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Nachlass: Writings from the Late Notebooks

Friedrich Nietzsche

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Nachlass, Late Notebooks 1887

Friedrich Nietzsche

Modern English edition

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Notebook 8: Summer 1887

Book One: "What is

truth?"

Chapter Three. The will to truth.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche himself. The editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari added them, following his last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook entry NF-1888, 18[17]).]

1.

The problem of truth.

The need to believe is the biggest

brake, the biggest thing holding back

honesty.

The will to truth

Falseness.

Falseness we are not aware of.

Every instinct that rules over a person treats the other instincts as its tools, its royal court, its flatterers. It never lets itself be called by its ugly real name. And it puts up with no other praise unless that praise also indirectly praises it.

Around every ruling instinct, all praise and blame in general hardens, like crystals forming, into a fixed order and a set of polite rules.

That is the first cause of falseness.

Every instinct that wants to rule, but is still held down under a yoke, needs all the beautiful names and accepted values for itself. It needs them to support its sense of self and to make itself stronger. So, most of the time, it dares to come out into the open under the name of the very "master" it is fighting against and wants to break free from. (For example, when Christian values are in charge, sexual desire or the desire for power will dress itself up in Christian names.)

That is the second cause of falseness.

In both cases there is complete innocence: the falseness never reaches awareness. When a person sees the driving force and its "expression" ("the mask") as separate things, that is a sign of a broken instinct. It is a sign that the person is in conflict with himself, and such a person is far less likely to win. Total innocence in your gestures, your words and your feelings, a "clear conscience" while being false, the confidence with which you reach for the greatest and most splendid words and poses: all of this is necessary in order to win.

In the other case, when someone sees through himself extremely clearly, he needs the talent of a great actor and enormous self-discipline in order to win. That is why priests are the most skillful hypocrites who know what they are doing. Next come princes, whose rank and family background raise them into a kind of acting. Third come people of high society and diplomats. Fourth, women.

Basic idea: Falseness seems to run so deep and to be everywhere. Our will is so strongly turned against seeing ourselves directly and calling things by their real names. So there is a very strong chance that this guess is right: truth, and the will to truth, are really something quite different, and they too are only a disguise.

Sensuality, meaning bodily and sexual desire, in its disguises

as

idealism ("Plato"), which belongs to young people. It creates the same kind of image as a curved magnifying mirror, the way the person you love appears to you in particular. It puts a shiny coating around every thing, enlarging it, making it glow, giving it a feeling of the infinite.

in

the religion of love: "a beautiful young man, a beautiful woman," somehow godlike, a bridegroom, a bride of the soul

in

art, as a force that "decorates": think of how a man sees a woman. He makes her, so to speak, a gift of every good quality there is. In the same way, the artist's sensuality pours into one single object everything else he honors and values. In this way he makes an object perfect (he "idealizes" it).

The woman knows what the man feels toward women. So she meets his effort to idealize her halfway: she dresses up, walks gracefully, dances, and says tender things. In the same way she practices modesty, holding back, keeping her distance, with an instinctive sense that this makes the man's power to idealize grow. (Because the female instinct is so incredibly fine-tuned, this modesty is not at all a conscious act of hypocrisy. She senses that it is exactly a naive, genuine shyness that tempts the man the most and pushes him to think too highly of her. That is why the woman is naive: out of a finely tuned instinct, which advises her that being innocent is useful. A deliberate keeping of her eyes closed to herself…

Wherever pretending works better when it is unconscious, it becomes unconscious.

On the origin of art. There is a way of making things perfect and seeing things as perfect that belongs to a brain overloaded with sexual energy. Think of an evening spent with the person you love: the smal-

lest chance events seem to glow, life becomes a series of lofty and wonderful things, and "the misery of someone unhappily in love is worth more than anything else." On the other hand, everything perfect and beautiful works as an unconscious reminder of that state of being in love and its way of seeing. Every perfection, all the beauty of things, brings back the bliss of love by association, because the two sit side by side in our minds. Physically speaking: the creative instinct of the artist and the spreading of semen into the blood… The longing for art and beauty is an indirect longing for the delights of the sex drive, which that drive passes on to the brain. The world made perfect through "love"…

The "herd instinct" in its disguise

The drive to lie and to pretend in the artist

breaking out

The drive to quietly look on and think, in its disguise.

Cruelty in its disguise

Sickness and decline in their disguises

Old age in its disguise (as nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) (as a return of the values of youth and of values handed down from one's parents — the strength and springiness of mind and character are broken, for example Richard Wagner

The disguise of laziness, the force of inertia, the pull to stay as one is

Book Two:

Where values come from.

Chapter One. The metaphysicians, the philosophers of a world beyond this one.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche himself. The editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari added them, following his last plan for "The Will to Power" (notebook entry NF-1888, 18[17]).]

2.

On the psychology of metaphysics

This world is only appearance — therefore there must be a 'real' world.

This world depends on conditions — therefore there must be a world that depends on nothing.

This world is full of contradictions — therefore there must be a world without contradictions.

This world is always changing — therefore there must be a world of fixed being.

All of these are false conclusions. (They come from blind trust in reason: if A exists, then its opposite idea, B, must exist too.)

Suffering is what inspires these conclusions. Deep down they are wishes: people wish such a world existed. Also, hatred of a world that causes suffering shows itself in the act of imagining another world, a valuable one. Here the resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) that metaphysicians feel against reality becomes creative: it invents something.

A second set of questions: what is suffering for?… And here people draw a conclusion about how the 'real' world relates to our world of appearances, which is changing, suffering and full of contradictions.

1) Suffering as the result of error: how is error possible?

2) Suffering as the result of guilt: how is guilt possible?

(— All of these are experiences taken from nature or from society, then blown up into universal rules and projected onto things "in themselves.")

But if the conditioned world is caused by the unconditioned one, then the freedom to make errors and to be guilty must also be caused by it. And once again people ask: what for?… So the world of appearance, of change, of contradiction, of suffering, must be something that was wanted on purpose: but what for?

The mistake in these conclusions is this: two opposite ideas are formed, and because one of them matches something real, the other one "must" also match something real. "Otherwise, where would we have gotten its opposite idea from?" So reason is treated as a source of revelation, a way of learning what things are like in themselves.

But the origin of these opposites does not have to go back to some supernatural source in reason. It is enough to set the true origin of our ideas against that view. The true origin is the practical world, the world of what is useful, and that is exactly why we believe in these ideas so strongly. (People perish if they do not reason according to this kind of reason. But that does not "prove" that what it claims is true.)

The way metaphysicians are obsessed with suffering is completely naive. "Eternal bliss" is psychological nonsense. Brave and creative people never treat pleasure and pain as the final questions of value. They are side effects. If you want to achieve something, you have to want both. When metaphysicians and religious people put the problems of pleasure and pain at the front of everything, it shows something tired and sick in them. Even morality only matters so much to

them because it counts as an essential condition for getting rid of suffering.

In the same way, being obsessed with appearance and error: seeing them as the cause of suffering. It is a superstition that happiness is tied to truth. (This is a mix-up: people really find happiness in feeling "certain," in "believing.")

Chapter Two. The Religious People.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche himself. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (note NF-1888,18[17]).]

3.

On "the religious people"

What do ideals of self-denial and harsh self-discipline mean?

They are an early form of the still-new *thoughtful, inward-looking* way of life. They are extreme so that they win respect, and so that people can *give themselves* respect (*against* the guilty conscience they feel about not being active). People go looking for the conditions that make such a life possible.

A feeling for keeping the soul *clean*, expressed in an over-the-top, showy way.

A *prison-like condition* (in which a person is secretly setting himself up for many fine pleasures later). It serves as a cure for desires that are far too wild (it simply avoids "temptations"). It shows itself as *hatred* of the senses and of life.

A *poorer, thinner life*, a need for laziness and rest. The trick of the fakir, the holy man who sits still for years. "Old age."

An *unhealthy touchiness*, oversensitivity, something like a fussy old maid who avoids life. Sometimes it is a sex drive sent in the wrong direction, and a hysteria of "love."

A critique of *humility* ("total obedience"). Sometimes this is really the instinct for power: either looking for people who will be total "tools," or getting the most done by being a tool yourself. There is cleverness in it, and laziness too (the same as in poverty and chastity).

A critique of *poverty* (the giving-up of things that only looks like giving up, and the competition behind it, used as clever means on the road to ruling over others).

A critique of *chastity*, that is, staying away from sex and marriage. *Its usefulness:* it gives you time and independence. It suits a spoiled, refined mind that cannot stand being among little wives. Families are big nests of chatter. Chastity keeps your strength and keeps some illnesses away. Being free of wife and children keeps away a lot of temptations (luxury, crawling before the powerful, fitting in with everyone else).

Picture a human being in whom the mysterious variety and richness of nature are at work: a blend of the terrifying and the delightful, someone full of promise, someone who knows more, someone who can do more. The ideal of self-denial always shows a failure, a lack, a contradiction in the body itself. It makes you think that the only kind of priest people today still know is this self-denying kind. That is a sign that humans in general have degenerated and turned out badly. — And just as we speak of romantic artists, we could say that the only priest we really know is the *romantic priest*. But a *classical* priest is possible in itself, and probably did exist once. With this idea of a classical priest in mind, go and stand before the statue of Plato in the Bourbon Museum in Naples. The archaeologists are not sure whether it might actually be a bearded Dionysus. That does not matter to us. What is

certain is that the statue shows a priestly type of person — but *not* a self-denying type…

The Christian priest stands for what goes against nature. He stands for the power of wisdom and of goodness — but a power that goes against nature, a wisdom that goes against nature, a goodness that goes against nature. He stands for hostility toward power, toward knowledge, and toward — — —

power as the power to work miracles

wisdom as the opposite of reason

love as the opposite of sexuality

hatred of the powerful people of this world, and a hidden, deep-rooted rivalry and contest with them — the priest wants their soul and leaves them their body —

hatred of the mind, of pride, of courage, of freedom, of a mind that is playful and unrestrained

hatred of the senses, of the joys of the senses, of joy in general, and a deadly hostility toward bodily pleasure and sexuality

The Christian priesthood has this on its conscience: the slandering, nasty will to misunderstand sexuality as it appeared in the worship rites and secret ceremonies from the very beginning…

From the very start, the Christian priest is the deadly enemy of bodily pleasure. You cannot imagine a greater contrast than the innocent, awe-filled and solemn way that, for example, the most respected women's religious rites in Athens felt the presence of sexual symbols. In all religions that do not preach self-denial, the act of making new life is the deepest mystery there is. It is a kind of symbol of fulfilment and of a mysterious purpose, of the future (rebirth, immortality).

Chapter Three. The Good People and the Improvers.

[The chapter titles here were not written by Nietzsche himself. They were added by the editors Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, following Nietzsche's last plan for "The Will to Power" (note NF-1888,18[17]).]

4.

The Good People and the Improvers.

Hatred of those who are gifted in body and soul: the uprising of ugly, badly-turned-out souls against the beautiful, proud, cheerful ones.

Their method: making beauty, pride and joy look suspicious.

what goes against nature

is treated as the higher thing

"Nobody deserves credit for anything."

"The danger is enormous: you *ought* to tremble and feel miserable."

"Being natural is evil. Fighting against nature is what is right. And fighting against 'reason' *too*."

Once again it is the *priests* who exploit this state of mind and win "the people" over to their side. "The sinner," whom God is said to enjoy more than "the righteous person."

This is the fight against "paganism" (using the sting of conscience as a way to destroy the harmony of the soul).

The hatred of the average people for *the exceptions*, of the herd for those who stand on their own.

custom as

the true

"morality"

Turning *against* "selfishness": the only thing that has value is what is done "for

others"

"We are all equal."

against the hunger to rule, against "ruling" in general

against special rights

against people who split off into their own groups, free thinkers, doubters

against philosophy (because it goes against the instinct to be a tool and to stay in one's own little corner)

Among philosophers themselves: "the categorical imperative," Kant's idea of a moral command that holds without exception, and the claim that the nature of morality is the same "for everyone and everywhere."

The three *claims*:

what is

not noble is the higher thing (the protest of the "common man")

what

goes against nature is the higher thing (the protest of those who got a bad deal in life)

what is

average is the higher thing (the protest of the herd, of the "middle people")

So the *history of morality* expresses a *will to power*, through which

sometimes the slaves and the oppressed,

sometimes those who turned out badly and suffer from themselves,

sometimes the mediocre

try to push through the judgments of value that suit them best.

For that reason, seen from the point of view of biology, the whole fact of morality is highly worrying. Until now, morality has grown *at the expense of*:

the rulers and their particular instincts

those who turned out well, the *beautiful* natures

those who are independent and privileged in any sense

So morality is a *movement against nature's efforts* to produce a *higher type* of human. Its effects are:

distrust of life in general (in so far as life's natural drives are felt to be "immoral")

meaninglessness, in so far as the highest values are felt to clash with the strongest instincts — an absurd contradiction.

the decline and self-destruction of the "higher natures," because it is exactly in them that this conflict becomes *conscious*.

The slave revolt in morals: resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) becomes creative. It comes from the crushed and trampled people, who are not allowed to actually *strike back*.

So: first comes a *negative* value (the reverse of noble morality, which springs from a feeling of *triumphant saying yes* to oneself).

"the evil one" (who is really the strong one)

The method of *slandering* aristocratic values (pride, beauty, happiness, cheerfulness, bodily pleasure, wealth)

with the help of 1) *refusing* to see, 2) *wanting* to see things wrongly, 3) wanting to *read things into* what one sees.

Turning things upside down: trying to explain resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) itself as a virtue (a "sense of justice")

their actual fearful lowliness is called "humility"

being harmless, "cowardice," waiting, are called "patience"

or called "kindness," "loving your enemies," "love of mankind"

also called "obedience to God," who

commands obedience to "the authorities"

the wish for revenge is called "God's victory over his enemies"; in the same way, the cruelty felt when watching someone's defeat is called "the triumph of God's justice"

their misery is called a test, a preparation of "the chosen ones," a mark of honor, even a clever move ("so that we will be repaid all the more one day")

living in "hope," in "love," in "faith" (in a God of the poor and oppressed)

the honor of being poor, called "serving God"

In short, it is an attempt to be pleased with oneself and to convince oneself that "we are not only better people" but also "better off." The "good" people are really the *weak* ones.

— And underneath it all, the deepest dishonesty and lying. —

How people turned inward (as a sickness)

Turning inward happens like this. Once peace and society are set up, powerful drives are no longer allowed to let themselves out on the world outside. So they try to make up for it on the inside, working

together with the imagination. The need for hostility, cruelty, revenge and violence turns back on itself; it "steps back" inside. In the urge to know things, there is greed and the wish to conquer. In the artist, the power to pretend and to lie shows up again, after it was pushed back inside. The drives get turned into demons, which a person then has to fight, and so on.

Being aware of yourself as a sickness

People keep putting themselves into situations for which they do not yet have any instinct. So for a while they are experimenting, and they act on the basis of "reasoning" and conclusions, not on the basis of instinct. Events driven by "reason" are an example of this, such as the French Revolution.

