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Nachlass: Writings from the Late Notebooks

Friedrich Nietzsche

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Nachlass, Late Notebooks 1886

Friedrich Nietzsche

Modern English edition

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Unpublished Writings: Late Notebooks, 1886

Notebook 3: Early 1886 to Spring 1886

1.

Toward a Natural History

of the Free

Thinker.

2.

Toward a

Natural History of the Free Thinker.

Thoughts and Dashes Between Thoughts

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

3.

Dedication and Closing Song.

"To the one who makes all the skies bright

And makes all the seas roar and crash — "

4.

The Will to Power.

Early Signs

of a philosophy of the future.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

5.

How people misunderstand the hunger to rule over others.

Lightheartedness as a way of being set free.

The dance.

Making fun of "godly" things — a sign that someone is getting well again.

The craving for "solid facts" — the theory of knowledge: how much gloomy pessimism is hidden in it!

Zarathustra creating his own opponent.

6.

Love of one's homeland is something young in Europe. It still stands on weak legs, and it easily falls over! You should not be fooled by all the noise it makes. After all, little children scream the loudest.

7.

In Russia, people have a saying: "So stupid that it's almost holy."

8.

Toward New Seas.

All Sorts of Questions and Questionable Things.

For good Europeans.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

9.

Beyond Good and Evil.

Prelude

to a philosophy of the future.

Book One:

Book Two:

Book Three:

Book Four:

Book Five:

Morality and knowledge.

Morality and religion.

Morality and art.

Our virtues.

On the ranking of people.

10.

Our Virtues.

All sorts of questions for questionable people.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

11.

Human, All Too Human.

A book for free thinkers.

New series.

And if this book is a mirror, and so a chance to look at ourselves in it: well then, you good Europeans, what do you think of our vanity? Does it like to look at itself — "in the mirror"?

12.

From the natural history of the free thinker.

The philosophy of the future.

Scientific workers.

Artists.

Toward a philosophy of the higher kind of person.

On the gloom of Europe.

13.

It is this loneliness that we are *protecting* when we speak up for organizing humanity through religion. And perhaps nothing sets us apart more clearly from those herd animals and preachers of equality who are wrongly called so-called free thinkers. Not one of them *could* bear to be alone. We think of religion as something that continues and deepens the basic teaching of politics. And that basic teaching has always been that people do not have equal rights, and that society must be built with high and low, with those who give orders and those who obey. So to us, religion means this: the teaching that souls differ in rank, and the breeding of higher souls, making them possible, at the cost of the lower ones.

14.

The world is not worth what we believed it was worth. People have figured that out. The pessimist even hints to us that this is exactly the bit of value the world still has left for us: the fact *that* we can figure out that it is not worth what we believed. In that case, the world would be a tool for making us sick of the world, for turning ourselves away from the world as much as we can. That would be nonsense, a nonsense that, after many miserable detours, finally begins to understand itself. It would be a rather long, drawn-out comedy of errors, which fades away in shame into nothingness.

15.

There is still plenty to say against a long illness. Least of all would I agree with the Christian moralists that it makes a person better. This is especially so when someone is struck by long, drawn-out pains that he watches with cool, calm awareness. He has neither that Eastern way of silently, numbly wiping himself out and giving in, nor that overstrained force of will and courage which meets an enemy like pain with pride and scorn — — —

In the middle of long torture, burned slowly, as if over a fire of green, damp wood, and without the relief that fever and fainting bring — — —

16.

Manzoni

Stifter

(G. Keller)

17.

"Cursed be the one —

who brings sorrow to an immortal spirit!"

Manzoni (Act 2 of The Count of Carmagnola)

18.

gangasrotogati, meaning "flowing along like the river Ganges"

equals

presto (fast)

kurmagati, meaning "moving the way a turtle walks"

equals

lento (slow)

mandeikagati, meaning "moving the way a frog hops"

equals

staccato (short and jumpy)

19.

We philosophers of the beyond — of Beyond Good and Evil, if you please! — we who are really clever interpreters and readers of signs. We, whom fate kept in reserve to stand as onlookers of what is happening in Europe, placed in front of a mysterious text that no one has *read* yet, a text that gives away more and more of its secrets to us. How hard it is for us to stay silent and keep our lips pressed shut, while more and more things, and rarer and rarer things, crowd and pile up inside us and demand light, air, freedom, and *words*!

But the word — — —

Notebook 4: Early 1886 to Spring 1886

1.

A philosopher: what a modest creature he is, if he really stays true to his name! Because the word does not mean "a friend of wisdom", forgive an old scholar of ancient languages for saying so, but only "someone who likes wise men". So if you want there to be philosophers, in the Greek sense and the Greek meaning of the word, then first bring on your "wise men"! But it seems to me, my friends, that in the end we love the unwise men more than the wise ones, even supposing there were any wise men at all? And maybe there is more wisdom in exactly that? What? Could it be that the wise themselves, seen up close perhaps, are not "philosophers" at all? But "philasophers", a made-up word for lovers of foolishness instead of lovers of wisdom? Friends of foolishness, good company for wandering musicians and silly folk? And not good company for themselves?

2.

On the problem of the mask. Stendhal wrote, in French: "A belief that is almost instinctive in me is that every powerful man lies when he speaks, and even more so when he writes." That is from Stendhal's Life of Napoleon, preface, page fifteen.

3.

Napoleon said, on the island of Saint Helena: "I know what the power of men amounts to; even the greatest cannot demand to be loved." Let us add right away something we have all too good reasons to suspect: they do not even demand it of themselves, and they do not love themselves either!

4.

Once I said to the god Dionysus: "You seem to me to be planning something wicked. One might think you wanted to destroy human beings?" "Maybe," the god answered, "but in such a way that something comes out of it for them." "What, then?" I asked, curious. "Who, then? is what you should ask." That is what Dionysus said, and then he fell silent in the way that is typical of him, that is, in a tempting, teasing way. You should have seen him! It was spring, and all the trees were full of fresh young sap.

5.

There is a part of the night about which a hermit will say: "Listen, now time stops!" Whenever you stay awake at night, especially when you are on unusual journeys or walks in the dark, you get a strange, surprised feeling about this part of the night. I mean the hours from one to three. It is a sort of feeling of "Much too short!" or "Much too long!", in short, the sense that time is behaving oddly. Could it be that in those hours, when we are awake for once, we are paying for the fact that we usually spend that time in the timeless chaos of the dream world? Anyway, at night from one to three we have "no clock in our heads". I think this is exactly what the ancient writers meant with the Latin phrase "intempestiva nocte" and the Greek phrase Aeschylus used, which both mean roughly "at that point in the night where there is no time". And there is also an obscure word in Homer for the deepest, quietest part of the night, and I explain its origin to myself in line with this same idea, even if the translators think they should render it as "the time of night milking". Where in the world were people ever so foolish that they milked their cows at night between one and three! But who are you telling your night thoughts to, anyway?

6.

Marriage in the middle-class sense of the word, and I mean the most respectable sense of the word "marriage", is not about love at all, just as little as it is about money. You cannot build an institution out of love. Instead, it is about society giving two people permission to satisfy their sexual needs with each other. Of course this comes with conditions, but conditions that keep the interests of society in view. It is obvious that a certain amount of liking between the two people, and a great deal of good will, meaning the will to be patient, to get along, and to look after each other, will be part of what such a contract needs. But people should not misuse the word love for it! For two people who love each other in the full and strong sense of the word, sex is not the main thing at all. It is really only a symbol. For one partner, as I said, it is a symbol of total surrender; for the other, it is a symbol of accepting that surrender, a sign of taking possession. Marriage in the noble, old aristocratic sense of the word is about the breeding of a race. Are there still any nobles today? That is the question. So it is about keeping alive a fixed, definite type of ruling people, and both man and woman were sacrificed to this goal. Naturally, love was not the first requirement here, quite the opposite! Not even that amount of good will toward each other that a good middle-class marriage needs. First the interest of the family line decided, and above that, the social class. We would shiver a little at the coldness, strictness and calculating clearness of such an upper-class idea of marriage, as it ruled in every healthy aristocracy, in ancient Athens just as much as in eighteenth-century Europe. We would shiver, we warm-blooded animals with our ticklish, sensitive hearts, we "modern people"! And that is exactly why love as a passion, in the great meaning of the word, was invented for the aristocratic world and inside it, right there where the pressure and the doing-without were the greatest…

7.

"Sickness makes people better": this famous claim, which you meet through all the centuries, both from the mouths of wise people and from the loud mouths of ordinary folk, makes you think. Assuming it is true, you might allow yourself to ask: is there perhaps a link of cause and effect between morality and sickness in general? Take the "improvement of humanity" on the large scale, for example the undeniable softening of Europeans over the last thousand years, the way they have become more humane and more good-natured. Is that perhaps the result of a long, secret and creepy suffering and failing, of going without and wasting away? Has "sickness" "made the European better"? Or to ask it another way: is our morality, our modern, tender European morality, which you could compare with the morality of the Chinese, the sign of a physical decline?… Because you can hardly deny that every point in history where "the human being" showed himself as a type in special splendor and power suddenly takes on a violent, dangerous, explosive character, in which kindness and humanity suffer badly. And maybe in those cases where it seems otherwise, people simply lacked the courage or the sharpness to push psychology deep enough and draw out the general rule there too: "the healthier, the stronger, the richer, the more fruitful and adventurous a person feels, the more 'immoral' he becomes as well." A painful thought! One you should certainly not dwell on! But suppose you run ahead with it for just one tiny, short moment: how amazed you are when you look into the future! What on earth would then cost us more than exactly the thing we demand with all our strength: making people more humane, "better", more and more "civilized"? Nothing would be more expensive than virtue. Because in the end, virtue would turn the earth into a hospital, and "everyone a nurse to everyone else" would be wisdom's final answer. Of course, we would then also have that much-wanted "peace on earth"! But also so little "good

will toward one another", so little real delight in one another! So little beauty, high spirits, daring and danger! So few "works" that would still make it worth living on earth! Oh! And no great "deeds" left at all! All the great works and deeds that have remained standing and were not washed away by the waves of time: were they not all, in the deepest sense, great immoral acts?…

8.

Just because people believe something very strongly, that proves nothing at all about whether it is true. In fact, strong belief can even take the most sensible idea and slowly, slowly turn it into a big piece of foolishness. This is the real insight we Europeans have gained. If we have learned anything, it is this: we have been burned by it, we have grown sharp and wary, we have become *wise* about it, after a lot of damage, it seems… People say, "Faith makes you happy." Fine! Sometimes, at least! But faith always makes you *stupid*, no matter what. It does this even in the rarer case where the belief itself is *not* stupid, where it started out as a clever belief. Every belief that is held for a long time *becomes* stupid in the end. To put it as clearly as our modern psychologists would, this means that its reasons sink down "into the unconscious" and disappear there. From then on, the belief no longer rests on reasons but on feelings. That is, when it needs help, it sends feelings out to fight for it, and *no longer* reasons. Suppose we could find out which belief among humans is the most firmly believed, the longest held, the least questioned, the most sincere. Then we could guess, and very likely be right, that it is also the deepest, the dumbest, the most "unconscious" belief. It would be the one best protected against reasons, and the one that reasons abandoned the longest time ago. —

All right, granted. But which belief is it? Oh, you curious people! Well, since I have started handing out riddles, I will be kind about it

and give you the answer and the solution right away. Nobody is likely to guess it before me anyway.

Above all, the human being is an animal that *judges*. And hidden inside our judging is our oldest and most lasting belief. In every judgment there is something underneath: a holding-as-true, a claiming, a certainty that something is this way and no other, that here a person has really "known" something. So *what* is it that we unconsciously believe to be true in every judgment? It is this: that we have the right to *tell apart* the subject and the predicate, that is, the thing and what we say about it, and also to tell apart cause and effect. That is our strongest belief. In fact, deep down, even our belief in cause and effect, in a condition and the thing it conditions, is only one special case of that first and general belief, our original belief in subject and predicate. It amounts to the claim that every effect is an activity, that everything that is conditioned needs something that conditions it, and that every activity needs a doer, in short, a subject. Could it be that this belief in the idea of subject and predicate is one huge piece of stupidity?

9.

Afterword

But here you interrupt me, you free thinkers. "Enough! Enough!" I hear you shouting and laughing. "We can't stand it anymore! Oh, this horrible tempter, this disturber of our conscience! Do you want to ruin our reputation with the whole world? Blacken our good name? Stick nicknames on us that eat in deeper than the skin? And why, on a bright blue day, all these dark ghosts, these gloomy moral gargling noises, all this tragic, raven-black music? Even if you speak truths, no feet can *dance* to truths like these, so they are certainly not truths for *us*! Here is our seal of truth!" (That is, the test of whether something

is true for them.) "And look, here is grass and soft ground. What could be better than to chase away your gloomy moods quickly and, after your night, give us a nice day? It is finally time for a rainbow to stretch over this land again, and for someone to give us gentle, crazy songs to listen to and milk to drink. All of us are thirsty again for a pious way of thinking, foolish from the heart and soft as milk." — My friends, I see that you are making me lose my patience. And who told you that I haven't been waiting for exactly *that* for a long time? But I will do what you want, and I also have what you need. Don't you see my herds over there, leaping about, all my gentle, sunny, calm little lambs and young goats of thought? And here is a whole bucket of milk already waiting for you. Once you have drunk it, and I can see you are all thirsty for *virtue*, there will be no shortage of songs of the kind you want! Let us begin with a dance song for the liveliest legs and hearts. And truly, whoever sings it does so in honor of someone who deserves honor: one of the freest among free thinkers, who makes all the skies bright again and all the seas roar. —

Notebook 5: Summer 1886 to Autumn 1887

1.

Books: *Ziegler*

History of Ethics

2.

Daybreak

and

The Joyful Science

3.

We put a word in the place where our ignorance begins, where we can't see any further. Take the word "I", the word "do", the word "suffer". These may be the horizon lines of our knowledge, the edges of what we can see, but they are not "truths".

4.

The rotten spot in Kant's critical philosophy has slowly become visible even to people who don't look very closely. Kant no longer had any right to separate "appearance" from the "thing as it really is in itself". He had cut off his own right to keep making this old, familiar distinction. Why? Because he refused to allow anyone to reason from an appearance back to some cause behind that appearance. He did this because of the way he understood cause and effect: for him, cause and effect only work inside the world of appearances. But on the other hand, that very way of understanding cause and effect already as-

sumes the distinction from the start. It acts as if the "thing as it really is in itself" were not just something we figure out, but something simply *given* to us.

5.

"The Origin of Moral Feelings" by Dr. Paul Rée: a clever, slow little book, with no gushing enthusiasm and no virtuous posing. In a pleasant way, it doesn't have the feel of *youth* about it at all. At one point I wrote some words trying to push its young author, who stood off to the side, into the world of serious science. They were strong words, and people even blamed me for them. Maybe they really do belong among my foolish acts; at least so far they were spoken all for nothing… (As you can tell, I'm annoyed as I remember a hope that let me down. It was the kind of hope that the talents of Jewish people have stirred in me several times. In today's Europe, they are by far the kind of people who most readily inherit a gift for the life of the mind. But at the same time they also inherit a speed of development that pushes them dangerously fast toward *ripeness*, and sadly, sometimes even past it…)

6.

And if you seriously want to get rid of "*the* next world", I'm afraid there is no other way: you first have to make up your mind to accept *my* "beyond".

7.

Happiness: the humble people believe that its true name here on earth is "So-so!"

Whoever is something that breaks easily is afraid of children's hands, and of everything that can't love without destroying.

Someone who grabs into thorns spares his fingers less than someone who handles a dagger.

Wagner fans with horns, like cattle

8.

The psychological trick of these years was to walk over a terrible abyss without looking *down*. Instead, we took one cheerful step after another, as if we were only crossing a colorful meadow, at the end of which some great danger might perhaps be waiting for us. In short: we bravely walked right over a danger, while believing that we were still walking toward a danger.

9.

For outsiders and for insiders

1.

— everything is one will pushing against another will

2

There is no such thing as a will at all

1

Belief in cause and effect

2

There is no such thing as cause and effect.

1.

Seen from the point of view of the mind, every idea of cause and effect goes back to our belief in *intentions*, in things being done on purpose:

And yet the effect of *an* intention is exactly the thing that cannot be proven.

(The "cause that makes something happen" and the "purpose it happens for" are really saying the same thing twice), when you look at it from the point of view of the mind —

10.

What does it mean to "know" something? It means tracing something strange back to something we already know and feel at home with. The first rule is this: whatever we have gotten *used to* no longer seems like a riddle or a problem to us. Our feeling for what is new and strange gets dull. Anything that happens *regularly* no longer seems worth questioning. That is why *looking for the rule* is the first instinct of anyone who wants to know things. But of course, once a rule has been found, nothing at all has really been "known" yet! — This is where the superstition of the physicists comes from. Wherever they can stop and rest, that is, wherever things happen so regularly that they can use short formulas to describe them, they think something has been *known*. They feel "safe". But behind this feeling of mental safety is really fear being calmed down. *They want the rule* because it strips the world of its frightening side. *The fear of what cannot be predicted* is the *hidden instinct behind* science.

Regularity lulls to sleep the instinct that asks questions, which is really the instinct that is afraid. To "explain" means to point out a rule for how things happen. Believing in "laws" means believing that whatever is random and unruly is dangerous. It was people's eager *will*

to believe in laws that helped science win (especially in democratic times).

11.

The mind cannot judge itself. That is because it cannot be compared with minds of a different kind. And its power to know things would only show itself when it stood face to face with "true reality". In other words, to judge the mind, we would have to be some higher being with "absolute knowledge". But that already assumes that, apart from every way of looking at things from a viewpoint, and apart from every way of taking things in through the senses and the mind, *there is something there*, something "in itself". — But once we see how the belief in *things* grew out of our own minds, we are no longer allowed to talk about "things as they really are in themselves".

12.

The basic question is this: does seeing from a viewpoint belong to the very *nature* of things? Or is it only a way of looking, a relationship between different beings? Do the different forces relate to one another in such a way that this relationship depends on how things are perceived? That would be possible *if all being were, at its very core, something that perceives*.

13.

People reason like this: if two shapes look alike, they must be related and come from a shared shape. If two words sound alike, the words must be related. But in this kind of reasoning, mental laziness is whispering the answer to us. It is as if it were *more likely* that a shape came about only once than that it came about several times…

No matter how exactly we describe one thing following another, the description cannot give us the *true nature* of what is happening. But at least one thing stays the *same*: the medium that bends the truth, which is our "I". It is like when rhymes in one language get lost when a poem is translated into another. Even so, the translation makes us *believe* that the original was a rhyming poem. In the same way, the order in which things follow each other makes us believe in some kind of "connection" *beyond* the changes we actually see.

14.

As science develops, it keeps dissolving what we thought was "known" into something unknown. But what it *wants* is exactly the *opposite*. It starts from the instinct to trace the unknown back to the known.

All in all, science is preparing the way for a *proud, confident not-knowing*. It is a feeling that "knowing" never actually happens at all, and that it was a kind of arrogance to dream of it. Even more, it is a feeling that we have not a single idea left that would let us accept "knowing" even as a *possibility*, and that "knowing" itself is an idea that contradicts itself. We are *translating* an ancient myth and vanity of humankind into a hard fact: just as there is no thing as it really is in itself, the idea of "knowledge in itself" is no longer *allowed* either.

The temptation

of "numbers and logic"

— —

of "laws"

"*Wisdom*", as an attempt to get *beyond* all the ways of valuing things from a viewpoint (that is, beyond the "will to power"), is a principle that is hostile to life and breaks things down. It is a symptom, as with

the people of India and others. It is a *weakening* of the power to take things in and make them one's own.

15.

People try to translate everything our senses give us into something dead and lifeless, for example by breaking it all down into movements and so on. But in the same way, it is just as fair to break down everything we see and hear, everything our senses offer us, into our *living* functions: into wanting, perceiving, feeling, and so on.

16.

Scientific exactness is easiest to reach with the *most surface-level* things. That is, where things can be counted, calculated, touched and seen, where amounts can be *measured and recorded*. So the poorest and most meager areas of life were the first ones to be farmed successfully. The demand that everything must be explained like a machine comes from an instinct that assumes the most valuable and most basic knowledge was found there *first*. That is naive. In fact, anything that can be counted and grabbed hold of is worth little to us. Whatever we *cannot* reach by "grasping" it with our minds is what we consider "higher". Logic and mechanics can only be applied to the *most surface-level* things. Really, they are just an art of making outlines and shortcuts, a way of getting control over a huge variety of things through a skill of expression. They are not "understanding" but labeling, done so that people can *communicate with each other*. To think of the world as reduced to its surface means, first of all, to make it "graspable".

