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Friedrich Nietzsche

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Nachlass, Late Notebooks 1887

Friedrich Nietzsche

Original English edition

Translated from the German by Blue Energy People, Inc. (SUN), with AI assistance from Claude Opus 5.5.

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Posthumous Fragments, Late Notebooks 1887

Notebook 8: Summer 1887

*First Book:** "What is

truth?"*

Third Chapter. The Will to Truth.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

1.

The Problem of Truth.

The *need for belief* is the *greatest*

drag

on truthfulness.

The Will to Truth

Falsity.

Unconscious Falsity.

Every *sovereign instinct* has the others as its tools, its courtiers, its flatterers: it never lets itself be called by its *ugly* name: and it tolerates *no other* praises in which it is not *indirectly* praised *as well*.

Around every sovereign instinct all praising and blaming whatsoever crystallizes into a fixed order and etiquette.

This is the *one* cause of falsity.

Every instinct that strives for dominion yet finds itself under a yoke needs for itself, to support its self-esteem, to strengthen it, all the fine names and *acknowledged* values: so that it ventures forth *mostly* under the name of the very "master" it is fighting against and from whom it wants to be free. (E.g., under the dominion of Christian values, carnal desire or the desire for power)

This is the *other* cause of falsity.

In both cases *perfect naïveté* prevails: the falsity does *not* enter consciousness. It is a sign of *broken* instinct when man sees the driving force and its "expression" ("the mask") as *separate* — a sign of self-contradiction, and far less victorious. Absolute *innocence* in gesture, in word, in affect, the "good conscience" in falsity, the assurance with which one reaches for the greatest and most magnificent words and postures — all this is necessary for victory.

In the *other* case: with *extreme clear-sightedness*, it takes the *genius* of the *actor* and a tremendous discipline in self-mastery in order to win. Hence priests are the most skilful *conscious* hypocrites; then princes, in whom their rank and their descent breed up a kind of play-acting. Thirdly, people of society, diplomats. Fourthly, women.

Fundamental thought: Falsity appears so deep, so all-pervading, the *will* is so set against direct self-knowledge and calling things by their names, that the *conjecture has a very great probability*: that *truth*, the *will to truth*, is really something quite different and likewise only a *disguise*.

Sensuality in its disguises

as

idealism ("Plato"), peculiar to youth, creating the same kind of concave-mirror image in which the beloved in particular appears, laying an incrustation, magnification, transfiguration, infinity around every thing

in

the religion of love: "a beautiful young man, a beautiful woman", somehow divine, a bridegroom, a bride of the soul

in

art, as an "adorning" power: just as the man sees the woman by making her, as it were, a present of every excellence there is, so the artist's sensuality lays into one object whatever else he honours and holds high — in this way he *perfects* an object ("idealizes" it)

Woman, conscious of what man feels with regard to woman, *meets his striving for idealization halfway* by adorning herself, walking beautifully, dancing, expressing tender thoughts: likewise *she practises modesty*, reserve, distance — with the instinct that thereby man's idealizing faculty *grows*. (— Given the tremendous subtlety of the feminine instinct, modesty by no means remains conscious hypocrisy: she divines that precisely *naive, genuine bashfulness* seduces man most and drives him to overestimation. That is why woman is naive — out of subtlety of instinct, which counsels her the usefulness of being innocent. A wilful keeping-one's-eyes-closed-to-oneself…

Wherever dissimulation works more strongly when it is unconscious, it *becomes* unconscious.

on the genesis of art. That *making-perfect*, *seeing-perfect*, which belongs to the cerebral system overcharged with sexual energies (the evening together with the beloved, the smallest accidents transfigured, life a succession of sublime things, "the misfortune of the unhappy lover worth more than anything"): on the other hand, everything *perfect* and *beautiful* acts as an unconscious reminder of that enamoured state and its way of seeing — every *perfection*, the whole *beauty* of things, reawakens through contiguity the aphrodisiac bliss. *Physiologically:* the creative instinct of the artist and the distribution of semen into the

blood… The *longing for art and beauty* is an indirect longing for the raptures of the sexual drive, which it communicates to the cerebrum. The world *become perfect* through "love" . . .

The "*herd drive*" in its disguise

The drive to *lie* and *dissemble* in the artist

breaking forth

The *contemplative* drive in its disguise.

Cruelty in its disguise

Sickness and degeneration in their disguises

Old age in its disguise (as nihilism (as return of youthful and *inherited* values — the resilience of intellect and character is broken e.g. Richard Wagner

The disguise of the *vis inertiae*

Second Book:

Origin of Values.

First Chapter. The Metaphysicians.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari following the last plan for the "Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

2.

On the Psychology of Metaphysics

This world is apparent — *therefore* there is a true world.

This world is conditioned — *therefore* there is an unconditioned world.

This world is full of contradiction — *therefore* there is a world free of contradiction.

This world is becoming — *therefore* there is a world that is.

Nothing but false inferences (blind trust in reason: if A *is*, then its opposite concept B must also *be*)

These inferences are *inspired by suffering*: at bottom they are *wishes* that such a world might exist; likewise, hatred against a world that causes suffering expresses itself in the imagining of another, a *valuable* one: the *ressentiment* of the metaphysicians against the real is creative here.

Second series of questions: *to what end* suffering?… and here an inference arises about the relation of the true world *to* our apparent, changeable, suffering and contradictory one.

1) Suffering as a consequence of error: how is error possible?

2) Suffering as a consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible?

(— nothing but experiences from the sphere of nature or of society, universalized and projected into the "in-itself")

But if the conditioned world is causally conditioned by the unconditioned, then the *freedom to err and to incur guilt* must also be conditioned by it: and again one asks *to what end?*… The world of appearance, of becoming, of contradiction, of suffering is therefore *willed*: *to what end?*

The error of these inferences: two opposite concepts are formed — *because* a reality corresponds to one of them, a reality "must" also correspond to the other. "*Where else* would one have its counter-concept from?" — *Reason* thus as a source of revelation about what is in itself.

But the *origin* of those opposites *need not necessarily* go back to a supernatural source of reason: it suffices to set against it the *true genesis of concepts*: — this stems from the practical sphere, from the sphere of utility, and precisely from there derives its *strong belief* (one *perishes* if one does not infer in accordance with this reason: but that does not "prove" what it asserts)

The *preoccupation with suffering* among the metaphysicians: is quite naive. "Eternal bliss": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men *never* take pleasure and pain as ultimate questions of value — they are accompanying states; one must *will* both if one wants to *achieve* something. — Something weary and sick in the metaphysicians and the religious expresses itself in the fact that they see problems of pleasure and pain in the foreground. Morality, too, has such *importance* for them *only* because it counts as an essential condition with regard to the abolition of suffering.

Likewise the preoccupation with appearance and error: cause of suffering, superstition that happiness is bound up with truth (confusion: happiness in "certainty", in "faith")

Second Chapter. The homines religiosi.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari according to the last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

3.

on "homines religiosi"

What do ascetic ideals mean?

preliminary form of the still new *contemplative* way of life, extreme, in order to find respect and to *make* respect *for oneself* (*against* the "bad conscience" of inactivity) its conditions are sought

a sense for *cleanliness* of the soul, expressed in baroque fashion

a *convict's condition* (preparing for itself a host of delicacies), as remedy for an over-wild covetousness (which steers clear of "temptations") — manifesting itself as *hatred* against the senses, against life.

an *impoverishment of life*, a need for indolence, rest. The fakir's trick. "Old age"

a *morbid vulnerability*, sensitivity, something old-maidish that steers clear of life: at times a misdirected eroticism and hysteria of "love"

Critique of *humility* ("absolute obedience") at times the instinct of power, to seek out absolute "instruments" or to achieve the most as an instrument. The shrewdness in it, the laziness (just as in poverty and chastity)

Critique of *poverty* (the apparent renunciation and the competition, as a means of shrewdness on the way to dominion.

Critique of *chastity*. *Usefulness:* it gives time, independence — intellectual fastidiousness, which cannot bear it among little females — families are great nests of chatter. It preserves strength, keeps many a disease at bay. Freedom from wife and child keeps a host of temptations at bay (luxury, servility toward power, falling into line

A human being in whom the mystery-laden multiplicity and fullness of nature works itself out, a synthesis of the terrible and the enchanting, something promising, something knowing-more, something able-to-do-more. The ascetic ideal always expresses a failure, a deprivation, a physiological contradiction. It gives one pause that really only this ascetic species of priest is still known to present-day men: it is an expression of degeneration and of the failedness of man in general. — And just as we speak of romantic artists, so one might say that really only the *romantic priest* is known to us — that in itself the *classical* priest is possible, that he probably also once existed. With this pos-

sibility of a classical priest in mind, let one stand before the Plato in the museo Borbonico of Naples: the archaeologists are uncertain whether it might not be a bearded Dionysus. That shall be a matter of indifference to us: what is certain is that a priestly type is presupposed here, — *not* an ascetic type…

The priest of Christianity represents anti-nature, the power of wisdom and of goodness, but the anti-natural power and the anti-natural wisdom, the anti-natural goodness: enmity against power, knowledge and the — — —

power as miracle-power

wisdom as anti-reason

love as anti-sexuality

hatred against the mighty of the earth and a hidden, fundamental contest and rivalry — one wants the soul, one leaves them the body —

hatred against the spirit, pride, courage, freedom, exuberance of the spirit

hatred against the senses, against the joys of the senses, against joy in general, and a mortal enmity against sensuality and sexuality

Christian priesthood has it on its conscience — the slanderous and contemptible will to misunderstanding with which sexuality in the cults and mysteries from the beginnings…

the Christian priest is from the beginning the mortal enemy of sensuality: one can conceive of no greater contrast than the innocently reverent, presentiment-filled and solemn attitude with which, for example, in the most venerable women's cults of Athens the presence of the sexual symbols was felt. The act of procreation is the mystery in itself in all non-ascetic religions: a kind of symbol of consummation and of the mysterious intention, of the future (rebirth, immortality

Third Chapter. The Good and the Improvers.

[The chapter headings at this point are not in Nietzsche's hand. They were added by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari according to the last plan for "The Will to Power" (NF-1888,18[17]).]

4.

The Good and the Improvers.

Hatred against the bodily and spiritually *privileged*: revolt of the ugly, failed souls against the beautiful, proud, high-spirited ones

their means: casting suspicion on beauty, pride, joy

the anti-natural

as the higher

"there is no merit"

"the danger is monstrous: one *ought* to tremble and feel wretched"

"naturalness is evil; to resist nature is what is right. *Also* "reason".

again it is the *priests* who exploit this condition and win the "people" over to themselves. "The sinner", in whom God takes more joy than in the "righteous"

this is the struggle against "paganism" (the sting of conscience as a means of destroying the harmony of the soul)

The hatred of the average against the *exceptions*, of the herd against the independent

custom as

actual

"morality"

turning *against* "egoism": only what is "for

others" has value

"we are all equal"

against the lust for domination, against "ruling" in general

against privilege

against sectarians, free spirits, sceptics

against philosophy (as opposed to the instrument- and corner-instinct)

among philosophers themselves "the categorical imperative", the essence of the moral "universal and everywhere"

The three *assertions*:

the

ignoble is the higher (protest of the "common man")

the

anti-natural is the higher (protest of those who have come off badly)

the

average is the higher (protest of the herd, of the "middling")

In the *history of morality*, then, a *will to power* expresses itself, through which

now the slaves and the oppressed,

now the failed and those who suffer from themselves

now the mediocre

attempt to impose the value judgments most favourable to them.

To this extent the phenomenon of morality is, from the standpoint of biology, highly questionable. Morality has hitherto developed *at the expense of*:

the rulers and their specific instincts

the well-constituted and *beautiful* natures

the independent and privileged in any sense

Morality is therefore a *countermovement against nature's efforts* to attain a *higher type*. Its effect is:

mistrust of life in general (insofar as its tendencies are felt to be "immoral"

senselessness, insofar as the highest values are felt to be in opposition to the highest instincts — absurdity.

degeneration and self-destruction of the "higher natures", because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes *conscious*.

Slave revolt in morality: ressentiment become creative. The crushed, the trampled-down, to whom actual *reaction* is denied.

Consequently: a *negative* value first (the reverse of noble morality, which springs from the feeling of a *triumphant Yes-saying* to oneself).

"the evil one" (actually the strong one)

Method of *slandering* aristocratic values: (pride, beauty, happiness, cheerfulness, sensuality, wealth

with the help of 1) *not*-wanting-to-see 2) *wrongly*-wanting-to-see 3) wanting-to-see-*into*.

Inversion: attempt to interpret *ressentiment* itself as virtue (sense of justice)

actual fearful lowliness as "humility"

inoffensiveness, "cowardice", waiting as "patience"

as "goodness", as "love of one's enemies", as "love of mankind"

also as "obedience to God", who commands obedience

to the "authorities"

the desire for revenge as "God's victories over his enemies", likewise cruelty at the sight of a defeat as "triumph over God's justice"

their misery as trial, preparation of the "elect", distinction, even as shrewdness ("so that it may one day be repaid more abundantly")

life in "hope", in "love", in "faith" (in a God of the poor and oppressed)

the honour of poverty as "divine service"

Attempt, *in summa*, to be satisfied with oneself and to persuade oneself that "one is not only better" but also "better off". The "good", actually the *weak*.

— The deepest dishonesty and mendacity in this. —

The *internalization* of man (as illness)

Internalization arises when powerful drives, which with the establishment of peace and society are denied discharge outward, seek to compensate themselves inward, in league with the imagination. The need for enmity, cruelty, revenge, violence turns back, "steps back"; in the will-to-know there is avarice and conquest; in the artist the power of dissimulation and lying that has stepped back makes its appearance; the drives are recast into demons with which there is struggle, etc.

Consciousness as illness

Man placing himself again and again in situations for which he as yet has no instinct: thus temporarily experimenting and acting on the

basis of "inferences", not of instincts. "Rationalistic" events, e.g. the French Revolution.

The *bad conscience* clinging to what is new

e.g. to marriage

to the mild, pitying, forgiving feelings (long bound up with self-annihilation)

to the will to inquiry (as directed against authority)

to the great conquests of nature (as acts of godlessness)

to peace

to the tradesman, to the tax-collector

among the noble families who renounce revenge in the face of the supreme authority.

thus the "consciousness of right" sister to the bad conscience

5.

every injustice something involuntary: consequently a συμφορά: so Plato in the 9th and 11th books of the Laws with regard to temple robbery and parricide.

6.

The development of personal responsibility *held back*: by the tautly stretched organization of the clan (the consequence did not fall upon the doer, and each bore the consequences of all — strangest of all, no doubt, was the state of the "conscience" of the chieftain, who had to atone, relatively, for everything)

The *great events*:

Victory of man over woman (warlike, master's right

Victory of peace over war

7.

Delight in lying as the mother of art, fear and sensuality as mother of religion, the Nitimur in vetitum and curiosity as mother of science, cruelty as mother of unegoistic morality, remorse as the origin of the social equality movement, the will to power as the origin of justice, war as the father (of good conscience and cheerfulness) of honesty, master's right as the origin of the family; mistrust as the root of justice and contemplation

8.

Zarathustra

With this work every word must at one time have hurt and wounded one, and at another time deeply delighted one: — what one has not understood *thus*, one has not understood at all.

Notebook 9: Autumn 1887

1.

Principles and Preliminary

Considerations.

1.

On the history of European *nihilism*.

As the necessary consequence of the ideals hitherto:

absolute valuelessness.

2.

The doctrine of *eternal recurrence*: as its

consummation, as crisis

(1) 3.

This whole development of philosophy as the developmental history of the *will to truth*. Its calling of itself into question. The *social* feelings of value inflated into absolute principles of value.

(2) 4.

The problem of life: as *will to power*.

(Temporary preponderance of the social feelings of value comprehensible and useful: it is a matter of establishing a *substructure* upon which a *stronger* species at last becomes possible.) Measure of strength: to be able to live under the *inverted* valuations and to will them again eternally. State and society as substructure: the standpoint of world economy, education as *breeding*.

2.

(3)

Critique of *the good man*. (*Not* of hypocrisy: — that served me at most for amusement and recreation) The struggle hitherto with the terrible

affects, their weakening, their holding down —: morality as diminishment.

3.

(4)

Kant: makes the epistemological scepticism of the English *possible* for Germans

1)

by enlisting the moral and religious needs of the Germans in its favour (: just as, for the same reasons, the later Academics used scepsis as a preparation for Platonism, cf. Augustine; just as Pascal even used *moralistic* scepsis in order to excite ("to justify") the need for faith

2)

by scholastically embellishing it with flourishes and curlicues and thereby making it acceptable to the scientific taste for form of the Germans (for Locke and Hume in themselves were too bright, too clear, i.e., judged by German instincts of value, "too superficial" —)

Kant: a meagre psychologist and judge of men; grossly mistaken with regard to great historical values (French Revolution); a moral fanatic à la Rousseau with a subterranean Christianity of values; a dogmatist through and through, but with a ponderous weariness of this propensity, to the point of wishing to tyrannize it, yet also at once tired in scepsis; not yet touched by any breath of cosmopolitan taste and ancient beauty… a *delayer* and *mediator*, nothing original

(— just as *Leibniz* between mechanics and spiritualism

as *Goethe* between the taste of the 18th century and that of the "historical sense" (— which is essentially a sense of exoticism)

as *German music* between French and Italian music

as *Charles* the Great between imperium Romanum and nationalism.

mediated, bridged, —

Delayer par excellence.

4.

In conclusion: "to have been a teacher of this"

come l'uom s'eterna…

(Inf. XV, 85)

5.

(5)

On the characterization of the *national genius*, with regard to what is foreign and borrowed.

the *English* genius coarsens and naturalizes everything it receives

the *French* thins out, simplifies, logicizes, dresses up.

the *German* mixes, mediates, entangles, moralizes.

the *Italian* has made by far the freest and subtlest use of what it borrowed and has put a hundred times more into it than it drew out: as the *richest* genius, the one that had most to give away.

6.

(6)

On Aesthetics

Sensuality

Images of *heightened, victorious* life and their *transfiguring* power: so that a certain *perfection* is laid into things

intoxication

Conversely: where the *beauty of perfection* shows itself, the world of sensuality and intoxication is stirred along with it, out of *old intergrowth*. That is why sensuality and intoxication belong to *religious happiness*.

And, essentially, likewise the sensualistic excitability of artists.

"*beautiful*" has an inflaming effect upon the feeling of pleasure; think of the transfiguring power of "love". Should not, conversely, what is transfigured and perfect gently stir sensuality in turn, so that life takes effect as a feeling of well-being? —

7.

(7)

The *superabundant* strength in *spirituality*, setting itself new goals; *by no means merely as commanding and leading for the lower world or for the preservation of the organism*, of the "individual". We are more than the individual, we are the whole chain besides, with the tasks of all the futures of the *chain*

8.

On the Plan.

In place of *moral values*, purely *naturalistic* values. Naturalization of morality.

In place of "sociology", a *doctrine of the structures of dominion*

In place of "epistemology", a *doctrine of the perspectives of the affects* (to which a hierarchy of the affects belongs).

the *transfigured* affects: their *higher order*, their "*spirituality*".

In place of metaphysics and religion, *the doctrine of eternal recurrence* (this as a means of breeding and selection)

(8)

"God" as moment of culmination: existence an eternal deification and de-deification. *But therein no summit of value*, rather a summit of power

Absolute *exclusion* of *mechanism* and of *matter*: both merely forms of expression of low stages, the most despiritualized form of affect ("of the will to power")

the *stupefaction* of the world as goal, in consequence of the will to power, which makes the elements as independent of one another as possible: *beauty* as *sign* of the *habituation* and *pampering* of the *victorious*: the ugly the expression of many defeats (in the organism itself) No heredity! The chain *growing as a whole* —

The decline from the summit in becoming (of the highest spiritualization of power upon the most slavish ground) to be represented as the *consequence* of this highest strength, which, turning *against itself* once it has nothing more to organize, employs its strength *to disorganize*…

a)

The ever greater *conquest* of societies and their subjugation under a smaller but stronger number.

b)

the ever greater conquest of the privileged and stronger, and consequently the advent of democracy, finally *anarchy* of the elements.

9.

The Music of the Present.

A Polemic

By

F. N.

10.

Second Polemic

Herd Optics as Morality.

Among Moralists and Moral Philosophers.

A

Settling of Accounts with Morality.

what has the difference of estates contributed to morality?

what the ascetic ideal?

what the herd?

what the philosophers?

what the affects of the beast of prey?

11.

Among Moralists. — The great moral philosophers. Morality as the fatality of philosophers hitherto

Rousseau. Kant. Hegel. Schopenhauer. Lichtenberg. Goethe.

B. Gracián. Machiavelli. Galiani. Montaigne. Pascal.

Carlyle. G. Eliot. H. Spencer.

S. Beuve. Renan. Goncourts. Stendhal. Napoléon.

Plato. Epictetus. Epicurus. Seneca. Marcus Aurelius.

12.

(9)

Offenbach: French music, with a Voltairean spirit, free, high-spirited, with a little sardonic grin, but bright, witty to the point of banality (— he does not *paint his face* —) and without the mignardise of morbid or blond-Viennese sensuality

13.

Values

"The value of life": but life is a single case, one must justify all existence and *not* only life, — the justifying principle is one from which life *is explained*…

life itself is not a means to something; it is the *expression* of forms of growth of power.

— That we not make our "desirabilities" judges over *being*!

— that we not place our final forms of development (e.g. "spirit") once again as an "in itself" *behind* development

14.

Final Chapter: the ultimate desirability.

End of the Book (like life, so wisdom itself:) deep and seductive.

15.

(10)

What Tertullian says of the evil angels could be said of the *ascetic priests*.

Tertullian (Apologet. no. 22) on the evil angels: "in the healing of diseases they are true sorcerers. For first they torment; but then they prescribe remedies that are, to the point of miracle, novel and harmful: — and yet people believe they have helped, *because they have ceased to torment*."

16.

(11)

"Judge not, *that* ye be not judged" The "that" is contemptible. *Ignoble*…

1) if one has the authority to judge, one by no means thereby concedes that others have the authority to judge *us*…

2) for one who is created for some task, the unpleasant consequences do *not* come into consideration as counter-arguments against this task: under certain circumstances they may be stimulants.

Nothing is more senseless than to set up an exaggeration as morality (e.g. love your enemies): with that one has driven *reason* out of morality… nature out of morality

Absolute conviction: that the feelings of value above and below are *different*; that countless *experiences* are *lacking* to those below, that from below to above misunderstanding is *necessary*.

17.

(12)

The *diminution* of man must for a long time count as the sole goal: because a broad foundation must first be created, so that a *stronger* kind of man can stand upon it: to what extent hitherto *every strengthened* kind of man *has stood upon a level of the lower — — —*

18.

(13)

War against the *Christian ideal*, against the doctrine of "blessedness" and salvation as the goal of life, against the supremacy of the simple-minded, the pure of heart, the suffering and the ill-constituted, etc. (— what do God, faith in God, still matter to us! "God" today merely a faded word, not even a concept any more!) But, as Voltaire says on his deathbed: "do not speak to me of *that* man!"

When and where has any man who counts ever *resembled* that Christian ideal? At least for such eyes as a psychologist and tryer of the reins must have! — leaf through all the heroes of a Plutarch.

19.

(14)

Francis of Assisi: amorous, popular, poet, fights against the *aristocracy* and order of rank of souls in favour of the lowest.

20.

(15)

Socrates: fights against the noble instincts, very plebeian (*against* art, but exemplarily scientific. Mockery of Renan's erring instinct, which *mixes together* noblesse and science.)

Science and democracy belong together (whatever M. Renan may say) as surely as art and "good society".

21.

(16)

In honour of the *vices*:

Greek culture

and pederasty

German music

and drunkenness

science

and

vindictiveness

22.

(17)

The great *lies* in history:

as if it had been the *corruption* of paganism that paved the way for Christianity! But it was the weakening and *moralization* of ancient man! The reinterpretation of the natural drives as *vices* had already gone before!

— as if the *corruption of the Church* had been the cause of the Reformation; only the pretext, the self-deceiving lie on the part of its agitators — there were strong needs present whose brutality very much needed a spiritual cloak

23.

(18)

the mendacious interpretation of the words, gestures and states of the *dying*: there, for example, the fear of death is fundamentally confused with the fear of the "after-death"…

24.

the imitatio as a book of *seduction* (in Comte)

25.

the four great democrats Socrates Christ Luther Rousseau

26.

(19)

against the *value* of the eternally-unchanging (cf. *Spinoza's* naivety, *Descartes*' likewise) the value of the briefest and most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the belly of the serpent

vita —

27.

(20)

Replacement of morality by the *will* to our goal, and *consequently* to its *means*.

of the categorical imperative by the *categorical imperator*

To want no *praise*: one does what is useful to one or what gives one pleasure or what one *must* do.

28.

(21)

The great falsifications of psychology:

1)

man strives after *happiness*

2)

morality is the only way to *becoming happy*

insipid and empty concept of *Christian* "blessedness"

29.

(22)

Absolute lack of instinct in M. Renan, who reckons science and noblesse together as one. Science is fundamentally democratic and *anti-oligarchic*.

30.

(23)

Correction of the *concept*

Egoism. Once one has grasped to what extent "individuum" is an error, and that rather every single being is precisely the *whole process* in a straight line (not merely "inherited", but itself…), then this single being has an *enormously great significance*. *Instinct* speaks quite rightly here; where this instinct *slackens* (— where the individual first *seeks* a value for itself in service to others) one may safely infer weariness and *degeneration*. Altruism of disposition, thorough and without Tartuffery, is an instinct for creating at least a *second value* for oneself, in the

service of *other* egoisms. Mostly, however, it is only *apparent*: a *detour* to the preservation of one's *own feeling of life, feeling of value* —

31.

(24)

In philosophy, as on the *battlefield*, it is a matter of

— interior lines —

32.

whoever has not taken part in the hideous *obscurantism* of the Bayreuthians

33.

(25)

the lack of discipline: in the future much asceticism will be needed for the strengthening of the will, voluntary self-denial

34.

(26)

Workers should learn to feel like *soldiers*. An honorarium, a salary, but no payment! No relation between remuneration and *performance*! Rather, place the individual, *according to his* kind, so that *it* can achieve *the highest* that lies within its sphere.

35.

(27)

1. *Nihilism a normal condition.*

Nihilism: the goal is lacking; the answer to the "Why?" is lacking. What does nihilism mean? — *that the highest values devalue themselves*.

It is *ambiguous*:

A))

Nihilism as a sign of the *heightened power of the spirit*: as *active nihilism*.

It can be a sign of *strength*: the force of the spirit may have grown so great that the *previous* goals ("convictions", articles of faith) are inadequate to it

— for a faith in general expresses the constraint of *conditions of existence*, a submission to the authority of circumstances under which a being *thrives, grows, gains power*…

On the other hand, a sign of *insufficient* strength to now productively *posit* for oneself once again a goal, a Why?, a faith.

It reaches its *maximum* of relative force as a violent force of *destruction*: as *active nihilism*. Its opposite would be the *weary* nihilism that no longer *attacks*: its most famous form Buddhism: as *passive* nihilism

Nihilism represents a pathological *intermediate condition* (pathological is the monstrous generalization, the inference *to no meaning at all*): whether because the productive forces are not yet strong enough, or because décadence still hesitates and has not yet invented its remedies.

B))

Nihilism as *decline and recession of the power of the spirit: passive nihilism*

as a sign of weakness: the force of the spirit may be wearied, *exhausted*, so that the *previous* goals and values are inadequate and no longer find belief —

that the synthesis of values and goals (on which every strong culture rests) dissolves, so that the individual values wage war on one another: *decomposition*

that everything that refreshes, heals, calms, stupefies comes to the fore, under various *disguises*, religious, or moral or political or aesthetic, etc.

2. *Presupposition of this hypothesis*

That there is *no truth*; that there is no absolute constitution of things, no "thing-in-itself"

— *this is itself a nihilism*, and *indeed the most extreme*. It places the value of things precisely in this, that *no* reality corresponds or corresponded to this value, but only a symptom of force on the part of the *value-positing*, a simplification for the *purpose* of *life*

36.

the will to truth as will to power

37.

Essence of *judgment* (*Yes*-positing).

38.

(28)

the *valuation* "I believe that this and that is so" as the *essence* of "*truth*"

in *valuation conditions of preservation* and *of growth* find expression

all our *organs and senses of knowledge* are developed only with regard to conditions of preservation and growth

trust in reason and its categories, in dialectic, hence the *valuation* of logic, proves only its *usefulness* for life, proven by experience: *not* its "truth".

That a great deal of *belief* must be present, that *judging* must be permitted, that doubt with regard to all essential values is *lacking*: —

that is the presupposition of everything living and of its life. Thus that something *must* be held to be true is necessary; *not* that something *is true*.

"the *true* and the *apparent* world" — this opposition is traced back by me to *relations of value*

we have projected *our* conditions of preservation as *predicates of being* in general

from the fact that we must be stable in our belief in order to thrive, we have made it that the "true" world is not a changeable and becoming one, but one that *is*.

39.

(29)

values and their change stand in relation to the *growth of power* of the *one who posits values*

the degree of *unbelief and* of permitted "freedom of spirit" as an *expression of the growth of power*

"Nihilism" as the ideal of the *highest powerfulness* of spirit, of the most overabundant life; partly destructive, partly ironic

40.

(30)

That things possess a *constitution in themselves*, quite apart from interpretation and subjectivity, is *an utterly idle hypothesis*: it would presuppose that *interpreting and being-subjective* are *not* essential, that a thing released from all relations would still be a thing. Conversely: the apparent *objective* character of things: might it not amount merely to a *difference of degree* within the subjective? — that, say, what changes slowly presented itself to us as "objectively" enduring, being, "in itself"

— that the objective were only a false concept of kind and an opposition *within* the subjective?

41.

(31)

What is a *belief*? How does it arise? Every belief is a *holding-to-be-true*.

The most extreme form of nihilism would be: that *every* belief, every holding-to-be-true, is necessarily false: *because there is no true world at all*. Thus: a *perspectival semblance* whose origin lies in us (inasmuch as we continually *have need* of a narrower, abbreviated, simplified world)

— that it is the *measure of strength* how far we can admit to ourselves *apparentness*, the necessity of the lie, without perishing.

To this extent nihilism, as the denial of a truthful world, of a *being, could be a divine way of thinking*: — — —

42.

(32)

Around 1876 I had the horror of seeing all my willing up to then *compromised*, when I grasped where Wagner was now heading: and I was very firmly bound to him, by all the bonds of a deep unity of needs, by

gratitude, by the irreplaceability and absolute privation that I saw before me.

At the same time I seemed to myself as if indissolubly *imprisoned* in my philology and teaching — in an accident and makeshift of my life —: I no longer knew how to get out and was tired, used up, worn out.

At the same time I grasped that my instinct was heading toward the opposite of Schopenhauer's: toward a justification of life, even in what is most terrible, most ambiguous and most mendacious in it: — for this I had the formula "Dionysian" in my hands.

(— as against the notion that an "in-itself of things" must necessarily be good, blessed, true, one, Schopenhauer's interpretation of the in-itself as will was an essential step: only he did not understand how to *deify* this will: he remained stuck in the moral-Christian ideal

Schopenhauer still stood so far under the dominion of Christian values that, once the thing-in-itself was no longer "God" for him, it had to be bad, stupid, absolutely reprehensible. He did not grasp that there can be infinite ways of being-able-to-be-otherwise, even of being-able-to-be-God.

Curse of that narrow-minded duality: good and evil.

43.

(33)

The question of nihilism, *"to what end?"*, proceeds from the habit hitherto by virtue of which the goal seemed to be set, given, demanded from outside — namely by some *superhuman authority*. Having unlearned belief in this, one nevertheless, out of old habit, seeks *another authority*, one that *would know how to speak unconditionally*, that *could command* goals and tasks. The authority of *conscience* now steps into the front rank (the more emancipated from theology, the more

imperative *morality* becomes); as compensation for a *personal* authority. Or the authority of *reason*. Or the *social instinct* (the herd). Or *history* with an immanent spirit, which has its goal within itself and to which one *can abandon oneself*. One would like to *get around* the will, the *willing* of a goal, the risk of giving oneself a goal; one would like to shift off the responsibility (— one would accept *fatalism*). Finally: *happiness*, and, with some Tartuffery, the *happiness of the majority*

individual goals and their conflict

collective goals in struggle with individual ones

Everyone takes sides in this, the philosophers too.

One tells oneself

1)

a definite goal is not necessary at all

2)

is not at all possible to foresee

Precisely now, when the *will* would be *needed in its highest strength*, it is at its *weakest* and *most faint-hearted*.

Absolute mistrust of the organizing power of the will *for the whole.*

An age in which all "intuitive valuations" step one after another into the foreground, as though one could *receive* from them the *directives* that one otherwise no longer has.

—

"to what end?" the answer is demanded of

1)

conscience

2)

the drive to happiness

3)

the "social instinct" (herd)

4)

reason ("spirit")

— only so as not to have to *will*, not to have to set the "to what end" oneself.

5)

finally: *fatalism*, *"there is no answer"* but "it is going *somewhere*", "it is impossible to will a to-what-end?", with *resignation*… or *revolt*… *agnosticism* with regard to the goal

6)

finally *negation* as the *to-what-end* of life; life as something that *comprehends* itself as unvalue and finally *abolishes* itself.

44.

(For the *third* treatise)

(34)

Main point of view: that one does not see the *task* of the higher species in the *guidance* of the lower (as Comte, for example, does —) but sees the lower as the *basis* upon which a higher species lives its *own* task, — upon which alone it *can stand*.

the conditions under which the *strong* and *noble* species preserves itself (with regard to spiritual discipline) are the reverse of those under which the "industrial masses", the shopkeepers à la Spencer, stand.

That which is open only to the *strongest* and *most fruitful* natures, to make *their* existence possible, — leisure, adventure, unbelief, even debauchery — would, if it were open to *average* natures, necessarily ruin them — and does so, too. Here industriousness, rule, moderation, firm "conviction" are in place, — in short, the herd virtues: under them this average kind of man becomes perfect.

Causes of

nihilism:

1) *the higher species is lacking, i.e.* the one whose inexhaustible fruitfulness and power upholds faith in man. (Consider what we owe to Napoleon: almost all the higher hopes of this century)

2) *the lower species*, "herd", "mass", "society", unlearns modesty and inflates its needs into *cosmic* and *metaphysical* values. Through this the whole of existence is *vulgarized*: for insofar as the *mass* rules, it tyrannizes the *exceptions*, so that these lose faith in themselves and become *nihilists*

All attempts to *think up higher types* have *miscarried* ("Romanticism", the artist, the philosopher, against Carlyle's attempt to ascribe to them the highest moral values).

Resistance to the higher type as the result.

Decline and *insecurity of all higher types*; the struggle against genius ("folk poetry" etc.). Pity for the lowly and suffering as the *standard* for the *height of the soul*

the philosopher is lacking, the interpreter of the deed, *not* merely the one who poeticizes it anew

45.

(35)

In general *every thing is worth as much as one has paid for it*. This does not hold, to be sure, if one takes the individual in isolation; the great capacities of the single man stand out of all proportion to what he himself has done, sacrificed, suffered for them. But if one looks at the prehistory of his lineage, one discovers in it the history of an enormous hoarding and accumulation of capital of strength, through every kind of renunciation, struggle, labour, self-assertion. Because the great man has *cost* so much, and *not* because he stands there like a miracle, as a gift of heaven and of "chance", did he become great. "Heredity" a false concept. For what a man is, his forefathers have paid the costs.

46.

(36)

The will to truth

1)

as conquest and struggle with nature

Descartes' judgment of the scholars

2)

as resistance to *ruling* authorities

3)

as critique of what is harmful *to us*

47.

History of scientific method, understood by A. Comte almost as philosophy itself

48.

(37)

the *establishing between "true"* and *"untrue"*, the *establishing* of facts in general, is fundamentally different from the creative *positing*, from forming, shaping, overpowering, *willing*, such as lies in the essence of *philosophy*. *To put a meaning into things* — this task unconditionally always still *remains*, supposing that *no meaning lies in them*. So it is with tones, but also with the destinies of peoples: they are *capable* of the most various interpretation and direction toward *various goals*. The still higher stage is a *positing of goals* and thereupon moulding the factual to it, hence the *interpretation by deed* and not merely the conceptual *recasting*.

49.

(38)

One is far more the child of one's four grandparents than of one's two parents: this is because at the time when we were begotten, our parents had for the most part not yet established themselves; the germs of the grandparental type ripen in us; in our children, the germs of our parents.

50.

(39)

Nothing is less innocent than the New Testament. One knows on what soil it grew. This people, with an inexorable will to itself, which, after it had lost every natural support and had long since forfeited its right to existence, nevertheless knew how to prevail, and for this needed to build itself up wholly and entirely upon unnatural, purely imaginary presuppositions (as the chosen people, as the community

of saints, as the people of the promise, as the "Church"): this people handles the pia fraus with a perfection, with a degree of "good conscience", that one cannot be cautious enough when it preaches morality. When Jews step forth as innocence itself, then the danger has grown great: one ought always to keep one's little fund of understanding, of mistrust, of malice in hand when one reads the New Testament.

People of the lowest origin, in part rabble, the outcasts not only of good but even of respectable society, grown up apart even from the *smell* of culture, without discipline, without knowledge, without any inkling that there could be conscience in spiritual matters (the word "spirit" present always only as a misunderstanding: what all the world calls "spirit" is to this people still "flesh") — just so — Jews: instinctively clever at creating, out of all superstitious presuppositions, out of ignorance itself, an advantage, a *seduction*

51.

(40)

To what extent the *will to power* remains as the sole and absolutely *immoral* thing: see Stuart Mill (on Comte)

"we do not consider life so rich in enjoyments that it could afford to dispense with the cultivation of all those which relate to the egoistic inclinations. On the contrary, we believe that a sufficient gratification of the latter, not to excess, but indeed up to that measure *which grants the fullest enjoyment*, almost always has a favourable effect upon the benevolent impulses. The moralizing of personal enjoyments consists for us not in restricting them to the smallest possible measure, but in cultivating the wish to share them with others, and with *all others*, and in scorning every enjoyment that cannot be shared in this way. *There is only one inclination, or passion, that is permanently incompatible with this*

condition, namely the lust to rule — a striving which includes within itself, and has as its presupposition, the corresponding abasement of others."

52.

(41)

The most courageous among us has not courage enough for what he actually *knows*… Where one stops or does *not yet* stop, where one judges "here is the truth", is decided by the degree and strength of one's bravery; more, at any rate, than by any fineness or dullness of eye and mind.

53.

(42)

the Jews have brushed against genius in the sphere of art, with H. Heine and Offenbach, this most spirited and most high-spirited of satyrs, who as a musician holds to the great tradition and who, for one who has more than mere ears, is a true redemption from the sentimental and at bottom *degenerate* music of German Romanticism

54.

— a woman who wants to suffer from what she loves…

55.

(43)

To *appraise* the *value* of a man *according to what he benefits* men or *costs* them or *harms* them: this means just as much and just as little as appraising a work of art according to the *effects* it produces. But a

work of art wants to be compared with works of art; and *thereby the value* of a man *in comparison with other men* is not touched at all.

"Moral valuation", insofar as it is a *social* one, measures man entirely by his effects.

A man with his own taste upon his tongue, enclosed and hidden by his solitude, incommunicable, uncommunicative — an *unreckoned* man, thus a man of a higher, at any rate *different* species: how would you be able to devalue him, since you cannot know him, cannot compare him?

I find the typical obtuseness with regard to *this* value in that *typical flathead*, the Englishman J. St. *Mill*: he says, e.g., of A. Comte "in his earlier days he regarded the name and memory of Napoleon with an indignation *that does him the highest honour*; later, to be sure, he declared Napoleon a more estimable dictator than Louis Philippe; — something that allows one to measure the depth to which his *moral standard* had sunk".

Moral devaluation has brought in its train the greatest obtuseness of judgement: the value of a man in himself is *underestimated*, almost *overlooked*, almost *denied*.

Remnant of naive *teleology*: *the value of man only with regard to* men

56.

Historians and other gravediggers, those who live between coffins and sawdust —

57.

(44)

Philosophy as the art of discovering the truth: so according to Aristotle. *Against this* the Epicureans, who made use of Aristotle's sensualist theory of knowledge: wholly ironical and dismissive toward the search for truth; "philosophy as an art of *living*".

58.

the three great naivetés:

Knowledge

as a means to happiness (as if…

as a means to virtue (as if…

as a means to the "negation of life", — insofar as it is a means to disillusionment — (as if…)

59.

(45)

— there they stand, the values from primeval times: who could overturn them, these heavy granite cats?

— whose sense is a nonsense, whose wit is a yet-and-but half-wit

— impatient and fiery spirits, we who believe only in truths that one guesses: all wanting-to-prove makes us refractory, — we flee at the sight of the scholar and his creeping from conclusion to conclusion.

— Stubborn spirits, subtle and petty

— whatever dwells around you soon settles in and makes itself at home.

— parched sandy souls, dry riverbeds

— of long will, deep in his mistrust and overgrown with the moss of solitude

— Secretly burned, not for his faith, but because he no longer has the courage for any faith

— to lie on one's belly before small round facts

— what one would not do when it was time for it, one must indeed will afterwards; one has to "make good" what one did not do well.

60.

(46)

Tremendous *self-reflection*: becoming conscious of oneself not as an individual but as mankind. *Let us reflect, let us think back: let us walk the small and the great paths*

A. Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, does not deceive, does not change, a *true* world — a world in which one does not suffer. Contradiction, deception, change — causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is a world as it ought to be; he would like to seek out the way to it. (Indian critique: even the "I" as apparent, as *not*-real)

Whence does man here take the concept of *reality*? —

Why does he derive precisely *suffering* from change, deception, contradiction? and why not rather his happiness?… —

The contempt, the hatred against everything that passes away, changes, alters: — whence this valuing of what endures?

Evidently the will to truth here is merely the longing for a *world of the enduring*.

The senses deceive, reason corrects the errors: *consequently*, so one concluded, reason is the way to the enduring; the *least sensuous* ideas must be closest to the "true world". — From the senses come most of the strokes of misfortune — they are deceivers, beguilers, destroyers:

Happiness can be guaranteed only in that which is: change and happiness exclude each other. The highest wish accordingly has in view becoming one with that which is. That is the *formula* for the way to the highest happiness.

In summa: the world as it *ought* to be exists; this world in which we live is an error, — this world of ours ought *not* to exist.

Belief in that which is proves to be only a consequence: the real primum mobile is disbelief in that which becomes, mistrust of that which becomes, disdain for all becoming.

What kind of men reflect *thus*? An unproductive, *suffering kind*; a life-weary kind. Were we to imagine the opposite kind of man, it would have no need of belief in that which is: more still, it would despise it, as dead, boring, indifferent…

The belief that the world which ought to be *is*, really exists, is a belief of the unproductive, *who do not want to create a world* as it ought to be. They posit it as already present, they search for means and ways to reach it. "Will to *truth" — as the impotence of the will to create*

to know that something *is* thus and thus

to act so that something *becomes* thus and thus.

Antagonism in the degrees of strength of natures.

Fiction of a world that corresponds to our wishes, psychological artifices and interpretations in order to link everything we honour and feel as pleasant to this *true world*.

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"Will to truth" at this stage is essentially *art of interpretation*; which still requires strength of interpretation.

The same species of man, grown poorer by yet another stage, *no longer in possession of the strength* to interpret, to create fictions, makes the *nihilist*. A nihilist is the man who judges of the world as it is that it ought *not* to be, and of the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. Accordingly, existence (acting, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning: the pathos of "in vain" is the nihilist's pathos — at the same time, as pathos, still an *inconsistency* on the nihilist's part

Whoever is unable to lay his will into things, the man without will and strength, at least still lays a *meaning* into them: i.e., the belief that a will is already there, which is to work and will in things.

It is a measure of *strength of will* how far one can do without *meaning* in things, how far one can endure living in a meaningless world: *because one organizes a small piece of it oneself*.

The *philosophical objective gaze* can thus be a sign of poverty of will and strength. For strength organizes what is near and nearest; the "knowers", who want only to *establish* what is, are those who can determine nothing *as it ought to be*.

Artists an intermediate kind: they at least fix a likeness of what ought to be — they are productive insofar as they really *alter* and reshape; not like the knowers, who leave everything as it is.

Connection of the philosophers with the pessimistic religions: the same species of man (— they ascribe the *highest degree of reality* to the *most highly valued things*.

Connection of the philosophers with moral men and their measures of value. (The *moral* interpretation of the world as *meaning* = after the decline of religious meaning —

Overcoming of the philosophers, through the *annihilation* of the world of being: intermediate period of nihilism: before the strength is there to turn values around and to deify and approve of becoming, the apparent world, as the *only* one.

B. Nihilism as a normal phenomenon can be a symptom of growing *strength* or of growing *weakness*.

partly

in that the strength to *create*, to *will* has grown so great that it no longer needs these total interpretations and introductions of *meaning* ("nearer tasks", state, etc.)

partly,

in that even the creative strength to create *meaning* slackens, and disappointment becomes the prevailing condition. The incapacity for *faith* in a "meaning", "unbelief"

What does *science* signify with regard to both possibilities?

1)

As a sign of strength and self-mastery, as *being able* to do without healing, consoling worlds of illusion

2)

as undermining, dissecting, disillusioning, weakening

C. *faith in truth*, the need to have a hold on something believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from all previous feelings of value. Fear, laziness

— likewise *unbelief*: reduction. To what extent it acquires a *new value* if there is no true world at all (thereby the feelings of value that have hitherto been *squandered* on the world of being become free again)

61.

the great *methodologists*: Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, A. Comte

62.

(47)

To what extent the individual *fundamental epistemological positions* (materialism, sensualism, idealism) are consequences of valuations: the source of the highest feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") as also decisive for the problem of *reality*.

— the measure of *positive knowledge* is quite indifferent, or secondary: just look at the Indian development.

The Buddhist *negation* of reality altogether (apparentness = suffering) is a perfect consequence: indemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories not only for a "world in itself", but *insight* into the *faulty procedures* by virtue of which this whole concept has been obtained. "Absolute reality", "being in itself" a contradiction. In a world of *becoming*, "reality" is always only a *simplification* for practical ends, or a *deception* owing to coarse organs, or a difference in the *tempo* of becoming.

The logical negation of the world and nihilization follows from the fact that we must oppose being to non-being, and that the concept "becoming" is denied ("*something* becomes") if being — — —

63.

Being and Becoming

"*Reason*" developed on a sensualistic basis, on the *prejudices of the senses*, *i.e.* in the belief in the truth of the judgments of the senses.

"Being" as a generalization of the concept "*life*" (breathing) "being animated" "willing, acting" "becoming"

The opposite is: "being inanimate", "*not*-becoming"; "*not*-willing". Thus: what is opposed to "that which is" is *not* the non-existent, *not* the apparent, nor yet the dead (for only something that can also live can be dead)

The "soul", the "I" posited as *primal fact*; and inserted everywhere there is a *becoming*.

64.

(48)

the *hawker-philosophers*, who build up a philosophy not out of their life but out of collections of pieces of evidence for certain theses

Never want to see *in order* to see! As a psychologist one must live and wait — until the *sifted* yield of many experiences has drawn its conclusion of its own accord. One must never know *whence* one knows something

Otherwise the result is bad optics and artificiality.

— The involuntary *forgetting* of the individual case is philosophical, *not* the *wanting* to forget, deliberate abstracting: the latter rather marks the *non*-philosophical nature.

65.

what I valued in Wagner was the good piece of Antichrist that he stood for with his art and his manner (oh so clever! —

I am the most disappointed of all Wagnerians; for at the moment when it was more decent than ever to be a pagan, he became a Christian… We Germans, supposing we have ever taken seriously in serious matters, are after all German atheists and mockers one and all: Wagner was too.

66.

(49)

Revaluing values — what would that be? All the *spontaneous* movements must be there, the new, future, stronger ones: only they still stand under false names and valuations and have not yet *become conscious* of themselves

a courageous becoming-conscious and *Yes-saying* to what has been *attained*

a breaking loose from the humdrum routine of old valuations, which degrade us in the best and strongest that we have attained.

67.

(50)

The involuntary naïveté of Larochefoucauld, who believes he is saying something bold, subtle and paradoxical — in those days "truth" in psychological matters was something that astonished — example: "les grandes âmes ne sont pas celles, qui ont moins de passions et plus de vertus que les âmes communes, mais seulement celles, qui ont de plus grands desseins." To be sure: J. Stuart Mill (who calls Chamfort the *nobler* and more philosophical Larochefoucauld of the 18th century —) sees in him only the most acute observer of everything in the human breast that goes back to "habitual selfishness", and adds: "a *noble* spirit will not bring itself to impose upon itself the necessity of a lasting contemplation of *meanness* and *baseness*, unless it were to show against what corrupting influences high-mindedness and nobility of character are able to hold their ground victoriously."

68.

The complicated character of Henri IV: royal and grave and then again with the humour of a buffo, ungrateful and loyal, magnanimous and cunning, full of wit, heroism and absurdity.

"in the writings of Frederick the Great one finds stains of beer and tobacco on the pages of a Marcus Aurelius"

Admiral de Coligny and the great Condé are Montmorencys through their mothers. The male Montmorencys are capable and energetic soldiers, but no *geniuses*.

Likewise the great generals Maurice and Henry of Nassau live again in Turenne, their nephew, the son of their sister Elisabeth

The mother of the great Condé, Charlotte de Montmorency, with whom Henri IV was so thoroughly in love: he said of her that she was unique, not only in her beauty but also in her *courage*.

The old Marquis de Mirabeau complaining when he saw how his son inclined "vers la canaille *plumière, écrivassière*"

"un certain génie fier, exubérant," — Mirabeau of his family.

Napoléon: "j'ai des nerfs fort intraitables; si mon coeur ne battait avec une continuelle lenteur, je courrais risque de devenir fou."

Descartes compared the discoveries of a scholar to a series of battles waged against nature.

Voltaire relates that he made the Catilina complete in 8 days "Ce tour de force me surprend et m'épouvante encore."

69.

"Le génie n'est qu'une longue patience." Buffon. This holds most of all when one thinks of the prehistory of genius, of the family patience

with which a capital of strength was accumulated and held together —

70.

Beethoven composed *while walking*. All moments of genius are accompanied by a surplus of muscular strength

That is following reason in every sense. If every excitement of genius first demands a quantity of muscular energy, — it *heightens* the feeling of strength everywhere. Conversely, a vigorous march intensifies mental excitement, to the point of intoxication

71.

(51)

NB. What is called useful is wholly and utterly dependent on the *intention*, the what-for?; the intention in turn is wholly and utterly dependent on the degree of *power*: therefore utilitarianism can be no foundation but only a doctrine of *consequences*, and can absolutely not be made *binding* on *all*.

72.

(52)

Knowledge as a *means to power*, to "likeness to God"

The old biblical legend believes *that man is in possession of knowledge*; that the expulsion from paradise is a consequence of this only insofar as God is now afraid of man and drives him away from the place where the tree of life, immortality, stands; if man were now to eat of the tree of life as well, God's power would be done for. Apart from this, the whole of culture is a growing fearsomeness of man, symbolized in the tower of Babel with its "heaven-storming" purpose. God

divides men: he splinters them; the multiplicity of languages is an emergency measure of God's, he copes better with the individual peoples insofar as they now make war on one another and destroy one another.

At the beginning of the Old Testament stands the famous story of *God's fear*. Man is presented as a blunder of God's; the animal likewise; man who knows as God's rival; as God's highest; labour, need, death as God's self-defence, to keep his rival down:

God's Fear.

man as a blunder of God's;

the animal likewise

Moral:

God forbids knowledge *because* it leads to *power*, to equality with God. In itself he would grant man immortality, provided that man always remained immortally stupid

He creates animals for him, then woman, so that he has company, — so that he has entertainment (so that he does not hit upon bad thoughts, upon thinking, upon knowing

But the demon (serpent) betrays to man what knowledge is all about.

God's danger is tremendous: now he must *drive* men *away* from the tree of life and *keep* them *down* through need, death and labour. Actual life is presented as a *self-defence of God's*, as an *unnatural* condition… Culture, i.e. the work of knowledge, *nevertheless* strives for equality with God: it towers up, storming heaven. Now war is found necessary (language as the cause of the "people"): men are to destroy themselves. Finally destruction is resolved upon. —

In such a God men have believed!…

73.

(53)

The need for *a metaphysical world* is the consequence of the fact that one did not know how to derive any *meaning*, any *what for?* from the existing world. "Consequently, so one concluded, this world can only be *apparent*."

Relation of "*apparentness*" to "*meaninglessness*", "*purposelessness*": to be interpreted psychologically: what does it signify?

Unreality, *dream*, etc.

(by what is the real distinguished from the dream? by the coherence of *meaning*, by the non-accidental, non-arbitrary, causal. *But* at every broad glance over the whole of existence it seemed meaningless, arbitrary, purposeless, the existing purposes merely tromperies, etc.)

mechanistic causality as such would still be capable of a complete interpretation as *apparentness*; indeed it *provokes one*.

74.

Period of the *Enlightenment*

thereupon period of *Sensibility*

to what extent Schopenhauer belongs to "Sensibility"

(Hegel to spirituality)

75.

(54)

A period in which the old masquerade and moral dressing-up of the affects arouses repugnance: *naked nature*, in which *quantities of power*

are simply conceded as *decisive* (as *determining rank*), in which the *grand style* appears again, as a consequence of *great passion*.

76.

(55)

The *posthumous* (— difficulty of understanding them; in a certain sense *never understood*)

Epicurus?

Schopenhauer

Stendhal

Napoleon

Goethe?

Shakespeare?

Beethoven?

Machiavelli?

Posthumous men are understood worse, but heard better, than those of their time. Or, more strictly: they are never understood: and hence their authority. (comprendre — c'est égaler)

77.

(56)

Every doctrine is superfluous for which everything does not already lie ready in accumulated forces, in explosive material. A revaluation of values is achieved only when there is a tension of new needs, of the newly needy, who suffer from the old valuation without becoming conscious of it, — — —

78.

(57)

Whoever knows how all *fame* arises will harbour a suspicion also against the fame that virtue enjoys.

79.

(58)

What is praising? —

Praise and *gratitude* at harvest, good weather, victory, wedding, peace — the festivals all need a *subject* towards which the feeling discharges itself. One wants everything good that happens to one to have been *done* to one, one wants the *doer*. Likewise before a work of art: one is not content with it; one praises the doer. — What, then, is *praising*? A kind of *compensation* in respect of benefits received, a *giving back*, an attestation of *our* power — for he who praises affirms, judges, appraises, *passes sentence*: he grants himself the right to *be able* to affirm, to *be able* to bestow honour… The heightened feeling of happiness and life is also a heightened *feeling of power*: it is out of this that man *praises* (— out of this that he invents and seeks a *doer*, a "*subject*" —)

Gratitude as *good revenge*: most strictly demanded and practised where equality and pride are to be upheld at the same time, where revenge is best practised.

80.

81.

Berlioz's overture "Roman Carnival" is from 1844 (Offenbach)

82.

The

second Buddhism.

The *nihilistic catastrophe* that puts an end to earthly culture.

Omens of it:

the prevalence of pity

spiritual over-fatigue

the reduction of problems to questions of pleasure and displeasure

the glory of war, which provokes a counterstroke

just as national demarcation provokes a countermovement, the most heartfelt "fraternity",

the impossibility for religion of continuing to work with dogmas and fables

83.

On the Genealogy of Morals.

Second Polemic

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Fourth Essay: the herd instinct in morality.

Fifth Essay: on the history of the denaturalization of morality.

Sixth Essay: among moralists and moral philosophers.

Afterword. A settling of accounts with morality (as Circe of philosophers). Morality — I have said it once before — has hitherto been the Circe of philosophers. It is the *cause* of *pessimism* and *nihilism*…

Its *highest formula* formulated.

The *task*.

Entry into the tragic age of Europe

84.

(59)

The great *nihilistic* counterfeiting through clever misuse of moral values

a)

Love as depersonalization; likewise pity.

b)

Only the *depersonalized intellect* ("the philosopher") knows the *truth*, "the true being and essence of things"

c)

the genius, the *great man* are *great* because they do not seek themselves and their own cause: the *value* of man *grows* in proportion as he denies himself. Schopenhauer II 440 ff.

d)

art as the work of the "*pure, will-less subject*"

Misunderstanding of "objectivity".

e)

Happiness as the purpose of life; *virtue* as

means to the end

the pessimistic condemnation of life in Schopenhauer is a *moral* one

Transference of the herd's standards into the metaphysical.

The "individual" meaningless; consequently giving it an origin in the "in-itself" (and a significance of its existence as an aberration); parents merely as "occasional cause".

It takes its revenge that the individual was not comprehended by science: it is *the whole of life hitherto in One line* and *not* its *result*.

85.

(60)

The *praised* states and desires:

peaceable, fair, moderate, modest, reverent, considerate, brave, chaste, honest, faithful, believing, upright, trusting, devoted, pitying, helpful, conscientious, simple, mild, just, generous, indulgent, obedient, unselfish, unenvious, kind, industrious

NB to be distinguished: to what extent *such qualities* are conditioned as *means* to a particular will and *purpose* (often an "*evil*" purpose)

—

or as natural *consequences* of a dominant affect (e.g. *spirituality*)

—

or expression of a state of need, that is to say: as a *condition of existence* (e.g. citizen; slave, woman, etc.)

Summa: they are all *not felt to be good for their own sake*, none of them "good" in and for itself, but already under the standard of "society", "herd", as means to its ends, as necessary for its maintenance and ad-

vancement, at the same time as the consequence of an actual *herd instinct* in the individual, thus in the service of an instinct that is *fundamentally different* from these *states of virtue*: for towards the outside the herd is *hostile*, *selfish*, *merciless*, full of lust for domination, mistrust, etc.

In the "*shepherd*" the *antagonism comes out*: he must have the *opposite* qualities to the herd

Mortal enmity of the herd against the *order of rank*: its instinct in favour of the *levellers* (Christ); towards the *strong individuals* (les souverains) it is hostile, unfair, immoderate, immodest, insolent, inconsiderate, cowardly, mendacious, false, merciless, secretive, envious, vengeful.

86.

(61)

moralistic naturalism: tracing the seemingly emancipated, supernatural moral value back to its "nature": i.e. to *natural immorality*, to natural "usefulness" etc.

I may designate the tendency of these reflections as *moralistic naturalism*: my task is to translate the seemingly emancipated moral values, which have become *natureless*, back into their nature — i.e. into their natural "*immorality*"

NB. Comparison with Jewish "*holiness*" and its natural basis: the same holds for the *moral law made sovereign*, detached from its *nature* (— to the point of opposition to nature —)

Steps in the "*denaturalization of morality*" (so-called "*idealization*")

as the way to individual happiness

as a consequence of knowledge

as categorical imperative, detached from — — —

as the way to sanctification

as negation of the will to life

the step-by-step *hostility of morality to life*.

87.

(62)

The *suppressed* and *effaced heresy* in

morality

Concepts

: pagan

: master morality

: virtù

88.

(63)

In the New Testament — especially from the Gospels — I hear nothing whatever "*divine*" speaking; rather an *indirect form* of the most abysmal rage for slander and annihilation — one of the most dishonest forms of hatred

—

all knowledge of the qualities of a *higher nature* is lacking

—

unabashed misuse of every kind of homespun worthiness; the whole treasury of proverbs is exploited and usurped; was it necessary for a god to come in order to tell those publicans etc.

nothing is more commonplace than this fight against the *Pharisees* with the help of an absurd and impractical moral apparentness — the people have always taken their pleasure in such a tour de force

The reproach of "hypocrisy"! from this mouth!

nothing is more commonplace than the treatment of opponents — an indicium of the most telling kind for nobility or its *absence*…

Had someone said only the hundredth part of it, he would have deserved destruction as an anarchist.

Pilate the only honnête person, his dédain for this Jewish prattle about "truth", as though such a people could have any say when truth is at issue, his ἃ γεγραφα, his well-meaning attempt to set free this absurd assassin, in whom he could hardly see anything other than a fool…

his disgust at that word, never to be condemned enough, "I am the truth"

89.

(64)

the *assumption of that which is* is necessary in order to be able to think and infer: logic handles only formulas for what remains the same

therefore this assumption would still have no probative force for reality: "that which is" belongs to our optics.

the "I" as being (— untouched by becoming and development)

the *fictitious world* of subject, substance, "reason" etc. is *necessary* —: an ordering, simplifying, falsifying, artificially separating power is in us. "Truth" — will to become master over the multiplicity of sensations.

—

to *string* the phenomena *along* certain categories

—

in this we proceed from the belief in the "in itself" of things (we take the phenomena as *real*)

The character of the world in becoming as *unformulable*, as "false", as "self-contradictory"

Knowledge and *becoming* exclude each other.

Consequently "knowledge" must be something else: a will to make knowable must come first, a kind of becoming itself must create the *deception of that which is*.

90.

In these combative treatises, with which I continue my campaign against the *overall overestimation* of morality, as unphilosophical as it is fateful — — —

91.

(65)

Toward the combating of *determinism*.

From the fact that something happens regularly and happens calculably, it does not follow that it happens *necessarily*. That a quantum of force in every particular case determines itself and comports itself in one single way and manner does not make it an "unfree

will". "Mechanical necessity" is not a fact: *we* first interpreted it into what happens. We have construed the *formulability* of what happens as the consequence of a necessity holding sway over what happens. But from the fact that I do something definite it by no means follows that I do it under compulsion. *Compulsion* cannot be demonstrated in things at all: the rule proves only that one and the same occurrence is not also another occurrence. Only because we have interpreted subjects, "*doers*", into things does the appearance arise that everything that happens is the consequence of a *compulsion* exerted upon subjects — exerted by whom? again by a "doer". Cause and effect — a dangerous concept, so long as one thinks of a *something* that *causes* and a something that is *acted upon*.

A) necessity is not a fact, but an interpretation.

B) Once one has grasped that the "subject" is nothing that *acts*, but only a fiction, much follows.