The guilty conscience that sticks to anything new

for example, to marriage

to gentle feelings of pity and forgiveness (which for a long time were linked with destroying oneself)

to the will to investigate and do research (because it was seen as aimed against authority)

to the great victories over nature (which were seen as acts against God)

to peace

to the merchant and to the tax collector

among noble families who give up their right to revenge and submit to the highest power.

So the sense of what is right and lawful is a twin sister of the guilty conscience.

5.

Every wrong deed is something done against one's will, and so it is a misfortune — the Greek word Plato uses is "symphora". That is how Plato puts it in the ninth and eleventh books of his "Laws", when he talks about robbing temples and murdering one's parents.

6.

The growth of personal responsibility was *held back* by the tightly organized family clans. The consequences of a deed did not fall on the person who did it, and everyone carried the consequences of what everyone else did. The strangest case was probably the "conscience" of the clan's chief, who had to pay, more or less, for everything.

The *great events*:

The victory of man over woman (through war, through the right of the master)

The victory of peace over war

7.

The love of lying is the mother of art. Fear and sensual desire are the mother of religion. The Latin saying "Nitimur in vetitum" — "we strive for what is forbidden" — together with curiosity, is the mother of science. Cruelty is the mother of unselfish morality. Regret is the origin of the social movement for equality. The will to power is the origin of justice. War is the father of honesty (because it gives a clear conscience and cheerfulness). The right of the master is the origin of the family. Distrust is the root of justice and of quiet thinking.

8.

Zarathustra

With this book, every single word should at some point have hurt you and wounded you, and at another point filled you with deep delight. If you have not understood it *that* way, you have not understood it at all.

Notebook 9: Autumn 1887

1.

Principles and opening

thoughts.

1.

On the history of European nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

As the unavoidable result of the ideals people have held so far:

complete worthlessness.

2.

The teaching of the eternal return of all things: as its

completion, as its turning point, its crisis

(1) 3.

This whole development of philosophy is the story of how the will to truth grew. Then that will to truth starts to question itself. Feelings about value that come from living in society were blown up into absolute principles of value.

(2) 4.

The problem of life: seen as will to power.

(It is understandable and useful that social feelings about value win out for a while: the point is to build a base, a foundation, on which a stronger kind of human can finally become possible.) The measure of strength: being able to live with the reversed ways of valuing, and to want them again and again forever. The state and society are a foundation: seen from the point of view of the whole world's economy, and with education as breeding.

2.

(3)

A critique of the 'good' person. (Not a critique of hypocrisy: that has, at most, amused me and given me a rest.) The struggle so far against the terrible passions, weakening them, holding them down: morality as a way of making people smaller.

3.

(4)

Kant: he made the English doubt about whether we can really know anything acceptable to Germans

1)

by getting the moral and religious needs of the Germans interested in that doubt. (In the same way, and for the same reasons, the later Academic philosophers used doubt to prepare the ground for Augustine's Platonism. And in the same way Pascal even used doubt about morals to stir up people's need for faith, to 'justify' it.)

2)

by decorating that doubt with fussy, curly, old-school scholarly twists, and so making it acceptable to the Germans' taste for scholarly form. (Because Locke and Hume on their own were too bright, too clear, which means, judged by German instincts about value, 'too shallow'.)

Kant: a poor psychologist and a poor judge of people. He got great historical values badly wrong, for example the French Revolution. He was a moral fanatic in the style of Rousseau, with Christian values hidden underground beneath his thinking. He was a dogmatist through and through, someone who lays down fixed doctrines. Yet he was heavily weary of this habit of his, even to the point of wanting to bully it into submission. But when he turned to doubt, he grew tired of that right away too. Not even a breath of worldly, international taste or of ancient Greek and Roman beauty had touched him… He

was someone who slowed things down and someone who stood in the middle and made compromises, nothing original.

(Just as Leibniz stood in the middle between a mechanical view of the world and a spiritual one,

just as Goethe stood between the taste of the 18th century and the taste of the 'historical sense' (which is really, at heart, a taste for the exotic and foreign),

just as German music stood between French and Italian music,

just as Charlemagne stood between the Roman Empire and nationalism.

they stood in the middle, they built bridges,

they were the slowers-down above all others.

4.

To end with: 'to have been a teacher of this'

'how a person makes himself eternal…'

(Dante, Inferno, Canto 15, line 85)

5.

(5)

On the character of each nation's genius, its special talent, in how it deals with foreign and borrowed things.

The English genius makes everything it receives coarser and more down-to-earth.

The French genius thins it out, simplifies it, makes it logical, and dresses it up.

The German genius mixes it up, makes compromises, tangles it, and turns it into morality.

The Italian genius has made by far the freest and finest use of what it borrowed, and has put a hundred times more into it than it took out: because it is the richest genius, the one that had the most to give away.

6.

(6)

On Art and Beauty

The senses and their pleasures

Images of a life that is raised up and victorious, and their power to make things shine more beautifully: so that a certain perfection is placed into things

intoxication, the feeling of being carried away

And the other way round: where the beauty of perfection shows itself, the world of the senses and of intoxication is stirred up too, because the two have grown together since long ago. That is why the senses and intoxication belong to religious happiness.

And in the same way, at its core, so does the way artists are so easily excited through their senses.

'Beautiful' sets our feeling of pleasure on fire; just think of how 'love' makes everything shine. Shouldn't it also work the other way round, so that what shines and is perfect gently stirs the senses, and life comes across as a feeling of well-being?

7.

(7)

The extra, overflowing strength in the life of the mind sets new goals for itself. It does not at all just give orders and lead the lower world, or just keep the body alive, the 'individual'. We are more than the individual: we are the whole chain, along with the tasks of all the futures of the chain.

8.

On the Plan.

In place of moral values, only natural values. Making morality natural again.

In place of 'sociology', a study of the structures of power and rule.

In place of the 'theory of knowledge', a study of the points of view that come from our passions (which includes a ranking of the passions).

The transformed passions: their higher order, their 'spiritual' quality.

In place of metaphysics and religion, the teaching of the eternal return of all things (used as a means of breeding and of choosing).

(8)

'God' as a high point: existence as an endless turning into God and turning away from God again. But in that there is no high point of value, only a high point of power.

Mechanism and matter are completely ruled out: both are only ways in which low levels express themselves, the most spiritless form of passion (of 'the will to power').

The world becoming dull and stupid as a goal, as a result of the will to power, which makes the parts as independent of one another as pos-

sible. Beauty as a sign that the winner has grown used to winning and been spoiled by it. Ugliness as the expression of many defeats (inside the body itself). No inheritance! The chain growing as a whole.

The falling back from the high point in change (the highest spiritual form of power, standing on the most slave-like foundation) should be shown as a result of this highest strength itself. Once it has nothing left to organize, it turns against itself and uses its strength to take things apart…

a)

Societies being conquered more and more, and made subject to a smaller but stronger number of people.

b)

The privileged and the stronger being conquered more and more, and so the rise of democracy, and finally anarchy among the parts.

9.

The Music of Today.

An Attack in Writing

By

F. N.

10.

Second Attack in Writing

The Herd's Way of Seeing, Passed Off as Morality.

Among Moralists and Moral Philosophers.

A

Settling of Accounts with Morality.

What did the difference between social classes add to morality?

What did the ideal of self-denial and harsh self-discipline add?

What did the herd add?

What did the philosophers add?

What did the passions of the beast of prey add?

11.

Among Moralists. The great moral philosophers. Morality as the doom of philosophers up to now.

Rousseau. Kant. Hegel. Schopenhauer. Lichtenberg. Goethe.

Baltasar Gracián. Machiavelli. Galiani. Montaigne. Pascal.

Carlyle. George Eliot. Herbert Spencer.

Sainte-Beuve. Renan. The Goncourt brothers. Stendhal. Napoleon.

Plato. Epictetus. Epicurus. Seneca. Marcus Aurelius.

12.

(9)

Offenbach: French music with a spirit like Voltaire's, free, cheeky, with a little mocking grin, but bright and witty to the point of being ordinary (he doesn't put on make-up, he doesn't fake), and without the dainty prettiness of a sickly or a blond, Viennese kind of sensuality.

13.

Values

'The value of life': but life is just one single case. We have to justify all of existence, not only life. The principle that justifies must be one that explains life…

Life itself is not a means to anything; it is the expression of ways in which power grows.

Let us not make our 'wishful ideals' into judges over fixed being!

Let us not take the final forms that development reached (for example 'mind' or 'spirit') and place them back behind development as some 'thing in itself'.

14.

Final Chapter: The Last Wishful Ideal.

End of the book (as with life, so with wisdom itself): deep and tempting.

15.

(10)

What Tertullian says about the evil angels could also be said about the priests who preach self-denial and harsh self-discipline.

Tertullian (in his Defense of Christianity, section 22) on the evil angels: 'When it comes to healing diseases, they are real magicians. First they torment people; then they prescribe remedies that are new and harmful to the point of being miraculous. And yet people believe the angels have helped them, because they have stopped tormenting them.'

16.

(11)

'Do not judge, so that you will not be judged.' That 'so that' is contemptible. It is not noble, high-minded…

1) If you have the right to judge, that does not in any way mean you admit that others have the right to judge you…

2) For someone who was made for some task, unpleasant consequences don't count as reasons against that task. In some cases they can even be a spur.

Nothing is more foolish than to set up an exaggeration as morality (for example, 'love your enemies'): by doing that, you have driven reason out of morality… and nature out of morality.

A complete conviction: that the feelings about value at the top and at the bottom are different; that the people at the bottom lack countless experiences; that misunderstanding from the bottom looking up is unavoidable.

17.

(12)

For a long time, making human beings *smaller* has to count as the only goal. That is because a broad foundation must be built first, so that a *stronger* kind of human being can stand on top of it. The question is to what extent, until now, *every strengthened* kind of human being *has stood on the level of the lower ones* — — —

18.

(13)

War against the *Christian ideal*. War against the teaching that 'blessedness' and salvation are the goal of life. War against the idea that the simple-minded, the pure in heart, the suffering and the failures should rule over everyone else, and so on. (— What do God, and belief in God, still matter to us! Today 'God' is just a faded word, not even an idea anymore!) But, as Voltaire said on his deathbed: 'Don't talk to me about *that* man!'

When and where has any human being who really counts ever *looked like* that Christian ideal? At least, not to eyes like the ones a psychologist needs, eyes that see deep into people's hearts and insides! Just leaf through all the heroes that Plutarch wrote about.

19.

(14)

Francis of Assisi: in love, popular, a poet. He fights against the *aristocracy* and against the ranking of people and values among souls, and he takes the side of the very lowest.

20.

(15)

Socrates: he fights against the noble, high-minded instincts. He is very much a man of the common people. (He is *against* art, but he is a model of the scientific spirit. Here belongs some mockery of Renan's mistaken instinct, which *mixes together* nobility and science.)

Science and democracy belong together, whatever Monsieur Renan may say, just as surely as art and 'high society' belong together.

21.

(16)

In honor of the *vices*:

Greek culture

and love between men and boys

German music

and heavy drinking

science

and

the thirst for revenge

22.

(17)

The great *lies* in history:

As if it had been the *rottenness* of paganism that cleared the way for Christianity! No, it was the weakening of the people of ancient times, and the way they were *loaded down with morality*! Natural drives had already been reinterpreted as *vices* before Christianity came!

— As if the *rottenness of the Church* had been the cause of the Reformation! That was only the excuse, the lie that its rabble-rousers told themselves. In truth there were strong needs at work, and they were so brutal that they badly needed a cloak of religion to cover them.

23.

(18)

The lying way people explain the words, gestures and states of the *dying*: for example, the fear of death is always mixed up with the fear of what comes 'after death'…

24.

The 'Imitation of Christ' as a book of *seduction* (as Comte used it)

25.

The four great democrats: Socrates, Christ, Luther, Rousseau

26.

(19)

Against the *value* of what stays forever the same (look at *Spinoza*'s naive belief, and *Descartes*' too). Instead: the value of what is shortest and passes away fastest, like the tempting flash of gold on the belly of a snake.

Life —

27.

(20)

Replacing morality with the *will* to reach our goal, and *therefore* the will to use the *means* that lead to it.

Replacing the 'categorical imperative', the absolute command of duty, with a *categorical emperor*, an absolute commander.

Don't want any *praise*. You do what is useful to you, or what gives you pleasure, or what you *have to* do.

28.

(21)

The great fakes of psychology:

1)

that human beings strive for *happiness*

2)

that *morality* is the only way to *become happy*

the dull and empty idea of *Christian* 'blessedness'

29.

(22)

Monsieur Renan completely lacks the right instinct: he counts science and nobility as one and the same thing. But science is democratic to its roots, and it is *against rule by a small elite*.

30.

(23)

Correcting an *idea*

Selfishness. Once you have understood how the 'individual' is a mistake, and how instead every single being is the *whole process* in a straight line (not just something 'inherited', but the process itself…), then this single being has an *enormously great importance*. Instinct speaks quite rightly here. Where this instinct *weakens* (— where the individual first *looks for* its value in serving others), you can safely conclude that there is tiredness and *decline*. A truly selfless attitude, deep and without pious hypocrisy, is an instinct to give yourself at least a *second value*, by serving *other people's* selfishness. Mostly, though, it only *looks* selfless: it is a *roundabout way* of keeping up your *own feeling of being alive*, your *own sense of worth* —

31.

(24)

In philosophy, just as on the *battlefield*, what matters is

— the inner lines —

32.

whoever has not taken part in the horrible *darkening of the mind*, the hostility to clear thinking, of the Bayreuth crowd around Wagner

33.

(25)

The lack of discipline: in the future we will need a lot of self-denying training to strengthen the will, choosing of our own free will to go without things.

34.

(26)

Workers should learn to feel like *soldiers*. A fee, a salary, but no payment as such! No link between what you are paid and what you *achieve*! Instead, each individual should be placed, *according to its own* kind, so that *it can achieve the highest* that lies within its reach.

35.

(27)

1. Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) is a **normal** state.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning): the goal is missing; the answer to 'Why?' is missing. What does nihilism mean? — *That the highest values lose their value.*

It has *two sides*:

A)

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) as a sign that the *power of the mind has grown*: as *active nihilism*.

It can be a sign of *strength*. The strength of the mind can have grown so much that the goals it had *until now* (its 'convictions', its articles of faith) no longer fit it.

— For a belief generally expresses the pressure of the *conditions a being needs to exist*. It is a bowing down to the authority of the circumstances in which a being *thrives, grows and gains power*…

On the other hand, it is a sign of *not enough* strength to go on and creatively *set* yourself a new goal, a new 'Why?', a new belief.

It reaches its *peak* of relative strength as a violent force of *destruction*: as *active nihilism*. Its opposite would be *tired* nihilism, which no longer *attacks*. Its most famous form is Buddhism: that is *passive nihilism*.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) is a sick *in-between state*. (What is sick about it is the enormous generalization, the conclusion that there is *no meaning at all*.) Either the creative forces are not yet strong enough, or decadence is still hesitating and has not yet invented the tools it needs.

