declaration of war.

107.

Critique of "justice" and "equality before the law": what is it really meant to *do away with*? Tension, enmity, hatred — but it is an error to think that "*happiness*" is thereby *increased*: the Corsicans enjoy more happiness than the people of the Continent

108.

Fundamental error: to place the goals in the herd and *not* in single individuals! The herd is a means, no more! But now one tries to understand *the herd as an individual* and to ascribe to it a higher rank than to the single one — deepest misunderstanding!!! Likewise, to characterize what makes one herd-like, the feelings of *fellow*-feeling, as the *more valuable* side of our nature!

109.

These Parisian poets and romanciers of today, fine inquisitive dogs, who with excited eyes follow "woman" even into her most foul-smelling secrets

110.

Gury, Compendium theologiae Moralis Ratisbonae 1862

Stein, Studies on the Hesychasts 1874

Braid, Hypnotism, German translation by Preyer 1882

v. Cremer,

Cultural History of the Orient

"

History of the Dominant Ideas of Islam 1868

"

Historical Excursions in the Field of Islam 1873

Notebook 6: Summer 1886 — Spring 1887

1.

If one has a brave and well-constituted soul in one's body, one may well permit oneself this charming luxury of immorality.

Epilogue and Parting Song

2.

Beyond Good and Bad?

A

philosophical polemic.

(As a supplement to and clarification of the most recently published

book "Beyond Good and Evil")

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

3.

Seven Prefaces

With an appendix:

Songs of Prince Vogelfrei.

"I live in a house that is my own,

"Have never aped nobody, nothing, at all,

"And — laughed at every master known

"Who had not laughed at himself at all"

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Leipzig.

Published by E. W. Fritzsch.

4.

Prefaces and Postscripts.

My writings speak only of my own experiences — fortunately I have experienced much —: I am in them, body and soul — why conceal it?, ego ipsissimus, and at the very most, ego ipsissim*um*. But I always first needed a distance of some years before I could feel that imperious desire and strength which bids one portray every such experience, every such *outlived* condition. To that extent all my writings, with one single, though very essential, exception, are *backdated*. Some, like the first Untimely Meditations, are even dated back behind the time of origin and experience of a previously published book, "The Birth of Tragedy": as will not remain hidden from a subtler observer and comparer. That wrathful outburst against the Teutomania, complacency and self-admiration of old David *Strauss* gave vent to moods in which I had sat as a student amid German culture and culture-philistinism; and what I said against the "historical sickness", I said as one who learned to *recover* from it and who was not in the least willing to renounce "history" thenceforth. (Quod demonstratum est —). When I expressed my gratitude to my first and only educator, to Arthur Schopenhauer — I would express it far more strongly still now — I was, for my own person, right in the midst of moralistic scepsis and dissolution and already believed in "nothing at all any more", as the common folk say, not even in Schopenhauer: it was at just that time

that a secretly kept piece of writing came into being, "on truth and lie in an extra-moral sense", — but already in "The Birth of Tragedy" and its doctrine of the *Dionysian*, Schopenhauerian pessimism appears as overcome. My festive address in honour of Richard Wagner, on the occasion of his Bayreuth victory celebration — Bayreuth signifies the greatest victory ever won by an artist — was at the same time an act of renunciation and estrangement. Wagner himself was not deceived about it: as long as one loves, one paints no such "portraits" and does not "contemplate" at all — "anyone who examines himself closely knows that even contemplation involves a mysterious *antagonism*, that of *looking against*", it says on p. 46 of the aforesaid work. The composure to *be able* to speak of long years of innermost solitude and privation came to me only with the book "Human, All Too Human"; upon it lies the cheerful and curious coldness of the psychologist who establishes for himself a host of painful things, sheer facta, more rightly fata, of his past, and as it were *pins* them fast with the needle: — in such work, as is well known, one always has some blood on one's fingers… To say at last what I find it necessary to prepare the readers of this book for with the hints just given: it is no different with this book, whose last part is herewith brought to light, than it has been hitherto with my writings, — it is a piece of my *behind-me*. What underlies it, thoughts, first drafts and sketches of every kind, belongs to my past: namely to that enigma-laden time in which "*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*" came into being: for the sake of this simultaneity alone it might well provide useful pointers towards the understanding of that *hard-to-understand* work just named. Especially towards the understanding of its origin: with which there is something peculiar. At that time thoughts of this kind served me whether as recreation, or as self-interrogation and self-justification in the midst of a boundlessly daring and responsible undertaking: may one make use of the book that has grown out of them for a similar purpose! Or else as a much-winding footpath which again and again, unnoticed, lures one to-

wards that dangerous and volcanic soil from which the aforesaid Zarathustra-gospel sprang. As surely as this "Prelude to a philosophy of the future" too neither provides nor is meant to provide a commentary on the speeches of Zarathustra, so perhaps it is nevertheless a kind of provisional glossary in which the most important innovations of concept and value of that book — an event without precedent, example or likeness in all literature — somewhere or other occur and are called by name. Supposing finally, my dear readers, that precisely these names do not please *you*, do not seduce *you*, supposing even that vestigia *terrent*…, who tells *you* that I — want it otherwise? For my son Zarathustra I demand reverence; and only the very fewest shall be *permitted* to listen to him. At me, on the other hand, his "father" — one may laugh, as I myself do: both of these even belong to my happiness. Or, to make use of a saying that stands over my house door, and to say once more briefly all that has been said:

I live in a house that is my own,

have never aped nobody, nothing, at all,

and laughed at every master known

who had not laughed at himself — at all.

*

5.

Poètes et Mélodes. Étude sur les origines du rhythme tonique dans l'hymnographie de l'église grecque. Par le P. Edmond *Bouvy*

XVI, 384 p.

Nîmes, Maison de l'Assomption 1886.

W. Meyer Beginning and Origin of Latin and Greek Rhythmic Poetry. Treatise of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences 1884.

Barbey d'Aurevilly

Oeuvres et hommes.

Sensations d'histoire.

6.

Matters of Principle.

To the Logicians.

On the Doctrine of the Feeling of Power.

Against the Idealists.

Against the Believers in Reality.

Enlightenment about Genius

What Is Questionable about the Virtues.

In Honour of Evil.

The Problem of the Artist.

Politika.

Woman and Love.

Peoples and "the People".

Music and Musicians

Towards a Critique of Religions.

The Spiritual Men

Solitude.

7.

On the psychology of philosophers. How one feels after long dwelling in abstractis; the cooling effect that Plato felt; the hypnotising effect that the Indians perhaps felt and sought. Whether the longing for the Om is not at bottom the longing of the fakir to become insensible by every possible means; likewise with the Stoa? — Side by side, the coarsest sensual revelry and speculative reverie.

8.

If we sharpened or dulled our senses tenfold, we would perish. The kind of sense stands in relation to a mediator of the possibility of preservation. Likewise what we feel to be great, small, near, far. Our "forms" — there is nothing in them that beings other than man could perceive: — our conditions of existence prescribe the most general laws within which we see forms, shapes, laws, are *permitted* to see them…

9.

If there lies no goal in the whole history of human destinies, then we must put one into it: supposing, that is, that a goal is *necessary* to us, and that on the other hand the illusion of an immanent goal and purpose has become transparent to us. And we need goals because we need a will — which is our backbone. "Will" as compensation for "faith", i.e. for the notion that there is a *divine* will, One who has something in mind for us…

10.

Let us free ourselves, if we do not wish to bring the name of philosophy to shame, from certain absurdities. For example from the concept "world-process": of that we know nothing. The very concept

"world" is already a limit-concept: with this word we grasp a realm to which we send all our necessary ignorances.

11.

The inventive force that fabricated categories worked in the service of need, namely of security, of rapid intelligibility on the basis of signs and sounds, of means of abbreviation: — it is not a matter of metaphysical truths with "substance", "subject", "object", "being", "becoming". — It is the powerful who made the names of things into law: and among the powerful it is the greatest artists of abstraction who created the categories.

12.

The more dangerous a quality appears to the herd, the more thoroughly it must be outlawed. This is a principle within the history of slander. Perhaps the wholly fearsome powers must still be left in fetters today. (Conclusion of H.A.H. 2.)

13.

Last of all we shall get rid of the oldest stock of metaphysics, supposing that we *can* get rid of it — that stock which has incorporated itself into language and the grammatical categories and made itself so indispensable that it might seem we would cease to be able to think if we renounced this metaphysics. It is precisely the philosophers who find it hardest to free themselves from the belief that the fundamental concepts and categories of reason belong, without further ado, to the realm of metaphysical certainties: from of old they have simply believed in reason as a piece of the metaphysical world itself, — in them this oldest belief breaks out again and again like an overpowering relapse.

14.

Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we can by no means prevent ourselves from feeling mere differences of quantity as something fundamentally different from quantity, namely as qualities that are no longer reducible to one another. But everything for which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all refers to the realm where one can count, weigh, measure, to quantity —; while conversely all our feelings of value (i.e. precisely our feelings) cling to qualities, that is, to our perspectival "truths", which belong to us alone and which absolutely cannot be "known". It is obvious that every being different from us feels other qualities and consequently lives in a world other than the one we live in. Qualities are our real human idiosyncrasy: to demand that these human interpretations and values of ours be universal and perhaps constitutive values belongs among the hereditary madnesses of human pride, which still has its firmest seat in religion. Must I, conversely, still add that quantities "in themselves" do not occur in experience, that our world of experience is only a qualitative world, that consequently logic and applied logic (such as mathematics) belong among the artifices of the ordering, overpowering, simplifying, abbreviating power that is called life, and are thus something practical and useful, namely life-preserving, but for that very reason also not in the remotest degree something "true"?

15.

Not to seek the sense in things: but to *put it into* them!

16.

What need of ideas still, when one has ideals! Beautiful feelings suffice.

17.

Desirability, I say, not ideal.

18.

One no longer eats a dish out of morality; so one day one will also no longer "do good" out of morality.

19.

Phenomeno-mania.

20.

Spirits without a nose or with a stuffed-up head cold, the whole species of spirit that I call brute-ox

21.

To have an ideal almost absolves one from having ideas. Beautiful eyes suffice, beautiful feelings in the right place, and, above all, here and there an unpardonably foolish action

What need of ideas still, when one has ideals! For that, beautiful eyes, swelling bosoms and here and there a foolish action of the first rank, proof against all reason, already suffice.

22.

Among artists of the future. — I see here a musician who speaks the language of Rossini and Mozart as his mother tongue, that tender, wild, now too soft, now too noisy vernacular of music with its roguish indulgence towards everything, even towards the "vulgar", — but who at the same time lets slip a smile, the smile of the pampered, the refined, the late-born, who from the bottom of his heart is still con-

stantly *making fun* of the good old times and their very good, very old, old-fashioned music: but a smile full of love, full even of emotion… What? is this not the best stance we *can* have towards the past in general today — to look back gratefully in this way and even to imitate "the old ones", with much delight and love for the whole grandfatherly respectability and disreputability from which we descend, and likewise with that sublime grain of admixed contempt without which all love too quickly spoils and grows musty, grows "stupid"… Perhaps one might promise oneself and imagine something similar for the world of the *word* as well, namely that one day a daring poet-philosopher might come, refined and "late-born" to excess, yet capable of speaking the language of the popular moralists and holy men of former times, and this so artlessly, so originally, so enthusiastically, so merrily straightforwardly, as if he himself were one of the "primitives"; but offering to him who still has ears behind his ears a pleasure without equal, namely to hear and to know what is really happening there, — how here the most godless and unholy form of modern thought is constantly translated back into the emotional language of innocence and the primeval world, and in this knowledge to share in tasting the whole secret triumph of the overweening rider who piled up this difficulty, this barricade, before himself and has leapt over impossibility itself. —

23.