It is only on the model of the subject that we invented *thinghood* and interpreted it into the jumble of sensations. If we no longer believe in the *acting* subject, then the belief in *acting* things also falls, the belief in interaction, cause and effect between those phenomena that we call things.

With it, naturally, there falls also the world of *acting atoms*: the assumption of which is always made on the presupposition that one needs subjects.

Finally there falls also the "*thing-in-itself*": because this is at bottom the conception of a "subject-in-itself". But we grasped that the subject is a fiction. The opposition "thing-in-itself" and "appearance" is untenable; but with that the concept "*appearance*" also falls away.

C) If we give up the acting *subject*, then also the *object* that is acted upon. Duration, sameness with itself, being inheres neither in what is

called subject nor in what is called object: they are complexes of what happens, apparently durable in respect to other complexes — thus e.g. through a difference in the tempo of what happens (rest-motion, firm-loose: all opposites that do not exist in themselves and by which in fact only *differences of degree* are expressed, which for a certain measure of optics look like opposites.

There are no opposites: only from those of logic do we have the concept of opposition — and from there falsely carried it over into things.

D) If we give up the concept "subject" and "object", then also the concept "*substance*" — and consequently also its various modifications, e.g. "matter", "spirit" and other hypothetical entities, "eternity and immutability of stuff" etc. We are rid of *materiality*.

Expressed morally: the world is false. But insofar as morality itself is a piece of this world, morality is false

The will to truth is a *making*-fast, a *making*-true-and-durable, a putting-out-of-sight of that *false* character, a reinterpretation of it into *what is*.

"Truth" is thus not something that would be there and that would have to be found, discovered, — but something *that is to be created* and that gives the name for a *process*, still more for a will to overpowering that in itself has no end: putting truth in, as a processus in infinitum, an *active determining*, *not* a becoming-conscious of something that would be "in itself" fixed and determined. It is a word for the "will to power"

Life is founded on the presupposition of a belief in what endures and what regularly recurs; the mightier life is, the broader must be the guessable world, the world *made to be*, as it were. Logicization, rationalization, systematization as aids to life.

Man projects his drive to truth, his "goal", in a certain sense outside himself as a world *that is*, as a metaphysical world, as "thing-in-itself", as a world already present.

His need as one who creates already invents the world on which he works, anticipates it: this anticipation ("this belief" in truth) is his support.

All happening, all motion, all becoming as a fixing of relations of degree and of force, as a *struggle*…

The "welfare of the individual" is just as imaginary as the "welfare of the species": the former is *not* sacrificed to the latter; the species, viewed from afar, is something just as fluid as the individual. "*Preservation* of the species" is only a consequence of the *growth* of the species, i.e. of the *overcoming of the species* on the way to a stronger kind

As soon as we *imagine* someone who is responsible for our being thus and thus etc. (God, nature), and so attribute to him our existence, our happiness and misery as *intention*, we spoil for ourselves the *innocence of becoming*. We then have someone who wants to achieve something through us and with us.

That the apparent "*purposiveness*" ("*the purposiveness infinitely superior to all human art*") is merely the consequence of that *will to power* playing itself out in all that happens

that *growing stronger* brings with it orders that resemble a design of purposiveness

that the apparent *purposes* are not intended, but that, as soon as supremacy over a lesser power is attained and the latter works as a function of the greater, an order of *rank*, of organization, must awaken the appearance of an order of means and end.

Against

the

apparent "*necessity*"

—

this only an *expression* of the fact that a force is not also something else.

Against

the

apparent "*purposiveness*"

—

the latter only an *expression* for an order of spheres of power and their interplay.

Logical determinacy, transparency as criterion of truth ("omne illud verum est, *quod clare et distincte percipitur*" Descartes): with this the mechanical hypothesis of the world is desirable and credible.

But that is a crude confusion: like simplex sigillum veri. How does one know that the true constitution of things stands in *this* relation to our intellect? — Could it not be otherwise? that the hypothesis which gives it the greatest feeling of power and security is the one most *preferred, esteemed, and consequently* designated as *true* by it? — The intellect posits its *freest* and *strongest faculty and capacity* as the criterion of what is most valuable, consequently *true*…

"true":

from the side of feeling —: what most strongly excites feeling ("I")

from the side of thinking — : what gives thinking the greatest feeling of strength

from the side of touching, seeing, hearing: where the strongest resistance has to be offered

Thus the *highest degrees of performance* awaken, for the *object*, the belief in its "truth", *i.e. reality*. The feeling of strength, of struggle, of resistance persuades us that there *is* something that is being resisted here.

92.

Liebmann p. 11

Dynamis "real tendency toward action", still inhibited, which tries to actualize itself

— "will to power"

"tensile force"

"accumulated and stored-up tendency to motion"

93.

(66)

I want to *renaturalize asceticism* too; in place of the aim at negation, the aim at *strengthening*; a gymnastics of the will; a privation and interposed periods of fasting of every kind, even in the most spiritual things (Dîners chez Magny: nothing but spiritual gourmands with ruined stomachs); a casuistry of the deed in relation to the opinion we hold of our own powers: an experiment with adventures and arbitrary dangers. — One ought to invent *tests* also for strength in the ability to keep one's word.

94.

To greatness belongs terribleness: let no one deceive himself.

95.

Treatises.

What the "*true world*" has hitherto been carpentered out of.

The denaturalization of morality, also of conscience (also of asceticism) (also of reason, scholasticism, state

Purposiveness.

Necessity.

The herd instinct in morality.

The Circe of philosophers.

The strong ones of the future.

The tragic age: doctrine of the eternal recurrence.

Psychological counterfeiting.

Logic under the dominion of value judgments.

Beauty. Nihilism as *art*.

Is there a *metaphysics*?…

96.

The three apparentnesses:

causality

purposiveness

necessity

Denaturalization of values

Opposites

in place of

Order of rank

The repudiated world

97.

(67)

We fail to affirm and to deny one and the same thing: that is a subjective empirical proposition; it expresses no "necessity", *but only an inability*.

If, according to Aristotle, the *law of contradiction* is the most certain of all principles, if it is the ultimate and lowest one, to which all demonstrations go back, if in it lies the principle of all other axioms: then one ought to consider all the more strictly what assertions it already *presupposes* at bottom. Either it asserts something concerning the actual, the existent, as though it already knew this from elsewhere: namely, that opposite predicates *cannot* be ascribed to it. Or the proposition means to say: that opposite predicates *ought* not to be ascribed to it? Then logic would be an imperative, *not* for the knowledge of the true, but for the positing and arranging of a world *which is to be called true by us*.

In short, the question stands open: are the logical axioms adequate to the actual, or are they standards and means for first *creating* the actual, the concept "actuality", for us?… To be able to affirm the first, however, one would, as has been said, have to know the existent already; which is absolutely not the case. The proposition therefore contains no *criterion of truth*, but an *imperative* concerning *what ought to count as true*.

Supposing there were no such self-identical A at all, as every proposition of logic (of mathematics too) presupposes, supposing the A were

already an *apparentness*, then logic would have a merely *apparent* world as its presupposition. In fact we believe in that proposition under the impression of endless empirical experience, which seems continually to *confirm* it. The "thing" — that is the real substrate of *A; our belief in things* is the presupposition for the belief in logic. The A of logic is, like the atom, a reconstruction after the fact of the "thing"… In not grasping this, and in making logic into a criterion of *true being*, we are already on the way to positing all those hypostases, substance, predicate, object, subject, action, etc., as realities: *i.e.* to conceiving a metaphysical world, *i.e.* a "true world" (— *but this is the apparent world once more*…)

The most original acts of thought, affirming and denying, holding-for-true and not-holding-for-true, are, inasmuch as they presuppose not merely a habit but a *right* to hold-for-true or to hold-for-untrue at all, already dominated by a belief *that there is knowledge for us*, that *judging really can hit upon the truth*: — in short, logic does not doubt that it can state something about the true-in-itself (namely that opposite predicates *cannot* belong to it)

Here *reigns* the crude sensualist prejudice that sensations teach us *truths* about things, — that I cannot at the same time say of one and the same thing that it is *hard* and that it is *soft* (the instinctive proof "I cannot have 2 opposite sensations at once" — *quite crude and false*). The conceptual prohibition of contradiction proceeds from the belief that we *can* form concepts, that a concept not only designates the essence of a thing but *grasps* it… In fact *logic* (like geometry and arithmetic) holds only for *fictitious truths which we have created*. Logic is the attempt *to comprehend the actual world according to a schema of being posited by us, more correctly, to make it formulable, calculable for us*…

98.

(68)

Psychological derivation of our belief in reason.

The concept "reality", "being" is taken from our "*subject*" feeling.

"Subject": interpreted from within ourselves, so that the I counts as substance, as the cause of all doing, as *doer*.

The logical-metaphysical postulates, the belief in substance, accident, attribute, etc., has its persuasive force in the habit of regarding all our doing as a consequence of our will: — so that the I, as substance, does not enter into the multiplicity of change. — *But there is no will.* —

We have no categories at all that would entitle us to separate a "world in itself" from a world as appearance. All our *categories of reason* are of sensualist origin: read off from the empirical world. "The soul", "the I" — the history of this concept shows that here too the oldest distinction ("breath", "life") — — —

If there is nothing material, there is nothing immaterial either. The concept no longer *contains* anything…

No subject "atoms". The sphere of a subject constantly *growing* or *diminishing* — the centre of the system constantly *shifting* —; in case it cannot organize the mass it has appropriated, it splits into 2. On the other hand it can, without annihilating it, transform a weaker subject into its functionary and to a certain degree form a new unity together with it. No "substance", rather something that in itself strives after strengthening; and that wants to "preserve" itself only indirectly (it wants to *surpass* itself —)

99.

NB. Not wanting to be clever, as a psychologist; we *may* not even be clever. Whoever wants to snatch little advantages from his knowledge, from his knowledge of men (— or great ones, like the politician —) goes back from the general to the most particular case; but this kind of optics is opposed to that other, which alone we can use: we look *out* from the most particular —

100.

(69)

"*Species*" — — —

The advance to higher power; species are only *relative slowings of the tempo*, signs that the possibilities, the preconditions for rapid strengthening, are beginning to be lacking (species are *not* goals; the last thing "nature" has at heart would be the preservation of species!!)

101.

NB. This one learns to know men, — he wants in this way to snatch little advantages over them (or great ones, like the politician). That one learns to know men, — he wants an *even greater advantage*, to feel himself superior to them; he wishes to despise.

102.

(70)

Aesthetica.

The states in which we lay a *transfiguration* and *fullness* into things and poetize upon them until they mirror back our own fullness and joy in life:

the sexual drive

intoxication

the feast

spring

victory over the enemy, mockery:

the bravura piece: cruelty; the ecstasy of religious feeling.

Three elements above all:

the sexual drive, intoxication, cruelty: all belonging to man's oldest *festive joy*: all likewise predominant in the original "artist".

Conversely: if things confront us which display this transfiguration and fullness, animal existence answers with an *excitation of those spheres* where all those states of pleasure have their seat: — and a mixture of these very delicate nuances of animal feelings of well-being and desires is the *aesthetic state*. The latter occurs only in such natures as are capable at all of that bestowing and overflowing fullness of bodily vigor; in it there is always the primum mobile. The sober one, the weary one, the exhausted one, the dried-up one (e.g. a scholar) can receive absolutely nothing from art, because he does not have the primordial artistic force, the compulsion of richness: whoever cannot give, receives nothing either.

"*Perfection*": in those states (in sexual love especially, etc.) there is naively betrayed what the deepest instinct recognizes as the higher, the more desirable, the more valuable as such, the upward movement of its type; likewise *toward which* status it actually *strives*. Perfection: that is the extraordinary expansion of its feeling of power, the richness, the necessary overflowing beyond all brims…

Art reminds us of states of animal vigor; it is on the one hand a surplus and outpouring of blossoming bodiliness into the world of images and wishes; on the other, a stimulation of the animal functions through images and wishes of heightened life; — an elevation of the feeling of life, a stimulant to it.

To what extent can even the ugly still have this power? Insofar as it still communicates something of the victorious energy of the artist who has become master over this ugliness and this terror; or insofar as it gently arouses in us the pleasure of cruelty (under certain circumstances even the pleasure of doing *ourselves* harm, self-violation: and with it the feeling of power over ourselves.)

103.

NB When one is sick, one should crawl away into some "cave" or other: that way reason is on one's side, that way alone is it animal-like.

104.

"I will this and that"; "I would like this and that to be so"; "I know that this and that is so". — the degrees of strength: the man of *will*, the man of *longing*, the man of *faith*

105.

(71)

On the Plan.

NB. 1) a word about all *essential* ages, peoples, men and problems.

2) a hundred good *anecdotes*, historical if possible.

3) warlike, *adventurous, insidious* —

4) a few passages of a *melancholy cheerfulness* —

5) advocate of the misjudged and the slandered (— of the *disreputable*…)

6) slow, misleading, labyrinth

7) *Minotaur*, *catastrophe* (the thought to which one must offer *human sacrifices* — the more, the better!)

106.

(71)

Our psychological optics is determined by the fact

1) that *communication* is necessary, and that for communication something must be fixed, simplified, capable of being made precise (above all in the *identical* case…) But in order for it to be communicable, it must be felt as *adjusted*, as "*recognizable again*". The material of the senses adjusted by the understanding, reduced to rough main strokes, made similar, subsumed under what is akin. Thus: the indistinctness and the chaos of the sense impression is, as it were, *logicized*

2) the world of "phenomena" is the adjusted world which we *feel to be real*. "Reality" lies in the constant recurring of identical, familiar, kindred things, in their *logicized character*, in the belief that here we can reckon, calculate.

3) the opposite of this phenomenal world is *not* "the true world", but the formless-unformulable world of the chaos of sensations, — thus *another kind* of phenomenal world, one "unknowable" for us.

4) Questions as to what "things-in-themselves" may be like, quite apart from our sensory receptivity and the activity of our understanding, must be rejected with the question: how could we know *that there are things*? "Thinghood" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an *apparent*

world — and whether this creating, logicizing, adjusting, falsifying is not itself the best-guaranteed *reality*: in short, whether that which "posits things" is not alone real; and whether the "effect of the external world upon us" is not also merely the consequence of such willing subjects…

"Cause and effect" a false interpretation of a *war* and of a relative *victory*

the other "beings" act upon us; our *adjusted* apparent world is an adjusting and *overpowering* of their actions; a kind of *defensive* measure.

The *subject alone is demonstrable*: *hypothesis that there are only subjects* — that "object" is only a kind of effect of subject upon subject… a *modus of the subject*

107.

(72)

Development of *pessimism into nihilism*.

Denaturalization of *values*. Scholasticism of values. Values, detached, idealistic, instead of ruling and guiding action, turn condemningly *against* action.

Opposites inserted in place of the natural degrees and ranks. Hatred of the order of rank. Opposites suit a plebeian age, because they are easier to *grasp*

The *rejected* world, in face of an artificially constructed, "true, valuable" one

Finally: one discovers out of what material one built the "true world": and now one has only the rejected one left and *adds that supreme disappointment to the account of its reprehensibility*

With that, *nihilism* is here: one has kept the *judging values* — and nothing more!

Here arises the *problem of strength and weakness*:

1)

the weak break upon it

2)

the stronger destroy what does not break

3)

the strongest overcome the judging values.

— together this makes up the

tragic age

Toward a Critique of Pessimism.

The "preponderance of *pain over pleasure*" or the reverse (hedonism): these two doctrines are themselves already signposts to nihilism, *nihilistic…*

for here in both cases no other ultimate *meaning* is posited than the phenomenon of pleasure or displeasure.

But so speaks a kind of man that no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, a *meaning*: — for every healthy kind of man the value of life is absolutely not measured by the standard of these secondary matters. And a *preponderance* of pain would be possible and *nevertheless* a mighty will, a *Yes-saying* to life; a needing of this preponderance

"Life is not worth it"; "resignation" "why are there tears?…" — a feeble and sentimental way of thinking. "un monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux."

The pessimism of the energetic: the "to what end?" after a terrible struggle, even after victory. That something is a hundred times *more important* than the question whether *we* feel well or badly: basic instinct of all strong natures — and consequently also whether the *others* feel well or badly. In short, that we have a *goal* for whose sake one does not hesitate to offer *human sacrifices*, to run every danger, to take upon oneself everything bad and worst: *great passion*.

108.

The "subject" is, after all, only a fiction; the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all.

109.

(73)

NB. to give the Jews courage for *new qualities*, now that they have passed into new conditions of existence: this alone was in keeping with my instinct, and on this path I have not let myself be led astray even by a poison-bearing countermovement which is just now on top.

110.

(74)

The *descriptive*, the *picturesque* as *symptoms* of *nihilism* (in the arts and in psychology)

Do not practise *penny-dreadful psychology*! Never observe for the sake of observing! That produces a false optics, a squint, something forced and exaggerated. *Experiencing* as wanting-to-experience; it does not succeed if one looks at oneself while doing it; the born psychologist guards himself, like the born painter, against seeing for the sake of seeing; he never works "from nature" — he leaves the sifting and ex-

pressing of what has been experienced, of the "case", of "nature", to his instinct, — what comes to his consciousness is the *universal* as such, *not* the arbitrary abstracting from particular cases. Whoever does otherwise, like the booty-hungry romanciers in Paris, who lie in wait for reality, as it were, and bring home a handful of curiosities every day: what comes of it in the end? A mosaic at best, something *added together*, garishly coloured, restless (as with the Frères de Goncourt). — "*Nature*", speaking in the artistic sense, is never "true"; it exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves gaps. "Study from nature" is a sign of submission, of weakness, a kind of fatalism unworthy of an artist. *To see what is* — that belongs to a specifically different kind of spirit, the factual ones, the ascertainers: if one has developed this sense in full strength, it is *anti-artistic in itself*.

Descriptive music; leaving it to reality to *take effect*…

All these kinds of art are *easier*, *more imitable*; the meagerly gifted reach for them. Appeal to the instincts; *suggestive* art.

111.

Wagner, a piece of superstition even in his lifetime, has meanwhile so wrapped himself in the clouds of the improbable that, with regard to him, only the paradoxical still finds belief

112.

(75)

Might not the opposition of the *active* and the *reactive* lie hidden behind that opposition of *classical* and *romantic*?…

113.

NB some fates one must gulp down without looking at them: as with drinking maté, that *improves* their taste.

114.

NB that *kind of egoism* which drives us to do something or leave it undone for the sake of our

neighbor

115.

(76)

To *consider*:

The perfect book. —

1)

the form, the style

An *ideal monologue*. Everything scholarly absorbed into the depths

all the accents of deep passion, care, also of weaknesses, mitigations, *sunny* spots, — brief happiness, sublime cheerfulness —

Overcoming of demonstration; absolutely *personal*. No "I"…

a kind of mémoires; the most abstract things in the most bodily and bloodiest way

the whole of history as if *personally lived and suffered* (— only thus does it become *true*)

as it were a conversation of spirits; a summoning, a challenge, a conjuring of the dead

as much as possible that is visible, definite, exemplary, caution toward the present. everything timely

Avoidance of the word "noble" and in general of all words in which a self-staging might lie.

Not "description"; all problems translated into *feeling*, to the point of passion —

2)

Collection of *expressive* words. Preference for military

words.

Substitute words for the philosophical termini: German if possible and minted into a formula.

to portray all the *states of the most spiritual men*; so that their whole series is encompassed in the entire work.

(— states

of the legislator

of the tempter

of one compelled to sacrifice, hesitating —

of great responsibility

of suffering from being unrecognizable

of suffering from having to *seem*

of suffering from having to cause pain,

of voluptuous delight in destroying

3)

To build the work toward a *catastrophe*

Introduction to be taken from the *will* to pessimism. *Not* to speak as one who suffers, who is disappointed. "We who do not believe in virtue and the beautiful swellings."

Satyr play

at the end

Interpose: brief conversations between Theseus, Dionysus and

Ariadne.

— Theseus is becoming absurd, said Ariadne, Theseus is becoming virtuous —

Theseus's jealousy of Ariadne's dream.

the hero admiring himself, becoming absurd, Ariadne's lament

Dionysus without jealousy: "What I love in you, how could a Theseus love that?"…

Last act. Wedding of Dionysus and Ariadne

"one is not jealous when one is a god, said Dionysus: unless of gods."

"Ariadne, said Dionysus, you are a labyrinth: Theseus has lost his way in you, he has no thread any longer; what use is it to him now that he was not devoured by the Minotaur? What devours him is worse than a Minotaur." You flatter me, answered Ariadne, but I am weary of my pity, all heroes shall perish by me: That is my last love for Theseus: "I bring him to ruin"

116.

(77)

Rousseau, this typical "modern man", idealist and canaille in one person, and the first for the sake of the second, a being that *needed*

"moral dignity" and its attitude in order to endure himself, sick at once with unbridled vanity and unbridled self-contempt: this misbegotten creature, which planted itself at the threshold of our new age, preached the "return to nature" — where, actually, did he want to go *back* to?

I too speak of a "return to nature": although it is actually not a "going back" but a "coming up" — into the strong, sovereign, terrible nature and naturalness of man, which may play with great tasks because it would grow weary of smaller ones and feel disgust. — Napoleon was "return to nature" in rebus tacticis and above all in matters of strategy.

The 18th century, to which we owe everything in which our 19th century has laboured and suffered: the moral fanaticism, the softening of feeling in favour of the weak, the oppressed, the suffering, the rancour against every kind of privileged person, the faith in "progress", the faith in the fetish "humanity", the senseless plebeian pride and the craving for full passions — both romantic —

Our enmity toward the révolution does not concern the bloody farce, the *"immorality"* with which it played itself out; rather its herd *morality*, its "truths", with which it still goes on working and working, its contagious notion of "justice and freedom", with which it ensnares all mediocre souls, its overthrow of the authority of the *higher estates*. That things went on so horribly and bloodily around it has lent this orgy of *mediocrity* an *appearance of greatness*, so that as a spectacle it has seduced even the proudest spirits.

117.

one gives in where giving in is giving odds: that is, when one is rich enough not to have to take.

118.

he loved to go on insisting he was right until some chance came to his aid, — and until he *was* right

119.

(78)

The *"purification of taste"* can only be the consequence of a *strengthening* of the type. Our society of today only *represents* culture; the man of culture is *lacking*. The great *synthetic man* is lacking: in whom the various forces are unhesitatingly harnessed to the yoke toward One goal. What we have is the *manifold* man, the most interesting chaos there has perhaps ever been: but *not* the chaos *before* the creation of the world, rather after it, the manifold man. — *Goethe* as the most beautiful expression of the type (— *not an Olympian at all!*)

To win back the right to great *affect* — for the man of knowledge! after unselfing and the cult of the "objective" have created a false order of rank in this sphere too. The error reached its peak when Schopenhauer taught: *precisely in breaking free of affect*, of the will, lies the only access to the "true", to knowledge; the will-less intellect *could not do otherwise* than see the true, real essence of things.

The same error in arte: as though everything were *beautiful* as soon as it is contemplated without will.

The struggle against "purpose" in *art* is always the struggle against the *moralizing* tendency of art, against its subordination to *morality*: l'art pour l'art means: "the devil take morality!" — But even this enmity still betrays the overpowering force of the prejudice; if one has excluded the *affect of moral preaching* and of "improving mankind" from art, it by no means follows that art is possible at all without "affect", without "purpose", without an extra-aesthetic need. "Reflecting",

"imitating": very well, but how? all art praises, glorifies, selects, transfigures — it *strengthens* certain valuations: may one take this merely as something incidental, as an accident of its effect? *Or does it already lie at the root of the artist's "ability"?* Does the artist's affect relate to art itself? Or not rather to life? to a *desirability of life?*

And the many ugly, hard, terrible things that art depicts? Does it mean thereby to *disgust* us with life? to dispose us to resignation, as Schopenhauer thinks? — But what the artist communicates above all is his *state* with regard to this terribleness of life: this state is itself a *desirability*; whoever has experienced it holds it in the highest honour and communicates it, provided that he is a communicative being, i.e. an artist. *Bravery* before a mighty enemy, a sublime calamity, a horrifying problem — this itself is the *higher state* of life which all art of the sublime glorifies. The warlike soul celebrates its Saturnalia in tragedy; the happiness of war and victory, of harsh cruelty in the face of suffering and struggling men, as all of this is proper to the man accustomed to suffering, and *seeking out* suffering.

120.

(79)

In our civilized world we come to know almost only the stunted criminal, crushed beneath the curse and contempt of society, mistrustful of himself, often belittling and slandering his deed, a *failed type of criminal*; and we resist the idea that *all great men were criminals*, only in the grand style and not in the pitiful one; that crime belongs to greatness (— spoken thus, that is, from the consciousness of the triers of the reins and of all those who have *descended* deepest into great souls) "Outlawry" from tradition, from conscience, from duty — every great man knows this danger of his. But he also *wills* it: he *wills* the great goal and therefore also its means.

121.

(80)

That one give men back the *courage* for their natural drives

That one check their *self-underestimation* (*not* that of man as an individual, but that of man *as nature*…)

That one take the *opposites* out of things, once one grasps that we have put them in.

That one take the *idiosyncrasy of society* out of existence altogether (guilt, punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, etc.)

To set out the problem of *civilization*.

Progress toward *"naturalness"*: in all political questions, even in the relations between parties, even mercantile parties or parties of workers and employers, what is at stake are questions of *power* — "what one *can* do?" and only then, what one *ought* to do?

That, in the midst of the mechanics of grand politics, the Christian fanfares are still being blown (e.g. in victory bulletins or in imperial addresses to the people) belongs more and more to what is becoming impossible: because it goes against taste. "The Crown Prince's throat" is no affair of God's.

Progress of the nineteenth century over the 18th.

— at bottom we good Europeans are waging a war against the 18th century. —

1. "Return to nature" understood ever more decisively in the opposite sense from that in which Rousseau understood it. *Away from the idyll and the opera!*

2. ever more decisively anti-idealist, more objective, more fearless, more industrious, more moderate, more mistrustful of sudden changes, *anti-revolutionary*

3. ever more decisively placing the question of the *health of the body* before that "of the soul": understanding the latter as a state consequent upon the former, at the least as conditioned by it — — —

122.

(80a)

On the *Genealogy* of *Christianity*

— the fanaticism of the timid, who do not dare to turn back once they have left their land: until, out of fear and the torment of fear, they come to *annihilate* it.

— it takes more courage and *strength* of character to halt or even to turn back than to go on. *To turn back without cowardice is harder than to go on without cowardice.*

123.

(81)

On the Genesis of the Nihilist.

One finds the courage only late for what one actually *knows*. That I have been a nihilist from the ground up until now, this I have only recently admitted to myself: the energy, the radicalism with which I pressed forward as a nihilist deceived me about this fundamental fact. When one is moving toward a goal, it seems impossible that "aimlessness in itself" should be the first principle of our faith.

124.

(82)

Morality as a means of seduction.

"Nature is good, for a wise and good God is its cause. On whom, then, does the responsibility for the 'corruption of man' fall? On its tyrants and seducers, the ruling estates — they must be annihilated."

: the logic of *Rousseau* (cf. the logic of *Pascal*, which draws the conclusion of original sin)

Compare the kindred logic of *Luther.*

: in both cases a pretext is sought for introducing an insatiable need for revenge as a *moral-religious duty*. Hatred against the ruling estate seeks to *sanctify* itself…

(the "sinfulness of Israel": foundation for the position of power of the priests)

Compare the kindred logic of *Paul.*

: it is always the cause of God under which these reactions appear, the cause of right, of humanity, etc.

(with *Christ* the jubilation of the people appears as the cause of his execution; an anti-priestly movement from the outset)

(— even with the *anti-Semites* it is always the same trick: to visit the opponent with moral verdicts of condemnation and to reserve for oneself the role of *punishing justice*.)

NB "Moral condemnation" as a *means to power*.

A.

"the arousal of the *bad* conscience" in order to make saviours, priests and the like necessary, or:

B.

the arousal of the *good* conscience: in order to be able to treat one's opponents as the

bad ones and to throw them down

125.

(83)

against Rousseau: the state of nature is terrible, man is a beast of prey, our civilization is an unheard-of *triumph* over this beast-of-prey nature: — *so Voltaire concluded*. He felt the mitigation, the refinements, the spiritual joys of the civilized condition; he despised narrow-mindedness, even in the form of virtue; the lack of delicacy even among the ascetics and monks.

The *moral reprehensibility* of man seemed to preoccupy Rousseau; with the words "unjust", "cruel" one can most of all stir up the instincts of the oppressed, who otherwise find themselves under the ban of the vetitum and of disfavour: *so that their conscience counsels them against their rebellious desires*. These emancipators seek above all *one thing*: to give their party the grand accents and attitudes of the *higher nature*.

126.

(84)

Chief symptoms of pessimism.

the dîners chez Magny.

Russian pessimism. Tolstoy Dostoevsky

aesthetic pessimism l'art pour l'art "Description" romantic and anti-romantic pessimism

epistemological pessimism.

Schopenhauer. "Phenomenalism".

anarchist pessimism.

the "religion of pity", Buddhist pre-movement.

cultural pessimism (exoticism. cosmopolitanism)

moralistic pessimism: I myself

The *distractions*, the temporary *redemptions*

from pessimism.

the great wars, the strong military organizations, nationalism

industrial competition

science

pleasure

Let us separate out here:

pessimism as strength — in what? in the energy of its logic, as anarchism and nihilism, as analytics.

pessimism as decline — in what? as softening, as cosmopolitan fellow-feeling, as "tout comprendre" and historicism.

127.

The Advent of Nihilism.

The Logic of Nihilism

The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism.

Overcomers and Overcome.

128.

(85)

the *critical tension*: the extremes come to light and gain preponderance.

129.

Decline of *Protestantism*: understood theoretically and historically as a half-measure. Actual preponderance of Catholicism; the feeling of Protestantism so extinguished that the strongest *anti-Protestant* movements are no longer felt as such (e.g. Wagner's Parsifal). The whole of higher intellectuality in France is *Catholic* in instinct; Bismarck has grasped that there is no longer any such thing as Protestantism.

130.

(86)

Critique of *modern man*

(his moralistic mendacity)

"the good man", merely corrupted and seduced by bad institutions (tyrants and priests)

reason as authority; history as the overcoming of errors; the future as progress.

the Christian state "the God of hosts"

the Christian management of sex, or marriage

the kingdom of "justice" the cult of "humanity"

"freedom"

the *romantic* attitude of modern man:

the noble-hearted man (Byron, V. Hugo, G. Sand

noble indignation

sanctification through passion (as true "nature"

taking sides with the oppressed and those who have come off badly: motto of the historians and romanciers.

the Stoics of duty

"selflessness" as art and knowledge

altruism (as the most mendacious form of egoism (utilitarianism) the most sentimental egoism.

131.

(87)

all this is 18th century. What, on the other hand, has *not* been inherited from it: the insouciance, the cheerfulness, the elegance, the clarity of mind; the tempo of the spirit has changed; the delight in intellectual subtlety and clarity has given way to the delight in colour, harmony, mass, reality, etc. Sensualism in matters of the spirit. In short, it is the 18th century of *Rousseau*.

132.

the *virtuosi* and the *virtuous*

133.

Science sans conscience n'est que ruine de l'âme. Rabelais. conscience sans science c'est le salut —

134.

(88)

In 1814 Augustin Thierry read what de Montlosier had said in his work De la monarchie française: he answered with a cry of indignation and set to work on his own work. That émigré had said: Race

d'affranchis, race d'esclaves arrachés de nos mains, peuple tributaire, peuple nouveau, licence vous fut octroyée d'être libres, et non pas à nous d'être nobles; pour nous tout est de droit, pour vous tout est de grâce, nous ne sommes point de votre communauté; nous sommes un tout par nous-mêmes.

135.

(90)

"evangelical freedom". "Responsibility before one's own conscience", this fine Tartuffery of *Luther's*: at bottom the "will to power" in its shyest form. For these are its three degrees: a) freedom, b) justice, c) love

136.

faith is a "sacred sickness", ἱερὰ νόσος: Heraclitus already knew that: faith, a stupefying inner compulsion *that something shall be true*…

137.

(91)

The struggle against *great* men, justified on economic grounds. They are dangerous, accidents, exceptions, tempests, strong enough to call into question what has been slowly built and founded. Not only to discharge the explosive harmlessly, but where possible to *prevent* its coming into being… Fundamental instinct of civilized society.

138.

(92)

NB to *take into service* everything terrible; singly, step by step, tentatively: so the task of culture demands; but until it is *strong enough* for that, it must combat it, moderate it, veil it, even curse it…

— wherever a culture *posits evil*, it thereby gives expression to a relation of *fear*, hence a *weakness*…

Thesis: everything good is an evil of former times made serviceable.

Standard: the more terrible and greater the passions which an age, a people, an individual can permit itself, because it is able to use them *as means, the higher stands its culture*. (— the realm of evil grows ever *smaller*…)

— the more mediocre, weaker, more submissive and more cowardly a man is, the more he will posit as *evil*: with him the realm of evil is most extensive; the lowest man will see the realm of evil (i.e. of what is forbidden and hostile to him) everywhere.

139.

(89)

Summa: mastery over the passions, *not* their weakening or extirpation!

the greater the master-strength of the will, the more freedom may be given to the passions.

the "great man" is great through the free play-room of his desires and through the still greater power that knows how to take these magnificent monsters into service.

— the "good man" is, at every stage of civilization, *the harmless and the useful at once*: a kind of *mean*; the expression in common consciousness of *whom one need not fear and whom one nevertheless may not despise*…

Education: essentially the means of *ruining* the exception, a diversion, a seduction, a sickening, in favour of the rule.

That is hard: but, considered economically, perfectly reasonable. At least for that long time, — — —

Cultivation: essentially the means of turning taste against the exception in favour of the middling.

A culture of the exception, of experiment, of danger, of nuance, as the consequence of a great *wealth of forces*: — *every* aristocratic culture tends *in that direction*.

Only when a culture has a surplus of forces at its command can there arise on its soil a hothouse of luxury culture as well — — —

140.

(93)

An attempt on my part to grasp the *absolute reasonableness* of social judging and valuation: naturally, free of any will to reckon out moral results from it.

: the degree of *psychological falseness* and opacity needed to *sanctify* the affects essential to preservation and the enhancement of power (to create a *good conscience* for them)

: the degree of *stupidity* needed for a common regulation and evaluation to remain possible (to which end education, surveillance of the elements of cultivation, drill)

: the degree of *inquisition, mistrust and intolerance* needed to treat the exceptions as criminals and to suppress them, — to give them a bad conscience themselves, so that they are inwardly sick with their exceptionality.

Morality essentially as a *defence*, as a means of protection: to that extent a sign of the man not yet fully grown p. 123

(armour-plated; stoic;

the fully grown man has above all *weapons*, he is *aggressive*

instruments of war transformed into instruments of peace (out of scales and plates, feathers and hair)

Sum: morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality itself is a form of immorality.

Great *liberation* that this insight brings: opposition is removed from things, the homogeneity of all that happens is *saved* — —

141.

(94)

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy — our *modern vices*

142.

(95)

The high points of culture and of civilization lie *apart*: one should not let oneself be misled about the antagonism of these two concepts.

The great moments of *culture* are, morally speaking, the times of *corruption*; the epochs of the willed and enforced *taming* ("civilization") of man are times of intolerance towards the most spiritual and boldest natures and their deepest adversaries.

143.

(96)

How little the object matters! It is the spirit that gives life! What sick and stuffy air rises from the midst of all that excited talk of "redemption", love, "blessedness", faith, truth, "eternal life"! Take by contrast a truly *pagan* book, e.g. Petronius, in which at bottom nothing is done, said, willed and esteemed that is not, by a Christian-bigoted measure of value, sin, even mortal sin. And yet: what a sense of well-being in

the purer air, the superior spirituality of the quicker step, the liberated and overflowing strength, certain of the future? In the whole New Testament there is not a single buffoonery: but that alone refutes a book… Compared with it, the New Testament remains a symptom of decline and of cultural *corruption* — and as such it has worked, as a ferment of decay

144.

(97)

On *"logical apparentness"*.

The concept "individual" and the concept "species" are equally false and merely apparent. *"Species"* expresses only the fact that an abundance of similar beings appear at the same time and that the tempo of their further growth and transformation is slowed down for a long time: so that the actual small continuations and increments do not much come into consideration (— a phase of development in which the developing does not become visible, so that an equilibrium *seems* to have been reached, and the false notion is made possible that *here a goal has been reached* — and that there has been a goal in development…)

Form counts as something enduring and therefore more valuable; but form is merely invented by us; and however often "the same form is attained", that does not mean that it *is* the *same* form, — rather *something new always appears* — and only we, who compare, reckon this new thing, insofar as it resembles the old, together into the unity of "form". As if a *type* were meant to be attained and, as it were, hovered before the forming and dwelt within it.

Form, species, law, idea, purpose — everywhere here the same mistake is made, of foisting a false reality upon a fiction: as though what hap-

pens carried some obedience within it, — an artificial division is made in what happens between that *which* acts and that *according to which* this acting directs itself (but the *which* and the *according to which* are only posited by us out of obedience to our metaphysical-logical dogmatics: no "state of affairs")

This *compulsion* to form concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws — *"a world of identical cases"* — should not be understood as though we were thereby able to fix the *true world*; but as a compulsion to arrange for ourselves a world in which *our existence* is made possible — we thereby create a world that is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us.

This same compulsion exists in the *activity of the senses*, which the understanding supports, — through simplifying, coarsening, underlining and inventing, on which all "recognition", all ability to make oneself understood, rests. Our *needs* have made our senses so precise that the "same world of appearances" keeps recurring and has thereby acquired the semblance of *reality*.

Our subjective compulsion to believe in logic expresses only that, long before logic itself came to our consciousness, we did nothing *but put its postulates into what happens*: now we find them present in what happens — we can no longer do otherwise — and now imagine that this compulsion guarantees something about "truth". It is we who have created "the thing", the "same thing", subject, predicate, deed, object, substance, form, after we had longest pursued the *making*-equal, the *making* coarse and simple.

The world *appears* logical to us because *we* first *made* it logical

145.

(98)

On the "Machiavellianism" of power.

(*unconscious Machiavellianism*)

The *will to power* appears

a)

among the oppressed, among slaves of every kind, as will to *"freedom"*: merely *getting loose* seems the goal (morally-religiously: "answerable only to one's own conscience", "evangelical freedom", etc.)

b)

among a stronger kind growing towards power, as will to superior power; if at first unsuccessful, then restricting itself to the will to *"justice"*, i.e. to the *same measure of rights* as the other, ruling kind possesses. Struggle for rights…

c)

among the strongest, richest, most independent, most courageous, as "*love* of mankind", of "the people", of the gospel, of truth, of God; as pity; "self-sacrifice", etc.; as overpowering, sweeping along with oneself, taking into one's service; as instinctive reckoning of oneself as one with a great quantum of power to which one *is able to give direction*: the hero, the prophet, the Caesar, the saviour, the shepherd (— sexual love too belongs here: it *wills* overpowering, taking possession, and it *appears* as self-surrender…) at bottom only love of one's "instrument", of one's "horse"…, one's conviction that this and that *belongs* to one, as someone who is capable *of using it*.

"Freedom", "justice" and "love"!!!

The *incapacity for power*: its *hypocrisy* and

cleverness:

as obedience (subordination, pride in duty, morality…)

as submission, devotion, love (idealization, deification of the one who commands as compensation and indirect self-glorification)

as fatalism, resignation

as "objectivity"

as self-tyrannization (Stoicism, asceticism, "unselfing", "sanctification")

(— everywhere the need expresses itself to exercise some power after all, or to create for oneself temporarily the *semblance* of a power (as *intoxication*)

as criticism, pessimism, indignation, tormenting

as "beautiful soul", "virtue", "self-deification", "aloofness", "purity from the world" etc. (— the insight into one's incapacity for power disguising itself as dédain)

The men who want power for the sake of the *advantages* in happiness that power grants (political parties)

other men, who want power even with visible *disadvantages* and *sacrifices* of happiness and well-being: the ambitiosi

other men, who want power merely because it would otherwise fall into other hands, on which they do not wish to be dependent

On the problem: whether power in the "will to power" is merely a *means*: The protoplasm appropriating something and *inorganizing* it, thus strengthening itself and exercising power in order to strengthen itself. To what extent the behaviour of the protoplasm in appropriating and inorganizing provides the key to the chemical behaviour of two substances toward each other (struggle and the establishment of power)

146.

(99)

Against Rousseau: man is *unfortunately* no longer evil enough; Rousseau's opponents, who say: "man is a beast of prey", are unfortunately not right; not the corruption of man but his softening and moralization is the curse; in the sphere which Rousseau most vehemently combated, there was precisely the *relatively* still strong and well-constituted type of man (— the one which still had the great affects unbroken, will to power, will to enjoyment, will and capacity to command) One must compare the man of the 18th century with the man of the Renaissance (also with that of the 17th century in France) in order to sense what is at issue: Rousseau is a symptom of self-contempt and of heated vanity — both signs that the dominating will is lacking: he moralizes and, as a man of rancune, seeks the *cause* of his wretchedness in the *ruling* classes.

147.

(100)

By what means does a virtue come to power?

Precisely by the means of a political party: slander, suspicion, undermining of the opposing virtues that are already in power, rebaptizing of their name, systematic persecution and mockery: Thus: *through sheer* "*immoralities*".

What does a *desire* do with itself in order to become a *virtue*? the rebaptizing; the denial, on principle, of its intentions; practice in misunderstanding itself; the alliance with existing and recognized virtues; the ostentatious enmity toward their opponents. If possible, buying the protection of sanctifying powers; intoxicating, inspiring, the

Tartuffery of idealism; winning over a party that *either* rises to the top with it *or* perishes…, becoming *unconscious, naive*…

148.

(101)

Doctrine of Metamorphoses.

Metamorphoses

of sexuality

"

of cruelty

"

of cowardice

"

of vindictiveness, anger

"

of laziness

"

of lust for domination

"

of foolhardiness

"

of the lie, of envy

"

of slander

"

of greed

"

of hatred

That which an age despises or hates as the *rudimentary* virtues, as remnants of the ideal of an earlier age, but in the form of atrophy ("the criminal"…)

149.

(102)

How does one go about bringing *life-hostile* tendencies into honour?

e.g.

chastity

poverty and beggary

stupidity and lack of culture

self-contempt

contempt for existence

150.

(103)

On the optics of valuation:

Influence of the

quantity (great, small) of the *purpose*.

Influence of the

spirituality in the *means*.

Influence of the

manners in the *action*.

Influence of

success or failure

Influence of the

opposing forces and their worth

Influence of the

permitted and the *forbidden*

The *quantity* in the *goal* in its effect upon the optics of valuation: the *great* criminal and the *petty* one. The quantity in the *goal* of what is willed also decides, in the one who wills, whether he feels respect for himself in the doing or feels faint-hearted and miserable.

— Then the degree of *spirituality* in the means in its effect upon the optics of valuation. How differently the philosophical innovator, tempter and man of violence appears beside the robber, the barbarian and the adventurer! — Semblance of the "disinterested".

Finally noble manners, bearing, bravery, self-confidence — how they alter the valuing of what is attained in this way!

Effect of the *prohibition*: every power that forbids, that knows how to arouse fear in the one to whom something is forbidden, produces the "bad conscience" (*i.e.* the desire for something together with the consciousness of the *dangerousness* of its satisfaction, with the compulsion to secrecy, to the furtive path, to caution; every prohibition

worsens the character of those who do not submit to it willingly, but only under compulsion)

151.

(104)

The will to power can express itself only *against resistances*; it therefore seeks out that which resists it, — this is the original tendency of protoplasm when it sends out pseudopodia and gropes about itself. Appropriation and incorporation is above all a wanting-to-overpower, a forming and adding-on and reshaping, until at last the overpowered has passed entirely into the power of the aggressor and has increased it. — If this incorporation does not succeed, then the structure presumably falls apart; and *duality* appears as a consequence of the will to power: in order not to let go of what has been conquered, the will to power divides into two wills (in some circumstances without wholly giving up their connection with one another)

"Hunger" is only a narrower adaptation, after the basic drive for power has gained a more spiritual form.

152.

Moral preoccupation places a spirit low in the order of rank: it thereby lacks the instinct of special right, of the a parte, the feeling of freedom of creative natures, of the "children of God" (or of the devil —) And it makes no difference whether he preaches the ruling morality or applies his ideal to a *critique* of the ruling morality: he thereby belongs to the herd — even if it be as its supreme necessity, as "shepherd"…

153.

(105)

The strong of the future.

What partly necessity, partly chance has here and there attained, the conditions for producing a *stronger species*: this we can now comprehend and knowingly *will*: we can create the conditions under which such an elevation is possible.

Until now "education" has had the utility of society in view: *not* the greatest possible utility of the future, but the utility of the society existing at the moment. "Tools" for it were what one wanted. Supposing *the wealth of force were greater*, one could conceive of a *withdrawal of forces* whose aim would *not* concern the utility of society, but a future utility,

— Such a task would have to be set the more one comprehended to what extent the present form of society was in a powerful transformation, so as at some time or other *no longer to be able to exist for its own sake*: but only as a *means* in the hands of a stronger race.

The increasing diminution of man is precisely the driving force for thinking of the breeding of a *stronger race*: one which would have its surplus precisely in that wherein the diminished species grew weak and weaker (will, responsibility, self-assurance, being-able-to-set-oneself-goals)

The *means* would be those which history teaches: *isolation* through interests of preservation the reverse of those that are average today; practice in reversed valuations; distance as pathos; a free conscience in what is today most underestimated and most forbidden.

The *levelling* of European man is the great process which cannot be checked: one ought rather to hasten it.

The necessity for a *tearing-open of the chasm*, for *distance*, for *order of rank* is thereby given: *not* the necessity of slowing down that process

This *levelled* species requires a *justification* as soon as it has been attained: it lies in the service of a higher, sovereign kind, which stands upon it and only upon it can rise to its task.

Not merely a master race whose task would be exhausted in ruling; but a race with *its own sphere of life*, with a surplus of force for beauty, bravery, culture, manners even into the most spiritual; an *affirming* race which may grant itself every great luxury…, strong enough not to need the tyranny of the virtue-imperative, rich enough not to need thrift and pedantry, beyond good and evil; a hothouse for strange and choice plants.

154.

(106)

Man is the *un-beast* and the *over-beast*; the higher man is the un-man and the overman: thus it belongs together. With every growth of man into greatness and height he grows also into the deep and the terrible: one ought not to will the one without the other — or rather: the more thoroughly one wills the one, the more thoroughly one attains precisely the other.

155.

(107)

Virtue now finds no more belief, its power of attraction is gone; unless someone should perhaps know how to bring it to market anew as an unusual form of adventure and debauchery. It demands too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers for it not to have conscience against it today. To be sure, for the conscienceless and the wholly unscrupulous precisely this may be its new magic — it is now what it has never yet been before, a *vice*.

156.

(108)

Falsification in psychology

The great crimes in psychology:

1) that all *displeasure, all misfortune,* has been falsified with wrong (with guilt) (pain has been robbed of its innocence)

2) that all *strong feelings of pleasure* (exuberance, voluptuousness, triumph, pride, audacity, knowledge, self-assurance and happiness in itself) have been branded as sinful, as seduction, as suspect.

3) that the *feelings of weakness,* the innermost cowardices, the lack of courage for oneself have been given sanctifying names and taught as desirable in the highest sense.

4) that everything *great* in man has been reinterpreted as unselfing, as sacrificing oneself for something else, for others; that even in the man of knowledge, even in the artist, *depersonalization* has been feigned as the cause of his highest knowing and ability.

5) that *love* has been falsified as self-surrender (and altruism), whereas it is a taking-to-oneself or a giving-away in consequence of an overwealth of personality. Only the *wholest* persons can love; the depersonalized, the "objective" ones are the bad lovers (— ask the little women!). This holds also of love of God, or of the "fatherland": one must sit firmly upon oneself,

Egoism as the *I*-ification, altruism as the *alter*-ation

6) life as punishment, happiness as temptation; the passions as devilish, trust in oneself as godless

NB *This whole psychology is a psychology* of *hindrance,* a kind of *walling-in* out of fear; on the one hand the great multitude (the ill-constituted

and the mediocre) wants thereby to defend itself against the stronger (— and to *destroy* them in their development…), on the other hand it wants all the drives by which it itself thrives best to be sanctified and alone held in honour. Cf. the Jewish priesthood.

157.

(109)

I. The deliberate *falsification of history*, so that it may furnish the *proof* for the moral valuation.

a) Decline of a people and corruption

b) Rise of a people and virtue

c) The high point of a people ("its culture") as a consequence of moral elevation

II. The falsification in principle of the *great human beings*, the *great creators*, the *great ages*

a) it is held that *faith* is what distinguishes the great: but unscrupulousness, skepticism, the permission to be able to rid oneself of a faith, "immorality" belong to greatness (Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe — the main thing is always suppressed, their "freedom of the will" —)

158.

What *I* fight against: that an exceptional kind makes war on the rule, instead of grasping that the continued existence of the rule is the precondition for the *value of the exception*. E.g., the females who, instead of feeling the distinction of their abnormal needs, would like to displace the position of woman altogether…

159.

(110)

Whose

will to power is morality?

What is *common* to the history of Europe since *Socrates* is the attempt to bring the *moral values* to dominion over all other values: so that they are to be the guide and judge not only of life but also of

1. knowledge

2. the arts

3. the endeavours of state and society

"becoming better" as the sole task, everything else a *means* to it (or a disturbance, hindrance, danger: consequently to be fought to the point of annihilation…)

A similar movement in *China*

A similar movement in *India*.

What is the meaning of this *will to power on the part of the moral values*, which has hitherto played itself out on earth in three tremendous developments?

Answer: — three powers are hidden behind it: 1) the instinct of the *herd* against the strong and independent 2) the instinct of the *suffering* and the ill-constituted against the fortunate 3) the instinct of the *mediocre* against the exceptions. — *Tremendous advantage of this movement*, however much cruelty, falseness and narrow-mindedness may have helped along in it: (for the history of the *struggle of morality with the fundamental instincts of life* is itself the greatest immorality that has hitherto existed on earth…)

160.

(111)

The moral values in the theory of knowledge itself

trust in reason — why not mistrust?

the "true world" is supposed to be the good one — why?

apparentness, change, contradiction, struggle appraised as immoral: longing for a world in which all this is *lacking*.

the transcendent world invented *so that* a place remains for "moral freedom" (in Kant)

dialectic as the way to virtue (in Plato and Socrates: evidently because sophistry was regarded as the way to immorality

Time and space ideal: consequently "unity" in the essence of things, consequently no "sin", no evil, no imperfection, — a *justification* of God.

Epicurus *denies* the possibility of knowledge: in order to keep the moral (or rather hedonistic) values as the highest. Augustine does the same; later Pascal ("corrupted reason") in favour of the Christian values.

Descartes' contempt for everything changing; likewise that of Spinoza.

161.

(112)

the moral values in their dominion over the aesthetic (or *precedence* over them, or opposition and *mortal enmity* towards them)

162.

(113)

Causes of the *advent of pessimism*

1)

that the mightiest drives of life, those richest in future, have hitherto been *slandered*, so that life lies under a curse

2)

that man's growing bravery and honesty and bolder mistrust grasp the *inseparability of these instincts* from life and turn against life

3)

that only the *most mediocre*, who do not *feel* that conflict at all, thrive, while the higher kind turns out badly and prejudices others against itself as a product of degeneration, — that, on the other hand, the mediocre, setting itself up as goal and meaning, *arouses indignation* (— that no one can any longer answer a *what for?*: —)

4)

that diminution, susceptibility to pain, restlessness, haste, swarming steadily increase, — that the *making-present* of this whole bustle, "so-called civilization", becomes ever easier, that the individual, in the face of this tremendous machinery, *loses heart* and *submits*.

163.

(114)

The great *falsifications* under the dominion of the *moral values*.

1)

in history (politics included)

2)

in the theory of knowledge

3)

in the judgement of art and artists

4)

in the appraisal of the value of man and action (of *people* and *race*)

5)

in psychology

6)

in the construction of philosophies ("moral world order" and the like)

7)

in physiology, the theory of evolution ("perfecting" "socialization" "selection")

164.

The Will to Power.

Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.

First Book:

nihilism

as the conclusion drawn from the highest values hitherto.

Second Book:

Critique of the highest values hitherto,

insight into what said Yes and No through them.

Third Book:

The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism,

attempt to say Yes to everything that has hitherto been negated.

Fourth Book:

The Overcomers and the Overcome.

A Soothsaying.

165.

(115)

The *lack of discipline of the modern spirit* beneath all sorts of moral finery:

The showpiece words are:

tolerance (for "incapacity for Yes and No")

la largeur de sympathie = one third indifference, one third curiosity, one third morbid excitability

"objectivity" = lack of personality, lack of will, incapacity for love

"freedom" against the rule (Romanticism)

"truth" against forgery and lying (naturalisme)

"scientific spirit" (the "document humain"), in plain German the penny-dreadful novel and addition instead of composition

"passion" in place of disorder and immoderation

"depth" in place of confusion, of the jumble of symbols

On "Modernity"

a)

the lack of discipline of the spirit

b)

play-acting

c)

morbid irritability (the milieu as "fatum")

d)

motleyness

e)

overwork

The *most favourable checks* and *remedies* of

"*modernity*"

1.

universal *conscription* with real wars, in which the joking stops

2.

national narrow-mindedness (simplifying, concentrating, though for the time being also wringing out and exhausting through overwork)

3.

improved *nutrition* (meat)

4.

the increasing *cleanliness* and healthiness of dwellings

5.

the predominance of *physiology* over theologians, moralists, economists and politicians

6.

military strictness in demanding and handling one's "duty" (one no longer *praises*…)

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Aesthetica.

To be a *classic*, one must

have *all* the strong, seemingly contradictory gifts and desires: but in such a way that they go together under One yoke

come at the *right* time, to bring a *genus* of literature or art or politics to its height and summit (: not *after* this has already happened…)

mirror a *collective condition* (be it a people, be it a culture) in its deepest and innermost soul, at a time when it still endures and is not yet coloured over by imitation of the foreign (or is still dependent…)

not a reactive spirit but a *concluding* and forward-leading one, saying *Yes* in all cases, even with its hatred

"Does it *not* require the highest personal worth?"… Perhaps one should weigh whether moral prejudices are not playing their game here, and whether great *moral* height is not perhaps in itself a *contradiction* of the classical?…

to "*mediterraneanize*" music: that is *my* watchword…

Must not the moral monsters necessarily be *romantics*, in word and deed?… Such a preponderance of One trait over the others (as in the moral monster) stands precisely in hostile opposition to the classical power held in equilibrium: supposing one had this height and were nevertheless a classic, one might boldly conclude that one possessed immorality at the same height as well: this perhaps the case of Shakespeare (supposing that it really is Lord Bacon: — — —

167.

(117)

The preponderance of the *traders* and *middlemen*, even in the most spiritual matters

the

man of letters

the

"representative"

the

the historian (as amalgamator of the past and the present)

the

exoticists and cosmopolitans

the

middlemen between natural science and philosophy

the

the semi-theologians.

168.

(118)

Toward a characterization of "*modernity*".

overabundant development of intermediate forms

stunting of types

breaking-off of traditions, schools,

the over-dominion of the instincts (after the *weakening* of *willpower* has set in, of the willing of end *and* means…) (philosophically prepared: the unconscious *worth more*)

169.

(119)

Schopenhauer as

aftershock

: condition before the Revolution.

..Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, Catholicism of the most spiritual desires — that is good eighteenth century au fond. *Schopenhauer's* fundamental misunderstanding of the *will* (as if desire, instinct, drive were what is *essential* in the will) is typical: a fatigue of the will's value to the point of stunting. Likewise hatred of willing; an attempt to see in no-longer-willing, in "being a subject *without* aim or purpose" ("in the pure will-less subject"), something higher, indeed *the* higher, the valuable. Great symptom of *fatigue*, or of the *weakness* of the *will*: for the will is quite properly that which treats desire as its master would, showing it its way and measure…

170.

(120)

Aesthetica.

modern *counterfeiting* in the arts: understood as *necessary*, namely as conforming to the *most genuine need* of the *modern soul*

one stuffs the gaps in *talent*, still more the gaps in *education*, in tradition, in *training*

first: one seeks out a *less artistic* public, one that is unconditional in its love (— and promptly kneels before the *person*…) To this end serves the superstition of our century, the superstition of "*genius*"…

second: one harangues the dark instincts of the dissatisfied, the ambitious, the self-concealed of a democratic age: importance of the *attitude*

third: one carries the procedures of one art over into another, mixes the aims of art with those of knowledge or of the Church or of racial

interest ("nationalism") or of philosophy — one strikes all the bells at once and arouses the dark suspicion that one is a "god"

fourth: one flatters woman, the suffering, the indignant; one brings narcotica and opiatica to predominance in art as well. One tickles the "cultivated", the readers of poets and old stories

171.

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NB. The division into "public" and "cenacle": in the first one *must* today be a charlatan, in the second one *wants* to be a virtuoso and nothing more! Reaching across this division, our specific "geniuses" of the century, great for both; the great charlatanry of Victor Hugo and R. Wagner, but paired with so much genuine *virtuosity* that they satisfied even the most refined in the sense of art itself

Hence the *lack of greatness* 1) they have a shifting optics, now with regard to the coarsest needs, now with regard to the most refined

172.

(122)

At Fort Gonzaga, outside Messina.

For the preface. State of deepest reflection. Everything done to place myself at a distance; bound no longer by love nor by hatred. As at an old fortress. Traces of wars; of earthquakes too. Forgotten

173.

(123)

Morality in the valuing of races and estates.

In consideration of the fact that the *affects* and *fundamental drives* in every race and in every estate express something of their conditions of existence (— at the very least of the conditions under which they have prevailed for the longest time:)

: to demand that they be "virtuous" means: that they change their character, jump out of their skin and wipe out their past.

: means that they should cease to distinguish themselves

: means that they should assimilate to one another in needs and claims — more plainly: *that they should perish*…

The will to *One* morality thus proves to be the *tyranny* over other kinds of that kind for which this One morality is tailor-made: it is annihilation or uniformization in favour of the ruling kind (whether so as no longer to be fearsome to it, or so as to be exploited by it)

"Abolition of slavery" — supposedly a tribute to "human dignity", in truth an *annihilation* of a fundamentally different species (— an undermining of its values and its happiness —)

Wherein an *opposing* race or an opposing estate has its strength, that is interpreted as its *most evil*, its worst: for with it, it harms us (— its "virtues" are slandered and renamed)

It counts as an *objection* against a man or a people if he *harms us*: but from his point of view *we* are desirable to him, because we are such as one can profit from.

The demand for "humanization" (which quite naively believes itself in possession of the formula "what is human?") is a Tartuffery under which a quite definite kind of man seeks to bring itself to dominion: more precisely, a quite definite instinct, the *herd instinct*.

"Equality of men": what *hides* beneath the tendency to *posit* ever more men *as equal* as men.

The "interestedness" with regard to common morality (*trick:* to make the great desires, lust for power and avarice, into protectors of virtue)

To what extent all kinds of *businessmen* and the avaricious, everything that must grant and claim credit, *need* to insist on equal character and an equal concept of value: *world trade* and *exchange* of every kind compels and, as it were, *buys* itself virtue.

Likewise the *state* and every kind of lust for power with regard to officials and soldiers; likewise science, in order to work with trust and economy of force

Likewise the *priesthood*:

— Here, then, common morality is enforced because an advantage is won with it; and to bring it to victory, war and violence are waged against immorality — by what "right"? By no right at all: but in accordance with the instinct of self-preservation. The same classes make use of *immorality* where it is useful to them.

174.

(124)

the *increase of strength* despite the temporary decline of the individual

—

to found a *new level*

—

a methodics of gathering forces, of preserving small achievements, as opposed to uneconomical squandering

—

destructive nature, meanwhile subjugated as a *tool* of this economics of the future

—

the preservation of the weak, because an enormous mass of *petty* work must be done

—

the preservation of a disposition under which existence is still *possible* for the weak and suffering

—

to plant *solidarity* as an instinct against the instinct of fear and servility

—

the struggle with chance, even with the chance of the "great man"

175.

(125)

The Patronage of Virtue.

Avarice

Lust for power

Sloth

Simplicity

Fear

all have an interest in the cause of virtue: that is why it stands so firm.

176.

(126)

Spinoza, of whom Goethe said, "I feel very close to him, although his mind is far deeper and purer than my own," — whom he occasionally calls his saint.

177.

(127)

To have run the whole circumference of the modern soul, to have sat in each of its corners — my ambition, my torture and my happiness

Really to *overcome* pessimism —; a Goethean gaze full of love and good will as the result.

NB. My work is to contain a *comprehensive verdict* on our century, on the whole of modernity, on the "civilization" *attained*

178.

(128)

The Three Centuries.

Their differing *sensibility* is best expressed thus:

Aristocratism Descartes,

rule of *reason*, testimony to the sovereignty of the *will*

Feminism Rousseau,

rule of *feeling*, testimony to the sovereignty of the *senses* (mendacious)

Animalism Schopenhauer,

rule of *desire*, testimony to the sovereignty of

animality (more honest, but gloomy)

The seventeenth century is *aristocratic*, ordering, haughty toward the animal, severe toward the heart, "uncosy," even without heart, "un-German," averse to the burlesque and the natural, generalizing and sovereign toward the past: for it believes in itself. Much of the beast of prey au fond, much ascetic habituation, in order to remain master. The century *strong of will*; also that of strong passion.