B)

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) as a *decline and shrinking of the power of the mind: passive nihilism*

as a sign of weakness: the strength of the mind can be tired and *worn out*, so that the goals and values it had *until now* no longer fit and nobody believes in them anymore —

so that the combination of values and goals, which every strong culture rests on, comes apart, and the separate values start making war on each other: *breaking down and rotting*

so that everything that refreshes, heals, calms or numbs moves to the front, in various *disguises*: religious, moral, political, artistic, and so on.

2. *What this theory takes for granted*

That there is *no truth*; that things have no absolute nature, that there is no 'thing in itself'

— *this is itself a form of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)*, and *in fact the most extreme one*. It puts the value of things exactly in the fact that *no* reality matches this value or ever did. Instead, the value is only a symptom of strength in *the one who sets the value*, a simplification *for the purpose* of *living*.

36.

the will to truth as will to power

37.

What a *judgment* really is (an act of *saying yes*, of setting something down as so).

38.

(28)

the *way of valuing* 'I believe that this and that is so' as the *essence* of '*truth*'

in a *way of valuing*, the *conditions for staying alive* and *for growing* are expressed

all our *organs and senses for knowing* have only developed with an eye to the conditions for staying alive and growing

trusting reason and its basic categories, trusting logical argument, in other words the *way of valuing* logic, only proves that experience has shown logic to be *useful* for life: it does *not* prove that logic is 'true'.

That there has to be a great deal of *belief*; that people must be allowed to *judge*; that doubt about all the essential values must be *missing*: —

that is the precondition for every living thing and its life. So what is necessary is that something *must* be held to be true; *not* that something *is true*.

'the '*real*' world and the *world of appearances*' — I trace this contrast back to *relations between values*

we have taken *our own* conditions for staying alive and projected them onto everything, as *qualities of fixed being* itself

We need to be steady in our beliefs in order to thrive. Out of that, we made the idea that the 'real' world is not one of change and becoming, but one of *fixed being*.

39.

(29)

values and how they change are tied to the *growth in power* of the *one who sets the values*

How much unbelief, and how much "freedom of the mind," a person allows: this shows how much their power has grown.

"Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)" as the ideal of a mind at its very highest power, of life at its richest and most overflowing; partly destructive, partly ironic.

40.

(30)

The idea that things have some nature "in themselves," completely apart from how we interpret them and apart from any point of view, is a totally pointless guess. It would assume that interpreting and having a point of view are not essential, and that a thing would still be a thing even if it were cut off from all its connections to everything else. Turn it around: the way things seem to be "objective," could that simply come down to a difference of degree within the subjective? For example, maybe the things that change slowly look to us as if they were "objectively" lasting, as if they simply existed, "in themselves."

Could it be that the objective is only a false category, a false opposite, that sits inside the subjective?

41.

(31)

What is a belief? How does it come about? Every belief is a way of holding something to be true.

The most extreme form of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) would be this: that every belief, every holding-something-to-be-true, is necessarily false, because there is no 'real' world at all. So it is all an illusion that depends on our point of view, and its source lies in us, since we constantly need a narrower, shortened, simplified world.

And this would follow: the measure of how strong we are is how far we can admit that everything is mere appearance, that lying is necessary, without being destroyed by it.

In this sense, nihilism, as the denial of a true world, of fixed being, could be a godlike way of thinking: — — —

42.

(32)

Around 1876 I had the shock of seeing everything I had wanted up to then put at risk and spoiled, when I understood where Wagner was now heading. And I was very tightly tied to him, by all the bonds of sharing the same deep needs, by gratitude, and by knowing that he could not be replaced and that I would face total loss without him.

At the same time I felt as if I were locked up, with no way out, in my work as a scholar of old languages and as a teacher. That work was just an accident in my life, something I had fallen back on out of need. I no longer knew how to get out, and I was tired, used up, worn out.

At the same time I understood that my instinct was aiming at the opposite of Schopenhauer's: it aimed at justifying life, even in its most terrible, most two-faced and most deceitful sides. For that, I had the word "Dionysian (joyfully life-affirming)" in my hands.

(People had held that the "thing in itself" must necessarily be good, blissful, true and one. Against that, Schopenhauer's idea that the thing in itself is will was an important step forward. But he did not understand how to make this will divine. He stayed stuck in the moral, Christian ideal.

Schopenhauer was still so much under the rule of Christian values that, once the thing in itself was no longer "God" for him, it had to be bad, stupid, and utterly to be rejected. He did not understand that there can be endless ways of being different, even endless ways of being God.

A curse on that narrow-minded split into two: Good and Evil.

43.

(33)

Nihilism's question, "What for?", comes from an old habit. By that habit, the goal seemed to be set, given, and demanded from outside, namely by some authority above human beings. After people have stopped believing in that authority, they still, out of old habit, look for another authority, one that could speak without any conditions and could give orders about goals and tasks. Now the authority of conscience steps to the front (the more morality frees itself from religion, the more commanding it becomes), as a replacement for a personal authority. Or the authority of reason. Or the social instinct (the herd). Or history, seen as having a spirit inside it, carrying its own goal within itself, so that one can simply hand oneself over to it. People want to get around the will, around actually wanting a goal, around the risk of giving themselves a goal. They want to push the responsibility off onto something else (they would even accept fatalism, the belief that everything is fixed in advance). Finally: happiness, and, with some pious hypocrisy, the happiness of the greatest number.

Individual goals, and how they clash with each other.

Shared goals of the group, fighting against individual ones.

Everyone takes sides in this, even the philosophers.

People tell themselves:

1)

a definite goal is not needed at all;

2)

it is not possible at all to see it in advance.

Right now, just when the will would be needed at its greatest strength, it is at its weakest and most fainthearted.

Complete distrust of the will's power to organize the whole.

A time when all the "intuitive ways of valuing," one after another, come to the front, as if one could get from them the directions one no longer has from anywhere else.

—

"What for?" The answer is demanded from:

1)

conscience

2)

the drive for happiness

3)

the "social instinct" (the herd)

4)

reason ("mind")

— all just so as not to have to will, not to have to set the "what for" oneself.

5)

finally: fatalism. "There is no answer," but "it is going somewhere," "it is impossible to will a what-for," accepted with resignation… or with revolt… Saying we cannot know anything about the goal.

6)

finally, denial as the "what for" of life: life as something that understands itself as worthless and in the end does away with itself.

44.

(For the third essay)

(34)

Main point of view: one should not see the task of the higher kind of human in leading the lower kind (as Comte does, for example). Instead, the lower kind should be seen as the base, the ground on which a higher kind lives for its own task, the ground it needs before it can even stand.

The conditions under which the strong and noble, high-minded kind keeps itself going (in terms of training the mind) are the opposite of those under which the "industrial masses" live, the shopkeepers in Spencer's style.

There are things that only the strongest and most creative natures are free to have, because they make their existence possible: free time, adventure, unbelief, even wild excess. If average natures were free to have these things, they would necessarily be ruined by them, and in fact they are. For them, the right things are hard work, rules, moderation, firm "convictions": in short, the virtues of the herd. Under these, this average kind of human becomes complete.

Causes of

nihilism:

1) The higher kind of human is missing, that is, the kind whose endless creativity and power keep up our faith in humanity. (Think of what we owe to Napoleon: almost all the higher hopes of this century.)

2) The lower kind, "the herd," "the masses," "society," forgets how to be modest and blows its own needs up into values for the whole universe and for the deepest truths. Because of this, all of existence is

made common and cheap. For where the masses rule, they bully the exceptions, so that these lose faith in themselves and become nihilists.

All attempts to imagine higher types have failed ("Romanticism," the artist, the philosopher; against Carlyle's attempt to give them the highest moral values).

The result: resistance against the higher type.

Decline and insecurity of all higher types; the fight against genius ("poetry of the people," and so on). Pity for the lowly and the suffering used as the yardstick for how high a soul is.

The philosopher is missing: the one who explains what is done and gives it meaning, not just one who retells it in poetry.

45.

(35)

In general, every thing is worth as much as was paid for it. Of course this is not true if you look at the individual on his own. The great abilities of a single person are completely out of proportion to what he himself has done, given up, or suffered for them. But if you look at the earlier history of his family line, you find in it the story of a huge saving up and piling up of strength, like capital in a bank, through all kinds of giving things up, struggling, working, and pushing through. The great person became great because he cost so much, and not because he stands there like a miracle, a gift from heaven or from "chance." "Heredity" is a false idea. His ancestors paid the cost for what a person is.

46.

(36)

The will to truth

1)

as conquest of nature and struggle with it

Descartes' judgment of scholars

2)

as resistance against the authorities in power

3)

as criticism of what harms us

47.

The history of the scientific method, which A. Comte understood almost as philosophy itself.

48.

(37)

Working out what is "true" and what is "untrue", and simply working out the facts at all, is something completely different from creative *setting*: from building, shaping, overpowering, and *willing*. That creative willing is what *philosophy* really is at its core. *Putting a meaning into things* is a task that always *remains*, no matter what, even if we assume that *there is no meaning in them* already. That is how it is with musical sounds, and it is also how it is with the fates of whole peoples: they can be read in the most varied ways and steered toward *very different goals*. An even higher step is *setting a goal* and then shaping the actual facts to fit it. In other words, giving things a meaning through *action*, and not just *rewriting* them in ideas and words.

49.

(38)

You are much more the child of your four grandparents than of your two parents. The reason is that, at the time when we were conceived, our parents mostly had not yet settled into who they really were. So the seeds of our grandparents' type ripen in us, and in our children, the seeds of our parents will ripen.

50.

(39)

Nothing is less innocent than the New Testament. We know what soil it grew out of. It came from a people with a relentless will to keep itself going. This people had lost every natural support and had long ago lost its right to exist, and yet it still managed to push itself through. To do that, it had to build itself entirely on unnatural, purely imaginary ideas: that it was the chosen people, the community of saints, the people of the promise, the "Church." This people uses the "pious fraud", the holy lie told for a good cause, so perfectly and with such a "clear conscience" that you cannot be careful enough when it preaches morality. When Jews step forward as innocence itself, the danger has become great. Whenever you read the New Testament, you should always keep your own little supply of good sense, of distrust, and of mischief close at hand.

People of the lowest origins, partly riffraff, outcasts not only from good society but even from respectable society. They grew up far away even from the *smell* of culture, without discipline, without knowledge, without the slightest idea that there could be such a thing as a conscience in matters of the mind. (For them the word "spirit" only ever exists as a misunderstanding: what the whole world calls "spirit" is, to

this people, still just "flesh.") In short — Jews: instinctively clever at turning every superstitious belief, and even ignorance itself, into an advantage, into a *temptation*

51.

(40)

How far the *will to power* is left over as the one and only thing that counts as absolutely *immoral*: see Stuart Mill, writing about Comte.

Mill writes: "We do not think life is so full of pleasures that it can do without nurturing all those pleasures that come from our selfish desires. On the contrary, we believe that satisfying these selfish desires well enough — not to excess, but up to the point *that gives the fullest enjoyment* — almost always has a good effect on our kindly, well-meaning drives. For us, making personal pleasures moral does not mean cutting them down as small as possible. It means growing the wish to share them with others, and with *all others*, and turning down any pleasure that cannot be shared in this way. *There is only one desire, or passion, that can never in the long run fit with this condition, and that is the craving to rule over others* — a striving that includes, and depends on, pushing other people down to match."

52.

(41)

Even the bravest among us does not have enough courage for what he actually *knows*… Where a person stops, or does *not yet* stop, where a person declares "here is the truth" — that is decided by how much bravery he has and how strong it is. In any case, it is decided by that more than by how sharp or how dull his eyes and his mind are.

53.

(42)

In the world of art, the Jews have come close to genius with H. Heine and with Offenbach. Offenbach is the wittiest and most cheeky of satyrs, those wild, mischievous creatures from Greek myth. As a musician he sticks to the great tradition. And for anyone who has more than just ears, he is a real relief, a true escape, from the sentimental and, at bottom, *degenerate* music of German Romanticism.

54.

— a woman who wants to suffer because of what she loves…

55.

(43)

Judging a person's *worth* by *how useful he is to people*, or by what he *costs* them, or by how he *harms* them: that tells us just as much, and just as little, as judging a work of art by the *effects* it has. But a work of art asks to be compared with other works of art. And judging by effects does not touch at all on *a person's worth compared with other people*.

The "moral way of valuing", insofar as it is a *social* one, measures people completely by their effects.

Picture a person with his own taste on his tongue, shut in and hidden by his loneliness, someone who cannot be shared and does not share himself — a person who has *not been figured out and calculated*, and so a person of a higher, or at any rate a *different*, species. How could you put a low value on him, when you cannot know him and cannot compare him to anyone?

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I find the typical dullness about *this* kind of worth in that *typical shallow thinker*, the Englishman J. St. *Mill*. For example, he says of A. Comte: "In his earlier days he regarded Napoleon's name and memory with a fierce anger *that does him the highest honor*; later, it is true, he declared Napoleon a more worthy dictator than Louis Philippe — something that shows how deep his *moral standard* had sunk."

Putting a *lower value on people for moral reasons* has brought with it the greatest dullness of judgment: the worth of a person in himself is *underrated*, almost *overlooked*, almost *denied*.

A leftover of naive *teleology*, the old belief that everything exists for a purpose: *a person's worth* seen *only in relation to other people*.

56.

Historians and other gravediggers, people who live among coffins and sawdust —

57.

(44)

Philosophy as the art of discovering the truth: that is how Aristotle saw it. *Against this* stood the Epicureans, who made use of Aristotle's theory that knowledge comes from the senses. They were completely mocking and dismissive toward the search for truth. For them it was "philosophy as an art of *living*".

58.

The three great naive beliefs:

Knowledge

as a way to reach happiness (as if…

as a way to reach virtue (as if…

as a way to reach "the denial of life" — insofar as knowledge is a way to become disillusioned — (as if…)

59.

(45)

— so there they stand, the values from ancient times: who could knock them over, these heavy cats carved out of granite, sitting there like statues that will not budge?

— whose sense is nonsense, whose cleverness is all "still" and "but", a crazy kind of cleverness

— we are impatient and fiery spirits, who only believe in truths that you guess at. Any attempt to prove things makes us stubborn and resistant. We run away when we see the scholar creeping from one conclusion to the next.

— Stubborn minds, subtle and petty

— whatever lives around you soon settles in and makes itself at home as well.

— dried-out, sandy souls, dry riverbeds

— someone with a long, patient will, deep in his distrust and overgrown with the moss of loneliness

— Secretly burned at the stake, not for his faith, but because he no longer has the courage for any faith at all

— lying flat on their bellies in front of small, neat, round little facts

— what you did not want to do when it was time, you have to want afterward anyway; you have to "make good" what you did not do well.

60.