It matters little to me whether today someone says to himself, with the modesty of philosophical skepticism or with religious resignation: "the essence of things is unknown to me", or another, more courageous one, who has not yet learned enough criticism and mistrust: "the essence of things is in good part unknown to me". Against both I maintain that in any case they still pretend to know far too much, imagine they know far too much, namely as if the distinction that

they both presuppose were valid, the distinction between an "essence of things" and a world of appearance. To be able to make such a distinction, one would have to think of our intellect as afflicted with a self-contradictory character: on the one hand, equipped for perspectival seeing, as is needful so that precisely beings of our kind can preserve themselves in existence, on the other hand at the same time with a faculty for comprehending this very perspectival seeing as perspectival, appearance as appearance. That is to say: endowed with a belief in "reality" as if it were the only one, and again also with the insight into this belief, namely that it is only a perspectival limitation with respect to a true reality. But a belief viewed with this insight is no longer belief, is dissolved as belief. In short, we may not think of our intellect as so self-contradictory that it is a belief and at the same time a knowing of this belief as belief. Let us abolish the "thing in itself" and, with it, one of the most unclear concepts, that of "appearance"! This whole antithesis, like that older one of "matter and spirit", has been proved useless

24.

This fate now lies over Europe: that precisely its strongest sons come late and seldom to their spring —, that for the most part, while still young, they perish disgusted, wintered, darkened, precisely because they have drunk, have drained, the cup of disappointment — and that today is the cup of *knowledge* — with the whole passion of their strength: — and they would not be the strongest had they not also been the most disappointed! For this is the test of their power: only out of the whole sickness of the age must they come to *their* health. The *late* spring is their badge; let us add: also the late folly, the late foolishness, the late exuberance! Our *youth* comes when it is no longer suspected; we shift the seasons of life. Let him understand us in this who, like us, has marvelled most at himself. For so dangerous

is the situation today: everything we loved when we were young has deceived us; our last love — the one that makes us confess this — our love of truth — let us see to it that this love too does not deceive us in the end! —

25.

Critique of Pessimism Hitherto

Rejection of the eudaemonological points of view as a final reduction to the question: what *meaning* does it have? Reduction of the darkening. — *Our* pessimism: the world is not worth *what* we believed, — our faith itself has so heightened our drives toward knowledge that today we *must* say this. At first it is thereby held to be worth less: so it is *at first felt* — only in this sense are we pessimists, namely with the will to admit this revaluation to ourselves without reserve and not to drone on or lie to ourselves in the old manner… Precisely in this do we find the pathos that perhaps drives us to seek *new values*. In sum: the world could be worth much more than we believed, — we must get behind the *naivety of our ideals*, and see that perhaps, in the consciousness of giving it the highest interpretation, we have not given our human existence even a moderately fair value.

what has been *deified*? the value-instincts within the *community* (that which made its continuance possible);

what has been *slandered*? that which separated the higher men from the lower, the chasm-creating drives.

Critique of Causalism.

It is *not even* an interpretation, only a formulation,

description; "the succession" still *awaits* interpretation.

Critique of the Concept "Knowledge".

Against "Appearance".

Our great modesty: not to deify the unknown; we are only just beginning to know a little. The false and wasted efforts.

Our "new world": we must recognize to what *degree we are the creators of our feelings of value*, — and hence *can* put "meaning" into history…

This faith in truth reaches its final consequence in us — you know how it runs: — that if there is anything at all to be worshipped, it is semblance that must be worshipped, that the lie — and *not* the truth — is divine…?

26.

On the History of European Nihilism.

The Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence.

On the Order of Rank.

Critique of the Highest Feelings of Value

Their Origin

1)

from the sphere of the sick and the failures.

2)

from the herd and its instincts — cheerful and gloomy religions.

Beginnings

of *opposite* values: —

why defeated?

Critique

of the "good man" (critique of *God*).

Critique

of the assessment of the affects hitherto (of the order of rank).

Critique

of philosophies hitherto (as consequences of partly morbid, partly herdlike desirabilities).

The Will to Truth

Fear, laziness sensuality, lust for domination, avarice — and their metamorphoses.

Sickness, age, weariness —

Morphology of the affects: their reduction to the *will to power*.

The organic functions, regarded as a development of the will to power.

Theory of the structures of domination:

Development of organisms.

The herd: a transitional form, a means for the preservation of the *more manifold, stronger* type.

"*Perfection*": reduction to the *becoming-more-powerful of the type*.

Conditions: slavery, estates.

— to what extent are decline and dissolution also a "will to power"?

In the human organism the highest kind of being appears as *spiritualized affect, commanding, predominant*.

What is "spirituality"?

Cosmological Perspective.

The *masterly* types and their psychology

the man (consequence of a victory)

the lawgiver

the conqueror

the priest

the "shepherd" in contrast to the "master" (the former a *means* for the preservation of the herd, the latter the *end* for which the herd exists.

the noblesse what is *beauty*? Expression of the *victorious* and of what *has become master*.

Notebook 7: End of 1886 — Spring 1887

*First Book:** "what is

truth?"*

First Chapter. Psychology of Error.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

1.

Psychology of Error

Since time immemorial we have placed the value of an action, of a character, of an existence in the intention, in the purpose for the sake of which something was done, acted, lived: this age-old idiosyncrasy of taste at last takes a dangerous turn — supposing, that is, that the absence of intention and purpose in what happens steps ever more into the foreground of consciousness. With this a universal devaluation seems to be in preparation: "nothing has any meaning" — this melancholy maxim means "all meaning lies in the intention, and supposing the intention is wholly and utterly lacking, then meaning too is wholly and utterly lacking". In accordance with that valuation one had been compelled to transfer the value of life into a "life after death"; or into the progressive development of ideas or of mankind or of the people, or beyond man altogether; but with that one had entered upon the purpose-progressus in infinitum, one at last found it necessary to secure oneself a place in the "world-process" (with the dysdaemonistic perspective, perhaps, that it was the process into nothingness).

Against this, "purpose" requires a stricter critique: one must understand that an action is *never caused by a purpose*; that purpose and means are interpretations, whereby certain points of an occurrence are underscored and selected at the expense of others, indeed of most; that every time something is done toward a purpose, something fundamentally different and other takes place; that with regard to every purposive action matters stand as with the alleged purposiveness of the heat which the sun radiates: the overwhelming mass is squandered; a part scarcely worth reckoning has "purpose", has "meaning" —; that a "purpose" with its "means" is an indescribably indeterminate sketch, which can indeed command as a prescription, as "*will*", but presupposes a system of obedient and trained instruments which put nothing but fixed magnitudes in the place of the indeterminate (*i.e.* we imagine a system of *cleverer* but narrower intellects that posit purposes and means, so as to be able to assign to our one known "purpose" the role of "cause of an action": to which we in truth have no right (it would mean, in order to solve a problem, placing the solution of the problem in a world inaccessible to our observation —) Finally: why could "a purpose" not be an *accompanying phenomenon* in the series of changes of active forces which call forth the purposive action — a pale sign-image cast ahead into consciousness, which serves us for orientation as to what is happening, as a symptom itself of the occurrence, *not* as its cause? — But with this we have criticised *the will itself*: is it not an illusion to take as cause that which surfaces in consciousness as an act of will? Are not all phenomena of consciousness merely end-phenomena, final links of a chain, yet seemingly conditioning one another in their succession within a single surface of consciousness? This could be an illusion. —

Objection to the alleged "facts of consciousness". Observation is a thousandfold more difficult; error is perhaps the condition of observation as such.

I have the intention of stretching out my arm; supposing I know as little of the physiology of the human body and of the mechanical laws of its movement as a man of the people, what is there, really, vaguer, paler, more uncertain than this intention in comparison with what then happens? And supposing I were the most acute of mechanicians and specially instructed in the formulae applied here, I would stretch out my arm not one whit better or worse. Our "knowing" and our "doing" in this case lie coldly apart: as though in two different realms. — On the other hand: Napoleon carries out the plan of a campaign — what does that mean? Here everything that belongs to the carrying out of the plan is *known*, because everything must be commanded: but here too subordinates are presupposed, who interpret the general, adapt it to the need of the moment, the measure of strength, etc.

The world is *not* thus and thus, with living beings seeing it as it appears to them. Rather: the world consists of such living beings, and for each of them there is a little corner from which it measures, perceives, sees and does not see. "Essence" is *lacking*: what is "becoming", what is "phenomenal" is the only kind of being. |?

"It changes", no change without a reason — always already presupposes a something that stands behind the change and remains.

"Cause" and "effect": reckoned up psychologically, it is the belief that expresses itself in the *verb*, active and passive, doing and suffering. That is to say: the division of what happens into a doing and a suffering, the supposition of one who does, has come first. Behind it lurks the belief in the *doer*: *as though, if all doing were subtracted from the "doer", he himself would still remain.* Here the "I-idea" is always prompting: all that happens has been interpreted as *doing*: with the mythology of a being corresponding to the "I" — — —

Second Chapter. Value of Truth and Error.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

2.

Value of *Truth* and *Error*

The origin of our valuations: from our needs

Whether the origin of our apparent "knowledges" is not likewise to be sought merely in *older valuations*, which are so firmly incorporated that they belong to our basic stock? So that really only *younger* needs come to blows with the *result of the oldest needs*?

The world seen, felt, interpreted thus and thus, so that organic life preserves itself under this perspective of interpretation. Man is *not* merely an individual, but the living-on whole of the organic along one particular line. That *he* endures proves that a kind of interpretation (even if continually built upon) has also endured, that the system of interpretation has not changed. "Adaptation"

Our "insufficiency", our "ideal", etc., is perhaps the *consequence* of this incorporated piece of interpretation, of our perspectival point of view; perhaps organic life will in the end perish of it — just as the division of labour in organisms brings with it at once a stunting and weakening of the parts and finally death for the whole. The *downfall* of organic life in its highest form must be laid down in advance just as the downfall of the individual is.

Value of Truth and Error

(19)

The *valuations*

A)

as consequence (life, or decline

B)

as cause

misunderstanding interpretation

masquerade

as art of slander, of self-glorification

conditioned by estate

conditioned by race

Sunday values and everyday values

in crises, in wars and dangers, or in peace

their origin in the *glorification* of an ideal, in the condemnation of its opposite.

Antagonism

between strengthening and "improvement", between *strengthening* of the individual and *strengthening* of a race, between strengthening of a race and strengthening of "mankind".

NB. The "creative" — how deep down?

why is all *activity*, even that of a *sense*, bound up with pleasure? Because an inhibition, a pressure existed beforehand? Or rather because all doing is an overcoming, a becoming-master, and gives an *increase of the feeling of power*? — The pleasure in thinking. — Ultimately it is not only the feeling of power but the pleasure in creating and *in what is created*: for all activity enters our consciousness as consciousness of a "work"

Value of Truth and Error.

An artist cannot endure any reality; he looks away, looks back; his earnest opinion is that what a thing is worth is that shadow-like residue which one wins from colours, shape, sound, thoughts; he believes that the more subtilized, thinned, volatilized a thing, a human being becomes, *the more his worth increases: the less real, the more worth*. This is Platonism: which, however, possessed one boldness more, in the reversal: — it measured the degree of reality by the degree of value and said: the more "idea", the more being. It turned the concept "reality" around and said: "what you take for real is an error, and the nearer we come to the 'idea', the nearer we come to the 'truth' ". — Is this understood? That *was the greatest rebaptism*: and because it has been taken up by Christianity, we do not see the astonishing thing. Plato at bottom *preferred* semblance, as the artist he was, to being: thus the lie and invention to truth, the unreal to what is present, — but he was so very convinced of the value of semblance that he bestowed upon it the attributes "being", "causality" and "goodness", truth, in short everything else to which one ascribes value.

The concept of value itself, thought of as cause: first insight.

The ideal endowed with all the attributes that confer honour: second insight

Third Chapter. The Will to Truth.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari in accordance with the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

3.

The Will to Truth

The "*agnostics*", the worshippers of the unknown and mysterious in itself, whence do they take the right to adore a question mark as God?

A God who keeps himself hidden in such a fashion deserves perhaps fear, but certainly not adoration! And why could the unknown not be the devil? But "it *must* be adored" — so commands here the instinct for propriety: that is English.