Logic and mechanics *never* touch what actually causes things — —

17.

Here is how times full of doubt, times that *suffer* from uncertainty, move over into a rigid faith. On the other hand, there are people who dislike rushing into fixed beliefs and narrow limits. They only slowly and late *let themselves be forced* into an overall belief, because uncertainty does not make them *suffer*; instead they enjoy it. This second kind of overall belief and general view, the kind that was forced out of someone, has real *value*: it grew even though the person leaned the other way. On the *origin* of *systems of ideas*: a) they come from minds that love neat outlines; b) they come from suffering over uncertainty; c) more rarely, they come from people who do not like making neat outlines and who are friends of uncertainty.

18.

"Whatever can be proven is true." That is a random decision about what the word "true" means, and that decision itself *cannot be proven*! It simply says: "This *shall* count as true, this shall be called 'true'!" Behind it lies how useful it is to have the word "true" count this way. Because what can be proven appeals to what is most common in everyone's heads, namely logic. So of course it is nothing more than a measure of usefulness that serves the majority. "True" means "proven", that is, worked out from reasoning, on the condition that the statements the reasoning starts from are already "true", meaning *generally agreed on*. So "true" is something that, by a generally agreed way of reasoning, is traced back to generally agreed truths. *What this means, then, is:* "whatever can be proven is true" already *assumes that some truths are given - - -*

19.

The world that matters to us is only an appearance; it is not real. — But we only got the idea of "real, truly there" from the fact that things "matter to us". The more something touches our interests, the more we believe in the "reality" of that thing or being. "It exists" means: through it, I feel myself as existing. — This is a contradiction that cannot be resolved.

The more life comes to us from that feeling, the more *meaning* we place in whatever we believe causes this excitement. So we understand "what is" as whatever has an effect on *us*, whatever *proves itself by having an effect*. — "Unreal" or "only an appearance" would then be whatever cannot produce effects but seems to produce them. —

But suppose we put certain values into things. Then those values act *back* on us, once we have forgotten that we were the ones who gave them.

Suppose I believe someone is my father. Then a lot follows from that for everything he says or does toward me: it all gets *interpreted* differently. — So, given our ways of seeing and explaining things, our interpretation of things, it follows that all the "real" effects these things have on us will look different because of it. They will be interpreted in a new way. In short, they will *have a different effect*.

Now, if all our ways of seeing things were false, then it follows that every effect things have on us is felt and interpreted through *a false idea of cause and effect*. In short, we measure worth and worthlessness, benefit and harm, based on a mistake. The world that *matters to us* is false.

20.

The air blows cool and clean

— I would like to

the day looks on with sorrow

In the evening, when even the bravest heart doubts and looks tired.

the flame with its whitish-gray belly, whose neck bends and twists hungrily toward pure heights

21.

The problems I am facing seem to me so deeply important that, almost every year, a couple of times, I fooled myself into imagining something. I imagined that the thinking people to whom I showed these problems would have to put their own work aside and, for the time being, give themselves completely to *my* concerns. What actually *happened* each time instead was the opposite of what I had expected, in a way that was both funny and unsettling. So I, who thought I knew people well, learned to be ashamed of myself. Again and again I had to go back and relearn a beginner's lesson: that people take their habits a hundred thousand times more seriously than even — their own advantage…

22.

The basic answer:

we believe in reason. But reason is the philosophy of gray, lifeless *ideas*, and language is built on the most naive prejudices of all.

So now we read clashes and problems into things, because we *think only* in the form of language. And so we believe in the "eternal truth" of "reason" (for example, the idea that every sentence has a subject and a predicate, and so on).

we stop thinking when we refuse to do it under the force of language. At most, we just barely reach the point of doubting, of seeing a limit here as a limit.

Reasonable thinking is interpreting according to a pattern that we cannot throw off.

23.

standing apart by choice, calm, friendly toward things and chance, thankful for the smallest rays of sunshine of good health, accepting pain as a rule, as a condition, as something we wanted ourselves, and cleverly forcing it to serve our goals, questioning it closely —

24.

people inside whose bodies the inner beast is always grunting and making a racket

25.

not only seeing morality as a prejudice, but living through and beyond the most highly honored type of morality there has been so far

to stand there with an ironic, all-knowing view of the whole "vita contemplativa", the life of quiet thought and reflection, as it has been lived up to now

With a very strong unwillingness to stay sitting in any one of the corners from which the world has been viewed so far, no matter how deeply my curiosity once drove me into each of them. And with an even stronger will to experience for myself, at least once, the state of mind out of which each of these narrow corner-views of the world arose, the views people call a philosophy or a "religion"

26.

the lived hint of something endless, which we are free to conquer

27.

To understand this book, you have to grant me a few starting points

28.

That someone can treat even morality as a prejudice, and afterward even enjoy a happiness like the first light of dawn in this victory of doubt —

29.

You must want to *live through* the great problems with your body and soul

30.

Ordinary people, quite understandably, have the falsest idea of the state they are furthest from: wisdom

31.

Every great problem is a symptom, a sign of something. A person with a certain amount of strength, subtlety, and breadth, with this kind of danger and this kind of boldness, has pushed it out from inside himself

32.

Ordinary people need others who lead the way by setting a good example. And by building, out of everything they must overcome in themselves, the ideal of a victorious overcomer, they have gained a

kind of measuring stick for their own idea of the *highest people*. There is a great danger in this. Let us be honest and admit to ourselves why Christ, for example, is only an ideal of the "common man".

33.

Ordinary people usually ask, with simple seriousness, whether a philosopher really *lived* the way he *taught*. They judge, privately, that preaching morality is easy and means little, but that *living* morality, any kind of morality, is something that really counts. This is naive. After all, how else could someone come to know anything, if he has not lived in the land he is talking about!

Suppose that a philosophy — — —

Ordinary people demand that a philosopher must not lie, because they believe only the truthful can know the truth. In the same way, they demand that he live without the pleasures of the senses, giving things up

34.

The most spiritual, thoughtful people feel the charm and magic of the things of the senses in a way that other people, those with "hearts of flesh", cannot even imagine — and should not be allowed to imagine. They are lovers of the senses in full good faith, because they give the senses a more basic value than those fine sieves, those machines for watering things down and making them smaller, or whatever you want to call what ordinary people call "mind" or "spirit". The strength and power of the senses — that is the most essential thing in a well-made, whole person. The magnificent "animal" must be there first — otherwise, what does all this "becoming human" matter!

35.

Note: The whole morality of Europe is built on what is useful for the herd. The sorrow of all higher, rare people lies in this: everything that makes them stand out comes into their awareness along with a feeling of being made smaller and insulted. The *strengths* of today's people are the causes of their pessimistic gloom. The average people, just as the herd is, are cheerful, without many questions or much conscience. On the gloom of the strong: Schopenhauer, Pascal

Note: *The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more thoroughly it is banned.*

36.

Our "knowing" is limited to measuring amounts, that is,

but nothing can stop us from feeling these differences in amount as differences in quality. *Quality* is a truth *for us*, depending on our point of view; it is not a truth "in itself".

Our senses work within a certain range of amounts, which acts as a go-between. That is, we feel things as big or small in relation to the conditions that keep us alive. If we made our senses ten times sharper or ten times duller, we would die. That means we also feel *size relationships*, as they relate to what makes our existence possible, as *qualities*.

37.

To describe, in terms of the body, what someone does when thinking about how knowledge works. *Primitive* people — how do they do it?

38.

The contradiction in my life is this. Everything I *need* as a radical philosopher — freedom from a job, a wife, children, friends, social

life, a fatherland, a home, a faith, and almost freedom from love and hate — I also feel as just as many losses, since I am luckily a living being and not just a machine for abstract thinking. I must add that, in any case, I lack *solid health*, and that only in moments of health do I feel the weight of those losses *less harshly*. Also, I still don't know how to bring together the five conditions on which a bearable middle state of my shaky health could be based. Even so, it would be a fatal mistake if, in order to create those 5 conditions for myself, I robbed myself of those 8 freedoms. That is an *objective* view of my situation. —

Things get more complicated because I am also a poet, naturally, with the needs all poets have: these include sympathy, a splendid household, peace and quiet, and so on (and as for these needs, I have no other name for my life than a dog-kennel existence). Things get complicated once more because I am also a musician, so that really nothing in life — — —

39.

— that I speak the language of the popular moral preachers and "holy men," and I do it without holding back. At first I do it with real excitement and fun. But at the same time I enjoy it the way an artist enjoys his craft, and that enjoyment is not far from irony. What I enjoy is this: here the most refined kind of modern thinking is constantly translated back into a simple, innocent language. So I feel a secret triumph at having beaten the difficulty, and what seemed to be the impossibility, of such a project.

40.

On the Origin and History

of Morality.

First Essay

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

2. The ideal of self-denial

3. Responsibility.

4. "I" and "he".

41.

The prelude to Wagner's opera Parsifal is the greatest gift anyone has given me in a long time. The power and strictness of the feeling are beyond words. I know nothing that grasps Christianity so deeply and brings it so sharply to the point of compassion. I was completely lifted up and moved. No painter has ever painted such an indescribably sad and tender *look* as Wagner has.

the greatness in taking hold of a terrible certainty, and out of that greatness, something like compassion pours out:

It is the greatest masterpiece of the sublime that I know. There is power and strictness in taking hold of a terrible certainty, and a greatness *in* the compassion about it that cannot be put into words. No painter has painted such a dark, sad, tender look as Wagner did in the last part of the prelude. Not even Dante, not even Leonardo.

It was as if, after many years, someone was finally talking to me about the problems that trouble me. Of course not with the answers I myself have ready for them, but with the Christian answers. And in the end, those were the answers of stronger souls than the last two centuries have produced. While listening to this music, you do put aside Protestantism as a misunderstanding. In the same way, Wagner's music in Monte Carlo made me put aside the other *very good* music I

heard there (Haydn, Berlioz, Brahms, Reyer's Sigurd overture) as a misunderstanding of music. I won't deny it. Strange! As a boy I had given myself the mission of bringing the sacred mystery onto the stage; — — —

42.

A Critique

of the

Christian ideal

of

poverty,

of

chastity,

of

humility.

How Europe longs to become like the *fakirs* — the holy men of India who torment their own bodies.

43.

(In French:) "this young Jew, both gentle and terrible, subtle and commanding, simple and deep, filled with the selfless zeal of a lofty morality and the burning passion of an exalted personality"

(from "The Gospels") by Renan.

(In French:) "It was from the feudal system, and not from its collapse, that selfishness, greed, violence and cruelty were born — the things that led to the horrors of the September massacres."

von Sybel!!

44.

So let us honor the blind, the trusting, the simple, the peaceful, the donkeys. Let us protect and defend them against ourselves — all these soft, milky-hearted people who suspect nothing and question nothing. The only thing they get from life is its most tricky distinction: *not knowing it*. Let us keep them safe, with this art of quickly falling silent, for our own bad days. Because we too sometimes need oases, human oases, where we can forget, trust, fall asleep, dream again, love again, and become "human" again…

45.

Meanwhile, a very strange gentleman named Theodor Fritsch from Leipzig has been writing letters to me. Since he was pushy, I couldn't help giving him a couple of friendly kicks. These present-day "Germans" disgust me more and more.

46.

We Hyperboreans (people beyond the north wind).

"Neither by sea nor by land can you find the way to the Hyperboreans (people beyond the north wind)."

Pindar.

Beyond the north, beyond the ice, beyond hardness, beyond death — that is where *our life* is! *Our* happiness!

47.

How could they ever be our proper audience, these moral people? With shameless pushiness they only listen for what's in it *for them*,

and whether there's anything in it for them at all. (Note for the preface.)

"What do *I* get out of it?

How do I look in all this?

"What liberties can I take with it?"

— the minds that shouldn't be allowed.

48.

Note: "German youths" and other gushing, dumb cattle — soft, milky-hearted people.

49.

Morality as humanity's *greatest danger*

Virtue — for example, honesty about truth — as *our* noble and dangerous luxury. We must not refuse to accept the drawbacks it brings with it.

50.

1)

That typical change, of which Gustave Flaubert is the clearest example among the French and Richard Wagner among the Germans: between 1830 and 1850, the romantic faith in love and in the future turns into a longing for nothingness.

2)

The tragic age for Europe: caused by the struggle against nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

Perhaps the *title* of *No. 10*.

3)

What does the French love of *color* mean, and the German love of sound (and of "*harmony*" in particular)? They are stimulants — partly for a *cruder* kind of person, partly for a more *jaded*, bored kind of person.

4)

Pessimism and the theory of art and beauty

5)

Greek philosophy from Socrates onward as a symptom of sickness, and so as a preparation for Christianity.

6)

Anarchism

7)

Against the belief in cause and effect. What it takes for something to count as a cause.

8)

The lie told in order to educate. Plato. All "ideals" belong here. But education *for what?* To create *lasting* structures in which something long-lived can grow.

9)

How does a moral quality become *famous* and admired?

10)

Morality aims at making everyone average, at lowering the level. To what extent is an instinct for *survival* speaking here?

10)

In the *great person*, the qualities that belong to life itself — injustice, lies, exploitation — are at their greatest. But because they have had an *overpowering* effect, their true nature has been misunderstood the most and interpreted as something good. Carlyle is the typical example of such an interpreter.

11)

The conflict between making stronger and making better.

12)

Against the theory of atoms.

13)

The belief in the "I"

14)

To imagine a new kind of perfection that our whole human need and uncertainty would not rebel against.

15)

How does the *strong person* come about? v. — — —

16)

The kinds of intoxication?

17)

What does our love of high mountains, the desert, the countryside around Rome, and nationalism *mean*?

18)

How humans have been made smaller since Copernicus.

19)

Ways of valuing as cause and as effect

20)

Saying that one thing comes after another is also only a *description*.

21)

Agnostics — people who say we can't know whether God exists

22)

On the mind's lack of discipline —

what is a vice of the intellect?

23)

What does it *mean* that music rules over the other arts?

24)

Devotion to a person as a way of making morality easier. (Father, ancestor, prince, priest, God)

25)

Sacred mysteries ("drama").

26)

Punishment: keeping a higher type of person going.

27)

The scientific "look". On play-acting

28)

On the body's role in power

29)

Our European culture — what is it *pushing* toward, compared with the Buddhist solution in Asia?

30)

Interpretation, *not* explanation.

31)

On logic: the will to make things equal as a will to power.

32)

"The thing as it really is in itself"

33)

Against the view that everything works like a machine

34)

The *moral* prejudice in the belief in

argument by debate (dialectic)

35)

How ideals slander things.

36)

The psychology of the need for science.

37)

Modern gloom

38)

Play-acting

39)

Crowd-pleasing rabble-rousing in the arts

40)

The pursuit of pleasure in present-day Christianity.

41)

Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer were all shaped by a basic *moral* judgment. So were Plato and Spinoza.

42)

How lightheartedness and irony are misunderstood.

43)

"Guilt"

44)

How moral judgments get turned upside down

45)

The theory that our surroundings shape us

46)

Ideals of the common people, Francis of Assisi.

47)

"We immoralists (enemies of morality)."

48)

The feeling of freedom.

49)

What is noble? (*the red-marbled notebook*)

50)

all great people are evil people

51)

The hypocrisy of acting scientific

52)

Just as Descartes based the truth of what our senses tell us on the nature of *God,* one could reject Kant's teaching that reason creates illusions. In this sense, even the theory of knowledge depends on an *earlier* decision about whether existence is moral in character.

The English think people will only obey a moral God. — Atheists are the most biased of all when it comes to moral questions.

53)

The feeling of well-being is the feeling of *power* that is set off by small resistances. Throughout the whole body, countless obstacles are constantly being overcome. This feeling of *victory* reaches our awareness as an *overall feeling* — as lightness, as "freedom."

The other way around: if there are heavy obstacles, then the feeling of power is not set off either:

Note.

So the feeling of displeasure is completely different from the feeling of pleasure. Pleasure is a feeling of power, and in order to be stirred up, it needs small obstacles and small feelings of displeasure to come first.

51.

Ranking of people

Paying back.

Truth and honesty about truth.

Law, punishment, and so on.

Pity

52.

Rule for living: have nothing to do with anyone who takes part in the lying race swindle.

(How much lying and filth it takes to stir up questions of race in today's mixed-up, jumbled Europe!)

53.

This century as the heir of the *one before*

1)

focused on the senses, focused on pleasure

(or pessimistic)

2)

dreamy and starry-eyed — moral

Freedom, knowledge, happiness

all joined together as allies

3)

— — —

54.

The law that energy is never lost demands the *eternal return (everything happening again forever)*.

55.

The main mistake of psychologists: they treat a less clear idea as a lower kind of idea compared to a bright, clear one. But something that moves away from our awareness and so *becomes dim may* still be perfectly clear in itself. *Becoming dim is a matter of the viewpoint of our awareness.*

The "dimness" comes from the way our awareness sees things, like the effect of a lens. It is not *necessarily* something that belongs to the "dim" thing itself.

56.

Everything that enters our awareness as a "single unit" is already hugely complicated. We only ever have an *appearance of unity*.

The *body* is the richer, clearer, easier-to-grasp thing to study. As a matter of method, it should come first, without deciding anything about what it ultimately means.

Note well: even if the *center of* "*consciousness*" is not in the same place as the *physical center* in the body, it could still be that the *physical center* is also the *mental* center.

The *intelligence in feeling* (pleasure and pain): that is, feeling is *ruled* from that center.

57.

The problem of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) (as opposed to pessimism and so on)

Fighting against it makes it stronger.

All the *positive* forces of this century seem only

to prepare the way for it,

for example, natural science.

Explanation: *the collapse of one way of valuing things*, which gives the impression that no other way of valuing is possible.

58.

Morality as an *illusion created by the species*, to push the individual to sacrifice himself for the future. It seems to grant him endless worth, so that, with this *sense of his own importance*, he bullies and holds down other sides of his nature and is hardly ever satisfied with himself.

The deepest thanks for what morality has achieved so far. But *now it is only a weight pressing down*, and it would become a disaster! *Morality itself forces us*, in the form of honesty, to say no to morality.

59.

What *scientific work* depends on: a belief that scientific work is connected together and will go on, so that each person may work on any spot, however tiny, trusting that *he is not working all for nothing*. This — — —

There is one *great paralysis*: working all for nothing, fighting all for nothing. — —

The times of *piling up*, when strength and tools of power are found that the future will one day use. *Science as a halfway station*, where the in-between, more many-sided, complicated beings find their most natural outlet and satisfaction: *all those for whom taking action is not advisable*.

60.

The stubborn, rule-bound mind in Kant

61.

A point in time when people will have more than enough *power* at their service. Science is aiming to bring about this *slavery of nature*, where nature works for us.

Then people will have *free time*: time to *develop* themselves into something new and higher. *A new aristocracy*

Then many *virtues* will be *outlived* that up to now were *conditions for survival*.

When we no longer need certain qualities, *we therefore* lose them.

We no longer need the virtues, so we lose them. This includes the morality of "Only one thing is needed," of saving the soul, of living forever. That morality was a tool to *make it possible* for people to master themselves enormously (through the emotion of an enormous *fear*:::

the different kinds of *hardship and need* whose discipline shaped human beings: need teaches us to work, to think, to hold ourselves back.

Cleaning up and strengthening the *body*

The *new aristocracy* needs an opponent to fight against. It must feel a terrible urgency to keep itself alive.

The two possible futures of humankind:

1) the result of making everyone average

2) deliberately setting oneself apart and shaping oneself

A teaching that creates a *gap*: it keeps the *highest and the lowest kind* (it destroys the middle kind).

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The aristocrats we have had so far, both religious and worldly, prove *nothing* against the need for a new aristocracy.

A theory of *power structures* instead of *sociology*

62.

You may allow yourself the truth only as far as you are already *raised up* enough that you no longer need the *harsh school of error*, where mistakes force you into shape.

If you judge existence by moral standards, *it disgusts you*.

63.

We should not invent false persons. For example, we should not say "nature is cruel." Realizing *that there is no* such *central being who is responsible* is exactly what *brings relief*!

How humankind develops. A. To gain power over nature, and *for that* a certain power over oneself. Morality was needed *so that* human beings could win out in the struggle with nature and the "wild beast."