The eighteenth century is ruled by *woman*, enthusiastic, witty, shallow, but with a spirit in the service of desirability, of the heart, libertine in the enjoyment of the most spiritual things, undermining all authorities; intoxicated, cheerful, clear, humane, false to itself, much canaille au fond, sociable…

The nineteenth century is more *animal*, more subterranean, *uglier*, more realistic, more plebeian, and for that very reason "better," "more honest," more submissive before "reality" of every kind, *truer*, there is no doubt: *more natural*; but weak of will, but sad and darkly covetous, but fatalistic. Neither before "reason" nor before the "heart" in awe and reverence; deeply convinced of the rule of desire (Schopenhauer said "will"; but nothing is more characteristic of his philosophy than that "will" is lacking in it, the absurd denial of genuine *willing*) Even morality reduced to an instinct ("pity")

A. Comte is a *continuation of the eighteenth century* (rule of coeur over la tête, sensualism in the theory of knowledge, altruistic enthusiasm)

That *science* has become sovereign to such a degree proves how the nineteenth century has *freed itself* from the domination of *ideals*. A certain "wantlessness" in our wishing is what first makes possible our scientific curiosity and rigor — this, our kind of virtue…

Romanticism is an *aftermath* of the eighteenth century; a kind of piled-up longing for its enthusiasm in the grand style (— in fact a good deal

of play-acting and self-deception: one wanted to portray the *strong nature*, the *great passion*)

The nineteenth century instinctively seeks *theories* by which it feels its *fatalistic submission to the factual* justified. Already *Hegel's* success against "sentimentality" and romantic idealism lay in the fatalistic element of his way of thinking, in his belief in the greater reason on the side of the victorious, in his justification of the actual "state" (in place of "humanity" etc.) Schopenhauer: we are something stupid and, at best, even something self-cancelling. Success of determinism, of the genealogical derivation of *obligations* formerly held to be absolute, the doctrine of milieu and adaptation, the reduction of the will to reflex movements, the denial of the will as "efficient cause"; finally — a real rechristening: one sees so little will that the word *free* comes to designate something else.

Further theories: the doctrine of *objective*, "will-less" contemplation as the only way to truth; *to beauty as well*; mechanism, the calculable rigidity of the mechanical process; the alleged "naturalisme," elimination of the choosing, judging, interpreting subject as a principle — Also the belief in *"genius,"* in order to have a right to *submission*

Kant, with his "practical reason," with his *moral fanaticism*, is entirely eighteenth century; still wholly outside the historical movement; without any eye for the reality of his time, e.g. the Revolution; untouched by Greek philosophy; a fantast of the concept of duty; a sensualist; with the hidden bent of dogmatic pampering — the *movement back to Kant* in our century is a *movement back to the eighteenth century*: one wants to procure for oneself once again a right to the *old ideals* and the old enthusiasm, — hence a theory of knowledge that "sets limits," i.e. that permits one *to posit a beyond of reason at will*…

Hegel's way of thinking is not very far from *Goethe's*: just listen to Goethe on *Spinoza*. Will to deify the universe and life, in order to find

peace and *happiness* in contemplating and fathoming it; Hegel seeks reason everywhere, — before reason one may *surrender* and *resign oneself*. In Goethe a kind of almost *joyful* and *trusting fatalism* that does not revolt, that does not flag, that seeks to form a totality out of itself, in the belief that only in the totality is everything redeemed and does it appear good and justified.

Goethe finding his eighteenth century within himself and *combating* it: sentimentality, nature-enthusiasm, the unhistorical, the idealistic, the impractical and unreal in the revolutionary; he calls history, natural science, antiquity to his aid, likewise Spinoza (as the supreme realist); above all practical activity with none but firmly fixed horizons; he does not separate himself from life; he is not faint-hearted and takes as much as possible upon himself, above himself, into himself, — he wants *totality*, he combats the sundering of reason, sensuality, feeling, will, he disciplines himself, he *forms* himself… he says Yes to all great realists (Napoleon — Goethe's supreme experience)

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Goethe: a magnificent attempt to *overcome the eighteenth century (return to a kind of Renaissance man)*, a kind of self-overcoming on the part of that century: he unleashed its strongest drives within himself and drove them to their consequence. But what he attained for his own person was *not* our nineteenth century…

— he conceives a highly cultivated human being, keeping himself in check, reverent toward himself, who may dare to grant himself the *whole wealth of the soul and of naturalness* (down to the burlesque and the buffoonish) because he is strong enough for it; the human being of tolerance, not out of weakness but out of strength, because he knows how to use for his advancement that which would destroy an average

nature, *the most comprehensive human being, yet not for that reason chaotic*. His complement is *Napoleon* (on a smaller scale Frederick the Great), who likewise takes up the *struggle against the eighteenth century*.

NB In a certain sense the nineteenth century too strove for all *that Goethe did for himself*: a universality of understanding, approving, letting things come close is proper to it; an audacious realism, a reverence before facts — how is it that the overall result is not a Goethe but a *chaos*, a *nihilism*, a *futility*, *which continually teaches us to reach back to the eighteenth century* (e.g. as romanticism, as altruism, as feminism, as naturalism)

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Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, Bismarck — characteristic of the *strong German type*. Living unhesitatingly between opposites, full of that supple strength which guards against convictions and doctrines by using one against the other and reserving freedom for itself.

181.

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a *systematizer*, a philosopher who will no longer concede to his spirit that it *lives*, that like a tree it reaches out about itself mightily and broadly and insatiably, who knows simply no rest until he has carved out of it something lifeless, something wooden, a four-cornered stupidity, a "system" —

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"*without the Christian faith*, Pascal thought, you will become to yourselves, just as nature and history, un monstre et un chaos". This prophecy we have *fulfilled*: after the feebly optimistic 18th century had *prettified* and *rationalized* man

Schopenhauer and *Pascal*: in an essential sense *Schopenhauer* is the first to *take up* again *Pascal's* movement: un monstre et un chaos, consequently something that is to be *negated*… history, nature, man himself!

our inability to know the truth is the consequence of our *corruption*, of our moral *fall*: so Pascal. And so, at bottom, Schopenhauer. "The deeper the corruption of reason, the more necessary the doctrine of salvation" — or, speaking Schopenhauerishly, negation

183.

(133)

the 17th century *suffers from man* as from a *sum of contradictions*, "l'amas de contradictions" that we are

Schopenhauer seeks to discover man, to *order* him, to dig him out: whereas the 18th century seeks to forget what one knows of the nature of man, in order to adapt him to its utopia. "superficial, soft, humane" — gushes over "man"

— The 17th century seeks to wipe out the traces of the individual, so that the work may look as much like life as possible. The 18th seeks through the work *to arouse interest in the author*.

The 17th century seeks in art art, a piece of culture; the 18th uses art to make propaganda for reforms of a social and political nature.

The "utopia", the "ideal man", the deification of nature, the vanity of putting oneself on stage, the subordination to the propaganda of *social* aims, the charlatanry — that we have from the 18th century.

The style of the 17th century: propre, exact et libre

the strong individual, sufficient unto himself or in zealous endeavour before God — and that modern authorial obtrusiveness and forwardness, — these are *opposites*. "Putting oneself on show" — compare with that the scholars of Port-Royal.

Alfieri had a sense for *grand style*

the hatred of the *burlesque* (the undignified), the *lack of a feeling for nature* belongs to the 17th century.

184.

(134)

Rousseau:

the rule grounded on feeling

nature as the source of justice

man perfects himself in the measure that he *draws near to nature*

(according to Voltaire, in the measure that he *distances*

*himself

from nature*

the same epochs for the one those of the progress of *humanity*, for the other times of the worsening of injustice and inequality

Voltaire still understanding *humanità* in the sense of the Renaissance, likewise virtù (as "high culture"), he fights for the cause of the

honnêtes gens and de la bonne compagnie, the cause of taste, of science, of the arts, the cause of progress itself and of civilization.

The struggle flared up around 1760: the citizen of Geneva and le seigneur de Tourney. Only from then on does Voltaire become the man of his century, the philosopher, the representative of tolerance and the piper of unbelief (until then merely *un bel esprit*). Envy and hatred of Rousseau's success drove him forward, "upward" —

— Pour "la canaille", un dieu rémunérateur et vengeur — Voltaire.

Critique of both standpoints with regard to the *value of civilization*.

the social invention the most beautiful there is for Voltaire, there is no higher aim than to maintain it and perfect it; precisely this is honnêteté, to respect social customs; virtue an obedience to certain necessary "prejudices" in favour of the preservation of "society".

Missionary of culture, aristocrat, representative of the victorious ruling estates and their valuations. But Rousseau remained a *plebeian*, even as homme de lettres, that was *unheard of*; his shameless contempt for everything that was not himself.

The *morbid* in Rousseau most admired and *imitated*. (Lord Byron akin; he too screwing himself up to sublime attitudes, to rancorous resentment; signs of "vulgarity"; later, brought into balance by *Venice*, he grasped what *relieves more* and *does good*,… l'insouciance)

he is proud with regard to what he is, despite his origins; but he flies into a rage when one reminds him of them…

In Rousseau unquestionably *mental derangement*, in Voltaire an uncommon health and lightness. The *rancune of the sick man*; the periods of his madness also those of his contempt for men, and of his mistrust.

The defence of *Providence* by Rousseau (against Voltaire's pessimism): he *needed* God in order to be able to cast the curse upon society and

civilization; everything had to be good in itself, since God created it; *only man has corrupted man*. The "good man" as natural man was a pure fantasy; but with the dogma of God's authorship something probable and well-founded.

Effect of Rousseau:

folly reckoned as greatness, romanticism (first example, *not* the *strongest*)

"the sovereign right of passion"

"the monstrous expansion of the "I"

"the feeling for nature"

"in politics for 100 years now a sick man has been taken as leader"

Romanticism à la Rousseau

passion,

"naturalness"

the fascination of madness

the rancune of the rabble as *judge*

the senseless vanity of the weak

185.

(135)

The unsettled problems which I pose anew:

the *problem of civilization*, the struggle between Rousseau and Voltaire around 1760

man becomes deeper, more mistrustful, more "immoral", stronger, more self-reliant — and to that extent "*more natural*" — *that* is "progress"

(in the process, through a kind of division of labour, the strata grown more evil and the softened, tamed ones separate from each other: so that the *total fact* does not immediately leap to the eye.)… It belongs to *strength*, to the self-mastery and fascination of strength, that these stronger strata possess the art of making their growing evil be felt as something *higher*. To every "progress" belongs a reinterpretation of the strengthened elements into the "good" (i.e. — — —

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The *problem of the 19th century*. Whether its strong and its weak side belong to each other? Whether it is carved from one wood? Whether the diversity of its ideals, their contradiction, are conditioned in a higher purpose, *as* something higher? — For it could be the *predestination to greatness* to grow in this measure, in violent tension. Discontent, nihilism *could* be a *good sign*.

187.

Beyle born 23 January 1783

188.

A book for thinking, nothing more: it belongs to those for whom thinking is a *pleasure*, nothing more…

That it is written in German is untimely, to say the least: I wish I had written it in French, so that it might not appear as an advocacy of any Reich-German aspirations whatever.

Books for thinking, — they belong to those for whom thinking is a pleasure, nothing more… The Germans of today are thinkers no longer: something else gives them pleasure and makes an impression on them. The will to power as a principle would be hard for them to understand… For that very reason I wish I had not written my Zarathustra in German

I mistrust all systems and systematizers and go out of their way: perhaps one will yet discover behind this book the system which I have *avoided*…

The will to a system: in a philosopher, expressed morally, a subtler corruption, a disease of character; expressed immorally, his will to make himself out stupider than he is — Stupider, that is: stronger, simpler, more imperious, less educated, more commanding, more tyrannical…

I no longer respect readers: how could I write for readers?… But I take note of myself, for myself.

189.

precisely among Germans there is the least thinking today. But who knows! in only two generations one will no longer need the sacrifice of national squandering of power, the stupefaction.

190.

I read Zarathustra: but how could I cast my pearls before the Germans in such a fashion!

Notebook 10: Autumn 1887

1.

Halcyonia.

Afternoons of a Happy Man.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

2.

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My five "Noes".

1. My struggle against the *feeling of guilt* and the intrusion of the concept of *punishment* into the physical and metaphysical world, likewise into psychology, into the interpretation of history. Insight into the *moralization* of all philosophy and valuation hitherto.

2. My recognizing and drawing out of the *traditional* ideal, the Christian one, even where one has done away with the dogmatic form of Christianity. The *dangerousness of the Christian ideal* lies in its value-feelings, in that which can do without conceptual expression: my struggle against *latent Christianity* (e.g. in music, in socialism)

3. My struggle against the 18th century of *Rousseau*, against his "nature", his "good man", his faith in the dominion of feeling — against the softening, weakening, moralization of man: an ideal born of *hatred of aristocratic culture* and in practice the dominion of unbridled feelings of ressentiment, invented as a standard for the struggle.

— the guilt-feeling morality of the Christian

the ressentiment morality (an attitude of the rabble)

4. My struggle against *Romanticism*, in which Christian ideals and Rousseau's ideals come together, but at the same time with a longing for the *olden times* of priestly-aristocratic culture, for virtù, for the "strong man" — something extremely hybrid; a false and imitated kind of *stronger* humanity, which esteems extreme states as such and sees in them the symptom of strength ("cult of passion")

— the craving for stronger men, extreme states

an imitating of the most expressive forms, *furore espressivo not* out of fullness but out of *lack*

(among poets, e.g., Stifter and G. Keller are signs of more strength, inner well-being, than — — —)

5. My struggle against the *overdominance of the herd instincts*, now that science makes common cause with them; against the recent hatred with which every kind of order of rank and distance is treated.

— what in the 19th century was relatively born of fullness, with *contentment*…

technique cheerful music etc. great technique and inventiveness

the natural sciences

history (?)

relative products of the strength,

of the self-confidence

of the 19th c.

3.

(138)

My new way to "Yes".

My new conception of *pessimism* as a voluntary seeking out of the terrible and questionable sides of existence: whereby kindred phenomena of the past became clear to me. "How much 'truth' does a spirit endure and dare?" A question of its strength. Such a pessimism *could flow out* into that form of a Dionysian *Yes-saying* to the world as it is: even to the wish for its absolute recurrence and eternity: whereby a new ideal of philosophy and sensibility would be given.

To grasp the sides of existence hitherto *negated* not only as necessary but as desirable; and not only desirable with regard to the sides hitherto affirmed (say, as their complements and preconditions), but for their own sake, as the mightier, more fruitful, truer sides of existence, in which its will expresses itself more clearly

To appraise the sides of existence hitherto alone *affirmed*; to draw out what it is that really says Yes here (the instinct of the suffering on the one hand, the instinct of the herd on the other, and that third instinct: the instinct of the majority against the exception)

Conception of a *higher* kind of being as an "immoral" one according to the concepts hitherto: the beginnings of this in history (the pagan gods, the ideals of the Renaissance)

4.

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How did one become master over the *ideal of the Renaissance*? The man of the 17th century, the man of the 18th century, the man of the 19th century. *Recrudescence* of Christianity (= Reformation), *Jesuitism* and *monarchy* in league

5.

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In place of Rousseau's "natural man", the 19th century has discovered a *truer image* of "man" — it has had the *courage* for it… On the whole, the Christian concept "man" has thereby been granted a restoration. What one has *not* had the courage for is to sanction precisely *this* "man in himself" and to see in him the future of man guaranteed. Likewise one has *not* dared to grasp the *growth in the terribleness* of man as an accompanying phenomenon of every growth of culture; in this one is still subservient to the Christian ideal and takes *its* side against paganism, likewise against the Renaissance concept of virtù. But in this way one does not have the key to culture: and in practice it remains with the counterfeiting of history in favour of "the good man" (as if he alone were the *progress* of man) and with the *socialist ideal* (i.e. the *residue* of Christianity and of Rousseau in the de-Christianized world)

The struggle against the 18th century: its *supreme overcoming* through *Goethe* and *Napoleon*. *Schopenhauer* too struggles against it; but involuntarily he steps back into the 17th century — he is a modern Pascal, with Pascalian value judgements *without* Christianity… Schopenhauer was not strong enough for a new Yes.

Napoleon: grasped the necessary belonging-together of the higher and the terrible man. The "man" restored; the tribute of contempt and fear owed by woman won back. "Totality" as health and highest activity; the straight line, the grand style in action rediscovered; the mightiest instinct, that of life itself, the lust to rule, affirmed.

6.

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NB One does not belong to us so long as one is not ashamed to catch oneself in some little Christianness of feeling: *with us the old ideal has conscience against it*…

7.

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To be reflected upon: to what extent the fateful belief in *divine providence* — the most *paralysing* belief for hand and reason that has ever existed — still persists; to what extent, under the formulas "nature", "progress", "perfection", "Darwinism", under the superstition of a certain belonging-together of happiness and virtue, of unhappiness and guilt, the Christian presupposition and interpretation still lives on. That absurd *trust* in the course of things, in "life", in the "instinct of life", that honest burgher's *resignation*, which is of the belief that everyone need only do his duty for *everything* to go well — such things make sense only on the assumption of a guidance of things sub specie boni. Even *fatalism*, our present form of philosophical sensibility, is a consequence of that *longest* belief in divine dispensation, an unconscious consequence: namely, as if it did not depend on *us* how everything goes (— as if we *might* let it run as it runs: each *individual* himself only a modus of absolute reality —)

What we owe to Christianity:

the intrusion of the concepts of guilt and punishment into all concepts

cowardice before morality

the *stupid* trust in the course of things (toward the "better")

psychological falseness toward oneself.

8.

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A *division of labour* among the *affects* within society: so that individuals and estates breed the *incomplete*, but precisely for that reason *more useful*, kind of soul. To what extent, in every type within society, some affects have become almost *rudimentary* (in favour of the stronger development of another affect)

Toward the justification of morality:

the

economic (the aim of the greatest possible exploitation of individual force against the squandering of everything exceptional)

the

aesthetic (the shaping of fixed types together with the pleasure in one's own type)

the

political (as the art of enduring the severe relations of tension between different degrees of power —

the

the physiological (as an imaginary preponderance of esteem in favour of those who have fared badly or middlingly — for the preservation of the weak

9.

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Every ideal presupposes *love* and *hatred*, *reverence* and *contempt*. Either the positive feeling is the primum mobile or the negative feeling.

Hatred and *contempt*, for example, are the primum mobile in all ideals of ressentiment.

10.

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The *economic* appraisal of the ideals hitherto

The lawgiver (or the instinct of society) selects a number of states and affects whose activity guarantees a regular performance (a machinalism, as the consequence of the regular needs of those affects and states)

Supposing that these states and affects strike notes of the painful, a means must be found to overcome this painfulness through a notion of value, to make displeasure be felt as valuable, hence as honourable, i.e. pleasurable. Put into a formula: "*how does something unpleasant become pleasant?*" For example, when it can serve as proof of strength, power, self-overcoming. Or when our obedience, our submission to the law, is honoured in it. Likewise as proof of public spirit, neighbourly spirit, patriotic spirit, of our "humanization", "altruism", "heroism"

That one does unpleasant things *gladly — the intention of ideals*.

11.

(146)

I am attempting an economic justification of virtue. — The task is to make man as useful as possible and to bring him, so far as this can in any way be done, close to the infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped with *machine virtues* (— he must learn to feel the states in which he works in a machinally useful way as the highest in value: for

this it is needful that the *others* be made as distasteful to him as possible, as dangerous and disreputable as possible…)

Here the first stumbling block is *boredom*, the *monotony* that all machinal activity brings with it. To learn to *endure this*, and not merely to endure it, to learn to see boredom played about by a higher charm: this has hitherto been the task of all higher schooling. To learn something that does not concern us; and precisely in this, in this "objective" activity, to feel one's "duty"; to learn to assess pleasure and duty separately from each other — that is the inestimable task and achievement of higher schooling. That is why the philologist has hitherto been the educator *as such*: because his activity itself furnishes the model of a monotony of activity that rises to the point of grandeur: under his banner the youth learns to "grind": the first precondition for the eventual proficiency in machinal fulfilment of duty (as civil servant, husband, office scribbler, newspaper reader and soldier). Such an existence perhaps needs a philosophical justification and transfiguration even more than any other: the *pleasant* feelings must be devalued by some infallible authority as being altogether of lower rank; "duty in itself", perhaps even the pathos of reverence with regard to everything that is unpleasant — and this demand speaking as from beyond all usefulness, amusement, expediency, imperatively… The machinal form of existence as the highest, most venerable form of existence, worshipping itself. (— Type: Kant as fanatic of the formal concept "thou shalt")

12.

the philosophers and other higher wet-nurses, at whose bosom youth drinks the milk of wisdom

13.

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Mockery of the false "*altruism*" among biologists: reproduction in amoebas appears as a casting off of ballast, as pure advantage. The expulsion of useless matter

14.

How to Help Virtue to Dominion.

A tractatus politicus.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

15.

(148)

The *continuum*: "marriage, property, language, tradition, tribe, family, people, state" are continua of lower and higher order. Their economics consists in the *surplus* of the advantages of uninterrupted work, as well as of multiplication, over the *disadvantages*: the greater costs of replacing the parts or of making them durable. (Multiplication of the working parts, which nonetheless often remain unemployed, hence greater acquisition costs and not insignificant costs of maintenance.) The advantage consists in avoiding interruptions and sparing the losses arising from them. *Nothing is more costly than new beginnings.*

"The greater the advantages of existence, the greater also the costs of maintenance and creation (nourishment and reproduction); the greater also the dangers and the likelihood of perishing before reaching the height of life."

16.

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"The distinction between lower and higher existence is *technically* untenable, for every animal, every plant answers to its task in the most perfect manner possible; the flight of the ponderous beetle is no less perfect than the hovering of the butterfly is for butterfly tasks. The distinction is an economic one; for complicated organisms are capable of performing more and more perfect work, and the *advantages* of these performances are so great that they exceed the substantially increased costs of maintenance and creation."

17.

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To demonstrate the *necessity* that an ever more economical consumption of man and mankind, an ever more tightly intertwined "machinery" of interests and performances, *calls for a countermovement*. I designate it as the *secretion of a luxury surplus of mankind*: in it a *stronger* kind, a higher type is to come to light, one that has other conditions of origin and other conditions of preservation than the average man. My concept, my *parable* for this type is, as is known, the word "overman".

Along that first path, which can now be fully surveyed, there arise adaptation, flattening, higher Chineseness, modesty of instinct, contentment in the diminishment of man — a kind of *standstill* in the *level of man*. Once we have that inevitably impending overall economic administration of the earth, then mankind *can* find its best meaning as machinery in its service: as an immense clockwork of ever smaller, ever more finely "adapted" wheels; as an ever-growing superfluousness of all dominating and commanding elements; as a whole of

immense force whose individual factors represent *minimal forces, minimal values*. In opposition to this diminishment and adaptation of man to a more specialized usefulness, the reverse movement is needed — the production of the *synthetic*, the *summing-up*, the *justifying* man, for whom that machinalization of mankind is a precondition of existence, as an understructure on which he can invent for himself his *higher form of being*…

He needs just as much the *opposition* of the crowd, of the "levelled", the feeling of distance in comparison with them; he stands upon them, he lives off them. This higher form of *aristocratism* is that of the future. — Morally speaking, that overall machinery, the solidarity of all the wheels, represents a maximum in the *exploitation of man*: but it presupposes those for whose sake this exploitation has *meaning*. Otherwise it would in fact be merely the overall diminution, the diminution in *value, of the type* man — a *phenomenon of regression* in the grandest style.

— One sees that what I am combating is *economic* optimism: as though with the growing expenditures of *all* the benefit of all must necessarily grow as well. The opposite seems to me to be the case: *the expenditures of all add up to a total loss:* man becomes *lesser*: — so that one no longer knows what this immense process has served for at all. A wherefore? a *new* "Wherefore!" — that is what mankind needs…

18.

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"*Modernity*" under the parable of nourishment and digestion.

Sensibility unspeakably more irritable (— in moralistic finery as the increase of *pity* —), the abundance of disparate impressions greater

than ever: — the *cosmopolitanism* of foods, of literatures, newspapers, forms, tastes, even landscapes etc.

the *tempo* of this influx a *prestissimo*; the impressions wipe each other out; one instinctively resists taking something in, taking it *deeply*, "digesting" something

— A *weakening* of the digestive power results from this. A kind of *adaptation* to this overloading with impressions sets in: man unlearns how to *act*; *he only reacts* now to stimuli from outside. *He expends his strength* partly in *appropriation*, partly in *defence*, partly in *rejoinder*.

Profound weakening of spontaneity: — the historian, critic, analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader — all *reactive* talents: *all* science!

Artificial *trimming* of one's nature into a "mirror"; interested, but as it were merely epidermally interested; a fundamental coolness, an equilibrium, a maintained *low* temperature just beneath the thin surface on which there is warmth, movement, "storm", play of waves

Contrast of *outward* mobility with a certain *deep heaviness and weariness*.

19.

(152)

The concept of *substance* a consequence of the concept of the *subject*: *not* the reverse! If we surrender the soul, "the subject," then the precondition for any "substance" whatsoever is lacking. One obtains *degrees of what is*, one loses *that which is*.

Critique of "*reality*": what does the "*more or less reality*", the gradation of being in which we believe, lead back to?

Our degree of the *feeling of life* and *of power* (logic and coherence of what is experienced) gives us the measure of "being," "reality," non-semblance.

Subject: that is the terminology of our belief in a *unity* beneath all the different moments of the highest feeling of reality: we understand this belief as the *effect* of One cause, — we believe in our belief so far that for its sake we imagine "truth," "reality," "substantiality" at all.

"Subject" is the fiction that many *like* states in us were the effect of One substrate: but it is *we* who first created the "likeness" of these states; the *equating* and *adjusting* of them is the *fact of the matter, not* the likeness (— this is rather to be *denied* —)

20.

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There are cases where a sympathy shown to us *offends*: e.g. immediately after an extraordinary deed that has its value in itself. But one congratulates us "on being done with it," etc.

With my critics I have often had the impression of canaille: Not *what* one says, but *that I say it* and how precisely *I* may have come to say this — that seems to be their sole interest, a doglike importunity, to which in praxi the answer is a kick. One judges *me* in order to have nothing to do with my work: one explains its genesis — with that it counts as sufficiently — *disposed of*.

21.

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Religion

In the inner economy of the soul of *primitive* man, *fear* of *evil* predominates. What is *evil*? Three things: chance, the uncertain, the sudden. How does primitive man combat evil? — He conceives it as reason, as power, as a person itself. Thereby he gains the possibility of entering into a kind of contract with them and of acting upon them in advance altogether, — of forestalling.

— Another expedient is to assert the mere apparentness of their malice and harmfulness: one interprets the consequences of chance, of the uncertain, of the sudden as *well-meant*, as meaningful…

— one interprets above all the bad as "deserved": one justifies evil as punishment…

— In summa: *one submits to it:* the whole moral-religious interpretation is only a form of submission to evil.

— the belief that there is a good meaning in evil means renouncing the struggle against it.

Now the whole history of culture represents a decrease of that *fear of chance*, of the uncertain, of the sudden. Culture means precisely learning to *calculate*, learning to think causally, learning to forestall, learning to believe in necessity. With the growth of culture, that *primitive* form of submission to ill (called religion or morality), that "justification of ill," becomes dispensable to man. Now he wages war against "ill" — he abolishes it. Indeed, a state of the feeling of security, of belief in law and calculability, is possible in which it enters consciousness as *surfeit*, — in which *delight in chance, in the uncertain* and *in the sudden* springs forth as a thrill…

Let us linger a moment over this symptom of the *highest* culture — I call it the *pessimism of strength*.

Man now *no longer* needs a "justification of ill"; he abhors precisely the "justifying": he enjoys ill pur, cru, he finds *senseless ill* the most inter-

esting. If formerly he had need of a God, now he is enraptured by a world-disorder without God, a world of chance, in which the terrible, the ambiguous, the seductive belong to its essence…

In such a state it is precisely *the good* that needs a "justification," i.e. it must have an evil and dangerous underground or contain a great stupidity within itself: *then it still pleases*.

Animality no longer arouses horror; a witty and happy exuberance in favour of the animal in man is, in such times, the most triumphant form of spirituality.

Man is now strong enough to be permitted to be ashamed of a *belief in God*: — he may now once again play the advocatus diaboli.

If in praxi he advocates the maintenance of virtue, he does so for the sake of the reasons that let one recognize in virtue a form of subtlety, cunning, greed for gain, greed for power.

This *pessimism of strength*, too, ends with a *theodicy*, i.e. with an absolute Yes-saying to the world, but for the sake of the very reasons on account of which one formerly said No to it: and in this way to the conception of this world as the actually *attained highest possible ideal*…

22.

(155)

Overall Insight.

In fact every great growth also brings with it a tremendous *crumbling away* and *passing away*:

suffering, the symptoms of decline *belong* to the times of tremendous advance.

every fruitful and powerful movement of mankind has at the same time *co-created* a nihilistic movement.

it could, under certain circumstances, be the sign of an incisive and most essential growth, of the transition into new conditions of existence, that the *most extreme* form of pessimism, nihilism proper, should come into the world.

This I have grasped.

23.

(156)

Overall insight: the *ambiguous* character of our *modern world*, — the very same symptoms could point to *decline* and to *strength*. And the marks of strength, of a maturity won, could, on the basis of an inherited *(lagging-behind)* devaluation by feeling, be *misunderstood* as *weakness*. In short, *feeling*, as *feeling of value*, *is not abreast of the times*

Generalized: the *feeling of value is always backward*, it expresses conditions of preservation and growth of far earlier times: it struggles against new conditions of existence out of which it has not grown and which it necessarily misunderstands, teaches one to regard with mistrust, etc.: it inhibits, it awakens suspicion against the new…

Examples: — — —

24.

(157)

The moralization of the arts. Art as freedom from moral narrowing and corner-optics; or as mockery of them. The flight into nature, where its *beauty* is paired with *terribleness*. Conception of the *great* human being.

— fragile, useless luxury-souls, which a mere breath clouds over, "the *beautiful souls*"

— to awaken the *faded ideals* in their ruthless hardness and brutality, as the most magnificent monsters that they are

— an exultant enjoyment of psychological insight into the sinuosity and unwitting play-acting of all moralized artists.

— to drag into the light the *falseness* of art, — its immorality

— to drag into the light the "idealizing" fundamental powers (sensuality, intoxication, superabundant animality)

25.

(158)

The false "*intensification*"

in *romantisme*: this constant espressivo is no sign of strength, but of a feeling of lack

picturesque music, so-called dramatic music, is above all *easier* (just as is the brutal colportage and juxtaposition of faits and traits in the novel of naturalisme)

"*passion*" a matter of the nerves and of weary souls; like the enjoyment of high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies and abominations, — of the massive and the mass-like (among historians, e.g.

In fact there is a cult of the excess of feeling. How is it that strong ages have an opposite need in art — for a beyond of passion?

the colours, the harmony, the nervous brutality of orchestral sound; the garish colours in the novel

the preference for *exciting* subjects (erotica or socialistica or pathologica: all signs of whom one works for today, for the *overworked* and the *distracted* or the weakened.

— *one must tyrannize in order to have any effect at all.*

26.

(159)

Conclusion. — At last we dare to justify the *rule*!

27.

(160)

Science, its two sides:

with regard to the individual

with regard to the cultural complex ("level")

— opposite valuation from this side and from that.

28.

(161)

in place of "society" the *culture-complex* as *my* preferred interest (as a whole, as it were, relative in its parts)

29.

(162)

With what sort of means one has to treat raw peoples, and that the "barbarism" of the means is nothing arbitrary or optional, this one can grasp in praxi with one's hands, if, with all one's European pampering,

one is once placed in the necessity of having to remain master over barbarians on the Congo or somewhere.

30.

(163)

Insight into the *increase of total power*: to calculate to what extent even the decline of individuals, of classes, of ages, of peoples is *included* in this growth.

Shifting of the *centre of gravity* of a culture.

The *costs* of every great growth: who bears them!

*To what extent they must now

be enormous.*

31.

The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. For a similar price one would have to wish for the anarchistic collapse of our whole civilization. Napoleon made nationalism possible: that is its limitation.

Setting aside, as is only fair, morality and immorality: for with these concepts the *value* of a man is not even touched.

One begins — — —

The value of a man does not lie in his usefulness: for it would persist even if there were no one whom he knew how to be useful to. And why could not precisely the man from whom the most ruinous effects proceeded be that summit of the whole type man: so high, so superior, that everything would perish of envy at him

32.

(164)

A. *The ways to power:* to introduce the new virtue under the name of an *old* one

: to stir up "interest" for it ("happiness" as its consequence and vice versa)

: the art of slander against its resistances

: to exploit advantages and accidents for its glorification

: to make its adherents into its fanatics through sacrifice, separation

: the *great symbolism*

B. Power *attained*

1) means of coercion of virtue

2) means of seduction of virtue

3) the etiquette (the court) of virtue

33.

(165)

— Artists are *not* the men of great passion, whatever they may tell us and themselves. And that for two reasons: they lack shame before themselves (they watch themselves *while they live*; they lie in wait for themselves, they are too curious…) and they also lack shame before great passion (they exploit it as artistes, the greed of their talent…)

But secondly: 1) their vampire, their talent, mostly begrudges them that squandering of strength which is called passion 2) their artist's *avarice* guards them against passion.

With a talent one is also the victim of a talent: one lives under the vampirism of one's talent, — one lives — — —

One does not get done with one's passions by representing them: rather, one is done with them *when* one represents them. (Goethe teaches otherwise: he *wanted* to be misunderstood here: a Goethe felt the indelicacy

34.

— a hiatus between two nothings —

35.

(166)

— to link vice with something decidedly painful in such a way that in the end one flees from vice in order to get free of what is linked to it. This is the famous case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser, robbed of his patience by Wagnerian music, can no longer bear it even with Lady Venus: all at once virtue acquires charm; a Thuringian maiden rises in price; and, to say the strongest thing, he even relishes the melody of Wolfram von Eschenbach…

36.

(167)

— to us fatalists of today the lascivious melancholy of a Moorish dance might in the end go more to the heart than the Viennese sensuality of the German waltz, — a too blond, too stupid sensuality.

37.

(168)

Modern art as an art of *tyrannizing*. — A coarse and strongly driven-out *logic of the lineament*; the motif simplified down to the formula, — the formula tyrannizes. Within the lines a wild multiplicity, an overwhelming mass, before which the senses grow confused; the brutality of colours, of material, of desires. Example: Zola, Wagner, in a more spiritual order Taine. Thus *logic*, *mass* and *brutality*…

38.

(169)

Men esteem a thing according to the expenditure they have made for its sake. To make a virtue estimable to them, one must compel them — or seduce them — to expend much for it

How does one spoil a pleasant vice for men? In no other way than by making it unpleasant to them. How does one persuade the drunkard that alcohol is disgusting? One *makes* it disgusting, one mixes in gentian. One must mix vice with —: first trick of the moralist.

39.

(170)

The instinct of the herd values the *middle* and the *mean* as the highest and most valuable: the place where the majority finds itself; the manner in which it finds itself there; thereby it is the opponent of all order of rank, which it regards an ascent from below to above as at the same time a descent from the greater number to the smallest number. The herd feels the *exception*, both what is beneath it and what is above it, as something that stands toward it in a hostile and harmful way. Its trick with regard to the exceptions upward, the stronger, the mightier, the wiser, the more fruitful, is to talk them into the role of guardians, shepherds, watchmen — into its *first servants*: thereby it has transformed a danger into a use. In the middle fear ceases; here

one is alone with nothing; here there is little room for misunderstanding; here there is equality; here one's own being is felt not as a reproach but as the *right* being; here contentment reigns. Mistrust is directed at the exceptions; to be an exception counts as guilt.

40.

(171)

Would any ring in the whole chain of art and science be missing if woman, if the *work of woman* were missing from it? Let us grant the exception — it proves the rule — woman attains perfection in everything that is not a métier, in the letter, in memoirs, even in the most delicate handiwork there is, in short in everything that is not a métier, precisely because in it she perfects herself, because in it she obeys that single artistic impulse she possesses, — she wants to *please*… But what has woman to do with the passionate indifference of the genuine artist, who grants more importance to a sound, a breath, a hey-diddle-diddle than to himself? who reaches with all five fingers for his most secret and innermost things? who grants value to no thing unless it knows how to become form (— unless it gives itself up, makes itself public —) Art, as the artist practises it — do *you* not grasp what it is: an assault upon all pudeurs?… Only with this century has woman ventured that swerve toward literature (— vers la canaille plumière, écrivassière, to speak with the elder Mirabeau): she writes, she does art, she loses instinct. *To what end*, though? if one may ask.

41.

the summit of modern lyric poetry, scaled by two brother geniuses, by Heinrich Heine and Alfred de Musset

Our immortals — we do not have too many: Alfred de Musset, Heinrich Heine, p. 267.

Schiller was a maestro of the theatre: but what is the theatre to us!

42.

(172)

Main proposition. In what sense *perfect nihilism* is the necessary consequence of the ideals hitherto.

— *incomplete* nihilism, its forms: we are living in the midst of it

— the *attempts to escape nihilism* without revaluing those values: they produce the opposite, they sharpen the problem.

43.

(173)

The *perfect nihilist* — the eye of the nihilist, *which idealizes into the ugly*, which practises infidelity toward its memories (— it lets them fall, shed their leaves; it does not protect them against the corpse-pale discolorations that weakness pours over what is distant and past; and what he does not practise against himself, he does not practise against the whole past of man either, — he lets it fall

44.

(174)

What becomes of the man who no longer has any reasons to defend himself and to attack? What remains of his affects when those are lost to him in which he has his defence and his weapon?

45.

(175)

One should diminish and confine the realm of morality step by step; one should drag into the light and bring to honour the names for the instincts actually at work here, after they have for the longest time been hidden under hypocritical names of virtue; out of shame before one's ever more imperiously speaking "honesty" one should unlearn the shame that would like to deny and lie away the natural instincts. It is a measure of strength how far one can dispense with virtue; and a height might be conceived where the concept "virtue" would be so re-felt that it would sound like virtù, Renaissance virtue, moraline-free virtue. But for the time being — how far we still are from this ideal!

The diminution of morality's territory: a sign of its progress. Wherever one has not yet been able to think *causally*, one thought *morally*.

46.

(176)

On the denaturalization of morality. That one *separates* the action from the man; that one turns hatred or contempt against "sin"; that one believes there are actions that are good or bad in themselves.

47.

(177)

Restoration of "nature": an action in itself is perfectly empty of value: everything depends on who does it. One and the same "crime" can in one case be the highest privilege, in another the brand of infamy. In fact it is the selfishness of those judging that interprets an action, *or* its doer, in relation to their own advantage or harm (— or in relation to its likeness or non-kinship with themselves.)

48.

What a time, when one demanded rain from the deity, when one believed one could act upon it with prayer after the fashion of a *diuretic*!

49.

(178)

On the idealism of the self-despisers.

"*Faith*" or "*works*"? — But that out of "works", out of the habit of certain works, a certain valuation and finally a *disposition* is engendered as well, is just as natural as it is unnatural that "works" should issue from a mere valuation. One must practise, *not* in strengthening feelings of value, but in doing; one must first be *able* to do something… The Christian *dilettantism* of Luther. Faith is an asses' bridge. In the background lies a deep conviction, an instinctive awareness as well, on the part of Luther and his like, of their incapacity for Christian works, a personal fact, veiled beneath an extreme mistrust as to whether *any* doing whatsoever is not sin and of the devil: so that the value of existence falls upon isolated highly strung states of *inactivity* (prayer, effusion, etc.) — In the end he would be right: the instincts that express themselves in the whole doing of the Reformers are the most brutal there are. Only in absolute *turning away* from themselves, in absorption in the *opposite*, only as *illusion* ("faith") was existence endurable for them.

50.

(179)

Crime belongs under the concept: "revolt against the social order". One does not "punish" a rebel: one *suppresses* him. A rebel may be a wretched and contemptible man; in itself there is nothing contempt-

ible about a revolt — and to be rebellious with regard to our kind of society does not in itself yet lower the value of a man. There are cases where one would even have to honour such a rebel, because he feels something in our society against which war is needed: where he wakes us from our slumber.

The fact that the criminal does a single thing to a single person does *not* refute that his whole instinct is in a state of war against the whole order: the deed as mere symptom

One should reduce the concept of punishment to the concept: putting down a revolt, measures of security against the one put down (whole or partial imprisonment). But one should not express *contempt* through punishment: a criminal is in any case a man who risks his life, his honour, his freedom — a man of courage. Likewise one should not take punishment as penance; or as a paying-off, as though there were a relation of exchange between guilt and punishment, — punishment does not cleanse, *for* crime does not defile.

One should not shut off from the criminal the possibility of making his peace with society: provided that he does not belong to the *race of criminality*. In the latter case one should make war on him even before he has done anything hostile (first operation, as soon as one has him in one's power: castrate him).

One should not count the criminal's bad manners, nor the low level of his intelligence, to his disadvantage. Nothing is more common than that he misunderstands himself; in particular his revolted instinct, the rancune of the déclassé, has often not come to consciousness, faute de lecture; that under the impression of fear, of failure, he slanders and dishonours his deed: quite apart from those cases where, psychologically reckoned, the criminal yields to a drive he does not understand and foists a false motive upon his deed by means of a secondary act (say, by a robbery, when what he was after was blood…)

One should beware of treating the value of a man according to a single deed. Napoleon warned against this. In particular, the high-relief deeds are quite especially insignificant. If one of us has no crime, e.g. no murder, on his conscience — what is the reason? That a couple of favourable circumstances were lacking to us. And if we did it, what would that indicate about our value? Would our value be diminished if we committed a couple of crimes? On the contrary: not everyone is capable of committing a couple of crimes. In itself one would despise us if one did not credit us with the strength, under certain circumstances, to kill a man. In almost all crimes there are expressed at the same time qualities which ought not to be lacking in a man. Not without justice did Dostoevsky say of the inmates of those Siberian penitentiaries that they formed the strongest and most valuable component of the Russian people. If among us the criminal is an ill-nourished and stunted plant, this redounds to the dishonour of our social conditions; in the age of the Renaissance the criminal flourished and acquired his own kind of virtue, — virtue in the Renaissance style, to be sure, virtù, moraline-free virtue.

One can raise up only such men as one does not treat with contempt; moral contempt is a greater degradation and injury than any crime.

51.

(180)

the great erotics of the ideal, the saints of transfigured and misunderstood sensuality, those typical apostles of "love" (like Jesus of Nazareth, Saint Francis of Assisi, Saint François de Paule): with them the misdirected sexual drive goes astray, as it were, out of ignorance, until at last it must satisfy itself on phantoms: on "God", on "man", on "nature". (This satisfaction itself is not merely an apparent one: among the ecstatics of the unio mystica it takes place, however much

outside their willing and "understanding", not without the physiological accompanying symptoms of the most sensual and natural sexual satisfaction.)

52.

(181)

The *Nihilism* of the *Artists*

Nature cruel through its cheerfulness; cynical with its sunrises

we are hostile to *emotional stirrings*

one flees to where nature moves our senses and our imagination; where we have nothing to love, where we are not reminded of the moral apparentnesses and delicacies of this northern nature; — and so too in the arts. We prefer what no longer reminds us of "good and evil". Our moralistic irritability and capacity for pain is as though redeemed in a terrible and happy nature, in the fatalism of the senses and of forces. Life without goodness

the benefit lies in the sight of nature's magnificent *indifference* to good and evil

no justice in history, no goodness in nature: therefore the pessimist, if he is an artist, goes in historicis to where the absence of justice itself still shows itself with magnificent naïveté, where precisely *perfection* comes to expression…

and likewise in *nature* to where its evil and indifferent character does not conceal itself, where it displays the character of *perfection*…

The nihilistic artist betrays himself in willing and preferring cynical history, cynical nature.

53.

(182)

The Naturalization of Man

in the 19th Century

(the 18th century is that of elegance, of refinement and of généreux sentiments)

Not "return to nature": for there has never yet been a natural humanity. The scholasticism of un- and *anti*-natural values is the rule, is the beginning; man comes to nature after a long struggle — he never goes "back"… Nature: i.e. daring to be immoral like nature.

We are coarser, more direct, full of irony towards generous feelings, even when we succumb to them.

More natural is our first *society*, that of the rich, of the idle: they hunt one another, sexual love is a kind of sport in which marriage provides both an obstacle and an allurement; they amuse themselves and live for the sake of pleasure; they value bodily advantages first and foremost, they are curious and daring

More natural is our attitude to *knowledge*: we have the libertinage of the spirit in all innocence, we hate the pathetic and hieratic manners, we delight in what is most forbidden, we would scarcely know of any interest in knowledge if we had to be bored on the way to it.

More natural is our position toward *morality*. Principles have become ridiculous; no one any longer allows himself to speak of his "duty" without irony. But one esteems a helpful, benevolent disposition (— one sees morality in *instinct* and disdains the rest —) Besides that, a few notions of the point of honour.

More natural is our position *in politicis*: we see problems of power, of one quantum of power against another quantum. We do not believe in a right that does not rest on the power to assert itself: we feel all rights to be conquests.

More natural is our estimation of *great men and things*: we reckon passion a privilege, we find nothing great where a great crime is not included; we conceive all being-great as a placing-oneself-outside with respect to morality.

More natural is our position toward *nature*: we no longer love it for the sake of its "innocence," "reason," "beauty"; we have nicely "bedevilled" and "bedunced" it. But instead of despising it for that, we have since felt more akin to it and more at home in it. It does *not* aspire to virtue: for that we respect it.

More natural is our position toward *art*: we do not demand of it the beautiful lies of semblance, etc.; brutal positivism reigns, which ascertains without becoming excited.

In summa: there are signs that the European of the 19th century is less ashamed of his instincts; he has taken a good step toward admitting to himself, for once, his unconditional naturalness, i.e. his immorality, *without bitterness*: on the contrary, strong enough to be the only one still able to endure this sight.

To certain ears this sounds as if *corruption* had advanced: and it is certain that man has not drawn nearer to the "*nature*" of which Rousseau speaks, but has taken a step further in the civilization which he *abhorred*. We have grown *stronger*: we have come closer again to the 17th century, especially to the taste of its end (Dancourt, Le Sage, Regnard).

54.

(183)

Protestantism, that spiritually unclean and long-drawn-out form of décadence in which Christianity has hitherto known how to preserve itself in the mediocre North: as something half and complex, valuable for knowledge, inasmuch as it brought together experiences of different order and origin in the same heads

Value of *complex formations*, of the mosaic of the soul, even of the disordered and neglected household of the intelligence

homoeopathic Christianity, that of the Protestant country parson

immodest Protestantism, that of the court preachers and anti-Semitic speculators.

55.

(184)

— It can be *loftiness* of soul when a philosopher keeps silent; it can be *love* when he contradicts himself; a *divinity* of the knower is possible which lies…

It has been said not without subtlety: "il est indigne de grands cœurs de répandre le trouble, qu'ils ressentent": only one must add that *not to be afraid of the most unworthy* can likewise be greatness of heart… A woman who loves sacrifices her honour…; a knower who "loves" sacrifices his integrity; a god who loves becomes a Jew…

56.

How much sullen heaviness, lameness, dampness, dressing-gown, how much "beer" there is in the German intelligence! The alcoholism of German academic youth is almost a desecration and in any case a

thorough question mark with regard to spirituality; the gentle degeneration which beer produces: I once put my finger on it in a case that has become almost notorious (the degeneration of Strauss into the author of "The Old Faith and the New"). One has at all times been able to count on one's fingers the German scholars who have "spirit" (— and it is not enough to have it, one must first take it, *take the liberty* of spirit…): the remaining scholars have understanding, and some of them, fortunately, that famous "childlike soul" which *divines*… It is our privilege: with "divination" German science has discovered things which are hard to grasp and which perhaps do not exist at all. One must almost be a Jew in order, as a German, not to *divine*.

57.

(185)

History of moralization

and demoralization.

First proposition: there are no moral actions whatsoever: they are entirely imagined.

Not only are they *not demonstrable* (which Kant, for example, admitted, and Christianity likewise) — but they are *not possible at all*. Through a psychological misunderstanding one has invented an *antithesis* to the driving forces, and believes one has designated another kind of them; one has feigned a primum mobile that does not exist at all. According to the valuation which first brought up the antithesis "moral" and "immoral" at all, one must say:

there are only immoral intentions and actions.

Second proposition. This whole distinction "moral" and "immoral" proceeds from the assumption that both moral and immoral actions are acts of free spontaneity, — in short, that such a thing exists, or, put

otherwise: that moral judgement relates at all only to one class of intentions and actions, *the free ones*.

But this whole class of intentions and actions is purely imaginary; the world to which alone the moral standard can be applied does not exist at all

there are neither moral nor immoral actions.

The psychological error from which the *antithetical concept* "moral" and "immoral" arose.

"selfless," "unegoistic," "self-denying" — all *unreal*, feigned.

Faulty dogmatism concerning the "ego": the latter taken as atomistic, in a false antithesis to the "not-I"; likewise detached from becoming, as something that is. The *false substantialization of the I*: this (in the belief in individual immortality) made into an article of faith especially under the pressure of *religious-moral discipline*. After this artificial detachment and declaration of the ego as in-and-for-itself, one had before one an antithesis of values that seemed irrefutable: the *individual ego* and the immense *not-I*. It seemed palpable that the value of the individual ego could lie only in relating itself to the immense "not-I", or rather in subordinating itself to it and existing for *its* sake. — Here the *herd instincts* were decisive: nothing goes so much against these instincts as the sovereignty of the individual. But supposing the ego is conceived as an in-and-for-itself, then its value must lie in *self-negation*.

Thus: 1) the false independence of the "individual", as *atom*

2) the herd valuation, which abhors the wish to remain an atom and feels it to be hostile

3) as a consequence: overcoming of the individual by displacement of his goal

4) Now there seemed to be actions which were *self-negating*: around them one fantasized a whole sphere of antitheses.

5) one asked: in which actions does man *affirm himself* most strongly? Around these (sexuality, greed, lust for dominion, cruelty, etc.) ban, hatred, contempt were heaped: one *believed* that there are unselfish drives, one *rejected* all selfish ones, one *demanded* the unselfish ones

6) Consequence of this: what had one done? One had put under ban the strongest, most natural, more than that, the *only real* drives — in order henceforth to find an action praiseworthy, one had to *deny* the presence of such drives in it

monstrous forgery in psychologicis. Even every kind of "self-satisfaction" first had to make itself possible again by being misunderstood and arranged sub specie boni.

Conversely: that species which derived its advantage from *taking away* man's self-satisfaction (the representatives of the herd instinct, e.g. the priests and philosophers) became subtle and psychologically sharp-sighted in showing how selfishness nonetheless reigns everywhere. Christian conclusion: "*Everything* is sin; our virtues too. Absolute reprehensibility of man. The selfless action is *not possible*." Original sin. In short: after man had brought his instinct into antithesis with a purely imaginary world of the good, he ended in self-contempt, as *incapable* of doing actions that are "good".

NB. Christianity thereby marks a *progress* in the psychological sharpening of the eye: La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It grasped the *essential sameness* of *human actions* and their sameness of value in the main (— all *immoral*)

Now one became *serious* about forming men in whom selfishness has been killed — the *priests*, the *saints*. And if one doubted the possibility

of becoming "perfect", one did *not* doubt that one knew what perfect is.

The psychology of the saint, of the priest, of "the good man" naturally had to turn out purely phantasmagorical. One had declared the *real* motives of action to be *bad*: in order to be able to act at all, to be able to prescribe actions, one had to describe actions that are not possible at all as possible and, as it were, *sanctify* them. With the same *falseness* with which one had slandered, one now revered and idealized.

The *raging* against the instincts of life as "holy", worthy of reverence.

Absolute chastity, absolute obedience, absolute poverty: priestly ideal.

Alms, pity; self-sacrifice, chivalry; denial of the beautiful, of reason, of sensuality; a morose eye for all the strong qualities one has: lay ideal.

One moves forward: the *slandered instincts* also seek to create a right for themselves (e.g. Luther's Reformation: crudest form of moral mendacity under "the freedom of the Gospel") — one rebaptizes them with holy names.

: the *slandered instincts* seek to prove themselves *necessary*, so that the *virtuous* are possible at all: one must vivre, pour vivre pour autrui. Egoism as a *means* to an end…

: one goes further, one seeks to give both the egoistic and the altruistic impulses a right to existence: *equality* of rights for the one as for the other (from the standpoint of utility)

: one goes further, one seeks the *higher usefulness* in preferring the egoistic standpoint over the altruistic, more useful with respect to the happiness of the majority, or the advancement of mankind, etc. Thus: a preponderance of rights for the ego, but under an extremely altruistic perspective ("total utility of mankind")

: one seeks to reconcile the *altruistic* mode of action with *naturalness*, one seeks the altruistic at the ground of life; one seeks the egoistic as well as the altruistic as equally grounded in the essence of life and of nature.

: one dreams of a disappearance of the opposition in some future or other, where, through continued adaptation, the egoistic is at the same time also the altruistic…

: finally, one grasps that altruistic actions are only a *species* of egoistic ones, — and that the degree to which one loves, squanders oneself, is a proof of the degree of individual *power* and *personality*. In short, *that by making man more evil, one makes him better,* — and that one is not the one without the other… With this the curtain rises before the monstrous *falsification of the psychology of man hitherto*.

Conclusions: there are *only* immoral intentions and actions

the so-called moral ones must therefore be demonstrated to be *immoralities*.

(— this the task of the Tractatus politicus)

(— the derivation of all affects from the one will to power: essentially the same

(— the concept of life — in the apparent opposition (of "good and evil") are expressed *degrees of power of instincts*, a temporary order of rank under which certain instincts are kept in check or taken into service

(— *justification* of morality: economic, etc.

Against the second proposition. Determinism; attempt to *save* the moral world by *translocating* it — into the unknown. Determinism is only a modus for being permitted to spirit away our valuations, since they have no place in the mechanistically conceived world. One must

therefore *attack* and *undermine* determinism: likewise *contest* our right to a separation of an in-itself world and a phenomenal world.

58.

(186)

In the first book:

nihilism as the consequence of ideal values

problem of *civilization*

the 19th century, its *ambiguity*:

What has been lacking so far is *freedom* from morality. Pessimists are *rebels of the moral pathos*

Morality as the cause of pessimism

pessimism as the preliminary form of nihilism

In the second book:

History of moralization how virtue is brought to dominion

Morality as Circe of philosophers

In the third book:

The problem of truth

In the fourth book:

History of the *higher types,* after we have

ungodded the world

the *means* to tear open a chasm: *order of rank*

Ideal of the most world-affirming doctrine the tragic age.

the psychological naïveté in the ideal *God*

59.

(187)

The order of rank of human values.

a) one should not appraise a man by single works. *Epidermal actions*. Nothing is rarer than a *personal* action. A class, a rank, a national race, a milieu, a chance — all of these express themselves in a work or deed sooner than a "person" does.

b) one should not presuppose at all that many men are "persons". And then some are even *several* persons, most are *none*. Wherever the average qualities predominate, on which it depends that a type persists, being a person would be a squandering, a luxury, and it would make no sense at all to demand a "person". They are carriers, instruments of transmission.

c) the "person" a relatively *isolated* fact; with regard to the far greater importance of the onward flow and of averageness, therefore almost something *contrary to nature*. To the genesis of the person belong a timely isolation, a compulsion to an existence of defence and arms, something like immurement, a greater power of closing oneself off; and, above all, a much *lesser impressionability* than the average man has, whose humanity is *contagious*

First question concerning the *order of rank*: how *solitary* or how *herdlike* someone is

(in the latter case his value lies in the qualities that secure the continued existence of his herd, of his type; in the other case in what sets him apart, isolates him, defends him and *makes him possible as a solitary*.

Conclusion: one should *not* appraise the solitary type by the herdlike, nor the herdlike by the solitary

Viewed from the heights: both are necessary; likewise their antagonism is necessary, — and nothing is more to be banished than that "desirability" that something *third* might develop out of the two ("type" as hermaphroditism). That is as little "desirable" as the rapprochement and reconciliation of the sexes. To *develop further* what is *typical*, to tear the *chasm* ever *deeper*…

Concept of *degeneration* in both cases: when the herd approaches the qualities of solitary beings, and these the qualities of the herd, — in short, when they *draw closer to one another*. This concept of degeneration lies apart from moral judgement.

60.

(188)

In relation to music all communication through *words* is of a shameless kind; the word thins and dulls; the word depersonalizes; the word makes the uncommon common.

61.

(189)

Where one has to seek

the stronger natures

.

The perishing and degenerating of the *solitary* species is far *greater* and more terrible: they have the instinct of the herd, the tradition of values against them; their instruments of defence, their protective instincts are from the outset not strong, not sure enough, — much favour of chance is needed for them to *thrive*. (— they thrive most often among the lowest and most socially abandoned elements: if one is

looking for *person*, there one finds it, how much more surely than in the middle classes!)

the struggle of estates and classes that aims at "equality of rights". Once it is more or less settled, the *struggle* begins against the *solitary person*. In a certain sense *it can preserve and develop itself most easily in a democratic society*: namely when the cruder means of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habituation to order, honesty, justice, trust belongs to the average conditions.

The *strongest* must be most firmly bound, supervised, laid in chains and watched over: so the instinct of the herd wills it. For them a regime of self-overpowering, of ascetic seclusion, or of "duty" in wearing labour in which one no longer comes to oneself.

62.

to hide one's envy of the business shrewdness of the Jews beneath formulas of morality is anti-Semitic, is vulgar, is itself canaille

63.

Principal point of view:

to tear open *distances*, but *to create no opposites*.

to detach the *intermediate formations* and diminish their influence: principal means for preserving distances.

64.

(190)

Absurd and contemptible kind of idealism, which would have mediocrity *not mediocre* and, instead of feeling a triumph in being an exception, is *indignant* at cowardice, falseness, smallness and

wretchedness. *One should not will this otherwise!* And tear the chasm open *wider*! — *One should compel the higher kind to set itself apart* through the sacrifices it has to make to its being

65.

(191)

NB. To what extent the *Christian* centuries with their pessimism were *stronger* centuries than the 18th century

— correspondingly the *tragic* age of the Greeks —

weaker, more scientific and — — —

— the 19th century *against* the 18th century —

in what respect

heir

in what respect

regression from it more "spirit"less more tasteless

in what respect

in what respect progress beyond it

(gloomier, more realistic, *stronger* —

66.

(192)

Your Henrik Ibsen has become very clear to me. With all his "will to truth" he has not dared to free himself from the moral illusionism that says "freedom" and will not admit to itself what freedom is: the second stage in the metamorphosis of the "will to power" on the part of those who lack it. In the first one demands justice. Even from those

who have power. At the second one says "freedom", i.e. one wants to *get away* from those who have power. At the third one says "*equal rights*", i.e. one wants, so long as one does not yet have the upper hand, to prevent one's rivals as well from growing in power.

67.

I have never for a moment failed to recognize the compromising mediocrity of *Protestantism*, of its theologians and preachers.

68.

(193)

Not to make men "better", *not* to talk morality to them in any way, as if "morality in itself" or an ideal kind of man were given at all: but *to create conditions* under which *stronger men are needed*, who for their part need and consequently *will have* a *morality* (more clearly: a *bodily-spiritual discipline*) *that makes strong*!

Not to let oneself be seduced by blue eyes or swelling bosoms: *greatness of soul has nothing romantic about it*… And unfortunately *nothing lovable at all*!

69.

(194)

Let us see what "the first Christian" does with all that goes against his instinct: the *besmirching* and casting of suspicion upon the beautiful, the radiant, the rich, the proud, the self-assured, the knowing, the powerful — in summa upon *the whole of culture*: his intention is to take from it *its good conscience*…

Just read Petronius immediately after the New Testament: how one breathes again, how one blows away the accursed air of bigots!

70.

(195)

a disposition that calls itself idealism and will not allow mediocrity to be mediocre nor woman to be woman. Not to make uniform! To make clear to ourselves how *dearly a virtue costs*: and that virtue is nothing averagely desirable, but a *noble madness*, a beautiful exception, with the privilege of being *strongly* attuned…

71.

(196)

the little women who wait until the priest or the mayor gives them permission to satisfy their sexual drive and in doing so make the promise always to satisfy it only with One man

that the satisfaction of the *sexual drive* and the question of *offspring* are fundamentally different things and interests, and "marriage", like all institutions, something *fundamentally mendacious*…

72.

(197)

The refined Jewish shrewdness of the first

Christians

One must not let oneself be misled: "judge not," they say, but they send everything that is not of their faith to hell. By letting God judge, they judge themselves; by glorifying God, they glorify themselves: by *demanding* the virtues of which they are capable — more still, which they need in order to endure it at all — they give themselves the grand semblance of a *war* and a *struggle for the good*: whereas they are fighting only for the preservation of their kind. By being peaceable,

meek, gentle, friendly, cheerful with one another, they obey their innermost herd-animal needs: but prudence wills that they should also *demand* this of themselves. Thus even the most unavoidable thing appears as obedience, as merit — it increases their *self-esteem*…

— *to glorify themselves constantly, but never to admit it to themselves.* The absolute *party-Tartuffery*, which reserves to itself virtue and the competition for virtue: knowledge *too*, "truth": the future dominion *too*, and revenge upon all enemies

— ah, this humble, chaste, gentle mendacity! Who can endure it!… "*Let our virtue, our happiness, our unpretentiousness bear witness for us!*"

— to make themselves *possible* within the world, to *prevail*: one notices that they have Jewish blood and Jewish prudence in them. 1) one must separate oneself, visibly 2) one must treat oneself as the "chosen people", secretly 3) one must not posit an order of rank of values, but *opposites*: "we" — and "the world"

73.

(198)

Just read the New Testament as a *book of seduction*:

virtue is commandeered, in the instinct that with it one wins public opinion over to one's side

and indeed the most modest *virtue* of all, which the ideal herd-sheep acknowledges and nothing further (the shepherd included —): a small, tender, benevolent, helpful and rapturously contented sort of virtue, which outwardly is absolutely unpretentious — which marks off "the world" against itself

the *most senseless conceit*, as though the destiny of mankind revolved around them in such a way that the congregation on the one side

were the right and the world on the other the false, the eternally reprehensible and reprobate.

the *most senseless hatred* of everything that is in power: but without touching it! A kind of *inward detachment* which outwardly leaves everything as it was (servitude and slavery; knowing how to make of *everything* a means for the service of God and of virtue)

74.

woman: a little hearth-fire amid much smoke and lies.

75.

Christianity as the *breeding of herd animals*; the small herd-animal virtues as *the* virtue (— conditions and means of self-preservation of the smallest kind of man restamped as virtues; the New Testament the *best book of seduction*)

76.

Marriage is worth exactly as much as those who enter into it: therefore it is, on average, worth little —; "marriage in itself" has no value whatsoever — as indeed is the case with every institution.