The *transcendentalists*, who find that all human knowledge does not satisfy the wishes of their heart, but rather contradicts them and makes them shudder, — they innocently posit a world somewhere which nevertheless corresponds to their wishes, and which precisely does not show itself accessible to our knowledge: this world, they suppose, is the *true* world, in relation to which our knowable world is only deception. So Kant, so already the Vedanta philosophy, so many Americans. — "True", that means for them: what corresponds to the wish of our heart. Formerly true meant: what corresponds to reason.

The *most general sign of the modern age*: man has lost an unbelievable amount of *dignity* in his own eyes. Long the centre and tragic hero of existence as a whole; then at least striving to prove himself akin to the decisive side of existence, the side valuable in itself — as all metaphysicians do who want to hold fast to the *dignity of man*, with their faith that moral values are cardinal values. Whoever let God go holds all the more strictly to faith in morality.

Will to Truth

Weakenings of the affect.

A.

a

Will, intention, vehement desire in One direction

b

Purpose, less vehement, because the representation of the means and the way intervenes.

c

"Reason", without desire: the principle of *sufficient reason* has its psychological certainty in the belief in *intention* as the cause of every event

B.

distinguishing thought as a consequence of fear and caution in the will to appropriation.

the *correct* representation of an object is originally only a *means* to the end of seizing, grasping and *taking possession*.

Later this correct representing is itself already felt as a seizing, as a *goal* at which *satisfaction* sets in.

Thinking, finally, as *overpowering* and the exercise of power: as a joining-together, as an ordering of the new under old series, etc.

C.

the *new* causes *fear*: on the other hand fear must already be there in order to grasp the new as new

astonishment is *weakened fear*.

The *familiar* arouses *trust*

"true" is something that awakens the feeling of security

inertia attempts first of all the *equating* in every impression: that is, equating the new impression and the memory; it wants *repetition*.

fear teaches *distinguishing, comparing*

In *judgement* a residue of *will* (it *shall* be thus and

so) a residue of pleasure-*feeling* (the *pleasure* of affirmation:)

NB. *Comparing* is *not an original* activity, but rather equating! *Judgement* is originally not the belief that something is thus and so, but the *will* that something *shall* be thus and so.

NB. *pain* a judgement (negating) in its crudest form

pleasure an affirmation

On the psychological genesis of "cause and effect".

Will to Truth

Interpretation

To what extent interpretations of the world are symptoms of a ruling drive.

The *artistic* contemplation of the world: to sit down before life. But here the analysis of aesthetic contemplation is lacking, its reduction to cruelty, the feeling of security, of being judge and being outside, etc. One must take the artist himself: and his psychology (the critique of the play-drive, as a discharge of force, pleasure in change, in impressing one's own soul, the absolute egoism of the artist, etc.) Which drives does he sublimate?

The *scientific* contemplation of the world: critique of the psychological need *for* science. The wanting-to-make-comprehensible; the wanting-to-make-practical, -useful, -exploitable —: to what extent anti-aesthetic. Value solely in what can be counted and calculated. To what extent an average kind of man wants thereby to gain the upper hand. Dreadful, if even *history* is taken possession of in this way — the realm of the superior, of the one who judges. Which drives he sublimates!

The religious contemplation of the world: critique of the religious man. He is *not* necessarily the moral man, but the man of strong exaltations and deep depressions, who interprets the former with gratitude or suspicion and does not derive them from *himself* (— nor the latter

either —) Essentially the man who feels himself "unfree", who sublimates his states, the instincts of submission.

The *moral* contemplation of the world. The social feelings of order of rank are transferred into the universe: immovability, law, subordination and coordination, because most highly esteemed, are also *sought* at the highest place, above the All, or behind the All, likewise — — —

What they have *in common*: the ruling drives want also to be *regarded* as the *highest authorities of value in general, indeed* as *creative* and *governing powers*. It goes without saying that these drives either feud with one another or subjugate one another (perhaps also bind one another synthetically) or alternate in dominion. Their deep antagonism, however, is so great that where they all want satisfaction, a man of profound *mediocrity* is to be imagined.

"Beauty" is for the artist something outside all order of rank because in beauty opposites are tamed, the highest sign of power, namely over what is opposed; moreover without tension: — that no force is needed any longer, that everything *follows, obeys* so easily, and puts on the most amiable countenance for obedience — that delights the artist's will to power.

The Interpretations of the World

and what they have in common.

Second Book: Origin of Values.

Second Book: Origin of Values.

First Chapter. The Metaphysicians

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari in accordance with the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

4.

The Metaphysicians

The naïve: Lamennais, Michelet, Victor Hugo

Out of the habituation to unconditional authorities there has at last arisen a deep need for unconditional authorities: — so strong that even in a critical age, such as Kant's, it proved itself superior to the need for critique, and, in a certain sense, knew how to make the whole work of the critical understanding subservient to it and turn it to its own use. — In the generation that followed, which by its historical instincts was necessarily steered toward the relativity of every authority, it proved its superiority once more, when it made even the Hegelian philosophy of development, history itself rebaptized as philosophy, serve its ends and presented history as the progressive self-revelation, the self-surpassing of the moral ideas. Since Plato, philosophy has been under the dominion of morality: even among his predecessors moral interpretations play a decisive part (in Anaximander the perishing of all things as punishment for their emancipation from pure being, in Heraclitus the regularity of appearances as testimony to the ethico-juridical character of all becoming)

What is the *criterion* of the moral action? 1) its disinterestedness 2) its universal validity etc. But that is armchair moralizing. One must study the peoples and look at what the criterion is in each case, and what is expressed in it. A belief: "such conduct belongs among our foremost conditions of existence". Immoral means "bringing about ruin". Now all these communities in which these propositions were found have perished: certain of these propositions have been underscored again and again, because every newly forming community needed them anew, e.g. "thou shalt not steal". In times when a communal feeling for society (e.g. the imperium romanum) could not be demanded, the drive threw itself onto the "salvation of the soul", reli-

giously speaking: or onto "the greatest happiness", in philosophical parlance. For even the Greek moral philosophers no longer felt at one with their πόλις.

Spinoza's psychological background. Meagre!

1) The *hedonistic standpoint* in the foreground: In what does *abiding joy* consist, or how can the joyful affect be made eternal?

So long as joy relates to something particular, it is limited and transient; it becomes perfect when it no longer changes with things but rests in the changeless connection of the whole; it is eternal when I transform the All into my own property, omnia in mea, and can say of these omnia mea at every moment "mecum porto"

In the tract. de intell. emendatione Op. II p. 413. "I resolved to inquire whether something might be found whose possession would grant me forever the enjoyment of a lasting and supreme joy." "Love toward an eternal and infinite being fills the mind with a joy that excludes every kind of sorrow." "The highest good is the *knowledge* of the unity of our mind with the universe."

2) the *naturally* egoistic standpoint: virtue and power identical. It does not renounce, it desires; it fights not against but for nature; it is not the annihilation but the *satisfaction* of the *mightiest* affect. Good is what furthers our power: evil its opposite. Virtue follows from the striving for self-preservation. "What we do, we do in order to preserve and increase our power." "By virtue and power I understand the same thing."

Finis = appetitus. Virtus = potentia. Eth. IV Defin. VII. VIII.

3) the specific "thinker" betrays himself. Knowledge becomes master over all the other affects; it is stronger. "Our true activity consists in thinking nature, in rational contemplation. The desire for activity = the desire to live in accordance with reason.

"I do not set much store by the authority of a Plato, Aristotle and Socrates"; the doctrine of "substantial forms" (the concept of purpose in scholastic terminology) he calls "one folly among a thousand others".

Feuerbach's "healthy and fresh sensuality"

"Principles *of the* Philosophy of the Future" 1843.

against "abstract philosophy"

Ancient philosophy had in view man as the *purpose* of nature

Christian theology conceived the redemption of man as the *purpose* of divine providence.

Remarkable, *Spinoza*: "by conscientiae morsus I understand sorrow, accompanied by the idea of a past thing which has turned out contrary to all expectation". Eth. III Prop. XVIII. Schol. I. II. p. 147. 48. Affect. Def. XVII p. 188.

As its opposite, gaudium, when the expected outcome does not come to pass and fear suddenly ceases. Despite K. Fischer, it would be possible that here Spinoza chose the designation a potiori: and that he regarded what is so designated as the objective core of every "sting of conscience". For he had to deny guilt *in himself*: what then, for him, was the fact "conscientiae morsus" *that remained*?

If everything ultimately happens by virtue of divine power, then everything is perfect in its kind, then there is no ill in the nature of things; if man is unfree through and through, then there is no evil in the nature of the human will; then ills and evil are not in things, but only in the imagination of man.

In God there is no will and no understanding and no personality and no purpose.

Spinoza resists those who say that God effects all things *sub* ratione boni. These seem to assume something outside God, not dependent on God, toward which he directs himself in his acting as toward a model, or after which he strives as after a goal. That, verily, is to subject God to fate: which is the greatest absurdity. Eth. 1 Prop. XXXIII Schol. 2.

The ultimate ground of every event: "God willed it". Asylum ignorantiae. But the will of God is impenetrable to man. With this way of thinking, truth would have remained hidden from man for all eternity, *had not mathematics* (which concerns itself not with purposes but solely with the nature and properties of magnitude) *held up before man another standard of truth*.

Descartes says "I have held many things to be *true* whose error I now perceive". Spinoza: "I have held many things to be *good* which I now perceive to be vain and worthless". "If there is a genuine and imperishable good, then the satisfaction in it is likewise lasting and indestructible, then my joy is eternal."

Psychological fallacy: as if the durability of a thing guaranteed the durability of the affection I have for it!

(complete absence of the "artist") Supreme and comical pedantry of a logician *who deifies his drive*

Spinoza believes he has known everything absolutely.

Withal he has the *greatest* feeling of power. The drive toward it has overpowered and extinguished all other drives.

The consciousness of this "knowledge" persists in him: a kind of "love of God" results from it, a joy in existence, however it may otherwise be, in *all* existence.

Whence come all ill humours, sorrow, fear, hatred, envy? From one source: from our love of *transient* things. With this love the whole race of those desires vanishes as well

"Although I saw clearly through the nothingness of the goods of the world, I still could not wholly lay aside avarice, sensual pleasure and ambition. But one thing I learned: *so long as my mind lived in that contemplation, it was turned away from these desires* — and this afforded me great comfort. For from this I saw that those ills were not incurable. At first the new life came in rare, brief moments —"

Nothing has value compared with the *value of clear inference*. All other values are merely the consequence of unclear thinking. Contemptuous rejection of all the goods of life; constant *slander* of everything, so as to raise one thing to the very highest height: *clear thinking*. "All *doubt* arises from things being investigated without order."!!!

As with Schopenhauer: the desires fall silent under the power of aesthetic contemplation.

A psychological experience, falsely and generally *interpreted*.

Leibniz: "One must judge with me ab effectu: because God chose this world as it is, *therefore it is the best*". Théod. p 506.

The theological prejudice in Kant, his unconscious dogmatism, his moralistic perspective as ruling, directing, commanding

The πρῶτον ψεῦδος: how is the fact of knowledge possible?

is knowledge a fact at all?

what is knowledge? If we do not *know* what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question whether there is knowledge. Very fine! But if I do not already "know" *whether* there is knowledge, whether there can be, I cannot reasonably pose the question "what is

knowledge" at all. Kant *believes* in the fact of knowledge: what he wants is a naïveté: *the knowledge of knowledge!*

"Knowledge is judgment!" But judgment is a *belief* that something is thus and thus! And *not* knowledge!

"all knowledge consists in synthetic judgments" — a necessary and universally valid connection of different representations —

with the character of universality (the matter stands thus in all cases and not otherwise)

with the character of necessity (the opposite of the assertion can never occur)

The *legitimacy* of the belief in knowledge is always presupposed: just as the legitimacy of the feeling in the judgment of conscience is presupposed. Here *moral ontology* is the *ruling* prejudice.