B. *Once* power over nature has been won, people can use this power to develop *themselves* freely: the will to power as raising oneself up and growing stronger.

64.

What does "passive" mean?

Resisting and reacting. Being *held back* in a forward-reaching movement: so, an action of resistance and reaction.

What does "active" mean?

reaching out for power

"Feeding"

comes only second. What comes first is wanting to take everything into oneself.

"Reproduction"

comes only second. Originally, when one will is not enough to organize everything it has taken in, a *counter-will* comes into force. After a struggle with the original will, this counter-will breaks away and forms a new center of organization.

Pleasure

as a feeling of power (which assumes displeasure comes first)

65.

All thinking, judging, and perceiving is *comparing*, and it depends on "*treating as the same*", and even before that on "*making the same*". Making the same is the same thing as an amoeba absorbing the matter it has grabbed.

Memory comes late, since here the urge to make things the same already seems *tamed*: the difference is kept. Remembering is like sorting things into categories and boxing them up — it is active. But who is doing it?

66.

The value of *unreasonable leanings*

for example, a mother's love, love for one's "work," and so on

not "selfless"!

67.

No "moral education" of the human race. Instead, the harsh school of errors is needed, because the "truth" disgusts people and spoils life for them — unless a person has already been pushed, with no way out, onto his *path*, and takes on his honest *insight* with a tragic pride.

68.

Physiologists, like philosophers, believe that *consciousness* grows in *value* the more it *increases* in clearness: that the clearest consciousness, the most logical and coldest thinking, is of the *first* rank. But by what is this value measured? The shallowest, *most simplified* thinking is the most useful for *setting the will in motion* (because it leaves few reasons to weigh) — so it could be that the, and so on. Note well.

Precise action is in conflict with *far-seeing caution*, which often judges with uncertainty. That caution is guided by the *deeper* instinct.

Note well: *measure value* by how *far-reaching* the

usefulness is.

69.

Our passions and inclinations want *their own* satisfaction, and *on top of that* they want to rule over the intellect too.

70.

1.

Philosophy of history.

2.

Psychology.

3.

The culture of the Greeks.

4.

Philosophy of morality.

5.

History of Greek philosophy.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning): the collapse of a whole way of valuing everything, namely the moral one. What is missing are new forces that can interpret the world afresh.

On the history of values.

The will to power and the different shapes it takes as it changes.

(what the will to morality has been until now: a school, a kind of training)

The eternal return (everything happening again forever) used as a hammer.

71.

European Nihilism.

Lenzerheide

June 10, 1887

1.

What *advantages* did the Christian moral idea offer?

1)

It gave human beings an absolute *worth*. This stood against how small they are, and how much they exist only by chance, in the endless flow of things coming into being and passing away.

2)

It helped the people who defended God, because it let the world still count as *perfect* in spite of suffering and evil. That included the so-called "freedom" of human beings. In this way, evil seemed full of *meaning*.

3)

It assumed that human beings *know* what the absolute values are. So it gave them *proper, fitting knowledge* about exactly the things that matter most.

It kept people from looking down on themselves for being human. It kept them from turning against life, and from giving up hope that they could know anything. It was a *way of keeping people going*. In short: morality was the great *cure* against nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning), both in how people lived and in how they thought.

2.

But among the strengths that morality raised and fed was *honesty about truth*. And in the end *this* turns against morality itself. It discovers that morality is always aiming at a purpose, and that its way of looking at things is *self-serving*. And now the *insight* into this long, deep-rooted lying, which we despair of ever getting rid of, works precisely as a

push. A push toward nihilism. We now notice needs in ourselves that were planted by the long habit of explaining everything through morality. Now these needs look to us like needs for what is untrue. On the other hand, they are the very needs that value seems to depend on, the ones that make us able to bear living at all. This conflict creates a process of falling apart. On one side, we do *not* value what we recognize as true. On the other side, we are no longer *allowed* to value the lies we would like to tell ourselves.

3.

In fact, we no longer need a cure against the *first* kind of nihilism so badly. Here in our Europe, life is no longer so uncertain, so random, so senseless. We don't really need such a huge *boosting* of the *worth* of human beings, or of the worth of evil, and so on. We can handle a big *lowering* of that worth. We can admit that there is a lot of nonsense and chance in the world. The *power* that human beings have now gained lets us *cut back* on the tools for keeping people in line. The moral interpretation was the strongest of those tools. "God" is a far too extreme idea.

4.

But extreme positions are not replaced by moderate ones. They are replaced by other extreme positions, only *turned upside down*. So when belief in God and in a world order that is moral at its core can no longer be held, people swing the other way. They come to believe that nature is completely immoral, without purpose and without meaning. This is the *feeling* that follows by psychological necessity. Nihilism appears now *not* because people dislike being alive more than they used to. It appears because people have become suspicious of any "meaning" in evil, and even of any meaning in life itself. *One* interpretation collapsed. But because it was taken to be *the only* interpretation,

it now seems as if there were no meaning in life at all, as if everything were *all for nothing*.

5.

It still needs to be shown that this cry of "All for nothing!" is what marks our present nihilism. Our distrust of the ways of valuing we used to have grows until it reaches this question: "Aren't all 'values' just bait that keeps the comedy dragging on, without ever getting any closer to an answer?" The thought of *going on and on*, all for nothing, without a goal or purpose, is the most *paralyzing* thought there is. This is especially true once you understand that you are being fooled, and yet you have no power to stop being fooled.

6.

Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence just as it is, without meaning and without a goal, but coming back again and again, unavoidably, without ever ending in nothingness: "the eternal return (everything happening again forever)."

That is the most extreme form of nihilism: nothingness (the "meaningless") forever!

This is a European form of Buddhism. The energy of matter and of force *forces* us into such a belief. It is the *most scientific* of all possible ideas. We deny that there are final goals. If existence had one, it would have to have reached it already.

7.

Then you see that what is being aimed at here is the opposite of pantheism, the belief that God and the universe are one. For the idea that "everything is perfect, divine, eternal" *also forces us to believe in the eternal return (everything happening again forever)*. The question is: when moral-

ity falls, does this pantheistic "yes" to all things become impossible too? Really, it is only the moral God who has been overcome. Does it make sense to imagine a God beyond "good and evil"? Would a pantheism in *this* sense be possible? Can we take the idea of purpose out of the process, and *still* say yes to the process? That would be the case if something within that process were *reached* at every single moment of it, and always the same thing.

Spinoza reached such a "yes" to the world, because for him every moment has a *logical* necessity. With his basic instinct for logic, he felt triumphant about a world made *that* way.

8.

But his case is just one single case. Take *any basic trait* that lies underneath *every* event and shows itself in every event. If a person felt that trait to be *his own* basic trait, it would drive that person to approve, in triumph, of every moment of existence as a whole. What would matter is that a person feels this basic trait in himself as good, as valuable, as something he enjoys.

9.

Now, *morality* has protected life from despair and from a leap into nothingness. It did this for those people and those social classes who were abused and crushed by *other people*. For it is being powerless against people, *not* being powerless against nature, that creates the most desperate bitterness against existence. Morality treated the powerful, the violent, the "masters" in general, as the enemies. It said the common man must be protected against them, *which means, first of all, encouraged and made stronger*. So morality taught people to *hate* and *despise*, as deeply as they could, the basic trait of those who rule: *their will to power*. To get rid of this morality, to deny it, to break it down,

would mean giving this most-hated drive the *opposite* feeling and the opposite value. If the suffering and oppressed person *lost the belief that he had a right* to despise the will to power, he would fall into hopeless despair. That would happen if this trait were part of the very core of life. It would happen if it turned out that even that "will to morality" was only this "will to power" in disguise, and that even all that hating and despising is still a will to power. Then the oppressed person would see that he stands *on the same ground* as his oppressor. He would see that he has no *special privilege* and no *higher rank* than the oppressor.

10.

Rather, it is the *other way around*! Nothing in life has value except the degree of power, assuming, that is, that life itself is the will to power. Morality protected *those who got a bad deal in life* from nihilism. It did this by giving *every single person* an endless value, a value beyond the physical world. And it placed people in an order that did not match the order of worldly power and the ranking of people. It taught them to accept their lot, to be humble, and so on. *Suppose the belief in this morality dies*. Then those who got a bad deal in life would no longer have their comfort, and they would *perish*.

11.

This *perishing* shows itself as *destroying oneself*. It is an instinctive picking-out of what *has to destroy*. Here are the *signs* of this self-destruction among those who got a bad deal in life: cutting oneself open to examine one's own soul, poisoning oneself, getting drunk on things, romanticism, and above all an instinctive urge to do things that turn the powerful into one's *deadly enemies*. It is as if they were raising their own executioners. This is the *will to destroy*, coming from an even

deeper instinct: the instinct to destroy oneself, the *will toward nothingness*.

12.

Nihilism is a sign that those who got a bad deal in life have no comfort left. They destroy in order to be destroyed. Cut loose from morality, they no longer have any reason "to accept their lot." They take their stand on the opposite principle, and they too *want power*, by *forcing* the powerful to become their executioners. This is the European form of Buddhism: *acting out a "no"* after all of existence has lost its "meaning".

13.

The "need" or suffering has not actually grown bigger. Quite the opposite! "God, morality, giving in to fate" were medicines used at terrible, deep levels of misery. But *active nihilism* (belief that nothing has meaning) shows up when living conditions are fairly much better. Just the fact that people feel morality has been left behind already takes a good deal of mental culture, and that culture in turn takes a fairly comfortable life. These nihilists also show a certain mental tiredness. The long battle between philosophical opinions has worn them down until they reached a hopeless doubt *about* philosophers themselves. This, too, shows that these nihilists are by no means from a *low* level. Think of the situation in which Buddha appeared. The teaching of the eternal return (everything happening again forever) would need *educated* foundations, just as Buddha the teacher had them, for example the idea of cause and effect, and so on.

14.

What does "those who got a bad deal in life" mean now? Above all, does it mean in the *body*, in health? It no longer means in politics. The *unhealthiest* kind of person in Europe, found in every social class, is the soil this nihilism grows from. Such people will feel the belief in the eternal return (everything happening again forever) as a *curse*. Once struck by it, they will no longer hold back from any action. They will not just quietly fade out themselves; they will try to *make* everything be wiped out that is this meaningless and aimless. And yet this is only a spasm, a blind rage, at the realization that everything has already existed for all eternity — even this very moment of nihilism and lust for destruction. — The *value* of such a crisis is that it *cleans things out*. It squeezes similar elements together and makes them ruin each other. It gives people who think in opposite ways shared tasks. Among them, too, it brings the weaker, less sure ones into the light. In this way it gives the push toward *a ranking of strengths*, judged by health: it recognizes those who command as commanders, and those who obey as followers. Of course, this happens apart from all existing social orders.

15.

Which people will turn out to be the *strongest* in all this? The most moderate ones. The ones who do not *need* extreme beliefs. The ones who not only accept a good share of chance and nonsense in life, but even love it. The ones who can think of human beings as worth a good deal less than people usually believe, without becoming small and weak because of it. The ones richest in health, who can handle most misfortunes and so are not so afraid of misfortunes. People who *are sure of their own power*, and who, with conscious pride, stand for the strength that humans have *already reached*.

16.

How would a person like that think about the eternal return (everything happening again forever)? —

72.

Morality defeating itself

honesty

Justice, punishment, pity, and so on.

73.

Beyond Good

and Evil

17 printed sheets, the *second*

half

74.

On the

Origins of Morality.

A Book Written to Pick a Fight.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Carefree, mocking, violent

— that is how wisdom wants *us* to be: she is a woman,

and she only ever loves a warrior.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

Leipzig

Published by C. G. Naumann.

75.

The Will to Power.

An Attempt at Rethinking All Values.

1.

On the Value of Truth.

2.

What Follows from This.

3.

On the History of European Nihilism (Belief That Nothing Has Meaning).

4.

The Eternal Return (Everything Happening Again Forever).

76.

Morality as Will

77.

Sayings and Arrows.

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Gathered from his writings

and brought home by E. V. W.

78.

Sayings

of an Immoralist (Enemy of Morality).

79.

This is a petty, small-minded age, and somehow I just have to put up with it. Giving it a sample of what psychology in the grand style really is makes no sense at all. After all, who would meet me with even a thousandth of the passion and the suffering needed to understand where a person gets the knowledge of such strange and decisive things?…

And think of everything a person must have lived through inside himself to come up with The Birth of Tragedy at just twenty-five years old!

I have never complained about how impossible it is to describe what I have had to do without: never hearing a voice that sounded like mine, never hearing of anyone who suffered and wanted the same things I did.

I myself know of no books, in any literature, that hold such a wealth of experiences of the soul, from the greatest to the smallest and most subtle. The reason that basically nobody but me sees and knows this is simple: I am condemned to live in a time when the rhinoceros thrives, meaning when thick-skinned brutes do well. On top of that, I live among a people that has not had even the most basic schooling in matters of psychology. This is a people that took Schiller and Fichte seriously!! When I think that people like Rohde have really behaved toward me like dumb cattle, then what is actually supposed to...
— — —

80.

8.

Finally, let me at least point, with a single word, to a huge fact that no one has discovered yet, a fact that has only slowly, very slowly,

become clear. Up to now there have been no problems more basic than the moral ones. It is their driving force that gave birth to all the great ideas in the whole realm of the values we have had so far. For example, this includes everything people usually call "philosophy," right down to its deepest starting assumptions about how knowledge works. But there are problems even more basic than the moral ones. You only catch sight of them once you have left the moral prejudice behind you…

81.

a)

The grand style

The naked and bare: a psychological cleansing of taste.

b)

the people who combine many things into a whole cannot grow out of the "ant"

(that is, out of the busy little worker).

Our society only puts on a show of culture; the truly "cultured" person is missing.

c)

suicide: the harakiri of Japan

d)

winning back for the person who seeks knowledge the right to have strong feelings

82.

Rights only come into being where there are agreements. But for there to be agreements, there must be a certain balance of power. If there is no such balance, and two amounts of power that are too unequal run into each other, then the stronger one reaches over to grab the weaker one and keeps weakening it. In the end comes submission, adjustment, falling into line, being absorbed and taken in. So the result is that two have become one. For two to stay two, as I said, a balance is needed. That is why every right goes back to an earlier act of weighing. So it is not a good idea, because it is misleading, to show Justice holding a pair of scales in her hand. The right picture would be to have Justice standing on the scales, in such a way that she keeps the two pans balanced. But people usually show Justice the wrong way, and they also put the wrong words in her mouth. Justice does not say "to each what is his own," but always only "as you treat me, so I treat you." When two powers, facing each other, put a bridle on the ruthless will to power, and not only leave each other as equals but actually want each other to be equal, that is the beginning of all "good will" on earth. You see, an agreement does not just say yes to an amount of power that already exists. At the same time it carries the wish to say yes to these amounts on both sides as something lasting, and so, to a certain degree, to keep them going oneself. And in that, as I said, lies a seed of all "good will."

83.

For now we are not yet looking at the problem of the aesthetic state, the state of experiencing beauty and art, from the side of the artist, but from the viewpoint of the onlooker. Here it is above all necessary to explain that the problem is not "what is the contemplative state, the state of calm looking, and how is it possible?" Until now, philosophers have innocently mixed up the contemplative state and the

aesthetic state and counted them as one. But the first is only something the second requires, not the second itself. It is only a condition for it. And, as one must add right away, not even in the sense that it is the real cause and source from which the aesthetic state grows. To claim that would be completely wrong. The inner "must" that makes a person become "aesthetic" is totally different from the inner "must" that leads to the contemplative state. This is true even though the contemplative state, as I said, is a requirement for the aesthetic one, and must be reached before the aesthetic state can show itself. But just as well, once the ground has been cleared, it can — — —

84.

As many international powers as possible, in order to practice seeing from a world-wide viewpoint.

85.

Every year 5 chapters

86.

And as the Bedouin of the desert says: "Even smoke is good for something." For it tells the traveler on his way that a welcoming fireplace is nearby.

87.

"For one man to stand above the rest of humanity, all the others have to pay far too high a price."

Montesquieu.

88.

The history of the Jews is a typical example of how the "idealist" comes into being. "God and Israel" are joined in a covenant, a binding agreement. First refinement: the just God stays in the covenant only with a just Israel. Second: but in the end he loves Israel even when it suffers, and even when it suffers because of its own guilt. And so on.

Ancient Israel and the Germans described by the Roman writer Tacitus are alike. So are the Arabs of the Bedouin lands and the people of Corsica. Compare too the people of Genoa from the time when President de Brosses visited them, and those of today.

89.

Against the great mistake of thinking that our time, meaning Europe, shows the highest form of the human type. On the contrary: the people of the Renaissance stood higher, and so did the Greeks. In fact, we may stand quite low. "Understanding" everything is not a sign of the greatest strength, but of a thorough tiredness. Turning everything into a moral question is itself a sign of "decline."

90.

A remark by Napoleon, said to Röderer on February 2, 1809:

"I love power, yes I do. But I love it as an artist... I love it the way a musician loves his violin. I love it so I can draw sounds, chords and harmonies out of it."

91.

(From the magazine Revue des deux mondes, February 15, 1887, by Taine.)

"Suddenly his master talent unfolds. The artist, locked up inside the politician, comes out of his sheath like a sword. He creates in the world of the ideal and the impossible. You recognize him again for what he is: the brother, born after their death, of Dante and of Michelangelo. And truly, when you look at the firm outlines of his vision, the strength, the unity and the inner logic of his dream, the depth of his thinking, and the more-than-human greatness of his ideas, he is like them and their equal. His genius is the same size and has the same build. He is one of the three ruling minds of the Italian Renaissance."

Take note - - -

Dante, Michelangelo, Napoleon — —

92.

On the Higher Kind of Person.

Or:

The Temptation of Zarathustra.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

93.

Dionysus the Philosopher.

A

Menippean Satire (a mocking piece mixing many styles).

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

94.

The opposing forces: problems whose solutions in the end depend on the will, that is, on strength —

1.

between the *strength* of individual people and how *long the race lasts*

2.

between the *creative force* and "*humaneness*" (being kind and gentle)

3.

— — —

95.

To call out like that from the deepest part of your soul and hear not a single sound in reply is a *terrible* experience. Even the toughest person can be destroyed by it. It has lifted me out of every bond I had with living people.

96.

Thoughts About the Greeks.

With a Preface

to

Jakob Burckhardt.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

97.

1.

European nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

2.

Morality up to now as an enemy of life.

3.

Morality up to now is itself "immoral"

98.

1.

Anyone who thinks about how the human type can be raised to its greatest splendor and power will first of all understand that they must place themselves outside of morality. That is because morality has mainly aimed at the opposite: it has tried to slow down or destroy that splendid development wherever it was underway. And in fact, a development like that uses up such a huge number of people in its service that a movement in the *opposite* direction is only too natural. The weaker, gentler, average sorts of people need to take sides *against* that glory of life and strength. To do that, they have to give themselves a new way of judging, one that lets them condemn life at its fullest and, if possible, destroy it. So morality has a built-in tendency to be hostile to life, to the extent that it wants to overpower the strongest types of life.

99.

Note

1) An attempt to bring *aesthetics*, the study of beauty and art, closer to *unselfish ethics* by getting rid of the "I" (as a way of preparing for that kind of ethics).

2) An attempt to bring it closer to *knowledge* (the idea of a pure viewer who is a "pure mirror of the object").

— Against this: when we look at something as art or beauty, the thing we look at is *faked* through and through.

"A pure viewer of knowledge, without will, without pain, outside of time."

— That is absolutely *not* "knowledge"!

— It is the will, which *underlines* everything in an object that helps it to feel *satisfied with itself* and *in harmony* (and which removes everything else).

It is the *making up and arranging of a world* in which we *say yes to ourselves*, even in our deepest needs.

Colors, sounds, shapes, movements: an *unconscious memory* is at work here, and in it the useful features of these qualities (or the things we link them with) are kept alive.

It is an *arranging* of things that is extremely self-interested, and ruthlessly self-interested at that.

It is a basic faking. It *shuts out* exactly that *objective* sense which only notes facts and seeks knowledge.

Simplifying things, bringing out what is typical: the pleasure of *overpowering* something by *putting a meaning into it*.

Thinking away everything harmful and hostile in the thing we are looking at (for example, a landscape or a thunderstorm).

The person who looks at something as art *allows* themselves to be *overpowered*. They do the opposite of what they usually do with anything coming at them from outside. They hang up their distrust, like taking off armor, and have no defense. It is an *exceptional* state: a *trusting, respectful, loving receiving*.