77.

(199)

Christianity as a *denaturalization* of herd-animal morality: amid absolute misunderstanding and self-delusion

democratization is a *more natural* form of it, a less mendacious one

Fact: the oppressed, the lowly, the whole great mass of slaves and half-slaves *will to power*

1st stage: they make themselves free — they detach themselves, imaginarily at first, they recognize one another, they prevail

2nd stage: they enter into struggle, they want recognition, equal rights, "justice"

3rd stage: they want privileges (— they draw the representatives of power over to their side)

4th stage: they want power *alone*, and they *have* it…

In Christianity *three elements* are to be distinguished:

a) the oppressed of every kind

b) the mediocre of every kind

c) the dissatisfied and sick of every kind

with the *first* element it fights against the politically noble and their ideal

with the *second* element against the exceptions and the privileged (spiritually, sensually —) of every kind

with the *third* element against the *natural instinct* of the healthy and happy.

when it comes to victory, the *second* element steps into the foreground; for then Christianity has talked the healthy and happy over to its side (as warriors for its cause), likewise the powerful (as having an interest in overpowering the multitude) — and now it is the *herd instinct*, the *mediocre nature*, valuable in every respect, that receives its highest sanction through Christianity. This *mediocre nature* at last becomes so far conscious of itself (— gains the courage to be itself —) that it grants itself *power politically* as well…

— democracy is Christianity *made natural*: a kind of "return to nature", after the opposite valuation could be overcome only through an

extreme anti-naturalness. — Consequence: *the aristocratic ideal now denaturalizes itself* ("the higher man", "noble", "artist", "passion", "knowledge", etc.) Romanticism as the cult of the exception, genius, etc.

78.

"méfiez-vous du premier mouvement; il est toujours généreux." Talleyrand to the young legation secretaries.

79.

(200)

The Jewish priesthood had understood how to present everything that *it* claimed as a *divine statute*, as compliance with a commandment of God… likewise to introduce what served to *preserve Israel*, what *made possible* its existence (e.g. a sum of *works*: circumcision, the sacrificial cult as the centre of national consciousness) not as nature but as "God". — *This process continues; within* Judaism, where the necessity of "works" was not felt (namely as separation against the outside), a priestly kind of man could be conceived, standing in the relation of the "noble nature" to the aristocrat; a casteless and as it were spontaneous priestliness of soul, which now, in order to set off its opposite sharply from itself, laid the value not on "works" but on "disposition"…

At bottom it was once again a matter of *making a certain kind of soul prevail*, as it were a *popular uprising within* a priestly people — a pietistic movement from below (sinners, tax collectors, women, the sick). Jesus of Nazareth was the sign by which they *recognized* one another. And again, in order to be able to believe in themselves, they need a *theological transfiguration*: nothing less than "the Son of God" is needful to them in order to create faith for themselves… And exactly as the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, so the attempt

was made once more to *refalsify* here the history of mankind altogether, so that Christianity might appear as its most cardinal event. This movement could arise only on the soil of Judaism: whose principal deed was to intertwine *guilt and misfortune* and to reduce all guilt to *guilt against God*: *of this Christianity is the second power*.

80.

(201)

these small herd-animal virtues by no means lead to "eternal life": to stage them in such a way, and oneself with them, may be very clever, but for one who still has his eyes open here, it remains, in spite of everything, the most ridiculous of all spectacles. One by no means earns a privilege on earth and in heaven by having brought oneself to the perfection of a small, dear sheepishness; one thereby remains, at best, merely a small, dear, absurd sheep with horns — provided one does not burst with vanity after the fashion of court preachers and scandalize with judicial attitudes.

the enormous transfiguration of colour with which the small virtues are here illuminated — as if as the reflected splendour of divine qualities

the *natural* purpose and usefulness of every virtue on principle *kept silent*; it is valuable only with regard to a *divine* commandment, a divine exemplar, only with regard to otherworldly and spiritual goods (Splendid: as though it were a matter of the "*salvation* of the *soul*": but it was a means of "enduring" it here with as many beautiful feelings as possible.)

On the *denaturalization of morality*.

81.

Evidently there is a lack of shame in the new Germany; even the imperial court has so far shown an unwillingness to keep itself free of being stained by the most contemptible and most compromising spawn of Christian bigotry: something to which, after all, everything ought to summon it — decency, good taste, prudence.

(What has done the court more harm than the court preachers?)

82.

(202)

Individualism is a modest and still unconscious kind of "will to power"; here it already seems enough to the individual to *get free* of an overpowering dominance of society (be it that of the state or of the church…) He sets himself in opposition *not as a person*, but merely as an individual; he represents all individuals against the totality. That is to say: he instinctively sets himself *equal to every individual*; what he fights for, he fights for not for himself as a person, but for himself as a single unit against the totality.

Socialism is merely a *means of agitation of the individualist*: he grasps that, in order to achieve something, one must organize oneself into a collective action, into a "power." But what he wants is not society as the purpose of the individual, but society as a *means of making many individuals possible*: — This is the instinct of the socialists, about which they frequently deceive themselves (— apart from the fact that, in order to prevail, they frequently have to deceive) The altruistic moral sermon in the service of individual egoism: one of the most common falsehoods of the *nineteenth* century.

Anarchism is in turn merely a *means of agitation of socialism*; with it, socialism arouses fear, with fear it begins to fascinate and to terrorize;

above all — it draws the courageous, the daring over to its side, even in spirit.

In spite of all this: *individualism* is the *most modest* stage of the will to power.

Once one has attained a certain independence, one wants more: *separation* emerges according to the degree of strength; the individual no longer simply sets himself as equal, but *seeks out his equals*, — he sets others apart from himself. Individualism is followed by the *formation of members* and *of organs*: kindred tendencies grouping themselves together and acting as a power, between these centres of power friction, war, recognition of the forces on both sides, adjustment, rapprochement, the establishment of an *exchange of services*. In the end: an *order of rank*.

NB.

1.

the individuals make themselves free

2.

they enter into struggle, they come to agree upon "equality of rights" (— justice —) as their goal

3.

once that is attained, the actual *inequalities of strength* come into an *enlarged effect* (because on the whole peace prevails, and far smaller quanta of strength already make for differences, such as were formerly almost = 0). Now the individuals organize themselves into *groups*; the groups strive for privileges and for preponderance. The struggle, in a milder form, rages anew.

NB. one wants *freedom* so long as one does not yet have power. Once one has it, one wants superior power; if one does not win it (if one is still too weak for it), one wants "*justice*", *i.e. equal power*

83.

(203)

Above all, my virtuous gentlemen, you have no precedence over us: we mean to bring *modesty* nicely home to your minds: it is a pitiful self-interest and prudence that counsels you to your virtue. And had you more strength and courage in your bodies, you would not press yourselves down in such fashion into virtuous nullity. You make of yourselves what you can: partly what you must — what your circumstances compel you to —, partly what gives you pleasure, partly what seems useful to you. But if you do only what accords with your inclin-

ations, or what your necessity demands of you, or what is of use to you, then you shall *neither be permitted to praise yourselves for it, nor let yourselves be praised*!… One is a *thoroughly small kind* of man if one is merely *virtuous*: let nothing lead you astray on that point! Men who count for anything in any respect were never yet such virtue-asses: their innermost instinct, that of their quantum of power, did not find its account therein: whereas your minimality of power makes nothing appear wiser than virtue. But you have *numbers* on your side: and insofar as you *tyrannize*, we mean to make war on *you*…

84.

(204)

The hypocritical semblance with which all *civil institutions* are whitewashed, as though they were *offspring of morality*… e.g. marriage; work; vocation; the fatherland; the family; order; law. But since they are all founded with a view to the *most mediocre* kind of man, as a protection against exceptions and the needs of exceptions, one must find it fair if a great deal of lying goes on here.

85.

(205)

A *virtuous man* is a *lower* species for this reason alone, that he is no "person", but receives his value by conforming to a schema of man that has been set up once and for all. He does not have his value a parte: he can be compared, he has his equals, he *is not supposed* to be singular…

Reckon up the qualities of the *good* man: why do they do us good? Because we have no need of war, because he imposes upon us no mistrust, no caution, no composure and severity: our laziness, good nature, light-mindedness give themselves a *good day*. It is this *feeling of*

well-being of ours that *we project out of ourselves* and attribute to the good man as a *quality*, as a *value*.

86.

(206)

I do not at all love it in that Jesus of Nazareth or in his apostle Paul that they *put so much into the heads of the little people*, as though their modest virtues amounted to something. It has had to be paid for too dearly: for they have brought the more valuable qualities of virtue and of man into disrepute, they have set the bad conscience and the self-esteem of the noble soul against each other, they have led astray the *brave*, *magnanimous*, *daring*, *excessive* inclinations of the strong soul, even to the point of self-destruction…

touching, childlike, devoted, femininely enamoured and shy; the charm of virginal-rapturous pre-sensuality — for chastity is only a form of sensuality (— its form of pre-existence)

87.

(207)

Questions of *strength*, every one: how far to assert oneself against the conditions of preservation of *society* and its prejudices? — how far to unchain *one's terrible qualities*, through which most perish? — how far to go to meet *truth* and take its most questionable sides to heart? — how far to go to meet *suffering*, self-contempt, pity, sickness, vice, with the question mark as to whether one will become master of them?… (what does not kill us makes us *stronger*…) — finally: how far to grant the rule, the common, the petty, the good, the upright of the average nature their right within oneself, without letting oneself be vulgarized thereby?… the strongest test of character: not to let oneself be ruined

by the seduction of the good. The *good* as luxury, as refinement, as *vice*…

88.

(208)

Marriage is a form of concubinage to which civil society grants its permission, out of self-interest, as goes without saying, *not* out of morality… Marriage is the kind of concubinage *preferred* by it, because here instinct does not act without regard and caution, but first applies for a licence… For this lack of courage and self-confidence society is grateful, it *honours* marriage because it represents a form of *submission* before society… Marriage is a form of concubinage in which, on principle, too much is promised: here something is promised that one cannot promise, namely "love for evermore", — here the sexual function is set down as a "duty" that can be demanded… But that is "modern marriage"

89.

(209)

Moral values have hitherto been the highest values: would anyone call that into doubt?… If we remove these values from that place, we alter all values: the principle of their previous *order of rank* is thereby overthrown…

90.

(210)

Let us remove supreme goodness from the concept of God: it is unworthy of a god. Let us likewise remove supreme wisdom: — it is the vanity of philosophers that is to blame for this absurdity of a God as a

monster of wisdom: he was to resemble them as closely as possible… No! God *the supreme power* — that suffices! From it everything follows, from it follows — "the world"! Symbolice, so as to have a mark of recognition

D.O.

omnipotens

91.

(211)

Christianity as *emancipated Judaism* (in the same way as a nobility conditioned by locality and race at last emancipates itself from these conditions and *goes in search* of kindred elements…)

1)

as church (community) on the soil of the state, as an unpolitical formation

2)

as life, discipline, practice, art of living

3)

as *religion of sin* (of transgression *against God* as the *sole* kind of transgression, as the sole cause of all suffering whatsoever), with a universal remedy against it. There is sin only against God; what is done amiss against man, man shall not judge, nor demand account of, except in the name of God. Likewise all commandments (love): everything is tied to God, and for God's sake it is done to man. Therein lies a high prudence (— life in great confinement, as among the Eskimos, is bearable only with the most peaceable and indulgent

disposition: the Judaeo-Christian dogma turned against sin, for the benefit of the "sinner" —)

92.

(212)

The *Christian* life, as it hovers before Paul as an ideal and is preached by him, is the *Jewish* life — not perhaps that of the ruling families, but that of the little people, especially of the Jews living in the diaspora. It has been lived, seen, drawn out of what was most revered and most beloved — this ideal: it has been recognized as exemplary for men of other races, provided that they live under similar conditions. This is Paul's deed: he recognized the *applicability of Jewish private life* to the private life of the little people everywhere. From Judaism he knew how a kind of man prevails without having power and without even being permitted to aim at power. A faith in an absolute privilege, the happiness of the chosen, which ennobles every wretchedness and privation — namely as counter-payment and spur; the virtues of the family, of the small congregation; the unconditional seriousness in one thing, in the inviolability of their life by the adversaries among whom they live — and everything soothing, softening, refreshing: prayer, music, common meals and outpourings of the heart, patience, forbearance, help and service toward one another, above all that *keeping still* of the soul, so that the affects of anger, suspicion, hatred, envy, revenge do not come to the top… Asceticism is *not* the essence of this life; sin stands in the foreground of consciousness only in the sense that it signifies the constant nearness of its redeemedness and bought-backness (— thus it is already Jewish: but a Jew deals with sin himself, that is precisely what he had his faith for; it is the one thing one can deal with completely; and supposing that all misfortune stands in relation to sin (or to sinfulness), then there is a remedium

against all misfortune itself — and misfortune is, moreover, *justified*, not *senseless*…

93.

(213)

What refreshment, after the New Testament, to take up Petronius, say! How one is restored at once! how one feels the nearness of healthy, high-spirited, self-assured and malicious spirituality! — and in the end one is left standing before the question: "is not even the filth of antiquity worth more than this whole petty presumptuous Christian wisdom and bigotry?"

94.

(214)

the European princes should in fact consider whether they can do without our support. We immoralists — we are today the only power that needs no allies in order to attain victory: thereby we are by far the strongest among the strong. We do not even need the lie: what other power could dispense with it? A strong seduction fights for us, perhaps the strongest there is — the seduction of truth… Of truth? Who put that word in my mouth? But I take it out again; but I disdain the proud word: no, we do not need it either; we would attain power and victory even without truth. The spell that fights for us, the eye of Venus that ensnares and blinds even our adversaries, that is the *magic of the extreme*, the seduction exercised by everything uttermost: we immoralists — we are *the uttermost*…

95.

"Oh Ariadne, you yourself are the labyrinth: one does not come out of you again"…

"Dionysus, you flatter me, you are divine"…

96.

(215)

The *Christian-Jewish* life: here ressentiment did *not* predominate. Only the great persecutions may have driven the passion out to such a degree — the *glow* of *love* as well as that of *hatred*.

When one sees one's dearest sacrificed for one's faith, one becomes *aggressive*; the victory of Christianity is owed to its persecutors.

NB The *asceticism* in Christianity is not specific to it: Schopenhauer misunderstood this: it only grows into Christianity wherever there was asceticism even without Christianity.

NB *Hypochondriac* Christianity, the animal-torment and torture of conscience, likewise belongs only to a certain soil in which Christian values have taken root: it is *not* Christianity itself. Christianity has taken into itself every kind of disease of morbid soils: the only reproach one could make against it is that it did not know how to defend itself against any infection. But precisely *that* is its essence: Christianity is a type of décadence.

The *deep contempt* with which the Christian was treated in the ancient world that had remained noble belongs precisely where the instinctive aversion to the Jew still belongs today: it is the hatred of the free and self-assured estates for those *who push their way through* and combine timid, awkward gestures with an absurd sense of self.

The New Testament is the gospel of an altogether *ignoble* kind of man; their claim to have more value, indeed to have all value, has in fact something outrageous about it — even today.

97.

(216)

How, while fully fitting into bourgeois respectability, one nonetheless for once gives vent to the needs of one's *immorality*:

to what extent we today, as knowers, have taken all our *evil drives* into service and are far from concluding a desirability of alliance between virtue and knowledge

all evil drives have become intelligent and curious, scientific

He to whom virtue comes easily makes fun of it as well. Seriousness in virtue cannot be sustained: it reaches virtue and hops out beyond it — whither? into devilry.

— in reaching it, he leaps over it — and fashions for himself a little devilry out of it in the process, and honors his God in no other way than as God's buffoon

How intelligent all our bad leanings and urgings have become in the meantime! how much scientific curiosity torments them! Nothing but fishhooks of knowledge!

98.

(217)

What I protest against? That one should take this petty, peaceable mediocrity, this equilibrium of a soul that does not know the great impulses of the great accumulations of force, as something lofty, perhaps even as the *measure of man*.

NB. *Bacon of Verulam:* "infimarum virtutum apud vulgus laus est, mediarum admiratio, supremarum sensus nullus." But Christianity, as a

religion, belongs to the vulgus; it has no sense for the highest kind of virtus

99.

(218)

The Schopenhauerian *denaturalization* of the *genius* of art: "an intellect that has become unfaithful to its destiny"

100.

one could introduce castration in the struggle against criminality and sickliness (thus with regard to all syphilitics): but to what end! one should think more *economically*!

101.

(219)

existence as punishment and penance: "it is the myth of the Fall alone that reconciles me with the Old Testament" Schopenhauer

102.

(220)

NB.

my *positive*

main points — what are they?

— and my chief *negativa* — what are they?

— and the realm of my *new*

questions and *distant prospects* — what are they?

103.

(221)

To such men as *concern me* I wish suffering, abandonment, sickness, ill-treatment, degradation — I wish that deep self-contempt, the martyrdom of mistrust of oneself, the misery of the vanquished may not remain unknown to them: I have no pity for them, because I wish them the one thing that can prove today whether someone has *value* or not — *that he holds his ground*…

I have not yet come to know a single idealist, but many liars — —

104.

(222)

Schopenhauer wishes that *scoundrels* be castrated and *geese* be shut up in convents: from what point of view could that be desirable? The scoundrel has this advantage over the mediocre, that he is not mediocre; and the fool this advantage over *us*, that he does not suffer at the sight of mediocrity… It would be more desirable that the gulf grow wider — that is, that scoundrelism and stupidity increase… In this way human nature would *expand*… But in the end precisely this is also what is necessary; it happens and does not wait to see whether we wish it or not. Stupidity and scoundrelism are growing: that *belongs* to "progress".

105.

(223)

On the strength of the 19th century.

We are *more medieval* than the 18th century; not merely more curious or more easily excited by the foreign and the rare. We have revolted against the *Revolution*…

We have emancipated ourselves from the *fear of raison*, the specter of the 18th century: we dare once again to be lyrical, absurd and childish… in a word: "we are musicians"

— we are just as little *afraid* of the *ridiculous* as of the *absurd*

— the *devil* finds God's tolerance in his favor: more than that, he has an interest, as the one misjudged and slandered since time immemorial, — we are the vindicators of the devil's honor

— we no longer separate the great from the terrible

— we reckon the *good* things together, in their complexity, with the *worst*: we have *overcome* the absurd "desirability" of former times (which wanted the growth of the good without the growth of evil —)

— the *cowardice* before the ideal of the Renaissance has abated — we dare to aspire *to its very mores* —

— the *intolerance* toward priests and the Church has at the same time come to an end: "it is immoral to believe in God", but precisely this counts for us as the best form of justification of this belief.

We have granted all of this a *right* among us. We are not afraid of the *reverse side* of the "good things" (— we *seek* it… we are brave and curious enough for that), e.g. in Greekdom, in morality, in reason, in good taste (— we calculate the loss one incurs with all such precious things: *one almost makes oneself poor* with such a precious thing —). Just as little do we conceal from ourselves the reverse side of the *bad* things…

106.

"*opinion* is half of reality," Napoleon said

107.

(224)

Have I thereby harmed virtue?… Just as little as the anarchists have harmed princes: only since they have been shot at do they sit firmly on their thrones again… — For so it has always stood and so it will stand: one cannot serve a cause better than by persecuting it and hunting it down with all the hounds… This — I have done.

108.

(225)

Against *remorse*. I do not love this kind of cowardice toward one's own deed; one should not leave oneself in the lurch under the onrush of unexpected disgrace and distress. An *extreme* pride is rather in place there. In the end, what good does it do! No deed is undone by being repented; just as little by being "forgiven" or by being "atoned for." One would have to be a theologian to believe in a guilt-effacing power: we immoralists prefer not to believe in "guilt." We hold that every kind of action whatsoever is at the root identical in value, — likewise, that actions which turn *against* us may for that very reason still be, economically reckoned, useful, *generally desirable* actions. — In the individual case we will concede that a deed could easily have been *spared* us, — only circumstances favored us toward it. — Which of us, *favored* by circumstances, would not already have run through the whole scale of crimes?… One should therefore never say: "you ought not to have done this and that," but always only: "how strange that I have not already done this a hundred times." — In the end the fewest

actions are *typical* actions, and truly abbreviations of a person; and considering how little person most people are, a human being is seldom *characterized* by a single deed. A deed of circumstance, merely epidermal, merely reflexive, ensuing as a release in response to a stimulus: before the depths of our being have been touched by it, consulted about it. An anger, a grab, a knife-thrust: what of "person" is there in that! — The deed frequently brings with it a kind of fixed stare and unfreedom: so that the doer is as if spellbound by its memory and feels himself merely as an *appendage* to it. This mental disturbance, a form of hypnotization, must above all be combated: a single deed, be it what it may, is, in comparison with everything one has done, equal to *zero* and may be *subtracted* without the reckoning becoming false. The cheap interest that society may have in reckoning up our whole existence in only one direction, as though its meaning were to drive out a single deed, should not infect the doer himself: unfortunately this happens almost constantly. This is due to the fact that every deed with unusual consequences is followed by a mental disturbance: regardless even of whether these consequences are good or bad. Look at a lover to whom a promise has been granted; a poet whom a theater applauds: as regards torpor intellectualis, they differ in nothing from the anarchist who is surprised by a house search. — There are actions that are *unworthy* of us: actions which, taken as typical, would push us down into a lower species. Here one has only to avoid this one error, *that* of taking them as typical. There is the reverse kind of actions, of which *we* are not worthy: exceptions, born of a special abundance of happiness and health, our highest tidal waves, which a storm, a chance once drove so high: such actions and "works" (—) are not typical. One should never measure an artist by the measure of his works.

109.

(226)

One should defend virtue against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal *for all*; they rob virtue of its charm of the rare, the inimitable, the exceptional and the unaverage, — of its *aristocratic magic*. One should likewise make a stand against the obdurate idealists who eagerly tap on all the pots and have their satisfaction when it sounds hollow: what naïveté, to *demand* the great and the rare and to establish its absence with fury and contempt for mankind! — It is obvious, for example, that a *marriage* is worth as much as those who enter into it, i.e. that on the whole it will be something wretched and unseemly: no pastor, no mayor can make anything else of it.

Virtue has all the instincts of the average man against it: it is unprofitable, imprudent, it isolates, it is akin to passion and poorly accessible to reason; it corrupts the character, the head, the mind — always measured by the measure of the middling sort of human being; it sets one at enmity with order, with the *lie* that lies hidden in every order, institution, reality, — it is the *worst vice*, supposing one judges it by the harmfulness of its effect on *others*.

— I recognize virtue by the fact that 1) it does not demand to be recognized 2) that it does not presuppose virtue everywhere, but precisely something else 3) that it *does not suffer* from the absence of virtue, but on the contrary regards this as the relation of distance on the basis of which there is something in virtue to be honored: it does not communicate itself 4) that it makes no propaganda… 5) that it permits no one to play the judge, because it is always a virtue *for itself* 6) that it does precisely all that is otherwise *forbidden*: virtue, as I understand it, is the true vetitum within all herd legislation 7) in short, that it is virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, moraline-free virtue…

110.

(227)

In the end, what have I achieved? Let us not conceal from ourselves this strangest of results: I have lent virtue a new *charm*, — it acts as something *forbidden*. It has our finest probity against it, it is salted into the "cum grano salis" of the scientific pang of conscience; it is old-fashioned in its odour and antiquarian, so that it now at last lures the refined and makes them curious; — in short, it acts as a vice. Only after we have recognized everything as lie and semblance have we also received permission once more for this most beautiful of falsehoods, the falsehood of virtue. There is no longer any authority that might forbid it to us: only by having exhibited virtue as a *form of immorality* is it *justified* once more, — it is ranked and set on equal footing with respect to its fundamental meaning, it partakes in the fundamental immorality of all existence, — as a luxury-form of the first rank, the most haughty, most costly and rarest form of vice. We have unwrinkled it and uncowled it, we have redeemed it from the importunity of the many, we have taken from it its idiotic rigidity, its empty eye, its stiff coiffure, its hieratic musculature.

111.

(228)

On the Order of Rank

What is *mediocre* in the typical man — That he does not understand the *reverse side of things* as necessary: that he fights against ills as though one could do without them; that he will not accept the one along with the other, — that he would like to blur and extinguish the *typical character of a thing*, of a condition, of an age, of a person, by approving only a part of its qualities and wishing to *abolish* the others.

The "desirability" of the mediocre is what we others fight against: the *ideal* conceived as something in which nothing harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, destructive is to remain. Our insight is the reverse: that with every growth of man his reverse side too must grow, that the *highest man*, supposing such a concept is permitted, would be the man who represented *the antithetical character of existence* most strongly, rather as its glory and sole justification… Ordinary men may represent only a tiny little corner and nook of this natural character: they perish forthwith when the multiplicity of the elements and the tension of the opposites increases, i.e. the precondition for the *greatness of man*. That man must become better *and* more evil, that is my formula for this inevitability…

Most people represent man as pieces and particulars; only when one adds them together does a man come out. Whole ages, whole peoples have something fragmentary about them in this sense; it belongs perhaps to the economy of human development that man develops piecemeal. For that reason one should by no means fail to recognize that what is at stake is nonetheless only the coming-about of the synthetic man, that the lower men, the enormous majority, are mere preludes and rehearsals, out of whose playing-together here and there the *whole man* arises, the milestone-man, who indicates how far humanity has come forward thus far. It does *not* advance in one stroke; often the type already attained is lost again…

— — we have, for example, with all the exertion of 3 centuries, not yet attained again the *man of the Renaissance*; and the man of the Renaissance, in turn, fell short of *the man of antiquity*…

— — one must have a *standard*: I distinguish the *grand style*; I distinguish *activity* and reactivity; I distinguish the *overflowing, prodigal* ones and the suffering-passionate ones (— the "idealists")

112.

(229)

Every society has the tendency to reduce its opponents to *caricature* and, as it were, to starve them out, — at least in its *imagination*. Such a caricature is, for example, our "*criminal*". In the midst of the Roman-aristocratic order of values the *Jew* was reduced to caricature. Among artists the "upright fellow and bourgeois" becomes a caricature; among the pious, the godless man; among aristocrats, the man of the people. Among immoralists it *is* the moralist who becomes one: Plato, for instance, becomes a caricature in my hands.

113.

(230)

Making propaganda is indecent: but clever! but clever!

Whatever kind of *bizarre ideal* one may follow (e.g. as a "Christian" or as a "free spirit" or as an "immoralist" or as a citizen of the Reich —), one should not demand that it be *the ideal*: for thereby one would rob it of the character of privilege, of prerogative. One should have it in order to distinguish oneself, *not* in order to make oneself equal

How does it come about, nonetheless, that most idealists immediately make propaganda for their ideal, as though they could have no right to the ideal unless *everyone* acknowledged it?… This is what, e.g., all those courageous little women do who take the liberty of learning Latin and mathematics. What compels them to do so? I fear, the instinct of the herd, timidity before the herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman" because under the form of a *generous activity*, under the flag of "*for* others", they push through their little private separatism most cleverly…

Cleverness of the idealists in being missionaries and representatives of an ideal: they thereby "transfigure" themselves in the eyes of those who believe in selflessness and heroism. And yet: real heroism consists in fighting *not* under the banner of sacrifice, devotion, selflessness, but in *not fighting at all*… "Thus am *I*; thus will *I* have it: — the devil take *you*!"

114.

(231)

War against the effeminate conception of "nobility" — a quantum more of brutality is not to be dispensed with; no more than a proximity to crime. "Self-satisfaction" too is *not* part of it; one must stand by oneself adventurously as well, temptingly, ruinously — nothing of "beautiful soul" drivel — I want to give vent to a *more robust ideal*.

115.

Incidental Remarks

on the

on the

Greeks

Pagan

116.

(232)

Aesthetica.

on our *modern music*: the atrophy of melody is the same thing as the atrophy of the "idea", of dialectic, of the freedom of the most spiritual movement, — a clumsiness and stuffedness which develops into new ventures and even into principles — in the end one has only the principles of one's talent, of one's *narrowness of talent*

as regards the elementary conditions for a genius, Offenbach was more a genius than Wagner…

"dramatic music" nonsense! That is simply bad music, as surely as — — —

the substitutes for the mockingly dancing and scornful *spirituality*

"feeling", "passion" as surrogates, when one no longer knows how to attain high spirituality and its *happiness* (e.g. Voltaire's). Expressed technically, "feeling", "passion" is *easier* — it presupposes far poorer artists. The turn to drama betrays that an artist knows himself to be master of the *sham* means even more than of the genuine means. We have *dramatic painting*, *dramatic lyric poetry*, etc.

117.

(233)

I have declared war on the anaemic "Christian ideal" (together with what is closely related to it), not with the intention of annihilating it, but only to put an end to its *tyranny* and to clear a space for new ideals, for *more robust* ideals… The *continuance* of the Christian ideal belongs among the most desirable things there are: and if only for the sake of the ideals that want to assert themselves beside it and perhaps above it — they must have opponents, *strong* opponents, in order to become *strong*. — Thus we immoralists need the *power of morality*: our instinct of self-preservation wills that our *opponents* remain in strength, — wills only to become *master over them*. —

118.

(234)

Schopenhauer interpreted high intellectuality as *liberation* from the will; he did not *want* to see the becoming-free from moral prejudices that lies in the unfettering of the great spirit, the typical *immorality* of genius; he artificially posited what he alone honoured, the moral value of "unselfing", as also the *condition* of the most spiritual activity, of "objective" seeing. "Truth", in art too, emerges once the *will* has been subtracted…

Straight through all moral idiosyncrasy *I* see a *fundamentally different valuing*: such an absurd sundering of "genius" and the will-world of morality and immorality *I do not know*. The moral man is a lower species than the immoral one, a weaker one; indeed — according to morality he is a type, and *not* his own type; a copy, a good copy in any case, — the measure of his value lies *outside* him. I esteem man according to the *quantum of power and fullness of his will*: *not* according to its weakening and extinction; I regard a philosophy that *teaches* the negation of the will as a doctrine of degradation and of slander…

— I esteem the *power* of a *will* according to how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to transform to its advantage; by this measure it must be far from me to reproach existence with its evil and painful character; rather, I seize the hope that it will one day be more evil and more painful than hitherto…

The *summit* of the spirit that Schopenhauer imagined was to arrive at the knowledge that nothing has any meaning, in short, to *know* what the good man instinctively already *does*… he denies that there could be *higher* kinds of intellect — he took his insight for a non plus ultra… Here spirituality is ranked far beneath goodness; its highest value (as

art, e.g.) would be to counsel, to prepare the moral conversion: absolute dominion of *moral values*..

beside Schopenhauer I want to characterize *Kant* (*Goethe's* passage on radical evil): nothing Greek, absolutely anti-historical (passage on the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic. With him too, *holiness* in the background…

I need a critique of the *saint*…

Hegel's value "passion"

Shopkeeper-philosophy of Mr. Spencer: complete absence of an ideal, save that of the average man.

Instinctive principle of all philosophers and historians and psychologists: everything that is *valuable* in man, art, history, science, religion, technology must be proved to be *morally valuable*, *morally conditioned*, in aim, means and result. Understanding everything with regard to the supreme value: e.g. Rousseau's question concerning civilization, "does it make man better?" — a comical question, since the opposite is obvious and that is precisely what speaks in *favour* of civilization

119.

(235)

We "Objective Ones". —

It is not "pity" that opens for *us* the gates to the most distant and most foreign kinds of being and culture; but rather our accessibility and lack of prejudice, which precisely does *not* "suffer with", but on the contrary takes delight in a hundred things where formerly one suffered (was indignant or moved, or looked on with hostility and coldness —) Suffering in all its nuances is now interesting to us: we are certainly *not* the more pitying for that, even when the sight of suf-

fering shakes us through and through and the tears break forth: — we are by no means disposed to be more helpful on that account.

In this *voluntary* wanting-to-look-upon every kind of distress and transgression we have become stronger and more vigorous than the 18th century was; it is a proof of our growth in strength (— we have *drawn closer* to the 17th and 16th centuries…) But it is a profound misunderstanding to take our "Romanticism" as proof of our "beautified soul"…

We want *strong* sensations, as all *coarser* ages and strata of the people want them… This must be well distinguished from the need of the neurasthenic and the décadents: with them there is the need for pepper, even for cruelty…

We *all* seek states in which bourgeois morality *no longer has a say*, still less priestly morality (— with every book to which some air of parsons and theologians has clung, we have the impression of a pitiable niaiserie and poverty…) "Good society" is the one in which, at bottom, nothing is of interest except what is *forbidden* in bourgeois society and brings a bad reputation: and it is the same with books, with music, with politics, with the estimation of woman

120.

To be questioned as to their *values*:

Plato. Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius. Epicurus.

Augustine. Pascal.

Bentham Comte. Hegel.

Books:

Reuter's Augustine and the Religious Enlightenment of the Middle Ages

Sainte-Beuve Port-Royal

Teichmüller, Greek Philosophy.

121.

(236)

How is it possible that someone has respect for himself *solely* with regard to moral values, that he *subordinates* everything else and thinks little of it in comparison with good, evil, improvement, salvation of the soul, etc.? e.g. Amiel. What does the *moral idiosyncrasy* signify? — I ask psychologically, physiologically too, e.g. Pascal. In cases, that is, where great *other* qualities are not lacking; also in the case of Schopenhauer, who evidently esteemed what he did not have and *could* not have… — is it not the consequence of a merely habitual *moral interpretation* of actual states of pain and displeasure? is it not a particular kind of *sensibility* which *does not understand* the cause of its many feelings of displeasure, but *believes it can explain them to itself with moral hypotheses*? So that even an occasional sense of well-being and *feeling of strength* always appears at once illuminated again under the optics of the "good conscience", of the nearness of God, of the consciousness of *redemption*?… So the *moral idiosyncratic* has

1) *either* really his own value in approximating to society's type of virtue: "the worthy man", the "*upright*", — a middling state of high respectability: *mediocre* in all his abilities, but in all his willing honest, conscientious, firm, respected, proven

2) *or* he believes he has it, because he believes he cannot understand any of his states otherwise at all…, he is unknown to himself, he interprets himself in this fashion.

Morality as the only *scheme of interpretation* by which man can bear himself… a kind of pride?…

122.

(237)

How should one dare to spoil their mediocrity for the mediocre! I do, as one sees, the opposite: for every step away from it — so I teach — leads *into* the *immoral*…

123.

(238)

The longest duration of scholasticism — the good, the evil, the conscience, virtue, nothing but entities of imaginary origin

124.

(239)

reflection on the most general things is always backward: the ultimate "desirabilities" concerning man, for example, have never really been taken as a problem by the philosophers. The "improvement" of man is naively posited by all of them, as though we had been lifted by some intuition above the question mark: *why* precisely "improve"? To what extent is it *desirable* that man become *more virtuous*? or *cleverer*? or *happier*? Supposing one does not already *know* the "why?" of man at all, then every such intention has no meaning; and if one wills the one, who knows? perhaps one may then not will the other?… Is the increase of virtuousness compatible at the same time with an increase of cleverness and insight? Dubito: I shall have only too much occasion to prove the contrary. Has not virtuousness as a goal in the rigorous sense in fact hitherto stood in contradiction to becoming happy? does it not, on the other hand, need misfortune, privation and self-maltreatment as a necessary means? And if *the highest insight* were the goal, would one not precisely thereby have to reject the enhancement

of happiness? and choose danger, adventure, mistrust, seduction as the way to insight?…

And if one wants *happiness*, well, then perhaps one must join the "poor in spirit".

125.

(240)

The benevolent, helpful, kindly dispositions have absolutely *not* come to be honoured for the sake of the utility that proceeds from them: but because they are states of *rich souls*, which can give away and bear their value as a feeling of the fullness of life. Look at the eyes of the benefactor! That is the counterpart of self-negation, of hatred of the moi, of "Pascalisme". —

126.

(241)

Everything that comes from weakness, from the self-doubt and sickliness of the soul, is good for nothing: even if it expressed itself in the greatest throwing away of goods and possessions. For as an *example* it poisons life… The gaze of a priest, his pallid apartness, has done more harm to life than all his devotion does good: such apartness *slanders* life…

127.

(242)

Preoccupation with oneself and one's "eternal salvation" is *not* the expression of a rich and self-assured nature: for such a nature does not give a damn whether it is saved, — it has no such interest in happiness of any shape, it is force, deed, desire, — it impresses itself upon

things, it *lays violent hands* on things… Christianity is a romantic hypochondria of those who do not stand on firm legs. — Wherever the *hedonistic* perspective steps into the foreground, one may infer suffering and a certain *ill-constitutedness*.

128.

(243)

How, under the pressure of the ascetic *morality of unselfing*, precisely the affects of love, of kindness, of pity, even of justice, of magnanimity, of heroism had to be *misunderstood*: *principal chapter*.

It is *richness in personality*, the fullness within, the overflowing and giving away, the instinctive well-being and Yes-saying to oneself, that makes the great sacrifices and the great love: it is the strong and divine selfhood out of which these affects grow, just as surely as the will to become master, the reaching out, the inner certainty of having a right to everything. The dispositions which by common conception are *opposed* are rather *one* disposition; and if one does not sit firm and stout in one's own skin, then one has nothing to give away, and no hand to stretch out, and cannot be shelter and staff…

How could these instincts be so *reinterpreted* that man feels as valuable what runs counter to his self? when he surrenders his self to another self!

Oh, the psychological wretchedness and mendacity which has hitherto held the floor in the Church and in a philosophy sicklied over by the Church!

If man is sinful, through and through, then he may only hate himself. At bottom he ought not to treat his fellow men with any feeling other than that with which he treats himself; love of mankind needs a justification, — it lies in the fact that *God has commanded it*. — From

this it follows that all the natural instincts of man (to love, etc.) seem to him forbidden in themselves and come into their right again only after their *disavowal*, on the ground of obedience to God… Pascal, the admirable *logician* of Christianity, went that far! consider his relationship to his sister, p. 162: "*not* to make oneself loved" seemed Christian to him.

129.

NB. Proof of the hypothesis and explanation on the basis of the hypothesis — not to be confused!

130.

"Community of slaughter is still in Islam a sacral community: whoever takes part in our worship and eats our slaughtered meat is a Muslim."

131.

(244)

"A commandment of the cult turns into a commandment of *culture*." Muhammad forbade the eating of blood (the heathens bled animals in order to make a kind of blood sausage in times of famine)

Principal rite: to let the blood flow unused

Wine and oil un-Arabian (at sacrifice)

132.

— — — for it is our values hitherto from which nihilism is the conclusion

133.

(245)

Useful are the affects one and all, some more directly, others more indirectly; with regard to utility it is utterly impossible to fix any sequence of values, — just as surely as, measured economically, the forces in nature are one and all good, i.e. useful, however much terrible and irrevocable doom may also proceed from them. At most one could say that the mightiest affects are the most valuable: inasmuch as there are no greater sources of strength

134.

(246)

The parochialism and clod-clinging of moral devaluation and its "useful" and "harmful" has its good sense; it is the necessary perspective of society, which is able to survey only what is nearer and nearest *with regard to consequences*. — The state and the politician already require a more *supramoral* way of thinking: because they have to calculate far larger complexes of effects. Likewise a world economy would be possible that has such distant perspectives that all its individual demands might for the moment appear unjust and arbitrary.

135.

(247)

Christianity is possible as the *most private* form of existence; it presupposes a narrow, withdrawn, completely unpolitical society, — it belongs in the conventicle. A "Christian state", on the other hand, a "Christian politics", — these are merely big fat words in the mouths of those who have *reasons* for making big fat words. Such people may also speak of a "God of hosts" as chief of the general staff: they deceive

no one by it. In praxi the Christian prince too pursues the politics of Machiavelli: provided, that is, that he does not pursue bad politics.

136.

(248)

With the moral degradation of the *ego* there goes hand in hand, even in natural science, an overestimation of the *species*. But the species is something just as illusory as the ego: a false distinction has been made. The ego is a hundred times more than merely a unit in the chain of links; it is the *chain* itself, wholly and entirely; and the species is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of these chains and their partial similarity. That, as has so often been asserted, the individual is *sacrificed* to the species is by no means a fact: rather only the model of a faulty interpretation.

137.

(249)

Necessity of an objective *positing of values*.

In view of the enormity and multiplicity of working for and against one another, such as the total life of every organism presents, its *conscious* world of feelings, intentions, valuations is a small excerpt. We lack all right to posit this piece of consciousness as the purpose, as the Why? of that total phenomenon of life: evidently becoming conscious is only one more means in the unfolding and the extension of the power of life. Therefore it is a naïveté to posit pleasure or spirituality or morality or any particular of the sphere of consciousness as the highest value: and perhaps even to justify "the world" by them. — That is my *fundamental objection* to all philosophical-moral cosmodicies and theodicies, to all *Whys* and *highest values* in philosophy and philosophy of religion hitherto. *One kind of means has been misunderstood as an*

end: life and its enhancement of power have conversely been degraded into a *means*.

If we wished to posit a purpose of life broadly enough, it would have to coincide with no category of conscious life; it must rather *explain* every one of them as a *means to itself*…

the "negation of life" as the goal of life, the goal of development, existence as a great stupidity: such a *lunatic interpretation* is only the offspring of a *measuring* of life by factors of *consciousness* (pleasure and displeasure, good and evil) Here the means are asserted against the end; the "unholy", absurd, above all *unpleasant* means — how can the end be worth anything that uses such means! But the error lies in this, that instead of *seeking* the end which explains the *necessity* of such means, we presuppose from the outset an end which precisely *excludes* such means: i.e. that we take a desirability with regard to certain means (namely pleasant, rational and virtuous ones) as the *norm* by which we first determine what *total end is desirable*…

The *fundamental error* always lies in this, that instead of positing consciousness as a tool and a particular within total life, we posit it as the standard, as the highest value-state of life: in short, the faulty perspective of a parte ad totum. Which is why all philosophers are instinctively bent on imagining a total consciousness, a conscious living-along and willing-along with everything that happens, a "spirit", "God". But one must tell them that *precisely thereby existence* becomes a *monstrosity*; that a "God" and total sensorium would be something on account of which existence would absolutely have to be *condemned*… Precisely that we have *eliminated* the total consciousness that posits ends and means: that is our *great relief*, — with that we cease *having* to be pessimists — *Our* greatest *reproach* against existence was the *existence of God*…

138.

(250)

The only possibility of maintaining a sense for the concept "God" would be: God *not* as a driving force, but God as a *maximal state*, as an *epoch*… A point in the development of the *will to power*, from which both the further development and the before, the up-to-it, are explained…

— viewed mechanistically, the energy of total becoming remains constant; viewed economically, it rises to a high point and sinks down from it again in an eternal cycle; this "will to power" expresses itself in the *interpretation*, in the *manner* of the *expenditure of force* — the transformation of energy into life, and life in its highest potency, accordingly appears as the goal. The same quantum of energy means different things at the different stages of development:

— what constitutes growth in life is the ever more sparing and more far-reckoning economy, which achieves ever more with ever less force… As ideal, the principle of least expenditure…

— that the world does *not* aim at a lasting state is the only thing *that has been proven*. Consequently one *must* conceive its high point in such a way that it is no state of equilibrium…

— the absolute necessity of the same happening in one course of the world as in all others in eternity, *not* a determinism over happening, but merely the expression of the fact that the impossible is not possible… that a particular force can be nothing other than just this particular force; that it discharges itself upon a quantum of resisting force in no other way than accords with its strength — happening and necessarily-happening is a *tautology*.

139.

Rather the last in Rome than the first in the provinces: even this is still *Caesarian*.

140.

Life in its *smallest form* can most readily be brought to perfection: Goethe says, for example… But to be the first in the smallest — — —

141.

(251)

I love the unfortunate who *are ashamed*; who do not empty their chamber pots full of misery into the street; in whom enough good taste remained in heart and on tongue to tell themselves "one must hold one's misfortune in honour, one must hide it"…

142.

— one must have experienced worse, deeper things than the gentlemen pessimists of today, these scrawny apes to whom nothing bad and deep will ever happen, in order to be entitled to respect their pessimism.

143.

(252)

Nothing comes easier to us than to be wise, patient, superior, full of indulgence, patience and sympathy; we are in an absurd fashion inhumanly just in each and every thing, we forgive everything. Forgiving, that is precisely *our* element. For that very reason we ought to keep ourselves somewhat more strictly and, at least from time to time, breed up in ourselves a little affect, a little vice of affect. It may come

hard to us — and, between ourselves, we laugh at the figure we cut in doing so —: but what help is there! we have no other kind of self-overcoming left…

144.

(253)

Cruelty has been refined into tragic pity, so that as such it is *denied*. Likewise sexual love in the form of amour-passion; the slavish disposition as Christian obedience; wretchedness as humility; the disease of the nervus sympathicus, for example, as pessimism, as Pascalism, as Carlylism, etc.

145.

(254)

Points of view for *my* values: whether out of fullness or out of craving… whether one looks on or lends a hand… or looks away, steps aside… whether the pent-up force is roused, stimulated "spontaneously" or merely *reactively*; whether *simple* from a paucity of elements *or* from overwhelming mastery over many, so that it takes them into its service when it needs them… whether one is a *problem* or a *solution*… whether *perfect* given the smallness of the task or *imperfect* given the extraordinariness of a goal… whether one is *genuine* or only an *actor*, whether as an actor one is genuine or only an imitation actor, whether one is a "representative" or the represented thing itself — whether a "person" or merely a rendezvous of persons… whether *sick* from sickness or from *superabundant* health… whether one goes ahead as shepherd or as "exception" (third species: as runaway)… whether one needs *dignity* — or "the buffoon"? — whether one seeks resistance or gets out of its way? whether one is imperfect as "too early" or as "too late"… whether by nature one says Yes or says No or

is a peacock's fan of motley things? whether one is proud enough not to be ashamed even of one's vanity? whether one is still capable of a pang of conscience (the species is growing rarer: formerly conscience had too much to bite on: it seems that now it no longer has teeth enough for it)? whether one is still capable of a "duty"? (— there are those who would rob themselves of their remaining zest for life if they let themselves be *robbed* of "duty"… especially the little womenfolk, those born to be subservient…)

146.

(255)

NB. To go further at this point I leave to another kind of spirit than mine. I am not narrow-minded enough for a system — and not even for *my* system…

147.

"Necessities of thought *are* moral necessities." "The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivability of its negation" (Herbert Spencer) is nonsense.

"to make a *mental* product the *test* of *objective* truth; the abstract expression of an article of faith into the proof of its truth, into its justification"

148.

There are delicately and sickly constituted natures, so-called idealists, who can rise no higher than to a crime, cru, vert: it is the great justification of their small and pallid existence, a repayment for a long cowardice and mendacity, a *moment* at least of strength. Afterwards they perish of it.

149.

(formerly conscience had too much to bite on: it seems that now it no longer has teeth enough for it)

150.

Morality as the Supreme Devaluation

Either our world is the work and the expression (the modus) of God: then it must be *supremely perfect* (Leibniz's conclusion…) — and no one doubted that he knew what belongs to perfection — then evil, ill, can only be *apparent* (more *radically* in Spinoza, the concepts good and evil) *or* must be derived from God's highest purpose (— say, as the consequence of a special favour shown by God, who permits a choice between good and evil: the privilege of not being an automaton; "freedom" at the risk of erring, of choosing wrongly… e.g. in Simplicius in his commentary on Epictetus)

Or our world is imperfect, ill and guilt are real, are determined, are absolutely inherent in its essence; then it cannot be the *true* world: then knowledge is precisely only the way to negate it, then it is an aberration which can be recognized as an aberration. This is Schopenhauer's opinion on Kantian presuppositions. Naive! That would be just another miraculum! Still more desperate, Pascal: he grasped that then knowledge too must be corrupt, falsified — that *revelation* is needed in order even to grasp the world as worthy of negation…

(256)

To What Extent Schopenhauer's Nihilism Is Still the Consequence of the Same Ideal That Created Christian Theism

The degree of certainty regarding the highest desirability, the highest values, the highest perfection was so great that the philosophers *proceeded from it as from an absolute certainty* a priori*: "*God" at the summit as a*

given *truth*. "*To become like God*", "*to be absorbed into God*" — *for millennia these were the most naive and most convincing desirabilities (— but a thing that convinces is not therefore true: it is merely* convincing*. A note for asses)

One has unlearned granting to that positing of the ideal also *personal reality*: one became atheistic. But has one actually renounced the ideal? — The last metaphysicians still at bottom seek in it the actual "reality", the "thing-in-itself", in relation to which everything else is merely apparent. Their dogma is that, because our world of appearances is so evidently *not* the expression of that ideal, it is therefore not "true" — and at bottom does not even lead back to that metaphysical world as its cause. The unconditioned, insofar as it is that highest perfection, cannot possibly furnish the ground for everything conditioned. Schopenhauer, who wanted it otherwise, needed to conceive that metaphysical ground as the opposite of the ideal, as "evil blind will": in this way it could then be "that which appears", which reveals itself in the world of appearance. But even so he did not give up that absolute of the ideal — he sneaked through… (Kant thought the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom" necessary in order to relieve the ens perfectum of responsibility for *this* world's being-thus-and-so, in short to explain evil and ill: a scandalous logic in a philosopher…)

151.

(257)

The *moral hypothesis* for the purpose of *justifying God*, very well presented in Simplicius's commentary on Epictetus, ran: evil must be voluntary (merely so that one can believe in the *voluntariness of the good*) and, on the other hand: in all ill and suffering there lies a purpose of salvation

The concept of guilt as *not* reaching back to the ultimate grounds of existence, and the concept of punishment as an educative benefaction, consequently as the act of a *good* God.

Absolute dominion of moral valuation *over* all others: no one doubted that God could not be evil and could do nothing harmful, i.e. by perfection one conceived merely a *moral* perfection

152.

(258)

Consider the *loss* that all human institutions suffer if a divine and otherworldly *higher sphere* is posited at all, which first *sanctions* these institutions. By growing accustomed to seeing their value in this sanction (e.g. in marriage), one has *slighted their natural dignity*, in some circumstances *denied* it… Nature has been judged unfavourably in the same measure as the anti-nature of a God has been brought to honour. "Nature" came to mean as much as "contemptible", "bad"…

The fatality of a belief in the *reality of the highest moral qualities as God*: with that all actual values were denied and in principle conceived as *unvalues*. Thus the *anti-natural* ascended the throne. With an inexorable logic one arrived at the absolute demand for the *negation of nature*.

153.

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The *remnants* of the *devaluation of nature* through *moral transcendence*:

Value of *unselfing*, cult of altruism

Belief in a *retribution* within the play of consequences

Belief in "goodness", in "genius" itself, as if the one as well as the other were *consequences of unselfing*.

the persistence of the Church's sanction of civil life

an absolute will to misunderstand history (as a work of education towards moralization) or pessimism at the sight of history (— the latter just as much a consequence of the devaluation of nature as that *pseudo-justification*, that *not*-wanting-to-see what the pessimist *sees*…

154.

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My intention: to show the absolute homogeneity in all that happens, and the application of the moral distinction as merely *perspectivally conditioned*; to show how everything that is morally praised is identical in essence with everything immoral, and has only been made possible, like every development of morality, by immoral means and for immoral ends…; how, conversely, everything that is decried as immoral is, considered economically, the higher and more fundamental thing, and how a development towards a greater fullness of life necessarily also entails the *progress of immorality*… "Truth" the degree to which we *permit* ourselves insight into *this* fact…

155.

(261)

There is today also a musician's pessimism, even among non-musicians. Who has not experienced it, who has not cursed it — the wretched youth who tortures his piano to the point of a scream of despair, who with his own hands rolls before him the mud of the gloomiest, grey-brownest harmonies? By this one is *recognized* as a pessimist… — But is one thereby also recognized as musical? I would not know how to believe it. The Wagnerian pur sang is unmusical; he succumbs to the elemental forces of music roughly as the woman succumbs to the will of her hypnotist — and in order to *be able* to do

this, he must not be made mistrustful by any strict and subtle conscience in rebus musicis et musicantibus. I said "roughly as" —: but perhaps we are dealing here with more than a simile. Consider the means of effect which Wagner prefers to employ (— a good part of which he first had to invent for himself): — the choice of movements, of the tone colours of his orchestra, the abominable evasion of the logic and squareness of rhythm, the creeping, stroking, mysterious quality, the hysterism of his "endless melody": — they resemble in a disconcerting way the means by which the hypnotist achieves his effect. And is the state into which, for example, the Lohengrin prelude transports the listener, and still more the female listener, essentially different from somnambulistic ecstasy? — I heard an Italian woman, after hearing the prelude in question, say with those pretty enraptured eyes in which the Wagnerienne is so expert: "come *si dorme* con questa musica!" —

156.

(262)

"Free marriage" is a contradiction in terms; the easing of divorce is a stretch of the way towards it: at bottom only the dangerous consequence of the fact that in establishing marriage too much has been conceded to individuals, and society has increasingly let go of its responsibility for the coming-about of marriage.

Marriage: a sturdy, unprejudiced institution of compulsion, devised with a great deal of bon sens and without sentimentality; coarse, foursquare, designed for those average natures and natural needs for which all the chief institutions ought to be calculated. But I think there is no reason, on its account, to regard adultery with superstitious horror. On the contrary: one ought to be grateful that, with a view to the greatest possible duration of that institution, there is a

natural safety valve: so that nothing makes it burst. A good marriage, moreover, can bear a small exception; it may even be the *test* of its goodness. Speaking in principle: as between adultery and divorce, the former — — —

Marriage is the *piece of nature* which society distinguishes with the highest value: for society itself grows out of the institution it fosters and secures. Nothing is less in place with it than an absurd idealism: the "love match" made into a principle is already such an idealism.

The relatives *ought* to have more say in it than the famous "two hearts".

One does not make an institution out of love: one makes it out of the sexual drive and other natural drives which are satisfied by marriage.

For that very reason one ought also to leave the priest out of it: one *degrades* nature in marriage if one empowers the sworn anti-naturalist to be able to contribute anything to the blessing of marriage — or indeed to be able to *put* any blessing into it in the first place.

157.

(263)

Moral castratism. — The castrato ideal.

1.

The *law*, the thoroughly realistic formulation of certain conditions for the preservation of a community, forbids certain actions in a particular direction, namely insofar as they turn against the community: it does *not* forbid the disposition from which these actions flow — for it needs these same actions in another direction — namely against the *enemies* of the community. Now the moral idealist steps forward and says: "God looketh on the heart: the action itself is as yet nothing; one must root out the hostile disposition from which it flows…" Under normal circumstances one laughs at this; only in those exceptional cases where a community lives *absolutely* outside the necessity of waging war for its existence does one have any ear at all for such things. One lets go of a disposition whose *usefulness* can no longer be foreseen.

This was the case, for example, when Buddha appeared, within a very peaceable and even spiritually over-wearied society.

This was likewise the case with the first Christian community (and the Jewish community too), whose presupposition is the absolutely *unpolitical* Jewish society. Christianity could grow only on the soil of Judaism, i.e., within a people that had already renounced politics and was living a kind of parasitic existence within the Roman order of things. Christianity is one step *further*: one may "unman" oneself still much more — circumstances permit it.

NB. One drives *nature out* of morality when one says "love your enemies": for now *nature* — "thou shalt *love* thy neighbour and *hate* thine enemy" — has become meaningless in the law (in instinct); now even *love of one's neighbour* must first find a new foundation (as a kind of *love of God*). Everywhere *God* stuck in and *"usefulness"* pulled out: everywhere denied *whence* all morality actually stems: the *esteem of*

nature, which lies precisely in the *acknowledgement of a natural morality*, *annihilated* root and branch…

Whence comes the *seductive charm* of such an unmanned ideal of humanity? Why does it not disgust us, as, say, the idea of the castrato disgusts us?… Precisely here lies the answer: the voice of the castrato does *not* disgust us either, despite the cruel mutilation that is its condition: it has become sweeter… Precisely by virtue's having had its "male members" cut away, a feminine timbre has been brought into virtue which it did not have before.

If, on the other hand, we think of the terrible hardness, danger and incalculability that a life of the manly virtues brings with it — the life of a Corsican even today, or that of the pagan Arabs (which down to the details resembles the life of the Corsicans: the songs might have been composed by Corsicans) — then one understands how precisely the most robust kind of man is fascinated and shaken by this voluptuous sound of "goodness," of "purity"… A shepherd's tune… an idyll… "the good man": such things work most powerfully in times when the opposite does harm (— the Roman invented the idyllic pastoral piece — i.e., *had need of it*)

2.

With this, however, we have also recognized to what extent the "idealist" (— ideal castrato) likewise proceeds from a quite *definite* reality and is not merely a fantast… He has come precisely to the realization that, for his kind of reality, such a crude prescription *forbidding* certain actions, in the crude popular manner of the law, has no meaning (because the instinct for precisely these actions has been *weakened*, through long lack of exercise, of necessity for exercise). The castratist formulates a sum of new conditions of preservation for men of a quite definite species: in this he is a realist. The *means* of his legislation are

the same as those of the older legislations: the appeal to every kind of authority, to "God," the use of the concept "guilt and punishment," i.e., he makes use of the whole apparatus of the older ideal: only in a new interpretation, punishment, for example, made more inward (say, as the sting of conscience)

In praxi this species of man *perishes* as soon as the exceptional conditions of its existence cease — a kind of Tahiti and island bliss, such as was the life of the little Jews in the provinces. Their only *natural* adversary is the soil out of which they grew: against it they need to fight, against it they must let the offensive and *defensive affects* grow again: their opponents are the adherents of the old ideal (— this species of enmity is represented on a grand scale by Paul in relation to the Jewish, by Luther in relation to the priestly-ascetic ideal). Buddhism is for this reason the most perfect form of moral castratism, because it has no adversary and may from the outset direct its whole strength toward rooting out the hostile feelings. The struggle against ressentiment appears almost as the Buddhist's first task: only thereby is *peace* of soul guaranteed. To detach oneself, but without rancour: this, to be sure, presupposes an astonishingly softened and sweetened humanity — goodness…

3.

The *prudence* of *moral castratism*. How does one wage war against the manly affects and valuations? One has no physical means of force; one can wage only a war of cunning, of enchantment, of lies — in short, "of the spirit."

First recipe: one claims virtue altogether for one's own ideal; one *negates* the older ideal to the point of making it *the opposite of all ideal*. This requires an art of slander.

Second recipe: one posits one's own type as the *measure of value* as such; one projects it into things, behind things, behind the destiny of things — as God

Third recipe: one posits the opponents of one's ideal as the opponents of God; one invents for oneself the *right* to great pathos, to power, to curse and to bless —

Fourth recipe: one derives all suffering, everything uncanny, terrible and fateful in existence from opposition to *one's own* ideal: — all suffering follows as *punishment*: and even among the adherents (— unless it be a *trial*, etc.)

Fifth recipe: one goes so far as to ungod nature, as the opposite of one's own ideal: one regards it as a great test of patience, as a kind of martyrdom, to hold out so long in the natural; one trains oneself in the dédain of looks and manners with respect to all "natural things"

Sixth recipe: the victory of anti-nature, of ideal castratism, the victory of the world of the pure, the good, the sinless, the blessed, is projected into the future, as end, finale, great hope, as the "coming of the kingdom of God"

— I hope one can still *laugh* at this screwing-up of a little species into the absolute measure of the value of things?…

158.

(264)

"There is thinking: therefore there exists something that thinks": this is what the argumentatio of Cartesius comes down to. But that means positing our belief in the concept of substance as already "true a priori": that, when there is thinking, there must be something "that thinks" is, however, simply a formulation of our grammatical habit, which posits a doer for every deed. In short, a logical-metaphysical

postulate is already being made here — and *not merely ascertained*… Along the path of Cartesius one does *not* arrive at something absolutely certain, but only at the fact of a very strong belief

If one reduces the proposition to "there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts," one has a mere tautology: and precisely what is in question, the "*reality* of thought," is not touched — namely, in this form the "apparentness" of thought cannot be dismissed. What Cartesius *wanted*, however, is that thought should have not merely an *apparent reality* but a reality *in itself*.

159.

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The increase of "*dissimulation*" in accordance with the ascending *order of rank* of beings. In the inorganic world it seems to be lacking; in the organic, cunning begins: plants are already mistresses of it. The highest men, like Caesar, Napoleon (Stendhal's remark about him), likewise the higher races (the Italians), the Greeks (Odysseus); craftiness belongs to the *essence* of the elevation of man… Problem of the actor. My Dionysus ideal… The optics of all organic functions, of all the strongest instincts of life: the error-*willing* force in all life; error as the precondition even of thinking. Before there is "thinking" there must already have been "poetizing"; the *shaping-into-form* of identical cases, into the *apparentness* of the same, is more original than the *recognition* of the *same*.

160.

Bogeys, moral gargling noises, tragic farce

161.

Truths *to which one can dance*, — truths for *our* feet…

162.

Here are storm clouds: but is that any reason why we free, airy, merry spirits should not make a fine day of it?

163.

(266)

NB. — they are rid of the Christian God — and now believe all the more that they *must* hold fast to the Christian moral ideal? That is English consistency; we will leave that to the little moral females à la Eliot (— in England, for every small emancipation from theology one must restore oneself to honour in a frightful manner as a *moral fanatic*…) That is the penance one pays there…

When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christianity's moral value judgments out from under one's feet. These are by no means self-evident: this must be brought to light today, in defiance of the insipid shallowness of the English freethinkers. Christianity is a well-thought-out and *whole* view of things. If one breaks out of it the belief in the Christian God, one breaks the whole system of its valuation to pieces: one has nothing firm left between one's fingers! Christianity presupposes that man does *not* know, *cannot* know, what is good and evil for him: he believes in a God who alone knows it; Christian morality is a command from the beyond, and as such *beyond* human judgment. — That the English now believe they know of their own accord what is good and evil, and consequently no longer need Christianity, is itself the *consequence* of the dominion of Christian value judgments — to the point of forgetting their origin, their highly *conditional* right to existence.

164.

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NB. There are quite naive peoples and men who believe that constant *fine weather* is something desirable: they still believe today, in rebus moralibus, that "the good man" alone and nothing but "the good man" is something desirable — and that the course of human development tends precisely toward this, that only *he* should remain (and that one *must* direct all one's aims to that alone —) This is thought in the highest degree *uneconomically* and, as I said, the summit of naivety. That is an *amenity* which "the good man" provides (— he arouses no fear, he permits relaxation, he gives what one can take; — — —

165.