(46)

A huge act of *looking back at ourselves*: becoming aware of ourselves not as single persons, but as humanity. *Let us reflect, let us think back: let us walk the small paths and the great paths.*

A. Man looks for "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, does not deceive, does not change — a '*real*' world, a world where nobody suffers. Contradiction, deception, change: these are the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is a world as it ought to be. He would like to find the way to it. (The Indian critique: even the "I" is seen as mere appearance, as *not* real.)

Where does man get the idea of *reality* from here? —

Why does he trace his *suffering*, of all things, back to change, deception and contradiction? And why not rather his happiness?… —

The contempt, the hatred toward everything that passes away, changes, transforms: — where does this high value placed on what lasts come from?

Clearly, the will to truth here is just the longing to get into a *world of what lasts*.

The senses deceive, and reason corrects the mistakes. *Therefore*, people concluded, reason is the path to what lasts, and the ideas that are *furthest from the senses* must be closest to the 'real' world. — Most of the blows of bad luck come from the senses — they are cheats, tricksters, destroyers:

Happiness can only be guaranteed in fixed being: change and happiness rule each other out. So the highest wish aims at becoming one with fixed being. That is the *formula* for the path to the highest happiness.

In short: the world as it *ought* to be exists; this world we live in is a mistake — this world of ours ought *not* to exist.

Belief in fixed being turns out to be only a result. The real driving force behind it, the first thing that sets it all in motion, is disbelief in change, distrust of change, looking down on all change.

What kind of people think *like this*? An unproductive, *suffering kind*; a kind that is tired of life. If we imagined the opposite kind of person, they would not need belief in fixed being. Even more, they would despise it as dead, boring, uninteresting…

The belief that the world as it ought to be *is*, that it really exists, is a belief held by unproductive people, *who do not want to create a world* as it ought to be. They assume it is already there, and they search for ways and means to reach it. "Will to *truth*" — *as the weakness of the will to create*.

to know that something *is* this way or that way

to act so that something *becomes* this way or that way.

A clash between natures with different levels of strength.

Making up a world that matches our wishes; psychological tricks and interpretations to link everything we honor and find pleasant to this '*real*' *world*.

At this stage, the "will to truth" is basically *the art of interpretation*; and that still takes a certain strength to interpret.

The same kind of person, grown one step poorer, *no longer having the strength* to interpret and to make up fictions, becomes the *nihilist* — someone who believes nothing has meaning. A nihilist is a person who judges the world as it is and says it ought *not* to exist, and who judges the world as it ought to be and says it does not exist. So for him, existing — acting, suffering, wanting, feeling — has no meaning.

The deep feeling of "it's all in vain" is the nihilist's feeling. And yet, simply by being a strong feeling, it is at the same time an *inconsistency* in the nihilist.

Whoever cannot put his own will into things — the person without will and without strength — at least still puts a *meaning* into them. That is, he puts in the belief that a will is already there inside things, a will that is supposed to work and want within them.

How far you can do without *meaning* in things, how far you can bear to live in a meaningless world, is a way to measure your *willpower*: *because you organize a small piece of that world yourself*.

So the *philosophical habit of looking at things objectively* can be a sign of a lack of will and strength. For strength organizes what is near and nearest. The "knowers", who only want to *establish* what is, are people who cannot *decide* anything about *how it ought to be*.

Artists are an in-between kind. At least they set down a picture, a likeness, of what ought to be. They are productive, because they really change and reshape things. They are not like the 'knowers', who leave everything just as it is.

The link between philosophers and pessimistic religions: they are the same kind of human being. (— They give the highest degree of reality to the things they value most.

The link between philosophers and moral people, and their ways of measuring value. (Explaining the world in moral terms becomes its 'meaning', after the religious sense of meaning has faded —

Overcoming the philosophers by destroying their world of fixed being. Then comes an in-between period of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning). It lasts until the strength exists to turn values around, and to treat the world of change, the world of appearances, as the only world, to make it divine and to say it is good.

B. Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning), as a normal event, can be a sign of growing strength or of growing weakness.

Partly

because the power to create and to will has grown so much that it no longer needs these all-embracing explanations and the meanings people put into the world. It turns to 'closer tasks', such as the state, and so on.

Partly

because even the creative power to make meaning grows weaker, and disappointment becomes the main mood. People can no longer believe in any 'meaning'. This is 'unbelief'.

What does science mean in relation to these two possibilities?

1)

It can be a sign of strength and self-control, of being able to do without healing, comforting worlds of illusion.

2)

Or it can be something that undermines, cuts things apart like a dissection, disappoints and weakens.

C. Belief in truth: the need to have something to hold on to, something you believe is true. Trace it back psychologically, setting aside all the feelings about value people have had so far. Behind it lie fear and laziness.

— Unbelief can be traced back in the same way. We can ask how far it gains a new value if there is no 'real' world at all. In that case, the feelings of value that until now were wasted on the world of fixed being become free again.

61.

The great masters of method: Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Auguste Comte.

62.

(47)

To what extent are the various basic positions in the theory of knowledge consequences of ways of valuing? I mean materialism, sensualism, which says all knowledge comes from the senses, and idealism. Whatever gives people their highest feelings of pleasure, their 'feelings of value', also decides how they answer the question of what is real.

— How much solid, proven knowledge people have does not matter at all, or only a little. Just look at how thinking developed in India.

The Buddhist denial of all reality, which says mere appearance equals suffering, follows through completely. It is not only that a 'world in itself' cannot be proven, cannot be reached, and has no categories that fit it. It is also an insight into the faulty steps by which this whole idea was arrived at. 'Absolute reality' and 'being in itself' contradict themselves. In a world of change, 'reality' is always just one of three things: a simplification for practical purposes, a deception caused by our crude sense organs, or a difference in the speed at which things change.

The logical denial of the world, turning it into nothing, comes from two things. We feel we must set being against non-being. And the idea of change ('something becomes') is denied if being — — —

63.

Fixed Being and Change

'Reason' grew up on a basis of the senses, on the prejudices of the senses. That means it grew out of the belief that what the senses tell us is true.

'Being' is a generalization of the idea of 'life' (breathing), of 'having a soul', of 'willing, acting', of 'becoming'.

Its opposite is 'having no soul', 'not becoming', 'not willing'. So what is set against 'what is' is not what does not exist, not what only appears to be, and not even what is dead. After all, only something that can also be alive can be dead.

The 'soul', the 'I', is set up as the most basic fact. And it is put into everything, wherever there is change.

64.

(48)

The peddler philosophers, who sell second-hand goods: they build a philosophy not out of their own lives, but out of collections of evidence for certain claims.

Never try to see just for the sake of seeing! As a psychologist, you have to live and wait, until the sifted result of many experiences has reached its conclusion on its own. You must never know where you know something from.

Otherwise you get a distorted view and something artificial.

— To forget the single case without meaning to is philosophical. To want to forget it, to abstract on purpose, is not. Doing it on purpose is rather the mark of a non-philosophical nature.

65.

What I valued in Wagner was the good chunk of Antichrist that he stood for with his art and his way of being. (Oh, so clever! —

I am the most disappointed of all Wagner fans. For at the very moment when it was more decent than ever to be a pagan, he became a Christian… We Germans, supposing we have ever taken serious things seriously, are all German atheists and mockers, every one of us. Wagner was one too.

66.

(49)

Rethinking values: what would that mean? All the spontaneous movements must already be there, the new, future, stronger ones. It is just that they still go by false names and false ways of valuing, and they have not yet become aware of themselves.

It means bravely becoming aware of what has been achieved, and saying yes to it.

It means breaking free from the lazy habit of old ways of valuing, which drag down the best and strongest things we have achieved.

67.

(50)

La Rochefoucauld was naive without meaning to be. He believed he was saying something bold, subtle and surprising. Back then, the 'truth' about the human mind was something that amazed people. An example: 'Great souls are not those that have fewer passions and more virtues than ordinary souls, but only those that have greater plans.' John Stuart Mill calls Chamfort the nobler and more philosophical La

Rochefoucauld of the 18th century. Yet Mill sees in La Rochefoucauld only the sharpest observer of everything in the human heart that comes from 'habitual selfishness'. And Mill adds: 'A noble mind will not bring itself to take on the task of constantly looking at meanness and baseness, unless it is to show which harmful influences a lofty mind and noble character can triumph over.'

68.

The complicated character of Henry IV of France: royal and serious, and then again in the mood of a clown from a comic opera; ungrateful and loyal, big-hearted and sly, full of wit, heroism and absurdity.

'In the writings of Frederick the Great you find beer and tobacco stains on pages worthy of a Marcus Aurelius.'

Admiral de Coligny and the great Condé come from the Montmorency family through their mothers. The Montmorency men are capable and energetic soldiers, but they are not geniuses.

In the same way, the great generals Maurice and Henry of Nassau come back to life in Turenne, their nephew, the son of their sister Elisabeth.

The mother of the great Condé was Charlotte de Montmorency, with whom Henry IV was so deeply in love. He said of her that she was one of a kind, not only in her beauty, but also in her courage.

The old Marquis de Mirabeau complained when he saw his son leaning 'toward the pen-pushing, scribbling rabble'.

'A certain proud, overflowing genius', said Mirabeau about his family.

Napoleon said: 'My nerves are very hard to control. If my heart did not beat with a constant slowness, I would be in danger of going mad.'

Descartes compared a scholar's discoveries to a series of battles fought against nature.

Voltaire tells us that he wrote his whole play Catilina in eight days. 'This feat still surprises and frightens me.'

69.

'Genius is nothing but a long patience,' said Buffon. This is truest when you think of what comes before a genius: the patience of a family over generations, through which a store of strength was built up and held together, like saved-up money —

70.

Beethoven composed while walking. All moments of genius come with a surplus of muscle strength.

That means following reason in every sense. If every burst of genius first demands a lot of muscle energy, then it raises the feeling of strength everywhere. The other way round, a vigorous march increases mental excitement, right up to a kind of intoxication.

71.

(51)

Note: what we call 'useful' depends entirely on the purpose, on the question 'what for?'. And the purpose, in turn, depends entirely on how much power someone has. That is why utilitarianism, the idea that what is useful is good, cannot be a foundation. It can only be a teaching about consequences, and it can never be made binding on everyone.

72.

(52)

Knowledge as a means to power, to becoming 'equal to God'.

The old Bible legend believes that *human beings already have knowledge*. It says that being thrown out of Paradise only happens because God is now afraid of humans. So he drives them away from the spot where the tree of life stands, the tree of never dying. If humans now also ate from the tree of life, God's power would be finished. Apart from that, the whole story of human culture is humans becoming more and more frightening, and this is pictured in the Tower of Babel, built with the aim of "storming heaven." God splits people apart: he breaks them into pieces. The many languages are God's emergency measure. He can handle separate peoples more easily, because now they make war on each other and destroy one another.

At the start of the Old Testament stands the famous story of *God's fear*. Humans are shown as God's mistake, and so are the animals. The human who gains knowledge is shown as God's rival, as God's highest danger. Work, hardship and death are shown as God's self-defense, to keep his rival down:

God's Fear.

humans as God's mistake;

the animals as well

The lesson:

God forbids knowledge *because* it leads to *power*, to being equal with God. In itself, he would be happy to let humans live forever, as long as they stayed stupid forever

He makes animals for man, and then woman, so that he has company, so that he is entertained (so that he doesn't get bad ideas, like thinking, like seeking knowledge

But the demon (the snake) tells man what knowledge is really all about.

The danger to God is enormous. Now he has to *drive* humans away from the tree of life and *keep them down* with hardship, death and work. Real life is shown as *God's self-defense*, as an *unnatural* state… Culture, that is, the work of knowledge, *still* strives to be equal with God: it piles itself up high, storming heaven. Now war is found to be necessary (language as the cause of separate "peoples"): humans are supposed to destroy themselves. In the end, their destruction is decided. —

And people believed in a God like that!…

73.

(53)

The need for *a world beyond this one* comes from the fact that people could find no *meaning*, no *what for?*, in the world that is here. "So," they concluded, "this world can only be a *mere appearance*."

How does "*mere appearance*" relate to "*meaninglessness*" and "*purposelessness*"? This needs to be explained in terms of psychology: what does it mean?

Unreality, *dream*, and so on.

(What makes the real different from a dream? Things *hang together with meaning*; they are not random or arbitrary; they follow cause and effect. *But* whenever people looked at the whole of existence on a big

scale, it seemed meaningless, random, without purpose, and the purposes that did exist seemed only tricks and so on.)

Cause and effect seen as a mere machine could, in itself, be fully explained as *mere appearance*. In fact, it practically *invites* that explanation.

74.

The age of *Enlightenment*

after that, the age of *Sentimentality*

in what way Schopenhauer belongs to "Sentimentality"

(Hegel to the life of the mind)

75.

(54)

An age when people grow disgusted with the old masks and the moral decorations put on feelings. An age of *naked nature*, where *amounts of power* are simply admitted to be *what decides things* (what *decides rank*), and where the *grand style* comes back, as a result of *great passion*.

76.

(55)

Those born after their time (— how hard it is to understand them; in a certain sense they are *never understood*)

Epicurus?

Schopenhauer

Stendhal

Napoleon

Goethe?

Shakespeare?

Beethoven?

Machiavelli?

People whose time comes after their death are understood worse, but listened to better, than people who fit their own time. Or, to put it more strictly: they are never understood, and that is where their authority comes from. (As the French saying goes: to understand is to be equal.)

77.

(56)

Any teaching is useless if everything is not already prepared for it: piled-up forces, explosive material. A rethinking of values only succeeds when there is a tension of new needs, of people with new needs, who suffer under the old way of valuing without becoming aware of it, — — —

78.

(57)

Anyone who knows how all *fame* comes about will also be suspicious of the fame that virtue enjoys.

79.

(58)

What is praising? —

Praise and *gratitude* at harvest time, for good weather, victory, a wedding, peace. All celebrations need a *someone* toward whom the feeling can be let out. People want everything good that happens to them to have been *done to them*; they want a *doer*. It's the same in front of a work of art: people aren't satisfied with the work itself; they praise the one who made it. — So what is *praising*? A kind of *evening the score* for favors received, a *giving back*, a showing of *our own* power. For the one who praises says yes, judges, weighs, *passes judgment*. He grants himself the right to *be able* to say yes, to *be able* to hand out honor… A heightened feeling of happiness and life is also a heightened *feeling of power*. That is where praise comes from (— and that is where people invent and look for a *doer*, a "*someone*" —)

Gratitude as the *good kind of revenge*. It is demanded and practiced most strictly where equality and pride must both be kept up at the same time, where revenge is practiced best.

80.

81.

Berlioz's overture "Roman Carnival" is from 1844 (Offenbach)

82.

The

Second Buddhism.

The *catastrophe of nihilism* (belief that nothing has meaning), which puts an end to culture on earth.

Warning signs of it:

pity taking over everything

mental exhaustion

boiling every problem down to questions of pleasure and pain

the glorifying of war, which causes a backlash

just as drawing hard national borders causes a counter-movement, the warmest "brotherhood,"

religion no longer being able to keep working with fixed doctrines and fairy tales

83.

On the Origins of Morality.

Second Polemic

by

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Fourth Essay: the herd instinct in morality.