The will

? Interest in the *causes* and in what is *typical* (what dominates).

100.

On the *critique of ideals*: begin it by getting rid of the word "*ideal*" altogether. Instead, a critique of *wishful ideals*.

101.

To lend an ear to some poor anarchist loudmouth, a shrieking little devil, who sprays the whole of history with the poison of his hatred and then wants to convince us that this makes him a historian.

102.

A life among dumb cattle!

103.

What a person must have lived through to be able to write The Birth of Tragedy at the age of 26!

104.

(In Italian:) But one must not whistle in front of a professor: that is a sin against good manners.

105.

An action is supposed to be *good* because the conscience said yes to it! As if a work of art were beautiful just because the artist likes it a great deal! As if the "*value*" depended on the feelings of *pleasure* that the doer has along with it! (— And who can even sort out what part of that is vanity, what part is just resting comfortably in old habits, and so on!)

On the other hand, all *decisive* and valuable actions have been done *without* that kind of certainty…

We must try to judge by *objective* values. Is "the usefulness" to the community such a value? Yes. But it is usually *mixed up* again with the community's "feelings of pleasure." A "bad action" that works as a spur for the community, and that at first stirs up very unpleasant feelings, would in that sense be a *valuable* action.

106.

Against the morality of the herd. A declaration of war.

107.

A critique of "justice" and "equality before the law": what is this really meant to *get rid of?* Tension, hostility, hatred. But it is a mistake to think that this *increases* "happiness." The people of Corsica enjoy more happiness than the people on the mainland.

108.

The basic mistake: placing the goals in the herd and *not* in single individuals! The herd is a means, nothing more! But now people are trying to understand *the herd as if it were an individual* and to give it a higher rank than the single person. That is the deepest misunderstanding!!! The same goes for describing what makes us herd-like, our feelings of *sympathy* for others, as the *more valuable* side of our nature!

109.

These Paris poets and novelists of today, clever, nosy dogs, who with excited eyes follow "woman" all the way into her most foul-smelling secrets.

110.

Gury, Handbook of Moral Theology, Regensburg 1862

Stein, Studies on the Hesychasts, 1874

Braid, Hypnotism, translated into German by Preyer, 1882

von Cremer,

Cultural History of the Orient

(same author)

History of the Leading Ideas of Islam, 1868

(same author)

Historical Explorations in the Field of Islam, 1873

Notebook 6: Summer 1886 to Spring 1887

1.

If you have a brave and well-made soul inside your body, you can easily allow yourself this nice little luxury of being immoral.

Afterword and Closing Song

2.

Beyond Good and Bad?

A

philosophical argument.

(To add to and make clearer the most recently published

book, "Beyond Good and Evil")

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

3.

Seven Prefaces

With an appendix:

Songs of Prince Free-as-a-Bird.

"I live in my very own house,

"I never copied anyone, not ever, not at all,

"And I have always laughed at every master

"Who never laughed at himself."

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Leipzig.

Published by E. W. Fritzsch.

4.

Prefaces and Afterwords.

My writings talk only about things I have lived through myself. Luckily, I have lived through a lot. I am in them, body and soul. Why hide it? They are me, my very own self, and at the very most, the deepest core of that self. But I always needed a few years of distance first. Only then did I feel that strong, commanding desire and strength to describe each such experience, each state I had *lived past* and survived. In that sense, all my writings, with one single exception, though a very important one, are *dated backwards*. They describe a time earlier than the time they were written. Some of them, like the first "Untimely Meditations", even go back further than the time when an earlier book, "The Birth of Tragedy", was born and lived through. A sharp reader who compares them carefully will notice this. That angry outburst against old David *Strauss*, against his showy German patriotism, his smug comfort and his self-admiration, let out feelings I had carried around as a student, sitting in the middle of German education and its narrow-minded, self-satisfied "cultured" people. And what I said against the "historical sickness", I said as someone who had learned to *recover* from it. I was not at all willing to give up on "history" from then on. (Which has been proven.) When I expressed my thanks to my first and only teacher, Arthur Schopenhauer (and I would express it much more strongly today), I myself was right in the

middle of doubting all morality and seeing it fall apart. I already believed in "nothing at all anymore", as ordinary people say, not even in Schopenhauer. Exactly at that time I wrote a piece that I kept secret, "On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense". But already in "The Birth of Tragedy", with its teaching about the *Dionysian*, Schopenhauer's pessimism appears as something left behind. My celebration speech in honor of Richard Wagner, for his victory festival at Bayreuth (and Bayreuth stands for the greatest victory any artist has ever won), was at the same time an act of breaking away and growing apart from him. Wagner himself was not fooled about this. As long as you love someone, you do not paint such "portraits" of them, and you do not "observe" them at all. On page 46 of that piece it says: "Anyone who examines himself closely knows that even observing involves a mysterious *opposition*, the act of *looking against* someone." The calm I needed to *be able* to talk about long years of the deepest loneliness and going without came to me only with the book "Human, All Too Human". That book has the cheerful, curious coldness of a psychologist. He takes a lot of painful things from his past, pure facts, or more truly, fates, and pins them down for himself, as if *sticking* them in place with a needle, like an insect collector. And as everyone knows, with work like that you always get some blood on your fingers… Finally, let me say what these hints were meant to prepare the readers of this book for. This book, whose last part is now being published, is no different from my other writings so far. It is a piece of what lies *behind me*. What it is built on, the thoughts, first drafts and rough sketches of every kind, belongs to my past. It belongs to that mysterious time when "Thus Spoke Zarathustra" was born. Because they come from the same time, these notes may give useful clues for understanding that *hard-to-understand* work. Above all, they may help in understanding how it came about, which is a remarkable story. Back then, such thoughts served me either as a way to rest, or as a way to question myself and justify myself, in the middle of a task that

was enormously daring and full of responsibility. May readers use the book that grew out of them for a similar purpose! Or use it as a winding footpath that keeps quietly leading you, without your noticing, toward that dangerous, volcanic ground from which the Zarathustra gospel I just mentioned sprang up. This "Prelude to a philosophy of the future" is certainly not a commentary on Zarathustra's speeches and is not meant to be one. But it may be a kind of early glossary, a list of terms, in which the most important new ideas and new values of that book are mentioned somewhere and called by name. And that book is an event with no model, no example, nothing to compare it to in all of literature. And finally, my dear readers, suppose these very names do *not* please *you*, do *not* tempt *you*. Suppose even that, like the fox in the old fable who saw only footprints going into the lion's den and none coming out, you are frightened off. Who says I *want* it any other way? For my son Zarathustra, I demand deep respect. Only the very few should be *allowed* to listen to him. But me, his "father", people may laugh at, just as I laugh at myself. Both of these things are even part of my happiness. Or, to use a saying that hangs over my front door, and to say everything I have said once more in short:

I live in my very own house,

I never copied anyone, not ever, not at all,

and I have always laughed at every master

who never laughed at himself.

*

5.

Poets and Hymn-Singers. A study of where stress-based rhythm came from in the hymns of the Greek Church. By Father Edmond *Bouvy*

16 plus 384 pages.

Nîmes, House of the Assumption, 1886.

W. Meyer, The Beginning and Origin of Latin and Greek Rhythmic Poetry. A paper of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences, 1884.

Barbey d'Aurevilly

Works and Men.

Impressions of History.

6.

Basic Principles.

To the Logicians.

On the Theory of the Feeling of Power.

Against the Idealists.

Against Those Who Believe in Reality.

The Truth About Genius

What Is Questionable About the Virtues.

In Honor of Evil.

The Problem of the Artist.

Politics.

Woman and Love.

Nations and "the People".

Music and Musicians

Toward a Critique of Religions.

The People of the Mind

Loneliness.

7.

On the psychology of philosophers. How it feels to spend a long time among abstract ideas. The cooling effect that Plato felt. The hypnotic effect that the people of India perhaps felt and looked for. Isn't the longing to sink into "Om" really the same as the fakir's longing to become numb, by any means possible? And isn't it the same with the Stoics? Side by side you find the crudest physical pleasure-seeking and dreamy, speculative thinking.

8.

If we made our senses ten times sharper or ten times duller, we would die. The kind of senses we have is tied to what helps us survive. The same goes for what we feel to be big or small, near or far. Our "forms", the shapes in which we see things, contain nothing that any being other than humans could perceive. The conditions we need in order to exist set the most general laws. Within those laws we see forms, shapes and laws, the ones we are *allowed* to see…

9.

If there is no goal in the whole history of human fate, then we have to put one into it. That is, assuming that we *need* a goal, and that, on the other hand, we have seen through the illusion that there is a goal or purpose built into things. And we need goals because we need a will, which is our backbone. "Will" serves as a replacement for "faith", that is, for the idea that there is a *divine* will, Someone who has plans for us…

10.

If we do not want to bring shame on the name of philosophy, let us free ourselves from a few silly ideas. For example, from the idea of a "world process". We know nothing about such a thing. Even the idea of "world" is a boundary idea. With this word we mark out a realm where we send all the things we necessarily cannot know.

11.

The inventive power that made up our categories was working to meet a need. It needed safety. It needed quick understanding through signs and sounds. It needed shortcuts. So when we say "substance," "subject," "object," "being," or "change / becoming," we are not dealing with deep truths about the ultimate nature of reality. It was the powerful who turned the names of things into law. And among the powerful, it was the greatest artists of abstract thinking who created the categories.

12.

The more dangerous a quality seems to the herd, the more completely it has to be banned. This is a basic rule in the history of slander, of how good things get a bad name. Perhaps the truly terrifying powers still have to be kept in chains even today. (End of Human, All Too Human, volume 2.)

13.

The very last thing we will get rid of is the oldest stock of metaphysics, meaning the oldest beliefs about what supposedly lies behind the world we see. That is, if we can get rid of it at all. This old stock has taken itself into our language and our grammar, absorbing itself so deeply that it has become indispensable. It almost seems that if we

gave up this metaphysics, we would no longer be able to think. Philosophers, of all people, find it hardest to free themselves from one belief: that the basic ideas and categories of reason automatically belong to the realm of certain, ultimate truths. Since ancient times they have believed that reason itself is a piece of that higher, metaphysical world. In them, this oldest belief keeps breaking out again and again, like an overpowering relapse.

14.

Qualities are walls we cannot climb over. Nothing we do can stop us from feeling mere differences in quantity as something completely different from quantity, namely as qualities that cannot be reduced to one another. But everything for which the word "knowledge" makes any sense belongs to the realm where things can be counted, weighed and measured: the realm of quantity. On the other hand, all our feelings of value (that is, simply our feelings) cling to qualities. In other words, they cling to our own viewpoint-bound "truths," which belong to us alone and which simply cannot be "known." It is obvious that every being different from us feels different qualities, and so lives in a different world from the one we live in. Qualities are our special human quirk. To demand that these human interpretations and values of ours should be universal values, maybe even values that build up reality itself, is one of the inherited madnesses of human pride. And that pride still has its firmest home in religion. On the other side, do I still need to add the following? That quantities "in themselves" never show up in experience. That our world of experience is only a world of qualities. And that therefore logic, and applied logic such as mathematics, are among the clever tricks of the power we call life: a power that orders, overpowers, simplifies and shortens. So logic is something practical and useful, something that keeps life going. But for exactly that reason it is not, even in the slightest, something "true."

15.

Don't go looking for the meaning inside things. Put the meaning into them yourself!

16.

Why bother with ideas when you have ideals! Beautiful feelings are enough.

17.

I say wishful ideal, not ideal.

18.

People no longer eat a certain food because morality tells them to. In the same way, one day people will no longer "do good" because morality tells them to.

19.

Phenomeno-mania: a craze for appearances.

20.

Minds with no nose, or with a badly blocked-up cold: the whole species of mind that I call "beast-oxen."

21.

Having an ideal almost lets you off having ideas. All you need are beautiful eyes, beautiful feelings in the right place, and above all, now and then, an unforgivably foolish action.

Why bother with ideas when you have ideals! For that, beautiful eyes are enough, a swelling bosom, and now and then a first-class foolish action that no reason in the world can touch.

22.

Among the artists of the future. Here I see a musician who speaks the language of Rossini and Mozart as if it were his mother tongue. It is that tender, wild, everyday language of music, sometimes too soft, sometimes too loud, with its playful tolerance for everything, even for the "common" and crude. But as he speaks it, he lets a smile slip out. It is the smile of someone spoiled, refined, born late in history, who at the same time, from the bottom of his heart, keeps poking fun at the good old days and their very good, very old, old-fashioned music. Yet it is a smile full of love, even full of tender emotion. What? Isn't that the best attitude we can have toward the past at all today? To look back like this, with gratitude, and even to imitate "the old ones," with a lot of joy and love for the whole respectable and not-so-respectable world of our grandparents that we come from. And to do it also with that fine little grain of contempt mixed in, without which all love goes bad too quickly, turns moldy, and becomes "stupid." Maybe we could hope for and imagine something similar in the world of words too. Namely, that one day a daring poet-philosopher might come along. He would be refined and "born late" to an extreme degree, but able to speak the language of the folk moralists and holy men of the old days. And he would speak it so naturally, so freshly, so enthusiastically, so cheerfully and directly, as if he himself were one of those "primitive" people. But to anyone who has ears behind his ears, meaning someone who can hear what is hidden, he would offer a pleasure like no other. That listener would hear and understand what is really going on: how the most godless and unholy form of modern thought is constantly being translated back into the emotional language of

innocence and ancient times. And knowing this, the listener could share the whole secret triumph of the bold rider, who piled up this difficulty, this barrier, in front of himself, and then leaped right over the impossible itself.

23.

It matters little to me whether someone today says, with the modesty of a philosophical doubter or with religious surrender, "The true nature of things is unknown to me." Or whether someone else, bolder, who has not yet learned enough criticism and suspicion, says, "The true nature of things is largely unknown to me." Against both of them I insist that they are still claiming to know far too much, and imagining that they know it. Both of them assume that there really is a valid difference between a "true nature of things" and a world of appearance. To be able to make such a distinction, we would have to imagine our mind as having a self-contradicting character. On one hand, it would be built for seeing from a viewpoint, which is necessary so that beings of our kind can survive. On the other hand, it would also have the ability to recognize this viewpoint-bound seeing as viewpoint-bound, and to recognize appearance as appearance. That means: it would be equipped with a belief in "reality," as if this reality were the only one, and at the same time with the insight that this belief is only a narrowness of viewpoint compared with some true reality. But a belief that is looked at with this kind of insight is no longer a belief. As a belief, it has dissolved. In short, we must not imagine our mind as so self-contradicting that it is a belief and, at the same time, knows that this belief is only a belief. So let's get rid of the "thing as it really is in itself," and along with it one of the vaguest ideas of all, the idea of "appearance"! This whole opposition, like the older one of "matter and spirit," has been proven useless.

24.

This is now the fate hanging over Europe: its strongest sons reach their springtime late, and only rarely. Most of them are already disgusted, frozen as if by winter, and filled with gloom while they are still young, and they go under. And this happens precisely because they drank the cup of disappointment, and today that is the cup of *knowledge*. They drank it with all the passion of their strength, and they drank it to the bottom. And they would not be the strongest if they had not also been the most disappointed! Because that is the test of their power: they have to find *their own* health by coming up out of the whole sickness of their time. A *late* spring is their badge. Let us add: also late foolishness, late silliness, late wild high spirits! Our *youth* arrives when no one expects it anymore. We shift the seasons of life around. Whoever has been as amazed at himself as we have been may understand us here. Because this is how dangerous things are today: everything we loved when we were young has cheated us. Our last love, the one that makes us admit all this, is our love of truth. Let us make sure that this love does not cheat us too! —

25.

A Critique of Pessimism So Far

We reject judging things by how much happiness they bring. In the end, everything comes down to one question: what *meaning* does it have? We cut back the gloom. — *Our* pessimism means this: the world is not worth *what* we believed it was worth. Our own belief has pushed our drive for knowledge so high that today we *have to* say this. At first, then, the world counts as worth less. That is how it is *felt at first*. Only in this sense are we pessimists: we are willing to admit this shift in values without holding anything back, and not to keep droning on and lying to ourselves in the old way… And exactly by doing

this we find the deep passion that may drive us to look for *new values*. In short: the world could be worth much more than we believed. We have to see through *how naive our ideals are*. We have to see that, while we thought we were giving the world the highest interpretation, we may not even have given our human life a modest, fair value.

What has been *turned into a god*? The instincts for value inside the *community*, meaning whatever allowed the community to keep going.

What has been *slandered*? Whatever set the higher kind of person apart from the lower kind: the drives that create gaps between people.

A Critique of the Belief in Cause and Effect.

It is *not even* an interpretation. It is only a way of putting things into words,

a description. "One thing after another" is still *waiting* to be interpreted.

A Critique of the Idea of "Knowledge".

Against "Appearance".

Our great modesty: not turning the unknown into a god. We are only just beginning to know a little. The false efforts, and the wasted ones.

Our "new world": we have to recognize *how far we ourselves create our feelings of value*. That means we *are able* to put "meaning" into history…

This belief in truth reaches its final conclusion in us. You know what that conclusion says: that if there is anything at all to worship, it is appearance, illusion, that must be worshipped. It says that the lie, and *not* the truth, is divine…?

26.

On the History of European Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

The Teaching of the Eternal Return (everything happening again forever).

On the Ranking of People.

A Critique of the Highest Feelings of Value

Where They Come From

1)

from the world of the sick and the unlucky.

2)

from the herd and its instincts: cheerful religions and gloomy ones.

First Beginnings

of *opposite* values: —

why did they lose?

A Critique

of the "good person" (a critique of *God*).

A Critique

of the way feelings and passions have been judged so far (the ranking of them).

A Critique

of the philosophies so far (seen as the results of wishful ideals that came partly from sickness and partly from the herd).

The Will to Truth

Fear, laziness, sensual desire, the hunger to rule, greed — and the forms they change into.

Sickness, old age, tiredness —

The Shapes of the Feelings and Passions: tracing them all back to the *will to power*.

The Functions of Living Bodies, seen as ways the will to power takes shape.

A Theory of Power Structures:

How living things develop.

The Herd: a stage on the way to something else, a means of keeping alive the *richer, more varied, stronger* type.

"*Becoming more perfect*": this really comes down to the *type becoming more powerful*.

What it needs: slavery, social classes.

— in what way is going backward and falling apart also a "will to power"?

In the human body, the highest kind of being shows up as a *feeling or passion that has become spiritual and refined*, one that *gives orders* and *dominates*.

What is "spirituality", the life of the mind?

The View from the Whole Universe.

The *Ruling* Types and How Their Minds Work

the man (the result of a victory)

the lawgiver

the conqueror

the priest

the "shepherd" as opposed to the "master" (the shepherd is a *means* for keeping the herd alive; the master is the *purpose*, the reason the herd exists at all).

the nobility. What is *beauty*? The outward sign of someone who has *won* and *become a master*.

Notebook 7: End of 1886 to Spring 1887

Book One: "What is

truth?"

Chapter One. The psychology of error.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, based on Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook entry 18[17] from 1888).]

1.

The psychology of error

Since ancient times, we have said that the value of an action, of a person's character, or of a whole life lies in its intention. That is, it lies in the goal for which something was done, carried out, or lived. This very old quirk of taste is finally taking a dangerous turn. That happens if people become more and more aware that the things that happen in the world have no intention and no goal behind them. This seems to set the stage for a general loss of value. The gloomy saying "nothing has any meaning" really means this: "all meaning lies in the intention, and if the intention is completely missing, then the meaning is completely missing too." Because people valued things this way, they were forced to place the value of life in a "life after death." Or they placed it in the steady progress of ideas, or of humanity, or of their nation, or in something beyond human beings altogether. But this led them into an endless chain of goals, each one pointing to another, forever. In the end, people needed to find themselves a place in some "world pro-

cess." And they might even have the grim outlook that this process was heading toward nothing at all.