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What has been *spoiled* by the misuse the Church has made of it:

1) *asceticism*: one scarcely has the courage any longer to bring to light its natural usefulness, its indispensability in the service of the *education of the will*. Our absurd world of educators (before whose eyes the "useful civil servant" hovers as the regulating schema) thinks it can make do with "instruction", with drilling of the brain; it lacks even the concept that something else is needed *first* — education *of willpower*; one takes examinations in everything, only not in the main thing: whether one *can will*, whether one *may promise*: the young man is *finished* without having so much as a question, a curiosity, about this supreme value problem of his nature

2) *fasting*: in every sense, also as a means of preserving the subtle capacity to enjoy all good things (e.g. not reading for a time; no longer listening to music; no longer being amiable; one must also have fast days for one's virtue)

3) the "*monastery*", temporary isolation with strict refusal, e.g., of letters; a kind of deepest self-reflection and self-recovery, which seeks to avoid not "temptations" but "duties": a stepping out of the round dance of the milieu, a stepping out of the tyranny of pernicious small habits and rules; a struggle against the squandering of our forces in mere reactions; an attempt to give our force time to accumulate, to become *spontaneous* again. Look at our scholars up close: they now think only *reactively*, i.e. they must first read in order to think

4) *festivals*. One must be very coarse not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian values as a *pressure* under which every genuine festive mood goes to the devil. The festival includes: pride, high spirits, exuberance; folly; mockery of every kind of seriousness and philistine respectability; a divine Yes-saying to oneself out of animal fullness and perfection — nothing but states to which the Christian may not honestly say Yes.

The festival is paganism par excellence.

5) *lack of courage before one's own*

nature: the *costuming into the "moral"* —

that one needs no *moral formula* in order to *approve* an affect in oneself

Measure of how far a man can say Yes to nature in himself, — how much or how little he must have recourse to morality…

6) *death*

166.

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Specimens of the moralistic

Art of Slander.

Morality has hitherto been the great slanderer and poisoner of life

Consider to what degree one must have been corrupted by it to write the following sentence:

"Every great pain, be it bodily or spiritual, declares what we deserve; for it could not come upon us if we did not deserve it." Schopenhauer II, 666

167.

(270)

Aesthetica.

On the origin of the *beautiful* and the *ugly*. What instinctively *repels* us, aesthetically, has been proven to man through the very longest experience to be harmful, dangerous, deserving of mistrust: the aesthetic instinct that suddenly speaks up (in disgust, for example) contains a *judgment*. To that extent the *beautiful* stands within the general category of the biological values of the useful, the beneficent, the life-enhancing: yet in such a way that a host of stimuli which only very distantly recall and connect with useful things and states give us the feeling of the beautiful, i.e. of an increase in the feeling of power (— thus not merely things, but also the sensations accompanying such things, or their symbols)

Herewith the beautiful and the ugly are recognized as *conditional*; namely with regard to our supreme *values of preservation*. Apart from that, to want to posit a beautiful and an ugly is senseless. *The* beautiful exists as little as *the* good, *the* true. In each particular case it is again a matter of the *conditions of preservation* of a particular kind of man: thus the *herd man* will have the *value feeling of the beautiful* in the presence of different things than the *exceptional* man and the overman.

It is the *foreground optics*, which takes into account only the *nearest consequences*, from which the value of the beautiful (also of the good, also of the true) derives

All instinct-judgments are *shortsighted* with regard to the chain of consequences: they advise what is to be done *first*. The understanding is essentially an *apparatus of inhibition* against immediate reaction to the instinct-judgment: it holds back, it reflects further, it sees the chain of consequences farther and longer.

Judgments of *beauty* and *ugliness* are *shortsighted* — they always have the understanding *against* them —: but they are *persuasive in the highest degree*; they appeal to our instincts, there where these decide most quickly and say their Yes and No *before* the understanding even gets a word in…

The most habitual affirmations of beauty *excite and incite one another*; once the aesthetic drive is at work, a whole abundance of other perfections, stemming from elsewhere, crystallizes around "the single beautiful thing." It is not possible to remain *objective*, or rather to unhook the interpreting, bestowing, filling-in, poeticizing power (— the latter is that very concatenation of affirmations of beauty) The sight of a "beautiful woman"…

Thus: 1) the judgment of beauty is *short-sighted*, it sees only the nearest consequences

2) it *heaps* upon the object that arouses it a *magic* which is conditioned by the association of various judgments of beauty, — but which is *wholly foreign to the essence of that object*.

To feel a thing as beautiful means: to feel it necessarily falsely… (— which is why, incidentally, the love match is the socially most unreasonable kind of marriage —)

168.

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Aesthetica.

It is a question of *strength* (of an individual or of a people) *whether* and *where* the judgment "beautiful" is applied. The feeling of fullness, of *dammed-up strength* (from which one may boldly and cheerfully accept much at which the weakling *shudders*) — the feeling of *power* pronounces the judgment beautiful even upon things and states which the instinct of impotence can only appraise as something *hateful*, as "ugly." The scent for what we could roughly cope with if it confronted us in the flesh, as danger, problem, temptation, — this scent determines even our aesthetic Yes: ("that is beautiful" is an *affirmation*)

From this it follows, reckoned on the large scale, that the *preference for questionable and terrible things* is a symptom of *strength*: whereas the taste for the *pretty and dainty* belongs to the weak, the delicate. *Delight* in tragedy, a symptom of *strong* ages and characters: its non plus ultra is perhaps the divina commedia. It is the *heroic* spirits who say Yes to themselves in tragic cruelty: they are hard enough to feel suffering as *delight*… Suppose, on the other hand, that *the weak* crave enjoyment from an art that was not devised for them, what will they do to make *tragedy* palatable to themselves? They will interpret *their own feelings of value* into it: for example the "triumph of the moral world order," or the doctrine of the "unvalue of existence," or the summons to resignation (— or else half-medical, half-moral discharges of affect à la Aristotle) Finally: the *art of the terrible*, insofar as it excites the nerves, can come to be esteemed as a stimulans among the weak and exhausted: that, for example, is today the reason for the *esteem* of Wagnerian art.

It is a sign of a feeling of *well-being* and *power* how far one may concede to things their terrible, their questionable character; and *whether* one needs "solutions" at the end at all, —

— this kind of *artist's pessimism* is precisely the *counterpart to moral-religious pessimism*, which suffers from the "corruption" of man, from the riddle of existence. This absolutely wants a solution, at least a hope of a solution… The suffering, the despairing, the self-mistrustful, in a word the sick, have at all times needed ravishing *visions* in order to endure (the concept "blessedness" is of *this* origin)

— A related case: the artists of décadence, who at bottom stand *nihilistically* toward life, *take flight* into the *beauty of form*… into the *select* things where nature has become perfect, where it is indifferently *great* and *beautiful*…

— the "love of the beautiful" can thus be something other than the *capacity* to *see* a beautiful thing, to *create the* beautiful: it can be precisely the expression of an *incapacity* for it.

— the overwhelming artists, who let a *consonant tone* ring out of every conflict, are those who let their own mightiness and self-redemption benefit even things: they utter their innermost experience in the symbolism of every work of art, — their creating is gratitude for their being.

The *depth of the tragic artist* lies in this, that his aesthetic instinct surveys the more distant consequences, that he does not stop shortsightedly at what is nearest, that he affirms the *economy on the grand scale*, which justifies the *terrible*, the *evil*, the *questionable*, and not merely… justifies.

169.

There is a *great literature of slander* (to which the New Testament belongs; the Church Fathers; the imitatio; Pascal; Schopenhauer), seconded too by an art of slander (to the latter belongs, for example, Wagner's Parsifal)

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NB More hidden forms of the cult of the Christian moral ideal. — The *soft* and *cowardly concept* "*nature*", brought into vogue by the nature-enthusiasts (— apart from all instincts for the terrible, the inexorable and the cynical in even the "most beautiful" aspects) a kind of attempt to *read* that moral-Christian "humaneness" *out of* nature, — the Rousseauian concept of nature, as if "nature" were freedom, goodness, innocence, fairness, justice, *idyll*… always at bottom *a cult of Christian morality*…

— To collect passages on *what* the poets actually revered, for example, in the high mountains etc. — What Goethe wanted to have in it, — why he revered Spinoza — Complete *ignorance* of the presupposition of this *cult*…

— the *soft* and *cowardly concept* "*man*" à la Comte and, after Stuart Mill, perhaps even an object of cult… It is again and again the cult of Christian morality under a new name… free-thinking, for example Guyau

— the *soft* and *cowardly concept* "*art*" as fellow-feeling for everything suffering, everything that has come off badly (even *history*, for example Thierry's): it is again and again the cult of the Christian moral ideal

— and now indeed the whole *socialist ideal*: nothing but a clumsy misunderstanding of that Christian moral ideal

171.

That the number of *errors* has decreased: naivety of faith among the free spirits

progress as a *perceptible* improvement of life

as a *triumph of logic*

as a triumph of *love* (Guyau) Fouillée

toward complete knowledge of oneself and of things, and from there toward a greater *consistency* of thought *with itself*

I find absolute monarchy, divine right, caste, slavery treated as *gross errors*

172.

Books: imitatio, Christian morality

173.

Schopenhauer says of the authors of the Upanishads "scarcely conceivable as human beings"

174.

Desire *enlarges* what one wants to have; it grows even through non-fulfilment, — the *greatest ideas* are those which the most violent and longest desire has created. We ascribe *ever more value* to things the more our desire for them grows: if the "moral values" have become the *highest values*, this betrays that the *moral ideal* has been the *most unfulfilled*. Insofar as it *counted* as the *beyond of all suffering*, as the means to *blessedness*. Mankind has embraced a *cloud* with ever-growing ardour: at last it called its despair, its impotence "God"…

175.

Hatred of mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a question mark against his *right* to "philosophy." Precisely because he is the exception, he has to take the rule under his protection, he has to preserve in everything middling its good courage in itself.

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There is today spread through society a great deal of consideration, of tact and forbearance, of good-natured halting before the rights of others, even before the claims of others; still more, a certain benevolent instinct for human worth in general prevails, which makes itself known in trust and credit of every kind; *respect* for human beings, and by no means merely for virtuous human beings — is perhaps the element which most strongly separates us from a Christian valuation. We have a good deal of irony when we hear moral preachers at all; one lowers oneself in our eyes and becomes comical if one preaches morality.

This *moralistic liberality* is among the best signs of our age. Where we find cases in which it is decidedly lacking, this strikes us as sickness (the case of Carlyle in England, the case of Ibsen in Norway, the case of the Catholic priest throughout Europe) If anything reconciles us with our age, it is the great quantum of *immorality* that it permits itself without thinking any the less of itself on that account. On the contrary! — What, then, constitutes the superiority of culture over unculture? Of the Renaissance, for example, over the Middle Ages? — Always just one thing: the great quantum of *conceded* immorality. From this it follows, of necessity, how all the *heights* of human development must present themselves to the eye of the moral fanatics: as the non plus ultra of corruption (— think of Plato's judgment

on Periclean Athens, of Savonarola's judgment on Florence, of Luther's judgment on Rome, of Rousseau's judgment on the society of Voltaire, of the German judgment *contra* Goethe.)

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One must reckon up everything that had piled up as a consequence of the *highest moral ideality*: how almost all *other values* had crystallized around the ideal

this proves that it was desired the *longest*, the *most strongly*, — that it was not attained: otherwise it would have *disappointed* (or rather would have brought a more moderate valuation in its train)

the highest honour and power among men: even on the part of the mightiest.

the only genuine kind of happiness

a privileged access to God, to immortality, under certain circumstances to the unio

power over nature — the „miracle-worker" (Parsifal)

power over God, over the bliss and damnation of the soul, etc.

the *saint* as the *mightiest species* of man —: *this* idea is what raised the value of moral perfection so high.

One must imagine the whole of knowledge striving to prove that the *most moral* man is the *mightiest*, the *most godlike*

— the overpowering of the senses, of the desires — everything aroused *fear*… the anti-natural appeared as the *supernatural*, the *otherworldly*…

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„the Christian ideal“: staged with Jewish shrewdness.

the *psychological basic drives*, its „nature“:

: the revolt against the ruling priestly power

: attempt to make the virtues under which the *happiness of the lowliest* is possible into the judging ideal of all values, — to call it *God*: the instinct of self-preservation of the strata poorest in life

: to justify absolute *abstention* from war and resistance out of the ideal, — likewise obedience

: love for one another, as a consequence of love for God

Trick: to *deny* all *natural mobilia* and invert them into the spiritual-otherworldly… to exploit *virtue* and its *veneration* wholly and entirely for oneself, step by step to *deny* it to everything non-Christian.

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Type of the preaching of ressentiment

Specimens of holy impudence.

Paul 1 Cor. 1, 20

Hath not God turned the wisdom of this world into foolishness?

21 For seeing that the world through its wisdom knew not God in his wisdom, it well pleased God through foolish preaching to save them that believe thereon.

26 Not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called.

27 But what is foolish before the world, that hath God chosen, that he might bring the wise to shame; and what is weak before the world, that hath God chosen, that he might bring to shame what is strong;

28 And the ignoble before the world, and the despised, hath God chosen, and that which is Nothing, that he might bring to nought what is Something;

29 That no flesh should boast itself before him.

Paul 1 Cor. 3, 16

Know ye not that ye are the temple of God and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?

17 If any man corrupt the temple of God, him shall God corrupt; for the temple of God is holy, which ye are.

1 Cor. 6, 2 Know ye not that the saints shall judge the world? If then the world is to be judged by you, are ye then not good enough to judge lesser matters?

Know ye not that we shall judge the angels? How much more the goods of this life!

*

Mankind has had to pay dearly for the *self-deification* of *these little people*: it is Judaism *once again*

„the chosen people"; the world, sin *against* it; the holy God as „idée fixe"; sin as the sole causality of suffering; everything *non-sinful* merely sham-suffering. Against sin an ever-ready and easy remedy…

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Does not exactly the same brazen-pious manner of interpreting *history* (i.e., absolute falsification, in order to prove the validity of the priestly code) hold also for the Judaeo-Christian interpreters and narrators of the *history of Jesus*? —

dressed up by Paul a) death *for* our sins b) meaning of the resurrection

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The reality on which Christianity was able to build itself was the small *Jewish family* of the Diaspora, with its warmth and tenderness, with its readiness to help, to stand up for one another — something unheard of and perhaps not understood in the whole Roman Empire —, with its hidden pride of the „chosen", disguised in humility, with its innermost No-saying, without envy, to everything that is on top and has splendour and power on its side. *To have recognized this as a power*, to have recognized this *soul*-state as communicable, seductive, contagious even for pagans — that is the *genius* of Paul: to exploit the treasure of latent energy, of prudent happiness, for a „Jewish church of freer confession", the whole Jewish experience and mastery of *community self-preservation* under foreign rule, Jewish propaganda as well — this he divined as his task. What he found was precisely that absolutely unpolitical and sidelined kind of *little people*: their art of asserting themselves and prevailing, bred into a number of virtues which expressed the sole meaning of virtue („means of preserving and enhancing a particular kind of man")

From the small Jewish community comes the principle of *love*: it is a *more passionate* soul that glows here beneath the ashes of humility and

wretchedness: thus it was neither Greek nor Indian, still less Germanic. The song in honour of love which Paul composed is nothing Christian, but a Jewish flaring-up of the eternal flame, which is Semitic. If Christianity has done anything essential in psychological respects, it is a *raising of the temperature of the soul* among those colder and nobler races which were on top at that time; it was the discovery that the most miserable life can become rich and inestimable through a raising of temperature…

It goes without saying that such a transference could *not* take place with regard to the ruling classes: the Jews and Christians had bad manners against them, — and what is strength and passion of soul when joined to bad manners has a repellent and almost nauseating effect. (— I *see* these bad manners when I read the New Testament) One had to be akin, through lowliness and need, to the type of the lower people speaking here in order to feel what was attractive… How one stands towards the New Testament is a test of whether one has any *classical taste* in one's body (cf. Tacitus): whoever is not revolted by it, whoever does not honestly and thoroughly feel in it something of *foeda* superstitio, something from which one draws back one's hand as if not to soil oneself: he does not know what is classical. One must feel the „cross“ as Goethe did —

182.

„Salvation is of the Jews“ — said the founder of Christianity (Gospel of John 4, 22) And people *believed* him!!!

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If one admits to oneself one's first impression of the New Testament: something nauseating and repugnant in bad taste, a bigot sentiment-

ality, nothing but repugnant symbols in the foreground; and the foul air of the hole-in-the-corner and the conventicle: — one does *not* sympathize. Pilate, Pharisees —

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That what matters is not *whether something is true*, but how it *works* — absolute *lack of intellect*ual *integrity*. Everything is good, the lie, the slander, the most shameless dressing-up, if it serves to raise that degree of warmth, — until one „believes“ —

A regular school of the *means of seduction* to a faith: a contempt, on principle, for the spheres from which contradiction might come (— reason, philosophy and wisdom, mistrust, caution); a shameless praising and glorifying of the doctrine with constant appeal to the claim that it is God who gives it — that the apostle signifies nothing, — that here there is nothing to criticize but only to believe, to accept; that it is the most extraordinary grace and favour to receive such a doctrine of redemption; that the deepest gratitude and humility is the state in which one ought to receive it…

There is constant speculation on the ressentiments which these lowly placed feel towards everything that is held in honour: that this doctrine is presented to them as a counter-doctrine to the wisdom of the world, to the power of the world — that is what seduces them to it. It persuades the outcast and the ill-favoured of every kind; it promises bliss, preference, privilege to the most inconspicuous and most humble; it fanaticizes the poor little foolish heads into a senseless conceit, as if they were the meaning and the salt of the earth —

All this, let it be said again, cannot be despised deeply enough: we spare ourselves the *critique of the doctrine*; it suffices to look at the

means it employs to know what one is dealing with. In the whole history of the spirit there is no more brazen and barefaced lie, no more calculated vileness than Christianity — But — it came to terms with *virtue*, it shamelessly claimed the whole *fascinating power of virtue* for itself alone… it came to terms with the power of the paradoxical, with the need of old civilizations for pepper and absurdity; it astonished, it outraged, it provoked persecution and maltreatment, —

It is precisely the same kind of *calculated vileness* with which the Jewish priesthood established its power and the Jewish church was created…

One should distinguish: 1) that warmth of the passion „love" (resting on the substratum of a heated sensuality) 2) the absolutely *ignoble* in Christianity

— the constant exaggeration, the garrulousness

— the lack of cool spirituality and irony (— not one bad joke occurs, and hence not even a good one)

— the unmilitary in all its instincts

— the priestly prejudice against manly pride, sensuality, the sciences and the arts.

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Everything spiritual is absolutely lacking in this book: „spirit" itself occurs only as a misunderstanding.

Very essential, this antithesis: „spirit and flesh". Here „spirit" is interpreted in a priestly sense

it is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing — Gospel of John 6, 63

186.

The *Christians* too did as the Jews did, and put into the mouth of their master what they felt to be a condition of their existence and an innovation, and encrusted his life with it. Likewise they gave the whole wisdom of sayings back to him —: in short, they presented their actual life and doings as an *obedience* and thereby sanctified it for their propaganda.

What everything hangs on emerges in Paul: it is *little*. The rest is the elaboration of a type of saint out of what counted for them as holy.

The whole „doctrine of miracles", the resurrection included, is a consequence of the self-glorification of the community, which ascribed to its master in a higher degree what it ascribed to itself (or rather derived its strength *from* him…)

187.

The deep vulgarity of such words: „to avoid fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband: it is better to marry than to burn." 1 Cor. 7, 2

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How even „the masters" can

become Christians. —

It lies in the instinct of a *community* (tribe, lineage, herd, congregation) to feel the states and desires to which it owes its preservation as *valuable in themselves*, e.g. obedience, reciprocity, consideration, moderation, pity, — and accordingly to *press down* everything that stands in their way or contradicts them.

It lies likewise in the instinct of the *rulers* (be they individuals, be they classes) to patronize and distinguish the virtues by virtue of which the subjugated are *manageable* and *submissive* (— states and affects which may be as foreign as possible to their own)

The *herd instinct* and the *instinct of the rulers agree* in praising a certain number of qualities and states: but for different reasons, the former out of immediate egoism, the latter out of mediate egoism.

The *submission of the master races* to Christianity is essentially the consequence of the insight that Christianity is a *herd religion*, that it teaches *obedience*: in short, that Christians are more easily ruled than non-Christians. With this hint the Pope even today commends Christian propaganda to the Emperor of China

Add to this that the seductive power of the Christian ideal works most strongly, perhaps, upon such natures as love danger, adventure and the contrary, as love everything *in which they risk themselves*, but in which a non plus ultra of the feeling of *power* can be attained. Think of Saint Theresa, amid the heroic instincts of her brothers: — Christianity appears there as a form of debauchery of the will, of strength of will, as a Don Quixotery of heroism…

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Paul: the unbridled and even insane ambition of an agitator; with a refined cleverness which never admits to itself what it actually wants and which handles self-mendacity by instinct, as a means of fascination. Humbling himself and on the sly administering the seductive poison of being chosen…

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In Buddhism this thought predominates: "All desires, everything that makes affect, that makes blood, draws on to actions", — only to that extent is one *warned* against evil. For acting — that has no sense, acting holds one fast in existence: but all existence has no sense. They see in evil the impulse to something illogical: to the affirmation of means whose end one negates. They seek a way to non-being and *therefore* they abhor *all* impulses on the part of the affects. E.g. by no means take revenge! by no means be an enemy! — the hedonism of the weary here furnishes the highest measures of value. Nothing is further from the Buddhist than the Jewish fanaticism of a Paul: nothing would be more repugnant to his instincts than this tension, flame, restlessness of the religious man, above all that form of sensuality which Christianity has sanctified under the name of "love". Besides all this, it is the educated and even overspiritualized classes that find their account in Buddhism: a race boiled down and made weary by a centuries-long struggle of philosophers, but not *beneath all culture*, like the strata out of which Christianity arises… In the ideal of Buddhism, getting free even of good and evil appears essential: here a refined beyond of morality is devised which coincides with the essence of perfection, on the presupposition that one needs even good actions only temporarily, merely as a means, — namely in order to get free of all acting.

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I regard Christianity as the most fateful lie of seduction that there has ever been, as the great *unholy lie*: I draw out its aftergrowth and off-

shoot of ideal even from under all its other disguises, I ward off all half and three-quarter positions toward it, — I compel war with it.

the *morality of little people* as the measure of things: that is the most disgusting degeneration that culture has yet had to show. And *this kind of ideal* left hanging over mankind as "God"!!

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On the Plan.

Radical nihilism is the conviction of an absolute untenability of existence where the highest values one recognizes are concerned, together with the *insight* that we have not the slightest right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that would be "divine", that would be morality incarnate.

This insight is a consequence of the "truthfulness" that has been reared: thus itself a consequence of the faith in morality.

This is the antinomy: insofar as we believe in morality, we *condemn* existence.

The logic of pessimism up to the ultimate nihilism: what drives it? — The concept of *valuelessness*, *meaninglessness*: to what extent moral valuations lie hidden behind all other high values.

— Result: *moral value judgments are condemnations, negations; morality is the turning away from the will to existence…*

Problem: *but what is*

morality?

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Pagan-Christian

Pagan is Yes-saying to the natural, the feeling of innocence in the natural, "naturalness"

Christian is No-saying to the natural, the feeling of unworthiness in the natural, unnaturalness

"Innocent" is, e.g., Petronius; a Christian, compared with this happy one, has lost innocence once and for all.

But since in the end the *Christian status* too must be merely a natural state, yet may not comprehend itself as such, *Christian* signifies a *counterfeiting of psychological interpretation* raised to a principle…

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"*Morality for morality's sake!*" — an important stage in its denaturalization: it appears itself as the ultimate value. In this phase it has permeated religion with itself: in Judaism, e.g. And likewise there is a phase where it *separates* religion *from itself* again, and where no god is "moral" enough for it: then it prefers the impersonal ideal… That is now the case.

"*Art for art's sake*" — that is an equally dangerous principle: with it one introduces a false opposition into things, — it amounts to a slander of reality ("idealization" *into the ugly*). If one detaches an ideal from the actual, one thrusts the actual down, one impoverishes it, one slanders it. "*The beautiful for the beautiful's sake*", "*the true for the true's sake*", "*the good for the good's sake*" — these are three forms of the *evil eye* for the actual.

— *Art, knowledge, morality* are *means*: instead of recognizing in them the aim at the enhancement of life, one has brought them into relation with an *opposite of life,* with "*God*", — as it were as revelations of a higher world that peers through them here and there…

— "*beautiful* and *ugly*", "*true* and *false*", "*good* and *evil*" — these *divisions* and *antagonisms* betray conditions of existence and enhancement, not of man in general, but of some fixed and durable complexes or other which separate their adversaries from themselves. The *war* that is thereby created is the essential thing in it: as a means of *segregation* that *strengthens* isolation…

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Consequence of struggle: the combatant seeks to reshape his opponent into his *opposite,* — in imagination, of course

— he seeks to believe in himself to such a degree that he can have the courage of the "good cause" (as if he were the *good cause*): as though it were reason, taste, virtue that were being fought by his opponent…

— the faith he needs, as the strongest means of defence and aggression, is a *faith in himself,* which, however, knows how to misunderstand itself as faith in God

— never to imagine the advantages and utilities of victory, but always only victory for victory's sake, as "God's victory" —

— Every small community engaged in struggle (even individuals) seeks to persuade itself: "*we have good taste, good judgment and virtue on our side*"… Struggle compels such an *exaggeration* of *self-esteem*…

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The *introduction for pessimists,* — and at the same time *against* the pessimists… To those who today do *not* suffer from the questionableness of our existence I have nothing to say: let them read newspapers and ponder the battle of Sedan. — A word on absolute solitude: whoever does not meet me with a hundredth part of passion and suffering has no ears for me… I have fought my way through until now…

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"Be simple" — a demand made of us intricate and unfathomable triers of the reins, which is a simple stupidity… Be natural! but what if one simply *is* "unnatural"…

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"Except ye become as little children": oh how far we are from this psychological naïveté!

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The *psychological presupposition*: *unknowing* and *lack of culture,* the ignorance that has unlearned all shame: imagine these shameless saints in the midst of Athens

: the *Jewish* "*chosen-people instinct*": they lay claim to *all virtues* for themselves without further ado and reckon the rest of the world as their opposite: a profound sign of *baseness of soul*

: the *complete lack of real goals*, of real *tasks*, for which one needs virtues other than those of the bigot, — *the state relieved them of this work*: the shameless people nonetheless acted as though they had no need of it.

The *mendacious* antitheses

"that which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit" Gospel of John 3:6

"earthly" — "heavenly"

Truth, light, darkness, judgment: whosoever doeth evil hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, lest his works should be punished. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his works may be made manifest… And this is the judgment, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light.

The horrible abuses of the

future:

the *judgment* is a Christian idea, *not* a Jewish one: it is the fundamental ressentiment-idea of all rebels.

the *profound unworthiness* with which all life outside the Christian is judged: it is not enough for them to think of their actual opponents as base, they need nothing less than a wholesale slander of everything that is not *they*… A vile and crafty soul goes perfectly well with the arrogance of holiness: witness the first Christians.

The *future*: they have themselves *handsomely paid* for it… It is the *uncleanest kind of spirit* there is:

The whole life of Christ is presented in such a way that he helps the *prophecies* to their due: he acts as he does *so that* they may be proved right…

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Matth. 5:46 For if ye love them which love you, what *reward shall ye have*? Do not even the publicans the same?

And if ye be friendly to your brethren only, *what do ye more than others*? Do not even the publicans so?

Two motives: reward and setting oneself apart

The whole 6th chapter of Matthew handles this fine morality: beware, if you are clever, of any public display of your virtuous actions. For otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in heaven. "— thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly"

6:14 For if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.

Here there speaks from every word the profound

hostility

toward the religious practice of the ruling estates

This whole reduction to hypocrisy, to avarice (6:19 "lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth etc. ye cannot serve God and mammon" 6:24)

"Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness: and all these things shall be added unto you" (namely food, clothing, all the necessities of life, all provision for them): is simply *nonsense*. "Living from one day to the next" — downright encouraged as a testing of God, as a testing of faith (30 "if God so clothe the grass of the field, shall he not much more clothe you? O ye of little faith!")

Matth. 7:1 "Judge not, *that* ye be not judged… with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you"

Luke 6:35 But love ye your enemies; do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again: *and your reward shall be great*, and ye shall be the children of the Highest.

This whole *morality of unselfishness* is a rancor against the Pharisees. But the Jew betrays himself in the fact that in the end it is also presented as *more profitable*…

The gospel to the poor, the hungry, the weeping, the hated, the outcast, the ill-reputed

— as encouragement to the disciples: Rejoice ye in that day, and leap for joy: for, behold, your reward is great in heaven. *For in the like manner did their fathers unto the prophets.* (what unbridled impudence, to intimate to this wretched disciple-rabble that they may feel themselves of equal rank with the prophets because they have the same fate! —)

And now the curse upon the rich, the full, the cheerful, the learned, the honored! (It is always the Pharisees: "for so did their fathers to the false prophets")

It is a perfect piece of philistine worthiness, for whose sake no one needs to come down from heaven, to preach morality, e.g. to say to the publicans "exact no more than that which is appointed you!" or to the soldiers "do violence to no man, neither do wrong"

This priestly intolerance

Mark 6:11 "And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear you, when ye depart thence, shake off the dust under your feet for a testimony against them. I say unto you: Verily, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city."

And now imagine this wretched *bigot-rabble creeping through the land*, with such *Last-Judgment curses* in their pockets

Who can read this book without taking the side of everything that is attacked in it: e.g. of the Pharisees and scribes

And these impudent promises, e.g. Mark 9:1 "Verily I say unto you, there be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power."

The New Testament is compromised by its "fors"…

Always the holy Jewish selfishness in the background of self-sacrifice and self-denial: e.g. Mark 8:34:

"Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. *For* (— note the "fors" in the New Testament — they contain its refutation —) whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall save it."

Everything is falsified and corrupted:

death as punishment; the flesh; the earthly; knowledge; eternal life as reward

all actions of love, charity and delicacy of soul as shrewd moves of the elect with a view to the most superabundant recompense

all virtue has been robbed of its "innocence"…

— *The refutation of the gospel discourses lies in their "for"*

"And whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that believe in me, it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea." — says Jesus, Mark 9:42.

If thine eye offend thee, cast it from thee. It is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. Mark 9:47

— an exhortation to *castration*; as emerges from the corresponding passage Matt. 5:28 "*whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart*. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee. It is better for thee that *one of thy members* should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell." (In v. 31 he is still on the chapter of sex and the refined conception of adultery: namely, divorce already as adultery…)

If Christianity is only a clever self-interest, then it is an even cleverer self-interest to get it out of the way —

201.

(295)

This was the most fateful kind of megalomania that has ever yet existed on earth: when these mendacious little misbegotten bigots begin to lay claim to the words "God" "Last Judgment" "truth" "love" "wisdom" "Holy Spirit" for themselves and with them to mark themselves off against "the world", when this kind of man begins to *turn values around to suit himself*, as though *they* were the meaning, the salt, the measure and the *judgment* of all the rest: then one ought to build madhouses for them and do nothing further. That they were *persecuted* was an ancient stupidity in the grand style: by this they were taken too seriously, by this they were made into something serious.

The whole fatality was made possible by the fact that a kindred kind of megalomania *was already in the world*, the *Jewish* one: once the chasm between the Jews and the Christian-Jews had been torn open and the latter could arrive at a *right to existence* only by way of the former, the Christian-Jews *had* to apply the procedure of self-preservation which the Jewish instinct had invented, once again and in a final intensification, for their own self-preservation —; and by the fact that, on the other hand, Greek moral philosophy had done everything to prepare

and make palatable a *moral fanaticism* even among Greeks and Romans… Plato, the great intermediate bridge of corruption, who was the first to want to misunderstand nature in morality, who took morality as meaning, purpose — — —, who had already devalued the Greek gods with his concept *Good*, who was already *tainted with Jewish bigotry* (— in Egypt?)

202.

(296)

The "thing-in-itself" absurd. If I think away all relations, all "properties", all "activities" of a thing, then the thing does *not* remain: because thinghood has first been *fictively added* by us, out of logical needs, thus for the purpose of designation, of communication, *not* — — — (for binding together that multiplicity of relations properties activities)

203.

(297)

Modern man has exercised his idealizing power in regard to a *God* mostly in an increasing *moralization of him* — what does that signify? Nothing good, a decrease in man's strength —

In itself, namely, the opposite would be possible: and there are signs of it. God, conceived as having become free of morality, crowding into himself the *whole* fullness of life's opposites and *redeeming*, *justifying* them in divine torment: — God as the beyond, the above of the wretched street-corner-loafer morality of "good and evil".

The same kind of man who wishes only for "good weather" also wishes only for "good men" and good qualities generally, — at least for the ever-increasing dominion of the good. With a superior eye one

wishes precisely the reverse, the ever greater *dominion of evil*, man's increasing liberation from the narrow and anxious constriction of morality, the growth of strength, so as to be able to press the greatest natural forces, the affects, into service…

204.

(298)

However modest one may be in one's claim to intellectual cleanliness, one cannot help feeling something like an unspeakable disgust on contact with the New Testament: for the filthy and unbridled impudence with which the most unqualified want to have their say about the great problems, indeed their claim to sit in judgment on such things, exceeds every measure. The shameless levity with which the most inaccessible problems are spoken of here, as though they were not problems: life, world, God, purpose of life, but simply matters which these little bigots *know*

205.

(299)

To assert the *existence* at all of things of which we know nothing whatever, precisely because there is an advantage in being unable to know anything of them, was a naivety of Kant's, the consequence of an after-surge of needs, especially moral-metaphysical ones…

206.

(300)

The intolerance of morality is an expression of man's *weakness*: he is afraid of his "immorality", he must *negate* his strongest drives because he does not yet know how to make use of them… Thus the most fertile

tracts of the earth lie uncultivated the longest: — the strength is lacking that could become master here…

Notebook 11: November 1887 — March 1888

Nice, the 24th of November 1887

1.

(301)

One should want nothing of oneself that one cannot do. Ask yourself: do you want to *go ahead*? Or do you want to *go your own way*? In the first case one becomes, at best, a shepherd, that is, an emergency need of the herd. In the other case one must be able to do something else — to be *able* to go one's own way by oneself, one must be *able* to go otherwise and elsewhere. In both cases one must be able to do it, and if one can do the one, one must not want the other

2.

(302)

To make do with people and keep open house with one's heart: that is liberal, but not noble. One recognizes the hearts that are capable of noble hospitality by their many curtained windows and closed shutters: they keep their *best* rooms empty, at the very least; they await guests with whom one does *not* make do…

3.

(303)

One is an artist at the price of feeling what all non-artists call "form" as *content*, as "the thing itself". With that, to be sure, one belongs to an

inverted world: for henceforth content becomes something merely formal to one — our life included.

4.

A letter reminds me of German youths, horned Siegfrieds and other Wagnerians. All respect to German frugality! There are modest intelligences in northern Germany whom even the intelligence of the Kreuzzeitung satisfies. One standing outside might at times be seized by the suspicion whether the young Reich, in its ravenous hunger for colonies and every sort of Africa the earth possesses, has not unawares also swallowed the two famous swarthy islands, Horneo and Borneo…

5.

If one is a philosopher, as one has always been a philosopher, one has no eye for what was and what is becoming: — one sees only what is. But since there is nothing that is, the philosopher was left with only the imaginary as his "world".

6.

One goes to the ground if one always goes *to the grounds*.

7.

A caterpillar between two springs, already growing a little wing: — — —

8.

"*An impulse toward the better*" — formula for "going to the privy"

9.

(304)

Sainte-Beuve: Nothing of a man about him; full of a mendacious hatred against all manly spirits: roams about, cowardly, curious, bored, slanderous — a female at bottom, with a female's vindictiveness and a female's sensuality (— the latter keeps him close to cloisters and other breeding-grounds of mysticism, at times even close to the Saint-Simonians). Moreover a real genius of médisance, inexhaustibly rich in means for it, capable, for instance, of *praising* in a deadly fashion; not without a graceful virtuoso's readiness to put his art on display wherever it is at all in place: namely before every sort of audience in which there is something to fear. To be sure, he afterwards takes revenge on his listeners too, inwardly, secretly, pettily, uncleanly; in particular all unmistakably noble natures must pay for having reverence for themselves — that he does *not* have! the merely manly, proud, whole, self-assured already provokes him, shakes him to the point of revolt. — This, now, is the *psychologist* comme il faut: namely after the measure and the need of the present esprit français, which is as late, as sick, as curious, as eavesdropping, as lecherous as he; sniffing out secrets, like him; instinctively seeking acquaintance with people from below and from behind, not much otherwise than dogs do among one another (who are, after all, psychologists in their own way too). Plebeian at bottom and akin to the instincts of Rousseau: *consequently* a romantic — for beneath all romantisme the rabble grunts and lusts after "nobility"; revolutionary, but still tolerably held in check by fear. Without freedom before everything that has strength (public opinion, Academy, court, even Port-Royal). Weary of himself in the last analysis, early on already without faith in his *right* to exist; a spirit that has squandered itself from youth on, that *feels* itself squandered, that grows ever thinner and older to itself. *That* goes on living at the last, from one day to the next, merely out of cowardice;

that grows embittered against everything great in man and thing, against everything *that believes in itself*, since it is unfortunately poet and half-woman enough still to feel the great as *power*; that writhes constantly, like that famous worm, because it constantly feels itself trodden upon by something great. As critic without standard, backbone or footing, with the tongue of the cosmopolitan libertin for many things, but without the courage even for an *avowed* libertinage, consequently submitting to an indeterminate classicism. As historian without philosophy and the *power* of the gaze, instinctively declining the task of *judging* in all main matters and holding up the mask of *objectivity* (— thereby one of the worst models that recent France has had): apart, as is only fair, from the small things, where a refined and worn-out taste is the highest authority, and where he really has the *courage* to be himself, the *pleasure* in himself (— in this he is akin to the Parnassiens, who like him represent the most refined and vainest form of modern self-contempt, self-renunciation). „Sainte-Beuve a vu une fois le premier Empereur. C'était à Boulogne: il était en train de pisser. N'est-ce pas un peu dans cette posture-là, qu'il a vu et jugé depuis tous les grands hommes?" (Journal des Goncourt, 2. p. 239) — so tell his malicious enemies, the Goncourts.

10.

Types of décadence.

The *romantics*

The "*free spirits*" Sainte-Beuve

The *actors*.

The *nihilists*.

The *artistes*.

The *brutalists*

The *delicate*.

11.

En amour, la seule victoire est la fuite. — Napoleon.

12.

canis reversus ad vomitum suum

13.

Les philosophes ne sont pas faits pour s'aimer. Les aigles ne volent point en compagnie. Il faut laisser cela aux perdrix, aux étourneaux… Planer audessus et avoir des griffes, voilà le lot des grands génies. — Galiani.

14.

Le hasard, père de la fortune et souvent beau-père de la vertu. — Galiani.

15.

(Ni l'amour ni les dieux; ce double mal nous tue. Sully Prudhomme.)

16.

Behind all the moralizing scribble of this rustic little woman, G. Eliot, I always hear the excited voice of all literary débutantes: „je me verrai, je me lirai, je m'extasierai et je dirai: Possible, que j'aie eu tant d'esprit?…"

17.

vomitus matutinus of the newspapers

18.

si hortum cum bibliotheca habes, nihil deerit. Cicero.

19.

notum quid foemina furens. Virg. Aen. V. 6

20.

„un monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux"

21.

come l'uom s'eterna (Inf. XV, 85)

22.

„Yo me sucedo a mi mismo", I say, like that old man in Lope de Vega, smiling, as he did: for I simply no longer know how old I already am and how young I shall yet be…

23.

— even then one still has reasons enough to be content and even grateful, if only in the manner of that old philanderer who came home tamquam re bene gesta from an amorous rendezvous. Ut desint vires, he said to himself with the meekness of a saint, tamen est laudanda *voluptas*.

24.

(305)

George Sand. I read the first lettres d'un voyageur: like everything that stems from Rousseau, false, false to the core, moralistically men-

dacious, like she herself, this "artist." I cannot bear this gaudy wallpaper style, any more than this agitated rabble-ambition for "noble" passions, heroic attitudes and thoughts that come across as attitudes. How *cold* she must have been all the while — cold, like Victor Hugo, like Balzac, like all genuine Romantics —: and how self-satisfied she may have lain there all the while, this broad fertile cow, who had something German about her, like Rousseau himself, and who in any case became *possible* only at the end of all French taste and esprit… But Ernest Renan reveres her…

25.

(306)

Men who are destinies, who, in bearing themselves, bear destinies, the whole kind of *heroic* burden-bearers: oh how gladly would they for once rest from themselves! how they thirst for strong hearts and necks, so as to be rid, for hours at least, of what weighs upon them! And how vainly they thirst!… They wait; they look at everything that passes by: no one comes to meet them with even a thousandth part of their suffering and passion, no one guesses *in what sense* they are waiting… At last, at last they learn their first piece of worldly wisdom — *no longer* to wait; and then soon their second as well: to be affable, to be modest, from now on to bear with everyone, to bear with everything — in short, to *bear* still a little *more* than they have borne hitherto…

26.

(307)

— and whoever reckons up without prejudice the conditions under which any *perfection* whatsoever is attained here on earth will not fail to notice how much that is strange and painful belongs to these con-

ditions. It seems that every great growth needs dung and manure of some kind. To take a paradoxical case: with regard to the perfecting of the modern woman, an authority who on this delicate point is perhaps not to be underestimated, the duc de Morny, that most experienced and most "lived" connoisseur of women in latter-day France, maintained that even a vice could serve this end, namely tribaderie: "qui raffine la femme, la parfait, l'accomplit."

Nice, 25 November 1887.

27.

(308)

Frau Cosima Wagner is the only woman of a grander style I have come to know; but I hold it against her that she *corrupted* Wagner. How did that come about? He did not "deserve" such a woman: by way of thanks for it he *fell under her sway*. — Wagner's Parsifal was first and foremost and from the very beginning a condescension of Wagner's taste to the Catholic instincts of his wife, Liszt's daughter, a kind of gratitude and humility on the part of a weaker, more manifold, more suffering creature looking up to one who knew how to protect and encourage, that is to say, to a stronger, more narrow-minded one: — in the end even an act of that eternal *cowardice* of man before everything "Eternal-Feminine." — Have not all great artists hitherto been *corrupted* by adoring women? When these senselessly vain and sensual apes — for that is what nearly all of them are — experience for the first time and at closest quarters the *idolatry* which woman in such cases knows how to practise with all her lowest and highest cravings, then the end comes soon enough: the last remnant of criticism, self-contempt, modesty and shame before what is greater is gone: — from then on they are capable of every *degeneration*. — These artists, who in the harshest and strongest period of their development

had reasons enough to despise their following wholesale, these artists grown silent inevitably become the victim of every first *intelligent* love (— or rather of every woman intelligent enough to *present herself* as intelligent with regard to what is most personal in the artist, "to understand" him as one who suffers, "to love" him…)

28.

To the woman he does not deserve, the man falls prey.

Woman, as a born idolatress, corrupts the idol — the husband.

29.

That which is the cause of the fact *that* there is development at all cannot itself in turn be found by way of research into development; one ought not to want to understand it as "becoming," still less as having become…

the "will to power" cannot have become

30.

(309)

To gain a height and bird's-eye view of contemplation from which one grasps how everything actually goes *as it ought to go*: how every kind of "imperfection" and the suffering from it belongs as well within the *highest desirability*…

31.

(310)

Overall view of the future European: he as the most intelligent slave-animal, very industrious, at bottom very modest, curious to excess,

manifold, pampered, weak of will — a cosmopolitan chaos of affects and intelligences. How might a *stronger* kind raise itself up out of him? One with *classical* taste? Classical taste: that is the will to simplification, intensification, to the visibility of happiness, to the terrible, the courage for psychological *nakedness* (— simplification is a consequence of the will to intensification; letting happiness become visible, likewise nakedness, a consequence of the will to the terrible…) To fight one's way up out of that chaos to this *form* — for that a *compulsion* is needed: one must have the choice either to perish or *to prevail*. A ruling race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the *barbarians* of the 20th century? Evidently they will become visible and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist crises, — they will be the elements capable of the *greatest hardness toward themselves* and able to guarantee the *longest will*…

32.

(311)

On the Psychology of the "Shepherds." The Great Average Ones.

Can one hide from oneself that a mind and taste must be *average* in order to leave behind deep, broad, popular effects, and that, for example, it ought *not* yet to be understood as to Voltaire's dishonour that the Abbé Trublet, with the very best of reason, called him "la perfection de la médiocrité"? (— for had he not been that, had he been an *exception*, as for instance the Neapolitan Galiani was an exception, that deepest and most thoughtful buffoon whom that cheerful century produced, whence then his power to *lead*? whence his ascendancy over his age?) One could, moreover, assert the same thing with regard to a far more popular case: the founder of Christianity, too, must have been something of a "perfection de la médiocrité." Just let the main propositions of that famous gospel of the Sermon on the

Mount concresce for once into a *person*: — afterwards one will no longer be in doubt as to why precisely such a shepherd and preacher on the mount had a seductive effect upon every kind of *herd animal*.

33.

(312)

— "une croyance presque instinctive chez moi c'est que tout homme puissant ment quand il parle, et à plus forte raison quand il écrit." — Stendhal.

34.

(313)

Flaubert could bear neither Mérimée nor Stendhal; one could make him furious by quoting "Monsieur Beyle" in his presence. The difference lies in this: Beyle descends from Voltaire, Flaubert from Victor Hugo.

The "men of 1830" (— men?…) practised a senseless deification of *love*: Alfred de Musset, Richard Wagner; of debauchery and vice as well…

"Je suis de 1830, moi! J'ai appris à lire dans Hernani, et j'aurai voulu être Lara! J'exècre toutes les lâchetés contemporaines, l'ordinaire de l'existence et l'ignominie des bonheurs faciles." Flaubert.

35.

(314)

Sexuality, the lust for domination, the delight in semblance and in deceiving, the great joyful gratitude for life and its typical states — that is essential to pagan cult and has good conscience on its side. —

Unnature (already in Greek antiquity) fights against the pagan, as morality, as dialectic.

Nice, 15 December 1887

36.

Rank is decided by the quantum of power that you are; the rest is cowardice.

37.

He whose instinct is bent on order of rank hates the intermediate forms and the intermediate formers: everything *middling* is his enemy.

38.

(315)

From the pressure of fullness, from the tension of forces that constantly grow within us and do not yet know how to discharge themselves, there arises a state such as precedes a thunderstorm: the nature that we are *darkens*. That too is pessimism… A teaching that puts an end to such a state by *commanding* something, a revaluation of values by virtue of which the accumulated forces are shown a way, a whither, so that they explode in lightning flashes and deeds — need by no means be a teaching of happiness: in releasing force that was compressed and dammed up to the point of torment, *it brings happiness*.

39.

— with whom I have little sympathy. I count them among the crabs. For firstly: if one has dealings with them, they pinch; and then — they go backwards.

40.

— cow-warm milk-hearts

41.

A weary wanderer, greeted by the harsh barking of a dog.

42.

— a runaway who sat long in prison, in fear of a jailer with his stick: now he goes his way fearfully, the mere shadow of a stick makes him stumble.

43.

— virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, moraline-free virtue

44.

(316)

That one stakes one's life, one's health, one's honour, is the consequence of high spirits and of an overflowing, prodigal will: not from love of mankind, but because every great danger challenges our curiosity as to the measure of our strength, of our courage.

45.

(317)

Emerson, far more enlightened, more manifold, more refined, happier, one who instinctively nourishes himself on ambrosia and leaves behind what is indigestible in things. Carlyle, who loved him greatly, nevertheless said of him "he does not give *us* enough to bite on":

which may be rightly said, but by no means to Emerson's disadvantage.

Carlyle, a man of strong words and eccentric attitudes, a rhetorician from *necessity*, constantly irritated by the craving for a strong faith and by the feeling of being incapable of it (— precisely in this a typical romantic —) The craving for a strong faith is not the proof of a strong faith, rather the opposite: *if one has it*, this betrays itself precisely in one's *being permitted* the luxury of scepticism and frivolous unbelief, — one is simply rich *enough* for it. Carlyle numbs something in himself through the vehemence of his veneration for men of strong faith and through his rage against all who are less simple: this constant passionate *dishonesty* towards himself, to speak morally, disgusts me in him. That the English admire precisely his honesty is English; and, considering that they are the people of perfect cant, even fair and not merely comprehensible. At bottom Carlyle is an atheist who does not want to be one. —

46.

In these combative treatises, in which I continue my campaign against the most fateful value judgment hitherto, against our *overestimation of morality* —

Such a word of peace stands, as is only fitting, at the close of these warlike treatises, with which I have opened my campaign against one of our most fateful value judgments, against our previous estimation and *overestimation of morality*.

47.

— Damp ideals and other thaw winds

48.

(318)

A spirit that wills great things, that also wills the means to them, is necessarily a sceptic: which is not to say that he must also seem one. Freedom from every kind of conviction belongs to his strength, the *ability* to look freely. The great passion, the ground and the power of his being, more enlightened and more despotic still than he himself is, — it takes his whole intellect into its service (and not merely into its possession); it makes him unscrupulous; it gives him the courage for unholy means (even for holy ones), it allows convictions, it uses and uses up convictions itself, but it does not submit to them. This is because it alone knows itself to be sovereign. Conversely: the need for faith, for something unconditional of Yes and No, is a need of weakness; all weakness is weakness of will; all weakness of will stems from no passion, no categorical imperative being in command. The man of *faith*, the "believer" of every kind, is necessarily a dependent kind of man, that is, one that cannot posit *itself* as an end, nor indeed posit ends from out of itself at all, — that must let itself be *used up* as a means… It instinctively gives the highest honour to a morality of *unselfing*; everything persuades it toward this, its prudence, its experience, its vanity. And *faith* too is yet another form of unselfing. —

49.

(319)

From the immense domain of art that is and will remain anti-German, and from which German youths, horned Siegfrieds and other Wagnerians are excluded once and for all: — Bizet's stroke of genius, which gave voice to a new — ah, so old — sensibility that had hitherto had no language in the *cultivated* music of Europe, a more southern,

browner, more sunburnt sensibility, which admittedly cannot be understood from the standpoint of the damp idealism of the North. The African happiness, the fatalistic cheerfulness, with an eye whose gaze is seductive, deep and dreadful; the lascivious melancholy of the Moorish dance; passion, flashing, sharp and sudden as a dagger; and scents floating in from the yellow afternoon of the sea, at which the heart takes fright, as though it remembered forgotten islands where it once dwelt, where it ought to have dwelt for ever…

Anti-German:

The buffo. The Moorish dance

The other anti-German treasures of aesthetic enjoyment

50.

The "true world", however it has hitherto been conceived, — it was always the apparent world *once more*.

51.

One must have courage in one's body to permit oneself a wickedness: most are too cowardly for it.

52.

"Caesar among pirates"

53.

and among these poets one finds stallions that neigh in a chaste manner

54.

(320)

On the Dominion

of Virtue.

How One Helps Virtue to

Dominion.

A tractatus politicus.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Preface.

This tractatus politicus is not for everyone's ears: it treats of the *politics* of virtue, of its means and ways to *power*. That virtue strives for dominion, who would forbid it that? But *how* it does so —! one would not believe it… That is why this tractatus is not for everyone's ears. We have intended it for the benefit of those who care to learn, not how one becomes virtuous, but how one *makes* virtuous, — how one brings virtue to dominion. I even mean to prove that, in order to will this one thing, the dominion of virtue, one must on principle *not* will the other; precisely thereby one renounces becoming virtuous. This sacrifice is great: but such a goal is perhaps worth sacrifices. And even greater ones!… And some of the great moralists have risked that much. For by them the truth was already recognized and anticipated which is to be taught for the first time in this treatise: that the *dominion of virtue* can be attained absolutely *only by the same means* by which any dominion whatsoever is attained, in any case not *through* virtue… This treatise treats, as was said, of politics in virtue: it posits an ideal of this politics, it describes it as it would have to be if anything on

this earth could be perfect. Now no philosopher will be in doubt as to what the type of perfection in politics is; namely Machiavellianism. But Machiavellianism, pur, sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son âpreté, is superhuman, divine, transcendent; it is never attained by men, at most grazed… In this narrower kind of politics too, in the politics of virtue, the ideal seems never to have been attained. Plato too only grazed it. One discovers, provided one has eyes for hidden things, even in the most unprejudiced and most self-aware *moralists* (— and that, after all, is the name for such politicians of morality, for every kind of founder of new moral powers), traces showing that they too paid their tribute to human weakness. *They all aspired*, at least in their weariness, *to virtue* for themselves as well: the first and capital error of a moralist, — who as such has to be an *immoralist in deed*. That he must *not seem* to be precisely that is another matter. Or rather it is *not* another matter: such a fundamental self-denial (expressed morally, dissimulation) belongs within the canon of the moralist and his very own doctrine of duties: without it he will never attain to *his* kind of perfection. Freedom from morality, *also from truth*, for the sake of that goal which outweighs every sacrifice: *dominion of morality — thus* runs that canon. The moralists need the *attitude of virtue*, also the attitude of truth; their error begins only where they *yield* to virtue, where they lose dominion over virtue, where they themselves become *moral*, become *truthful*. A great moralist is, among other things, necessarily also a great actor; his danger is that his dissimulation should imperceptibly become nature, whereas his ideal is to keep his esse and his operari apart in a divine manner; everything he does he must do sub specie boni, — his lofty, remote, exacting ideal! A *divine* ideal!… And indeed the saying goes that in this the moralist imitates no lesser model than God himself: God, the greatest immoralist in deed there is, who nonetheless knows how to remain what he *is*, the *good* God…

55.

(321)

One should never forgive Christianity for having ruined such men as Pascal. One should never cease to combat precisely this in Christianity, that it has the will to break precisely the strongest and noblest souls. One should never give oneself peace so long as this one thing is not yet utterly destroyed: the ideal of man that was invented by Christianity. The whole absurd remainder of Christian fable, conceptual cobweb-spinning and theology is no concern of ours; it could be a thousand times more absurd still, and we would not lift a finger against it. But we combat that ideal which, with its morbid beauty and womanish seduction, with its secret slanderer's eloquence, persuades all the cowardices and vanities of souls grown weary — and the strongest have weary hours —, as though everything that may seem most useful and most desirable in such states, trust, guilelessness, unpretentiousness, patience, love of one's equals, resignation, devotion to God, a kind of unharnessing and abdication of one's whole ego, were also in itself the most useful and most desirable; as though the small, modest abortion of a soul, the virtuous average animal and herd-sheep man, not only had precedence over the stronger, more wicked, more covetous, more defiant, more prodigal and for that very reason a hundredfold more endangered kind of man, but actually furnished for man in general the ideal, the goal, the measure, the highest desirability. *This* erection of an ideal has hitherto been the uncanniest temptation to which man was exposed: for with it destruction threatened those more strongly constituted exceptions and lucky strokes of man in whom the will to power and to the growth of the whole type man takes a step forward; with its values the growth of those more-than-men was to be undermined at the root, who for the sake of their higher claims and tasks voluntarily accept a more dangerous life as well (expressed economically: an in-

crease of the entrepreneur's costs just as much as of the improbability of success). What do we combat in Christianity? That it wants to break the strong, that it wants to dishearten their courage, exploit their bad hours and wearinesses, turn their proud security into unrest and distress of conscience, that it knows how to make the noble instincts poisonous and sick, until their strength, their will to power turns backwards, turns against itself, — until the strong perish from the excesses of self-contempt and self-maltreatment: that gruesome kind of perishing of which Pascal furnishes the most famous example.

56.

(322)

Zola: — a certain rivalry with Taine, a learning-off of his means for bringing it to a kind of dictatorship in a sceptical milieu. To this belongs the deliberate *coarsening* of principles, so that they may act as commands.

57.

To comprehend — is that to approve? —

58.

(323)

Not to know oneself: the prudence of the idealist. The idealist: a being that has reasons for remaining in the dark about itself, and that is prudent enough to remain in the dark about these reasons as well.

59.

(324)

The literary woman, unsatisfied, agitated, desolate in heart and entrails, listening at every moment with painful curiosity for the imperative which, from the depths of her organization, categorically formulates *its* aut liberi aut libri: the literary woman, educated enough to understand the voice of nature even when it speaks Latin, and on the other hand ambitious enough to speak French with herself as well, in secret: „je me verrai, je me lirai, je m'extasierai et je dirai: Possible que j'aie eu tant d'esprit?"…

The perfect woman commits literature as she commits a little sin, by way of experiment, in passing, glancing round to see whether anyone notices and *that* someone notices: she knows how well a little spot of rot and brown corruption becomes the perfect woman, — she knows still better how all literature-making *acts* upon a woman, as a question mark regarding all her *other* feminine pudeurs…

60.

(325)

The modern unclarity. —

I do not see what one wants to do with the European worker. He is far too well off not to demand more now, step by step, to demand more immodestly: in the end he has numbers on his side. The hope is entirely past that here a modest and self-sufficient kind of man, a slavedom in the mildest sense of the word, in short an estate, something possessing immutability, might take shape. One has made the worker fit for military service: one has given him the right to vote, the right of association: one has done everything to corrupt the instincts on which a worker-Chinesedom might have been founded: so that the worker today already feels his existence as a state of distress (expressed morally, as an *injustice*…) and makes others feel it so… But what does one want? to ask once more. If one wills an end, one must

will the means: if one wants slaves, — *and* one needs them! — one must not educate them to be masters.

61.

(326)

„The sum of displeasure outweighs the sum of pleasure: consequently the non-being of the world would be better than its being“: such chatter calls itself pessimism today

„The world is something which, reasonably, would not be, because it causes the feeling subject more displeasure than pleasure.“

Pleasure and displeasure are secondary matters, not causes; they are value judgements of the second rank, which are first derived from a ruling value; a „useful“, „harmful“ speaking in the form of feeling, and consequently absolutely fleeting and dependent. For with every „useful“, „harmful“ there are still a hundred different What-for?s to be asked.

I despise this *pessimism of sensibility*: it is itself a sign of deep impoverishment of life. I shall never permit such a scrawny ape as Hartmann to speak of his „philosophical pessimism“. —

62.

(327)

Talma said:

oui, nous devons être sensibles, nous devons éprouver l'émotion, mais pour mieux l'imiter, pour mieux en saisir le caractère par l'étude et la réflexion. Notre art en exige de profondes. Point d'improvisation possible sur la scène, sous peine d'échec. Tout est calculé, tout doit être prévu, et l'émotion, qui semble soudaine, et le trouble, qui paraît

involontaire. — L'intonation, le geste, le regard qui semblent inspirés, ont été répétés cent fois. Le poète rêveur cherche un beau vers, le musicien une mélodie, le géomètre une démonstration: aucun d'eux n'y attache plus d'interêt que nous à trouver le geste et l'accent, qui rend le mieux le sens d'un seul hémistiche. Cette étude suit en tous lieux l'acteur épris de son art. — Faut-il vous dire plus? Nous nous sommes à nous-mêmes, voyez vous, quand nous aimons notre art, des sujets d'observation. J'ai fait des pertes bien cruelles; j'ai souvent ressenti des chagrins profonds; hé bien, après ces premiers moments où la douleur se fait jour par des cris et par des larmes, je sentai qu'involontairement je faisais un retour sur mes souffrances et qu'en moi, à *mon insu*, l'acteur étudiait l'homme et prenait la nature sur le fait. Voici de quelle façon nous devons éprouver l'émotion pour être un jour en état de la rendre; mais non à l'improviste et sur la scène, quand tous les yeux sont fixés sur nous; rien n'exposerait plus notre situation. Récemment encore, je jouais dans *Misanthropie et repentir* avec une admirable actrice; son jeu si réfléchi et pourtant si naturel et si vrai, m'entraînait. Elle s'en aperçut. Quel triomphe! et pourtant elle me dit tout bas: „Prenez garde, Talma, vous êtes ému!" C'est qu'en effet de l'émotion naît le trouble; la voix résiste, la mémoire manque, les gestes sont faux, l'effet est détruit! Ah! nous ne sommes pas la nature, nous ne sommes que l'art, qui ne peut tendre qu'à imiter.

63.

Lessing ranked Molière below Destouches

Minna von Barnhelm — „un marivaudage raisonné".

64.

Chinese: „since my beloved has taken lodging in my heart, I take care not to eat anything warm: this heat shall not trouble him"

„Even if you saw your own mother dying of hunger, do nothing that is contrary to virtue."

„if, like the tortoise that draws its five limbs back into its shell, you draw your five senses back into yourself, this will still stand you in good stead after death: you will receive heavenly bliss"

65.

„One is astonished at the great deal of hesitating and wavering in Montaigne's argumentation. But placed on the Index in the Vatican, long suspect to all parties, he perhaps voluntarily puts upon his dangerous tolerance, his slandered impartiality, the mute of a kind of question. That was already a great deal in his time: a humanity that *doubts*…"

66.

Mérimée, supérieur comme joaillier en vices et comme ciseleur en difformités, belongs to the movement of 1830, not through passion (he lacks it —), but through the novelty of the calculated procédé and the bold choice of subjects.

67.

„bains intérieurs", to express myself chastely after the manner of Madame Valmore

68.

„rien ne porte malheur comme une bonne action"

69.

(328)

Sainte-Beuve: „la jeunesse est trop ardente pour avoir du goût.

Pour avoir du goût, il ne suffit pas d'avoir en soi la faculté de goûter les belles et douces choses de l'esprit, il faut encore du loisir, une âme libre et vacante, redevenue comme innocente, non livrée aux passions, non affairée, non bourrelée d'âpres soins et d'inquiétudes positives; une âme désintéressée et même exempte du feu trop ardent de la composition, non en proie à sa propre verve insolente; il faut du repos, de l'oubli, du silence, d'espace autour de soi. Que de conditions, même quand on a en soi la faculté de les trouver, pour jouir des choses délicates!" —

70.