Fifth Essay: on the history of morality turning against nature.

Sixth Essay: among moralists and moral philosophers.

Afterword. Settling accounts with morality (as the witch Circe who bewitches philosophers). Morality — I have said it once before — has so far been the witch Circe who bewitches philosophers. It is the *cause* of *pessimism* and *nihilism* (belief that nothing has meaning)…

Its *highest formula* put into words.

The *task*.

Europe enters its tragic age

84.

(59)

The great *nihilist* faking (like forging money), cleverly misusing moral values

a)

Love as giving up one's own self; and pity in the same way.

b)

Only the *mind that has given up its own self* ("the philosopher") knows the *truth*, "the true being and nature of things"

c)

the genius, the *great person*, are *great* because they don't look out for themselves and their own concerns: a person's *worth grows* the more he denies himself. Schopenhauer, volume II, page 440 and following.

d)

art as the work of a "*pure subject, free of will*"

A misunderstanding of "objectivity."

e)

Happiness as the goal of life; *virtue* as

a means to that goal

Schopenhauer's pessimistic condemnation of life is a *moral* one

It carries the herd's standards over into the world beyond.

The "individual" is seen as meaningless; so it is given an origin in the "thing in itself" (and the meaning of its existence is seen as a going astray); parents are seen as only the "occasion" for it.

Science pays the price for not having understood the individual: the individual is *the whole of life so far, in one single line*, and *not* its *result*.

85.

(60)

The *praised* states and desires:

peaceful, fair, moderate, modest, respectful, considerate, brave, chaste, honest, loyal, believing, straightforward, trusting, devoted, full of pity, helpful, conscientious, simple, gentle, just, generous, forgiving, obedient, unselfish, free of envy, kind, hard-working

Note, we must tell apart: how far *such qualities* are conditioned as *means* to a certain will and *goal* (often an "*evil*" goal)

—

or as natural *results* of a ruling passion (for example, *the life of the mind*)

—

or as the expression of a hard situation, that is: as a *condition for survival* (for example, the ordinary citizen, the slave, the woman, and so on)

In short: none of them are *felt to be good for their own sake*. None of them is "good" in and of itself. They are already judged by the standard of "society," of "the herd": as means to its goals, as necessary to keep it going and help it grow. At the same time they are the result of a real *herd instinct* in each individual. So they serve an instinct that is *completely different* from these *virtuous states*. For toward the outside, the herd is *hostile*, *selfish*, *merciless*, full of the lust to rule, full of distrust, and so on.

In the "shepherd" the conflict comes out into the open: he has to have the opposite qualities from the herd.

The herd is a deadly enemy of any ranking of people and values. Its instinct favors those who make everyone equal (Christ). Toward strong individuals (the sovereign ones), the herd is hostile, unfair, without limits, immodest, rude, ruthless, cowardly, lying, false, merciless, sneaky, envious, and vengeful.

86.

(61)

Moralistic naturalism: tracing moral values, which seem to have broken free and become supernatural, back to their "nature." That means back to their natural immorality, their natural "usefulness," and so on.

I may call the direction of these reflections moralistic naturalism. My task is to translate moral values, which seem to have broken free and lost all connection to nature, back into their nature. That means back into their natural "immorality."

Note well: compare this with Jewish "holiness" and its roots in nature. The same goes for the moral law that has been made into an absolute ruler, cut loose from its nature (— even to the point of being set against nature —).

Steps in the turning against nature of morality (what people call "idealization")

as a path to personal happiness

as a result of knowledge

as a categorical imperative, meaning an absolute command, cut loose from — — —

as a path to becoming holy

as denial of the will to live

morality's step-by-step hostility to life.

87.

(62)

The suppressed and wiped-out heresy in

morality

Ideas

: pagan

: morality of the masters

: Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing

88.

(63)

In the New Testament, and especially in the Gospels, I hear absolutely nothing "divine" speaking. Instead I hear an indirect form of the most bottomless rage to slander and destroy. It is one of the most dishonest forms of hatred.

—

it lacks any knowledge at all of the qualities of a higher nature

—

a shameless misuse of every kind of plain, honest-citizen talk. The whole treasure of proverbs is exploited and claimed as its own. Was it really necessary for a god to come down just to tell those tax collectors, and so on.

nothing is more common than this fight against the Pharisees using an absurd, impractical morality that is only for show. Ordinary people have always enjoyed a stunt like that.

The charge of "hypocrisy"! And coming from that mouth!

nothing is more common than this way of treating opponents. And the way someone treats opponents is a very revealing sign of whether he is noble, high-minded or not…

If someone had said even a hundredth of that, he would have deserved to be destroyed as an anarchist.

Pilate is the only decent person here. Look at his scorn for this Jewish chatter about "truth," as if people like that had any right to speak up when truth is the subject. Look at his words, "What I have written, I have written." Look at his kindly attempt to set free this absurd troublemaker and attacker, in whom he could hardly see anything other than a fool…

his disgust at those words that can never be condemned enough: "I am the truth."

89.

(64)

We have to assume that there is fixed being in order to think and draw conclusions. Logic only works with formulas for things that stay the same.

That is why this assumption still proves nothing about reality: "fixed being" is part of our way of seeing.

the "I" as something with fixed being (— untouched by change and development)

The made-up world of subject, substance, "reason," and so on is necessary. There is a power in us that puts things in order, simplifies, falsifies, and artificially separates. "Truth" means the will to become master over the huge variety of sensations.

—

lining up appearances under fixed categories

—

in doing this we start from the belief that things exist "in themselves" (we take appearances to be real)

The nature of the changing world is that it cannot be put into formulas. It is "false," it "contradicts itself."

Knowledge and change rule each other out.

So "knowledge" must be something else. First there must be a will to make things knowable. A kind of change itself must create the illusion of fixed being.

90.

In these fighting essays, where I carry on my campaign against the way morality as a whole is rated far too highly, which is both unphilosophical and disastrous — — —

91.

(65)

Against *determinism*, the belief that everything is fixed in advance.

Just because something happens regularly, and in a way we can predict, it does not follow that it happens *by necessity*. A certain amount of force, in each particular case, acts and behaves in one

single way. But that does not make it an "unfree will." "Mechanical necessity" is not a fact. *We* are the ones who read it into what happens. We took the fact that events can be *put into formulas* and explained it as the result of some necessity ruling over those events. But if I do one particular thing, that does not at all mean I was forced to do it. You cannot actually find any *force or compulsion* in things. A rule only proves that one and the same event is not also some other event. It is only because we read subjects, "*doers*," into things that it looks as if every event is the result of *compulsion* applied to subjects. Applied by whom? Again, by a "doer." Cause and effect is a dangerous idea, as long as we picture a *something* that *causes* and a something that is *acted upon*.

A) Necessity is not a fact. It is an interpretation.

B) Once you understand that the "subject" is not something that *acts*, but only a made-up idea, many things follow.

We invented the idea of *things* simply by copying our idea of the subject, and we read it into the jumble of sensations we experience. If we stop believing in a subject that *acts*, then our belief in things that *act* also falls. So does our belief in things acting on each other, and in cause and effect between those appearances we call things.

Of course, this also brings down the world of *acting atoms*. People have only ever assumed atoms because they believed they needed subjects.

Finally, the "*thing in itself*" falls too. At bottom, it is really the idea of a "subject in itself." But we have understood that the subject is made up. The contrast between the "thing in itself" and "appearance" cannot hold. And with that, the idea of "*appearance*" falls away as well.

C) If we give up the *subject* that acts, we also give up the *object* that is acted upon. Lasting through time, staying the same as itself, fixed being: none of these belong to what we call the subject, nor to what

we call the object. Both are bundles of events that only seem lasting when compared with other bundles. For example, this happens through a difference in the speed of events. Think of rest and motion, or solid and loose. These are all opposites that do not exist in themselves. In fact they only express *differences of degree*, which look like opposites when seen from a certain point of view and at a certain scale.

There are no opposites. We only got the idea of opposites from logic, and then we wrongly carried it over from logic into things.

D) If we give up the ideas of "subject" and "object," we also give up the idea of "*substance*", the basic stuff things are made of. And so we give up its various versions too, for example "matter," "mind," and other imagined beings, like "the eternity and unchangeableness of matter," and so on. We are rid of *material stuff*.

Put in moral terms: the world is false. But since morality itself is a part of this world, morality is false.

The will to truth is a *making* firm, a *making* true and lasting. It is a way of getting that *false* character of the world out of sight, and of reinterpreting it as *fixed being*.

So "truth" is not something that is simply there, waiting to be found or discovered. It is something *that has to be created*. It is the name for a *process*, and even more, for a will to overpower that has no end in itself. Truth means putting truth into things, as a process that goes on forever, an *active shaping*. It is *not* becoming aware of something that is already firm and fixed "in itself." It is a word for the "will to power."

Life is built on the assumption of believing in things that last and things that regularly come back. The more powerful life is, the wider the world must be that we can guess and predict, a world that has

been, so to speak, *made into fixed being*. Making things logical, rational and systematic are tools that help life.

Human beings project their drive for truth, their "goal" in a certain sense, outside themselves. They picture it as a world of *fixed being*, as a world beyond nature, as a "thing in itself," as a world that already exists.

Because humans need to create, they already make up in their imagination the world they are working on. They look ahead to it in advance. This looking ahead, this "belief" in truth, is what holds them up.

All events, all motion, all change, seen as a settling of how degrees and forces stand against each other, as a *struggle*…

The "well-being of the individual" is just as imaginary as the "well-being of the species." The first is *not* sacrificed for the second. Seen from far away, a species is something just as fluid and changing as an individual. "*Preserving* the species" is only a side effect of the *growth* of the species, that is, of the *species overcoming itself* on the way to a stronger kind.

As soon as we *imagine* someone who is responsible for our being this way or that way, and so on, such as God or Nature, we treat our existence, our happiness and our misery as part of someone's *plan*. When we do that, we spoil for ourselves the *innocence of becoming*. Then we have someone who wants to achieve something through us and with us.

That the apparent "*purposefulness*" in nature ("*a purposefulness infinitely greater than any human art*") is merely the result of that *will to power* playing itself out in everything that happens;

that *growing stronger* brings with it kinds of order that look like a plan with a purpose;

that the apparent *purposes* are not intended. But as soon as a greater power has won control over a lesser power, and the lesser one works as a part of the greater one, an order of *rank* and organization arises. And this is bound to look like an order of means and ends.

Against

the

apparent "*necessity*"

—

this is only a *way of saying* that a force is not also something else.

Against

the

apparent "*purposefulness*"

—

this is only a *way of saying* that there is an order of spheres of power and how they play together.

Logical clearness and see-through clarity are taken as the test of truth. Descartes said, in Latin: "Everything is true that is perceived clearly and distinctly." With this, the hypothesis that the world is a machine becomes welcome and believable.

But this is a crude mix-up, like the old Latin saying "simplicity is the seal of truth." How do we know that the true nature of things stands in *this* relationship to our mind? Could it not be the other way around? Could it be that the hypothesis which gives the mind the strongest feeling of power and safety is the one the mind *prefers* most, *values* most, *and so* calls *true*? The mind takes its *freest* and *strongest ability and skill* as the test of what is most valuable, and so of what is *true*…

"True":

from the side of feeling: whatever stirs feeling most strongly (the "I");

from the side of thinking: whatever gives thinking the greatest feeling of strength;

from the side of touch, sight and hearing: whatever we have to push against hardest.

So it is the *highest levels of effort* that make us believe the *object* is "true," *that is, real*. The feeling of strength, of struggle, of resistance persuades us that there *is* something here that we are resisting.

92.

Liebmann, page 11

Dynamis, the Greek word for potential power: "a real tendency toward action," still held back, which tries to become actual.

— "will to power"

"stored-up tension"

"a tendency to motion that has been gathered and stored up"

93.

(66)

I also want to make *self-discipline*, the old practice of strict self-denial, *natural* again. Instead of aiming at denial, it should aim at *strengthening*. It should be a workout for the will. It should mean going without things, and putting in times of fasting of every kind, even in the most mental matters. (Think of the Dinners at Magny's in Paris: nothing but people with a sweet tooth for ideas and an upset stomach.) It should mean carefully testing our actions against the opinion

we have of our own strength: trying ourselves out with adventures and dangers we choose on purpose. — We should invent *tests* even for how strong we are at keeping our word.

94.

Greatness includes being frightening. Don't let anyone fool you about that.

95.

Essays.

What people have used so far to build the 'real' world.

The turning against nature in morality, and also in conscience (also in self-denying discipline) (also in reason, in medieval school philosophy, in the state

The idea that things have a purpose.

The idea that things must happen the way they do.

The herd instinct in morality.

The witch Circe who bewitches philosophers.

The strong people of the future.

The tragic age: the teaching of the eternal return of all things.

Psychological faking (like forging money).

Logic ruled by judgments about value.

Beauty. Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) as an *art*.

Is there such a thing as *metaphysics*, a knowledge of what lies beyond the physical world?…

96.

The three mere appearances:

cause and effect

purpose

necessity

Turning values against nature

Opposites

in place of

Ranking of people and values

The rejected world

97.

(67)

We cannot manage to say yes and no to one and the same thing. That is a rule drawn from our own personal experience. It does not express any "necessity" about the world, *only something we are unable to do*.

According to Aristotle, the *law of contradiction*, the rule that something cannot both be and not be, is the most certain of all basic principles. It is the last and deepest one, which all proofs come back to in the end, and the root of all the other basic rules. If that is so, then we should think all the more carefully about what claims it already *takes for granted*. Either it says something about what is real, about what actually exists, as if it already knew this from somewhere else: namely, that opposite qualities *cannot* be given to the same thing. Or does the rule mean that opposite qualities *should* not be given to it? In that case logic would be a command. It would *not* be a way of know-

ing what is true, but a way of setting up and arranging a world *that we are supposed to call true*.

In short, the question is still open. Do the rules of logic match what is real? Or are they measuring sticks and tools that we use to *create* the real, the very idea of "reality," for ourselves in the first place?… But to be able to say yes to the first option, we would, as I said, already have to know what really exists. And that is simply not the case. So the rule contains no *test for truth*. Instead it contains a *command* about *what should count as true*.

Suppose there were no such thing as an A that stays exactly identical to itself, which every rule of logic (and of mathematics too) takes for granted. Suppose the A were already a *mere appearance*. Then logic would rest on a world that is only an *appearance*. In fact, we believe in that rule because of the endless experience that seems to keep *confirming* it. The "thing" is what really stands underneath the *A*. *Our belief in things* is what our belief in logic is built on. The A of logic, like the atom, is a copy made afterwards of the "thing"… Because we don't understand this, and we turn logic into a test of *what truly exists*, we are already on our way to treating all those made-up entities, such as substance, quality, object, subject, action and so on, as real. *That is*, we are on our way to dreaming up a world beyond the physical, *that is*, a 'real' world (— *but this is just the world of appearances all over again*…)

The most basic acts of thinking are saying yes and saying no, holding something to be true and holding it to be untrue. These acts take for granted not just a habit, but a *right* to hold things true or untrue at all. So they are already ruled by a belief *that we can have knowledge*, that *judgments can really hit upon the truth*. In short, logic has no doubt that it can say something about what is true in itself (namely, that opposite qualities *cannot* belong to it).