Against all this, the idea of a "goal" needs a much stricter critique. We must see that an action is never caused by a goal. We must see that "goal" and "means" are interpretations. When we interpret this way, we underline and pick out certain points of an event and ignore others, in fact most of them. We must see that every time something is done for a goal, something completely different and other actually happens. Every goal-directed action is like the supposed usefulness of the heat the sun gives off: the huge mass of it is wasted, and only a tiny part, hardly worth counting, has a "goal" or a "meaning." We must also see that a "goal" together with its "means" is an incredibly vague sketch. Such a sketch can give orders, as an instruction or as a "will." But it needs a whole system of obedient, trained tools that replace everything vague with fixed, exact amounts. In other words, we imagine a system of smarter but narrower minds, each setting goals and means, just so that we can give our one known "goal" the role of "cause of an action." But we really have no right to do this. It would be like solving a problem by placing its solution in a world we cannot observe. Finally: why couldn't a "goal" just be a side effect? It could be something that comes along with the chain of changes in the forces that are actually at work and that produce the goal-directed action. It could be a pale picture-sign, thrown forward into our awareness ahead of time, which helps us find our bearings about what is happening. It would then be a symptom of the event itself, not its cause. But with this, we have criticized the will itself. Isn't it an illusion to treat what shows up in our awareness as an act of will as if it were a cause? Aren't all the things that appear in our awareness just end results, the last links of a chain? They only seem to cause one another because they come one after another on a single surface of awareness. This could be an illusion.

An objection to the so-called "facts of consciousness." Observing ourselves is a thousand times harder than people think. Error may even be a condition for any observing at all.

Let's say I intend to stretch out my arm. Suppose I know as little about the human body and the mechanical laws of its movement as an ordinary person does. Then what could be vaguer, paler, and more uncertain than this intention, compared with what actually happens next? And suppose instead that I am the sharpest expert in mechanics, and I know exactly the formulas that apply here. I still would not stretch out my arm one bit better or worse. In this case, our "knowing" and our "doing" lie coldly apart, as if they were in two different kingdoms. On the other hand, think of Napoleon carrying out the plan for a military campaign. What does that mean? Here everything needed to carry out the plan is known, because everything has to be ordered. But even here, he needs people under him who interpret the general plan and fit it to the needs of the moment, to the amount of strength available, and so on.

The world is not one fixed way, with living beings simply seeing it as it appears to them. Instead, the world is made up of such living beings. And each of them has its own little corner from which it measures, notices, sees, and fails to see. There is no hidden "true essence" behind things. What changes, what appears — that is the only kind of being there is. (?)

Saying "it changes," or "there is no change without a reason," always already assumes a Something that stands behind the change and stays the same.

"Cause" and "effect": if we trace this back psychologically, it is the belief that shows itself in the verb, in active and passive, in doing and being done to. That means: first we split what happens into a doing and a being-done-to, and we assumed there is someone who does it.

Behind this lies the belief in the doer. It is as if, after you subtract all the doing from the "doer," the doer himself would still be left over. Here the idea of the "I" is always whispering the lines to us, like a prompter in a theater. Everything that happens has been interpreted as a doing, together with the myth of a being that matches the "I"
— — —

Chapter Two. The value of truth and error.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, based on Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook entry 18[17] from 1888).]

2.

The value of truth and error

Where our ways of valuing come from: from our needs

Could it be that what seems to be our "knowledge" also comes only from older ways of valuing? Ways so deeply absorbed into us that they are part of our basic makeup? So that really, it is only newer needs that are fighting against the results of the very oldest needs?

The world is seen, felt, and interpreted in such a way that living things can survive from this point of view. A human being is not just an individual. He is the whole of living things carrying on along one particular line. The very fact that he exists proves that a certain kind of interpretation has also lasted, even if it kept being built on. It proves that the system of interpretation has not changed. "Adaptation."

Our feeling of "not being good enough," our "ideals," and so on, may be the result of this piece of interpretation we have absorbed, of our viewpoint. Perhaps living things will finally die from it. It would be

like how organisms divide up their work among their parts: this also makes the parts shrink and weaken, and in the end brings death to the whole. The downfall of life in its highest form must be built in from the start, just as the downfall of each individual is.

The value of truth and error

(19)

Ways of valuing

A)

as a result (of life, or of decline)

B)

as a cause

misunderstood interpretation

masquerade (a disguise)

as the art of slandering others and glorifying oneself

shaped by social class

shaped by race

Sunday values and everyday values

in crises, in wars and dangers, or in peacetime

how values arise by praising an ideal and condemning its opposite.

Conflict

between making stronger and "making better"; between making the individual stronger and making a race stronger; between making a race stronger and making "humanity" stronger.

Note: how deep does "creativity" go?

Why is all activity, even the activity of one of our senses, tied to pleasure? Is it because there was some blockage or pressure before? Or is it rather because every action is an overcoming, a becoming master over something, and so it increases our feeling of power? Then there is the pleasure in thinking. In the end, it is not only the feeling of power. It is also the pleasure in creating and in what has been created. For all activity enters our awareness as awareness of a "work," something made.

The value of truth and error.

An artist cannot stand reality. He looks away, he looks back. He seriously believes that what a thing is worth is that shadowy leftover you get out of colors, shapes, sounds and thoughts. He believes that the more a thing, or a person, is refined, thinned out and turned into vapor, the more its worth grows: the less real it is, the more it is worth. This is Platonism. But Plato had one more piece of daring: he turned the whole thing upside down. He measured how real something is by how valuable it is, and said: the more "idea" something has, the more being it has. He flipped the idea of "reality" around and said: "What you take to be real is a mistake, and the closer we come to the 'idea', the closer we come to the 'truth'." Do you see it? That was the greatest renaming ever: and because Christianity took it over, we no longer notice how astonishing it is. Deep down, Plato, being the artist he was, preferred appearance to real being. That means he preferred the lie and the made-up story to the truth, and the unreal to what actually exists. But he was so convinced of how valuable appearance is that he gave it the labels "being", "causing things", "goodness" and truth, in short, everything else that people treat as valuable.

The idea of value itself, thought of as a cause: first insight.

The ideal, given every label that brings honor: second insight.

Chapter Three. The Will to Truth.

[The chapter titles here are not in Nietzsche's handwriting. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, based on Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook 1888, 18[17]).]

3.

The Will to Truth

The "agnostics", the people who worship the unknown and the mysterious for its own sake: where do they get the right to pray to a question mark as if it were God? A god who keeps himself hidden like that may deserve fear, but certainly not worship! And why couldn't the unknown be the devil? But "it must be worshipped": that is what the instinct for good manners commands here. That is very English.

The "transcendentalists" find that all human knowledge does not satisfy the wishes of their heart. In fact, it goes against those wishes and makes them shudder. So they innocently set up a world somewhere else, one that does match their wishes, and that happens to be out of reach of our knowledge. This world, they think, is the true world, and compared with it, the world we can know is only a trick of the senses. That is what Kant did, and before him the Vedanta philosophy of India, and also quite a few Americans. For them, "true" means: whatever matches what our heart wishes for. In the old days, "true" meant: whatever matches reason.

The most common sign of modern times: in his own eyes, man has lost an unbelievable amount of dignity. For a long time he saw himself as the center of existence, as the tragic hero of the whole show. Later he at least tried to prove that he was related to the deciding, truly valuable side of existence. That is what all metaphysicians do, the

thinkers about what lies beyond the physical world, who want to hold on to "the dignity of man" by believing that moral values are the most important values of all. Whoever has let go of God holds on all the more tightly to the belief in morality.

Will to truth

How strong feelings get weaker.

A.

a

Will, intention, fierce craving aimed in one direction.

b

Goal: less fierce, because the thought of the means and the path to get there comes in between.

c

"Reason" or "ground", without any craving: the rule that everything has a reason feels psychologically certain because people believe that an intention is the cause of everything that happens.

B.

Thinking that tells things apart comes from fear and caution in the will to take hold of things.

Picturing an object correctly was at first only a means to an end: the end of grabbing it, getting a grip on it and taking control of it.

Later, this correct picturing is itself felt as a kind of grabbing, as a goal, and reaching it brings satisfaction.

In the end, thinking becomes overpowering and using power: putting things together, fitting the new into old rows, and so on.

C.

The new causes fear. On the other hand, fear must already be there for us to notice something new as new.

Amazement is fear that has been weakened.

What is familiar makes us feel trust.

"True" is something that awakens a feeling of safety.

Mental laziness first tries treating as the same with every impression: that is, it treats the new impression and the memory as the same thing. It wants repetition.

Fear teaches us to tell things apart and to compare them.

In a judgment there is a leftover of will (it should be like this and that

), and a leftover of feeling pleasure (the pleasure of saying yes).

Note: comparing is not the original activity. Treating as the same is! A judgment, at first, is not the belief that something is like this or that. It is the will that something should be like this or that.

Note: pain is a judgment (a "no") in its crudest form.

Pleasure is a "yes".

On the psychological origin of "cause and effect".

Will to truth

Interpretation

How far the ways of interpreting the world are symptoms of a ruling drive.

The artistic way of looking at the world: sitting down in front of life like a spectator. But what is missing here is an analysis of how we look at things aesthetically, of how it boils down to cruelty, to a

feeling of safety, of being the judge and of standing outside. You have to take the artist himself and his psychology: a critique of the urge to play as a way of letting off energy, of the pleasure in change, of the pleasure in stamping your own soul onto things, of the artist's total selfishness, and so on. Which drives does he refine into something higher?

The scientific way of looking at the world: a critique of the psychological need for science. The wish to make everything understandable; the wish to make everything practical, useful and exploitable. How far this is against beauty and art. Only what can be counted and calculated has value. How far an average kind of person wants to gain the upper hand through it. It is terrible when even history is taken over in this way: the realm of those who feel superior and sit in judgment. Which drives does he refine into something higher!

The religious way of looking at the world: a critique of the religious person. He is not necessarily the moral person. He is the person of great highs and deep lows, who explains the highs with gratitude or suspicion and does not think they come from himself (and the lows neither). Basically, he is the person who feels "unfree", who refines his states of mind, his instincts to submit, into something higher.

The moral way of looking at the world. Feelings about social ranking of people are moved out into the whole universe. Things that cannot be shifted, law, everyone having a place, everyone being made equal: because these are valued most highly, they are also looked for in the highest place, above the universe or behind the universe, and also — — —

What they all have in common: the ruling drives also want to be seen as the highest judges of value in general, and even as the powers that create and rule. Of course these drives either fight each other or make each other give in (and sometimes they combine), or they take turns

ruling. But their deep conflict is so great that, if all of them want to be satisfied, you would have to picture a person of deep mediocrity.

So for the artist, "beauty" is something outside every ranking, because in beauty opposites are tamed. That is the highest sign of power, namely power over things that pull against each other. And it happens without strain: no force is needed anymore, everything follows and obeys so easily, and puts on the friendliest face while obeying. That is what delights the artist's will to power.

The ways of interpreting the world

and what they have in common.

Book Two: Where Values Come From.

Book Two: Where Values Come From.

Chapter One. The Metaphysicians

[The chapter titles here are not in Nietzsche's handwriting. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, based on Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook 1888, 18[17]).]

4.

The Metaphysicians

The naive ones: Lamennais, Michelet, Victor Hugo

People got used to authorities that could not be questioned, and in the end this habit turned into a deep need for such authorities. This need was so strong that, even in an age of criticism like Kant's, it proved stronger than the need to criticize. In a certain sense, it even managed to take over all the work of the critical mind and make that work serve it. In the next generation, people's sense of history natur-

ally led them to see that every authority is only relative. Yet the need proved stronger once again. It even put Hegel's philosophy of development to work for itself. That philosophy was really history renamed as philosophy, and it presented history as moral ideas slowly revealing themselves and outdoing themselves step by step. Since Plato, philosophy has been ruled by morality. Even in the thinkers before him, moral interpretations played a deciding role. For Anaximander, all things perish as a punishment for breaking away from pure being. For Heraclitus, the regular order of appearances was proof that the whole of change / becoming has a moral and lawful character.

What is the *test* for a moral action? People say: first, that it is unselfish; second, that it holds for everyone; and so on. But that is the morality of someone sitting in his study. You have to study actual peoples and see what the test is in each case, and what it expresses. It is a belief: "this kind of behavior is one of the basic conditions for our survival." Immoral means "bringing ruin." Now, all the communities where these rules were found have since died out. Some of these rules have been stressed again and again, because every new community that formed needed them once more, for example "you shall not steal." In times when people could not be expected to feel loyal to their society, for example in the Roman Empire, the urge turned instead toward "the salvation of the soul," to put it in religious terms, or toward "the greatest happiness," to put it in philosophical terms. For even the Greek moral philosophers no longer felt as one with their city-state.

Spinoza's psychological background. Thin!

First: the *pleasure-seeking point of view* comes first. What does *lasting joy* consist of? Or: how can the feeling of joy be made to last forever?

As long as joy is tied to some single thing, it is limited and passing. It becomes perfect when it no longer changes along with things, but

rests in the unchanging whole that connects them. It is eternal when I turn the whole universe into my own property, "all things in me," and can say at every moment of all these things of mine: "I carry them with me."

In his "Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding," Works volume two, page 413, Spinoza writes: "I made up my mind to find out whether there was something whose possession would give me the enjoyment of a lasting and highest joy forever." And: "Love for an eternal and infinite being fills the mind with a joy that shuts out every kind of sadness." And: "The highest good is the *knowledge* that our mind is one with the universe."

Second: the *natural*, self-centered point of view. Virtue and power are the same thing. Virtue does not give things up; it wants. It does not fight against nature, but for it. It is not the destruction of the *strongest* feeling, but its *satisfaction*. Good is whatever increases our power; evil is the opposite. Virtue comes from the drive to keep ourselves alive. Spinoza says: "Whatever we do, we do in order to keep and increase our power." And: "By virtue and power I mean the same thing."

"Goal equals desire. Virtue equals power." Ethics, part four, definitions seven and eight.

Third: here the typical "thinker" gives himself away. Knowledge becomes master over all other feelings; it is the stronger one. Spinoza says: "Our true activity lies in our thinking nature, in reasonable reflection. The desire to be active is the same as the desire to live according to reason."

Spinoza says: "I don't think much of the authority of a Plato, an Aristotle, or a Socrates." He calls the teaching of "substantial forms," which is the old church-school way of talking about built-in purposes, "one foolishness among a thousand others."

Feuerbach's "healthy and fresh delight in the senses"

"Principles of the Philosophy of the Future," 1843.

against "abstract philosophy"

Ancient philosophy saw human beings as the *purpose* of nature.

Christian theology saw the saving of human beings as the *purpose* of God's plan.

Strange, this *Spinoza*: "By the bite of conscience I mean sadness, together with the thought of something in the past that turned out against all expectation." Ethics, part three, proposition eighteen, notes one and two, pages 147 and 148; and the definitions of the feelings, number seventeen, page 188.

As its opposite he sets gladness: when the expected outcome does not happen and fear suddenly stops. Despite what the scholar Kuno Fischer says, it could be that Spinoza picked this name based on its main feature, and that he saw what he described here as the real core of every case of guilt. After all, he had to deny guilt *in his own system*. So what was left for him of the fact called "the bite of conscience"? What *remained* of it?

If, in the end, everything happens through the power of God, then everything is perfect in its own way, and there is no evil in the nature of things. If human beings are completely unfree, then there is no evil in the nature of the human will. So harm and evil are not in things, but only in human imagination.

In God there is no will, no mind, no personality, and no purpose.

Spinoza argues against those who say that God does everything for the sake of the good. These people seem to assume something outside God, something that does not depend on God, which God looks to as a model when he acts, or which he strives toward as a goal. Truly,

Spinoza says, that would mean making God a slave to fate, and that is the greatest nonsense. Ethics, part one, proposition thirty-three, note two.

The final reason given for every event is "God willed it." Spinoza calls this "the hiding place of ignorance." But God's will cannot be seen into by human beings. With this way of thinking, truth would have stayed hidden from people for all eternity, *if mathematics had not shown people a different measuring stick for truth*. Mathematics does not deal with purposes, but only with the nature and properties of size and quantity.

Descartes says: "I took many things to be *true* that I now see were mistakes." Spinoza says: "I took many things to be *good* that I now see are empty and worthless." And: "If there is a real good that can never be lost, then the satisfaction it gives is just as lasting and unbreakable, and my joy is eternal."

A psychological mistake in reasoning: as if the fact that a thing lasts guaranteed that my feeling toward it would last too!

Here the "artist" is completely missing. This is the extreme, and comical, nitpicking of a logician *who turns his own drive into a god*.

Spinoza believes he has understood everything completely.

And with it he has the *greatest* feeling of power. The drive toward that has overpowered and wiped out all his other drives.

The awareness of this "knowledge" stays with him. A kind of "love of God" grows out of it: a joy in existence, however it may be, a joy in *all* existence.

Where do all our bad moods come from, our sadness, fear, hatred, and envy? From one single source: our love for things that *pass away*. When this love goes, the whole family of those desires goes with it.

Spinoza writes: "Even though I saw clearly how empty the goods of the world are, I still could not fully get rid of greed, lust for pleasure, and ambition. But one thing I learned: *as long as my mind lived in that reflection, it was turned away from these desires*. And this was a great comfort to me. For from this I saw that those evils were not beyond cure. At first, the new life came only in rare, short moments —"

Nothing has value compared to the *value of clear reasoning*. All other values are just the result of unclear thinking. It is a contemptuous rejection of all the good things in life, a constant *slandering* of everything, in order to lift one single thing to the highest height: *clear thinking*. Spinoza says: "All *doubt* comes from examining things without order."!!!

Just like in Schopenhauer: our desires fall silent under the power of looking at something beautiful, what he calls aesthetic contemplation.

This is a real psychological experience, but it has been explained wrongly and turned into a general rule.

Leibniz says: “You must judge with me from the result: because God chose this world exactly as it is, that is why it is the best one.” From his book Theodicy, page 506.

Kant's religious prejudice. His unconscious habit of believing things without questioning them. His moral point of view, which takes charge of everything: it rules, it steers, it gives the orders.

The first lie, the basic mistake everything else is built on (the Greeks called it “proton pseudos”): the question “How is the fact of knowledge possible?”

But is knowledge even a fact at all?

What is knowledge? If we do not know what knowledge is, we cannot possibly answer the question of whether knowledge exists. Very nice!

But if I do not already "know" whether knowledge exists, or even can exist, then I cannot sensibly ask the question "What is knowledge?" in the first place. Kant simply believes that knowledge is a fact. What he wants is naive: he wants knowledge of knowledge!

"Knowledge is judgment!" But a judgment is a belief that something is this way or that way! And it is not knowledge!

"All knowledge consists of synthetic judgments," meaning a link between different ideas that is necessary and true everywhere.

It has the quality of being universal: the thing behaves this way in every case and never otherwise.

It has the quality of being necessary: the opposite of the claim can never happen.

People always take it for granted that our belief in knowledge is justified, just as they take it for granted that the feeling behind our conscience's judgments is justified. Here the ruling prejudice is a moral view of what reality is.

So the argument goes: 1) There are claims that we consider true everywhere and necessary.

2) This quality of being necessary and true everywhere cannot come from experience.

3) Therefore it must be based on something other than experience, somewhere else, and must have a different source of knowledge!

Kant argues: 1) There are claims that are valid only under certain conditions.

2) This condition is that the claim does not come from experience, but from pure reason.

So the question is: where does our belief in the truth of such claims get its reasons from? No, wait: where does it get its judgments from! But how a belief comes about, how a strong conviction is born, is a psychological problem. And very limited, narrow experience is often enough to produce such a belief!

Kant already assumes in advance that there are not only facts that come after experience ("data a posteriori"), but also facts that come before it ("data a priori"). Necessity and universality can never be given by experience. But then what makes it clear that they exist at all without experience?

There is no such thing as a single, separate judgment!

A single judgment on its own is never "true" and never knowledge. Only when many judgments are connected and related to each other do we get some kind of guarantee.

What makes a true belief different from a false one?

What is knowledge? Kant "knows" it. How heavenly!

Necessity and universality can never be given by experience. So, Kant says, they must be independent of experience, coming before all experience!

An insight that comes "a priori," meaning independent of all experience, straight from reason alone, is what Kant calls "pure knowledge."

Kant says the basic rules of logic, the rule that a thing is the same as itself and the rule that something cannot contradict itself, are pure knowledge, because they come before all experience. But these are not knowledge at all! They are articles of faith that we use as rules to guide our thinking!

To prove that mathematical judgments come before experience, that they belong purely to reason, Kant has to treat space as a form that belongs to pure reason itself.

Hume had declared: "There are no synthetic judgments a priori at all," meaning no judgments that link ideas in a new way and yet come before experience. Kant says: Yes, there are! The mathematical ones! And if such judgments exist, then maybe metaphysics exists too, a knowledge of things through pure reason! That is the question.

Mathematics is possible under conditions under which metaphysics is never possible.

All human knowledge is either experience or mathematics.