At the performance of Christine (by A. Dumas): Joanny holds a signed passport from the queen. At the moment of making use of it, he thinks better of it and puts the paper away about his person with the words: réservons en l'effet pour de plus grands besoins.

71.

(329)

Displeasure and pleasure are the stupidest conceivable *means of expressing* judgments: which of course is not to say that the judgments which become audible in this way must be stupid. The omission of all grounds and logicality, a Yes or No reduced to a passionate wanting-to-have or thrusting-away, an imperative abbreviation whose usefulness is unmistakable: that is pleasure and displeasure. Their origin lies in the central sphere of the intellect; their presupposition is an infinitely accelerated perceiving, ordering, subsuming, calculating, inferring: pleasure and displeasure are always concluding phenomena, not "causes"…

The decision as to what is to arouse displeasure and pleasure depends on the degree of power: the same thing which, in relation to a small quantum of power, appears as danger and as a compulsion to the swiftest defence, can, given a greater consciousness of abundance of power, have as its consequence a voluptuous stimulation, a feeling of pleasure.

All feelings of pleasure and displeasure already presuppose a *measuring according to overall usefulness, overall harmfulness*: hence a sphere where the willing of a goal (a state) and a selecting of the means to it takes place. Pleasure and displeasure are never "original facts"

Feelings of pleasure and displeasure are *reactions of the will (affects)*, in which the intellectual centre fixes the value of certain changes that have occurred in relation to the overall value, at the same time as the introduction of counter-actions.

72.

(330)

If the movement of the world had a goal-state, it would have to have been reached. The sole fundamental fact, however, is that it has *no* goal-state: and every philosophy or scientific hypothesis (e.g. mechanism) in which such a state becomes necessary is *refuted* by this one fact… I seek a conception of the world which does justice to *this* fact: becoming is to be explained without taking refuge in such final intentions: becoming must appear justified at every moment (or *incapable of being devalued*: which comes to the same thing); the present must absolutely not be justified for the sake of something future, or the past for the sake of the present. "Necessity" not in the shape of an overarching, dominating total force, or of a prime mover; still less as necessary in order to bring about something valuable. For this it is necessary to deny a total consciousness of becoming, a "God", so as

not to bring events under the perspective of a being that feels with, knows with, and yet *wills* nothing: "God" is useless if he does not will something, and on the other hand a *summation of displeasure and illogic* would thereby be posited which would debase the overall value of "becoming": fortunately just such a summing power is lacking (— a suffering and all-surveying God, a "total sensorium" and "universal spirit" — would be the *greatest objection to being*)

More strictly: one *must admit nothing that is at all*, — because then becoming loses its value and appears downright meaningless and superfluous.

Consequently the question to be asked is: how the illusion of that which is could (had to) arise

likewise: how all value judgments which rest on the hypothesis that there is something that is are devalued.

but with this one recognizes that this *hypothesis of that which is* is the source of all *slander of the world*

"the better world, the true world, the 'beyond' world, thing-in-itself"

1)

becoming has *no goal-state*, does not flow out into a

"being".

2)

becoming is *no apparent state*; perhaps the world *that is* is a semblance.

3)

becoming is of equal value at every moment: the sum of its value remains the same: *expressed otherwise: it has no value at all*, for there is lacking anything against which it could be measured and in relation to which the word "value" would have meaning.

the *overall value of the world cannot be devalued*, consequently philosophical pessimism belongs among the comic things

73.

(331)

The standpoint of "value" is the standpoint of *conditions of preservation and enhancement* with regard to complex formations of relative duration of life within becoming:

— : there are no enduring ultimate units, no atoms, no monads: here too "that which is" has first been *put in* by us (for practical, useful, perspectival reasons)

— "formations of dominion"; the sphere of what dominates continually growing or periodically decreasing, increasing; or, under the favour and disfavour of circumstances (of nourishment —)

— "value" is essentially the standpoint for the increase or decrease of these dominating centres ("multiplicities" in any case, but "unity" is not present at all in the nature of becoming)

— *a quantum of power*, a becoming, insofar as nothing in it has the character of "being"; insofar as

— the means of expression of language are useless for expressing becoming: it belongs to our *inescapable need for preservation* constantly to posit a cruder world of the abiding, of "things" etc. Relatively, we may speak of atoms and monads: and it is certain that the *smallest world is in duration the most durable*…

there is no will: there are punctuations of will which constantly increase or lose their power

74.

(332)

— that in the "*process of the whole*" *the labour of mankind does not come into consideration,* because there is no total process at all (this thought of as a system —):

— that there is no "whole", that *no devaluation of human existence,* of human goals, can be made with regard to something that does not exist at all…

— that necessity, causality, purposiveness are useful *apparentnesses*

— that the goal is *not* the increase of consciousness but the enhancement of power, in which enhancement the usefulness of consciousness is included, as much with pleasure as with displeasure

— that one does not take the *means* as the highest measure of value (hence not states of consciousness, such as pleasure and pain, if consciousness itself is a means —)

— that the world is by no means an organism but chaos: that the development of "spirituality" is a means to the relative duration of organization…

— that all "desirability" has no meaning in relation to the overall character of being.

75.

(333)

not the satisfaction of the will is the cause of pleasure: against this most superficial theory I want especially to fight. The absurd psychological counterfeiting of the nearest things…

but rather that the will wants to go forward and again and again becomes master over what stands in its way: the feeling of pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of the will, in the fact that without limits and resistances it is never yet sated enough…

"The happy man": herd ideal

76.

(334)

The normal *dissatisfaction* of our drives, e.g. of hunger, of the sexual drive, of the drive to movement, contains in itself nothing whatever that is depressing; rather it acts as an agitating stimulus on the feeling of life, just as every rhythm of small painful stimuli *strengthens* it, whatever the pessimists may try to tell us: this dissatisfaction, instead of making life loathsome, is the great *stimulant* of life.

— One could perhaps describe pleasure in general as a rhythm of small stimuli of displeasure…

77.

(335)

In proportion to the resistances a force seeks out in order to become master over them, the measure of the failure and fatality thereby provoked must grow: and insofar as every force can discharge itself only on what resists, there is necessarily in every action an *ingredient of displeasure*. Only this displeasure acts as a stimulus of life: and strengthens the *will to power*!

78.

(336)

The *most spiritual* men, provided they are the most courageous, also experience by far the most painful tragedies: but for that very reason they honour life, because it sets against them its *greatest opposition*…

79.

(337)

The means by which Julius Caesar defended himself against sickliness and headache: tremendous marches, a simple way of life, uninterrupted sojourn in the open air and constant hardships: these are, reckoned on the grand scale, the conditions of preservation of genius in general.

80.

(338)

Beware of morality: it devalues us in our own eyes —

Beware of pity: it overburdens us with the distress of others —

Beware of "spirituality": it spoils the character by making one extremely solitary: solitary, i.e. unbound, untethered…

81.

— only becoming is felt, but not dying (?) —

82.

The meaning of becoming must be fulfilled, attained, consummated at every moment.

83.

(339)

What is called a good action is a mere misunderstanding; such actions are not possible at all.

"Egoism", just like "selflessness", is a popular fiction; likewise the individual, the soul.

Within the tremendous multiplicity of happening inside an organism, the part that becomes conscious to us is a mere corner: and the little bit of "virtue", "selflessness" and similar fictions are given the lie in a wholly radical manner by the rest of the total happening. We do well to study our organism in its perfect immorality…

The animal functions are, after all, in principle a million times more important than all beautiful states and heights of consciousness: the latter are a surplus, insofar as they need not be tools for those animal functions.

The whole of *conscious* life, the spirit together with the soul, together with the heart, together with goodness, together with virtue: in whose service does it labour, then? In that of the greatest possible perfecting of the means (means of nourishment, means of enhancement) of the basic animal functions: above all of the *enhancement of life*.

So unspeakably much more depends on what used to be called "body" and "flesh": the rest is a small accessory. The task of spinning on the whole chain of life, and in such a way *that the thread grows ever mightier* — that is the task. But now look how heart, soul, virtue, spirit positively conspire to *pervert* this fundamental task: as if *they* were the goals… The degeneration of life is essentially conditioned by the extraordinary capacity of consciousness for error: it is held in check least of all by instincts and therefore *blunders* the longest and most thoroughly.

To measure by the *pleasant or unpleasant feelings of this consciousness* whether existence has value: can one imagine a madder extravagance

of vanity? It is, after all, only a means: and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are, after all, also only means! — By what is *value* objectively measured? Solely by the quantum of *enhanced* and *organized power*, according to what happens in all happening, a will to more…

84.

"Spirit" posited as the essence of the world; logicality as essential

85.

(340)

Through alcohol and hashish one carries oneself back to stages of culture that one has overcome (at least *outlived*). All foods give some revelation about the past out of which we *became*.

86.

Even the wise man often enough does just like those foolish women who hold milk to be no nourishment, but turnips indeed:

87.

(341)

All the beauty and sublimity that we have lent to real and imagined things I will reclaim as the property and product of man: as his fairest apology. Man as poet, as thinker, as God, as love, as power —: oh, his royal liberality, with which he has endowed things so as to *impoverish* himself and to feel *himself* wretched! That has hitherto been his greatest selflessness, that he admired and worshipped and knew how to hide from himself that it was *he* who had created what he admired. —

88.

(342)

How much unadmitted and even unwitting satisfaction of old religious needs still lingers in the emotional hodgepodge of German music! How much prayer, virtue, unction, virginity, incense, bigotry and "inner chamber" still has its say there! That music itself abstracts from the word, from the concept, from the image: oh, how well she knows how to draw her advantage from that, the cunning feminine "Eternal-Feminine"! even the most honest conscience need not be ashamed when that instinct is satisfied — it stays outside. This is healthy, clever and, insofar as it expresses shame before the paltriness of all religious judgment, a good sign… In spite of all that, it remains a Tartuffery…

If, on the other hand, one sets religious symbolism alongside it, as Wagner did in his last days with dangerous mendacity, as in Parsifal, where he alludes to the superstitious nonsense of the Lord's Supper, and does not merely allude: then such music arouses indignation…

89.

(343)

Men have always misunderstood love: they believe themselves selfless in it because they want the advantage of another being, often against their own advantage: but in return they want to *possess* that other being… In other cases love is a subtler parasitism, a dangerous and ruthless nesting of one soul in another soul — sometimes also in the flesh… alas! how very much at "the host's" expense!

How much advantage man sacrifices, how little "self-seeking" he is! All his affects and passions want to have their due — and how far from the clever utility of self-interest is affect!

One does not want one's "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to be able to believe that man always seeks his advantage; our desires want to lay hold of things in long passion — their pent-up force seeks resistances

90.

What Richard Wagner is worth will be told us only by the one who has made the best use of him. Meanwhile people try to believe in a worth of Wagner's in which he himself would all too gladly have liked to believe…

91.

(344)

Ennoblement of prostitution, *not* abolition…

Marriage has for the longest time had the bad conscience against it: should one believe it? Yes, one should believe it. —

In honour of old women —

92.

I take the liberty of forgetting myself. The day after tomorrow I mean to be at home with myself again.

93.

(345)

everything that man has so far not known how to deal with, what no man has yet digested, the "*dung of existence*" — for wisdom at least it remains the best manure…

94.

(346)

That emperor constantly held before himself the transience of all things, so as not to take them *too seriously* and to remain calm among them. To me, on the contrary, everything seems far too valuable to be permitted to be so fleeting: I seek an eternity for each and every thing: may one pour the most precious ointments and wines into the sea? — and my consolation is that all that was is eternal: — the sea washes it up again

95.

(347)

As is well known, Voltaire was pestered even in his last moments: "do you believe in the divinity of Christ?" his curé asked him; and not content that Voltaire gave him to understand he wished to be left in peace, he repeated his question. Then the dying man was overcome by his last fury: in a rage he thrust the unwarranted questioner back: "au nom du dieu! — he cried in his face — ne me parlez pas de cet-homme-là!" — immortal last words, in which everything is summed up against which this bravest of spirits had fought. —

Voltaire judged: "there is nothing divine about this Jew of Nazareth": thus did *classical taste* judge out of him.

Classical taste and Christian taste posit the concept "divine" in fundamentally different ways; and whoever has the former in his body cannot help but feel Christianity as foeda superstitio and the Christian ideal as a caricature and degradation of the divine.

96.

(348)

That one takes the *doer* back into the doing, after having conceptually drawn him out of it and thereby emptied the doing;

that one takes the doing-*something*, "the goal", the "intention", the "purpose" back into the doing, after having artificially drawn it out of it and thereby emptied the doing;

that all "purposes", "goals", "meanings" are only modes of expression and metamorphoses of the One Will that inheres in all happening, the will to power; that having purposes, goals, intentions, *willing* as such, is as much as willing-to-become-stronger, willing to grow, and *for that* also willing the *means*;

that the most general and lowest instinct in all doing and willing has remained the most unrecognized and most hidden precisely because in praxi we always follow its command, because we *are* this command… All valuations are only consequences and narrower perspectives *in the service of this One Will*: valuing itself is only this will to power; a critique of being from out of any one of these values is something absurd and misconceived; even supposing that a process of decline is thereby initiated, this process still stands *in the service of this will*…

To appraise being itself: but the appraising itself is still this being —: and in saying No, we still do what we *are*… One must see the *absurdity* of this gesture of sitting in judgment on existence; and then seek further to divine *what* is actually happening with it. It is symptomatic.

97.

(349)

The philosophical nihilist is convinced that all that happens is meaningless and in vain; and that there ought to be no meaningless and vain being. But whence this: There ought not? But whence does one

take *this* "meaning"? *this* measure? — The nihilist means, at bottom, that the sight of such a bleak, useless being affects a philosopher as *unsatisfying*, bleak, despairing; such an insight runs counter to our finer sensibility as philosophers. It comes down to the absurd valuation: the character of existence *would have to give the philosopher pleasure* if it is to exist by right at all…

Now it is easy to grasp that pleasure and displeasure within what happens can have only the meaning of means: it would remain to ask whether we *could* see the "meaning" and "purpose" at all, whether the question of meaninglessness or of its opposite is not insoluble for us. —

98.

(350)

Value of transience: something that has no duration, that contradicts itself, has little value. But the things we believe in as *enduring* are, as such, *pure fictions*. If everything flows, then transience is a quality (the "truth") and duration and imperishability merely an *appearance*.

99.

(351)

Critique of nihilism. —

1.

Nihilism as a *psychological state* will have to set in, *first*, when we have sought a "meaning" in all that happens which is not there: so that the seeker finally loses heart. Nihilism is then the becoming-conscious of the long *squandering* of strength, the torment of the "in vain", the insecurity, the lack of any opportunity to recover in some way, to find reassurance about anything at all — shame before oneself, as though one had *deceived* oneself all too long… That *meaning* could have been: the "fulfilment" of a supreme moral canon in all that happens, the moral world order; or the increase of love and harmony in the intercourse of beings; or the approach to a universal state of happiness; or even the setting out toward a universal state of nothingness — a goal is still a meaning. What all these kinds of notion have in common is that something is to be *attained* through the process itself: — and now one grasps that with becoming *nothing* is aimed at, *nothing* is attained… Thus disappointment over an alleged *purpose of becoming* as the cause of nihilism: whether with regard to a quite specific purpose, or, generalized, the insight into the inadequacy of all previous hypotheses of purpose that concern the whole "development" (— man *no longer* a collaborator, let alone the centre of becoming)

Nihilism as a psychological state sets in, *second*, when one has posited a *totality*, a *systematization*, even an *organization* in all that happens and beneath all that happens: so that the soul thirsting for admiration and reverence revels in the overall notion of a supreme form of rule and administration (— if it is the soul of a logician, then absolute consistency and real dialectic suffice to reconcile it with everything…) A kind of unity, some form of "monism": and in consequence of this faith, man in a deep feeling of connection with and dependence upon a whole infinitely superior to him, a mode of the deity… "The welfare of the general demands the devotion of the individual"… but lo and

behold, there *is* no such general! At bottom man has lost faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable whole works through him: that is, he conceived such a whole *in order to be able to believe in his own value*.

Nihilism as a psychological state has yet a *third* and *last* form. Given these two *insights*, that with becoming nothing is to be aimed at and that beneath all becoming there reigns no great unity in which the individual may wholly immerse himself, as in an element of supreme value: then there remains as an *escape* to condemn this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world lying beyond it, as the *true* world. But as soon as man finds out how this world has been knocked together solely out of psychological needs, and how he has utterly no right to it, there arises the last form of nihilism, which includes within itself *disbelief in a metaphysical world*, — which forbids itself belief in a *true* world. From this standpoint one admits the reality of becoming as the *only* reality, forbids oneself every kind of secret path to back-worlds and false divinities — but *cannot endure this world, which one already will not deny*…

— What has happened, at bottom? The feeling of *valuelessness* was reached when one grasped that the overall character of existence may be interpreted neither with the concept "*purpose*", nor with the concept "*unity*", nor with the concept "*truth*". Nothing is aimed at and attained thereby; the overarching unity in the multiplicity of what happens is lacking: the character of existence is not "true", is *false*…, one simply has no reason any longer to talk oneself into a true world…

In short: the categories "purpose", "unity", "being", with which we had invested the world with a value, are *withdrawn* again by us — and now the world *looks valueless*…

2.

Supposing we have recognized to what extent the world may no longer be *interpreted* with these *three* categories, and that after this insight the world begins to become valueless for us: then we must ask *whence* our faith in these 3 categories stems — let us try whether it is not possible to give notice of our faith to *them*. Once we have *devalued* these 3 categories, the demonstration that they cannot be applied to the universe is no longer a reason *to devalue the universe*.

*

Result: *faith in the categories of reason* is the cause of nihilism, — we have measured the value of the world by categories *which refer to a purely fictitious world*.

*

Final result: all the values by which we have hitherto sought first to make the world estimable to ourselves, and in the end precisely thereby *devalued* it, once they proved inapplicable — all these values are, reckoned up psychologically, results of particular perspectives of utility for the maintenance and enhancement of human structures of domination: and only falsely *projected* into the essence of things. It is still the *hyperbolic naïveté* of man to posit himself as the meaning and measure of value of things…

100.

(352)

The supreme values in whose service man *was to* live, especially when they disposed of him in a very hard and costly way: these *social values* were, for the purpose of *amplifying* their tone, as though they were commands of God, erected above man as "reality", as the "true" world,

as hope and *future* world. Now, when the paltry origin of these values becomes clear, the universe seems to us thereby devalued, to have become "meaningless"… but that is only an *intermediate state*.

101.

I have not the slightest wish to play a part in the contemptible comedy which today, in Prussia above all, is still called *philosophical pessimism*; I do not even see the necessity of speaking of it. One should long since have turned away with disgust from the spectacle put on by that scrawny ape Herr von Hartmann: in my eyes anyone is *struck out* who takes this name into his mouth together with that of Schopenhauer.

102.

(353)

That one commit no cowardice against one's actions. That one not leave them in the lurch afterwards… The sting of conscience is indecent.

103.

(354)

That one at last set human values nicely back in the corner where alone they have a right to be: as corner-loafer values. Many species of animals have already vanished; supposing man too vanished, nothing in the world would be missing. One must be philosopher enough to admire even *this* nothing (— Nil admirari —)

104.

(355)

If one is clear with oneself about the "Why?" of one's life, one lets its How? go cheaply. It is itself already a sign of disbelief in Why?, in purpose and meaning, a *lack of will*, when the value of pleasure and displeasure steps into the foreground and hedonistic-pessimistic doctrines find a hearing; and renunciation, resignation, virtue, "objectivity" *can* at the very least already be signs that the main thing is beginning to be lacking.

That one knows how to give oneself a goal — — —

105.

NB. a rabble-man, a rancour-man, a *rancunculus*…

106.

Not to be confused: — Unbelief as *incapacity* to *believe* at all and, on the other hand, as incapacity to *still* believe something: in the latter case commonly as the symptom of a new faith —

To unbelief as incapacity belongs the *inability to negate* — it knows how to defend itself neither against a Yes nor against a No…

107.

Idleness is the beginning of all philosophy. — Consequently — is philosophy a vice?…

108.

A philosopher recovers differently and in different things: he recovers, for example, in nihilism. The belief that there is no truth at all, the nihilists' belief, is a great stretching of the limbs for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, lies ceaselessly in combat with nothing but ugly truths. For the truth is ugly

109.

If one deducts dramatic music from music: there still remains enough good music

110.

We too believe in virtue: but in virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, moraline-free virtue.

111.

(356)

How does it come about that the fundamental articles of faith in psychology are, one and all, the worst distortions and counterfeitings? "*Man strives for happiness*", for example — what is true in that! In order to understand what life is, what kind of striving and tension life is, the formula must hold as well for tree and plant as for animal. "What does the plant strive for?" — but here we have already invented a false unity that does not exist: the "fact of a millionfold growth with its own and half-its-own initiatives is concealed and denied if we put a clumsy unity "plant" in front. That the ultimate smallest "individuals" are *not* intelligible in the sense of a "metaphysical individual" and atom, that their sphere of power is continually shifting — that is visible first of all: but does each of them, when it transforms itself in this way, strive *for* "*happiness*"? — But all self-spreading, incorporating, growing is a striving against what resists; movement is essentially something bound up with states of displeasure: what drives here must in any case will something else, if it thus wills displeasure and continually seeks it out. — For what do the trees of a primeval forest fight with one another? For "happiness"? — For *power*…

Man, become master over the forces of nature, master over his own wildness and unbridledness: the desires have learned to obey, to be useful

Man, compared with a pre-man, represents a tremendous quantum of *power — not* a plus of "happiness": how can one maintain that he *strove* for happiness?…

112.

(357)

The *higher* man distinguishes himself from the *lower* in respect of fearlessness and the challenging of misfortune: it is a sign of *decline* when eudaemonistic measures of value begin to count as the highest (— physiological fatigue, impoverishment of will —) Christianity with its perspective on "blessedness" is a typical way of thinking for a suffering and impoverished species of man: a full strength wants to create, to suffer, to perish in suffering: to it the Christian bigot's salvation is bad music and hieratic gestures a vexation

113.

(358)

On Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge.

I hold fast to the phenomenality of the *inner* world too: everything *that becomes conscious to us* is through and through first arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted — the *actual* process of inner "perception", the *causal union* between thoughts, feelings, desires, like that between subject and object, absolutely hidden from us — and perhaps a pure fancy. This "apparent *inner* world is treated with exactly the same forms and procedures as the "outer" world. We never come upon

"facts": pleasure and displeasure are late and derivative phenomena of the intellect…

"Causality" slips away from us; to assume an immediate causal bond between thoughts, as logic does — that is the consequence of the very crudest and clumsiest observation. *Between* two thoughts *all possible affects besides* play their game: but the movements are too rapid, therefore we *mistake* them, we *deny* them…

"Thinking", as the epistemologists posit it, does not occur at all: it is an entirely arbitrary fiction, arrived at by singling out One element from the process and subtracting all the rest, an artificial arrangement for the purpose of making things intelligible…

The "spirit", *something that thinks*: possibly even "spirit absolute, clean, pure" — this conception is a derived, second consequence of the false self-observation that believes in "thinking": here *first* an act is imagined that does not occur at all, "thinking", and *secondly* a subject-substrate is imagined in which every act of this thinking, and nothing else, has its origin: that is, *both the doing and the doer are fictions*

114.

"willing" is *not* "desiring", striving, craving: it sets itself apart from these through the *affect of command*

there is no "*willing*", but only a *willing-something*: one must not detach the goal from the state, as the epistemologists do. "Willing", as they understand it, occurs as little as "thinking": it is a pure fiction.

that *something is commanded* belongs to willing (: by which it is of course not said that the will is "effected"…)

That general *state of tension* by virtue of which a force seeks discharge — is no "willing"

115.

(359)

In a world that is essentially false, truthfulness would be an *anti-natural tendency*: such a tendency could only have meaning as a means to a particular *higher potency of falsehood*: in order that a world of the true, of what is, could be feigned, the truthful man first had to be created (including the fact that such a man believes himself "truthful")

Simple, transparent, not in contradiction with himself, durable, remaining the same, without fold, volte, curtain, form: a man of this kind conceives a world of being as "*God*" in his own image.

For truthfulness to be possible, the whole sphere of man must be very clean, small and respectable: the *advantage* must in every sense be on the side of the truthful. — Lies, malice, dissimulation must arouse astonishment…

Hatred of lies and dissimulation out of *pride*, out of an irritable sense of honour; but there is also such a hatred out of cowardice: because lying is forbidden. — With *another* kind of man all moralizing, "thou shalt not lie", avails nothing against the instinct that constantly needs the lie: witness the *New Testament*.

116.

(360)

There are those who search for where something is immoral: when they judge, "that is wrong", they believe one must abolish it and change it. I, conversely, have no rest anywhere so long as I am not yet clear about a thing's *immorality*. Once I have found this out, my equilibrium is restored.

117.

To an exuberant spirit, for whom dance is the most natural movement and who loves to touch every reality only with the tips of his toes, it is hateful to dwell on sad things

118.

we Hyperboreans

(361)

My conclusion is: that *actual* man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any previous ideal; that all "desirabilities" with regard to man were absurd and dangerous excesses by which a single kind of man would like to hang up *its* conditions of preservation and growth over mankind as law; that every "desirability" of such origin that has been brought to dominion has until now *depressed* the value of man, his strength, his certainty of the future; that the paltriness and hole-and-corner intellectuality of man exposes itself most, even today, when he *wishes;* that man's capacity to posit values has until now been too poorly developed to do justice to the actual, not merely "desirable" *value of man*; that the ideal has until now been the real world- and man-slandering force, the poisonous breath over reality, the great *seduction to nothingness*…

119.

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For the Preface.

I describe what is coming: the advent of nihilism. I can describe here because something necessary is taking place here — the signs of it are everywhere, only the *eyes* for these signs are still lacking. I neither praise nor blame here *that* it is coming: I believe there will be one of

the greatest *crises*, a moment of man's *very deepest* self-reflection: whether man recovers from it, whether he becomes master over this crisis, that is a question of his strength: it is *possible*…

modern man believes experimentally now in this, now in that *value*, and then lets it drop: the circle of outlived and discarded values grows ever fuller; the *emptiness* and *poverty in values* are felt more and more; the movement is unstoppable — although delay has been attempted in the grand style —

At last he ventures a critique of values as such; he *recognizes* their origin; he recognizes enough to believe in no value any longer; the *pathos* is there, the new shudder…

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries…

120.

(363)

That between subject and object there obtains some kind of adequate relation; that the object is something which, *seen from within*, would be subject, is a good-natured invention which, as I think, has had its day. The measure of what becomes conscious to us at all is, after all, wholly and entirely dependent on the crude usefulness of becoming conscious: how could this corner-perspective of consciousness permit us in any way to make statements about "subject" and "object" by which reality would be touched! —

121.

(364)

one cannot derive the lowest and most primordial activity in protoplasm from a will to self-preservation: for it takes into itself, in a senseless fashion, more than preservation would require: and above

all, it does *not* thereby "preserve itself", but *falls apart*… The drive that rules here has to explain precisely this *not*-wanting-to-preserve-oneself: "hunger" is already an interpretation, modelled on incomparably more complicated organisms (— hunger is a specialized and later form of the drive, an expression of the division of labour, in the service of a higher drive ruling over it)

122.

(365)

— it is not this that sets *us* apart: that we *find* no God *again*, neither in history, nor in nature, nor behind nature, — but that we feel what was revered as God to be not "divine" but a holy grimace, a moutonnerie, an absurd and pitiable niaiserie, a principle of slander against the world and man: in short, that we deny God as God. It is the summit of man's psychological mendacity to reckon out for himself a being as beginning and "in-itself" according to his corner-measure of what happens to appear to him good, wise, mighty, valuable — and in doing so to think away the *entire causality* by virtue of which any goodness, any wisdom, any power whatever exists and has value. In short, to posit elements of the latest and most conditioned origin as not having come to be, but as "in themselves", and if possible even as the cause of all coming-to-be whatsoever… If we start from experience, from every case in which a man has raised himself significantly above the measure of the human, we see that every high degree of power includes freedom from good and evil as well as from "true" and "false", and can grant no account to what goodness wants: we grasp the same once more for every high degree of wisdom — in it goodness is sublated just as much as truthfulness, justice, virtue and other popular velleities of valuing. Finally, every high degree of goodness itself: is it not evident that it already presupposes a spiritual myopia and coarseness? likewise the inability to distinguish between true and false,

between useful and harmful, at any greater distance? not even to speak of the fact that a high degree of power in the hands of the highest goodness would bring with it the most calamitous consequences ("the abolition of evil")? — Indeed, one need only look at what tendencies the "God of love" instils in his believers: they ruin mankind for the sake of the "good" — In praxi this same God, in the face of the actual constitution of the world, has proved himself the *God of the utmost short-sightedness, devilry* and *impotence*: from which it follows how much value his conception has.

In itself, after all, knowledge and wisdom have no value; no more than goodness: one must always first have the goal from which these qualities receive value or unvalue — there *could be a goal* from which an extreme knowledge would represent a high unvalue (say, if extreme deception were one of the preconditions for the enhancement of life; likewise if goodness were perhaps able to paralyse and discourage the mainsprings of great desire…

Our human life being given as it is, all "truth", all "goodness", all "holiness", all "divinity" in the Christian style has so far proved itself a great danger — even now mankind is in danger of perishing from an ideality hostile to life

123.

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The advent of *nihilism*.

Nihilism is not only a contemplating of the "In vain!", and not only the belief that everything deserves to perish: one lays hand to it, one *brings to ruin*… That is, if you will, *illogical*: but the nihilist does not believe in the compulsion to be logical… It is the condition of strong spirits and wills: and for such it is not possible to stop at the No "of

judgement": — the *No of the deed* comes from their nature. Annihilation by judgement is seconded by annihilation by the hand.

124.

(367)

If we are "disillusioned", we are not so with regard to life: but in that our eyes have been opened about "desirabilities" of every kind. We look on with a mocking rage at what is called "ideal": we despise ourselves only for not being able, at every hour, to keep down that absurd stirring which is called "idealism". The *pampering* is stronger than the rage of the *disillusioned*…

125.

(368)

The complete immaturity of the moralists, who expect our many-skinned and hidden self to be *simple*; who say "show yourself as you are": as if for that one did not first have to be something that *is*…

126.

(369)

IV. NB. The *selection of equals,* the "*exodus*", *isolation* —

127.

(370)

NB. against *justice*… Against J. Stuart Mill: I abhor his vulgarity, which says "what is right for one is fair for another; what you would not have done etc., do not do to any other either"; which wants to found all human intercourse on *reciprocity of service,* so that every action ap-

pears as a kind of repayment for something that has been rendered to us. Here the *presupposition* is *ignoble* in the lowest sense: here the *equivalence of the values of actions* is presupposed between me and you; here the *most personal* value of an action is simply annulled (that which can be balanced and paid for by nothing —) "Reciprocity" is a great vulgarity; precisely that something which *I* do *may* not and *could* not be done by another, that there *may* be *no equalization* — except in the *most select sphere* of "my equals", inter pares —; that in a deeper sense one never gives back, because one *is* something *unique* and *does* only *what is unique* — this fundamental conviction contains the cause of the *aristocratic separation from the crowd*, because the crowd believes in "equality" and *consequently* in equalizability and "reciprocity".

128.

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It is the *feeling of kinship* that binds the children of one people to one another: this kinship is physiologically a thousand times stronger than is commonly supposed. Language, customs, community of interests and destinies — all that is little against that *being-able-to-understand-one-another* on the ground of shared ancestors.

129.

the *decline of the German spirit*, which has kept pace with the advent of fatherlandishness and of nationalism —

130.

To woman one does not speak of truthfulness: "show yourself as you are", said to woman, means almost the opposite of what it means as a demand addressed to man

131.

— it is not for his faith that he is burned, with little green sticks: but for no longer having the courage for his faith.

132.

— a human being as he *ought* to be: that sounds to us as insipid as: "a tree as it ought to be"

133.

NB. One acknowledges the *superiority* of the Greek human being, of the Renaissance human being — but one would like to have him without his causes and conditions: to this day a deeper insight into the Greeks is lacking

134.

"Things that have a constitution in themselves" — a dogmatic notion with which one must break absolutely

135.

Toward a critique of the big words. — I am full of suspicion and malice toward what is called "ideal": here lies *my pessimism*, in having recognized how the "higher feelings" are a source of calamity, i.e., of the diminution and devaluation of man.

— one deceives oneself every time one expects "progress" from an ideal: the victory of the ideal has every time hitherto been a *retrograde movement*.

— Christianity, revolution, abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words have value

only in battle, as a standard: *not* as realities, but as *showpiece words* for something quite different (indeed opposite!)

136.

Critique of the big words.

"Freedom" for *will to power*

"Justice"

"Equality of rights"

"Brotherhood"

"Truth" (among sects etc.

137.

The "growing autonomy of the individual": these Parisian philosophers, like Fouillée, talk about it: they ought only to look at the race moutonnière that they themselves are!…

Do open your eyes, you gentlemen sociologists of the future!

The "individual" grew strong under *reversed* conditions: you describe the most extreme weakening and stunting of man, you want it yourselves and need the whole lying apparatus of the old ideal for it! you are *of such a kind* that you really feel your herd-animal needs as an *ideal*!

The complete lack of psychological integrity!

138.

(372)

The origin of the ideal. Examination of the soil in which it grows.

A.

Proceeding from the "aesthetic" states, in which the world is *seen* as fuller, rounder, *more perfect* —

the *pagan* ideal: in it self-affirmation predominant, from the buffo onward

—

the highest type: the *classical* ideal — as the expression of a well-constitutedness of *all* the principal instincts

—

within it again the highest style: *the grand style*, expression of the "will to power" itself (the most feared instinct *dares to avow itself*)

— *one gives out* —

B.

Proceeding from states in which the world is *seen* as emptier, paler, more diluted, in which "spiritualization" and non-sensuousness take the rank of the perfect; in which the brutal, the animal-direct, the nearest is most avoided: the "sage", "the angel" (priestly = virginal = ignorant) physiological characteristics of such "idealists"…

the *anaemic* ideal: under certain circumstances it can be the ideal of such natures as *represent* the first, the pagan one (: thus Goethe sees in Spinoza his "saint")

— *one deducts, one selects* —

C.

Proceeding from states in which we feel the world to be too absurd, too wicked, too poor, too deceptive for us still to suspect or wish for the ideal within it: the projection of the ideal into the anti-natural, the

anti-factual, the anti-logical. The state of him who judges thus (— the "impoverishment" of the world as a consequence of suffering: one *takes*, one *no longer* gives —)

: the *anti-natural ideal*

— *one negates*, one *annihilates* —

(The *Christian ideal* is an *intermediate formation* between the second and the third, now with this, now with that form predominating.)

the three ideals

A.

Either

a

strengthening

(pagan)

of life

B.

or

a

dilution

(anaemic)

C.

or

a

disavowal

(anti-natural)

"deification" felt

in

the highest abundance

in

the most delicate selection

in

the destruction and contempt of life.

139.

The degree of tension, of resistance, of danger, of justified mistrust; the degree to which human lives are sacrificed, to which the probability of failure is great and the venture is ventured nonetheless: —

140.

The herd-animal ideals — now culminating as the *highest positing of value* of "society": attempt to give it a cosmic, indeed a metaphysical value

against them I defend *aristocratism*.

A society which preserves within itself that *consideration* and *delicacy* with regard to freedom must feel itself to be an exception and must have over against it a power from which it sets itself apart, toward which it is hostile and upon which it looks down

— the more I give up rights and set myself as an equal, the more I fall under the dominion of the most average, finally of the most numerous

— the precondition an aristocratic society bears within itself for preserving the high degree of freedom among its members is the extreme tension that springs from the presence in all its members of the *opposite* drive: the will to dominion…

141.

if you want to do away with the strong oppositions and differences of rank, then you also do away with strong love, lofty disposition, the feeling of being-for-oneself.

142.

On the *actual* psychology of the society of freedom and equality:

what diminishes?

The will to *self-responsibility* — sign of the

decline of autonomy

fitness for defence and *for arms*, even in the most spiritual things — the power to command

the sense of *reverence*, of subordination, of being able to keep silent.

the *great passion*, the great task, tragedy, cheerfulness

143.

Chapter:

Critique of the big words.

On the origin of the ideal.

the herd-animal ideal

How virtue is brought to dominion.

The Circe of philosophers.

the ascetic ideal

The religious ideal.

Physiology of the ideal I. II. III

the master ideal

The political ideal.

"Science"

the ideal of spirituality

III

the herd-animal ideal

III

the master ideal

I

the ideal of anti-nature

II

the ideal of spirituality

I

the pagan ideal

III

the hermit ideal (Stoa etc.)

II

the ideal of sensualization

Table:

On the Origin of the Ideal

A.

the herd-animal ideal

the master-animal ideal

the hermit-animal ideal

B.

the pagan ideal

the ideal of anti-nature

C.

the ideal of sensualization

the ideal of spiritualization

the ideal of the dominating affect

Critique of the Big Words.

Truth.

Justice.

Love.

Peace.

Virtue

Freedom.

Goodness

Integrity

Genius

Wisdom

144.

Pascal: le pire mal est celui, qu'on fait par bonne intention.

145.

Role of "consciousness"

It is essential that one not be mistaken about the role of "consciousness": it is our *relation with the "external world" that has developed it*. On the other hand the *direction*, or rather the guardianship and provident care with regard to the interplay of the bodily functions, does *not* enter our consciousness; any more than does the mental *storing-up*: that there is a supreme authority for this one may not doubt: a kind of directing committee, where the various *chief desires* assert their voice and power. "Pleasure", "displeasure" are hints from this sphere: …the act of *will* likewise. The *ideas* likewise

In summa: what becomes conscious stands under causal relations that are withheld from us entirely, — the succession of thoughts, feelings, ideas in consciousness expresses nothing to the effect that this succession is a causal succession: yet it *appears* so, in the highest degree. Upon this *apparentness we have founded our whole notion of spirit, reason, logic* etc. (none of this exists: they are fictitious syntheses and unities)… And these in turn projected *into* things, *behind* things!

Usually one takes *consciousness* itself as the total sensorium and supreme authority: yet it is only a *means of communicability*: it has de-

veloped in intercourse, and with regard to the interests of intercourse… "Intercourse" understood here also to include the influences of the external world and the reactions they make necessary on our part; as well as our effects *upon* the outside. It is *not* the direction, but an *organ of direction* —

146.

The means by which a stronger kind preserves itself.

To grant oneself a right to exceptional actions; as an experiment in self-overcoming and freedom

To place oneself in conditions where it is not permitted *not* to be a barbarian

To procure for oneself, through every kind of asceticism, a superiority and certainty with regard to one's strength of will.

Not to communicate oneself; silence; wariness of charm.

To learn to obey, in such a way that it furnishes a test of self-maintenance. Casuistry of the point of honour carried to the utmost refinement.

Never to conclude "what is right for one is fair for another" — but the reverse!

To treat retribution, the being *permitted* to repay, as a privilege, to grant it as a distinction —

Not to covet the virtue of *others*.

147.

Theory of the *sexual drive*: "the 'homunculi' which crave existence unite their desire for life into a collective desire, which consciousness notices and takes for its *own* need" —

Renan's words *Hartley* Fouillée p 217.

148.

The time is coming when we must *pay* for having been *Christians* for two millennia: we are losing the *centre of gravity* that let us live, — for a while we know neither which way to turn nor where. We plunge headlong into the *opposite* valuations, with the same measure of energy with which we were Christians — with which we the senseless exaggeration of the Christian — — —

1)

the "immortal soul"; the eternal value of the "person" —

2)

the solution, the direction, the valuing in the "beyond" —

3)

moral value as the highest value, the "salvation of the soul" as the cardinal interest —

4)

"sin", "earthly", "flesh", "lusts" — stigmatized as "world".

Now everything is false through and through, "word", jumbled, weak or overstrained

a)

one attempts a kind of *earthly solution*, but in the same sense, that of the *final triumph* of truth, love, justice: socialism: "equality of the person"

b)

one attempts likewise to hold fast to the *moral ideal* (with the precedence of the unegoistic, of self-denial, of the negation of will)

c)

one attempts even to hold fast to the "beyond": be it only as an antilogical x: but one at once dresses it up so that a kind of metaphysical consolation of the old style can be drawn from it

d)

one attempts to read out of events the *divine guidance of the old style*, the order of things that rewards, punishes, educates, leads toward the *better*

e)

one believes as before in good and evil: so that one feels the victory of the good and the annihilation of evil as a *task* (— that is English, typical case the flathead John Stuart Mill)

f)

contempt for "naturalness", for desire, for the ego: attempt to understand even the highest spirituality and art as a consequence of a depersonalization and as désintéressement

g)

one still permits the *Church* to intrude itself into all the essential experiences and chief points of individual life, in order to give them *consecration*, a *higher meaning*: we still have a "Christian state", Christian "marriage" —

149.

Perfect Nihilism

its symptoms:

the great *contempt*

the great *pity*

the great *destruction*

its point of culmination: *a doctrine* which teaches as *absolute* and *eternal* precisely the life that arouses disgust, pity and the lust for destruction

150.

On the History of European Nihilism.

The period of unclarity, of attempts of every kind to conserve the old and not to let go of the new.

The period of clarity: one *grasps* that old and new are fundamental opposites: the old values born of declining life, the new of ascending life, — that knowledge of nature and history no longer permits us such "hopes", — that *all old ideals* are ideals hostile to life (born of décadence and determining décadence, however much decked out in the splendid Sunday finery of morality) — we *understand* the old and are far from strong enough for something new.

The period of the

three great affects

of contempt

of pity

of destruction

The period of

catastrophe

the advent of a teaching which

sifts men… which

drives the weak to decisions

and the strong likewise

151.

An insight which the "free spirits" *lack*: the same *discipline* that makes a strong nature stronger still and fits it for great undertakings *breaks and stunts the mediocre*.

: doubt

: la largeur de cœur

: experiment

: independence.

152.

my "future"

a rigorous polytechnic education

military service: so that, on average, every man of the higher classes is an officer, whatever else he may be

153.

The *vicious* and the *unbridled*: their depressing influence on the *value of the desires*. It is the gruesome barbarism of custom which, chiefly in the Middle Ages, compels a veritable "league of virtue" — together

with equally gruesome exaggerations about what constitutes the *value* of man. Struggling "civilization" *(taming)* needs every kind of iron and torture to maintain itself against terribleness and the nature of the beast of prey.

Here a confusion is quite natural, although of the worst influence: what *men of power and will* can demand of themselves gives a measure also for what they may permit themselves. Such natures are the opposite of the vicious and unbridled: although under certain circumstances they do things for which a lesser man would be convicted of vice and immoderation.

Here the concept of the "*equal value* of men *before God*" does extraordinary harm: one forbade actions and dispositions which, in themselves, belong among the prerogatives of the strongly constituted, — as though they were in themselves unworthy of man. One brought the whole tendency of the strong man into disrepute by setting up the protective measures of the weakest (weakest even against themselves) as the norm of value.

The confusion goes so far that one positively branded the great *virtuosos* of life (whose sovereign self-mastery forms the sharpest contrast to the vicious and "unbridled") with the most ignominious names. Even now one believes one must disapprove of a Cesare Borgia: that is simply laughable. The Church excommunicated German emperors on account of their vices: as if a monk or priest had any say in what a Frederick the Second may demand of himself. A Don Juan is sent to hell: that is very naive. Has it been noticed that all interesting men are missing from heaven?… Just a hint for the little women as to where they may best find their salvation… If one thinks a little consistently, and moreover with a deepened insight into what a "great man" is, there can be no doubt that the Church sends all "great men" to hell —, it fights *against* all "greatness of man"…

154.

The "concept of honour": resting on faith in "good society", in chivalrous cardinal qualities, in the obligation to represent oneself continually. Essential: that one does not take one's life seriously; that one insists unconditionally on the most respectful manners on the part of all with whom one comes into contact (at least insofar as they do not belong to *"us"*); that one is neither familiar, nor good-natured, nor merry, nor modest, except inter pares; that one *always represents oneself*…

155.

New Testament

The war against the noble and the powerful, as it is waged in the New Testament, is a war like that of *Reynard* and with the same means: only always with priestly unction and with a resolute refusal to know of its own cunning.

156.

One speaks of the "profound injustice" of the social pact: as though the fact that this man is born under favourable circumstances and that one under unfavourable ones were an injustice; or even that this man is born with these qualities, that one with those… This must be fought unconditionally. The false concept "individual" leads to this nonsense. To isolate from a man the circumstances out of which he grows and, as it were, merely to set him *in*, or let him fall in, like a "psychic monad": this is a consequence of the wretched metaphysics of the soul. No one has *given* him his qualities, neither God *nor* his parents; no one is responsible for the fact that he *is*, that he is thus and so, that he is under these circumstances… The thread of life which he now represents cannot be disentangled from everything that

was and must be: since he is not the result of a long intention, nor of any will at all to an "ideal of man" or "ideal of happiness" or "ideal of morality", it is absurd to want to "shift the burden" onto anything: as though a *responsibility* lay anywhere.

The *revolt* of the "sufferer" against

God

society

nature

ancestors

upbringing etc.

imagines *responsibilities* and *forms of will* that do not exist at all. One should not speak of a *wrong* in cases where no *preconditions for right and wrong* are present at all. That *one* soul is in itself equal to *every* soul — or *ought* to be equal: that is the worst kind of optimistic enthusiasm. The reverse is what is desirable, the greatest possible *dissimilarity* and consequently friction, struggle, contradiction: and what is desirable is what is *real*, fortunately!

157.

The aim of *equal rights* and finally of *equal needs*, an almost inevitable consequence of our kind of civilization of commerce and of the political equal value of votes, brings with it the exclusion and slow dying-out of the higher, more dangerous, stranger and, in sum, *newer* men: *experimenting* ceases, as it were, and a certain standstill is reached.

158.

The rebel pessimism (instead of "indignation pessimism")

159.

On the *"great disgust"*: *partly* suffering from it, *partly*

producing it oneself

the

nervous-Catholic-erotic literature

the

literary pessimism of France | Flaubert. Zola. Goncourt. Baudelaire.

the

dîners chez Magny

On the *"great pity"*

Tolstoy, Dostoevsky

Parsifal

160.

True civilization consists, according to Baudelaire, dans la diminution du péché originel. Baudelaire

161.

Le Français est un animal de basse-cour si bien domestiqué, qu'il n'ose franchir aucune palissade. Baudelaire

C'est un animal de race latine: l'ordure ne lui déplaît pas, dans son domicile, et, en littérature, il est scatophage. Il raffole des excréments… Baudelaire

162.

Tartuffe. Not a comedy but a pamphlet. An atheist, if he happens to be a man of good upbringing, will think, with regard to the play, that certain grave questions should never be handed over to the canaille. Baudelaire

163.

Baudelaire speaks, with reference to Petronius, of ses terrifiantes impuretés, ses bouffonneries attristantes

Nonsense: but symptomatic…

164.

genus irritabile vatum

165.

like Trimalchio, who wipes his hands on the hair of his slaves…

166.

livres vécus, poèmes vécus.

167.

Byron: garrulous. Mais, en revanche, ces sublimes défauts, qui font le grand poète: la mélancholie, toujours inséparable du sentiment du beau, et une personnalité ardente, diabolique, un esprit salamandrin.

168.

"… il n'y a de grand parmi les hommes que le poète, le prêtre et le soldat: l'homme qui chante, l'homme, qui bénit, l'homme qui sacrifie et se sacrifie. Le reste n'est fait que pour le fouet…"

169.

"il n'y a de gouvernement raisonnable et assuré que l'aristocratique. Monarchie ou république, basées sur la démocratie, sont également absurdes et faibles."

170.

"avant tout être un grand homme et un saint pour soi même."

171.

"Dieu est le seul être qui, pour régner, n'a même pas besoin d'exister."

172.

On the theory of "devotion"…

L'amour, c'est le goût de la prostitution. Il n'est même pas de plaisir noble, qui ne puisse être ramené à la prostitution. L'être le plus prostitué, c'est l'être par excellence, c'est Dieu. Dans un spectacle, dans un bal chacun jouit de tous. Qu'est-ce que l'art? Prostitution

L'amour peut dériver d'un sentiment généreux: le goût de la prostitution. Mais il est bientôt corrompu par le goût de la propriété.

173.

De la féminéité de l'église comme raison de son omnipuissance.

174.

That love resembles torture or a surgical operation. That one of the two is always the executioner or the operator.

Wherein consists the greatest pleasure of love? someone asked in Baudelaire's presence. One answered: in receiving; another: in giving oneself. This one said: voluptuousness of pride; that one: voluptuousness of humility (volupté d'humilité). All these orduriers talked like the imitatio Christi. At last there was found an impudent utopian who maintained that the greatest pleasure of love consisted in forming citizens for the fatherland.

Moi, je dis: la volupté unique et suprême de l'amour gît dans la certitude de faire le mal. Et l'homme et la femme savent, de naissance, que dans le mal se trouve toute volupté.

175.

We love women in proportion as they are strange to us. Aimer les femmes intelligentes est un plaisir de pédéraste.

176.

Thinness is more naked, more indecent than fat.

177.

L'enthousiasme qui s'applique à autre chose que les abstractions est un signe de faiblesse et de maladie.

178.

Prayer. Connais donc les jouissances d'une vie âpre et prie, prie sans cesse. La prière est réservoir de force.

179.

Peoples do everything in order not to have great men. The great man must therefore, in order to exist, possess a force of attack greater than the force of resistance developed by millions of individuals.

180.

As regards slumber, aventure sinistre de tous les soirs, one may say: men fall asleep with a boldness that would be incomprehensible, did one not know that it stems from ignorance of the danger.

181.

These great beautiful ships, imperceptibly swaying upon the calm water, these strong vessels, with their idle air that speaks of home-sickness, do they not say to us in a mute language: "when do we set out pour le bonheur?"

182.

En politique, le vrai saint est celui, qui fouette et tue le peuple, pour le bien du peuple.

183.

The beautiful, as Baudelaire understands it (*and* Richard Wagner —) Something ardent and sad, a little uncertain, giving room for conjecture.

184.

une tête séduisante et belle, une tête de femme, c'est une tête qui fait rêver à la fois, mais d'une manière confuse, de volupté et de tristesse; qui comporte une idée de mélancholie, de lassitude, même de satiété,

— soit une idée contraire, c'est-à-dire une ardeur, un désir de vivre, associés avec une amertume refluante, comme venant de privation ou de désespérance. Le mystère, le regret sont aussi des caractères du Beau.

185.

A handsome male head has no need (except perhaps in the eyes of a woman) to contain that idea of voluptuousness which, in a woman's face, is a provocation all the more attractive the more melancholy that face generally is. But this head too will contain something ardent and sad, of spiritual needs, of ambitions kept in darkness, the idea of a power that gronde at bottom et is without employment, at times the idea d'une insensibilité vengeresse, at times — in the most interesting case — mystery, and finally *le malheur*.

186.

Auto-idolâtrie. Poetic harmony of character. Eurhythmy of character and of the faculties. To preserve all faculties. To make all faculties grow. A *cult*.

187.

What enchants in woman and *constitutes beauty*.

l'air blasé, l'air ennuyé, l'air évaporé, l'air impudent, l'air froid, l'air de regarder en dedans, l'air de domination, l'air de volonté, l'air méchant, l'air malade, l'air chat, enfantillage, nonchalance et malice mêlées.

188.

In Protestant countries two things are lacking that are indispensable to the happiness of a well-bred man, la galanterie et la dévotion

189.

What is intoxicating in bad taste: the aristocratic pleasure of *displeasing*.

190.

Stoicism, which has but one sacrament: suicide…

191.

La femme est naturelle, c'est-à-dire abominable. Aussi est-elle toujours vulgaire, c'est-à-dire le contraire du dandy.

192.

Il y a dans tout changement quelque chose d'infâme et d'agréable à la fois, quelque chose, qui tient de l'infidélité et du déménagement.

193.

il y a des gens, qui ne peuvent s'amuser qu'en troupe. Le vrai héros s'amuse tout seul.

194.

One must work, if not from taste, then at least from despair, since, all things well considered, working is less boring than amusing oneself.

195.

While still quite a child, I felt in my heart 2 contradictory feelings: l'horreur de la vie et l'extase de la vie. C'est bien le fait d'un paresseux nerveux.

196.

Baudelaire says of himself: "De Maistre et Edgar Poe taught me to reason"

197.

The death penalty, result of a mystical idea that is today wholly uncomprehended. The death penalty does not have as its goal to sauver society materiellement: it wants to sauver society and the guilty man spirituellement. For the sacrifice to be perfect, there must be consent and joy on the part of the victim. To give chloroform to one condemned to death would be an impiety: for that would take from him the consciousness de sa grandeur comme victime and take from him the chances of winning paradise.

As for torture, it stems from that partie infâme du cœur de l'homme which thirsts after voluptuousness. Cruauté et volupté, identical sensations, like extreme heat and extreme frost.

198.

Ce qu'il y a de *vil* dans une fonction quelconque.

Un dandy ne fait rien. Vous figurez-vous un dandy parlant au peuple, excepté pour le bafouer?

There are only 3 respectable beings: the priest, the warrior, the poet. Savoir, tuer et créer.

The other men are taillables ou corvéables, faits pour l'écurie, c'est-à-dire pour exercer ce qu'on appelle des professions.

199.

La femme Sand was a moralist.

— elle a le fameux *style coulant*, cher aux bourgeois.

— elle est bête, elle est lourde, elle est bavarde. In matters of morality the same depth of judgment, the same delicacy of feeling as les concierges et les filles entretenues.

— a naive old woman who will not quit the stage

— she has persuaded herself se fier à son *bon cœur* et à son *bon sens* and persuades other grosses bêtes to do the same.

— I cannot think of this stupide créature without a shudder of loathing.

200.

I am bored in France because everyone there resembles Voltaire. Voltaire ou Antipoète (Emerson, he says, forgot him), le roi des badauds, le prince des superficiels, l'antiartiste, le prédicateur des concierges.

201.

Voltaire's mockery of the immortal soul, which for 9 months resides between excrement and urine. Baudelaire divines in this localization "une malice ou une satire de la Providence contre l'amour et, dans le mode de la génération, un signe du péché originel. De fait, nous ne pouvons faire l'amour qu'avec des organes excrémentiels."

202.

Disinfection of love by the Church: marriage

203.

Dandyism. What is the higher man? He is no specialist. C'est l'homme de loisir et d'éducation générale. Être riche et aimer le travail.

204.

That is what is tedious about love: it is a crime in which one cannot avoid having an accomplice.

205.

Si tu étais jesuite et révolutionnaire, comme tout vrai politique doit l'être ou l'est fatalement…

206.

Dictators are les domestiques du peuple, nothing more; and *glory* is the result of adaptation — l'adaptation d'un esprit à la sottise nationale —

207.

What is love? A need to go out of oneself.

Man is un animal adorateur. Adorer c'est se sacrifier et se prostituer. Aussi tout amour est-il prostitution.

l'indestructible, éternelle, universelle et ingénieuse férocité humaine. Love of blood, l'ivresse du sang, l'ivresse des foules.

208.

NB. Défions-nous du peuple, du bon sens, du cœur, de l'inspiration et de l'évidence.

How can one let women into church? What sort of conversation can they carry on with God?

L'éternelle Vénus (caprice, hystérie, fantaisie) est une des formes séduisantes du diable.

209.

In love, l'entente cordiale is the consequence of a misunderstanding. Ce malentendu c'est *le plaisir*. The chasm remains unbridged.

210.

"Soyons médiocres!" Saint-Marc Girardin, out of passionate hatred of le sublime.

211.

One ought not to ascribe to ruling princes the merits and vices of the people over whom they are master. These merits and vices almost always belong to the atmosphere of the *preceding* reign.

Louis XIV inherits the people of Louis XIII: gloire.

Napoleon inherits the people of the Republic: gloire.

Napoleon inherits the people of Louis-Philippe: déshonneur.

212.

Ineradicable taste de la prostitution in the heart of man: hence his horreur of *solitude*. — Il veut être *deux*.

Genius (l'homme de génie) veut être un, donc solitaire

La gloire, c'est rester *un*, et se prostituer d'une manière particulière.

213.

C'est cette horreur de la solitude, le besoin d'oublier son *moi* dans la chair extérieure, que l'homme appelle noblement *besoin* d'aimer.

214.

De la nécessité de battre les femmes.

215.

Trade is, in its essence, satanic. Le commerce, c'est le prêté-rendu, c'est le prêt avec le sous-entendu: Rends-moi plus que je ne te donne.

— The mind of every tradesman is utterly vicié.

— Le commerce est naturel, *donc il est infâme*.

— The least wicked of all tradesmen is he who says: let us be virtuous, so as to earn far more money than the fools who are vicious. For the merchant, honnêteté itself is a speculation on profit.

— Le commerce est satanique, parce qu'il est une des formes de l'égoïsme —

216.

Only through misunderstandings is all the world in accord. If, unfortunately, people comprehended one another, they would never come to terms with one another

A man of spirit, he, that is, who will never come to terms with anyone, should train himself to love conversation with fools and the reading of bad books. He will draw from them bitter pleasures which will amply compensate him for the fatigue.

217.

A functionary, a minister — these may be estimable people: mais ils ne sont jamais divins. People without personality, beings without originality, born for the function, i.e. pour la domesticité publique.

218.

Every newspaper bears the signs of the most frightful human perversity: un tissu d'horreurs. With this dégoûtant apéritif civilized man accompanies his morning meal. Tout, en ce monde, sue le crime: le journal, la muraille et le visage de l'homme. — How can a clean hand touch a newspaper without a convulsion of disgust?…

219.

Sans la charité, je ne suis qu'une cymbale retentissante.

220.

Mes humiliations ont été des grâces de Dieu.

221.

Je n'ai pas encore connu le plaisir d'un plan réalisé.

222.

Tout recul de la volonté est une parcelle de substance perdue.

223.

like Baudelaire, who one day felt le vent de l'aile de l'imbécillité sweep over him

224.

Pour guérir de tout, de la misère, de la maladie et de la mélancolie, il ne manque absolument que le *goût du travail*.

225.

“Ridentem ferient ruinae” written upon his portrait.

226.

1.

That mankind has a collective task to accomplish, that as a whole it is running toward some goal — this very unclear and arbitrary notion is still very young. Perhaps one will be rid of it again before it becomes an "idée fixe"… It is no whole, this mankind: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending and descending life-processes — it does not have a youth and thereafter a maturity and finally an old age. For the strata lie jumbled together and one upon another — and in a few millennia there may still be younger types of man than those we can point to today. Décadence, on the other hand, belongs to all epochs of mankind: everywhere there is refuse and decaying matter; it is itself a life-process, the excretion of the forms of decline and waste.

2.

Under the dominion of the Christian prejudice *this question did not exist at all*: the meaning lay in the salvation of the individual soul; the more or less in the duration of mankind did not come into consideration. The best Christians wished that it might come to an end as soon as possible: — as to what the individual needed, *there was no doubt*… The task presented itself now for every individual, as it would in any future whatever for a man of the future: the value, meaning, compass of values was fixed, unconditional, eternal, one with God… Whatever deviated from this eternal type was sinful, devilish, condemned…

The centre of gravity of value lay for each soul within itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the *eternal* soul! Most extreme form of *selfing*… For each soul there was only one perfecting; only one ideal; only one way to redemption… Most extreme form of *equal rights*, bound up with an optical magnification of one's own importance to

the point of absurdity… Nothing but absurdly important souls, revolving around themselves with dreadful anxiety…

3.

Now no one believes any longer in this absurd self-importance: and we have strained our wisdom through a sieve of contempt. Nevertheless the *optical habit* remains unshaken of seeking a value of man in his approximation to an *ideal man*: at bottom one maintains both the *selfing perspective* and *equal rights before the ideal*. In summa: *one believes one knows* what, with regard to the ideal man, the *ultimate desirability* is…

This belief, however, is only the consequence of a tremendous *pampering* by the Christian ideal: which one at once pulls out again with every cautious examination of the "ideal type." One believes, *first*, that one knows that approximation to one type is desirable; *second*, that one knows what kind of type this is; third, that every deviation from this type is a regression, an inhibition, a loss of strength and power for man… To dream of conditions in which this *perfect man* has the enormous numerical majority on his side: higher than that our socialists, even the gentlemen utilitarians, have not got. — With this a *goal* seems to enter into the development of mankind: in any case the belief in a *progress toward the ideal* is the only form in which a kind of *goal* in the history of mankind is conceived today. In summa: one has transferred the coming of the "*kingdom of God*" into the future, onto the earth, into the human, — but at bottom one has held fast to the belief in the *old* ideal…

227.

To be grasped:

That every kind of decay and sickness has continually collaborated in the collective value judgments: that in the value judgments that have become dominant, décadence has even gained the upper hand: that we have to fight not only against the consequences of all the present misery of degeneration, but that *all* previous décadence has remained residual, i.e. *alive*. Such a collective aberration of mankind from its fundamental instincts, such a collective décadence of value judgment, is the question mark par excellence, the real riddle that the animal "man" sets the philosopher —

228.

The chief kinds of pessimism, the pessimism of *sensibility* (overexcitability with a preponderance of feelings of displeasure)

The pessimism of the "*unfree will*" (in other words: the lack of inhibitory forces against stimuli)

The pessimism of *doubt* (: the shyness of everything fixed, of all grasping and touching)

the psychological states belonging to these can all be observed in the madhouse, albeit in a certain exaggeration. Likewise "nihilism" (the piercing feeling of "nothingness")

But where does one place

the

moral pessimism of Pascal?

the

metaphysical pessimism of the Vedanta philosophy?

the

social pessimism of the anarchist (or of Shelley)?

the

pessimism of *compassion* (like that of Tolstoy, of Alfred de Vigny)?

— are these not all likewise phenomena of decay and sickness?… The excessive taking-seriously of moral values, or of "beyond"-fictions, or of social distress, or of *suffering* in general: every such *exaggeration* of a *single* point of view is in itself already a sign of sickness. Likewise the preponderance of the *No* over the *Yes*!