What *rules* here is the crude prejudice of trusting the senses: the belief that our sensations teach us *truths* about things. It is the belief that I cannot say of one and the same thing, at the same moment, that it is *hard* and that it is *soft*. (The gut-feeling proof goes: "I cannot have two opposite sensations at once" — *very crude and wrong*.) The ban on contradiction between ideas starts from the belief that we *can* form concepts, that a concept does not just label the essence of a thing but actually *grasps* it… In fact, *logic* (like geometry and arithmetic) only holds true for *invented truths, which we ourselves have created*. Logic is the attempt *to understand the real world according to a scheme of being that we ourselves set up; more correctly, to make the world something we can put into words and calculate*…

98.

(68)

Where our belief in reason comes from, psychologically.

The idea of "reality" and of "being" is taken from our feeling of being a "*subject*", a self.

"Subject": this is our own interpretation, in which the "I" counts as a lasting substance, as the cause of everything that is done, as the *doer*.

The basic demands of logic and metaphysics, the belief in substance, in passing features, in qualities and so on, get their convincing power from our habit of seeing everything we do as the result of our will. — So the "I," as a substance, does not get lost in the many changes. — *But there is no such thing as a will.* —

We have no categories at all that would give us the right to separate a "world in itself" from a world as it appears to us. All our *categories of reason* come from the senses: they are read off from the world we ex-

perience. "The soul," "the I" — the history of this idea shows that here too the oldest distinction ("breath," "life") — — —

If there is nothing material, then there is nothing non-material either. The idea no longer *contains* anything…

There are *no* subject "atoms," no tiny unchanging selves. The range of a subject is constantly *growing* or *shrinking*, and the center of the system is constantly *shifting*. If it cannot organize the mass it has taken in, it splits in two. On the other hand, it can turn a weaker subject into its servant without destroying it, and to a certain degree form a new unit together with it. It is no "substance"; it is rather something that strives, by its very nature, to grow stronger. It only wants to "preserve" itself indirectly (what it wants is to *outdo* itself —).

99.

Note well: as a psychologist, don't try to be clever; we are not even *allowed* to be clever. Someone who wants to snatch small advantages from his knowledge and his understanding of people (— or big ones, like the politician —) goes from the general back down to the single individual case. But this way of looking is the opposite of the other one, the only one we can use: we look from the single individual case *outward* —

100.

(69)

"*Species*" — — —

The movement is toward greater power. Species are only *relative slowdowns of the pace*. They are signs that the chances and conditions for quickly growing stronger are starting to run short. (Species are *not*

goals. The very last thing "nature" would care about is keeping species alive!!)

101.

Note well: one person gets to know people because he wants to snatch small advantages over them that way (or big ones, like the politician). Another person gets to know people because he wants an *even bigger advantage*: to feel superior to them. He wants to look down on them.

102.

(70)

On Art and Beauty.

The states in which we pour a *shining glow* and *richness* into things and keep imagining things about them, until they reflect back our own richness and joy in living:

sexual desire

intoxication

the feast

spring

victory over the enemy, mockery:

the daring stunt; cruelty; the ecstasy of religious feeling.

Three elements above all:

sexual desire, intoxication, cruelty. All of them belong to humanity's oldest *joy in celebrating*. And all of them were also the strongest forces in the earliest "artist."

The other way round: when we meet things that show this shining glow and richness, our animal nature answers by *stirring up those areas* where all those states of pleasure live. And a mixture of these very delicate shades of animal well-being and desire is the *state of enjoying beauty*. This state only happens in people who are capable of that generous, overflowing richness of bodily strength. In such people, that strength is always the first thing that sets everything in motion. The sober person, the tired one, the worn-out one, the dried-up one (a scholar, for example) can get absolutely nothing out of art, because he lacks the original creative power of the artist, the urge that comes from having plenty. Whoever cannot give, cannot receive anything either.

"Perfection": in those states (especially in sexual love, and so on), something comes out quite innocently. We see what our deepest instinct counts as higher, more wished-for, and more valuable in general: the upward movement of its own type. In the same way, we see *what kind of* state it is really *striving* for. Perfection means this: a huge widening of its feeling of power, richness, a necessary bubbling over every edge…

Art reminds us of states of animal vigor, of raw bodily strength. On one side, it is an overflow, a pouring-out of a blossoming, healthy body into the world of images and wishes. On the other side, it stirs up our animal functions through images and wishes of a heightened life. In short, it raises our feeling of being alive, and it acts as a stimulant for that feeling.

How far can even the ugly still have this power? It can, insofar as it still passes on something of the artist's winning energy, the energy of someone who has mastered this ugliness and horror. Or it can, insofar as it quietly stirs up our pleasure in cruelty. (Sometimes this is even

the pleasure of hurting *ourselves*, of forcing ourselves: and with that comes the feeling of power over ourselves.)

103.

Note: When you are sick, you should crawl away and hide in some kind of "cave". That is the sensible thing to do; only that is how an animal does it.

104.

"I want this and that"; "I wish that this and that were so"; "I know that this and that is so." These are levels of strength: the person of *will*, the person of *longing*, the person of *belief*.

105.

(71)

For the plan.

Note. 1) Say something about all the *important* ages, peoples, people and problems.

2) A hundred good *stories*, if possible true ones from history.

3) Warlike, *adventurous, tricky and tempting* —

4) Some passages of a *sad kind of cheerfulness* —

5) Speak up for those who are misunderstood and slandered (— for those with a *bad reputation*…)

6) Slow, misleading, a labyrinth

7) *The Minotaur, catastrophe* (the thought to which one must offer *human sacrifices* — the more, the better!)

106.

(71)

The way we see things in our minds is shaped by the following:

1) That we need to *communicate*, and that for communication something has to be fixed, simplified, and possible to pin down exactly (above all in the case where things are *the same*…). But for it to be something we can communicate, it has to be felt in a *tidied-up* form, as something we can "*recognize again*". The raw material of the senses is tidied up by the mind. It is cut down to rough main lines, made to look alike, and filed under things that are similar. So the vagueness and chaos of what our senses take in is, so to speak, *made logical*.

2) The world of "appearances" is the tidied-up world that we *feel to be real*. "Reality" lies in the constant return of things that are the same, familiar, and related, in their *made-logical character*, in the belief that here we can count and calculate.

3) The opposite of this world of appearances is *not* "the 'real' world". It is the shapeless world of chaotic sensations that cannot be put into words. So it is *another kind* of world of appearances, one that is "unknowable" to us.

4) Questions about what "things in themselves" might be like, completely apart from what our senses take in and what our minds do, must be pushed back with another question: how could we know *that there are things at all*? "Thingness" is something we ourselves first created. The question is whether there could be many other ways of creating such a world of *appearances*. And it is whether this very creating, making-logical, tidying-up and faking is not itself the most certain *reality* there is. In short: whether only that which "sets up things" is real. And whether "the effect of the outside world on us" is also just the result of such willing subjects…

"Cause and effect" is a false reading of a *war* and of a partial *victory*.

The other "beings" act on us. Our *tidied-up* world of appearances is a way of tidying up and *overpowering* their actions. It is a kind of *defensive* measure.

Only the *subject*, the self that experiences, *can be proved*. Here is a *hypothesis*: *that there are only subjects*, and that an "object" is only a kind of effect of one subject on another… a *form that the subject takes*.

107.

(72)

How *pessimism develops into nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)*.

The turning against nature of *values*. Values turned into hair-splitting school theory. Values cut loose, made into ideals. Instead of ruling and guiding what we do, they turn *against* what we do and condemn it.

Sharp opposites are put in place of the natural levels and ranks. Hatred of the ranking of people and values. Opposites suit an age of the common mob, because they are easier to *grasp*.

The *rejected* world, set against an artificially built one that is called "real and valuable".

Finally, people discover what material the "real" world was built from. Now they have only the rejected world left. And they *add that greatest disappointment to the bill of how bad that world is*.

With that, *nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)* has arrived: people have kept the *values that judge and condemn* — and nothing else!

This is where *the problem of strength and weakness* comes up:

1)

the weak break apart because of it

2)

the stronger destroy whatever does not break

3)

the strongest overcome the values that judge and condemn.

— all of this together makes up the

tragic age

(end)

Toward a critique of pessimism.

The "*pain outweighs pleasure*" view, or the reverse view (hedonism, the belief that pleasure is what matters): both of these teachings already point the way to nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning). They are *nihilistic…*

because in both cases, no final *meaning* is set up other than the experience of pleasure or pain.

But this is how a kind of person talks who no longer dares to set up a will, a purpose, a *meaning*. For every healthy kind of person, the value of life is simply not measured by these side issues. And it would be possible for pain to *outweigh* pleasure and *still* have a mighty will, a *saying yes to life*, even a need for this extra weight of pain.

"Life isn't worth it"; "Resignation"; "Why all the tears?…" — this is a weak and sentimental way of thinking. As the French saying goes: "a cheerful monster is better than a boring sentimental person."

The pessimism of people of action: the question "what for?" after a terrible struggle, even after winning. The feeling that something is a hundred times *more important* than whether *we* feel good or bad: this is the ba-

sic instinct of all strong natures. And so it follows that it is also more important than whether *others* feel good or bad. In short, that we have a *goal*, for whose sake we do not hesitate to make *human sacrifices*, to run every risk, to take on everything bad, even the very worst: that is *great passion*.

108.

The "subject", the self, is really just a made-up idea. The ego that people talk about when they criticize selfishness does not exist at all.

109.

(73)

Note. To encourage the Jews to develop *new qualities*, now that they have moved into new conditions of life: that was the only thing that fit my instinct. And on this path I have not let myself be thrown off course by a poison-spreading counter-movement that happens to be on top right now.

110.

(74)

The *descriptive* and the *picturesque* as *symptoms* of *nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)* (in the arts and in psychology)

Don't practice *cheap gossip-column psychology*! Never observe just for the sake of observing! That gives you a false way of seeing, a squint, something forced and exaggerated. *Experiencing* things because you want to experience them does not work if you keep looking at yourself while you do it. The born psychologist, like the born painter, takes care not to look just for the sake of looking. He never works "from nature". He leaves the sifting and the expressing of what he has

lived through, of the "case", of "nature", to his instinct. What comes to his mind is the *general truth* as such, *not* some random abstract idea pulled out of particular cases. What happens to someone who does it differently, like the prey-hungry novelists in Paris? They lie in wait for reality, as it were, and every day they bring home a handful of curiosities. What comes of it in the end? At best a mosaic, something *pieced together*, loud in its colors, restless (as with the Goncourt brothers). — "Nature", speaking in an artistic sense, is never "true". It exaggerates, it distorts, it leaves gaps. "Studying from nature" is a sign of giving in, of weakness. It is a kind of fatalism, a passive acceptance, which is beneath an artist. *Seeing what is* — that belongs to a quite different kind of mind, the fact-minded, the people who record and pin things down. If you have developed this sense to its full strength, it is* anti-artistic in itself*.

Descriptive music: leaving it to reality to make the *effect*…

All these kinds of art are *easier* and *easier to copy*. That is why people with little talent reach for them. They appeal to the instincts. It is art that works by *suggestion*, by putting ideas into your head.

111.

Wagner was already a bit of a superstition while he was still alive. Since then he has wrapped himself so deeply in clouds of the unlikely that, when it comes to him, only paradoxes still get believed.

112.

(75)

Could it be that the contrast between *active* and *reactive* is hidden behind that other contrast, between *classical* and *romantic*?…

113.

Note: some fates you have to gulp down without looking at them. Just as with drinking maté tea, that actually *improves* their taste.

114.

Note: that *kind of selfishness* that drives us to do something, or to hold back from doing it, for the sake of

our neighbor.

115.

(76)

Things to *think over*:

The perfect book.

1)

The form, the style.

An *ideal monologue*, one person speaking alone. Everything scholarly is soaked up and sunk into the depths, so it no longer shows on the surface.

All the tones of deep passion and worry, and also of weaknesses, softer moments, *sunny* spots. The brief happiness, the lofty cheerfulness.

Leaving proof and argument behind. Completely *personal*. But no "I"…

A kind of memoir. The most abstract things told in the most physical, flesh-and-blood way.

All of history told as if *personally lived through and suffered*. Only that way does it become *true*.

Like a conversation with ghosts, so to speak. A summoning, a challenge, a calling up of the dead.

As much as possible that you can see, that is definite, that works as an example. Be careful with the present day and with everything that is in fashion right now.

Avoid the word "noble, high-minded", and in general any word that could sound like putting yourself on stage.

No "description". Every problem translated into *feeling*, all the way up to passion.

2)

Collect *forceful, clear-cut* words. Prefer military

words.

Replacement words for the technical terms of philosophy: German ones if possible, shaped into a formula.

Show all the *states of mind of the most spiritual people*, so that the whole range of them is covered across the entire work.

(The states

of the lawgiver,

of the one who experiments and tempts,

of the one forced to sacrifice, who hesitates,

of great responsibility,

of suffering from not being recognized or understood,

of suffering from having to *put on an appearance*,

of suffering from having to cause pain,

of the deep pleasure in destroying.)

3)

Build the work up toward a *catastrophe*.

Take the introduction from the *will* to pessimism. Do *not* speak as someone who suffers or has been let down. "We who do not believe in virtue and in fine, puffed-up feelings."

A comic satyr play

at the end.

Mix in: short conversations between Theseus, Dionysus and

Ariadne.

"Theseus is becoming ridiculous," said Ariadne. "Theseus is becoming virtuous."

Theseus is jealous of Ariadne's dream.

The hero admires himself and becomes ridiculous. Ariadne complains.

Dionysus is not jealous: "What I love in you, how could someone like Theseus ever love that?"…

Last act. The wedding of Dionysus and Ariadne.

"You are not jealous when you are a god," said Dionysus, "unless it is of other gods."

"Ariadne," said Dionysus, "you are a labyrinth, a maze. Theseus has lost his way in you, and he no longer has a thread to lead him out. So what good is it to him now that he was not eaten by the Minotaur? What is eating him now is worse than any Minotaur." "You flatter me," Ariadne answered, "but I am tired of my pity. I want every hero to be ruined by me. That is my last love for Theseus: I am bringing him to ruin."

116.

(77)

Rousseau was the typical 'modern person'. He was an idealist and a scoundrel in one and the same person, and he was the first because he was the second. He was a creature who *needed* 'moral dignity' and the pose that goes with it just to be able to stand himself. He was sick from unbridled vanity and, at the same time, from unbridled self-contempt. This misshapen creature, who settled himself down on the doorstep of our new age, preached a 'return to nature'. But where exactly did he want to go *back* to?

I also talk about a 'return to nature'. But really it is not a 'going back', it is a 'climbing up'. It means climbing up into the strong, sovereign, frightening nature and naturalness of human beings, the kind of nature that is allowed to play with great tasks, because small tasks would tire it and make it feel disgust. Napoleon was a 'return to nature' in matters of tactics, and above all in strategy.