So the inference is: 1) there are assertions which we hold to be universally valid and necessary

2) the character of necessity and universal validity cannot stem from experience

3) consequently it must *ground itself elsewhere*, without experience, and have another source of knowledge!

Kant infers 1) there are assertions which are valid only under certain conditions

2) this condition is that it does not stem from experience, that it stems from pure reason

So: the question is, *whence our belief* in the truth of such assertions takes its grounds? No, whence it has its judgments! But the *origin of a belief*, of a strong conviction, is a psychological problem: and a *very* limited and narrow experience often brings about such a belief!

He *already presupposes* that there are not only "data a posteriori" but also data a priori, "prior to experience". Necessity and universality can never be given by experience: by what, then, is it made clear that they exist at all without experience?

There are no single judgments!

A single judgment is never "true", never knowledge; only in *coherence*, in the *relation* of many judgments, does a guarantee arise.

What distinguishes true belief from false?

What is knowledge? He "knows" it, that is heavenly!

Necessity and universality can never be given by experience. Therefore independent of experience, *prior to* all experience!

That insight which takes place a priori, thus independent of all experience, *out of mere reason*: "a *pure* knowledge".

The principles of logic, the law of identity and of contradiction, are pure knowledge, because they precede all experience. — But these are not knowledge at all! rather *regulative articles of faith*!

In order to ground the apriority (the pure rationality) of mathematical judgments, space must be *conceived as a form of pure reason*.

Hume had declared: "there are no synthetic judgments a priori at all". Kant says: there are! the mathematical ones! And if, then, there are such judgments, there is perhaps also metaphysics, a knowledge of things through pure reason! Quaeritur.

Mathematics is possible under conditions under which metaphysics is *never* possible

all human knowledge is either experience or mathematics

A judgment is synthetic: i.e. it connects different representations

it is a priori: i.e. that connection is a universal and necessary one, which can never be given through sense perception, but only through pure reason.

If there are to be synthetic judgments a priori, then reason will have to be capable of connecting: connecting is a form. Reason must *possess form-giving faculties*.

Space and time as *condition* of *experience*

Kant describes the French Revolution as the transition from the *mechanical* to the *organic* polity!

The inventive and pioneering minds in the sciences, the so-called "great heads", are, *Kant* judges, specifically different from *genius*: what they discovered and invented could also have been learned, and has been completely understood and learned. In Newton's work there is nothing unlearnable; Homer is not as comprehensible as Newton! *"In science, therefore, the greatest inventor differs from the most laborious imitator and apprentice only in degree." Psychological idiocy!!*

"a certain lack of urbanity attaches to music", "it as it were forces itself upon one", "it infringes upon freedom"

music and the art of colour form a genus of their own under the name of the "beautiful play of sensations"

Painting and the art of gardening paired with one another.

The question whether mankind has a *tendency toward the good* is prepared by the question whether there is an event which cannot be explained otherwise than by that moral disposition of mankind. This is the Revolution. "Such a phenomenon in human history is never again forgotten, because it has revealed a disposition and a faculty in human nature *toward the better*, such as no politician could have subtly devised from the previous course of things."

If mankind grows progressively worse, then its goal is the *absolutely bad*: the *terroristic* mode of representation, in contrast to the *eudaemonistic* mode of representation or "chiliasm". If history sways back and forth between progress and regress, if its entire activity is purposeless and aimless, nothing but a busy folly, so that *good and evil neutralize each other and the whole appears as a farce*: this Kant calls the *Abderitic mode of representation*.

Kant sees in *history* nothing other than a moral movement.

"A conscientious inquisitor is a contradictio in adjecto"

Psychological idiocy

without rebirth all human virtues are, according to Kant, glittering paltrinesses. This betterment is possible only by virtue of the intelligible character; without it there is no freedom, neither in the world, nor in the will of man, nor for redemption from evil. If redemption does not consist in betterment, it can consist only in *annihilation*. The origin of the empirical character, the propensity to evil, rebirth are, in Kant, deeds of the intelligible character; the empirical character must undergo a reversal at its root.

the *whole of Schopenhauer*.

Pity a squandering of the feelings, a parasite harmful to moral health; "it cannot possibly be a duty to increase the evils in the world". If one does good merely out of pity, one actually does good to oneself and not to the other. Pity rests not on maxims but on affects; it is pathological; the suffering of others infects us, pity is a contagion.

all the gestures and words of submissiveness; "a pedantry in which the Germans have gone furthest of all the peoples of the earth" "are these not proofs of a widespread propensity to servility among men?" "But he who makes himself a worm cannot afterwards complain that he is trodden underfoot."

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and the more steadily reflection occupies itself with them: the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us."

He continues: "the first view of a countless multitude of worlds *annihilates, as it were, my importance* as an *animal creature*, which must give back the matter from which it came to the planet (a mere point in the universe), after having been endowed for a short time, one knows not how, with vital force. The second, on the other hand, raises my worth as *an intelligence infinitely*

The thinkability of freedom rests upon the transcendental aesthetic. If time and space belong to things as such, then appearances are equal to things in themselves, then no appearance is possible between the two, then there is nothing independent of time, then freedom is utterly impossible. Freedom can be thought only as the property of a being that is not subject to the conditions of time, hence is not appearance, not representation, but thing in itself.

Why are appearances not things in themselves? Because they are in space and time, and space and time are pure intuitions.

Against the alleged psychological freedom Kant says: "If our freedom consisted in our being driven by representations, as an automaton spirituale," then "it would at bottom be no better than the freedom of a turnspit, which likewise, once it has been wound up, performs its movements of its own accord."

Freedom is unthinkable in the world of appearances, be it the outer or the inner

Second Chapter. The homines religiosi.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

5.

homines religiosi

The Reformation: one of the most mendacious eruptions of vulgar instincts

A number of strong, thoroughly vulgar drives that have grown unruly want to get out into the open air: nothing is needed but to invent pretexts, above all grandiose words, under which these wild beasts may be let loose.

Luther the psychological type: a coarse and inauthentic peasant who, with "evangelical freedom", gives vent to all his accumulated violent needs.

one wants for once to be master again, to rob, to throw down, to curse, not to mention that the senses want to have their due: above all, one looks lustfully at the enormous wealth of the Church.

The priest at times the god himself, at the least his deputy

In themselves, ascetic habits and exercises are still far from betraying an anti-natural disposition hostile to existence: just as little degeneration and sickness

self-overcoming, with harsh and terrible inventions: a means of having and demanding reverence for oneself: asceticism as a means of *power*

The priest as representative of a superhuman feeling of power, even as a good *actor* of a god whom it is his *calling* to portray, will instinctively reach for such means by which he attains a certain fearsomeness in his mastery over himself

The priest as representative of superhuman powers, with regard to knowledge, foreknowledge, the ability to harm and to help, also with regard to superhuman raptures and kinds of happiness: —

— the actor of "gods" before the healthy, the happy, the hopeful, the powerful

— the actor of the "Saviour", turning essentially to the sick and the deprived, to men of ressentiment, to the oppressed and — — —

— priests are the actors of something or other superhuman to which they have to give sensuous palpability, be it ideals, be it gods, or saviours: in this they find their calling, for this they have their instincts; to make it as credible as possible, they must go as far as possible in assimilating themselves to it; their actor's cleverness must above all produce in them *a good conscience*, with the help of which alone true persuasion is possible.

Chapter Three. The Good and the Improvers.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

6.

The Good

ruthless righteousness.

(9)

The victory of a moral ideal is won by the same "immoral" means as every victory: violence, lies, slander, injustice

"Thou shalt not lie": truthfulness is demanded. But the acknowledgement of what is factual (the refusal to let oneself be lied to) has been

greatest precisely among liars: they also recognized the *non*-factual character of this popular "truthfulness". Too much or too little is constantly being said: the demand *to lay oneself bare* with every word one speaks is a naivety.

One says what one thinks, one is "truthful" *only under certain presuppositions*: namely, that of being *understood* (inter pares), and indeed understood benevolently (*once again* inter pares). Before the *stranger* one conceals oneself: and whoever wants to achieve something says what he wants to have thought about himself, but *not* what he thinks. ("The powerful man always lies")

An ideal that wants to prevail or still maintain itself seeks to support itself a) by a *spurious* origin b) by an alleged kinship with already existing powerful ideals c) by the shudder of mystery, as though an indisputable power were speaking here d) by slandering the ideals opposed to it e) by a mendacious doctrine of the *advantage* it brings with it, e.g. happiness, peace of soul, peace, or also the assistance of a mighty god, etc.

On the psychology of the idealist: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet

Once one has uncovered all the defensive and protective measures by which an ideal preserves itself: is it thereby *refuted*? It has employed the means by which everything living lives and grows — they are, one and all, "immoral".

My insight: all the forces and drives by virtue of which there is life and growth lie under the *ban of morality*: morality as the instinct of the negation of life. One must destroy morality in order to liberate life.

The Good

Toward a critique of the herd virtues.

Inertia at work

1) in trust, because mistrust necessitates tension, observation, reflection

2) in veneration, where the distance in power is great and submission necessary: so as not to fear, one tries to love, to esteem highly, and to interpret the difference in power as a difference in *value*: so that the relationship *no longer provokes revolt*.

3) in the sense of truth. What is true? Where an explanation is given that costs us the minimum of intellectual exertion. Besides, lying is very strenuous.

(21)

4) in sympathy. To equate oneself, to try to feel the same, to *adopt* an existing feeling is a relief: it is something passive as against the activum which safeguards and constantly exercises the most personal rights of value judgement. The latter gives no rest.

5) in impartiality and coolness of judgement: one shies away from the exertion of affect and prefers to stand aside, "objective"

(18)

6) in righteousness: one prefers to obey an existing law rather than *create* a law for oneself, rather than command oneself and others. The fear of commanding — Better to submit than to react.

7) in tolerance: the fear of exercising right, of judging

the

masked

kinds of the will to power

1)

Desire for *freedom*, independence, also for equilibrium, peace, *coordination*; also the hermit, "freedom of spirit"; in its lowest form: the will simply to exist, "the drive to self-preservation"

2)

integration, in order to satisfy the will to power of the greater whole: *submission*, making oneself indispensable, making oneself useful to him who holds power; *love*, as a secret path to the heart of the more powerful, — in order to rule over him

3)

the feeling of duty, conscience, the imaginary consolation of belonging to a *higher* rank than those who actually hold power; the acknowledgement of an order of rank that permits *judging*, even over the more powerful; self-condemnation. The invention of *new tables of values* (the Jews the classic example)

Morality as the work of immorality.

A.

For moral values to attain *dominion*, nothing but immoral forces and affects must help.

B.

The *origin* of moral values itself is the work

of immoral affects and considerations.

Morality as the work of error.

Morality gradually

in contradiction with itself.

Retribution.

Truthfulness, doubt, epoché, judging.

"Immorality" of *faith* in morality.

The steps:

1)

absolute dominion of morality

all biological phenomena measured and *judged* by it

2)

Attempt at an identification of life and morality (symptom of an awakened scepticism: morality is no longer to be felt as an antithesis) several means, even a transcendent path

3)

Opposition of *life* and *morality*: morality judged and condemned from the standpoint of life.