What is not to be confused with this: the delight in saying No and doing No out of a tremendous strength and tension of Yes-saying — peculiar to all rich and powerful men and ages. A luxury, as it were; a form of bravery too, which sets itself against the fearful; a sympathy for the terrible and questionable, because one is, among other things, terrible and questionable oneself: the *Dionysian* in will, spirit, taste.

229.

Leopardi complains, has reason to complain: but for that very reason he does not belong to the perfect type of the nihilist.

230.

J'écris pour une dizaine d'âmes que je ne verrai peut-être jamais, mais que j'adore sans les avoir vues. Stendhal.

231.

c. 1844 Baudelaire, dependent on Sainte-Beuve (Joseph Delorme), says… Sainte-Beuve says to him: „Vous dites vrai, ma poésie se rattache à la vôtre. J'avais goûté du même fruit amer, plein de cendres, au fond."

232.

Baudelaire: („Volupté“ l'histoire d'Amaury)

et devant le miroir, j'ai perfectionné

l'art cruel, qu'un démon, en naissant, m'a donné,

— de la douleur pour faire une volupté vraie, —

d'ensanglanter son mal et de gratter sa plaie.

233.

Concevoir un canevas pour une bouffonnerie lyrique — et traduire cela en un roman sérieux. Noyer le tout dans une atmosphère anormale et songeuse, — dans l'atmosphère des *grands jours* — Que ce soit quelque chose de berçant et même de serein dans la passion. — Régions de la *poésie pure*. —

234.

The further development of mankind as Baudelaire imagines it. Not that we should draw near to the savage state again, somewhat after the manner of the désordre bouffon of South American republics, where one seeks one's food, rifle in hand, amid the ruins of our civilization. That would still presuppose a certain vital energy. Mechanics will have so Americanized us, progress will have so atrophied the spiritualist part in us, that everything mad that has been dreamed by socialists will fall short of positive reality. No religion, no property; not even revolution any more. It is not in political institutions that the general ruin will show itself (ou le progrès universel: the name matters little). Need I say that the little of politics that remains se débattra péniblement dans les étreintes de l'animalité générale, and that the political rulers will be compelled, in order to keep themselves upright and to create a phantom of order, to take refuge in means qui

feraient frissonner notre humanité actuelle, *pourtant si endurcie*! (Hair-raising!) Then the son will flee the family, at 12 years of age, émancipé par sa précocité gloutonne, in order to enrich himself, in order to compete with his infamous father, fondateur et actionnaire d'un journal that spreads enlightenment, etc. — Then even the prostitutes will be a merciless wisdom, qui condamne tout, fors l'argent, tout, *même les erreur des sens*! Then everything that we call virtue will be regarded as something monstrously ridiculous — everything that is not ardeur vers Plutus. Justice will forbid citizens who do not know how to make their fortune, etc. — avilissement —

As for me, who at times feel within myself the ridiculousness of a prophet, I know that I shall never find in it la charité d'un médecin. Lost in this wretched world, coudoyé par les foules, I am like a weary man who, looking back, sees nothing but désabusement et amertume through long deep years, and before him a storm in which there is nothing new, neither teaching nor pain. Le soir, où cet homme a volé à la destinée quelques heures de plaisir — the evening on which this man has stolen an hour of pleasure from fate —, bercé dans sa digestion, oublieux autant que possible du passé, content du présent et résigné à l'avenir, enivré de son sang-froid et de son dandysme, fier de n'être pas aussi bas, que ceux qui passent, il se dit, en contemplant la fumée de son cigare: „Que m'importe, où vont ces consciences?" —

235.

A little pure air! This absurd condition of Europe shall not last any longer! Is there any thought whatever behind this horned-cattle nationalism? What value could there be, now that everything points to greater and common interests, in goading on these boorish self-regards?… And that calls itself a „Christian state"! And near the highest circles the court-preacher rabble!… And the „new Reich", founded

once again upon the most worn-out and best-despised of thoughts, equality of rights and of votes…

And this in a condition where *intellectual dependence* and denationalization leap to the eye, and where the real value and meaning of present-day culture lies in a mutual fusing and fertilizing!

The economic unification of Europe is coming of necessity — and likewise, as a reaction, the *party of peace*…

The struggle for precedence within a condition that is good for nothing: this culture of the big cities, of the newspapers, of fever and of „purposelessness"

236.

A party of *peace*, without sentimentality, which forbids itself and its children to wage war; forbids them to make use of the courts; which conjures up struggle, contradiction, persecution against itself; a party of the oppressed, at least for a time; soon the *great* party. Hostile to feelings of *revenge* and *rancour*.

A *war party*, proceeding with the same rigour of principle and severity against itself in the opposite direction —

237.

Buddhism and Christianity: struggle with *ressentiment*.

238.

Abolition of „punishment". „Reconciliation" in place of all means of force.

239.

Original Christianity is *abolition of the state*:

it forbids

the

oath

the

military service

the

law courts

the

defence of oneself and defence of any whole whatever

the

distinction between fellow countrymen and foreigners; likewise the order of *estates*

The *example of Christ*: he does not resist those who do him ill (he forbids defence); he does not defend himself; he does more: „he offers the left cheek“ (to the question „art thou Christ?“ he answers „and henceforth ye shall see etc.“)

— he forbids his disciples to defend him; he points out that he could have help, but does not *want* it.

— Christianity is also *abolition of society*: it favours everything thrust away by it, it grows out of the disreputable and the condemned, out of lepers of every kind, the „sinners“, the „publicans“ and prostitutes, the most stupid folk (the „fishermen“); it disdains the rich, the learned, the noble, the virtuous, the „correct“…

240.

On the psychological problem of

Christianity

The driving force remains: ressentiment, the popular uprising, the uprising of those who have come off badly

(with Buddhism it is otherwise: it is not *born* out of a movement of *ressentiment*. It combats ressentiment because it drives one to *action*)

this party of peace grasps that *renunciation of hostility in thought and deed* is a condition of distinction and of preservation

: herein lies the psychological difficulty which has prevented Christianity from being understood.

The drive that *created* it compels a fundamental combating of itself —

Only as a *party of peace and innocence* does this movement of uprising have any chance of success: it must conquer through extreme mildness, sweetness, gentleness; its instinct grasps this —

Trick: to deny, to condemn the drive of which one is the expression, to display constantly, by deed and word, the counterpart of this drive —

241.

A right to existence, to work, to happiness!!!

242.

un doux rêve du „charmant docteur“ — Renan

243.

Christians have never practised the actions which Jesus prescribed for them: and the impudent chatter about „faith“ and about „justification

by faith“ and its supreme and sole significance is merely the consequence of the fact that the Church had neither the courage nor the will to profess the *works* which Jesus demanded.

244.

The Buddhist acts differently from the non-Buddhist; *the Christian acts like everybody else* and has a Christianity of ceremonies and of *moods* —

245.

The deep and contemptible mendacity of Christianity in Europe: we truly deserve the contempt of the Arabs, Hindus, Chinese… Listen to the speeches of the first German statesman about what has really occupied Europe for these 40 years… listen to the language of the court-preacher Tartuffes

246.

— not to resist „evil“…

But if one does not believe in good and evil, what then does this mean?

247.

— The old law, which resists evil and repays evil with evil, and the new, which does not repay, does not defend itself

248.

— It only goes better *if one repays everything bad with good*, — and no longer makes any distinction of persons

249.

Jesus denies Church State society art, science, culture, civilization

All sages in their time have thus denied the value of culture and of the organization of the state. —

Plato, Buddha,

250.

One must destroy this temple and build it up again in three days.

251.

I have not been a Christian for a single hour of my life: I regard everything I have seen as Christianity as a *contemptible ambiguity of words*, a real *cowardice* before all the powers that otherwise rule…

Christians of universal conscription, of parliamentary suffrage, of newspaper culture, and amid all this talking of „sin", „redemption", „the beyond", death on the cross —: how can one endure it in such an unclean household!

252.

None of you has the courage to kill a man, or even to whip him, or even to — but the monstrous madness in the state overpowers the individual, so that he *refuses* responsibility for what he does (obedience, oath, etc.)

— Everything a man *does* in the service of the state goes against his nature…

— likewise everything he *learns* with a view to future service in the state goes against his nature

This is achieved through the *division of labour*: so that no one any longer bears the whole responsibility.

: the lawgiver and the one who carries out the law

: the teacher of discipline and those who have grown hard and severe in discipline

The state as *organized violence*…

253.

That Jesus said something so dark and mystical that faith is needed even to hold it true:

254.

"that which is *highly* esteemed among men is an abomination in the sight of God"

255.

The intellectual condition of Europe: our *barbarism*

the contemptible and paltry nonsense of a personal survival of the individual: a standpoint which Hindus, Jews and Chinese are said to have left behind

faith in God

256.

Entry into the *true* life —

— one saves one's personal life from death by living the universal life —

257.

— the *Church* is exactly what Jesus preached against — and what he taught his disciples to fight against —

258.

— *reciprocity*, the ulterior motive of wanting to be paid: one of the most insidious forms of degrading man's value. It brings with it that "equality" which devalues the gulf of distance as *immoral*…

259.

— one has no right, neither to existence, nor to work, nor least of all to "happiness": it is no different with the individual man than with the lowliest worm.

260.

— "what must one do in order to believe?" — an absurd question.

261.

What is lacking in Christianity is the observance of all that Christ commanded us to *do*.

It is the mean, petty life, but interpreted with an eye of contempt

262.

God created man happy, idle, innocent and immortal: our actual life is a false, fallen, sinful existence, an existence of punishment… Suffering, struggle, labour, death are assessed as objections and question marks against life, as something unnatural, something that ought not to last; against which one needs a remedy — and *has* one!…

263.

From Adam until now mankind has found itself in an abnormal condition: God himself gave up his Son for Adam's guilt, in order to put an end to this abnormal condition: the natural character of life is a *curse*; Christ gives back to him who believes in him the normal condition: he makes him happy, idle and innocent. — But the earth has not begun to bear fruit without labour; women do not bear children without pain, sickness has not ceased: the most believing fare as badly here as the most unbelieving. Only that man is freed from *death* and from *sin*, assertions which admit of no verification — this the Church has asserted all the more emphatically. "He is free from sin" — not through his own doing, not through a rigorous struggle on his part, but *bought free by the deed of redemption* — consequently perfect, innocent, paradisal…

The *true* life merely a belief (i.e. a self-deception, a madness). The whole struggling, fighting actual existence, full of splendour and darkness, merely a bad, false existence: to be *redeemed* from it is the task.

264.

Religion has *falsified* the conception of life: science and philosophy have always merely made an ancilla of this doctrine…

Whether one believes in God, in Christ and in Adam or not: one agrees that life is merely an *illusion*, nothing true, nothing real —

265.

Life is bad: but it does not depend on us to make it better. Change proceeds from laws that lie outside us. — The determinism of science and the belief in the deed of redemption stand on the same ground in this.

Likewise in this, that they grant man a *right to happiness*; that by this standard they condemn present life —

266.

All ask: "why is life not as we wish it to be, and *when* will it be so?"

267.

NB. NB. "man, innocent, idle, immortal, happy" — this conception of "supreme desirability" must above all be criticized.

Why are guilt, labour, death, suffering (*and*, speaking in Christian terms, *knowledge*…) *contrary* to supreme desirability?

The lazy Christian concepts "blessedness", "innocence", "immortality" — — —

268.

"Peace of men among one another": as the highest conceivable good: the kingdom of God

269.

be at peace with all the world, regard no one as though he were a nothing or a fool! When peace is broken, do everything to restore it. The worship of God lies wholly and entirely in the extirpation of enmity among men. Be reconciled at the slightest dispute, so as not to lose the inner peace which is the *true life*. What above all disturbs peace? First, sexual desire: against it, monogamy, and indissoluble at that. The second temptation is the oath: it draws man into sin: swear no oath to anyone and under no circumstances, so that you have no master over you but God. The third temptation is revenge, which calls itself justice: bear injuries and do not repay evil with evil! The fourth

temptation is the distinction between fellow countrymen and strangers; break peace with no one on account of your nationality and descent!

The practice of these 5 commandments brings about the condition the human heart longs for: all brothers among one another, each at peace with each, each enjoying the goods of the earth to his end…

Luke IV, 18

"the acceptable year of the Lord" — the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth —

270.

man has a right to nothing, he has obligations for the benefits he has received: he has no quarrel to pick with anyone. Even if he gave his life, he would not give back all that he has received: therefore his lord cannot be unjust towards him. But when man asserts his right to life, when he disputes with the principle of all things, from which he has his life, he proves only one thing — he does not grasp the *meaning* of life. Men, having received a benefit, *demand* something more. The labourers of the parable found themselves idle, unhappy: the lord gives them the highest happiness of life — work. They accept the benefit and are still dissatisfied. They came with their false theory of the right to work, and consequently with a *reward* for their work. They do not grasp that they have received the highest good for nothing, that they ought to show themselves grateful for it — and *not* demand payment. Matth. XX, 1 Luke 17, 5, 10.

The doctrine consists in renouncing personal life: and you demand personal glory — a personal reward… In the world there is glory and personal power; you, my disciples, are to know that the true meaning of life is not found in personal happiness, but in serving everyone and

humbling oneself before everyone… Christ does not recommend them to believe: he teaches them the true distinction between good and evil, between the important and the secondary…

Peter does not grasp the teaching: hence his lack of faith. *Reward proportional to the work* has importance only with regard to personal life. The belief in reward for work, in proportion to the work, is a consequence of the theory of *personal life*…

271.

Faith cannot come from trust in his words: it can come only from *insight into our situation*. One cannot create it through promises of reward and punishment — the faith that "moves mountains" can be founded only on the consciousness of our inevitable shipwreck, if we do not accept the rescue that still stands open to us… — life *in conformity with the will of the Lord* —

272.

Matth. 21, 18

— but as he went again into the city in the morning, he hungered. And he saw a fig tree by the wayside and went to it and found nothing thereon but leaves alone, and said unto it: Let no fruit grow on thee henceforth for evermore. And the fig tree withered away forthwith. And when the disciples saw this, they marvelled and said: How is the fig tree withered away so soon? —

273.

The five commands: be not angry; commit no adultery; swear no oath; do not defend yourselves by force; go not to war: You may, in moments, transgress against these commandments, just as you now transgress against the articles of the code civil and the code mondain.

But in moments of calm you will then not do what you do now: you will not *organize* for yourselves an existence that makes the task so difficult — not to be angry, not to commit adultery, not to swear, not to defend oneself by force, not to go to war. *Rather, organize for yourselves an existence that would make it hard for you to do these things!*

274.

For this present life of yours — says Tolstoy to the unbelievers, to us philosophers — you currently have no rule save those that are drawn up by men whom you do not esteem and enforced by the police. The doctrine of Jesus gives you these rules, which assuredly are in accord with your law, because your law of "altruism" or of the single will is nothing other than a bad paraphrase of this very doctrine of Jesus.

Tolstoy, My Religion.

Moscow, 22 January 1884

275.

No God died for our sins; no redemption through faith; no resurrection after death — these are all counterfeitings of genuine Christianity, for which that baleful crank must be held responsible;

The *exemplary life* consists in love and humility; in a fullness of heart that excludes not even the lowliest; in the formal renunciation of wanting-to-be-in-the-right, of defence, of victory in the sense of personal triumph; in faith in blessedness here, on earth, in spite of need, resistance and death; in forgivingness, in the absence of anger, of contempt; not wanting to be rewarded; having bound oneself to no one; the most spiritual-intellectual masterlessness; a very proud life under the will to a poor and serving life.

After the Church had let the *entire Christian practice* be taken from it, and had quite properly sanctioned life in the state, that kind of life which Jesus had fought against and condemned, it had to place the *meaning* of Christianity somewhere else: in *faith* in unbelievable things, in the ceremonial of prayer, worship, feast-days, etc. The concepts "sin", "forgiveness", "punishment", "reward" — all quite inconsiderable and almost *excluded* from the first Christianity — now come to the fore.

A horrible hodgepodge of Greek philosophy and Judaism; asceticism; the constant judging and condemning; the order of rank; — — —

276.

If one does not grasp that the Church is not merely the caricature of Christianity but the organized *war against Christianity*: — — —

277.

Tolstoy, p. 243

"The doctrine of Jesus cannot in any way run counter to the men of our century in their manner of regarding the world; it is in advance in accord with their metaphysics, but it gives them what they do not have, what is indispensable to them and what they are seeking: it gives them the path of life, not an unknown path, but a path explored and familiar to everyone."

p. 236

The antagonism between the explanations of the Church, which pass for faith, and the true faith of our generation, which consists in obeying the laws of society and that of the state, has entered an acute phase, and the majority of civilized people have nothing to regulate their lives but faith in the policeman and the gendarmerie. This situ-

ation would be appalling if it were entirely so; but fortunately there are people, the best of our age, who are not content with this religion, but who have an altogether different faith regarding what the life of men ought to be. These men are considered the most harmful, the most dangerous and above all the most unbelieving of all beings: and yet they are the only men of our time who believe in the gospel doctrine, if not in its entirety, at least in part… Often they even hate Jesus… However much one may persecute and slander them, they are the only ones who do not submit without protest to the orders of the first comer; consequently, they are the only ones in our age who live a reasoned life, not the animal life; they are the only ones who have faith.

278.

NB. One cannot have enough respect for man as soon as one regards him in terms of how he knows how to fight his way through, to endure, to turn circumstances to his advantage, to throw down adversaries; if, on the other hand, one looks at man insofar as he *wishes*, he is the most absurd beast… It is as if he needed a romping-ground of cowardice, laziness, feebleness, sweetishness, servility as a recreation for his strong and manly virtues: see the human *desirabilities*, his "ideals". The *wishing* man recovers from what is eternally valuable in him, from his doing: in the null, the absurd, the worthless, the childish. The spiritual poverty and lack of invention in this so inventive and resourceful animal is appalling. The "ideal" is, as it were, the penance man pays for the enormous expenditure he has to meet in all real and urgent tasks. When reality ceases, there comes the dream, the fatigue, the weakness: "the ideal" is downright a form of dream, fatigue, weakness… The strongest and the most powerless natures become alike when this state comes over them: they *deify* the *cessation* of work, of struggle, of the passions, of tension, of oppositions, of

"*reality*" in sum… of the wrestling for knowledge, of the *toil* of knowledge

innocence: that is what they call the ideal state of stupefaction

blessedness: the ideal state of laziness

love: the ideal state of the herd animal that no longer wants to have an enemy

with this, everything that degrades and brings man down has been raised into the *ideal*.

279.

Jesus set a real life, a life in truth, over against that ordinary life: nothing lies further from him than the clumsy nonsense of an "eternalized Peter", of an eternal personal continuance. What he combats is the self-importance of the "person": how can he want to eternalize precisely that?

He likewise combats the hierarchy within the community: he does not promise any proportion of reward according to performance: how can he have meant punishment and reward in the beyond!

280.

I do not see against what the revolt was directed whose author was Jesus, if it was not the revolt against the Jewish church — church understood exactly in the sense in which we understand the word… It was a revolt against "the good and the just", against "the saints of Israel", against the hierarchy of society — *not* against its corruption, but against the tyranny of caste, of custom, of formula, of order, of privilege, of spiritual pride, of puritanism in the spiritual domain — it was unbelief in the "higher men", the word understood in the spiritual sense, that led to rebellion here, an assault on everything that is

priest and theologian. But the hierarchy which was thus called into question was the foundation on which the Jewish people still continued to exist at all, the laboriously won *last* possibility of surviving, the relic of its old separate political existence: an attack on it was an attack on the deepest national instinct, on the will to Jewish self-preservation. This holy anarchist, who summoned the lowly people, the outcasts and "sinners" to opposition against the "ruling estate" — in a language that would still lead to Siberia today — was a political criminal, insofar as a political crime was still possible at all under these circumstances. This brought him to the cross: the testimony to it is the inscription on the cross: the King of the Jews. There is no ground whatever for asserting, with Paul, that Jesus died "for the sins of others"… he died for his own "sin". Placed in other conditions, for example in the midst of present-day Europe, the same kind of man would live, teach and speak as a nihilist: and in this case too one would hear from his party that their master had died for justice and for love between man and man — not for the sake of his guilt, but for the sake of *our* guilt (— that of the classes now governing: insofar, namely, as governing itself already counts as guilt among anarchists.)

281.

Paul, with an instinct for the needs of the non-Jews, translated those great symbols of the first Christian movement into the tangible and unsymbolic: first, he made out of the opposition of the *true* and the *false* life the opposition between this earthly life and that heavenly one beyond, to which death is the bridge (— he placed them in the movement of time, as now and as one day —). To this end he reached deep into full paganism and took *personal immortality*, something as anti-Jewish as it is anti-Christian. But throughout the whole world, wherever there were secret cults, people believed in this continuance, and indeed under a perspective of reward and punishment. This dark-

ening of paganism by the shadow of guilt-repayment in the beyond was what Epicurus, for example, combated… The trick of Paul was to inflate the belief that Christ had been seen again after his death (i.e. the fact of a *collective hallucination*) into a theological logic, as if immortality and resurrection were the *principal facts* and, as it were, the keystone of Jesus' order of salvation (— for this the whole *teaching* and *practice* of the old community had to be turned upside down)

That is the humour of the matter, a tragic humour: Paul re-erected on a grand scale precisely what Christ had annulled through his life. Finally, when the church is complete, it even takes *the existence of the state* under its sanction…

282.

NB.: a naive beginning of a Buddhist *peace movement*, out of the very hearth of ressentiment… but turned around by Paul into a pagan mystery doctrine, which finally learns to get along with the whole *organization of the state*… and wages wars, condemns, tortures, swears oaths, hates.

Paul starts from the need for mysteries of the great religiously excited multitude: he seeks a *sacrifice*, a bloody phantasmagoria that can hold its own in the struggle with the images of the secret cults: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the unio mystica with the "sacrifice"

he seeks to bring *continued existence* (the blessed, atoned continued existence of the individual soul) as resurrection into causal connection with that *sacrifice* (after the type of Dionysus, Mithras, Osiris)

he needs to bring the concept of *guilt* and *sin* into the foreground, *not* a new practice (such as Jesus himself showed and taught) but a new cult, a new faith, a faith in a miraculous transformation ("redemption" through faith)

he understood the *great need of the pagan world* and made a completely arbitrary selection from the facts of the life and death of Christ, re-accentuated everything, shifted the centre of gravity everywhere… he *annulled* original Christianity on principle…

The assault on *priests* and *theologians* ended, thanks to Paul, in a new priesthood and theology — a *ruling* estate, a *church* too

The assault on the excessive self-importance of the "*person*" ended in the belief in the "eternal person" (in concern for "eternal salvation"…), in the most paradoxical exaggeration of personal egoism.

One sees what had happened with the death on the cross. *Paul* appears as the demon of the dysangel…

283.

That a man's *harmfulness* should already be an *objection* to him!… As if among the great promoters of life there were not room for the great criminal too!…

We leave the animals untouched by our wishes; nature too; but men we absolutely want otherwise…

The most extraordinary men, supposing that a will, a resolution, a vote were made necessary for their coming into being, would never be striven for…

This much I have grasped: if the emergence of great and rare human beings had been made dependent on the consent of the many (granted that these *knew* what qualities belong to greatness, and likewise at whose expense all greatness develops) — well, there would never have been a single significant human being…

That the course of things takes its way *independently* of the consent of the vast majority: that is why a few astonishing things have crept onto the earth…

284.

In Morocco one comes to know the Middle Ages; in Corsica Jewish and Arab history at the time of its concentration; in Arabia the patriarchal age; — — —

285.

Feeling stronger — or, put differently: joy — always presupposes a comparing (but *not* necessarily with others; rather with oneself, in the midst of a state of growth, without one's first *knowing* in what respect one is comparing —)

— *artificial* intensification: whether through stimulating chemicals or through stimulating errors ("delusions")

e.g. the feeling of *security* such as the Christian has. He feels strong in his being-permitted-to-trust, in his being-permitted-to-be-patient-and-composed: he owes this artificial intensification to the delusion of being sheltered by a God

e.g. the feeling of *superiority*, e.g. when the Caliph of Morocco is shown only globes on which his three united kingdoms take up 4/5 of the surface

e.g. the feeling of *uniqueness*, e.g. when the European imagines that the course of culture plays itself out in Europe and when he seems to himself a kind of abridged world-process; or the Christian makes all existence whatsoever revolve around the "salvation of man" —

It depends on where one feels the pressure, the unfreedom: accordingly a different feeling of *being-stronger* is produced. A philo-

sopher, for example, feels, amid the coolest, most transmontane gymnastics of abstraction, like a fish that comes into its water: whereas colours and sounds oppress him, not to speak of the dull cravings — of what the others call "the ideal."

286.

Morphology of the *feelings of self*:

First point of view

A: to what extent the *feelings of sympathy and community* are the lower, the preparatory stage, at a time when the personal feeling of self, the initiative of value-positing in the individual, is not yet possible at all

B: to what extent the *height of the collective feeling of self*, pride in the distance of the clan, the feeling-oneself-unequal, the aversion to mediation, equal rights, reconciliation, is a school of the *individual feeling of self*: namely insofar as it compels the individual to *represent* the pride of the whole… He must speak and act with an extreme respect for himself, insofar as he embodies the community in his person…

likewise: when the individual feels himself to be the *instrument and mouthpiece of the godhead*

C: to what extent these forms of *unselfing* in fact give the person a tremendous importance: insofar as higher powers make use of it: religious awe before oneself, the state of the prophet, the poet…

D: to what extent responsibility for the whole *cultivates* in and *permits* the individual a wide gaze, a severe and terrible hand, a deliberateness and coldness and grandeur of bearing, of gesture, which he would not grant himself for his own sake

In sum: the collective feelings of self are the great preparatory school of personal sovereignty

the noble class is the one that comes into the inheritance of this exercise —

287.

In the concept of power, whether of a god or of a man, the capacity to *benefit* and the capacity to *harm* are always reckoned in together. So among the Arabs; so among the Hebrews. So among all strongly constituted races.

It is a fateful step when one *dualistically separates* the power for the one from that for the other… With this, morality becomes the poisoner of life…

288.

My friends, today one must already crawl on all fours in this "state" and bray like an ass: it is needful to make the epidemic believe that one is an ass — the only means of keeping oneself uninfected by this madness

289.

Heva is the serpent: she stands at the head of the biblical genealogy (just as the serpent commonly occurs as a proper name among the Hebrews)

290.

The meaning of circumcision is a test of manliness of the first rank (a *certificate of maturity* before one may marry): the Arabs call it "flaying." The scene takes place in the open air: the father and the friends stand around the youth. The tonsor draws the knife and, after he has cut off the foreskin, strips the *member* (the private parts) of all skin, together with the belly from the navel up to the hips. Meanwhile the youth

brandishes a knife in his right hand above the back of the tonsor and cries "cut without fear!" Woe if the tonsor hesitates and his hand trembles! But the father kills his son on the spot if he cries out in pain. Finally the youth strikes up a gloria Deo and betakes himself into the tent, where he falls to the ground in pain. Some perish from the tremendous suppuration; of ten, usually eight survive: they have no pecten, and a pale skin covers their belly. (among the 'Asîr)

291.

barbarian = uncircumcised is both Jewish and Arab

292.

Christianity did not understand the Last Supper: the communio through flesh and drink, which by natural means are transubstantiated into flesh and blood —

All community is blood community. This is not only inborn, it is also acquired; just as blood is not merely inborn but is also acquired. Whoever eats and drinks together renews his blood from the same source, brings the same blood into his veins. A stranger, even an enemy, who shares our meal (even without and against our will) is thereby received, at least for a while, into the community of our flesh and blood.

293.

Shared partaking of blood the oldest means of alliance, of covenant-making. The eating fellowship is a sacral community. The animal that supplies the covenant blood is a sacrifice; the covenant is made through every sacrifice.

294.

"Christianity" has become something fundamentally different from what its founder did and willed

it is the great *anti-pagan movement* of antiquity, formulated by making use of the life, teaching and "words" of the founder of Christianity, but in an absolutely *arbitrary* interpretation according to the schema of *fundamentally different needs*: translated into the language of all the already existing *subterranean religions* —

it is the advent of pessimism, whereas Jesus wanted to bring the peace and happiness of the lambs

: and indeed the pessimism of the weak, the defeated, the suffering, the oppressed

its mortal enemy is 1) *power* in character, spirit and taste; "worldliness" 2) classical "happiness," noble levity and scepticism, hard pride, eccentric dissipation and the cool self-sufficiency of the sage, Greek refinement in gesture, word and form, — its mortal enemy is the *Roman* just as much as the *Greek*.

Attempt of *anti-paganism* to ground itself philosophically and make itself possible: a nose for the ambiguous figures of ancient culture, above all for Plato, this anti-Hellene and Semite by instinct… Likewise for Stoicism, which is essentially the work of Semites (— "dignity" as severity, law, virtue as greatness, self-responsibility, authority, as the highest personal sovereignty — that is Semitic:

the Stoic is an Arab sheikh wrapped in Greek swaddling clothes and concepts

295.

Christianity from the very outset converted the symbolic into *crudities*:

1)

the opposition "true life" and "false" life: misunderstood as "life on this side" and "life in the beyond"

2)

the concept "eternal life," in contrast to the personal life of transience, as "personal immortality"

3)

fraternization through shared partaking of food and drink according to Hebrew-Arab custom as the "miracle of transubstantiation"

4)

the "resurrection" — as entry into the "true life", as "being born again" — out of this: a historical eventuality that occurs at some point after death

5)

the doctrine of the Son of Man as the "Son of God", the living relationship between man and God — out of this: the "second person of the Godhead" — precisely this *done away with*: the filial relationship of every man to God, even the lowliest

6)

redemption through faith, namely that there is no other way to sonship of God than the *practice of life* taught by Christ — inverted into the belief that one must believe in some miraculous *paying off* of *sin*, accomplished not by man but by the deed of Christ

: with this, "Christ on the cross" had to be interpreted anew.

This death was in itself by no means *the* main thing… it was only one more sign of how one ought to conduct oneself toward the authorities

and the laws of the world — *not defending oneself… Therein lay the example.*

Christianity merely takes up the struggle that already existed against the *classical* ideal, against the *noble* religion

In fact this whole *transformation* is a translation into the needs and the level of understanding of the *religious mass* of that time: that mass which believed in Isis, Mithras, Dionysus, the "great mother", and which demanded of a religion

1)

the hope of a beyond

2)

the bloody phantasmagoria of the sacrificial animal, "the mystery"

3)

the redeeming *deed,* the holy legend

4)

asceticism, world-negation, superstitious "purification"

5)

a hierarchy, a form of community-building

in short: Christianity adapts itself to the already existing *anti-paganism* that had grown in everywhere, to the cults that Epicurus had fought against… more precisely, to the *religions of the lower mass*, of *women*, of *slaves*, of the *non-noble classes*.

We thus have as *misunderstanding*:

1)

the immortality of the person

2)

the alleged *other* world

3)

the absurdity of the concept of punishment and the concept of atonement at the centre of the interpretation of existence

4)

the de-deification of man instead of his *de*ification, the tearing open of the deepest chasm, over which only the miracle, only the prostration of the deepest self-contempt can help one across

5)

the whole world of corrupted imagination and morbid affect, instead of the loving, simple-hearted practice, instead of a Buddhistic happiness attainable on earth…

6)

an ecclesiastical order, with priesthood, theology, cult, sacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth had *fought against*

7)

the *miracle* in each and every thing, superstition: whereas precisely what distinguishes Judaism and the earliest Christianity is its *aversion* to miracles, its relative *rationality*

296.

Journal des Goncourt I.

"a God à l'américaine, who is God in an altogether human fashion, who wears spectacles, about whom there are testimonials in the little newspapers" — a God in photograph —

… she asks for news of your soul, "are you in a state of grace?", as though she were asking: "have you a cold?"

Joubert: his thoughts lack French precision. It is neither clear nor franc. It smells of the little Genevan school: Mad. Necker, Tracy, Jouffroy. The *bad* Sainte-Beuve comes from there. Joubert turns ideas the way one turns du buis.

— from time to time one feels the need d'un encanaillement de l'esprit

— the broad brush is lacking in his conversation; nothing but pretty, small, timid things (of Sainte-Beuve)

— did the ancients work after a beautiful reality? were they perhaps not "idealists" at all?

— they look for a *zero* in order to multiply their value tenfold

— in early youth, when the whole liveliness of expansion *recedes* through great solitude —

"in a synagogue one feels as in the Orient, in a happy religion. A kind of familiarity with God, no prayer, as in the Christian church, where one always wants to have something forgiven…

The "4 Syndics" of *Rembrandt*; the martyrdom of Saint Mark by *Tintoretto* — the most beautiful pictures in the world for the Goncourts.

English comfort a marvellous understanding of bodily well-being, but of a kind of happiness such as the blind might make use of: the eye finds no satisfaction in it.

NB: rien de si mal écrit qu'un beau discours.

In Salammbô Flaubert comes to light, bombastic, declamatory, melodramatic, in love with thick colour

— the only one who has made the discovery of a language in which one can speak of ancient times: Maurice de Guérin in the "Centaur"

— the people love neither the true nor the simple: they love the novel and the charlatan.

It is very remarkable that the four men les plus purs de tout métier et de tout industrialisme, les quatre plumes les plus entièrement vouées à l'art should have been the very ones to come before the benches of the police correctionelle: Baudelaire, Flaubert and les Goncourt.

We have multiplied the speed of all means of transport tenfold: but at the same time multiplied the need for speed within us a hundredfold…

Je hais tout ce qui est *cœur* imprimé, mis sur du papier. Gavarni.

A corruption of old civilizations, to take pleasure only in the works of man and à s'embêter des œuvres de Dieu.

we are le siècle des chefs-d'œuvre de l'irrespect.

happiness in the light of Algiers, the caressing kind of light: how one breathes cheerfulness…

The French mélancholie contemporaine, une mélancolie non *suicidante*, non blasphématrice, non désespérée: une tristesse, qui n'est pas sans douceur et où rit un coin d'ironie. The melancholies of Hamlet, Lara, Werther, even René are the melancholies of peoples *more northern* than we are.

The type of 1830: energetic features, a mild expression, a soft smile that caresses you; accustomed to battle, to noble struggles, to ardent sympathies, to the loud applause of a young public; and withal carrying in the depths of himself sorrow and remorse, not to be consoled, with a torn heart; the political ideas of 1848 set him in a fever once more for a moment. Since then the boredom and the idleness of his

thoughts and aspirations. A distinguished mind, suffering from a peaceful homesickness for an ideal in politics, literature, art, complaining in an undertone and avenging himself only on himself for the vision of the imperfection of things here below.

In the modern lawbook, in the Code, honour is just as forgotten as la fortune. Pas un mot de l'arbitrage de l'honneur: the duel etc. As for the fortune of today, qui est presque toute in stock-exchange operations dans des opérations de bourse, de courtage, d'agiotage, de coulisse ou d'agences de change, nothing is provided to protect and defend it: no réglementation de ces trafics journaliers; the tribunals incompetent for all stock-exchange transactions; the exchange broker gives no reçu.

La Bruyère: „on peut se servir des coquins, mais l'usage en doit être discret."

How does one have the courage to speak to a theatre public? The play is appraised by a masse d'humanité réunie, une bêtise agglomérée… (A book one takes cognizance of in solitude —)

"If one is good, one appears cowardly: one must be wicked in order to pass for courageous": a theme for Napoleon III

"Before a good landscape I feel myself more à la campagne than in the open field and in the depths of the forest." We are too civilized, too old, too much in love with the factice and artificiel to be amused by the green of the earth and the blue of the sky.

Flaubert likewise: horreur on the Rigi.

Literature of the 20th century: mad and mathematical at once, analytic-fantastic: things more important and in the foreground, no longer beings; love abolished (already in Balzac money steps into the foreground): narrating more of the history in the head than of that in the *heart*.

Ces désespérances, ces doutes, non de nous, ni de nos ambitions, mais du moment et des moyens, au lieu de nous abaisser vers les concessions, font en nous, plus entière, plus intraitable, plus hérissée, la *conscience littéraire*. Et, un instant, nous agitons si nous ne devrions pas penser et écrire absolument pour nous, laissant à d'autres le bruit, l'éditeur, le public. Mais, comme dit Gavarni: on n'est pas parfait.

Journal des Goncourt I, p. 147.

the café a rudimentary state: cheerfulness for 40 ct., perhaps with a gas (gas exhilarant): une demi-tasse de paradis

Gavarni: it is cruel, but so it is, I have not two sous' worth of vénération in me. (but sensitivité indeed —)

Flaubert: de la forme naît l'idée, the highest formula of the school, after Théophile Gautier

il faut à des hommes comme nous, une femme peu élevée, peu éduquée, qui ne soit que gaieté et esprit naturel, parce que celle-là nous réjouira et nous charmera ainsi qu'un agréable animal, auquel nous pourrons nous attacher.

The time when all men will read and all women will play the piano, the world will be in full dissolution; it has forgotten a word from the testament of Cardinal de Richelieu: "ainsi qu'un corps qui auroit des yeux en toutes ses parties, seroit monstrueux, de même un État le seroit, si tout le sujets étoient savants. On y verroit aussi peu d'obéissance que l'orgueil et la présomption y seroient ordinaires."

No painters any more. An army of chercheurs d'idées ingénieuses. De l'esprit, non de touche, mais dans le choix du sujet. Literature of the brush.

Raphael found the classical type of the Virgin through the perfection of the vulgar type — through the absolute opposite of beauty as le

Vinci sought it in the *exquisiteness* of the type and the *rarity* of the expression. A kind of wholly human cheerfulness, a rounded beauty, an almost Junonian health. It will remain eternally popular.

Voltaire the last mind of old France, Diderot the first of the new. Voltaire carried the epic, the fable, the little vers, tragedy to the grave. Diderot inaugurated the modern novel, the drama and art criticism.

To be a skeptic, to profess skepticism — a bad way of making one's way! The means of skepsis is irony, the formula least accessible aux épais, aux obtus, aux sots, aux niais, aux masses? Then this negation shocks, this doubt about everything, the illusions of everyone, at the very least those which everyone flaunts: the self-satisfaction of mankind with itself, which presupposes satisfaction with oneself, — that peace of the human conscience which the bourgeois affects, as though passing off the peace of his personal conscience. —

At the bottom of this metaphysical monologue I feel the preoccupation — "la préoccupation et la terreur du au-delà de la mort, que donne aux esprits les plus émancipés l'éducation religieuse."

Man made woman by giving her all his poetries… Gavarni

With clowns and tightrope walkers their métier is their duty: the only actors whose talent is undisputed and absolute, like that of mathematicians or, more still, comme le saut périlleux. For here there is no false semblance of talent: either one falls or one does not fall.

Rien de plus charmant, de plus exquis que l'esprit français des étrangers, l'esprit de Galiani, du prince de Ligne, de Henri Heine.

Flaubert: "après tout, le travail, c'est encore le meilleur moyen d'escamoter la vie."

What strikes one in Victor Hugo, who has the ambition of wanting to pass for a thinker: it is the *absence* of thought. That is no thinker, that

is a creature of nature (un naturaliste, says Flaubert): he has the sap of trees in his veins —

De l'amoureux à la mode. 1830 the *ténébreux*, after the influence of Antony. The dominant actor sets the tone for seduction in love. In 1860 it is the farceur (after the model of Grassot)

There are no more arms for working the land. Education destroys the *race* of workers and consequently agriculture…

true freedom for the individual exists only so long as he is not yet enrégimenté in a perfectly civilized society: in it he loses all possession of himself, of his goods, of his *good*. The State, from 1789 on, has devilishly absorbed the rights of everyone, and I ask myself whether, under the name of the perfect rule of the State, the future does not hold in store for us yet a wholly different tyranny, servi par le despotisme d'une bureaucratie française —

297.

Half-sided competence: or the good man.

To an attempt to think away from the godhead all "evil" qualities and intentions there corresponds an attempt to reduce man to the half that makes up his *good* qualities: under no circumstances is he to harm, to *want* to harm…

The way to this: the castration of the capacity for *enmity*, the uprooting of *ressentiment*, *peace* as the sole and solely sanctioned *inner* state…

The point of departure is wholly ideological: "good" and "evil" have been posited as a contradiction, and it is now held to be consistent that the good man should renounce and resist "evil" down to its last root; one thinks thereby to return to wholeness, to unity, to strength, and to put an end to one's own inner anarchy and self-dissolution between opposing value-impulses.

But: one holds *war* to be *evil* — and yet wages war!… In other words: now more than ever one does not cease to hate, to say No, to do No: the Christian, for example, hates sin (not the sinner: as pious cunning keeps them apart) — And precisely through this false separation of "good" and "evil" the world of what is hateworthy, of what must eternally be fought, has grown monstrously. In practice "the good man" sees himself surrounded by evil, sees evil in all doing — he ends by understanding nature as evil, man as corrupt, being good as grace.

— Thus there arises a type overladen with hatred and contempt, but one which has *cut itself off from the means* of waging war in deed and with weapons: a worm-eaten species of "chosen ones", apostles of peace

I. The perfect "ox".

The *Stoic* type. Or: the perfect ox. Firmness, self-mastery, the imperturbable, peace as the unbendingness of a long will — the deep calm, the state of defence, the mountain, warlike mistrust — firmness of principles; the unity of *will* and *knowledge*, high esteem for oneself. Hermit type.

The *consistent* type: here it is grasped that one may not hate even evil, that one may not resist it, that one may not wage war even against oneself: that one does not merely accept the suffering such a practice brings with it; that one lives wholly and entirely in the *positive* feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word and deed; that through a superfetation of peaceable, kindly, conciliatory, helpful and loving states one impoverishes the soil of the other states…, that one needs a continual *practice*

what is attained here? — The Buddhist type: or the perfect cow

This standpoint is possible only where no moral fanaticism prevails, i.e. where evil is hated not for its own sake but only because it fur-

nishes the path to states that hurt us (unrest, work, care, entanglement, dependence.)

This the *Buddhist* standpoint: here sin is not hated, here the concept "sin" is lacking.

II.

The *inconsistent* type: one wages war against evil — one believes that war *for the sake of the good* does not have the moral consequences and consequences for character that war otherwise brings with it (and on account of which one abhors it as *evil*). In fact such a war against evil corrupts far more thoroughly than any hostility from person to person; and usually "the person" even slips back in as opponent, at least in imagination (the devil, the evil spirits, etc.) The hostile attitude, the watching, the spying upon everything in us that is bad and could be of bad origin, ends in the most tormented and restless condition: so that now "miracles", reward, ecstasy, a solution in the beyond become *desirable*…

The Christian type: or the perfect *bigot*.

298.

How false, how mendacious men have always been about the fundamental facts of their inner world! To have no eye here, to keep one's mouth shut here or to open one's mouth —

299.

The big words

The great men

The great ages.

300.

"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral indifferentism towards oneself, blindness towards good and bad consequences: lack of scruple in the use of dangerous means; perversity and multiplicity of character divined as an advantage and exploited —

My deep indifference towards myself: I want no advantage from my insights and do not evade the disadvantages they bring with them either — reckoned in here is what might be called *corruption* of character; this perspective lies outside: I handle my character, but think neither of understanding it nor of changing it — the personal calcul of virtue has not for a moment entered my head. It seems to me that one shuts the gates of knowledge on oneself as soon as one takes an interest in one's personal case — or indeed in the "salvation" of one's soul!… One must not take one's morality too seriously, nor let oneself be robbed of a modest claim to its opposite…

A kind of *inherited wealth of morality* is perhaps presupposed here: one scents that one can squander a great deal of it and throw it out of the window without thereby becoming especially poorer. Never to feel tempted to admire "beautiful souls". Always to know oneself superior to them. To meet the monsters of virtue with an inward mockery; déniaiser la vertu — secret pleasure.

To roll around oneself; no wish to become "better" or even merely "different" at all; too interested not to cast the tentacles and nets of every morality out after things —

301.

This figure is not cast in one piece. Not only has it been disguised with all manner of wisdom- and proverb-philistinism, so that it is almost vulgarized into a "moralist": the worst is that the type itself

has not been left untouched. One guesses how early this figure had from the outset to serve various purposes: within a short time there was already merely a tradition of this already doctored figure. It seems that the old typical prophet of Israel strongly coloured this portrait: the unevangelical traits, the wrath, the curses, the whole so improbable prophecy of the "judgment", the whole desert type, the unbridled language against Pharisees and scribes, the driving out from the temple

— also the cursing of the fig tree — the typical case of where and how one should *not* work a miracle

Thou shalt not curse. Thou shalt not work sorcery. Thou shalt take no revenge. Thou shalt not lie (— for that a thing, merely because it is held to be true, should have the obligingness to become truth, is a lie: one experiences the demonstratio ad absurdum three times a day —

302.

Here every word is symbol; at bottom there is no reality any more. The danger of laying hands wrongly on these symbols is extraordinary. Almost all ecclesiastical concepts and valuations lead astray: one cannot possibly misunderstand the New Testament more thoroughly than the Church has misunderstood it. It lacked all the preconditions for an understanding: the historian's neutrality, which does not give a damn whether "the salvation of the soul" hangs on the word

The Church never had the good will to understand the New Testament: it wanted to prove itself with it. It sought and seeks behind it a theological system: it presupposes one, — it believes in the One Truth. It took the nineteenth century — le siècle de l'irrespect — to regain some of the most preliminary conditions, to read the book as a book (and *not* as truth), to recognize this history not as "sacred his-

tory" but as a devilry of fable, doctoring, falsification, palimpsest, muddle, in short as *reality*…

We do not take sufficient account of the barbarism of concepts in which we Europeans still live.

NB: That people could have believed that "the salvation of the soul" depends on a book!… And I am told that people still believe it today.

What is the use of all scientific education, all criticism and hermeneutics, if such an absurdity of biblical interpretation as the Church upholds has not yet made the blush of shame our very livery?

303.

Love

Look into it: this love, this pity of women — is there anything more egoistic?… And when they sacrifice themselves, their honour, their reputation, to whom do they sacrifice themselves? to the man? or not rather to an unbridled need?

— these are just as much selfish desires: whether they do good to others and plant gratitude…

— to what extent such a hyperfoetation of a single valuation can *sanctify* everything else!!

304.

We would be right to be shocked by it: an enthusiasm such as Thekla's is something one cannot possibly approve in principle. We may let ourselves be carried away by the poet's talent into sympathizing with a single individual who experiences it: but it cannot serve as the basis for a general system et nous n'aimons en France que ce qui peut être d'une application universelle.

Theatrical morality in France is far more rigorous than in Germany. Cela tient à ce, que les Allemands prennent le sentiment pour base de la morale, tandis que pour nous cette base est la raison. Un sentiment sincère, complet, sans bornes, leur paraît, non seulement excuser ce qu'il inspire, mais l'ennoblir et, si j'ose employer cette expression, le sanctifier. We have far stricter principles and we never depart from them in theory. A feeling that disregards a duty seems to us only one fault more; we would more readily forgive interest, because interest brings more skill and decency to its transgressions. Feeling challenges opinion, brave l'opinion, and opinion is provoked by it; interest seeks to *deceive* it by sparing it, and even when opinion discovers the deception, it is grateful for this kind of homage.

305.

Nous n'envisageons l'amour que comme les passions humaines, c'est-à-dire ayant pour effet d'égarer notre raison, ayant pour but de nous procurer des jouissances. B. Constant.

306.

The rule of the unities makes composition very difficult: elles circonscrivent les tragédies, surtout historiques, dans un espace. — They often force the poet to neglect, in the events and the characters, the truth of gradation, the delicacy of nuances; there are gaps, transitions that are too abrupt.

The French paint only one fact or one passion. They have a need for unity. Ils repoussent des caractères tout ce qui ne sert pas à faire ressortir la passion qu'ils veulent peindre; ils suppriment de la vie antérieure de leurs héros tout ce qui ne s'enchaîne pas nécessairement au fait, qu'ils ont choisi.

The French system presents le fait qui forme le sujet and likewise la passion, qui est le mobile de chaque tragédie, in a perfect *isolement*. Unity of *interest*, of *perspective*. The spectator recognizes that this is not a historical personnage, but un héros factice, une créature d'invention —

307.

Does *love* need unrest and fears? does it require jealousy as manure? does it strive gently toward the pure and peaceful air of dreams? — In the other case a skilful and *disinterested egoism* would be the first of the virtues, le plus raisonnable des devoirs —

308.

Les circonstances sont bien peu de chose, le caractère est tout.

309.

On change de situation; on ne se corrige pas en se déplaçant.

310.

The whole conception of the rank of the *passions*: as if what is right and normal were to be guided by *reason* — while the passions are the abnormal, the dangerous, the half-animal, and moreover, as regards their goal, nothing other than *desires for pleasure*…

Passion is degraded 1) as if it were the mobile only in an *un*seemly way, and not necessarily and always 2) insofar as it has in view something that has no high value, an enjoyment…

The misunderstanding of passion and *reason*, as if the latter were an entity in itself and not rather a state of relation among various

passions and desires; and as if not every passion had its quantum of reason within it…

311.

By painting only one passion (and *not* a whole individual character) one obtains tragic effects, because individual characters, which are always *mixed*, *damage* the unity of the impression. But truth loses thereby. One asks oneself what would remain of the heroes if they were not moved by this passion: certainly *very little*… Characters are countless. The passions of the theatre are few in number. "Polyphonte le tyran ("the tyrant") est un genre: le tyran Richard III un individu"

312.

Things to come. Against the romanticism of the great "passion".

To grasp how every "classical" taste requires a quantum of coldness, lucidity, hardness: logic above all, happiness in spirituality, "three unities", concentration — hatred of feeling, sentiment, esprit, hatred of the manifold, the uncertain, the roving, the presentient, as much as of the brief, the pointed, the pretty, the kindly

One should not play with artistic formulas: one should recreate life so that afterwards it *must* formulate itself…

It is a cheerful comedy, which only now we are learning to laugh at, which only now we *see*: that the contemporaries of Herder, Winckelmann, Goethe and Hegel claimed *to have rediscovered the classical ideal*… And at the same time Shakespeare!

— and the same generation had disowned the classical school of the French in a contemptuous manner!

— as if the essential could not have been learned just as well here as there!…

But they wanted "nature", "naturalness": oh dullness! they believed that classicism was a kind of naturalness!

To think through to the end, without prejudice or softness, on what soil a classical taste can grow.

Hardening, simplifying, strengthening, making man more evil: these belong together. The logical-psychological simplification. Contempt for detail, for the complex, the uncertain —

The romantics in Germany did *not* protest against classicism, but against reason, enlightenment, taste, the 18th century.

The sensibility of romantic-Wagnerian music: its opposite, the *classical sensibility*…

the will to unity (because unity tyrannizes: namely the listeners, the spectators) but inability to let it tyrannize in the main thing: namely with regard to the work itself (in renouncing, shortening, clarifying, simplifying.

the overpowering through mass (Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine) and never with greatness

313.

"Didst thou perchance imagine I should hate life, flee into deserts, because not all my blossoming dreams grew ripe?" — says Goethe's Prometheus.

314.

Wagnerian art: a compromise between the three most modern needs: for the morbid, for the brutal and for the innocent (the idiotic)…

315.

Why does German music culminate at the time of German romanticism? Why is Goethe missing from German music? How much Schiller, more precisely how much "Thekla", there is by contrast in Beethoven!

— Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffmann, Tieck in him

— Richard Wagner has Freischütz, Hoffmann, Grimm, the romantic legend, the mystical Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, the "free-thinking of passion", Rousseau's intentions

The "Flying Dutchman" smacks of France, where le ténébreux of 1830 was the seducer-type

— *Cult of music:* the revolutionary romanticism of form

Wagner *sums up* romanticism, the German and the French —

316.

The big words:

"Peace of the soul"

"love"

"classical taste"

317.

Nationalism has corrupted character in France, and spirit and taste in Germany: to endure a great defeat — and a definitive one at that — one must be younger and healthier than the victor

318.

Wagner's exoticism among the adherents of "Teutomania"

319.

The humor of European culture: one holds this to be true, but does *that*. For example, what use is all the art of reading and of criticism, if the ecclesiastical interpretation of the Bible (the Protestant as much as the Catholic) is upheld now as ever!

320.

The Wagnerian, with his overhasty admiration for everything in Wagner that is not at all wondrous, but rather "Wagnerish" —

321.

— this senseless overloading with details, this underscoring of the little traits, the mosaic effect: Paul Bourget

The ambition of the grand style — and with it the not-wanting-to-renounce what he did better, the small, the smallest; this overloading with details; this chaser's work at moments when no one *ought* to have eyes for small things; this restlessness of the eye, which is to be adjusted now for mosaic and now for boldly dashed-off wall frescoes

I have traced the peculiar torment that listening to Wagner's music arouses in me back to this: that this music resembles a painting that does not permit me to stay in one place… that the eye, in order to understand, must constantly readjust itself: now myopic, so that the most refined mosaic chasing escapes it not, now for bold and brutal frescoes that want to be seen from very far off. The inability to hold to a definite optics constitutes the style of Wagner's music: style here used in the sense of incapacity for style

322.

Wagner:

1)

not to let oneself be deceived by the *German*

tendency

— his sensibility is as little German as possible; all the more German, by contrast, his kind of spirit and spirituality (style included)

— he has the deepest sympathy for the great symbols of *medieval* Europe and seeks their "bearers" —

— the type of his heroes is as little German as possible: Tannhäuser, the Flying Dutchman, Rienzi, Lohengrin, Elsa, Tristan, Siegfried, Parsifal: just try the — — —: there remain the "Meistersinger"

— the cult of "passion" is not German

— the cult of "drama" is not German: it has a tremendous power of persuasion through the weight and terribleness of its gesture.

2)

what is German?

— the uncertain symbolism, the delight in what is imprecisely thought, the false "profundity", the arbitrary, the lack of fire, wit and grace, the incapacity for the *great line*, for the necessary in — — —

3)

in the main thing one must not let oneself be misled: Wagner's musical drama is a step backward, worse, a décadence-form of music —

— he has sacrificed everything musical, music itself, in order to make of it an art of expression, of intensification, of suggestion, of the psychologically picturesque

the extraordinary instinct for acting and theater has likewise not been German hitherto (— one understands nothing of Wagner if one does not grasp in this instinct his faculté maîtresse, his dominating instinct)

German depth, multiplicity, arbitrariness, fullness, uncertainty: the great symbols and riddles, growing loud with gentle thunder out of an immense distance: the grey and malicious German sky, which knows happiness only as caricature and wish —

323.

Where does he get his following? From the majority of the unmusical, the half-musical, the three-quarters-educated of both sexes, whose vanity it flatters to understand Wagner

Victory of the unmusical, half-musical enthusiast for culture, who is flattered by Wagner's grand attitude, as if it were a sign of superiority to "understand" here

: he appeals to the beautiful feelings and the heaving bosom

he stirs above all that which an enthusiastic — the German — feeling for nature — — —

— he hypnotizes the mystical-erotic little females, in that his music makes the spirit of a mesmerist palpable right down into their spinal marrow (— observe the Lohengrin prelude in its physiological effects upon secretion and — — —

— each time he attains the height of pathos together with a breadth and a river-like expansiveness that set him in opposition to all the short-winded and dramatists of the moment

324.

the misunderstandings of the Church

the Last Supper

"the Son of God"

death on the cross as *repayment*

of the story of the Fall

of "faith"

325.

Toward a Critique of the Good Man

Uprightness, dignity, sense of duty, justice, humaneness, honesty, straightness, good conscience — are qualities really affirmed and approved for their own sake with these fine-sounding words? or are qualities and states that are in themselves indifferent as to value merely moved under some point of view where they acquire value? — Does the value of these qualities lie in them, or in the utility, the advantage that follows from them (seems to follow, is expected to follow)?

I do not mean here, of course, an opposition of ego and alter in the judging: the question is whether it is the *consequences*, be it for the bearer of these qualities, be it for the surroundings, society, "humanity", on account of which these qualities are supposed to have value: or whether they have value in themselves…

Asked otherwise: is it *utility* that bids us condemn, combat, negate the opposite qualities (— unreliability, falseness, crookedness, self-uncertainty, inhumanity —)? Is it the essence of such qualities that is condemned, or only the consequence of such qualities?

Put otherwise: would it be *desirable* that people of these second qualities did not exist? — *That, at any rate, is what is believed* —

but here lies the error, the shortsightedness, the narrow-mindedness of *parochial egoism*.

Expressed otherwise: would it be desirable to create conditions in which the whole advantage is on the side of the upright — so that the opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and would slowly die out?

— this is at bottom a question of taste and of *aesthetics*: would it be desirable that the "most respectable", i.e. most boring species of man should be left over? the right-angled, the virtuous, the worthy philistines, the good honest fellows, the straight ones, the "blockheads"?

— if one thinks away the tremendous superabundance of the "others": then even the upright man no longer has so much as a right to existence: he is no longer necessary — and here one grasps that only crude utility has brought such an *insufferable virtue* into honor.

Desirability lies perhaps precisely on the reverse side: to create conditions in which the "upright man" is pressed down into the modest position of a "useful tool" — as the "ideal herd animal", at best herd shepherd: in short, in which he no longer comes to stand in the higher order —: which demands *other qualities* —

326.

Rubrics.

1 Toward a Critique of the "Good Man".

2 From the School of the Strong.

3 The Big Words.

4 Toward a Critique of "Christianness".

5 How Virtue Is Brought to Dominion.

6 Aesthetic Values; Their Origin and Future.

7 The Advent of Nihilism.

8 On "*Modernity*"

327.

Diary of the Nihilist…

the shudder at the discovered "falseness"

empty:

no thought any more; the strong affects revolving around objects without value:

— spectator of these absurd stirrings for and against

— superior, scornful, cold toward oneself

— the strongest stirrings appear like liars: as if we were supposed to believe in their objects, as if they wanted to seduce us —

— the strongest force no longer knows: what for?

— everything is there, but no ends —

atheism as idealessness

Phase

of passionate No and No-doing: in it the stored-up craving for affirmation, for worship, discharges itself…

Phase

of contempt

even toward the No…

even toward doubt…

even toward irony…

even toward contempt…

Catastrophe:

whether

the lie is not something divine…

whether

the value of all things does not rest in their being false?…

whether

despair is not merely the consequence of a belief in the *divinity of truth*

whether

precisely *lying* and *making-false* (falsifying), the

inserting of meaning, is not a value, a meaning, an end

whether

one ought not to believe in God, not because he is true (*but because he is false — ?*

328.

I.

Concept of Nihilism.

Toward the Psychology of the Nihilist.

Toward the History of European Nihilism

Critique of "Modernity"

The Big Words.

From the School of the Strong.

The Good Man.

Christianness

Genealogy of the Ideal

The Circe of Philosophers

Aesthetic Values: Origin and Critique

Art and Artists: new question marks.

329.

NB. Critique of *fatherlandishness* (under "modernity").

330.

Winckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, V. Hugo's Orientals, Wagner's Edda personages, W. Scott's Englishmen of the 13th century — some day the whole comedy will be discovered: it was all historically false beyond all measure, *but* — modern, true!

331.

Bési.

To accuse no one —

My wishes have not enough strength to guide me —

jealous even of these négateurs: jealous of their *hopes* — that they can take a hatred so seriously!

"To what end use this strength?" —

What kept me from joining with them was not fear of the ridiculous — I am beyond that — but the hatred and contempt they inspire in me. I have, despite everything, the habits of a homme comme il faut, and their company repels me.

"Had I felt still more hatred and jealousy towards them, perhaps I would have come to an understanding with them."

"I am afraid of suicide, for I fear to show greatness of soul… I see that this would be yet another tromperie, — one last lie added to all the countless ones of former times! — What advantage would there be in deceiving oneself merely in order to play the magnanimous one? — Since I have always been a stranger to indignation and shame, I shall never come to know despair…"

Note also that I have no pity for you, so as to call you; and do not esteem you, so as to wait for you… Meanwhile I call you and wait for you —

I can, as I always could, have the need to do a good deed, and I take pleasure in it; but alongside that I also wish to do evil, and I likewise find satisfaction in it. All these impressions, if they arise at all, which is rarely enough, are, as always, very slight…

"On peut traverser une rivière sur une poutre et non sur un copeau." I have experimented with débauche in the grand style and exhausted my strength on it; but I do not love it, it was not my goal.

When one is no longer attached to one's fatherland, one has no more gods, that is to say no more goals in existence…

One can discuss everything endlessly, but out of *me* there has come only a *negation without greatness and without strength*. In the end I am flattering myself even by speaking thus. Everything is always faible et mou.

The great-hearted Kiriloff was vanquished by an idea: he shot himself. I see the greatness of his soul in the fact that he lost his head. Never would I be able to act so. Never would I be able to believe in an idea so passionately… More still, it is impossible for me to occupy myself with ideas to such a point… Never, never would I be able to shoot myself…

I know that I ought to kill myself, that I ought to cleanse the earth of me, as of a miserable insect.

332.

On the Psychology of the Nihilist.

"the most venerable thing in man, according to Goethe: — — — consistency; that belongs to the nihilist.

Around this time he talks himself into debauchery. Let no one underestimate the logic in this; one must be a philosopher to understand it. Ideas are deception; sensations are the ultimate reality… It is the last hunger for "truth" that counsels debauchery — It could not be "love": all the veils and embellishments, i.e. falsifications, must be wiped away: therefore it must be debauchery, pain, and the combination of debauchery and pain.

An intensification: pain is more real than pleasure… The affirmative element in the latter has the character of valuation, of fraud and exaggeration…

pain does not easily intoxicate, its sobriety…

—

Beware of the intoxicating and befogging pains…

—

the pain one inflicts is more real than the pain one suffers —

333.

The absolute change that comes about with the negation of God —

We have absolutely no master over us any longer; the old world of valuations is theological — it is overturned —

In short: there is no higher authority over us: insofar as God could be, we ourselves are now God…

We must ascribe to ourselves the attributes we ascribed to God…

334.

The Logic of Atheism.

If God exists, everything depends on his will and I am nothing outside his will. If he does *not* exist, then everything depends on me, and I must prove my independence —

Suicide the most complete way of proving one's independence —

God is necessary, therefore he must exist

But he does not exist

So one can no longer live.

this thought consumed Stavrogin too: "if he believes, he does not believe that he believes. If he does not believe, he does not believe that he does not believe."