A judgment is synthetic, which means it links different ideas together.

It is a priori, which means that this link is universal and necessary, and can never come from what our senses perceive, only from pure reason.

If there are to be synthetic judgments a priori, then reason must be able to link things together. Linking is a form. So reason must have powers that give things their form.

Space and time as conditions that make experience possible.

Kant describes the French Revolution as the change from a state that works like a machine to a state that works like a living body!

Kant judges that the inventive, groundbreaking minds in the sciences, the so-called "great minds," are a completely different kind of thing from a genius. What they discovered and invented could also have been learned, and it has in fact been fully understood and learned. In Newton's work there is nothing that cannot be learned; but Homer cannot be understood in the same way as Newton! Kant writes: "In

science, then, the greatest inventor differs from the most hardworking imitator and student only in degree." Psychological idiocy!!

Kant says: "Music has a certain lack of good manners about it," "it pushes itself on us, so to speak," "it cuts into our freedom."

For Kant, music and the art of color form their own category, which he calls "the beautiful play of sensations."

He puts painting and garden design together in the same group.

Kant prepares the question of whether humanity has a tendency toward the good by first asking whether there is any event that cannot be explained in any other way than by this moral nature of humanity. That event is the Revolution. He writes: "Such an event in human history is never forgotten, because it has revealed a tendency and a power in human nature toward the better, something no politician could ever have worked out from the way things had gone up to then."

If humanity keeps getting worse, then its goal is the absolutely bad. Kant calls this the "terrorist" way of thinking, the opposite of the happiness-centered way of thinking, or "chiliasm," the belief in a coming golden age. And if history swings back and forth between progress and going backward, if all its activity has no purpose and no goal, nothing but busy foolishness, so that good and evil cancel each other out and the whole thing looks like a silly comedy, Kant calls this the "Abderitic" way of thinking, named after the town of Abdera, whose people were famous for being fools.

Kant sees nothing in history except a moral movement.

Kant says: "A conscientious judge of heretics is a contradiction in terms."

Psychological idiocy.

According to Kant, without being born again, all human virtues are just shiny bits of misery. This improvement is possible only through what he calls the "intelligible character," our true self beyond what the senses can see. Without it there is no freedom: not in the world, not in the human will, and not to be saved from evil. If salvation does not consist in improvement, it can only consist in destruction. For Kant, the origin of our visible, everyday character, our leaning toward evil, and our rebirth are all acts of that hidden true self. Our everyday character must be turned around at its very root.

That is the whole of Schopenhauer right there.

Kant says pity is a waste of feelings, a parasite that harms moral health. "It cannot possibly be a duty to increase the suffering in the world." If you do good only out of pity, you are really doing good to yourself and not to the other person. Pity is not based on principles but on emotions. It is a kind of sickness: other people's suffering infects us. Pity is a contagion.

Kant on all the gestures and words of bowing and scraping: "a kind of fussy pedantry in which the Germans have gone further than any other people on earth." "Are these not proof of a widespread tendency among people to crawl and grovel?" "But whoever turns himself into a worm cannot complain afterward when he gets stepped on."

Kant writes: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and growing wonder and awe, the more often and the longer we think about them: the starry sky above us and the moral law within us."

He goes on: "The first sight, of a countless crowd of worlds, *as it were wipes out my importance* as an *animal creature*. Such a creature must give back the matter it was made from to the planet, which is just a tiny dot in the universe, after it has been filled with living energy for a

short time, nobody knows how. The second, on the other hand, raises my worth as *an intelligence* to infinity."

Whether we can even think of freedom depends on Kant's theory of space and time, which he calls the "transcendental aesthetic." If time and space belong to things just as they are, then appearances are the same as the things as they really are in themselves. Then there is no room for any difference between the two. Then nothing exists outside of time. And then freedom is completely impossible. Freedom can only be thought of as a quality of a being that is not bound by the conditions of time. So it must be a being that is not an appearance, not an idea in someone's mind, but a thing as it really is in itself.

Why are appearances not things as they really are in themselves? Because they exist in space and time, and space and time are only pure forms of how we see and sense things.

Against the supposed freedom of the mind, Kant says: "If our freedom consisted in being pushed along by ideas, like a spiritual machine," then "it would really be no better than the freedom of a roasting spit, which also, once it has been wound up, makes its movements all by itself."

Freedom cannot be thought of in the world of appearances, whether that is the outer world or the inner one.

Chapter Two: The Religious People

[Note: The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

5.

Religious people

The Reformation: one of the most dishonest outbursts of low, common instincts

A number of strong, crude urges that have grown out of control want to break out into the open air. All that is needed is to invent excuses, above all grand-sounding words, under which these wild animals are allowed to be let loose.

Luther as a psychological type: a coarse and phony peasant who, using "Christian freedom" as his excuse, lets out all the violent needs that had piled up inside him.

People want to be masters again, to rob, to knock others down, to curse. On top of that, the senses want to get their share of pleasure. Above all, people look greedily at the enormous wealth of the Church.

The priest at times is God himself, or at least the one who stands in for him

In themselves, habits and exercises of self-denial are far from showing an attitude that goes against nature or is hostile to life. Nor do they show decline or sickness.

Overcoming yourself, using harsh and terrible inventions: a way to respect yourself and to demand respect from others. Self-denial as a means of power.

The priest stands for a superhuman feeling of power. He is even a good actor playing a god, and acting that god is his job. So he will instinctively reach for methods that give him a certain frightening strength in his control over himself.

The priest stands for superhuman powers: in knowledge, in knowing the future, in the ability to harm and to help, and also in superhuman ecstasies and kinds of happiness: —

— the actor who plays "gods" in front of people who are healthy, happy, hopeful and powerful

— the actor who plays the "Savior," speaking mainly to the sick and the deprived, to people full of bitter resentment, to the oppressed and — — —

— Priests are the actors of something superhuman, which they have to make visible and real to the senses, whether it is ideals, gods or saviors. That is where they find their calling; that is what their instincts are made for. To make it as believable as possible, they have to go as far as they can in making themselves like what they play. Above all, their actor's cleverness must give them a clear conscience, because only with that can they truly persuade anyone.

Chapter Three. The Good People and the Improvers.

[The chapter titles here are not in Nietzsche's handwriting. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following the last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

6.

The Good People

Ruthless uprightness.

(9)

A moral ideal wins by the same "immoral" means as every other victory: force, lies, slander, injustice

"You shall not lie": people demand honesty about truth. But recognizing the facts, refusing to let yourself be fooled, has been strongest of all among liars. They also saw exactly how unreal this popular "honesty" is. People always say either too much or too little. The demand that you lay yourself bare with every word you speak is naive.

People say what they think, they are "truthful," only under certain conditions: namely, that they will be understood (among equals), and understood kindly (again, among equals). With strangers, people hide themselves. And anyone who wants to get something says what he wants others to think about him, not what he actually thinks. ("The powerful man always lies.")

An ideal that wants to win out, or to hold its ground, tries to prop itself up: a) by a fake origin; b) by claiming to be related to powerful ideals that already exist; c) by the shiver of mystery, as if some power beyond all argument were speaking here; d) by slandering the ideals that oppose it; e) by a lying teaching about the advantages it brings, for example happiness, peace of mind, calm, or the help of a powerful god, and so on.

On the psychology of the idealist: Carlyle, Schiller, Michelet

Once you have uncovered all the defenses and protective measures by which an ideal keeps itself alive, have you proved it wrong? It has used the means by which everything alive lives and grows. And all of those means are "immoral."

My insight: all the forces and urges that make life and growth possible have been placed under the ban of morality. Morality is an instinct for saying no to life. Morality must be destroyed in order to set life free.

The Good People

A critique of the virtues of the herd.

Mental laziness at work

1) in trust, because distrust demands tension, watching and thinking things over

2) in worship, where the gap in power is large and giving in is necessary. In order not to be afraid, people try to love and look up to the

stronger one, and to explain the difference in power as a difference in worth. That way the relationship no longer makes them rebel.

3) in the sense for truth. What is true? Whatever explanation costs us the least mental effort. Besides, lying is very hard work.

(21)

4) in sympathy. Treating yourself as the same as others, trying to feel the same, taking on a feeling that is already there, is a relief. It is something passive, set against the active attitude that holds on to its own right to judge values and keeps using it all the time. That active attitude never lets you rest.

5) in fairness and coolness of judgment: people shy away from the effort of strong feeling and prefer to stand on the sidelines, "objective."

(18)

6) in uprightness: people would rather obey a law that already exists than create a law for themselves, than give orders to themselves and others. The fear of commanding. Better to give in than to react.

7) in tolerance: the fear of using one's right to judge

The

masked

kinds of the will to power

1)

The longing for freedom, independence, and also for balance, peace, working side by side as equals. Also the hermit, and "freedom of mind." In its lowest form: the will simply to exist, the "instinct to survive."

2)

Fitting into something bigger in order to satisfy that bigger whole's will to power. Submission; making yourself indispensable and useful to whoever holds power. Love, as a sneaky path into the heart of someone more powerful, in order to rule over him.

3)

The sense of duty, conscience, the imagined comfort of belonging to a higher rank than those who actually hold power. Accepting a ranking of people that allows you to judge, even those more powerful than you. Condemning yourself. The invention of new lists of values (the Jews are the classic example).

Morality as the work of immorality.

A.

For moral values to come to power, nothing but immoral forces and feelings have to help.

B.

The very birth of moral values is the work

of immoral feelings and calculations.

Morality as the work of error.

Morality gradually

contradicting itself.

Payback.

Honesty about truth, doubt, holding back judgment, judging.

The "immorality" of believing in morality.

The steps:

1)

Morality rules completely

All the facts of biology are measured and judged by it

2)

An attempt to treat life and morality as one and the same (a sign that doubt has woken up: morality should no longer be felt as the opposite of life). Several methods are used, even a path that goes beyond this world.

3)

Setting life and morality against each other: morality is judged and condemned from the point of view of life.

In what ways morality has harmed life

a)

the enjoyment of life, gratitude toward life, and so on

b)

making life more beautiful and more noble

c)

knowledge of life

d)

the unfolding of life, since morality tried to turn life's highest forms against life itself

On the other side of the account: how morality has been useful to life.

The

morality as a principle for keeping a larger whole alive, by putting limits on its members: "the tool"

The

morality as a principle for keeping people alive against the danger that passions pose from inside: "the average person"

The

morality as a principle for keeping people alive against the life-destroying effects of deep need and wasting away: "the sufferer"

The

morality as a principle working against the terrible explosion of the powerful: "the lowly person"

The narrow-minded pride of certain philosophers who see themselves as following pure reason, and who oppose feeling in general in morality (Kant): against pity, against the emotions

The Good People

The danger in modesty. — Think of fitting in too early with a setting, with tasks, with groups of people, with the daily routines and work habits that chance happens to put us in. Think of doing this at a time when neither our strength nor our goal has yet become clear to us as something that gives us our own laws. Fitting in like that wins us a peace of conscience that comes far too early. It feels pleasant and refreshing, and it makes us feel part of something. This early settling for less flatters our feelings, because it feels like escaping from restlessness inside and outside us. But it spoils us and holds us down in the most dangerous way. We learn to respect things the way "people like us" do, as if we had no measure and no right inside ourselves to set values of our own. We try to value things the same way others do, *against* the inner voice of our taste, which is also a kind

of conscience. All this becomes a terrible, delicate set of chains. And if there is no explosion in the end, one that bursts all the ties of love and morality at once, then such a mind shrinks and becomes petty. It grows soft, weak and dull, like an object rather than a person. — The opposite is bad enough, but still better. That means suffering from the people around you, both from their praise and from their disapproval. It means being wounded by them and festering inside, without showing it. It means defending yourself against their love, mistrustful without wanting to be. It means learning silence, maybe by hiding it behind talking. It means making yourself hidden corners and lonely places no one can guess at, for the moments when you breathe out, when you cry, when you find a lofty comfort. You keep this up until at last you are strong enough to say: "What do I have to do with *you*?" and go *your own* way.

Virtues are just as dangerous as vices, as long as we let them rule us from the outside, as an authority and a law. The right way is to produce them ourselves first, as our most personal self-defense and need. They should be conditions of *our own* life and well-being, which we see and accept, no matter whether other people grow under the same conditions as we do or under different ones. This rule, that virtue is dangerous when it is understood as impersonal and *objective*, also applies to modesty. Many of the finest, rarest minds are ruined by it.

The morality of modesty is the worst kind of softening for those souls who only make sense if they become *hard* in good time.

The Good People

Very few people manage to see a problem in the things we live in and have been used to since ancient times. Our eyes are simply not set up to see that. As far as our morality is concerned, it seems to me this has not yet happened at all.

The problem of "every person as an object for others": this is the reason for the highest honors. But every person for themselves — no!

The problem of "you shall": here is an urge that cannot explain its own reasons, much like the sex drive. Yet it is supposed *not* to fall under the judgment that other drives fall under. On the contrary, it is supposed to be the one that measures their worth and judges them!

The problem of equality, while all of us are thirsty to stand out: here, of all places, we are supposed to do the opposite and demand exactly the same of ourselves as we demand of others.

This is so tasteless, so obviously crazy. And yet it is felt to be holy, to be of a higher rank. The way it contradicts reason is hardly noticed.

Sacrificing yourself and being selfless are treated as marks of distinction. So are total obedience to morality and the belief that, before morality, you stand equal with everyone.

Neglecting and giving up your well-being and your life are treated as marks of distinction. So is giving up completely on setting your own values, and so is the strict demand to see everyone else give up the same thing. "The value of actions is *fixed*: every single person is subject to this judgment."

We see that an authority is speaking. But who is speaking? We can forgive human pride for looking for this authority as high up as possible, so that it would feel as little humbled as possible by bowing to it. So — God is speaking!

People needed God as an absolute approval that has no higher court above it, as a "categorical imperative," meaning a command with no conditions. Or, if they believed in the authority of reason, they needed a philosophy of oneness, a theory of everything being one, through which it would be logical

Now suppose the belief in God is gone. Then the question comes up again: "*Who* is speaking?" My answer comes not from metaphysics, not from grand theories about reality, but from the biology of animals: *the herd instinct is speaking*. It *wants* to be the master; that is why it says "you shall!" It only lets the single person count as part of the whole, for the good of the whole. It hates those who break away, and it turns the hatred of every other individual against them

Let us think about how high a price is paid for such a moral rulebook (an "ideal"). Its enemies are — well, the selfish people

the gloomy sharp-mindedness of making oneself small in Europe (Pascal, La Rochefoucauld)

the inner weakening, the loss of courage, the gnawing at oneself, among those who are not herd animals

the constant stress on average qualities as the most valuable ones (modesty, standing in line with everyone else, being a tool by nature)

a guilty conscience mixed into everything that is its own master, everything original:

and so unhappiness: — and so *gloom* over the world of those who turned out stronger

the herd mindset carried over into philosophy and religion: also its fearfulness, its — — —

let us leave aside the fact that a purely selfless action is psychologically impossible

My philosophy aims at a ranking of people, not at a morality of individualism. The thinking of the herd should rule within the herd, but it should not reach beyond it. The leaders of the herd need a completely different way of valuing their own actions. So do the independent ones, or the "beasts of prey," and so on.

I stand apart from both movements, the morality of the individual and the morality of the group. That is because the first one doesn't know the ranking of people either; it wants to give each one the same freedom as everyone. My thoughts are not about how much freedom should be allowed to this person, or that person, or everyone. They are about how much *power* one person or another should have over others or over everyone. In other words, they are about how far giving up freedom, even slavery itself, can be the foundation for producing a *higher type*. Thought of on the largest scale: *how could the development of humanity be sacrificed* in order to help a higher kind than humans come into being? —

Don't make a mistake about yourself! If you hear the moral command inside you the way selflessness understands it, then you belong to the *herd*. If you have the opposite feeling, if you feel that your unselfish, selfless actions are your danger and lead you off your path, then you do not belong to the herd.

There is an idea that seems crazy. It says that each person should value what he does for someone else more highly than what he does for himself, and that this other person should do the same in turn, and so on. It says we should only call actions good because the person doing them is not thinking of himself but of the other person's well-being. Yet this idea makes sense. It makes sense as an instinct of community spirit. It rests on the judgment that the single person matters very little, but that everyone together matters a great deal, as long as they really form a *community*, with a shared feeling and a shared conscience. So it is a kind of training to look in one particular direction, a will to a way of seeing that tries to make it impossible to see oneself.

My thought: goals are missing, and *these goals must be individual people*!

We see what is going on everywhere: every single person is sacrificed and used as a tool. Walk down the street and see whether you meet anything but "slaves." Where to? What for?

Moral things have puzzled me like riddles. Today I would know how to give an answer. What does it mean that my neighbor's well-being *should* be worth more to me than my own? And yet that my neighbor himself *should* value his own well-being differently than I do, namely by putting *my* well-being above it?

Whether a person is used from childhood on to — — —

The advantage of standing apart from your own time.

To get a clear look at all moralizing as a thing in itself to be studied. Also as a *riddle*.

What does the "you shall" mean? And what does it mean even to treat a philosophy as something simply "given"?

Because in the end, you need a great deal of morality to be immoral in this subtle way. Let me use a comparison.

A doctor who studies how the body works and is interested in a disease, and a sick person who wants to be cured of it, do not want the same thing. Let's suppose that this disease is morality, because it is a disease, and that we Europeans are the ones suffering from it. What a subtle torment and difficulty arises when we Europeans are, at the same time, the curious observers and doctors of that same disease! Will we even seriously wish to get free of morality? Will we really want to? Leaving aside the question of whether we *can*? Whether we can be "cured" at all? —

Holding back, for example, on the pessimists' question of whether pleasure or pain is greater in life

and the same goes for the question of what our knowledge is worth

— What has been held back until now? Our urge to experiment. The danger was too great: "the salvation of the soul" was at stake.

The victory over the old God, seen as a principle that *slanders the world* — a victory of paganism. But then the world shows itself in a new and terrifying light.

— the saying "One thing is needful" and the saying "Seek the kingdom of God, and everything else will be given to you as well!" ("Everything else" includes, for example, love of your neighbor, which is morality in today's sense.)

(8)

Note this well! *To give the evil person back a good conscience* — has that been what I was trying to do, without even meaning to?

And to give it to the evil person precisely because he is the *strong person*? (Here one should mention what *Dostoevsky* thought about the criminals in the prisons.)

The Good People

Guilt: a sign that a person's character is not up to the *deed* he has done. People feel guilt even after *good deeds*: because those deeds are unusual, because they lift a person out of his old surroundings —

The events just before an action relate to that action itself. But there is also a history *further back*, and it points *further ahead*: the single action is at the same time one link in a much larger fact that comes *later*. The *shorter* processes and the *longer* ones are not separate —

Book Three: The Struggle of Values.

Chapter Two. How Art Works on the Body.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following his last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

7.

How Art Works on the Body

To the Artists.

A distinction: there are artists who want to make a living from their art, and there are others, like Dante and Goethe.

What *need* does the art grow out of? Working backward from the "work" to the artist.

What "success" proves: in any case, a *misunderstanding* of the artist, and *usually* of the work too.

The demanding *senses* — what does that mean?

The lack

of *logic* — wit, the subject matter.

of honesty in *education*

"Naturalism" — what does it mean? Above all, it is a *stimulant*: the ugly and the monstrous stir up emotion.

"Romanticism" — what does it mean?

Where the different nations stand in the development of the "European soul".

How art relates to the Church.

Pessimism in the theory of beauty ("looking without any personal interest", "the Parnassian poets").

— I am not happy enough, not healthy enough, for all this romantic music (Beethoven included). What I need is music that makes you forget suffering; music in which animal life feels like a god and triumphs; music that makes you want to dance; music that perhaps, to put it bluntly, helps you digest well? Making life lighter through *light*, bold, self-confident, carefree rhythms, and covering life in gold through *golden*, tender, kind harmonies — that is what I take for myself out of all music. Really, a few bars are enough for me.

Wagner, from beginning to end, has become impossible for me, because he cannot *walk*, let alone dance.

But these are judgments about the body, not judgments about beauty. Only — I don't have a theory of beauty anymore!

Can he walk?

Can he dance?

— the borrowed forms: for example Brahms, a typical "latecomer" who only imitates. Mendelssohn's educated Protestantism is the same (an earlier "soul" is being *copied* in verse…)

— the moral and poetic substitutes in Wagner: one art used as an emergency patch for weaknesses in the others.