To what extent morality was *harmful* to life

a)

to the enjoyment of life, to gratitude toward life, etc.

b)

to the beautification, the ennoblement of life

c)

to the knowledge of life

d)

to the unfolding of life, insofar as it sought to set the *highest* phenomena of life at odds with life itself

Counter-reckoning: its *usefulness* for life.

the

morality as a principle of preservation of greater wholes, as a restriction of the members: "the instrument"

the

morality as a principle of preservation in relation to the inner endangering of man by the passions: "the mediocre man"

the

morality as a principle of preservation against the life-destroying effects of deep distress and atrophy: "the sufferer"

the

morality as a counter-principle against the terrible explosion of the powerful: the "lowly"

Narrow-minded arrogance of certain philosophers as being purely in accordance with *reason*, against feeling in general in morality (Kant), against pity, against the affects

The Good

Danger in modesty. — To adapt oneself too early to a milieu, to tasks, societies, orders of everyday life and of work in which chance sets us, at a time when neither our strength nor our goal has entered our consciousness as lawgiver; the all-too-early security of conscience thereby won, the refreshment, the fellowship, this premature self-contentment, which ingratiates itself with feeling as a release from inner and outer unrest, pampers and holds us down in the most dangerous way; learning to respect after the fashion of "one's equals," as though we had in ourselves no measure and no right to set values, the effort to esteem alike *against* the inner voice of taste, which is also a conscience, becomes a terrible, subtle fettering: if in the end there is no

explosion, with all the bonds of love and morality burst asunder at a single stroke, then such a spirit withers and grows petty, grows womanish and matter-of-fact. — The opposite is bad enough, but still better: to suffer from one's surroundings, from their praise as much as from their disapproval, to be wounded by it and to fester inwardly without betraying it; to defend oneself, involuntarily mistrustful, against their love, to learn silence, perhaps by concealing it through speech, to create for oneself corners and unguessable solitudes for the moments of drawing breath, of tears, of sublime consolation — until at last one is strong enough to say: "what have I to do with *you*?" and goes *one's own* way.

The virtues are as dangerous as the vices, insofar as one lets them rule from without as authority and law and does not first generate them out of oneself, as is right, as the most personal self-defence and necessity, as the condition precisely of *our* existence and well-being, which we recognize and acknowledge, indifferent whether others grow along with us under the same or under different conditions. This tenet of the dangerousness of virtue understood impersonally, *objectively*, holds also of modesty: through it many of the choicest spirits perish.

The morality of modesty is the worst softening for those souls for whom alone it makes sense that they become *hard* in good time.

The Good.

Very few succeed in seeing a problem in that wherein we live, that to which we have been accustomed from of old; the eye is precisely not adjusted for it: with regard to our morality this seems to me not yet to have happened.

The problem "every man as object for others" is the occasion for the highest bestowals of honour; for himself — no!

The problem "thou shalt": an inclination that does not know how to justify itself, similar to the sexual drive, is *not* to fall under the condemnation of the drives; on the contrary, it is to be their measure of value and their judge!

The problem of equality, while we all thirst for distinction: here precisely we are, on the contrary, to make exactly the same demands on ourselves as on others.

That is so absurd, so palpably mad: but — it is felt as holy, as of higher rank; the contradiction against reason is scarcely heard.

Self-sacrifice and selflessness as distinguishing, unconditional obedience to morality, and the faith that before it one stands equal with everyone.

The neglect and surrender of well-being and life as distinguishing, the complete renunciation of one's own positing of values, the stern demand to see everyone renounce the same. "The value of actions is *determined*: every individual is subject to this valuing."

We see: an authority speaks — who speaks? — One may forgive human pride if it sought this authority as high as possible, so as to find itself as little humiliated beneath it as possible. Therefore — God speaks!

One needed God, as an unconditional sanction which has no court above it, as a "categorical imperative" —: or, insofar as one believes in the authority of reason, one needed a metaphysics of unity, by virtue of which it was logical

Suppose now the faith in God is gone: then the question presents itself anew: "*who* speaks?" — My answer, taken not from metaphysics but from animal physiology: *the herd instinct speaks*. It *wants* to be master: hence its "thou shalt!" it will let the individual count only in the

sense of the whole, for the good of the whole; it hates those who break loose — it turns the hatred of all individuals against him

Let us consider how dearly such a moral canon (an "ideal") is paid for. Its enemies are — well, the egoists

the melancholy acuteness of self-belittlement in Europe (Pascal, Larochefoucauld)

the inner weakening, discouragement, self-gnawing of the non-herd animals

the constant underlining of the qualities of mediocrity as the most valuable (modesty, falling into rank and file, the instrument-nature)

the bad conscience mixed into everything sovereign, original:

displeasure, therefore: — therefore *darkening* of the world of the more strongly constituted

herd consciousness carried over into philosophy and religion: its timidity too, its — — —

let us leave out of play the psychological impossibility of a purely selfless action

My philosophy is directed toward order of rank: not toward an individualistic morality. The sense of the herd should rule in the herd, — but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation of their own actions, likewise the independent ones, or the "beasts of prey," etc.

Set apart against both movements, individualistic and collectivist morality, for the first, too, knows no order of rank and wants to give the one the same freedom as all. My thoughts turn not on the degree of freedom that is to be granted to the one or the other or to all, but on the degree of *power* that the one or the other is to exercise over

others or over all, or rather to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even an enslavement, provides the basis for the production of a *higher type*. Thought in its grandest form: *how could one sacrifice the development of mankind* in order to help a higher kind than man into existence? —

Let one not mistake oneself! If one hears within oneself the moral imperative as altruism understands it, then one belongs to the *herd*. If one has the opposite feeling, if one feels in one's disinterested and selfless actions one's danger, one's going astray, then one does not belong to the herd.

The apparently mad thought that one should hold the action one performs for another higher than that performed for oneself, and this other likewise in turn, etc., that one should call actions good only because in them one has in view not oneself but the welfare of the other, has its sense: namely as the instinct of communal spirit, resting on the estimation that little matters about the individual as such, but very much about all together, provided that they do indeed form a *community*, with a common feeling and a common conscience. Thus a kind of practice in a definite direction of the gaze, a will to an optics that wants to make it impossible to see oneself.

My thought: the goals are lacking, and *these must be individuals*!

We see the general bustle: every individual is sacrificed and serves as an instrument. Walk through the street and see whether one does not meet nothing but "slaves." Whither? To what end?

Moral phenomena have occupied me like riddles. Today I would know how to give an answer. What does it mean that for me the welfare of my neighbour *is to* have a higher value than my own? But that my neighbour himself *is to* estimate the value of his welfare differently from me, namely is to set precisely *my* welfare above it?

Whether a man is accustomed from childhood on — — —

Advantage of standing apart from one's time.

To get the whole of moralizing into view as a phenomenon. Also as a *riddle*.

What does the "thou shalt" mean, and even a philosophy regarded as "given"?

For in the end one needs a great deal of morality in order to be immoral in this subtle way: I want to use a parable.

A physiologist who is interested in an illness and a sick man who wants to be cured of it do not have the same interest. Let us suppose for once that this illness is morality — for it is an illness — and that we Europeans are its patients: what a subtle torment and difficulty will arise if we Europeans are now at the same time also its curious observers and physiologists! Shall we even seriously wish to get free of morality? Shall we want to? Setting aside the question whether we *can*? Whether we can be "cured"? —

Modest restraint, e.g. regarding the question of pessimism, whether pleasure or displeasure predominates

likewise regarding the question of the value of our knowledge

— what has been inhibited hitherto? Our drive to experiment; the danger was too great, "the salvation of the soul"

the victory over the old God as over a *world-slandering* principle — victory of paganism — but the world shows itself in a new fearfulness

— the "One thing is needful" and the "seek ye the kingdom of God: then all the rest shall be added unto thee!" ("the rest" is, e.g., also love of one's neighbour, morality in the present sense)

(8)

NB! *To give the evil man back his good conscience* — has that been my involuntary endeavour?

And indeed to the evil man insofar as he is the *strong man*? (*Dostoevsky's* judgement on the criminals in the prisons should be cited here.)

The Good

The *sting of conscience*: a sign that the character is not equal to the *deed*. There are stings of conscience even after *good works*: their unusualness, that which lifts one out of the old milieu —

The immediate prehistory of an action refers to that action: but *further back* lies a prehistory that points *further ahead*: the single action is at the same time a link in a far more comprehensive *later* fact. The *shorter* and the *longer* processes are not separate —

Third Book: The Struggle of Values.

Second Chapter. On the Physiology of Art.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

7.

On the Physiology of Art

To the Artists.

Distinction: those who want to live from their art, and others, like Dante, Goethe

On what *need*? Inference from the "work" back to the artist.

What "success" proves: in any case a *misunderstanding* of the artist, *mostly* also of the work.

The demanding *senses* — what does that mean?

The lack

of *logic* — the esprit, the sujet.

of probity of *cultivation*

"Naturalism" — what does it mean? Above all a *stimulant* — the ugly and the monstrous produce emotion.

"Romanticism" — what does it mean?

Position of the nations with regard to the development of the "European soul".

Relation of art to the Church.

Pessimism in aesthetic theory ("disinterested contemplation", "les Parnassiens").

— I am not happy enough, not healthy enough, for all this romantic music (Beethoven included). What I need is music in which one forgets suffering; in which animal life feels itself deified and triumphs; to which one would like to dance; with which one perhaps, to ask cynically, digests well? The lightening of life through *light*, bold, self-assured, exuberant rhythms, the gilding of life through *golden*, tender, kindly harmonies — that is what I take out of all music for myself. At bottom a few bars are enough for me.

Wagner from beginning to end has become impossible for me, because he cannot *walk*, let alone dance.

But these are physiological judgements, not aesthetic ones: only — I no longer have an aesthetics!

Can he walk?

Can he dance?

— the borrowed forms, e.g. Brahms, as a typical "epigone"; Mendelssohn's cultivated Protestantism likewise (an earlier "soul" is poetically *re*-created…)

— the moral and poetic substitutions in Wagner, the one art as a makeshift for deficiencies in the others.

— the "historical sense", inspiration through poems, legends; that typical transformation for which, among the French, G. Flaubert, among the Germans, R. Wagner is the clearest example

how the romantic faith in love and the future transforms itself into the longing for nothingness, 1830 into 1850

if anything has been achieved, it is a more innocent attitude towards the senses, a more joyful, more benevolent, more Goethean stance towards sensuality

likewise a prouder feeling with regard to knowing: so that the "pure fool" finds little credence

Physiology of Art

Beethoven — un pauvre grand homme, sourd, amoureux, méconnu et philosophe, dont la musique est pleine de rêves gigantesques ou douloureux.

Mozart — expressing *wholly German feelings*, la candeur naïve, la tendresse mélancholique, contemplative, les vagues sourires, les timidités de l'amour.

The piano exalte et raffine. Mendelsohn les entoure de rêves ardents, délicats, maladifs.

Les âpres désirs tourmentés, les cris brisés, révoltés, les passions modernes, sortent de tous les accords de Meyerbeer.

With regard to the *painters*.

tous ces modernes sont des *poètes*, qui ont volu être *peintres*. L'un a cherché des drames dans l'histoire, l'autre des scènes de moeurs, celui-ci traduit des religions, celui-là une philosophie. That one imitates Raphael, another the first Italian masters; the landscape painters use trees and clouds to make odes and elegies. *None* is simply a painter; all are archaeologists, psychologists, stagers of some memory or theory. They take pleasure in our erudition, in our philosophy. They are, like us, full and overfull of general ideas. They love a form not for what it is but for what it *expresses*. They are the sons of a learned, tormented and reflective generation — a thousand miles away from the old masters, who did not read and thought only of giving their eyes a feast.

Our condition: prosperity makes sensibility grow; one suffers from the smallest sufferings; our body is better protected, our soul sicker. Equality, the comfortable life, freedom of thought — but at the same time l'envie haineuse, la fureur de parvenir, l'impatience du présent, le besoin du luxe, l'instabilité des gouvernements, les souffrances du doute et de la recherche.

— one loses just as much as one gains —

A citizen of 1850, compared with one of 1750, happier? moins opprimé, plus instruit, mieux fourni de bien-être, but *not plus gai* - - -

In the 17th century nothing was uglier than a mountain range; it brought a thousand thoughts of misfortune. *One was tired of barbarism, as we today are tired of civilization.* The streets today so clean, gendarmes in abundance, manners so peaceable, events so small, so foreseen, that one aime *la grandeur et l'imprévu*. Landscape changes like literature; back then it offered long sugar-sweet novels and gallant treatises: *today* it offers la poésie violente et des drames physiologistes.