Kirillov's *classic formula* in Dostoevsky:

I am bound to affirm my *unbelief*; in my eyes there is no greater idea than the denial of God. What is the history of mankind? Man has done nothing but invent God so as not to kill himself. I, as the first, thrust back the fiction of God…

To kill another — that would be independence in its lowest form: I want to reach the highest point of independence

Earlier suicides had reasons for it; but I have no reason, solely to prove my independence —

335.

the beginning of nihilism

the detachment,

the break with the native soil

unhomely it begins

uncanny it ends

336.

If nature itself has not spared its masterpiece, if it has let Jesus live in the midst of the lie and for a lie (— and to him the earth owes everything it has let live —) without him the planet, with everything on it, would be mere folly, well then, the planet rests on a lie, on a stupid mockery. Consequently the laws of nature themselves are an imposture and a diabolical farce. Why then live, if you are a man?…

"But if you are disillusioned? if you have grasped that the whole error lay in belief in the old God?"

The salvation of mankind depends on proving this thought to it —

I do not understand how an atheist has hitherto been able to know that there is no God and not kill himself at once…

"To feel that God is not, and not at the same time to feel that one has thereby become God, is an absurdity: otherwise one would not fail to kill oneself. If you feel this, you are tsar, and, far from killing yourself, you will live at the summit of glory…

"I am God only under compulsion and I am unhappy, for I am *obliged* to prove my freedom. All are unhappy because they are afraid to prove their freedom. If man has until now been so unhappy and so poor, this happened because he did not dare to show himself free in the highest meaning of the word, because he contented himself with a schoolboy's insubordination… For I am terribly unhappy, for I am terribly afraid. *Fear is the curse of man* —

This will save all men and physically transform the next generation: for, judging by myself, in his present *physical form* man cannot do without the old God… For 3 years I have been seeking the attribute of my divinity: and I have found it — *independence*. I want to kill myself in order to prove my insubordination, my new and terrible freedom" —

337.

Five, six seconds and no more: then you suddenly feel the presence of eternal harmony. Man, in his mortal shell, cannot endure it; he must transform himself physically or die. It is a clear and indisputable feeling. You seem to be in contact with the whole of nature and you say: "Yes, this is true!" When God had created the world, he said at the end of each day: "Yes, this is true, this is good!" That is not emotion, that is joy. You forgive nothing, because there is nothing to forgive. You no longer love — oh, this feeling is higher than love. The most terrible thing is the dreadful *certainty* with which it expresses itself and the joy with which it fills you. If it lasted longer, the soul

could not endure it, it would have to vanish — In these 5 seconds I live a whole human existence; for them I would give my whole life, it would not be too dearly paid. To bear this for longer, one would have to transform oneself physically. I believe man ceases to procreate. *Why children, when the goal is reached? —*

Understanding of the symbol of resurrection:

"After the resurrection they will no longer beget; they will be as the angels of God," i.e. *the goal is reached*: why children?… In the child the dissatisfaction of woman expresses itself…

338.

If men had consistency in their bodies, they would also have consistency in their heads. But their hodgepodge…

339.

What has caused me the most vexation? To see that no one any longer has the courage *to think to the end*…

340.

The omens of a great revolt: a cynicism on command, a thirst for scandal, agaçant, irritation, lassitude. The public, enervated, on false paths, no longer recognized itself

In moments of crisis one feels a mass of individuals surfacing from the deepest strata of the population who have no goal, no idea of any kind, and who are distinguished only by their love of désordre. Almost always they are driven by the small group of the "avancés", who make of them what they will…

The gens de rien acquired a sudden importance; they loudly criticized all respectable things, they who until then had not dared to open their

mouths, and the most gifted listened to them in silence, often even with a little smile of approval.

341.

— seeking a criminal solidarity and gaining his mastery over him?

Espionage. In his system every member keeps an eye on the other, denunciation is a duty. Each belongs to all and all to each. All are slaves and equal in slavery. Slander and assassination in the extreme cases, but everywhere "*equality*". First of all, lower the level of scientific culture and of talents, bring it down! A scientific level is accessible only to higher intelligences; but there must be no higher intelligence. Men of high abilities have always seized power and have always been despots. They cannot be anything but despots, they have always done more evil than good; let them be driven out or delivered au supplice. Cut out Cicero's tongue, blind Copernicus, stone Shakespeare… Slaves may be equal: without despotism there has never yet been either freedom or equality, but *in a herd equality may reign*… The mountains must be levelled; down with instruction and science! There is enough of it for a millennium; but *obedience must be organized*, the one thing that is lacking in the world. The thirst for study is an aristocratic thirst. With the family or with love the thirst for property vanishes. We shall kill this thirst: we shall encourage drunkenness, noise, denunciation, we shall propagate a debauchery without equal, we shall smother geniuses in the cradle. "Reduction of all au même dénominateur, perfect equality!"

"We have learned a trade and are honest people; we need nothing else" — so English workers said recently. The necessary alone is necessary, that shall be the motto of the globe from now on. But convulsions are needed too; *we* shall see to that, we others, the leaders and steerers… Slaves must have masters. Complete obedience,

complete depersonalization: but every thirty years the signal for convulsions will be given, and all will suddenly set about devouring one another, up to a certain point, of course, for the sole purpose of not being bored. *Boredom* is an aristocratic feeling; under socialism there will be no *desire*. We reserve pain and desire for *ourselves*; the slaves will have socialism… I have thought of delivering the world over to the Pope. Let him step out of his palace barefoot and say to the people: "this is what they have reduced me to!" — Everything, even the army, will throw itself down at his feet. The Pope above, we around him, and beneath us socialism… The International must come to an understanding with the Pope: he will agree at once, he has no other way out…

You are beautiful! You sometimes forget what there is of the exquisite in you! Even bonhomie and naïveté! You suffer, no doubt, you suffer deeply, on account of this bonhomie. I am a nihilist, but I love beauty — je suis nihiliste, mais j'aime la beauté. Do the nihilists not love it? What they do not love are idols: I, I love idols, and you are mine!

You offend no one and are universally abhorred; you regard all men as your equals, and all are afraid of you: that is as it should be. No one will dare to clap you on the shoulder. You are a terrible aristocrat, and when he comes among democrats, the aristocrat is un charmeur. It is equally indifferent to you whether you sacrifice your own life or that of others. You are precisely the man that is needed…

We are penetrating into the people itself, we are already terribly strong. Not only those are ours who strangle, set fires and carry out classic coups. These hinder us rather… I comprehend nothing without discipline. I have counted them all: the teacher who mocks with the children at their God and their cradle; the advocate who defends a well-educated assassin by proving that he had a better upbringing than his victim and that, to obtain money, he had no other

means than to kill; the students who kill a peasant to try out a sensation; the jurors who systematically acquit all criminals; the prosecutor who trembles before the tribunal lest he not show himself liberal enough… Among the administration, among the scholars — how many belong to us! (— and they do not know it!)… On the other hand, everywhere an immeasurable vanity, a bestial appétit… Do you know how much we owe to the famous theories? When I left Russia, Littré's theory, which likened crime to madness, was all the rage; I come back, and already crime is no longer a madness but bon sens itself, almost a duty, at the very least a noble protest. "Hé bien, how should an enlightened man not murder when he needs money?" But that is nothing yet. The Russian God has given way to drink; everyone is a drunkard, the churches are empty… When we are the masters, we shall *cure* them… if need be we shall banish them for 40 years into a Thebaid. But for 2 generations débauche is necessary, a débauche ignoble, inouïe, sale — that is what is needed!… Until now the Russian people, despite the coarseness of its vocabulary of rage, has not known cynicism. Do you know that the serf respected himself more than Turgenev respects himself?… He was beaten, but he remained true to his gods — and Turgenev has forsaken his…

The people must believe that we all know the goal. We shall preach destruction: this idea is so seductive. We shall call conflagration to our aid — and pistol shots… Il se cache… An unheard-of strength is required…

342.

Theatromania

343.

"ceci tuera cela"

344.

The Decembrist (Russian uprising of 1825) sought danger his whole life long: the feeling of danger intoxicated him and had become a need of his nature… The brave men of legend were surely in high degree susceptible to fear: otherwise they would have been far calmer and would not have transformed the feeling of danger into a need of their nature. But to conquer la poltronnerie within oneself, with consciousness of this victory, and to think that nothing could frighten one back — that is what seduced them!… Including struggle in all its forms; not only in bear-hunting and in the duel did he prize in himself stoicism and strength of character.

But the nervous disposition of the more recent generation no longer admits the need for those free and immediate sensations which certain restless personages of the good old days sought with such ardour. Nicolas would have been just as brave in all cases as that Decembrist: only he would have found no pleasure in this struggle; he would have accepted it with indolence and boredom, as one submits to an unpleasant necessity. In anger no one could be compared to him: he was cold, calm, *raisonnable* — consequently he was more terrible than anyone else.

345.

Rome preached a Christ who yielded to the third temptation; it declared that he could not do without an earthly kingdom, and thereby proclaimed the *Antichrist*…

346.

God as Attribute of Nationality

The people is the body of God. A nation deserves this name only so long as it has a god of its own and obstinately thrusts all others away from itself; only so long as it reckons on conquering with its god and driving the foreign gods out of the whole world.

Peoples move by the force of an insatiable need to reach their goal: it is the tireless, constant affirmation of their existence and negation of death. "The spirit of life", the "stream of living water", the aesthetic or moral principle of the philosophers, la "recherche de Dieu". In every people, at every phase of its existence, the goal of its movement is la recherche de Dieu, the search for a God of its own, in whom it believes as the only true one. God is the synthetic person of an entire people, regarded from its beginning to its end. When the cults begin to generalize, the destruction of nationalities is near. When the gods lose their individual character, they die, and with them the peoples. The stronger a nation, the more strongly its God stands apart. No people has ever been found without religion (i.e. *without the concept of good and evil*) Every people understands these words in its own manner. When these ideas are understood in the same way by several peoples, they die, and the difference between good and evil begins to fade and to vanish. Reason has never been able to define these concepts, nor even so much as approximately to *separate* them: it has always mixed them up in a disgraceful way: la science a conclu en faveur de la force brutale. This has happened above all through *half-science*, the greatest curse, the despot before whom everything bows, *even science*…

347.

The Jews lived only to await the true God; the Greeks deified nature and bequeathed to the world their religion, that is to say philosophy and art. Rome deified the people in the state.

348.

"Si un grand peuple ne croit pas qu'en lui seul se trouve la vérité, s'il ne se croit pas seul appelé à ressusciter et à sauver l'univers par sa vérité, il cesse immédiatement d'être un grand peuple pour devenir une matière éthnographique."

A truly great people has never contented itself with a secondary role; even an influential role does not suffice for it; it absolutely requires the first. The nation that renounces this conviction renounces existence…

349.

il y a là un audacieux défi au sens commun: that is what seduced you!…

350.

The second half of life consists of the habits one has contracted in the first.

351.

il faut être un grand homme pour savoir résister au bon sens: un grand homme ou un imbécile.

352.

Malebranche said that God, because he was God, could act only by the simplest means

"Dieu, parce qu'il était Dieu, ne pouvait agir que par les voies les plus simples"

Consequently — there is no God.

353.

"*Follow one's feeling?*"

That one, *yielding* to a generous feeling, puts one's life in danger, and under the impulse of a moment: that is worth little… and does not even characterize… in the capacity for it all are equal — and in resolve for it the criminal, the bandit and the *Corsican* certainly surpass us respectable people…

The higher stage is: to overcome even this surge within oneself and to do the heroic deed *not* on impulse, — but coldly, raisonnably, without the stormy overflowing of pleasurable feelings that goes with it…

The same holds for pity: it must first be habitually *sifted through raison*; otherwise it is as dangerous as any affect…

Blind yielding to an affect, quite regardless of whether it is a generous and pitying one or a hostile one, is the cause of the *greatest evils*…

Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these affects — on the contrary, one has them in the most terrible degree: but in keeping them on the rein… and even that without pleasure in this taming, but merely because…

354.

Christian Misunderstandings

The *thief on the cross*: — when the criminal himself, suffering a painful death, judges: "the way this Jesus suffers and dies, without revolt, without enmity, kindly, resigned, that alone is the right way": he has affirmed the Gospel: and with that *he is in Paradise*…

The kingdom of heaven is a state of the heart (— of the children it is said "for theirs is the kingdom of heaven"); nothing that is "above the earth".

The kingdom of God does not "come" chronologically-historically, not according to the calendar, something that would be there one day and not the day before: rather it is a "change of mind in the individual", something that comes at every moment and at every moment is not yet there…

Moral: the founder of Christianity had to pay for having turned to the lowest stratum of Jewish society and intelligence…

— it conceived him according to the spirit it understood…

— it is a veritable disgrace to have fabricated a history of salvation, a personal God, a personal redeemer, a personal immortality, and to have retained the whole mesquinerie of the "person" and of "history" out of a doctrine that denies reality to everything personal and historical…

The legend of salvation in place of the symbolic Now and Always, Here and Everywhere, the miracle in place of the psychological symbol

355.

If I understand anything at all of this great symbolist, it is this, that he saw and acknowledged only *inner realities*: that he understood the *rest* (everything natural, historical, political) only as sign and occasion for parable — *not* as reality, not as "true world"…

Likewise the Son of Man is not a concrete person of history but an "eternal fact", a psychological symbol not locked up in time…

The same holds finally, once more and in the highest degree, of the *God* of this typical symbolist… of the kingdom of God, of the "kingdom of heaven"…

the "Father" and the "Son": the latter expresses the entry into that state of the total transfiguration of all things, the former is that very state…

— and this notion has been misunderstood to such a degree that the Amphitryon story (a badly masked adultery) was placed at the head of the new faith (together with the abominable notion of an immaculate conception: as if conception in itself were something maculate —)

The deep degeneration

1)

through the *will to understand historically*

2)

through the *will to see miracles* (— as if it were a matter of laws of nature broken through and overcome!)

3)

— — —

356.

One cannot misunderstand Christianity more thoroughly than by assuming that at its beginning stands the *crude story of the miracle-worker and redeemer*, and that the spiritual and symbolic reading is only a later form of the metamorphosis…

On the contrary: the history of Christianity is the history of the *step-by-step, ever cruder necessary misunderstanding of a sublime symbolism*…: with every spread of Christianity over ever broader and rawer masses, who stood far from the original instincts of Christianity (— who lacked all the preconditions for understanding it —) there emerged a history of legends, a theology, the founding of a church —: the need of

the lowest, later of the barbarian strata brought with it the necessity first of *vulgarizing* Christianity, then of *barbarizing* it…

The Church is the will to uphold the vulgar and barbarian language of Christianity as "the truth" —… and to this day!

The Pauline, the Augustinian Platonism —: until at last this shameless caricature of philosophy and rabbinism was complete, Christian theology…

the unworthy components of Christianity:

the miracle

the hierarchy of souls, the order of rank

the history of salvation and the belief in it…

the concept of "sin"

the history of Christianity is the necessity that a faith itself become as low and vulgar as the needs it is meant to satisfy —

…think of *Luther*! What could a nature so overladen with coarse appetites make of original Christianity!

the Jewish stage of *denaturalization*: "apostasy, misfortune, penance, reconciliation" as a leftover schema, — for the rest, hatred of the "world"

Jesus goes straight for the state itself, the "kingdom of heaven" in the heart, and finds the means *not* in the observances of the Jewish church — he counts even the reality of Judaism (its necessity of preserving itself) as nothing; he is purely *inward* —

likewise he cares nothing for all the coarse formulas in intercourse with God: he resists the whole doctrine of penance and reconciliation; he shows how one must live in order to feel oneself "deified" — and how one does not arrive there through penance and contrition over one's sins: "*sin is of no account*" is his chief judgment. To become "di-

vine," the main thing is that one should be sick of oneself: in this respect even the sinner is better than the righteous…

Sin, penance, forgiveness, — none of that belongs here… that is Judaism mixed in, or else it is pagan

357.

the deep instinct for how one must live in order to feel oneself "in heaven," whereas otherwise one by no means feels oneself in heaven… that is the psychological reality of Christianity

358.

Our nineteenth century at last has the precondition for understanding something that for nineteen centuries has been fundamentally misunderstood — Christianity…

One was unspeakably far from that loving and conscientious neutrality — a state full of sympathy and discipline of the spirit — one was, in a disgraceful manner, in every age of the church, egoistically blind, importunate, shameless, always with the air of the most submissive reverence

359.

the symbolism of Christianity rests upon the *Jewish*, which had already dissolved the *whole of reality* (history, nature) into a holy unnaturalness and unreality… which no longer wished to see actual history —, which no longer took any interest in natural success —

360.

One shall offer no resistance to him who is evil toward us, neither by deed nor in the heart.

One shall acknowledge no reason for putting away one's wife. Perhaps also: "one shall make oneself a eunuch".

One shall make no distinction between strangers and natives, foreigners and fellow countrymen.

One shall be angry with no one, one shall despise no one… Give alms in secret — one shall not wish to become rich —

One shall not swear — One shall not judge — One shall be reconciled, one shall forgive — pray not in public —

Let your good works be seen, let your light shine! Who shall enter into heaven? He that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven…

"*Blessedness*" is nothing promised: it is there when one lives and acts thus and so:

Is not the church precisely this: "false prophets in sheep's clothing, but inwardly ravening wolves"?…

"Prophesying, working wonders, casting out devils — all that is nothing"…

In an utterly absurd manner the *doctrine of reward and punishment* has been mixed in: everything is spoiled by it.

In like manner the *practice* of the first ecclesia militans, of the apostle and his conduct, is presented in an utterly falsifying way as *commanded*, as established *beforehand*…

the retrospective glorification of the actual *living* and *teaching* of the first Christians: as though everything had been thus *prescribed*… and merely *followed*…

the whole attitude of prophet and wonder-worker, the wrath, the conjuring up of judgment is a hideous corruption (e.g. Mark 6, 11 "and

whosoever shall not receive you… verily I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha etc.")

the fig tree

"A prophet is nowhere held in less honour than at home, among his own": is nonsense, the opposite is the truth…

And then the *fulfilment* of the *prophecies*: what has not been falsified and trimmed into shape there!

361.

NB. Schopenhauer had, out of his nihilism, a perfect right to retain pity alone as a virtue: with it, in fact, the negation of the will to life is most powerfully promoted. Pity, caritas, by permitting the depressed and the weak to live on and to have offspring, crosses the natural laws of development: it accelerates decay, it destroys the species, — it *negates* life. Why do the other animal species keep themselves *healthy*? Because they lack pity.

362.

NB. The antisocial inclination, mental derangement, pessimism: the three typical forms of décadence. Christianity, as a *religion of décadence*, grew up on a soil that swarmed with degenerates of all three kinds

363.

We have *restored* the Christian ideal: it remains to *determine* its *value*.

1. Which values are *negated* by it: what does the *counter-ideal* contain?

Pride, pathos of distance, the great responsibility, exuberance, splendid animality, the warlike and conquest-loving instincts, the deifica-

tion of passion, of revenge, of cunning, of wrath, of voluptuousness, of adventure, of knowledge…

: the noble ideal is negated: beauty, wisdom, power, splendour and dangerousness of the type man: the goal-setting, the "future" man (— here Christianity reveals itself as the *conclusion* of *Judaism* —)

2. Is it *realizable*?

Yes, but conditioned by climate… Similar to the Indian… *Work* is lacking… — it detaches from people, state, cultural community, jurisdiction, it rejects instruction, knowledge, education in good manners, gain, commerce… it detaches everything that constitutes the use and value of man — it *shuts* him *off* through an idiosyncrasy of feeling — unpolitical, antinational, neither aggressive nor defensive, — possible only within the most firmly ordered political and social life, which lets these *holy parasites* proliferate at the general expense…

3. it remains a consequence of the will to *pleasure* — and to nothing further! "blessedness" counts as something that proves itself, that needs no further justification, — everything else (the manner of living and letting live) is only a means to an end…

— But that is *basely conceived*: fear of pain, of defilement, of corruption itself as a sufficient motive for letting everything go… This is a *poor* way of thinking… sign of an *exhausted* race… One should not let oneself be deceived ("become as little children") — the *kindred* natures: Francis of Assisi (neurotic, epileptic, visionary, like Jesus)

364.

On the History of Christianity.

Continual change of milieu: the Christian doctrine thereby continually shifts its *centre of gravity*…

the favouring of the *low* and *little*

people…

the development of caritas…

the type "Christian" gradually takes back everything that it originally negated (*in the negation of which it consisted* —)

the Christian becomes citizen, soldier, judicial officer, worker, tradesman, scholar, theologian, priest, philosopher, farmer, artist, patriot, politician, "prince"… he takes up again all the *activities* he had abjured (— self-defence, sitting in judgement, punishing, swearing oaths, distinguishing between people and people, disdaining, being wrathful…)

The whole life of the Christian is in the end precisely the life *from which Christ preached detachment*…

The *Church* belongs just as much to the *triumph* of the anti-Christian as the modern state, modern nationalism…

The Church is the barbarization of Christianity.

What became master over *Christianity*: Judaism (Paul), Platonism (Augustine), the mystery cults (doctrine of redemption, symbol of the "cross"), asceticism (— hostility towards "nature", "reason", "senses", — Orient…)

365.

the eccentric concept of "holiness" is lacking —

"God" and "man" are not torn asunder

the "miracle" is lacking — that sphere does not exist at all…

— the only one that comes into consideration is the "spiritual" (i.e. symbolic-psychological) as décadence: counterpart to "Epicurean-

ism"… *Paradise*, according to the Greek concept, also a "garden of Epicurus"

the *task* is lacking in such a life

: it *wills* nothing…

: a form of the "Epicurean gods" —

: every *reason* for still setting goals is lacking: for having children… everything has been attained…

Christianity is still possible at any moment… It is bound to none of the impudent dogmas that have adorned themselves with its name: it needs neither the doctrine of a *personal God*, nor of *sin*, nor of *immortality*, nor of *redemption*, nor of *faith*, it has absolutely no need of metaphysics, still less of asceticism, still less of a Christian "natural science"…

Whoever said now "I will not be a soldier", "I do not concern myself with the courts", "I make no use of the services of the police" — he would be a Christian… "I will do nothing that disturbs the peace within myself: and if I must suffer for it, nothing will preserve my peace better than suffering"…

The whole Christian doctrine of what *ought* to be believed, the whole Christian "truth" is nothing but lies and deceit: and precisely the opposite of what gave the Christian movement its beginning…

precisely what is Christian in the *ecclesiastical* sense is the *anti-Christian* from the very outset: nothing but things and persons instead of symbols, nothing but history instead of eternal facts, nothing but formulas, rites, dogmas instead of a practice of life… Christian is perfect indifference towards dogmas, cult, priests, Church, theology.

The practice of Christianity is no fantasy, any more than the practice of Buddhism is: it is a means of being happy…

366.

Our age is in a certain sense *ripe* (that is, *décadent*), as the time of Buddha was…

Therefore a Christianity without the absurd dogmas is possible…

the most repulsive monstrosities of ancient hybridism

The barbarization of Christianity

367.

Christianismi et buddhismi Essentia. (Comparison of the first *Buddhism* and the first *Christianity*)

Buddhism, Christianity are *terminal religions*: beyond culture, philosophy, art, the state

A. In common: the struggle against the hostile feelings, — these recognized as the source of evil. "Happiness": only as something inward, — indifference towards the semblance and pomp of happiness.

Buddhism: wanting to get free of life, philosophical clarity; sprung from a high degree of spirituality, from the midst of the higher classes…

Christianity: wants fundamentally the same thing (— already "the Jewish Church" is a décadence phenomenon of life), but, in keeping with a profound lack of culture, without knowledge of what one wants… getting stuck at "blessedness" as the goal…

B. the most powerful instincts of life no longer felt as pleasurable but rather as causes of suffering

for the *Buddhist*: insofar as these instincts drive one to action (action, however, counting as *displeasure*…)

for the *Christian*: insofar as they give occasion for enmity and contradiction (being an enemy, doing harm, however, counting as displeasure, as disturbance of the "peace of the soul")

(A capable soldier, conversely, has no joy except in honest warfare and in wanting to be an enemy.)

368.

The Type of Jesus.

One goes astray if one imagines a *fanatical* element into Jesus… "impérieux" Renan

— all *torture* is lacking in this faith, it is a glad tidings and the state of a "bearer of glad tidings"…

— this faith is not won by struggle, has no development, no catastrophe… rather childlike… in such natures childhood has *receded inward* like an illness —

— this faith does not grow wrathful, does not reproach, does not punish, does not defend itself —

— this faith does not bring "the sword"… it does not suspect that it could divide…

— this faith proves itself neither by miracles nor by promise of reward… it is itself at every moment its own proof, its reward, its miracle —

— this faith does not formulate itself, because it *lives* —… it holds nothing else to be real… "true", i.e. living…

— the accidents of his early schooling, of his reading (the prophets) determine his conceptual language: what is Jewish in Christianity is above all the Jewish world of concepts. Vehicle, Jewish psychology:

but one must beware of confusing things here —: a Christian in *India* would have availed himself of the formulas of the Sankhya philosophy, in *China* of those of Laotse — nothing whatever depends on that —

Christ as "*free spirit*": he cares nothing for anything fixed (word, formula, church, law, dogmas) "everything that is fixed *kills*…" he believes only in life and the living — and that "is" not, it *becomes*…

: he stands outside all metaphysics, religion, history, natural science, psychology, ethics —: he never so much as suspected that such things exist…

: he speaks only of the innermost, of experiences: everything *else* has the sense of a sign and a means of language —

369.

On the Type of Jesus.

— What remains to be *subtracted*? the whole manner of motivating the wisdom of Christ, likewise the acts of his life… the latter are supposed to have been done in obedience to the promises; he fulfils, he has a schema of all that the Messiah has to do and to suffer, a program… On the other hand, every "for" in the mouth of Jesus is *unevangelical*… utility, cunning, reward, punishment…

— What remains to be *subtracted*: the ample measure of *gall* that overflowed from the agitated state of the first propaganda onto the type of its master… it made him in its own image, it justified itself by fashioning out of him a judging, quarrelling, wrathful, hating prophet… it *needed* such a "model" —: likewise the belief in the "second coming", in the "judgment" (— that is Jewish, see Apocalypse)

The psychological *absurdity and contradiction in the attitude of Jesus* against the clerics and theologians of the Jewish church…

Likewise in the judicial bearing toward those who do not accept him…

Likewise in the typical story of the fig tree —

The psychological problem with regard to the teacher of such a teaching is precisely: "how does he relate to other teachings and teachers?"

His teaching itself did not grow out of opposition and contradiction: I doubt that such a nature *can* know of opposition and contradiction to its teaching… It wholly lacks the free imagination of being-able-to-value-and-will-otherwise… it cannot conceive of contrary judgment… Where it encounters it, it will only mourn, with the most inward fellow-feeling, over a "blindness", but will not speak against it…

Dialectic is lacking, the belief is lacking in any provability of the teaching, except through "inward effects" ("fruits", "proof of power"

such a teacher cannot contradict… he does not at all understand how one could be permitted to combat error… he does not defend himself, he does not attack…

On the other hand, explaining, continuing, subtilizing, transfiguring the old is his affair… abbreviating…

370.

a *nihilistic* religion, sprung from and suited to a senile-tenacious people that had outlived all its strong instincts — transferred step by step into other milieus, finally entering among the young peoples *that had not yet lived at all* —

very strange! a closing-, shepherd-, evening-bliss preached to barbarians, to Germanic peoples! How all of it first had to be Germanized, barbarized! to such as had dreamed of a *Valhalla*… —: who found all

happiness in war! — a *supernational* religion preached into a chaos where there were *not even* nations yet —

371.

| : this *nihilistic* religion gathers together the *décadence elements* and *what is akin to them* in antiquity, namely:

a)

the party of the *weak* and the *ill-constituted*… (the refuse of the ancient world: that which it thrust from itself most forcefully…

b)

the party of the *moralized* and the *anti-pagan*…

c)

the party of the *politically weary* and indifferent (blasé Romans…) of the *denationalized*, to whom an emptiness remained

d)

the party of those who are sick of themselves, — who gladly join in working at a *subterranean* conspiracy —

372.

Christianity was in antiquity the great *nihilistic movement*, which ended in its being victorious: and now it ruled…

373.

The two great nihilistic movements: a) Buddhism b) Christianity: the latter has only now roughly reached conditions of culture in which it can fulfil its original destiny — a *level* to which it *belongs*… at which it can show itself *pure*…

374.

Our advantage: we live in the age of *comparison,* we can reckon things up as they have never been reckoned before: we are the self-consciousness of history as such…

We enjoy differently, we suffer differently: comparing an unheard-of multiplicity is our most instinctive activity…

We understand everything, we live everything, we have no hostile feeling left… Even if we ourselves come off badly in the process, our obliging and almost loving curiosity goes unabashed straight at the most dangerous things…

"Everything is good" — it costs us effort to negate…

We suffer when for once we become so unintelligent as to take sides against something…

At bottom it is we scholars today who best fulfil the teaching of Christ — —

375.

Toward a Critique of Greek Philosophy

The appearance of the Greek philosophers from Socrates onward is a symptom of décadence; the anti-Hellenic instincts come to the top…

Still wholly Hellenic is the "sophist" — including Anaxagoras, Democritus, the great Ionians —

But as a transitional form: the polis loses its faith in the uniqueness of its culture, in its master's right over every other polis…

one exchanges culture, i.e. "the gods", — in doing so one loses faith in the sole prerogative of the deus autochthonus…

the good and evil of different descent intermingle: the boundary between good and evil becomes *blurred*…

That is the "sophist" —

The "philosopher", by contrast, is the *reaction*: he wants the *old* virtue…

— he sees the causes of decay in the decay of institutions, he wants old institutions —

— he sees decay in the decay of authority: he searches for new authorities (journeys abroad, into foreign literatures, into exotic religions…)

— he wants the *ideal polis* after the concept "polis" had outlived itself (roughly as the Jews held fast to themselves as a "people" after they had fallen into servitude)

: they take an interest in all tyrants: they want to restore virtue by force majeure —

— gradually everything *genuinely Hellenic* is made responsible for the *decay* (and Plato is just as ungrateful toward Homer, tragedy, rhetoric, Pericles, as the prophets toward David and Saul)

— *the decline of Greece is understood as an objection to the foundations of Hellenic* culture: *fundamental error of the philosophers* —

Conclusion: the Greek world is perishing. *Cause:* Homer, myth, ancient morality, etc.

The *anti*-Hellenic development of the philosophers' value judgment:

: the Egyptian ("life after death" as judgment…)

: the Semitic (the "dignity of the sage", the "sheikh" —

: the Pythagoreans, the subterranean cults, silence, the means of terror concerning the beyond; *mathematics*: religious valuation, a kind of intercourse with the cosmic all

: the priestly, ascetic, transcendent —

: *dialectic*, — I think it is already an abominable and pedantic hair-splitting of concepts in Plato?

Decline of good intellectual taste: one no longer even feels the ugliness and clatter of all direct dialectic.

Side by side run the *two* décadence movements and extremes:

a) the luxuriant, amiably malicious décadence that loves pomp and art,

b) and the darkening of the religious-moral pathos, the Stoic self-hardening, the Platonic slander of the senses, the preparation of the soil for Christianity…

376.

NB Our holiest convictions, what is unchangeable in us with regard to the highest values, are *judgments of our muscles*.

377.

From J. *Wellhausen*

Justice as a social requirement:

"the justice of the Sermon on the Mount can only have its turn once the civil legal order is taken for granted"…

the Jews, with the arrogance of a spiritual aristocracy as the foundation on which alone their artificial structure of theocracy was possible,

despised the *state*… Without the state no "church" can exist… Foreign rule keeps the *pathos of distance* alive.

the stages of *denaturalization*:

: through the establishment of kingship there first came to be a nation, a unity, a collective self-consciousness: but with that the "god of the desert" and likewise the nature-god of agriculture and cattle-breeding taken over (from the Canaanites) (Baal-Dionysus) — — — The festival cult, to be sure, long remained half-pagan; but it referred more and more to the destinies of the nation and stripped off its natural character. Yahweh in necessary relation to people and kingdom: this belief stood firm even for the worst idolaters: from no one else came victory and salvation. The civic state was the *miracle*, was "the *help of God*": "the providence of authority" remained an ideal for them (— evidently because they lacked it…)

When the kingdom falls into division and danger, when one lives on in anarchy and outward ruin, in fear of the Assyrian, one dreams all the more strongly of the *return of the perfect royal* rule, of the national state in all its independence: this kind of fantasy is the prophetic. Isaiah is its highest type with his so-called *messianic prophecies* — prophets were critics and satirists, anarchists; at bottom they had nothing to say, the leadership was in other hands; they want the re-establishment of the civic state; they by no means wish for a "golden age", but for a tight and stern rule, a prince with military and religious instincts who would re-establish trust in Yahweh. That is the "Messiah": any modern sovereign would have satisfied the longing of the prophets, perhaps even too much so: as one must fear…

But nothing was fulfilled. One had the choice of giving up one's old god or of making something else out of him. The latter was done, e.g., by Elijah and Amos: they cut the bond, more precisely the unity of people and god; they not only separated, but they raised the one side

high aloft and pressed the other down: they conceived a new relationship between the two parties, a *relationship of reconciliation*. Yahweh had hitherto been the god of Israel and consequently the god of justice: now he became first and foremost the *god of justice* and, only apart from that, the god of Israel. The Torah of Yahweh, originally, like all his doing, a helping, a setting-right, a showing of the way, a solving of tangled problems, became the epitome of his *demands*, on which his relation to Israel depended.

A law became legally valid by virtue of the fact that those to whom it applied bound themselves to keep it. "Contract" for law. Originally the various representatives of the people had bound themselves to keep the "law"; now Yahweh and Israel are to be the contracting parties… Since the solemn act by which Josiah introduced the law, the idea of the covenant between Yahweh and Israel moved to the centre of religious reflection. The Babylonian as well as the Assyrian exile contributed to making people familiar with the idea of conditionality, of eventual dissolution.

The downfall of the kingdom gave free rein to enthusiastic fantasies: *the feeling of opposition against all the rest* spreads: since the exile people fantasize about a general union of all peoples against the "new Jerusalem". Formerly the national state was the highest wish; now they dream of a universal world-dominion that was to rise in Jerusalem over the ruins of the pagan kingdoms.

The danger was that the Jewish exiles, like the Samarian ones before them, would be absorbed by the pagans. So now the holy remnant is organized, so that it may remain, as bearer of the promise, and outlast the storms of the interim…

Equal rights of the contracting parties *not* essential: the word berith is also used of capitulation, whose conditions the stronger imposes —

Continuation: *Wellhausen*.

On what basis could one organize? The re-establishment of a real state was impossible; foreign rule did not permit such a thing. Then the importance of institutions became apparent.

The old commonwealth of the age of the kings was in bad repute among the men of the Restoration: evidently it had been *rejected* by Yahweh… People remembered the prophets, who said that fortresses, horses, warriors, kings, princes — none of it is of any help…

The Jewish temple of the realm in Jerusalem — in the shadow of kingship the priests of Jerusalem had grown great. The weaker the state, the higher the prestige of the temple, the more independent the power of the priesthood. Upsurge of the cult in the seventh century, introduction of costly material, e.g. incense, preference for the heavy offerings (child-sacrifices and sin-offerings) *Bloody seriousness* in the performance of divine worship

When the kingdom collapsed, the elements for organizing the "*congregation*" were present in the priestly estate. The customs and ordinances were there in the main: they were systematized, as a means for establishing an organization *of the remnant*…

The "holy constitution of Judaism": the *artificial product*… Israel *reduced* to being "a kingdom of priests and a holy people". Formerly the natural order of society had its support in belief in God; now the divine state was to be visibly represented in an artificial sphere, in any case in ordinary popular life. The idea that formerly permeated *nature* was now to have a holy body of its own. An external opposition of holy and profane arose; boundaries were drawn; the *domain of nature* was pushed back further and further… (ressentiment *at work* —) Holiness, empty, antithetical, becomes the ruling concept: originally = divine,

now equal to priestly, clerical, — *as if the divine were opposed to the worldly, the natural, by external marks* —

Hierocracy… an artificial product carried through under unfavourable conditions with an energy forever worthy of astonishment, unpolitical: the Mosaic theocracy, the residuum of a perished state — it has foreign rule as its presupposition. Closely related to the old Catholic Church, indeed its *mother*…

Wherein the *retrogression* lay. Yahweh's law signified the Jewish peculiarity in opposition to the pagans. In truth this did not lie in the cult: one cannot discover any essential difference between Greek and Hebrew rites. The cult is what is pagan in the religion of Israel: in the Priestly Code it becomes the main thing. Is that not a *retrogression into paganism*? — it is what the prophets most thoroughly fought against. — Likewise: through the priestly legislation the cult is estranged from its own essence and overcome within itself. The festivals have lost all memory of harvest and cattle-breeding; they have become days of historical remembrance; they deny their origin in nature; they celebrate the founding of a supernatural religion and the gracious deeds of Yahweh. The universally human, the freely grown, departs from them; they become statutory and specifically Israelite… They no longer draw the deity into earthly life, so that it might share in its joy and sorrow; they are no longer attempts to do it some good and to dispose it to grace. *Nothing but divine means of grace*, which Yahweh instituted as sacraments of the hierarchy. They are founded not on the inner value of the thing, on fresh occasions, but on the painstakingly precise command of an unmotivated will. The bond between cult and sensuousness cut. The cult an exercise in godliness; no natural but only a transcendent, incomparable and unspecifiable meaning. Its chief effect *atonement*. Since the exile the consciousness of sin is permanent; Israel *cast away* from the face of God…

What is valuable in the offerings lies not in themselves but in *obedience* to precepts; the centre of gravity of the cult is shifted into a realm foreign to it, morality. Sacrifices and gifts recede behind *ascetic performances*, which stand in a still simpler connection with morality. Precepts which originally for the most part had in view the *sanctification* of the priests for liturgical functions were extended to the laity; the observance of the commandments of bodily purity was of greater and more pervasive significance than the great public cult, and led by a straight path to the ideal of holiness and of the universal priesthood. The whole of life was *confined* within a holy track, in that there was always a divine commandment to be fulfilled. this kept one from roaming after one's own thoughts and the desires of one's heart. This small private cult, making constant demands, kept the *feeling of sin* awake and alive in the individual.

The great pathologist of Judaism is right: the cult has become a means of discipline. It is foreign to the heart: it no longer has its roots in naive feeling: it is *dead* work, despite all its importance, or precisely *because of* its painstaking scrupulousness and conscientiousness. The old customs have been patched together into a *system*, into a system that served as a form, as a hard shell, in order to save something nobler within it. Paganism overcome on its own ground, in the cult: the cult, once *nature* had been killed in it, is merely the armour of a *supernatural monotheism — End*

378.

My Theory of the Type of Jesus.

The type of the "Redeemer" corrupted, indeed destroyed…

Causes: the intellectual level, at which everything is continually coarsened, distorted, displaced, the absolute blindness towards oneself (— here not even the beginning of self-knowledge has been made

—), the monstrous unscrupulousness of all sectarians in making use of their master as of their apology… the criminal's death of Christ as a riddle…

In the type there will be a *backwardness*: the crudity of the mind: one does not walk among fishermen with impunity

: the false generalization into the common type of the miracle-man, prophet, Messiah —

: the subsequent history and psychology of the young community, which inscribed its strongest affects into the image of its master —

: the sick, extravagant sentimentality and pampering in place of all reason: so that the instincts at once become master again — there is not the slightest trace of spirituality, of discipline and rigour in matters of the spirit, of conscientiousness.

What a pity that there was not a Dostoevsky among this company: in truth the whole story belongs best in a *Russian novel* — the *morbid*, the touching, individual features of sublime strangeness, amid the desolate and the filthy-vulgar… (like Mary of Magdala

Only *death*, the unexpected, ignominious death, only the cross, which was in general reserved for the rabble, — only this most horrifying paradox brought the disciples before the real riddle: "*who was that?*", "*what was that?*"

The shaken feeling, offended in its very depths, the suspicion that such a death might be the *refutation* of a cause, the terrible question mark "why thus?" — for here everything had to be necessary, had to have meaning, reason, the highest reason —: a disciple's love knows no chance:

only now did the chasm open: "who killed him?", "who was the natural enemy?" Answer: ruling Judaism, its foremost estate

— One felt *oneself* to be in *revolt against the* "*order*"

— one understood *Jesus* after the fact as in *revolt against the

order*

Until then this *warlike* trait was lacking in Jesus: more than that, it was impossible given his way of thinking. In practice, too, his conduct at his condemnation and death was surely the very opposite: he does not resist, he does not defend himself, he prays for them. The words to the thief on the cross mean nothing else: if you feel that this is what is right, not-defending-oneself, not being angry, not holding-responsible, but rather suffering, pitying, forgiving, praying for those who persecute and kill us: well then, you have the one thing needful, peace of the soul — *then you are in Paradise* —

Evidently it was precisely the main thing that was *not* understood: the exemplar of this freedom from all ressentiment:

for again, the death of Christ has no meaning other than to be the *strongest exemplar* and the *strongest proving* of his teaching…

His disciples were all far from forgiving this death: the most unevangelical feeling, *revenge*, came uppermost…

It was impossible that the matter could be at an end: one needed a "retribution", a "judgment" (— and nothing is less evangelical than reward and punishment!)

Only now did the popular expectations of a Messiah come to the fore again: awaiting a historical moment when "the Judge" comes to sit in judgment over his enemies…

: only now did one *misunderstand* the coming of the "kingdom of God" as though it were a prophecy concerning a final act of history

: only now did one carry the whole contempt and bitterness against the Pharisees and theologians into the type of the master

: one did not understand the main thing: that precisely such a death was itself the *highest victory* over the "world" (over the feelings of enmity, revenge, etc.) — over evil, over *the* Evil One, this always understood only as an inward psychological reality

: the veneration of these souls, utterly thrown off balance, could not bear to believe in that valid equal right of everyone to be a "son of God", as Jesus had taught it: their revenge was to *exalt* Jesus in an extravagant manner (— just as the Jews had exalted the role of Israel, as though the whole rest of the world were its enemy. Origin of the absurd theology of One God and his One Son —

Problem: "how *could* God permit this?" To this one found the absurd answer: "he gave his son for the forgiveness of sins, as a sacrifice". How *everything* was misunderstood!!! Nothing is more unevangelical than the guilt-offering, and above all that of the innocent for the sins of the guilty;

: but Jesus had indeed abolished sin! — not through "faith", but through the feeling of divinity, of equality with God.

There enters into the type:

a) the doctrine of the judgment and of the second coming

b) the doctrine of death as sacrifice

c) the doctrine of the resurrection: whereby the whole "blessedness", the whole meaning of the Gospel is at a stroke spirited away in favour of a state — "after death"…

Paul, logicizing this conception with rabbinical impudence: "if Christ be not risen from the dead, then is our faith vain"

: and finally, to crown it all, the "immortality of the person"

And so already in the second generation after Jesus one held as Christian everything that ran most deeply counter to the evangelical instincts

sacrifice, even blood sacrifice, as the offering of the firstfruits

punishment, reward, judgment…

a keeping-apart of this world and the beyond, of time and eternity

a theology instead of a practice, a "faith" instead of a way of life

a deep and deadly hostility towards everything non-Christian

the whole *predicament of the missionary* has been carried into the teaching of Jesus: all the harsh and wicked things against those who do not accept his missionaries are now supposed to have been proclaimed already by the master

once judgment, punishment, reward had been accepted again in the main, the whole teaching and proverbial wisdom of Jesus was saturated with them…

379.

The Nihilist.

The Gospel: the tidings that for the lowly and the poor an access to happiness stands open, — that one has nothing to do but free oneself from the institution, from tradition, from the tutelage of the upper classes: in this respect the advent of Christianity is nothing more than the *typical socialist doctrine*.

Property, gain, fatherland, class and rank, tribunals, police, state, church, education, art, military affairs: all so many hindrances to

happiness, errors, entanglements, works of the devil, upon which the Gospel proclaims judgement… All typical of the socialist doctrine.

In the background the uprising, the explosion of a pent-up loathing against the "masters", the instinct for how much happiness, after so long an oppression, might already lie in merely feeling oneself free…

Mostly a symptom that the lower strata have been treated too philanthropically, that they already taste upon their tongue a happiness forbidden them… It is not hunger that begets revolutions, but the fact that the people en mangeant have acquired an appetite…

380.

The Alleged Youth

One deceives oneself if one dreams here of a naive and young folk-existence standing out against an old culture; the superstition goes about that in these strata of the lowest people, where Christianity grew and took root, the deeper wellspring of life had once more bubbled up: one understands nothing of the psychology of Christianness if one takes it as the expression of a newly rising youth of the people and a strengthening of race. On the contrary: it is a typical form of décadence; the moral mollycoddling and hysteria of a sickly, hodgepodge population grown weary and aimless. This curious society which gathers here around this master of popular seduction belongs, properly speaking, one and all in a Russian novel: all the nervous diseases have a rendez-vous among them… the absence of tasks, the instinct that everything is really at an end, that nothing is worth the trouble any longer, contentment in a dolce far niente

: the power and certainty of the future of the Jewish instinct, the tremendousness of its tenacious will to existence and power, lies in its ruling class; the strata which young Christianity lifts up are marked

by nothing more sharply than by the exhaustion of instinct. One is sick of it: that is the one thing — and one is content, by oneself, in oneself, for oneself — that is the other.

381.

Inability to express *political* ideals otherwise than in religious formulas

382.

Renan.

In the Orient the fool is a privileged being; he walks in before the highest councils without anyone daring to stop him; he is listened to, he is consulted. He is a being believed to be nearer to God, because, his individual reason being extinguished, it is presumed that he partakes of the divine. The esprit that singles out every flaw in reasoning with a subtle mockery is lacking in Asia.

Less value was set upon these writings than upon oral tradition: and this still in the first half of the 2nd century. Hence the slight authority of these writings: people adjusted them to suit themselves, supplemented them, the one from the others —

In the Gospel of John the parables are missing, the exorcisms…

383.

Ego:

"I was hungry and ye gave me no meat — depart from me, ye cursed, etc." Matth. 25, 41 etc.

this outrageous language "inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these my brethren, ye did it not to me"

"the spirit of propaganda", which presents itself as the spirit of Christ…

"the spirit of unsatisfied vindictiveness", which rages itself out in words, curses and prophecies of scenes of judgement…

"the spirit of asceticism" ("the keeping of the commandments" as a means of discipline, as a way to reward in the beyond, as in Judaism) instead of that *Christian indifferentism* which puts all these goods away from itself, out of "blessedness"… the Essenes, John etc.

"the spirit of the feeling of sin and of the necessity of redemption"

With the death of Christ and the psychological compulsion not to see a conclusion in it, all the *popular tendencies* were restored: all the *crudities* which it had been the work of that typical spiritualist to transform into *spirit* —

: messianism, the coming of the "kingdom of God", the spirit of enmity and vindictiveness, the expectation of "reward" and "punishment", the arrogance of the "elect" (they judge, curse, condemn, the sacrificial idea of Judaism… the socialist tendency in favour of the poor, the "dishonourable", the despised)

Jesus, who lived as the *fulfilment* of all popular expectations, who did nothing else but say: "here *is* the kingdom of heaven", who transformed the *crudity* of these expectations into *spirit*:

— but with his death everything was forgotten (in plain German: *refuted*) there was no choice, either to *translate back* the type into the popular notion of the "Messiah", of the future "judge", of the prophet in battle — ——

As the after-effect of this blow, to which this uncertain and enthusiastic band was not equal, *complete degeneration* at once set in: it had all been in vain…

an absurd *coarsening* of all spiritual values and formulas

the *anarchistic* instincts against the ruling class step shamelessly into the foreground.

: hatred against the rich, the powerful, the learned — the "kingdom of heaven", the "peace on earth" were at an end: out of a psychological *reality* there comes a *faith*, an *expectation* of a *reality coming at some time or other*, "a return": *a life in the imagination* is the eternal form of "redemption" — oh how differently Jesus had understood it!

384.

The first degeneration of Christianity is the infusion of Judaism, — a regression into *overcome* forms…

385.

"My kingdom is not of this world"

"I will destroy the temple of God and build it up again in three days"

the procedure against the "seducer" (mesith) who calls religion into question: stoning was provided for in the law

— against every prophet, every worker of miracles who drew the people away from the old faith —

"*ce grand maître en ironie*"

Renan finds it fair that he paid for this triumph with his life.

386.

"he is a disputeur only when he argues against the Pharisees: his opponent forces him, as almost always happens, to adopt his own tone" —

387.

Renan I, 346

Ses exquises moqueries, ses malignes provocations frappaient toujours au coeur. Stigmates éternelles, elles sont restées figées dans la plaie. Cette tunique de Nessus du ridicule, que le juif, fils des pharisiens, traîne en lambeaux après lui depuis dixhuit siècles, c'est Jésus, qui l'a tissée avec un artifice divin. Chefs-d'œuvre de haute raillerie, ses traits se sont inscrits en lignes de feu sur la chair de l'hypocrite et du faux dévot. Traits incomparables, traits dignes d'un fils de Dieu! Un dieu seul sait tuer de la sorte. Socrate et Molière ne font qu'effleurer la peau. Celui-ci porte jusqu'au fond des os le feu et la rage.

And this is the same one who could say of himself Isaiah 42, 2—3!!

388.

He never had any concept of "person", of "individual": one is one when one loves one another, when one lives only from the other. His disciples and he were One.

389.

That he was God, equal to God, was presented as a slander of the Jews (cf. John V, 18; X, 33). He is less than the Father: the Father has not revealed everything to him. He resists being called equal to God. He is God's son: all can become so (— thus it is *Jewish*: divine sonship is allotted in the Old Testament to several persons of whom it is by no means claimed that they are equal to God) "*Son*" in the Semitic languages is an extremely vague, loose concept

390.

The great Umbrian movement of the XIIIth century, most closely akin to that of the Galilean, took place in the name of poverty:

Francis of Assisi: exquisite goodness, his delicate, fine and tender communion with universal life

391.

in the rabbinical language of that time "heaven" is synonymous with "God": whose name one avoided.

392.

"The kingdom of God is *among* us" Luke 17:20.

393.

"blessed are they that hear the word of God and *do* it." Luke 11:27 etc.

394.

the concept "nature", "law of nature" is wholly and utterly lacking: everything proceeds morally, "miracles" are nothing "contrary to nature" (because there is no nature)

395.

"The law is annihilated: it is he who will annihilate it": a split among his first disciples, of whom a considerable part remained Jewish… The trial against him leaves no doubt…

396.

"the neighbour" in the Jewish sense is the fellow believer

397.

there is no *more unevangelical type* whatever than that of the scholars of the Greek Church, who from the fourth century on push Christianity onto the path of an absurd metaphysics; and likewise the Schoolmen of the *Latin* Middle Ages.

398.

Renan I, 461

… the feeling that Jesus introduced into the world is indeed our own. His perfect idealism is the highest rule of the detached and virtuous life. He created the heaven of pure souls, where one finds what one asks in vain of the earth, the perfect nobility of the children of God, accomplished holiness, total abstraction from the defilements of the world, freedom at last, which real society excludes as an impossibility and which has its full amplitude only in the domain of thought. The great master of those who take refuge in this ideal paradise is still Jesus. He was the first to proclaim the sovereignty of the spirit: he was the first to say, at least by his acts: "my kingdom is not of this world". The founding of the *true religion* is indeed his work…

399.

"Christianity" has become synonymous with "religion": everything that one does outside the great and good Christian tradition will be barren.

400.

Our civilization, governed by a meticulous police, gives no notion of what man does in epochs when the originality of each has freer scope.

Our petty preventive vexations, far more murderous than tortures for the things of the spirit, did not exist. Jesus could lead, for three years, a life which in our societies would have brought him before the tribunal twenty times…

Freed from our polite conventions, exempt from the uniform education which refines us but so greatly diminishes our individuality, these whole souls brought to action a surprising energy… The breath of God was free among them; among us, it is chained by the iron bonds of a petty society condemned to an irremediable mediocrity.

Let us then place the person of Jesus at the highest summit of human greatness: so Herr Renan bids us.

401.

Medicine, which sees in a certain moral délicatesse the onset of étisie… (of phthisis?)

402.

Philosophy does not suffice for the great number. It needs holiness. — A nice piece of malice on Renan's part.

403.

Who would not rather be sick like Pascal than healthy like the vulgar? Renan.

404.

Imagine Jesus reduced to bearing the burden of his divinity until sixty or seventy years of age, losing his heavenly flame, wearing himself out little by little under the necessities of an unheard-of role! Renan.

Devoted without reserve to his idea, he subordinated everything to it to such a degree that the universe no longer existed for him. It is by this fit of heroic will that he conquered heaven. There has been no man, Shakyamuni perhaps excepted, who has so trampled underfoot family, the joys of this world, every temporal care… As for us, eternal children, condemned to impotence, let us bow before these demigods! Renan.

405.

Renan, p. 187

The most exalted democratic movement of which humanity has kept the memory had long been stirring the Jewish race. The thought that God is the avenger of the poor and the weak against the rich and the powerful recurs on every page of the writings of the Old Testament. The history of Israel is, of all histories, the one in which the popular spirit has most constantly dominated. The prophets, true tribunes and, one may say, the boldest of tribunes, had thundered ceaselessly against the great and established a close relation between the words "poor, meek, humble, pious" on the one hand and, on the other, the words "rich, impious, violent, wicked". Under the Seleucids, the aristocrats having almost all apostatized and gone over to Hellenism, these associations of ideas only grew stronger. The Book of Enoch contains curses still more violent than those of the Gospel against the world, the rich, the powerful. The name "poor" (ebion) had become synonymous with "saint", with "friend of God".

406.

Pierre Loti, Pêcheur d'Islande.

407.

The *state*, or organized *immorality*…

inwardly: as police, criminal law, estates, commerce, family

outwardly: as will to power, to war, to conquest, to revenge

how is it brought about that a *great multitude* does things to which the *individual* would never consent?

—

by the division of responsibility

—

of commanding and of executing

—

by the *interposition* of the virtues of obedience, of duty, of love of fatherland and of prince

the maintenance of pride, of severity, of strength, of hatred, of revenge, in short of all the typical traits that *contradict* the herd type…

The *artifices* for making possible actions, measures, affects which, measured individually, are no longer "permissible", — nor any longer "palatable" —

— *art* "makes them palatable to us", letting us enter such "estranged" worlds

— the *historian* shows their kind of right and reason; travels; exoticism; psychology; criminal law; madhouse; criminals; sociology

— *"impersonality"*: so that as *media* of a collective being we permit ourselves these affects and actions (judicial colleges, jury, citizen,

soldier, minister, prince, society, "critic")… gives us the feeling as though *we were making a sacrifice*…

The *maintenance of the military state* is the very last means of either taking up or holding fast the *great tradition* with regard to the *highest type* of man, the *strong type*. And all *concepts* that perpetuate the enmity and distance of rank between states may on that account appear sanctioned…

e.g. nationalism, protective tariffs, — — —

the strong type is maintained as *value-determining*…

408.

One should not adorn and dress up Christianity (as this equivocal Herr Renan does): it has waged a war to the death against the *strong type* of man

it has placed all the fundamental instincts of this type under ban

it has manufactured out of these instincts evil, *the* evil one

: the strong man as the typically *reprehensible* and *reprobate* man

it has taken the side of everything weak, base, ill-constituted

: it has made an ideal out of *contradiction* to the preservation instincts of strong life…

: it has corrupted the reason even of the most spiritual men by teaching them to feel the highest instincts of spirituality as sinful, as misleading, as *temptations*…

the most pitiful example — the corruption of Pascal, who believes in the corruption of his reason through original sin: whereas it has been corrupted for him only by his Christianity…

409.

Authors in whom still to take pleasure today compromises one once and for all: Rousseau, Schiller, George Sand, Michelet, Buckle, Carlyle, the imitatio

410.

NB. I mistrust all systematizers and stay out of their way. The will to a system is, for a thinker at least, something that compromises, a form of immorality… Perhaps, with a glance beneath and behind this book, one will guess which systematizer it has itself only with difficulty evaded — myself…

411.

Preface.

1.

Great things demand that one either keep silent about them or speak greatly: greatly, that is, cynically and with innocence.

2.

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come otherwise: *the advent of nihilism*. This history can already be told now: for necessity itself is at work here. This future already speaks in a hundred signs, this destiny announces itself everywhere; for this music of the future all ears are already pricked. Our whole European culture has long been moving, with a torture of tension that grows from decade to decade, as if toward a catastrophe: restless, violent, precipitate: like a river that wants *to reach its end*, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to reflect.

3.

— He who here takes the word has, conversely, done nothing so far but *reflect*: as a philosopher and hermit by instinct, who found his advantage in standing apart, in the outside, in patience, in delay, in lagging behind; as a spirit of daring and — of temptation, who has already lost his way once in every labyrinth of the future; as a soothsayer-bird spirit who *looks back* when he tells what is to come; as the first perfect nihilist of Europe, who, however, has already lived nihilism through to its end within himself, — who has it behind him, beneath him, outside him…

4.

For let no one mistake the meaning of the title by which this gospel of the future wishes to be named. "*The Will to Power.* Attempt at a Revalu-

ation of All Values" — with this formula a *countermovement* is given expression, with regard to principle and task: a movement which in some future will supersede that perfect nihilism; which, however, *presupposes* it, logically and psychologically, which can come absolutely only *upon it* and *out of it*. For why is the advent of nihilism now *necessary*? Because it is our previous values themselves that draw their final conclusion in it; because nihilism is the logic of our great values and ideals thought through to its end, — because we must first experience nihilism in order to find out what the *value* of these "values" really was… We shall need, at some point, *new values*…

412.

To read books which could have been written by many: they betray most clearly the intellectual habits of the scholarly type of an age, they are "impersonal".

413.

The *overman*

: it is *not* my question what is to supersede man: but rather what kind of man is to be chosen, willed, *bred* as the one of higher value…

Mankind does *not* represent a development toward the better; or the stronger; or the higher; in the sense in which it is believed today: the European of the 19th century is, in his value, far below the European of the Renaissance; further development is by no means, with any necessity whatever, elevation, enhancement, strengthening…

in another sense there is a continual *success* of individual cases in the most diverse places on earth and arising out of the most diverse cultures, in which *a higher type* does in fact *present itself*: something which, in relation to mankind as a whole, is a kind of "overman". Such lucky strokes of great success have always been possible and will

perhaps always be possible. And even whole tribes, lineages, peoples can under certain circumstances represent such a *hit*…

From the oldest times of Indian, Egyptian and Chinese culture that we can guess at down to today, the *higher type of man* is far more uniform than one thinks…

One forgets how little mankind belongs to a single movement, how youth, age, decline are by no means concepts that apply to it as a whole

One forgets, to give an example, how our European culture is only today again approaching that state of philosophical mellowness and late culture out of which the emergence of a Buddhism becomes comprehensible.

If it ever becomes possible to draw isochronic lines of culture through history, then the modern concept of progress will come to stand nicely on its head: — and so will the very index by which it is measured, democratism

414.

Preface.

*

What is good? — Everything that enhances the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.

What is bad? — Everything that stems from weakness.

What is happiness? — The feeling that power is growing, — that a resistance is being overcome.

Not contentment, but more power; not peace at all, but war; not virtue, but proficiency (virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, moraline-free virtue.)

The weak and ill-constituted shall perish: first principle of society. And one shall even help them to do so.

What is more harmful than any vice? — Active pity for all the ill-constituted and weak, — "Christianity"…

*

Not what is to supersede mankind in the sequence of beings is the problem I hereby pose; but rather which type of man one is to *breed*, to *will*, as the one of higher value, more worthy of life, more certain of the future.

This type of higher value has often enough been present already: but as a stroke of luck, as an exception, — never as *willed*. Rather, it is precisely he who has been most feared, he has hitherto been almost *the terrible thing*: and out of fear the opposite type has been willed, bred, *attained*: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the animal of "equal rights", the *weak* animal man, — the "Christian"…

*

The Will to Power.

Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.

415.

The conception of the world that one comes upon in the background of this book is singularly gloomy and unpleasant: among the types of pessimism that have so far become known, none seems to have reached this degree of malignity. Here the opposition of a true world and an apparent world is lacking: there is only One world, and this is

false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, without meaning… A world so constituted is the true world… *We have need of lies* in order to triumph over this reality, this "truth", that is, in order to *live*… That the lie is necessary in order to live — this itself still belongs to this terrible and questionable character of existence…

Metaphysics, morality, religion, science — in this book they are considered only as various forms of the lie: with their help one *believes* in life. "Life *ought* to inspire trust": the task, so posed, is tremendous. To solve it, man must already be a liar by nature, he must be, more than anything else, an *artist*… And so he is: metaphysics, morality, religion, science — all merely offspring of his will to art, to the lie, to flight from "truth", to the *negation* of "truth". This very faculty, thanks to which he *violates reality through the lie*, this *artist's faculty* par excellence of man — he still has it in common with all that is: he himself is, after all, a piece of actuality, truth, nature — he himself is also a piece of the *genius of the lie*…

That the character of existence be *misjudged* — deepest and highest secret intention of science, piety, artistry. To never see much, to see much falsely, to see much into things… Oh how clever one still is in states where one is farthest from thinking oneself clever! Love, enthusiasm, "God" — nothing but subtleties of the ultimate self-deception, nothing but seductions to life! In moments when man becomes the deceived, when he believes in life once more, when he has outwitted himself: oh how it swells up in him then! What rapture! What feeling of power! How much artist's triumph in the feeling of power!… Man has once again become master over "matter" — master over truth!… And whenever man rejoices, he is always the same in his joy: he rejoices as an artist, he enjoys himself as power. *The lie is power*…

Art and nothing but art. It is the great enabler of life, the great seductress to life, the great stimulant to life…

416.

Revaluation of Values.

Book 1: *the Antichrist.*

Book 2: *the Misosoph.*

Book 3: *the Immoralist*

Book 4: *Dionysus.*

Revaluation of All Values.

417.

i have given the Germans the deepest book they possess, my Zarathustra — today I give them the most independent. What? says my bad conscience to this, how can you think of casting pearls before the Germans!…

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