— the "historical sense", inspiration drawn from poems and legends: that typical transformation, for which G. Flaubert is the clearest example among the French and R. Wagner among the Germans

how the romantic belief in love and in the future turns into a longing for nothingness: 1830 turning into 1850

if anything at all has been achieved, it is a more harmless attitude toward the senses, a more joyful, more kindly, more Goethe-like attitude toward physical pleasure

and likewise a prouder feeling about knowing things, so that the "pure fool" finds few believers

How Art Works on the Body

Beethoven — a poor great man, deaf, in love, misunderstood, and a philosopher, whose music is full of gigantic or painful dreams.

Mozart — expressing *completely German feelings*: naive innocence, a melancholy, thoughtful tenderness, faint smiles, the shyness of love.

The piano heightens and refines these feelings. Mendelssohn surrounds them with burning, delicate, sickly dreams.

Harsh, tormented desires, broken and rebellious cries, modern passions pour out of every chord Meyerbeer wrote.

Regarding the *Painters*.

All these modern painters are really *poets* who wanted to be *painters*. One looked for dramas in history, another for scenes of everyday customs; this one turns religions into pictures, that one a philosophy. One imitates Raphael, another the early Italian masters; the landscape painters use trees and clouds to make odes and sad poems. *Not one* of them is simply a painter. They are all archaeologists, psychologists, people who stage some memory or theory. They enjoy flattering our learning and our philosophy. Like us, they are full, overfull, of general ideas. They love a form not for what it is, but for what it *expresses*. They are the sons of a learned, tormented, overthinking generation — a thousand miles away from the old masters, who did not read and only thought about giving their eyes a feast.

Our situation: wealth makes our sensitivity grow; we suffer from the tiniest pains; our bodies are better protected, our souls are sicker. Equality, comfortable living, freedom of thought — but at the same time hateful envy, a mad rush to get ahead, impatience with the

present, a craving for luxury, unstable governments, and the suffering that comes from doubt and searching.

— we lose just as much as we gain —

Is a citizen of 1850 happier than one from 1750? He is less oppressed, better educated, better supplied with comforts, but *not more cheerful - - -*

In the 17th century nothing was uglier than a mountain range; it made people think of a thousand misfortunes. *People were tired of wildness and barbarism, just as today we are tired of civilization.* Today the streets are so clean, there are police everywhere, manners are so peaceful, events so small and so predictable, that people now love *greatness and the unexpected*. Taste in landscape changes just like taste in literature. Back then, literature offered long, sugary-sweet novels and polite essays on love; *today* it offers violent poetry and dramas about the body and its drives.

This wilderness, the total, merciless rule of bare rock, the enemy of life — it gives us a rest from our sidewalks, our offices and our shops. *That is the only reason* we love it.

On Delacroix:

singing with color

"you echo of Victor Hugo's voice

during the wars, the poetic melancholy of England and the philosophical lyricism of Germany had crept into the French soul

the soul that completed Victor Hugo's

the dominance of *music* among the Romantics of the 1830s and 1840s

Delacroix

Ingres was a passionate musician who worshipped Gluck, Haydn, Beethoven and Mozart

He told his students in Rome: "If I could turn you all into musicians, you would become better painters because of it.")

The same goes for Horace Vernet, who had a special passion for the opera Don Giovanni (as Mendelssohn reported in 1831).

The same goes for Stendhal, who says about himself: — — —

President De Brosses says about the countryside around Rome: "Romulus must have been drunk when he got the idea of building a city on such ugly land."

Fénelon compares the Gothic style of building to a bad sermon.

In 1803, in a letter to Monsieur de Fontanes, Chateaubriand describes his first impression of the countryside around Rome.

Lamartine has the right words for Sorrento and for Posillipo, near Naples —

Victor Hugo raves about Spain, because, as he says, "no other nation has borrowed less from the ancient world, because it has never been touched by classical influence."

Delacroix did not want Rome either; it frightened him. He raved about Venice, just like Shakespeare, like Byron, like George Sand. The dislike of Rome shows up in Théophile Gautier too — and in Richard Wagner.

What is laughable about our *democracy*: the black coat that everyone wears…

envy, sadness, a lack of moderation and of good manners, the heroes in the books of George Sand, Victor Hugo and Balzac

(and of Wagner)

the taste for the *Renaissance*

a room furnished in it, dazzling and dark, in a style that is tormented and magnificent

that age of strength and effort, of bold invention, of wild, unchecked pleasures and terrible hard work, of sensuality and heroism

Jeanne d'Albret, the mother of King Henry the Fourth, as d'Aubigné judged her:

"a princess who had nothing of a woman about her except her sex; her whole soul was given to manly things, her mind was powerful in great matters, and her heart could not be beaten by hard times."

To act, to dare, to enjoy; to spend your strength and your effort freely, like someone throwing money around; to give yourself over to the feeling of the moment; to be always pushed along by passions that never die down; to put up with, and even go looking for, the extremes of every kind of contrast — that was life in the sixteenth century.

In the middle of all this violence and all these pleasures, religious devotion burned hot. Back then, religion was not a virtue but a passion. People went to church the way they went into battle or off to meet a lover.

The knights in the time of the Crusades were strong, sturdy children. When they killed and howled, they were like beasts of prey. Once the rage had passed, they went back to tears, and happily threw their arms around each other's necks, full of tenderness.

Whether we judge something "pleasant" or "unpleasant" — think of music, for example — changes and takes shape according to what we feel follows a rule: what seems reasonable, makes sense, and means something to us.

The Physiology of Art: How Art Relates to the Body

The feel for fine shades of difference, and the pleasure in them — which is what being truly *modern* really means — the pleasure in what is *not* general, runs against another drive. That other drive finds its pleasure and strength in grasping what is *typical*, just like Greek taste in its best period. In that Greek taste, the overflowing richness of life is mastered: measure and balance take charge. Underneath it lies that *calm* of the strong soul, which moves slowly and dislikes anything that is too lively. The general case, the rule, is *honored* and *lifted up*; the exception, on the other hand, is pushed aside, and the fine shades are wiped away. What is firm, powerful and solid, a life that rests broad and mighty and keeps its strength hidden inside — that is what "*pleases*" us. In other words, it matches what we think of ourselves.

Chapter Three. On the History of European

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

[The chapter titles at this point were not written by Nietzsche himself. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following his last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook entry NF-1888,18[17]).]

8.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)

For the preface.

Until now I have gone through a kind of torture. All the laws by which life grows and develops seemed to me to stand against the very values that make people like me able to bear living. This does not seem to be something many people suffer from knowingly. Even so, I want to gather the signs that lead me to believe this is the basic character, the truly tragic problem, of our modern world. I believe it is a hidden distress that is the cause, or the explanation, of all its other troubles. This problem has become conscious in me.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)

A.

Start from a full, wholehearted appreciation of the people of our time:

do not be fooled by how things look on the surface. These people make less of a dramatic impression, but they offer quite different guarantees that they will last. Their pace is slower, but the rhythm itself is much richer.

Health is improving. People are discovering what a strong body really needs, and little by little they are creating those conditions. "Asceticism", the old self-denial, is now meant only ironically.

There is a shyness about extremes, a certain trust in the "right path", no wild enthusiasm. People settle down for a while into narrower values, like "the fatherland", or like "science", and so on.

But this whole picture would still be ambiguous, it could mean two things:

it could be a rising movement of life,

or else a falling movement of life.

B.

The belief in "progress". Among the less intelligent, it looks like life on the rise. But that is self-deception.

Among the more intelligent, it looks like life in decline.

Description of the symptoms.

One single point of view ties them together: uncertainty about how to measure value.

Fear that everything is, in general, all for nothing.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

C.

How all ways of measuring value depend on moral ones:

the religious, the artistic, the economic, the political, the scientific.

D.

Signs that belief in morality is declining.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

Nothing is more dangerous than a wishful ideal that goes against the very nature of life.

The nihilistic result, the belief that nothing is worth anything, comes as a consequence of the moral way of valuing.

Selfishness has been spoiled for us, made distasteful, even after we have seen that true unselfishness is impossible.

What is necessary, what must happen, has been spoiled for us, even after we have seen that a "free will" (liberum arbitrium) and a so-called "freedom of the mind beyond the senses" are impossible.

We see that we cannot reach the realm where we placed our values. But that does not mean the other realm, the one we actually live in, has gained any value at all. On the contrary, we are tired, because we have lost our main driving force. "All for nothing, until now!"

How morality blocks knowledge.

For example, the attempt to make life agree with morality (to

treat them as the same thing), and to justify life before the court of morality.

The claim that unselfishness was there from the very beginning.

The claim that a selfless way of thinking is possible even without duty and without punishment or reward (sans obligation et sanction).

How far morality has blocked knowledge.

The value of the individual, the "eternal soul": a falsification of psychology.

Resistance to cause and effect: a falsification of physics.

Resistance to the history of how things came to be at all: a falsification of history.

A falsification of the theory of knowledge.

Book Four: The Great Noon.

Book Four: The Great Noon.

Chapter One. The Principle of Life

"Ranking of people".

[The chapter titles here are not in Nietzsche's handwriting. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following the last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

9.

On method: the value of studying what appears inside us and what appears outside us,

that is, inner and outer description of how things appear.

A. Consciousness developed late and poorly. It developed for outward purposes. It is open to the crudest mistakes. In its very nature it is something that falsifies, makes things cruder, and lumps things together.

B. By contrast, the world we know through our senses can be observed a hundred times more richly, more finely and more exactly. Studying what appears outside us gives us by far the richest material and allows much stricter observation. Inner events, on the other hand, are hard to grasp and lie closer to error. In fact, inner processes by their very nature produce errors, because life is only possible when it is guided by forces like these, forces that narrow things down and create a particular viewpoint.

Note well: every movement is a sign of something happening inside. So by far the greatest part of everything happening inside us is given to us only as signs.

Principle of life

The basic mistakes of biologists so far: what matters is not the species, but individuals who can make a stronger impact. The many are only a means to that.

Life is not inner conditions adjusting to outer ones. It is will to power, which works from the inside, conquering more and more of what is "outside" and absorbing it into itself.

These biologists simply carry on the old moral ways of valuing. They assume that unselfishness is higher in value by its very nature. They are hostile to the lust for rule, to war, to what is useless, and to rank and the order of social classes.

Against the theory that the single individual keeps in mind the good of the species, its offspring, at the cost of its own good: that is only appearance, an illusion.

The individual takes the sexual instinct enormously seriously. But that is not a result of how important sex is for the species. Rather, producing offspring is the individual's real achievement, and so its highest interest, its highest expression of power. Of course this is not

judged from the point of view of consciousness, but from the center of the whole process of being an individual.

Principle of life

Consciousness begins entirely on the outside, as the coordinating and becoming aware of "impressions". At first it is as far away as possible from the biological center of the individual. But it is a process that goes deeper, becomes more inward, and keeps moving closer to that center.

On how logic came about. There is a basic urge to treat things as the same, to see things as the same. This urge is changed and kept in check by what helps and what harms, that is, by success. An adjustment forms, a milder degree in which the urge can be satisfied without at the same time denying life and putting it in danger. This process matches exactly that outer, mechanical process, which is its symbol: living matter, the plasma, constantly makes whatever it takes in like itself, and fits it into its own forms and rows.

Being an individual, seen from the theory of descent, shows one thing constantly splitting into two. It also shows individuals constantly dying away for the benefit of a few individuals who carry the development further. Each time, the overwhelming mass dies off, like "the body". The basic event is this: countless individuals sacrificed for the sake of a few, so that the few can exist. One must not fool oneself: it is just the same with peoples and races. They form the "body" that produces single valuable individuals, who carry the great process forward.

Principle of life

The powers at work in history can be recognized clearly once we strip away all moral and religious ideas of purpose. They must be the same

powers that are at work in the whole of living, organic existence. The plant kingdom tells us about them most clearly.

The great

victories over the animal: the animal as slave,

or as enemy.

Victories of the man over the woman: the woman

alongside the great swings back and forth, for example between the healthy and the sick.

Where human dignity has been placed:

in having become master over the animal in the human being,

in having become master over the woman in the human being.

The Greek

ideal.

Against this, Christian dignity:

in having become master over pride in the human being,

over the . . .

Principle of life

Greater complexity, sharp separation, fully developed organs and functions side by side, while the in-between stages disappear: if that is perfection, then there is a will to power in the organic process. Through it, ruling, shaping, commanding forces keep expanding the area of their power, and inside that area they keep simplifying again and again. The command is: grow.

Being useful for speeding up the pace of development is a different kind of "useful" from being useful for fixing and preserving, as firmly and lastingly as possible, what has already developed.

The mind is only a means and a tool serving a higher life, serving the raising of life. And as for "the Good", as Plato understood it, and Christianity after him, it even seems to me a principle that is dangerous to life, that slanders life, and that says no to life.

10.

We all know the kind of person who has fallen in love with the saying "to understand everything is to forgive everything." These are the weak people, and above all the disappointed ones. Because if there is something to forgive in everything, isn't there also something to look down on in everything? This is the philosophy of disappointment. Here it wraps itself up so kindly in pity and puts on a sweet face.

These are romantics who have lost their faith. Now they at least want to stand by and *watch* how everything goes and how it all turns out. They call it "art for art's sake," "objectivity," and so on.

11.

Think of how things first seem to us: empty and full, solid and loose, still and moving, the same and different. Hasn't the oldest way that things seem to us been turned into metaphysics, into big theories about what is ultimately real?

European philosophy of the last few centuries, which, with a kind of dignity and plain, honest solemnity

— what does it mean to know something? Am I able to know?

12.

The popular ideals: the good person, the selfless person, the saint, the wise man, the just man. Oh, Marcus Aurelius!

13.

You have to keep your eyes open when some fellow who was worn out and feeble from the very start keeps showing off his tiredness as if it were wisdom, pessimism, and a higher, glowing insight.

When a tired, failed fellow, worn out and feeble from the very start, keeps presenting his tiredness as the result of a deep inner life full of struggle and suffering, an inner life of brooding and beer — — —

or a loud-mouthed, restless, cackling goose breathes out her ambition onto printed paper

I have already seen so much of this faking in philosophy, like passing off fake money: the donkey who was tired and feeble from the very start, who his tiredness — — —

14.

Kant defined philosophy as "*the science of the limits of reason*"!

The idea that there is some "truth" that we could somehow get closer to —

Say I see something that happens in a regular way, and I sum it up in a *formula*. Then I have made it easier and shorter to describe the whole thing. But I have not proven any "law." Instead, I have raised a question: why does something repeat itself here? My formula is only a guess that, behind it, there is a tangle of forces, still unknown to us, and of those forces being released. It is pure myth to think that these

forces obey a law, and that because they obey it, we get the same thing happening every time.

15.

Ethics, or the "philosophy of the wishful ideal." "It *ought* to be different," it *should* become different. So being dissatisfied would be the seed that ethics grows from.

One could save oneself from this feeling in two ways. First, by choosing to look at the places where one does *not* have this feeling. Second, by understanding how arrogant and silly it is. Because to demand that *one thing* be different from how it is, means to demand that *everything* be different. It contains a rejection, a criticism, of the whole world. In that sense it is… *But life itself is exactly such a demand!*

To find out *what* is, and *how* it is, seems far higher and more serious than any "this is how it should be." That is because "this is how it should be" is a human criticism and a piece of arrogance, so it seems doomed from the start to be laughable. It expresses a need: the demand that the way the world is set up should match our human comfort and well-being. It also expresses the will to do as much as possible toward that goal. On the other hand, it was only this demand, "this is how it should be," that gave rise to the other demand, the wish to know what *is*. Knowing what is, after all, already grows out of the questions: "What? Is this possible? Why exactly like this?" Our surprise that our wishes and the way the world goes do not match is what led us to study the way the world goes. Or maybe it is different again. Maybe that "this is how it should be," our wish to overpower the world, — —

16.

Our badges, for example: our critical attitude toward Christianity. Human, All Too Human, volume 2, section 182

Table of Where We Draw the Line

For example:

against idealists

and romantics

as actors and people who lie to themselves

against those who just sit back and look on

against nationalism.

On the Psychology of Loneliness.

In Honor of Error.

The conflict between making people more humane and making people greater.

Those who are full and give freely, in contrast to those who search and crave.

There are two kinds of artistic states of mind.

Books and people.

Questions of health.

Modern music.

Classical education.

The big city.

Vices of the mind

17.

So far, the thing that has disgusted me most is the parasites of the mind. In our unhealthy Europe you find them sitting everywhere, and with the clearest conscience in the world. Maybe they are a little gloomy, with a bit of a pessimistic air. But mainly they are greedy, dirty, and they make things dirty. They sneak in, they snuggle up, they steal, they are like a skin rash — and they are as innocent as all little sinners and germs. They live off the fact that other people have minds and spend them freely, with full hands. They know that it is part of the very nature of a rich mind to spend itself carelessly, without petty caution, living for the day, even wastefully. For the mind is a bad housekeeper. It never notices how everyone lives off it and eats it up.

18.

"*Every activity*, simply as activity, brings pleasure," say the scientists who study the body. In what way? Is it because built-up energy creates a kind of *urge* and *pressure*, a state in which doing something feels like a *release*? *Or* is it because every activity means *overcoming* difficulties and resistance? And because many small resistances, overcome again and again, easily, as if in a rhythmic dance, bring with them a kind of *tickle of the feeling of power*?

Pleasure as a *tickle of the feeling of power*: it always assumes something that pushes back and gets overcome.

All feelings of pleasure and pain are matters of the mind. They are overall judgments about some kind of blockage or holding back, interpretations of it

19.

In ages when the will is weaker and people are more varied, a high degree of decline and strangeness is not immediately dangerous. It does not require cutting such people out of the body of society. On the other hand, society does not collapse right away either. That is because even very willful and *selfish* people only have an *average* amount of strength, and this keeps them from turning outward to attack and dominate others.

In such ages, the danger comes from those few who have gathered a *powerful will*. In strong ages, by contrast, the danger lies in the *unsure* people.

20.

The morality of philosophers, from Socrates on, is like Don Quixote: a foolish fight against imaginary enemies

a good deal of play-acting

a misunderstanding of oneself

what is it really?

a personal quirk: the enthusiasm for clever arguing, an optimistic attitude — senses that are far too easily stirred up, and therefore fear

the biggest of all frauds and self-deceptions: to claim that the good, the true, and the beautiful are one and the same, and to *put this unity on display*

The fight against the Sophists, the paid teachers of arguing, is hard to understand psychologically. A *separation* was needed so as not to be mistaken for them. And everything invited that mistake, because they actually felt related to each other. It was a *competition* for the *young men* —

Virtue and irony and sharp wit in Socrates — in Plato, the lover (a lover of boys), the artist (?), the man who favored rule by a small elite —

A declaration of independence, leaving the city-state behind, breaking away from one's roots —

Criticizing culture from the standpoint of "morality" and clever arguing!!! —

a total lack of "historical sense" —

A symptom of *decline* —

— haven't *all* specifically *moral* movements so far been symptoms of decline?

21.

The view that all seeing is from a viewpoint, applied to the wishful ideal (to the *ideal*)

22.

Someone criticizes something: deep down, his temperament is saying yes to it

Often it does us good when there is no cleverness around

23.

Note: When it comes to psychology, I have *two senses*:

first:

a sense for the naked truth

and second:

the will to the grand style (a few main statements, tied together as tightly as possible; no showy wit, no fancy speechmaking).

24.

All the drives and forces that morality *praises* turn out, as I see it, to be basically *the same* as the ones it slanders and rejects. For example, justice as will to power, and the will to truth as a tool of the will to power

25.

Against Darwinism.

— how useful a body part is does *not* explain how it came about. Quite the opposite!

— during most of the long time while a trait is forming, it does not keep the individual alive and does not help it, least of all in the struggle against outside conditions and enemies

— So what does "useful" really mean in the end? You have to ask: "Useful for *what*?" *For example*, something that helps a person *last longer* could work against that person's strength and splendor. Something that keeps a person alive could, at the same time, hold them back and freeze their growth. On the other hand, a *lack* of something, or even a *defect*, can be extremely useful, because it pushes other organs to work harder. In the same way, a *hard situation* can be what keeps something alive, because it squeezes a person down to a size where they *hold together* and don't waste themselves.

— The individual itself is a struggle between its parts, fighting over food, space, and so on. Its growth depends on some parts *winning* and *taking control*, while other parts *shrink away* or are turned into mere organs that serve the rest.