The eighteenth century, to which we owe everything that our nineteenth century has worked on and suffered from: the fanatical obsession with morals; the softening of feeling in favor of the weak, the oppressed and the suffering; the spiteful grudge against every kind of privileged person; the belief in 'progress'; the belief in 'humanity' as an idol to be worshipped; the senseless pride of the common people; and the craving for passions felt to the full — both of these romantic —

Our hostility toward the French Revolution has nothing to do with the bloody farce, the '*immorality*', with which it played itself out. Instead, it is aimed at its *morality* of the herd. It is aimed at its 'truths', which are still having their effect, again and again. It is aimed at its contagious idea of 'justice and freedom', which charms and traps every mediocre soul. And it is aimed at the way it threw down the authority

of the *higher classes*. Because things around it were so horrible and bloody, this wild party of *mediocrity* was given an *appearance of greatness*. So, as a spectacle, it even seduced the proudest minds.

117.

One gives in where giving in is really giving the other a head start: that is, when one is rich enough not to need to take anything.

118.

He loved to keep insisting he was right until some lucky chance came to his rescue — and until he really *was* right.

119.

(78)

A '*cleaning up of taste*' can only come as the result of a *strengthening* of the type of person. Our society today only *puts on a show* of education; the truly educated person is *missing*. The great *uniting person* is missing: the person in whom all the different forces are harnessed together, without hesitation, like animals under one yoke, all pulling toward a single goal. What we have instead is the *many-sided* person, perhaps the most interesting chaos there has ever been. But it is *not* the chaos that came *before* the creation of the world; it is the chaos that comes after it: the many-sided person. Goethe is the most beautiful example of this type (*— and not at all a calm, godlike Olympian!*).

We must win back the right to great *passion* for the person who seeks knowledge! For self-denial and the worship of the 'objective' have created a false ranking of people and values in this area too. This mistake reached its peak when Schopenhauer taught that the only way to the 'truth', to knowledge, lies *precisely in breaking free from pas-*

sion, from the will. He claimed that an intellect free of will *simply cannot help* seeing the true, real essence of things.

The same mistake happens in art: as if everything were *beautiful* the moment it is looked at without any will.

The fight against 'purpose' in *art* is always a fight against art's tendency to *moralize*, against making art serve *morality*. 'Art for art's sake' means: 'To hell with morality!' But even this hostility shows how overpowering the prejudice still is. Even if you have banned from art the *passion for preaching morals* and for 'improving people', it does not at all follow that art can exist without any 'passion', without any 'purpose', without some need that lies outside of beauty itself. 'To mirror', 'to imitate': fine, but how? All art praises, glorifies, picks things out, makes them shine. It *strengthens* certain ways of valuing. Should we be allowed to treat that as just a side effect, as something that happens by accident? *Or is it already at the very root of what the artist 'can do'?* Is the artist's passion aimed at art itself? Or is it not rather aimed at life? At a *wishful ideal of life?*

And what about all the ugly, harsh, terrible things that art shows? Does art want to make us *sick of life* with them? To put us in a mood of giving up, as Schopenhauer thinks? But above all, the artist is sharing his own *state of mind* when facing the frightening side of life. This state itself is a *wishful ideal*. Whoever has lived through it honors it as highly as possible and passes it on, provided that he is a creature who likes to share, that is, an artist. *Courage* in the face of a powerful enemy, a great hardship, a horrifying problem — this courage itself is the *higher state* of life that all sublime art celebrates. The warlike soul holds its wild festivals in tragedy, like the ancient Roman feasts of Saturn. There it celebrates the happiness of war and victory, and the harsh cruelty felt when watching people suffer and struggle, just as all

of this belongs to the person who is used to suffering, and who even *goes looking* for suffering.

120.

(79)

In our civilized world, we almost only get to know the stunted criminal. He is crushed under society's curse and contempt, he does not trust himself, and he often makes his deed seem smaller and speaks badly of it. He is a *failed type of criminal*. And so we resist the idea that *all great people were criminals*, only in the grand style and not in a pitiful one; that crime belongs to greatness. (I say this from the knowledge of those who search hearts and minds, and of everyone who has *climbed down* most deeply into great souls.) Being an outlaw, free and unprotected, cut loose from custom, conscience and duty — every great person knows this is his danger. But he also *wants* it: he *wants* the great goal, and so he also wants the means to reach it.

121.

(80)

That we give people back the *courage* to follow their natural drives.

That we put a stop to their *underrating of themselves* (*not* the underrating of the human being as an individual, but of the human being *as part of nature*…).

That we take the *opposites* out of things, once we understand that we are the ones who put them there.

That we take society's *peculiar quirks* out of existence as a whole (guilt, punishment, justice, honesty, freedom, love, and so on).

To set out the problem of *civilization*.

Progress toward '*naturalness*': in all political questions, even in the relations between parties, even between business parties or between workers' and employers' parties, the real issue is a question of *power*. First comes 'what *can* we do?', and only after that, 'what *should* we do?'

That, in the middle of all the machinery of big politics, people still blow the Christian trumpets (for example, in victory reports or in the emperor's speeches to the people) is more and more becoming impossible, because it goes against good taste. 'The crown prince's throat' is not something God is concerned with.

Progress of the nineteenth century compared with the eighteenth.

— Deep down, we good Europeans are waging a war against the eighteenth century. —

1. 'Return to nature' is understood more and more firmly in the opposite sense from the way Rousseau understood it. *Away from pretty country scenes and the opera!*

2. More and more firmly against idealism: more down-to-earth, more fearless, harder-working, more moderate, more suspicious of sudden changes, *against revolution*.

3. More and more firmly putting the question of the *health of the body* ahead of the health 'of the soul': seeing the soul's health as a condition that follows from the body's health, or at least as something that depends on it first — — —

122.

(80a)

On the family tree of Christianity

— The fanaticism of shy, timid people who do not dare to go back once they have left their homeland: until, out of fear and the torture of fear, they end up *destroying* it.

— It takes more courage and *strength* of character to stop, or even to turn back, than to keep going. *Turning back without cowardice is harder than going on without cowardice.*

123.

(81)

How the nihilist comes into being.

It takes us a long time to find the courage for what we really *know*. Only recently have I admitted to myself that, deep down, I have been a nihilist (someone who believes nothing has meaning) all along. The energy and the radical drive with which I pushed forward as a nihilist fooled me about this basic fact. When you are heading toward a goal, it seems impossible that your core belief could be "having no goal at all."

124.

(82)

Morality as a Way of Luring People

"Nature is good, because a wise and good God made it. So who is to blame for the 'corruption of mankind'? Its tyrants and seducers, the ruling classes. They must be destroyed."

That is how *Rousseau* reasons. (Compare how *Pascal* reasons, which leads him to the idea of original sin, the sin everyone is supposedly born with.)

Compare the similar reasoning of *Luther*.

In both cases, people are looking for an excuse to present a never-satisfied hunger for revenge as a *moral and religious duty*. Hatred of the ruling class tries to make itself look *holy*…

(The idea that "Israel is sinful" was the foundation on which the priests built their power.)

Compare the similar reasoning of *Paul*.

These reactions always show up dressed as the cause of God, the cause of justice, of humanity, and so on.

(In the case of *Christ*, it seems that the people cheering for him was the reason he was executed. It was a movement against the priests from the very start.)

(Even with the *anti-Semites*, it is always the same trick: to attack your opponent with moral condemnations and to keep for yourself the role of *justice that punishes*.)

Note: "Moral condemnation" as a *way to gain power*.

A.

Stirring up a *guilty* conscience, so that saviors, priests and the like become necessary; or:

B.

Stirring up a *good*, clear conscience, so that you can treat your opponents as the

bad ones and knock them down.

125.

(83)

Against Rousseau: the natural state of things is terrible, man is a beast of prey, and our civilization is an amazing *victory* over this predator nature. *That is what Voltaire concluded.* He could feel how civilized life softens us, how refined it is, and what pleasures of the mind it offers. He looked down on narrow-mindedness, even when it came dressed as virtue. He looked down on the lack of delicacy and good taste, even in hermits and monks.

Rousseau seemed obsessed with how *morally wicked* people are. With words like "unjust" and "cruel" you can most easily stir up the instincts of the oppressed. Normally these instincts are held down by what is forbidden and by fear of disgrace, *so that their own conscience warns them against their rebellious desires.* These liberators want* one thing *above all: to give their side the grand tone and the proud poses of a* higher kind of being*.

126.

(84)

Main Symptoms of Pessimism

The dinners at Magny's restaurant in Paris.

Russian pessimism: Tolstoy, Dostoevsky.

Artistic pessimism: "art for art's sake"; mere "description"; romantic and anti-romantic pessimism.

Pessimism about what we can know.

Schopenhauer. The idea that we only ever know how things appear to us.

Anarchist pessimism.

The "religion of pity": a movement leading up to something like Buddhism.

Pessimism about culture (love of the exotic, feeling at home everywhere and nowhere).

Moral pessimism: that is me.

The *distractions*, the temporary *escapes*

from pessimism:

the great wars, the strong military organizations, nationalism;

competition between industries;

science;

pleasure.

Here we should tell two things apart:

Pessimism as strength: where does it show? In the energy of its logic, as anarchism and nihilism, as cold analysis.

Pessimism as decline: where does it show? As becoming soft and delicate, as a worldly habit of feeling one's way into everything, as "understanding everything," and as seeing everything only through history.

127.

The Coming of Nihilism

The Logic of Nihilism

How Nihilism Overcomes Itself

The Winners and the Defeated

128.

(85)

The *critical tension*: the extremes come out into the open and take over.

129.

The decline of *Protestantism*: both in theory and in history it is seen as a half-measure. In fact, Catholicism has the upper hand. The feeling for Protestantism has died out so completely that even the strongest *anti-Protestant* movements are no longer noticed as such (for example, Wagner's opera Parsifal). All the finest minds in France are *Catholic* by instinct. Bismarck understood that Protestantism no longer really exists.

130.

(86)

A Critique of *Modern Man*

(his lying, moralizing nature)

"The 'good' person," who has only been spoiled and led astray by bad institutions (tyrants and priests).

Reason as the final authority; history as the overcoming of mistakes; the future as progress.

The Christian state; "the God of armies."

The Christian way of handling sex, that is, marriage.

The kingdom of "justice"; the worship of "humanity."

"Freedom."

The *romantic* pose of modern man:

the noble person (Byron, Victor Hugo, George Sand);

noble outrage;

being made holy by passion (passion seen as true "nature");

taking the side of the oppressed and the losers: the motto of historians and novelists.

The Stoics of duty, who grimly do what they must.

"Selflessness" treated as an art and as a way of knowing.

Altruism, living for others (the most dishonest form of selfishness; utilitarianism, the idea of the greatest good for the greatest number); the most sentimental selfishness.

131.

(87)

All this comes from the 18th century. But here is what was *not* passed down from it: the carefree spirit, the cheerfulness, the elegance, the clarity of mind. The pace of the mind has changed. The pleasure in mental sharpness and clarity has given way to pleasure in color, harmony, mass, reality, and so on. The mind has become a matter of the senses. In short, it is the 18th century of *Rousseau*.

132.

The *masters of skill* and the *virtuous*.

133.

"Knowledge without conscience is nothing but the ruin of the soul." Rabelais. Turned around: "Conscience without knowledge, that is salvation."

134.

(88)

In 1814 the historian Augustin Thierry read what de Montlosier had said in his book On the French Monarchy. He answered with a cry of outrage and set to work on his own book. That noble, who had fled the Revolution, had written: "Race of freed slaves, race of slaves torn from our hands, people who paid us tribute, new people: you were granted permission to be free, but we were not granted permission to be noble. For us everything is by right; for you everything is by favor. We are not part of your community; we are a whole unto ourselves."

135.

(90)

"Gospel freedom." "Being answerable only to your own conscience." This lovely pious hypocrisy of *Luther's* is really the "will to power" in its shyest form. For these are its three steps: a) freedom, b) justice, c) love.

136.

Faith is a "holy sickness" (in Greek, hiera nosos). Heraclitus already knew that. Faith is an inner compulsion that makes you stupid, a need *that something must be true*…

137.

(91)

The fight against *great* people, justified for economic reasons. Such people are dangerous. They are accidents, exceptions, storms, strong enough to call into question things that were slowly built and founded. The aim is not only to set off the explosive harmlessly, but if

possible to *prevent* it from ever forming… This is the basic instinct of civilized society.

138.

(92)

Note: *put everything terrible to work*, one thing at a time, step by step, by trial and error. That is the task of culture. But until culture is *strong enough* to do it, it has to fight these terrible things, tame them, hide them, even curse them…

Wherever a culture *labels something as evil*, it shows that it is *afraid*, and so it shows a *weakness*…

Thesis: everything good is something evil from the past that has been made to serve.

Measure: the more terrible and the greater the passions that an age, a people or a single person can allow itself, because it can use them *as tools, the higher its culture stands*. (The realm of evil keeps getting *smaller*…)

The more mediocre, weak, submissive and cowardly a person is, the more he will label things as *evil*. For him the realm of evil is the widest. The lowest kind of person will see the realm of evil, that is, of what is forbidden and hostile to him, everywhere.

139.

(89)

In sum: master the passions, do *not* weaken them or wipe them out!

The greater the masterly strength of the will, the more freedom the passions may be given.

The "great human being" is great because of how much freedom he gives his desires, and because of the even greater power that knows how to put these magnificent monsters to work.

— At every stage of civilization, the 'good' person is the one who is *harmless and useful at the same time*: a kind of *middle*. In ordinary people's minds, he stands for *the one you don't need to fear, but whom you still aren't allowed to look down on…*

Education: basically a tool for *ruining* the exception, by distracting it, tempting it, making it sickly, all in favor of the rule.

That is harsh. But seen as a matter of economy, it is completely reasonable. At least for that long period of time — — —

Cultivation and learning: basically a tool for turning people's taste against the exception, in favor of the average.

A culture of the exception, of experiment, of danger, of fine shades and differences, which grows out of a great *wealth of strength*: *every* aristocratic culture leans *in that direction*.

Only when a culture has more strength than it needs can a greenhouse for a luxury culture also grow on its soil — — —

140.

(93)

My own attempt to understand how *completely reasonable* society's way of judging and its way of valuing really are: of course without any wish to squeeze moral lessons out of it.

: the amount of *psychological falseness* and murkiness needed to *make holy* the feelings that are essential for survival and for growing in power (so that people can have a *clear conscience* about those feelings)

: the amount of *stupidity* needed so that shared rules and a shared way of valuing stay possible (for this purpose: education, keeping watch over what people learn, training them like animals)

: the amount of *inquisition, suspicion and intolerance* needed to treat the exceptions as criminals and to crush them — even to give them a guilty conscience themselves, so that deep inside they feel sick about being exceptions.