This wilderness, the universal implacable dominion of the naked rocks, ennemi de la vie — nous délasse de nos trottoirs, de nos bureaux et nos boutiques. *Only for that reason* do we love it

On Delacroix:

chanter avec la couleur

"thou echo of the voice of Victor Hugo

during the wars there had crept into the French soul la mélancholie poétique d'Angleterre, le lyrisme philosophique d'Allemagne

l'âme complémentaire de Victor Hugo

the preponderance of *music* in the Romantics of 1830 and '40

Delacroix

Ingres a passionate musician, cult of Gluck, Haydn, Beethoven, Mozart

said to his pupils in Rome „si je pouvais vous rendre tous musiciens, vous y gagneriez comme peintres“ —)

likewise Horace Vernet, with a particular passion for Don Juan (as Mendelssohn attests, 1831)

likewise Stendhal, who says of himself: — — —

President De Brosses says of the campagna Romana: „il fallait que Romulus fût ivre, quand il songea à bâtir une ville dans un terrain aussi laid

Fénelon compares the Gothic style to a bad sermon.

Chateaubriand, in 1803, in a letter to M. de Fontanes, gives the first impression of the campagna Romana.

Lamartine has the language for Sorrento and Posillipo —

V. Hugo raves about Spain, parce que „aucune autre nation n'a moins imprunté à l'antiquité, parce qu'elle n'a subi aucune influence classique"

Delacroix, too, did not want Rome; it frightened him. He raved about Venice, like Shakespeare, like Byron, like G. Sand. The aversion to Rome also in Th. Gautier — and in R. Wagner.

What is laughable about our *democracy*: the black frock coat…

l'envie, la tristesse, le manque de mesure et de politesse, les héros de George Sand, de Victor Hugo et de Balzac

(et de Wagner)

le goût de la *Renaissance*

a furnishing in it, éclatant et sombre, d'un style tourmenté et magnifique

cet âge de force et d'effort, d'audace inventive, de plaisirs effrénés et de labeur terrible, de sensualité et d'hérosïme

Jeanne d'Albret, the mother of Henry IV, according to d'Aubigné's judgement:

„princesse n'ayant de la femme que le sexe, l'âme entière aux choses viriles, l'esprit puissant aux grandes affaires, le coeur invincible aux adversités."

Agir, oser, jouir, dépenser sa force et sa peine en prodigue, s'abandonner à la sensation présente, être toujours pressé de passions toujours vivantes, supporter et rechercher les excès de tous les contrastes, voilà la vie du seizième siècle.

Parmi ces violences et ces voluptés la dévotion était ardente. Religion in those days was not a virtue but a passion. One went to church as to battle or to a rendezvous.

the knights in the age of the Crusades — enfants robustes. In killing and howling a beast of prey. Once the fury is past, they come back round to tears and fling their arms merrily about one another's necks, tenderly.

The judgement „pleasant", „unpleasant" — cf. music — changes and forms itself according to what we feel to be „lawful", rational, meaningful, significant.

Physiology of Art

The sense for and the delight in nuance (genuine *modernity*), in what is *not* general, runs counter to the drive that has its delight and its strength in grasping the *typical*: like the Greek taste of the best period. There is in this an overpowering of the fullness of the living; measure becomes master; at its root lies that *calm* of the strong soul which moves slowly and has an aversion to the all-too-lively. The general case, the law, is *revered* and *lifted* out; the exception, conversely, is set aside, the nuance wiped away. The firm, the mighty, the solid, life that rests broad and powerful and conceals its strength — that is what *„pleases"*: i.e. that corresponds to what one thinks of oneself.

Third Chapter. On the History of European

nihilism.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the „Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

8.

Nihilism

For the *Preface*.

I have until now endured a torture: all the laws by which life develops seemed to me to stand in opposition to the values for the sake of which the likes of us *endure* living. This does not seem to be a condition from which many suffer *consciously*: nonetheless I want to gather together the signs from which I assume that it is the *fundamental character*, the truly *tragic problem* of our modern world, and, as a secret distress, the cause or interpretation of all its distresses. *This problem has become conscious in me*.

Nihilism

A.

To start from a full, hearty *appreciation* of our present humanity:

not to let oneself be deceived by appearances (this humanity is less "effective," but it gives quite different guarantees of *duration*, its tempo is slower, but the measure itself is much richer

health is increasing, the real conditions of a strong body are being recognized and gradually created, "asceticism" ironice —

the shyness of extremes, a certain trust in the "right path," no enthusiasm; a temporary settling into narrower values (such as "fatherland"), such as "science" etc.

this whole picture, however, would still be *ambiguous*:

— it could be an *ascending*

— or else a *descending* movement of life.

B.

The faith in "progress" — in the lower sphere of intelligence it appears as ascending life: but there it is self-deception;

in the higher sphere of intelligence as *descending*

Description of the symptoms.

Unity of the point of view: uncertainty regarding the measures of value.

Fear of a universal "in vain"

Nihilism.

C.

The dependence of *all* measures of value on the moral ones

the religious, aesthetic, economic, political, scientific

D.

Signs of a decline in the faith in morality.

Nihilism.

Nothing is more dangerous than a desirability that conflicts with the essence of *life*.

the *nihilistic* consequence (the belief in valuelessness) as a result of moral valuation

the egoistic has been spoiled for us (even after the insight into the impossibility of the unegoistic)

the *necessary has been spoiled for us* (even after insight into the impossibility of a liberum arbitrium and of an "intelligible freedom")

we see that we do not reach the sphere in which we have placed our values — with that, the other sphere, in which we live, has *by no means yet* gained in value: on the contrary, we are *weary*, because we have lost the chief incentive. "In vain until now!"

Obstruction of knowledge by morality.

e.g. attempt to *reconcile life* with morality (to

identify them) and to justify it before morality

altruism primordial

the selfless way of thinking possible even sans obligation and sanction

To what extent morality has obstructed knowledge.

the value of the individual, the "eternal soul," falsification of psychology

resistance to causality: falsification of physics

against the history of origins altogether: falsification of history.

Falsification of the theory of knowledge

Fourth Book: The Great Noon.

Fourth Book: The Great Noon.

First Chapter. The Principle of Life

"Order of rank".

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

9.

Methodologically: the value of *inner* and *outer

phenomenology*.

A. *Consciousness* developed late, meagrely, for external purposes, exposed to the crudest errors, even *essentially* something falsifying, coarsening, summarizing

B. by contrast, the phenomenon of the *sensuous* world can be observed a hundred times more manifoldly, finely and precisely. Outer phenomenology gives us by far the richest material and permits the greater rigour of observation; whereas inner phenomena are hard to grasp and more akin to error (inner processes are essentially *error-producing*, because life is possible only under the guidance of such narrowing, perspective-creating forces)

NB. All *movement* as a *sign* of an *inner* event: — *thus by far the overwhelming part of all inner events is given to us only as a sign.*

Principle of life

Fundamental errors of biologists hitherto: it is *not* a matter of the species, but of *individuals who are to have a stronger effect* (the many are only means)

life is *not* the adaptation of inner conditions to outer ones, but will to power, which from within subjugates and incorporates ever more of the "outer"

these biologists *continue* moral valuations (the in itself higher value of altruism, the hostility toward the lust for domination, toward war, toward uselessness, toward the order of rank and of estates).

Against the theory that the single individual has in view the advantage of the *species*, of its progeny, at the expense of its own advantage: that is only *semblance*

the enormous importance with which the individual takes the *sexual instinct* is not a *consequence* of its importance for the species: rather, begetting is the individual's real *achievement* and consequently its highest interest, *its highest expression of power* (judged, naturally, not from consciousness but from the centre of the whole individuation)

Principle of life

Consciousness, beginning wholly externally, as coordination and becoming-conscious of "impressions" — at first furthest removed from the biological centre of the individual; but a process which deepens, inwardizes itself, constantly approaches that centre.

On the *origin of logic*. The fundamental inclination to *equate*, to *see as equal*, is modified, held in check by use and harm, by *success*: an adaptation forms, a milder degree in which it can satisfy itself without at the same time denying life and endangering it. This process corresponds entirely to that outer mechanical one (which is its symbol), whereby *plasma* continually makes equal to itself what it appropriates and arranges it into its forms and series.

Individuation, judged from the standpoint of the theory of descent, shows the constant falling apart of one into two, and the equally constant perishing of individuals *for the gain of few individuals*, who carry on the development: the overwhelming mass dies off each time ("the body"). The fundamental phenomenon: *countless individuals sacrificed for the sake of a few*, as what makes them possible. — One must not let oneself be deceived: it is just so with *peoples* and *races*: they form the "body" for the production of single *valuable individuals*, who carry on the great process.

Principle of life

The *powers in history* can indeed be recognized, once all moral and religious teleology is stripped away. They must be the powers that also work in the whole phenomenon of organic existence. The clearest statements are in the *plant kingdom*.

The great

victories over the *animal*: the animal as slave,

or as enemy.

— of man over *woman*: woman

alongside the great fluctuations e.g. between the healthy and the sick.

Wherein the *dignity* of man has been placed:

to have become master over the animal in man

to have become master over the woman in man

Greek

ideal

by contrast the *Christian* dignity:

to have become master over pride in man

over the — — —

Principle of life

— the greater complexity, the sharp separation, the juxtaposition of developed organs and functions, with the disappearance of the intermediate links — if that is *perfection*, then there follows a will to power in the organic process, by virtue of which *dominating, shaping, commanding forces* continually increase the domain of their power and within it continually simplify again: the imperative *growing*.

— useful with respect to accelerating the tempo of development is a different "useful" from that with respect to the greatest possible fixing and durability of what has been developed.

the spirit is only a means and instrument in the service of higher life, of the enhancement of life: and as for the good, as Plato (and after him Christianity) understood it, it seems to me even a principle dangerous to life, slandering life, denying life.

10.

One knows the kind of man who has fallen in love with the maxim tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner. They are the weak, they are above all the disappointed: if there is something to forgive in everything, then is there not also something to despise in everything? It is the philosophy of disappointment that here wraps itself so humanely in pity and gazes so sweetly.

These are romantics whose faith has gone up the spout: now they want at least to *look on* as everything runs and runs its course. They call it l'art pour l'art, "objectivity", etc.

11.

Has not out of the seeming of the empty and the full, of the solid and the loose, of the resting and the moving, of the equal and the unequal — has not the oldest seeming been made into metaphysics?

European philosophizing of the last centuries, which with a dignity and a worthy uprightness

— what is it to know? Can I know?

12.

The popular ideals, the good man, the selfless man, the saint, the sage, the just man. Oh Marcus Aurelius!

13.

One must keep one's eyes open: when some fellow, decrepit with age from the very beginning, always parades his weariness as wisdom pessimism and transfiguration.

When a weary, misbegotten fellow, decrepit with age from the very beginning, always passes off his weariness as the outcome of a deep, struggling, suffering inner- and beer-life — — —

or a pert and restless cackling goose breathes out its ambition onto printed paper

what have I not already lived through in the way of philosophical counterfeiting: the weary ass, decrepit with age from the very beginning, who his weariness — — —

14.

Philosophy defined by Kant as *"the science of the limits of reason"*!

That there should be a "truth" which one could somehow approach —

When I bring a regular occurrence into a *formula*, I have made the designation of the whole phenomenon easier for myself, abbreviated it, etc. But I have established no "law"; rather I have posed the question of how it comes about that something repeats itself here: it is a conjecture that the formula corresponds to a complex of as yet unknown forces and discharges of force: it is mythology to think that here forces obey a law, so that in consequence of their obedience we have each time the same phenomenon.

15.

Ethics or "philosophy of desirability". "It *ought* to be otherwise", it *shall* become otherwise: discontent would thus be the germ of ethics.