— Darwin *overrates* the influence of "outside conditions" to the point of nonsense. What really matters in the process of life is the huge shaping force that works from the inside and creates forms. That force *makes use of* and *exploits* the "outside conditions"…

— The *new* forms that grow from the inside are *not* shaped with a goal in mind. But in the struggle between the parts, a new form will soon find some partial use. Then, through being *used*, it keeps getting shaped more and more perfectly.

— If only the things that proved useful *over a long time* had survived, then the first to survive would be the abilities that harm, destroy, and break things apart, along with the senseless and the accidental,
— — —

26.

What does it *mean* that we feel drawn to the empty countryside around Rome? And to the high mountains? What does our nationalism *mean*?

Idealism, or lying to yourself.

A critique of civilization.

The changing shapes of the Cross.

The ways we refine and polish

fear

lust.

contempt

27.

A fuller idea of life

The kinds of intoxication

Modern play-acting (for example, the "Fatherland": how far being patriots actually goes against our conscience)

All the falseness of Europe.

The gap —

28.

The strong person, powerful in the instincts that come with strong health, digests his actions exactly the way he digests his meals. He can handle even heavy food. But mainly he is guided by a sound and strict instinct: he does nothing that goes against him, just as he eats nothing that doesn't taste good to him.

29.

Toward a history of modern vice.

Anarchism.

30.

— The ancient philosophers were naive. They were innocent about how the mind works. Their "wise men" were boring.

The ancient world believed in reason, and believed reason came from the gods. It believed in virtue, seen as the highest form of reason and as the mind's independence. Compared with that, Christianity teaches *suspicion*: the suspicion that everything is basically evil and cannot be fixed, that the pride of the mind is its greatest danger, and so on.

31.

The tragic age for Europe: brought about by the struggle with nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

32.

There is a total lack of *preparation* for taking in truths. There are no steps in education. There is blind trust in the mind. And there is modern "good-naturedness".

33.

Against the theory of the "milieu", the idea that our surroundings make us what we are. Race is far, far more important. Surroundings only lead to "adapting". Within that adapting, all the stored-up strength is what really plays out.

34.

The belief in cause and effect. This idea of one thing "following another" still needs *interpretation*. A "law of nature" is an interpretation, and so on.

"Cause and effect" goes back to the idea of a "*deed* and a *doer*". Where does *this* split come from?

Motion is a sign of something happening that is not mechanical. To *stop* at the mechanical view of the world is like a deaf person treating the written score of a piece of music as the whole point.

Logic — nobody has discovered what it really is. Is it the art of naming things in a way that can only mean *one thing*?

35.

A critique of human goals. What did ancient philosophy want? What did Christianity want? What did the Vedanta philosophy of India want? What did Buddha want? — And *what is hiding behind* this wanting?

How the ideals so far came about in the mind:

what do they really mean?

36.

Suppose the usual way we understand the world were a *misunderstanding*. Could we imagine a kind of *perfection* in which even such *misunderstandings are approved?*

The idea of a new perfection: things that do *not* fit our logic, our "beautiful", our "good", our "true" could be perfect in a higher sense than our ideal itself is.

37.

"*Life is force, you see, and it forces us to do everything.*"

Lucilius

"It is called life because it is won by force." (In Greek, the word for life, "bios", sounds like the word for force, "bia".)

38.

The first question is not at all whether we are happy with ourselves. It is whether we are happy with anything at all. Suppose we say yes to one single moment. Then we have said yes not only to ourselves, but to all of existence. For nothing stands on its own, neither in us nor in things. If our soul has trembled and rung with happiness even once, like a string on an instrument, then all of eternity was needed to make

that one event happen. And in that single moment of saying yes, all of eternity was approved, set free, justified, and affirmed.

39.

A full and powerful soul doesn't just cope with painful, even terrible losses, with going without, with being robbed, with being looked down on. It comes out of such hells richer and more powerful. And, to say the most important thing, it comes out with new growth in the joy of love. I believe that anyone who has guessed something about the deepest conditions for all growth in love will understand Dante, when he wrote over the gate of his Hell: "Eternal love made me too."

40.

The world has grown enormous and keeps on growing. Our wisdom is finally learning to think of itself as smaller. Even we scholars are just beginning to know *little*…

41.

The soil of desires that logic grew out of: the herd instinct is in the background. Assuming that cases are the same takes for granted that there is "the same soul". *The purpose is to make understanding each other, and ruling, possible.*

42.

There is a conflict between the "true world" that pessimism uncovers and a world that we can actually live in. To deal with it, we have to test what rights *truth* really has. We need to measure the meaning of all these "ideal drives" against *life*, so we can understand what that conflict really is. It is the fight between a sick, despairing *life* that clings to the beyond, and a life that is healthier, more stupid, more

full of lies, richer, and less broken down. So it is not "truth" fighting against life, but one kind of life fighting another. — But the first kind wants to be the *higher kind*! — This is where the argument has to start: that a ranking is needed, — that the first problem is the *ranking of the kinds of life*.

43.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) as a result of the moral interpretation of the world.

Ranking of people.

The eternal return (everything happening again forever).

44.

"Useful" in the sense of Darwin's biology means proving to be an advantage in the struggle with others. But to me, the real *progress* is already the *feeling of more*, the feeling of *getting stronger*, quite apart from any use in the struggle. Only out of this feeling does the will to struggle arise in the first place, —

45.

1.

A critique of values, measured against life.

2.

Where values come from

3.

Life as will to power

4.

The ones who turn things upside down

Their hammer is "the teaching of the eternal return (everything happening again forever)".

46.

The kind of person I speak for, the kind whose mouthpiece I am:

They do not suffer from ideals that never came true, but from ideals that did come true! What I mean is this: the ideal that we ourselves stand for, the one people make such a fuss about, is something we treat with a slight contempt —

a dangerous homesickness for the old "wildness" of the soul, for the conditions that made greatness possible, and devilry too —

we enjoy our messier, wilder, crazier moments. We would be capable of committing a crime just to find out what guilt actually feels like —

we are bored and unimpressed by the everyday charms of the "good person", of a good, orderly society, of decent, well-behaved scholarship —

we do not suffer from "corruption". We are very different from Rousseau, and we do not long for the "good person living in a state of nature" —

we are tired of goodness, not of suffering. We no longer take sickness, bad luck, old age and death seriously enough, and least of all with the seriousness of the Buddhists, as if these things were arguments against life.

47.

A critique of flag-waving patriotism: Suppose someone feels values above himself that he rates a hundred times higher than the well-being of the "fatherland", of society, of family and blood ties and race. These are values that stand beyond all countries and races, international values. Such a person would become a hypocrite if he tried to play the "patriot". It takes a low kind of person, a low kind of soul, to put up with national hatred inside itself, or even to admire it and praise it. Royal ruling families take advantage of this kind of person. And again, there are plenty of business classes and social classes who profit whenever these national acids, which split peoples apart, are in power again. Of course this includes the clowns who can be bought, the artists. In fact, a lower species of human has come out on top — —

48.

Pain is a kind of intelligence: it does not simply point to what is being harmed right now. Instead it tells us how much the damage matters for the individual as a whole.

The question is whether there are pains in which "the species", and not the individual, is suffering —

What do "active" and "passive" mean? Isn't it really about becoming the master and being overpowered?

And what about subject and object?

49.

The question of values goes deeper than the question of certainty. The question of certainty only becomes serious once we assume that the question of values has already been answered.

If you work out "being" and "appearance / illusion" in psychological terms, you do not end up with any "being in itself". You get no tests for what is "real". You only get degrees of how much something appears to be so, measured by how strongly we take part in, or invest in, a particular appearance.

50.

The problem of truth, honesty about truth, and certainty.

The problem of the good

The problem of justice.

The problem of measure and moderation.

The problem of the ranking of people.

51.

Being hurt provokes either a fight back or giving in.

52.

Christian interpreters like Carlyle are today a form of dishonesty, and so is the admiration for the ages of faith.

53.

Ideas and perceptions do not fight a struggle for survival among themselves, but a struggle for control. The idea that loses is not destroyed. It is only pushed back or placed beneath the winner. In the world of the mind, nothing is ever destroyed…

54.

To stamp the character of being onto change / becoming, to make what is always changing look fixed and lasting: that is the highest will to power.

A double falsification, one coming from the senses and one from the mind, in order to keep hold of a world of things that simply are, that stay the same, that are equal in value, and so on.

The idea that everything comes back again is the closest that a world of change / becoming can come to a world of fixed being. It is the peak of thinking about these things.

Because people gave high values to what simply "is", they came to condemn and feel dissatisfied with everything that changes. This happened only after such a world of fixed being had first been invented.

The different shapes that "what is" has taken over time: body, God, ideas, laws of nature, formulas, and so on.

"What is" as an appearance / illusion; values turned upside down: it was the appearance / illusion that gave things their value —

Pure knowledge as such is impossible in a world of change / becoming. So how is knowledge possible at all? As a mistake about itself, as will to power, as a will to fool ourselves.

Change / becoming as inventing, wanting, denying oneself, overcoming oneself. There is no subject behind it, only a doing, a setting-up of things, something creative. There are no "causes and effects".

Art as a will to overcome change / becoming, as a way of "making things last forever". But it is short-sighted, depending on its point of view. It is like repeating, on a small scale, the tendency of the whole world.

What all life shows should be seen as a small-scale formula for the tendency of everything. That is why the idea of "life" needs to be pinned down in a new way: as will to power.

Instead of "cause and effect", there is the struggle of changing things against each other, often with one swallowing up its opponent. The number of changing things is not fixed.

The old ideals are useless for explaining everything that happens, once we have seen that they come from our animal past and were useful for survival. Besides, all of them go against life.

The mechanical theory of the world is useless too. It gives the impression that everything is meaningless.

All the idealism of humanity so far is about to flip over into nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning): into the belief that nothing has any value at all, which means nothing has any meaning…

The destruction of ideals, the new emptiness, the new skills needed to bear it: we amphibians, creatures who live in two worlds at once.

What is needed first: courage, patience, no "going back", and no feverish rushing forward.

Note: Zarathustra keeps treating all earlier values as something to parody and poke fun at, and he does this out of overflowing richness, not out of lack.

55.

Suppose that "there is only one thing that truly is, the I", and that all other "things that are" are made in its image. Suppose, too, that belief in the "I" stands or falls with belief in logic, meaning belief that the categories of reason are a deep, metaphysical truth. And suppose, on the other hand, that the I turns out to be something that is changing / becoming. Then — — —

56.

Against the physical atom. To understand the world, we have to be able to calculate it. To calculate it, we need causes that stay constant. Because we find no such constant causes in reality, we make some up: the atoms. That is where the theory of atoms comes from.

Being able to calculate the world, being able to express everything that happens in formulas: is that really "understanding"? Think of a piece of music. If everything in it that can be calculated and shortened into formulas were worked out, what would we actually have understood about it? And then these "constant causes", these things and substances, something "unconditional": they are made up. So what has been achieved?

57.

There was a gloomy afternoon when Spinoza was unhappy with himself. A small incident would not leave his mind, and he blamed himself for it. All of a sudden he said to himself: "This is the morsus

conscientiae, the bite of conscience! But how can I still feel the bite of conscience?"

58.

A critique of the Christian ideal: what it takes for granted are the conditions for the soul's existence. It is all about eternal life, and about damnation or salvation.

59.

The belief that everything is determined only harms the kind of morality that believes in liberum arbitrium, free will, as the basis of being moral, and that believes in "responsibility".

60.

Positivism stops at what appears and says, "There are only facts." Against this I would say: No, facts are exactly what there are not. There are only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in itself". Perhaps it is nonsense even to want such a thing. "Everything is subjective," you say. But even that is an interpretation. The "subject" is not something given. It is something added on by invention, something stuck in behind things. And in the end, is it even necessary to put an interpreter behind the interpretation? Even that is invention, a guess.

As far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning at all, the world can be known. But it can also be read in other ways. It does not have one meaning hidden behind it, but countless meanings. This is "the view that all seeing is from a viewpoint".

It is our needs that interpret the world: our drives, and what they are for and against. Every drive is a kind of lust for control. Each one has

its own point of view, which it would like to force on all the other drives as the rule.

61.

Draft chapter titles

The conflict between "improving" humans and "making them greater" (that is, taming them versus making them stronger)

A critique of the Christian ideal (humility, chastity, poverty, simple-mindedness)

A critique of the Stoic ideal (including the "fakir", the holy man who conquers his body)

A critique of the Epicurean ideal (including the calm "Olympian" attitude, and also the "quietly contemplative" people)

The changing shapes of slavery.

Artists and conquerors. What does beauty want?

Justice, guilt, punishment, responsibility — the lawmaker.

A critique of the romantic ideal, and also of the ideal that gives the pessimist his strength to hate and to look down on things

Life is all about interpretation (what does nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) mean?) "Having no goal"

The next century and the ones that came before it.

A critique of action (cause and effect, doing, purpose)

Ranking of people

62.

Very few people realize what is packed into the point of view of the *wishful ideal*. Every "this is how it should be, but it isn't," or even "this is how it should have been," carries a hidden verdict: it condemns the whole course of things. Because in that course nothing stands alone. The tiniest thing holds up the whole. The entire building of the future stands on your one little wrong. So every time you criticize the smallest thing, you condemn the whole along with it. Now suppose, as even Kant believed, that the moral rule has never been fully lived up to, and that it just hangs above reality like a kind of next world, never actually dropping down into it. Then morality would contain a judgment on the whole of things. But that would let us ask: *where does morality get the right to do that?* How does a part get to play judge over the whole? — And suppose this moral judging, this dissatisfaction with what is real, really is a instinct that can never be rooted out, as people have claimed. Then might this instinct not belong among the stupidities of our species that can never be rooted out, and among its arrogances too? — But by saying this, we are doing the very thing we are blaming. The point of view of the wishful ideal, of playing judge without any right to, is itself part of the nature of the course of things. So is every injustice and every imperfection. — It is simply our idea of "perfection" that does not get what it is counting on. Every drive that wants to be satisfied is expressing its unhappiness with the way things are right now. What? Is the whole perhaps made up of nothing but unhappy parts, all of them with wishful ideals in their heads? Is the "course of things" perhaps exactly this cry: "Away from here! Away from reality!" — endless dissatisfaction itself? Is the wishful ideal perhaps the very force that drives everything? Is it — god?

It seems important to me that we get rid of *the* Universe, the idea of one single unity, of some single force, of something absolute. Other-

wise we could not help treating it as the highest authority and naming it God. We have to break the Universe into pieces. We have to unlearn our respect for the Universe. We have to take back what we gave to the unknown and to the whole, and give it instead to what is close to us, to what is ours. Take what Kant said, for example: "Two things remain forever worthy of awe." Today we would rather say: "Digestion is more worthy of respect." The idea of the Universe would always drag the old problems along with it, like "How is evil possible?" and so on. So: *there is no Universe. There is no* great sense organ, or great inventory, or great storehouse of force: *in it* [+++]

63.

Shouldn't all philosophy finally bring to light the assumptions that the workings of *reason* rest on? Our *belief in the* "*I*" as a substance, as the only reality, the model by which we grant reality to things at all? The oldest kind of "realism" comes to light last of all. It comes at the same time as the whole religious history of humankind recognizes itself as a history of superstition about the soul. *Here there is a limit:* our thinking itself involves that belief (with its split between substance and accident, between doing and doer, and so on). To let go of that belief would mean no longer being allowed to think.

But a belief can be necessary for keeping living beings alive and still have nothing to do with truth. You can see this, for example, from the fact that we *have to* believe in time, space and motion, without feeling forced to treat them here as absolute [+++]

64.

[+++] of all values

Book One.

European nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

Book Two.

A critique of the highest values.

Book Three.

The principle of a new way of setting values.

Book Four.

Training and Breeding.

Sketched on March 17, 1887, in Nice.

I. Every purely moral way of setting values (like the Buddhist one, for example) *ends in nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)*: we should expect this for Europe! People think they can get by with a morality that has no religion behind it. But that makes the road to nihilism *unavoidable*. In religion there is nothing forcing us to see *ourselves* as the ones who set values.

65.

How crude it is, every time, to lump together a success and the miserable place it started from, as if they were one thing! Even with artists: how can anyone reason backward from the work to the artist? *Homer* — don't you sense the pessimist in him, the overly sensitive man, who made up all that rich perfection of the Olympian gods because of his own suffering? A philosopher's theories are *either* a brutal generalization of what his own sensitive feelings have gone through, *or* a tool he uses to stay in control of that sensitivity — intellectualism, and so on.

— running away from it into what is cold and mental, into stiff formulas.

4.

Selfishness and its problem! Look at the Christian gloom in La Rochefoucauld. He dragged selfishness out into the open everywhere, and believed that by doing so he *lowered* the value of things and of virtues! Against that, I first tried to prove that there *could* be nothing else but selfishness. I tried to show that in people whose sense of self grows weak and thin, the power of great love grows weak too. I tried to show that the most loving people are loving above all because their sense of self is strong, and that love is an expression of selfishness, and so on. The false way of valuing really serves the interest of: 1) those who are being helped and benefited — the herd. 2) It contains a pessimistic suspicion against the very ground of life. 3) It would like to deny the most splendid and best-turned-out people — out of fear. 4) It wants to help the losers get their rights against the winners. 5) It brings with it a dishonesty that spreads everywhere, and especially among the most valuable people.

5.

Music and its danger — its wallowing in pleasure, its skill at bringing Christian states of mind back to life, above all that mix of displaced sexual desire and burning passion in prayer (like Francis of Assisi). It goes hand in hand with an unclean, muddled head and an overexcited, dreamy heart. It breaks the *will*. It overstimulates the feelings. Musicians are lustful.

Note: the *causes* (inner states) that art grows out of — and, *very different* from them, the *effects* art has.

66.

What kind of people might feel bad when they read my writings? Leaving aside, of course, those who simply "don't understand" them at

all (like the educated pigs and big-city geese, or the pastors, or the "young German lads," or anyone who drinks beer and stinks of politics). There are, for example, the literary types who peddle the mind like goods at a market and want to "make a living" from their opinions. You see, they have discovered that there is something in an opinion (at least in certain opinions) that is worth money. A steady breath of icy contempt blows at them from my writings. In the same way, I hardly make the little literary ladies happy, the way they usually are, with their sickly sex organs and ink stains on their fingers. Maybe that's because I think too highly of woman to want to drag her down into an ink-squirting squid? In the same way, I understand why all the puffed-up agitators hold a grudge against me. They need exactly the big words and the noise of virtuous principles, which I — — — and the moment they feel a prick, they are in danger of bursting like a balloon — — —

I care very little about all this hostility. But there is another kind, whose pain hurts me too. — These are the people who are working their way up, with great effort, out of the common crowd: people thirsty for moral goodness, people living in constant inner struggle and tension, people who passionately long for what is noble. To them it must seem as if an ironic eye is looking at them out of my writings, an eye that misses none of their small heroics. It is an eye that always sees all their small misery, their tiredness too, and the bit of vanity that all tired people need to keep going, their climbing up like ants and tumbling back down again.

67.

Not long ago, a certain Mr. Theodor Fritsch from Leipzig wrote to me. There is no gang in Germany more shameless and more stupid than these antisemites. To thank him, I gave him a good solid kick in a

letter. This rabble dares to take the name Zarathustra into its mouth! Disgusting! Disgusting! Disgusting!

68.

Note this well!!

So it turns out that among atheists you find less open-mindedness about moral matters than among pious people who believe in God. (For example, Pascal is freer and more open-minded on moral questions than Schopenhauer.)

69.

Pascal saw his real tempters in two figures, Epictetus and Montaigne. Against them he had to defend his Christianity again and again and keep it safe.

70.

High above the steam and dirt of the low places where most people live, there is a higher, brighter kind of humanity. It will be very small in number, because everything that stands out is rare by its very nature. You belong to it not because you are more gifted, more virtuous, more heroic, or more loving than the people down below. You belong to it because you are colder, clearer, more far-seeing, and more alone. You belong because you can bear being alone, because you prefer it, because you demand it as happiness, as a privilege, even as something you need in order to live at all. You belong because you live among clouds and lightning as if they were your equals, your own kind. But you live just as much among sunbeams, dewdrops, snowflakes, and everything else that must come from on high, and that, whenever it moves, only ever moves in one direction: from above to

below. Striving to reach the heights is not our way; we are already up there. The heroes, martyrs, geniuses, and people full of enthusiasm are not quiet enough for us, not patient enough, not subtle enough, not cold enough, not slow enough.

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