One could save oneself, first by selecting where one does *not* have the feeling; secondly, by grasping the presumption and silliness of it: for to demand that *something* be other than it is means: to demand that *everything* be other than it is, — it contains a condemning critique of the whole — it is to that extent… *But life is itself such a demanding!*

To establish *what* is, *how* it is, seems something unspeakably higher, more serious than any "thus it ought to be": because the latter, as human critique and presumption, appears condemned from the outset to ridiculousness. What is expressed in it is a need which demands that the arrangement of the world correspond to our human well-being; also the will to do as much as possible toward this task. On the other hand, it is only this demand "thus it ought to be" that has called forth that other demand for what *is*: for the knowing of what is is already a consequence of that questioning: "how? is it possible? why precisely so?" Astonishment at the non-agreement of our wishes and the course of the world has led us to come to know the course of the world. Perhaps the matter stands otherwise still: perhaps that "thus it ought to be", our wish to overpower the world, — —

16.

Our insignia, e.g. the critical stance toward Christianity MA 2, 182

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against idealists

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The full and bestowing in contrast to the seeking, the craving.

The aesthetic states twofold.

Books and men.

Questions of health.

Modern music.

Classical education.

Big city.

Vices of the intellect

17.

The greatest disgust I have felt so far has been caused me by the parasites of the spirit: one finds them, in our unhealthy Europe, sitting everywhere, and indeed with the best conscience in the world. Perhaps a little gloomy, a little air pessimiste, but in the main gluttonous, dirty, befouling, creeping in, nestling in, thievish, scabby, — and innocent as all little sinners and microbes are. They live off the fact that other people have spirit and spend it with full hands: they know how it belongs to the very nature of the rich spirit to spend itself carelessly, without petty caution, from day to day and even prodigally — for the spirit is a bad housekeeper and pays no heed to how everything lives and feeds on it.

18.

"*Every activity* as such gives pleasure" — say the physiologists. To what extent? Because the pent-up force has brought with it a kind of *urge* and *pressure*, a state in the face of which the deed is felt as *release*? *Or* insofar as every activity is an *overcoming* of difficulties and resistances? And many small resistances, overcome again and again, lightly and as

in a rhythmic dance, bring with them a kind of *tickle of the feeling of power?*

Pleasure as a *tickle of the feeling of power*: always presupposing something that resists and is overcome.

All phenomena of pleasure and displeasure are intellectual, overall judgments of some phenomena of inhibition or other, interpretations of them

19.

In ages that are weaker in will and more manifold, a high degree of degeneration and eccentricity is not immediately dangerous and does not necessitate expulsion from the social body; on the other hand, one does not perish at once, because the *average* quantity of all forces, even in very wilful and *self-seeking* beings, prevents the aggressive and domineering tendency outwardly.

The dangers of such ages are the concentrated *mighty of will*; whereas in strong ages the danger lies in the *uncertain*.

20.

The philosophers' morality from Socrates onward a Don Quixotery

a good deal of play-acting

a self-misinterpretation

what is it really?

idiosyncratic: the enthusiasm for dialectic, optimistic — the over-excitable sensuality and consequently fear

the greatest of all swindles and self-mendacities, to posit an identity between good, true and beautiful and to *represent* this unity

the struggle against the Sophists is psychologically hard to grasp: a *separation* is necessary in order not to be confused with them (to which everything invited, because they did in fact feel themselves related). *Competition* for the *youths* —

Virtue and irony and acuity in Socrates — in Plato the lover (pederast), the artist (?), the oligarch —

Declaration of independence, emigration from the polis, detachment from one's origins —

Critique of culture from the standpoint of "morality" and of dialectic!!! —

absolute lack of "historical sense" —

Symptom of *décadence* —

— whether *all* specifically *moral* movements so far have not been symptoms of décadence?

21.

Perspectivism of desirability (of the *ideal*)

22.

Someone criticizes: his temperament says Yes to it

often the absence of spirit does us good

23.

NB. In psychological respects I have *two senses*:

first:

the sense for the naked

secondly:

the will to the grand style (few principal propositions, these in the strictest connection; no esprit, no rhetoric).

24.

All the drives and powers that are *praised* by morality turn out for me to be essentially *the same* as those it slanders and rejects, e.g. justice as will to power, will to truth as a means of the will to power

25.

Against Darwinism.

— the usefulness of an organ does *not* explain its origin, on the contrary!

— for the longest time, during which a property is forming, it does not preserve the individual and is of no use to it, least of all in the struggle with external circumstances and enemies

— what, in the end, is "useful"? One must ask "useful *with respect to what*?" *E.g.* what is useful to the *duration* of the individual might be unfavourable to its strength and splendour; what preserves the individual might at the same time hold it fast and bring it to a standstill in its development. On the other hand a *deficiency*, a *degeneration* can be of the highest use, insofar as it acts as a stimulans to other organs. Likewise a *state of need* can be a condition of existence, insofar as it screws an individual down to the measure at which it *holds together* and does not squander itself.

— The individual itself as a struggle of the parts (for nourishment, space, etc.): its development bound up with a *conquering*, a *predominance* of individual parts, with a *withering*, a "becoming-organ" of other parts

— the influence of "external circumstances" is *overestimated* by Darwin to the point of absurdity; what is essential in the life process is precisely the tremendous shaping force, creating forms from within, which *utilizes*, *exploits* the "external circumstances"…

— that the *new* forms built from within are *not* formed toward a purpose, but that in the struggle of the parts a new form will not long remain without a relation to a partial utility, and then, according to its *use*, shapes itself ever more perfectly

— if only that has been preserved which proved itself *lastingly* useful, then first and foremost the damaging, destroying, dissolving capacities, the senseless, the accidental, — — —

26.

What does it *mean* that we feel our way into the campagna Romana? And the high mountains? What does our nationalism *mean*?

Idealism or self-mendacity.

Critique of Civilization.

The Metamorphoses of the Cross.

The refinements

of fear

of voluptuousness.

of contempt

27.

Fuller concept of life

The kinds of intoxication

Modern play-acting (e.g. "*Fatherland*": in what respect it goes against our conscience to be patriots)

The whole European falseness.

The chasm —

28.

The strong man, mighty in the instincts of a strong health, digests his deeds just as he digests his meals; he copes even with heavy fare: but in the main an unimpaired and strict instinct guides him, so that he does nothing that goes against him, just as little as he eats anything that does not taste good to him.

29.

On the History of Modern Vice.

Anarchism.

30.

— Naivety of philosophical antiquity, psychological innocence; its "sages" were boring.

Held up against antiquity, which believed in reason (the *divine* origin of reason) and in virtue (as the highest rationality and independence of spirit), Christianity teaches the *suspicion* that everything is at bottom evil and incorrigible, that the pride of the spirit is its greatest danger, etc.

31.

The tragic age for Europe: conditioned by the struggle with nihilism.

32.

The absolute lack of *preparation* for the reception of truths; no gradation of education; blind trust in the spirit; modern "good-naturedness".

33.

Against the theory of the "*milieu*". Race unspeakably more important. The milieu yields only "adaptation"; within it the whole stored-up force comes into play.

34.

Causalism. This "one-after-another" still always requires *interpretation*: "natural law" is an interpretation, etc.

"Cause and effect" goes back to the concept "*deed* and *doer*". Whence *this* separation?

Motion as a symptom of a non-mechanical occurrence. To *stop short* at the mechanistic view of the world — that is as if a deaf man were to take the score of a work as the goal.

Logic — its essence not discovered. Art of *unambiguous designation*?

35.

Critique of human goals. What did ancient philosophy want? What did Christianity? What the Vedanta philosophy? What Buddha? — And *behind* this willing, *what lies hidden there*?

Psychological genesis of the ideals hitherto:

what do they actually mean?

36.

Supposing our customary conception of the world were a *misunderstanding*: could a *perfection* be conceived within which even such *misunderstandings* would be *sanctioned*?

Conception of a new perfection: that which does *not* correspond to our logic, our "beautiful", our "good", our "true" might be perfect in a higher sense than our ideal itself is.

37.

vis est vita, vides, quae nos facere omnia cogit

Lucilius

Βίος καλεῖται δ'ὃς βίᾳ πορίζεται.

38.

It is not at all the first question whether we are content with ourselves, but whether we are content with anything at all. Supposing we say Yes to a single moment, we have thereby said Yes not only to ourselves but to all existence. For nothing stands by itself, neither in ourselves nor in things: and if but a single time our soul has trembled and rung like a string for happiness, then all eternities were needed to bring about this One event — and all eternity was, in this single moment of our Yes-saying, approved, redeemed, justified and affirmed.

39.

A full and mighty soul not only copes with painful, even terrible losses, privations, deprivations, contempts: it comes out of such hells with greater fullness and mightiness: and, to say what is most essential, with a new growth in the bliss of love. I believe that he who has

divined something of the lowest conditions of every growth in love will understand Dante when he wrote over the gate of his inferno: "me too eternal love created".

40.

The world has grown into the immense and grows continually: our wisdom is at last learning to think smaller of itself; even we scholars, we are just beginning to know *little*…

41.

The soil of desires out of which *logic* has grown: herd instinct in the background, the assumption of identical cases presupposes the "identical soul". *For the purpose of communication and mastery.*

42.

The antagonism between the "true world", as pessimism uncovers it, and a world in which life is possible: — for this one must examine the rights of *truth*; it is necessary to measure the meaning of all these "ideal drives" against *life*, in order to grasp what that antagonism really is: the struggle of sickly, despairing *life*, clinging to what lies beyond, with healthier, more stupid, more mendacious, richer, less decomposed life. Thus not "truth" in struggle with life, but one kind of life with another. — But it wants to be the *higher kind*! — Here the demonstration must begin that an order of rank is needful, — that the first problem is that of the *order of rank of the kinds of life*.

43.

Nihilism as a consequence of the moral interpretation of the world.

Order of rank.

The eternal recurrence.

44.

"Useful" in the sense of Darwinist biology, i.e. proving favourable in the struggle with others. But to me it seems that the *feeling of more*, the feeling of *becoming stronger*, quite apart from usefulness in the struggle, is already the real *progress*: only out of this feeling does the will to struggle spring, —

45.

1.

Critique of values, measured against life.

2.

The origin of values

3.

Life as will to power

4.

The Inverted Ones

their hammer "the doctrine of recurrence".

46.

The kind of man whose mouthpiece I am:

suffering not from unfulfilled ideals, but from fulfilled ones! namely from this, that the ideal *which we represent*, and about which so much fuss is made, is treated by us with a slight disdain —

a dangerous homesickness for the former "wilderness" of the soul, for the conditions of greatness, as much as of devilry —

we enjoy our more disorderly, wilder, crazier moments, we would be capable of committing a crime merely to see what a sting of conscience amounts to —

we are jaded toward the everyday charms of the "good man", of good social order, of upright scholarship —

we do not suffer from "corruption", we are very different from Rousseau and do not long for the "good natural man" —

we are *weary of the good, not* of suffering: we *no* longer take sickness, misfortune, old age, death seriously enough, least of all with the seriousness of the Buddhists, as though the objections to life were given thereby.

47.

Critique of fatherlandishness: whoever feels values above himself which he holds a hundred times higher than the welfare of the "fatherland", of society, of kinship of blood and race, — values that stand beyond fatherlands and races, that is, international values — would become a hypocrite if he wished to play the "patriot". It is a *lowland* of man and soul that tolerates national hatred in itself (or even admires and glorifies it): the dynastic families exploit this kind of man, — and again there are enough commercial and social classes (naturally also the venal buffoons, the artists) who gain their advancement when these national separating acids once more hold power. In fact a *lower* species has attained preponderance — —

48.

Intellectuality of *pain*: it does not in itself indicate what is momentarily damaged, but what *value* the damage has with respect to the individual as a whole.

whether there are pains in which "the species" and *not* the individual suffers —

What do *active* and *passive* mean? is it not becoming *master* and being *overpowered*

and subject and object?

49.

The question of values is *more fundamental* than the question of certainty: the latter attains its seriousness only on the presupposition that the question of value has been answered.

Being and semblance, reckoned out psychologically, yield no "being in itself", no criteria for "reality", but only for degrees of apparentness, measured by the strength of the *share* we grant to a semblance.

50.

The problem of truth, truthfulness, certainty.

The problem of the good

The problem of justice.

The problem of measure.

The problem of order of rank.

51.

Injury provokes *either* reaction or *submission*

52.

The Christian interpreters, like Carlyle, today a form of *improbity*: likewise the admiration for the ages of *faith*.

53.

It is not a struggle for existence that is fought between representations and perceptions, but one for dominion: — the vanquished representation is *not annihilated*, only *pushed back* or *subordinated*. *In the realm of the spirit there is no annihilation*…

54.

To *stamp* the character of being upon becoming — that is the highest *will to power*.

Twofold falsification, from the side of the senses and from the side of the spirit, in order to preserve a world of what is, of what persists, of what is of equal value, etc.

That *everything recurs* is the most extreme *approximation of a world of becoming to that of being: summit of contemplation*.

From the values attributed to what is stem the condemnation of and discontent with what becomes: once such a world of being had first been invented.

The metamorphoses of what is (body, God, ideas, laws of nature, formulas, etc.)

"What is" as semblance; inversion of values: semblance was what *conferred value* —

Knowledge in itself impossible in becoming; how then is knowledge possible? As error about itself, as will to power, as will to deception.

Becoming as inventing willing self-denying, self-overcoming: no subject, but a doing, a positing, creative, no "causes and effects".

Art as will to overcome becoming, as "eternalizing", but short-sighted, according to the perspective: as it were repeating in miniature the tendency of the whole

To regard what *all life* shows as a reduced formula for the total tendency: hence a new fixing of the concept "life", as will to power

Instead of "cause and effect", the struggle of things becoming with one another, often with the absorption of the opponent; no constant number of things becoming.

Uselessness of the old ideals for interpreting all that happens, once their animal origin and utility have been recognized; all of them, moreover, contradicting life.

Uselessness of the mechanistic theory — gives the impression of *meaninglessness*.

The whole *idealism* of mankind hitherto is on the point of turning into *nihilism* — into the belief in absolute *value*lessness, that is, *meaning*lessness…

The annihilation of ideals, the new desolation, the new arts for enduring it, we *amphibians*.

Presupposition: bravery, patience, no "return", no heat to press forward

NB. Zarathustra, constantly behaving parodically toward all former values, out of abundance.

55.

If "there is only one being, the I" and all other "beings" are made in its image, — if finally the belief in the "I" stands and falls with the belief in logic, i.e. in the metaphysical truth of the categories of reason: if on the other hand the I proves to be something *becoming*: then — — —

56.

Against the physical atom. In order to comprehend the world, we must be able to calculate it; in order to be able to calculate it, we must have constant causes; because we find no such constant causes in reality, we *invent* some for ourselves — the atoms. This is the origin of atomism.

The calculability of the world, the expressibility of all that happens in formulas — is that really a "comprehending"? What would be compre-

hended of a piece of music if everything in it that is calculable and can be abbreviated in formulas were calculated? — And then the "constant causes", things, substances, something "unconditioned" therefore; *invented* — what has been achieved?

57.

There was a melancholy afternoon on which Spinoza was dissatisfied with himself: a small incident would not leave his mind — he reproached himself with regard to this incident. All at once he said to himself: this is the morsus conscientiae! But how is the morsus conscientiae still possible in me?

58.

Critique of the Christian ideal: its presuppositions the conditions of existence of the soul — what is at stake is *eternal life*, and damnation or bliss

59.

Determinism is harmful only to that morality which believes in the liberum arbitrium as the presupposition of morality, in "responsibility"

60.

Against positivism, which halts at the phenomenon — "there are only facts" — I would say: no, facts are precisely what there are not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself": perhaps it is nonsense to want such a thing. "Everything is subjective", you say: but even that is *interpretation*, the "subject" is nothing given, but something invented and added on, something stuck behind. — Is it finally

necessary to place the interpreter behind the interpretation as well? Even that is invention, hypothesis.

Insofar as the word "knowledge" has any meaning at all, the world is knowable: but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings "perspectivism".

It is our needs *that interpret the world*: our drives and their for and against. Every drive is a kind of lust to rule, each has its perspective, which it would like to force upon all the other drives as their norm.

61.

Provisional chapter headings.

Antagonism between the "improvement" and the "enlargement" of man (respectively taming and strengthening)

Critique of the Christian ideal (humility, chastity, poverty, simplicity)

Critique of the Stoic ideal (including the "fakir")

Critique of the Epicurean ideal (including the "Olympian" — also the "contemplatives")

The metamorphoses of slavery.

Artist and conqueror. What does beauty want?

Justice, guilt, punishment, responsibility — the lawgiver.

Critique of the romantic ideal, likewise of that ideal which gives the pessimist his strength to hate and to despise

The interpretative character of life (what does nihilism mean?) "Aimlessness"

The next century and its forerunners.

Critique of action (cause and effect, doing, purpose)

62.

Very few make clear to themselves what the standpoint of *desirability*, every "thus it ought to be, but it is not" or even "thus it ought to have been", implies: a condemnation of the entire course of things. For in it there is nothing isolated: the smallest thing bears the whole, upon your little wrong stands the whole edifice of the future, the whole is condemned along with it in every critique that strikes the smallest thing. Suppose now, moreover, that the moral norm, as even Kant supposed, has never been perfectly fulfilled and would remain hanging over reality as a kind of beyond, without ever falling into it: then morality would contain within itself a judgment upon the whole, which would nonetheless permit one to ask: *whence does it take the right to do so?* How does the part come to play the judge here over against the whole? — And were it in fact an ineradicable instinct, this moral judging and dissatisfaction with the real, as has been asserted, would this instinct then not perhaps belong among the ineradicable stupidities, immodesties too, of our species? — But in saying this we do the very thing we reproach; the standpoint of desirability, of unauthorized playing at judge, belongs to the character of the course of things, every injustice and imperfection likewise, — it is precisely our concept of "perfection" that does not find its account. Every drive that wants to be satisfied expresses its dissatisfaction with the present state of things: what? is the whole perhaps composed of nothing but dissatisfied parts, all of which have desirabilities in their heads? is the "course of things" perhaps precisely this "Away from here! Away from reality!", eternal dissatisfaction itself? is desirability perhaps the driving force itself? is it — deus?

It seems to me important that one should get rid of *the* All, the unity, any force, any unconditioned; one would not be able to avoid taking it

as the highest authority and christening it God. One must shatter the All; unlearn respect for the All; take back what we have given to the unknown and the whole, and give it to what is nearest, to what is ours. What Kant, for example, says, "Two things remain eternally worthy of veneration" — today we would rather say "digestion is more venerable". The All would always bring with it the old problems, "how is evil possible?" etc. Therefore: *there is no All, there is lacking* the great sensorium or inventorium or storehouse of force: *in it* [+++]

63.

Must not all philosophy finally bring to light the presuppositions on which the movement of *reason* rests? Our *belief in the I*, as in a substance, as in the sole reality according to which we ascribe reality to things at all? The oldest "realism" comes to light last: at the same time as the whole religious history of mankind recognizes itself as the history of the superstition of the soul. *Here is a barrier:* our thinking itself involves that belief (with its distinction of substance–accident, doing, doer etc.); to let it go means no-longer-being-permitted-to-think.

But that a belief, however necessary it may be for the preservation of beings, has nothing to do with truth, one recognizes, for example, even from the fact that we *must* believe in time, space and motion, without feeling ourselves compelled to [+++] absolute here

64.

[+++] of all values

First Book.

European Nihilism.

Second Book.

Critique of the Highest Values.

Third Book.

Principle of a New Positing of Values.

Fourth Book.

Discipline and Breeding.

sketched on 17 March 1887, Nice.

I. Every purely moral positing of values (as, for example, the Buddhist) *ends in nihilism*: this to be expected for Europe! One believes one can make do with a moralism without religious background: but with that the way to nihilism is *necessary*. In religion there is lacking the compulsion to regard *ourselves* as value-positing.

65.

How crudely, every time, the success and its wretched point of departure are reckoned as one! Even with artists: how can one infer back from the work to the artist! *Homer* — do you not sense the pessimist and the over-excitable one who, for the sake of his sufferings, invents that fullness of perfection of the Olympians! The theories of the philosopher are *either* the brutal generalization of his experience of sensibility, *or* the means by which he wants to remain master over this sensibility, — spirituality etc.

— Flight from it into the spiritually cold, the formulaically rigid.

4.

Egoism and its problem! The Christian darkening in Larochefoucauld, who drew it out everywhere and believed he had thereby *diminished*

the value of things and virtues! Against this I sought first to prove that there *could* be nothing at all other than egoism, — that in those men in whom the ego becomes weak and thin, the strength of great love also becomes weak, — that the most loving are so above all out of the strength of their ego, — that love is an expression of egoism etc. The false valuation aims in truth at the interest 1) of those who are benefited, helped, the herd 2) it contains a pessimistic suspicion against the ground of life 3) it would like to negate the most splendid and well-constituted men; fear 4) it wants to help the defeated to their rights against the victors 5) it brings with it a universal dishonesty, and precisely in the most valuable men.

5.

Music and its dangerousness, — its voluptuous revelling, its art of reawakening Christian states, above all that mixture of displaced sensuality and ardour of prayer (Francis of Assisi) — goes hand in hand with uncleanliness of the head and enthusiasm of the heart; breaks the *will*, overstimulates sensibility; musicians are lecherous.

NB. *Causes* (inner states) out of which art grows: and, *very different* from them, the *effects*.

66.

What kind of men may feel ill at ease in reading my writings? Leaving aside, as is only fair, those who do not "understand" them at all (such as the educated swine and big-city geese, or the parsons, or the "German youths", or everything that drinks beer and stinks of politics). There are, for example, men of letters who haggle with the spirit and want to "live" off their opinions — they have, namely, discovered that there is something about an opinion (at least about certain opinions) that is worth money, — against them there blows from my writings a

constant breath of icy contempt. Likewise I hardly gladden the little literary women, as they tend to be, with diseased sexual organs and ink-blots on their fingers; perhaps because I think too highly of woman to want to bring her down to an ink-fish? Likewise I understand why all swollen agitators bear me a grudge: for they need precisely the big words and the noise of virtuous principles, which I — — — and who, as soon as they feel a prick, are in danger of bursting — — —

For all this opposition I care little: but there is another, whose woe pains me myself: — these are those laboriously-working-their-way-up out of the rabble, the men of moral thirst, of struggling tension, those passionately longing for what is noble. To them it must seem as if out of my writings an ironic eye were looking at them, an eye that lets nothing of their little heroism escape it — an eye before which their whole little misery, their weariness too and what of vanity all the weary need, their ant-like climbing and tumbling down, is constantly present.

67.

Recently a certain Herr Theodor Fritsch of Leipzig wrote to me. There is no more shameless and stupid gang in Germany than these anti-Semites. By way of thanks I gave him a proper kick in a letter. This rabble dares to take the name Zarathustra into its mouth! Disgust! Disgust! Disgust!

68.

NB!!

so that one finds less *liberality* in moral matters among the atheists than among the pious and the believers in God (e.g., Pascal is freer and more liberal in moral questions than Schopenhauer)

69.

Pascal saw in two figures, in Epictetus and Montaigne, his real tempters, against whom he needed again and again to defend his Christianity and make it secure.

70.

There is, above the steam and filth of the human lowlands, a *higher, brighter humanity*, which in number will be a very small one — for everything that towers above is, by its nature, rare —: one belongs to it not because one is more gifted or more virtuous or more heroic or more loving than the men down below, but because one is *colder, brighter, more far-sighted, more solitary*, because one endures solitude, prefers it, demands it as happiness, privilege, indeed as the condition of existence, because one lives among clouds and lightning as among one's equals, but likewise among sunbeams, dewdrops, snowflakes and everything that necessarily comes from the heights and, when it moves, moves eternally only in the direction *from above to below*. Aspirations *toward* the heights are not ours. — The heroes, martyrs, geniuses and enthusiasts are not quiet, patient, subtle, cold, slow enough for us.

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