Morality is basically a *shield*, a means of defense: and in that sense, it is a sign of a human being who is not yet fully grown. p. 123

(covered in armor; stoic;

the fully grown human being has, above all, *weapons*; he *attacks*

tools of war turned into tools of peace (just as scales and armor plates turned into feathers and hair)

In short: morality is just as 'immoral' as anything else on earth; morality itself is one form of immorality.

This insight brings a great *liberation*: the idea of opposites is taken out of things, and the fact that everything that happens is of one single kind is *saved* — —

141.

(94)

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy — these are our *modern vices*

142.

(95)

The high points of culture and the high points of civilization lie *far apart* from each other. Don't let yourself be fooled about how deeply these two ideas are opposed.

The great moments of *culture* are, in moral language, times of *corruption*. The eras when human beings are deliberately and forcibly *tamed* ('civilization') are times of intolerance toward the most spiritual and boldest natures, and those eras are their deepest enemies.

143.

(96)

How little the subject itself matters! It is the spirit that brings things to life! What sick, stale, stuffy air comes out of all that excited talk about 'salvation', love, 'heavenly bliss', faith, truth, 'eternal life'! Just compare it with a truly *pagan* book, for example Petronius. In his book, basically nothing is done, said, wanted or valued that would not count as sin, even deadly sin, by the measure of a Christian sanctimonious hypocrite. And yet: what a good feeling of cleaner air, of superior intelligence, of a quicker step, of strength that has been set free, that overflows, that is sure of the future! In the whole New Testament there is not a single bit of clowning or playful fun: and that alone is enough to prove a book wrong… Compared with Petronius, the New Testament remains a symptom of decline and of the *corruption* of culture — and that is exactly how it has acted in history: like a yeast that makes things rot.

144.

(97)

On 'logical mere appearance'.

The ideas of the 'individual' and the 'species' are both false and only skin-deep. The word '*species*' only expresses the fact that a lot of similar creatures show up at the same time, and that the speed at which they keep growing and changing has slowed down for a long time. Because of this, the small continuations and additions that really do happen hardly get noticed. (— It is a stage of development in which the developing can't be seen, so that a balance *seems* to have been reached. This makes the false idea possible that *a goal has been reached here* — and that development had a goal at all…)

The *form* is thought of as something lasting, and so as something more valuable. But form is simply something we invented. And no matter how often 'the same form is reached', that doesn't mean that it really *is* the *same* form. Rather, *something new always appears* — and only we, who compare things, lump this new thing together with the old, as far as it looks like the old, into the single unit we call 'form'. It is as if a *type* were meant to be reached, as if it floated before the growing thing like a plan and lived inside it.

Form, species, law, idea, purpose — everywhere here the same mistake is made: something made-up is secretly given a false reality. It is as if what happens carried some kind of obedience inside it. An artificial split is made in what happens, between *the thing that* acts and *the rule by which* the acting is guided. (But the 'thing that' and the 'rule by which' are only set up by us, out of obedience to our fixed beliefs about metaphysics and logic: they are not a 'fact'.)

We feel *forced* to form concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws — 'a world of identical cases'. But this should not be understood as if it let us pin down the 'real' world. It should be understood as a need to arrange a world for ourselves in which *our existence* becomes possible. In this way we create a world that, for us, can be calculated, is simplified, can be understood, and so on.

This same compulsion is at work in what our *senses do*, and the mind supports it — by simplifying, making things rougher, underlining and inventing. All 'recognizing', and all ability to make ourselves understood, rests on this. Our *needs* have tuned our senses so precisely that 'the same world of appearances' keeps coming back again and again, and that is how it has come to look like *reality*.

We personally feel forced to believe in logic. But this only shows that long before we became aware of logic itself, we did nothing but *put its demands into what happens*. Now we find them there in what happens — we can't do anything else — and we believe that this compulsion proves something about 'truth'. It is we who created 'the thing', 'the same thing', the subject, the predicate, the action, the object, substance, form — after we had spent the longest time *making* things alike, *making* them rough and simple.

The world *looks* logical to us because *we* first *made* it logical

145.

(98)

On the 'Machiavellianism' of power — its cunning, ruthless tactics.

(*unconscious* Machiavellianism)

The *will to power* shows up

a)

among the oppressed, among slaves of every kind, as a will to '*freedom*': the only goal seems to be *getting loose* (in moral and religious terms: 'answerable only to one's own conscience', 'the freedom of the Gospel', and so on)

b)

among a stronger kind of people who are growing into power, as a will to have the upper hand. If that fails at first, it limits itself to a will to '*justice*', that is, to having *the same amount of rights* as the other, ruling kind has. A struggle for rights…

c)

among the strongest, richest, most independent and most courageous, it shows up as '*love* for humanity', for 'the people', for the Gospel, for truth, for God; as pity; as 'self-sacrifice' and so on. Really, it is overpowering others, sweeping them along, taking them into one's service. It is an instinctive feeling of being one with a great amount of power that one *is able to steer*: the hero, the prophet, the Caesar, the savior, the shepherd. (— Sexual love belongs here too: it *wants* to overpower and take possession, yet it *looks like* giving oneself away…) At bottom it is only love for one's 'tool', for one's 'horse'…, the conviction that this or that *belongs* to oneself, as someone who is able *to use it*.

'Freedom', 'justice' and 'love'!!!

The *inability to gain power*: its *hypocrisy* and

cleverness:

as obedience (fitting in, pride in doing one's duty, conventional morals…)

as submission, devotion, love (idealizing and worshipping the one who gives orders, as a way to make up for one's loss and as an indirect way of glorifying oneself)

as fatalism, the belief that fate decides everything, and as giving up

as 'objectivity'

as being a tyrant over oneself (Stoicism, harsh self-discipline, 'self-denial', 'making oneself holy')

(— everywhere what shows through is the need to still use some kind of power after all, or at least to give oneself, for a while, the *appearance* of power (as a kind of *intoxication*)

as criticism, pessimism, outrage, as tormenting others

as the "beautiful soul", as "virtue", as "worshipping oneself", as "standing apart", as "staying pure from the world", and so on. (— here people realize they are unable to get power, and they disguise that realization as contempt, as looking down on power)

There are people who want power for the sake of the *advantages* for their happiness that power brings (political parties)

other people want power even when it brings clear *disadvantages* and costs them *sacrifices* in happiness and well-being: these are the ambitious ones

other people want power simply because otherwise it would fall into someone else's hands, and they do not want to depend on those hands

On the question of whether the power in the "will to power" is only a *means* to something else: Think of protoplasm, the living stuff of cells. It takes something in and *builds it into its own body*. So it makes itself stronger, and it uses power in order to grow stronger. To what extent does this behavior of protoplasm, taking things in and building them into itself, give us the key to how two chemical substances behave toward each other (as a struggle, and a settling of who has power)?

146.

(99)

Against Rousseau: Sadly, the human being is no longer wicked enough. Rousseau's opponents, who say "man is a beast of prey," are sadly not right. The curse is not that people have become corrupt. The curse is that they have become soft, pampered and over-moralized. In the very social circles that Rousseau attacked most fiercely, you found the kind of people who were, *relatively speaking*, still strong and well-made (— those who still had their great passions unbroken: the will to power, the will to enjoy, the will and the ability to command). You have to compare the people of the 18th century with the people of the Renaissance (and also with the people of 17th-century France) to feel what is really at stake here. Rousseau is a symptom of self-contempt and of overheated vanity. Both are signs that a commanding, dominant will is missing. He preaches morals, and as a man full of grudges, he looks for the *cause* of his own misery in the *ruling* classes.

147.

(100)

By what means does a virtue come to power?

By exactly the same means as a political party: by slander, by spreading suspicion, by undermining the rival virtues that already hold power, by renaming them, by hunting them down and mocking them in a systematic way. In other words: *through nothing but "immoral" acts*.

What does a *desire* do to itself in order to become a *virtue*? It renames itself. On principle, it denies what it is really after. It practices misunderstanding itself. It forms an alliance with virtues that already exist and are accepted. It puts on a show of hostility toward their enemies. If possible, it buys the protection of powers that can make things holy. It intoxicates people and fills them with enthusiasm, using the pious hypocrisy of idealism. It wins over a party of followers

who will *either* rise to the top along with it *or* go down with it… It becomes *unaware of itself, innocent-seeming*…

148.

(101)

The Theory of Transformations

Transformations

of sexuality

of

cruelty

of

cowardice

of

vengefulness and anger

of

laziness

of

the lust to rule

of

reckless daring

of

lying and envy

of

slander

of

greed

of

hatred

What an age despises or hates are the *leftover* virtues: remains of the ideal of an earlier age, but in a stunted, shriveled form ("the criminal"…)

149.

(102)

How do people manage to make tendencies that are *hostile to life* look honorable?

for example:

chastity

poverty and begging

stupidity and lack of culture

self-contempt

contempt for existence itself

150.

(103)

On how our way of valuing sees things:

The influence of

the *size* (big or small) of the *goal*.

The influence of

the *intelligence and refinement* in the *means*.

The influence of

the *manners* shown in the *action*.

The influence of

success or failure

The influence of

the *opposing* forces and what they are worth

The influence of

what is *allowed* and what is *forbidden*

The *size* of the *goal*, and how it affects the way we value something: the *great* criminal and the *petty* one. The size of the *goal* someone is after also decides, for that person himself, whether he respects himself while doing it, or feels small-hearted and miserable.

— Next, how much *intelligence and refinement* goes into the means, and how this affects our way of valuing. How differently the philosophical innovator, the tempter and the man of force look compared with the robber, the barbarian and the adventurer! — It gives them the appearance of being 'unselfish'.

Finally, noble, high-minded manners, bearing, bravery, self-confidence — how much they change the way people judge whatever is achieved in this manner!

The effect of a *ban*: any power that forbids things, and knows how to make the person it forbids afraid, creates a 'guilty conscience'. (That means: a craving for something, together with the awareness that satisfying it is *dangerous*, and the pressure to act in secret, to sneak

around, to be careful. Every ban makes the character worse in those who do not submit to it willingly, but only because they are forced to.)

151.

(104)

The will to power can only show itself *against resistance*. So it goes looking for whatever resists it. This is the original tendency of protoplasm, the basic living jelly of cells, when it pushes out its little false feet and feels around itself. Taking something over and absorbing it is above all a wish to overpower: to shape it, to build onto it and rebuild it, until finally what has been overpowered has passed completely into the power of the attacker and has made the attacker bigger. — If this absorbing does not succeed, then the creature probably falls apart. And so *splitting into two* appears as a result of the will to power: in order not to let go of what it has conquered, the will to power divides into two wills (sometimes without completely giving up the bond between them).

'Hunger' is only a narrower adaptation, which comes after the basic drive for power has taken on a more mental, more refined form.

152.

Being *preoccupied with morality* puts a mind low in the ranking of people and values. Such a mind lacks the instinct for special rights, for standing apart; it lacks the feeling of freedom that creative natures have, the 'children of God' (or of the devil —). And it makes no difference whether he preaches the ruling morality or uses his own ideal to *criticize* the ruling morality: either way, he belongs to the herd — even if only as the thing the herd needs most in an emergency, as its 'shepherd'…

153.

(105)

The Strong Ones of the Future

What need achieved in some cases, and chance in others, here and there — the conditions for producing a *stronger kind* of human — we can now understand and *want* on purpose. We can create the conditions under which such a raising up of humans is possible.

Until now, 'education' has had the usefulness to society in mind: *not* the greatest possible benefit for the future, but the benefit of whatever society happens to exist right now. People wanted 'tools' for that society. Suppose *the wealth of strength were greater*: then one could imagine *setting aside some of that strength* for a goal that would *not* serve the benefit of society, but a future benefit,

— Such a task would need to be set all the more, the more people understood how far the present form of society is going through a powerful change, so that one day it will *no longer be able to exist for its own sake*, but only as a *means* in the hands of a stronger race.

The fact that humans are getting smaller and smaller is exactly the force that pushes us to think about the breeding of a *stronger race*. This race would have plenty to spare in exactly those things in which the shrunken species was growing weak and weaker: will, responsibility, self-assurance, the ability to set goals for oneself.

The *means* would be the ones history teaches: *isolation*, by having interests in survival that are the opposite of the average person's interests today; practice in opposite ways of valuing; distance felt as a passion, a proud sense of distance; a free conscience about the very things that are most underrated and most forbidden today.

The *levelling* of European humans, making them all alike, is the great process that cannot be stopped. One ought to speed it up even more.

This creates the need to *tear open a gap*, to create *distance* and a *ranking of people and values*: *not* the need to slow that process down

Once this *levelled* species has been reached, it needs a *justification*. Its justification lies in serving a higher, sovereign kind, which stands on top of it and can only rise to its task by standing on it.

Not just a race of masters whose whole task would be to rule; but a race with *its own sphere of life*, with a surplus of strength for beauty, bravery, culture, and good manners reaching right up into the most mental and spiritual things; a race that *says yes*, that may allow itself every great luxury…, strong enough not to need the tyranny of the command to be virtuous, rich enough not to need thriftiness and fussy pedantry, beyond good and evil; a greenhouse for strange and specially chosen plants.

154.

(106)

Man is the *un-beast* and the *over-beast*, both below and above the animal. The superior person is both the inhuman one and the higher human being: these belong together. Every time a human grows toward greatness and height, he also grows into what is deep and terrible. You should not want the one without the other — or rather: the more thoroughly you want the one, the more thoroughly you end up getting exactly the other.

155.

(107)

Virtue no longer finds anyone who believes in it; its attraction is gone. Unless, perhaps, someone knew how to bring it back to market as an unusual kind of adventure and wild excess. It demands too much extravagance and narrow-mindedness from its believers for it not to have people's conscience against it today. Of course, for people without conscience and without any scruples, that might be exactly its new charm — it is now something it has never been before: a *vice*.

156.

(108)

Faking in Psychology

The great crimes in psychology:

1) that all *displeasure*, *all misfortune*, has been falsely mixed up with wrongdoing (with guilt) (pain has been robbed of its innocence)

2) that all *strong feelings of pleasure* (high spirits, lust, triumph, pride, daring, knowledge, self-assurance and happiness itself) have been branded as sinful, as temptation, as suspicious.

3) that *feelings of weakness*, the deepest inner cowardice, the lack of courage to be oneself, have been given holy names and taught as desirable in the highest sense.

4) that everything *great* in a human has been reinterpreted as self-denial, as sacrificing oneself for something else, for others; that even in the person seeking knowledge, even in the artist, *giving up one's own personality* has been falsely presented as the cause of his highest knowledge and skill.

5) that *love* has been faked into devotion (and altruism, living for others), when really it is a taking-in, or a giving-away that happens because one's personality is overflowing with riches. Only the most

whole people can love; people who have lost their personality, the 'objective' ones, are bad lovers (— just ask the women!). The same is true of love for God, or for the 'fatherland': you have to sit firmly on yourself,

Egoism as 'I-ifying', making things part of the self; altruism as 'other-ifying', turning oneself into something else

6) life as punishment, happiness as temptation; the passions as devilish, trust in oneself as godless

NB: *This whole psychology is a psychology* of *holding back*, a kind of *walling-in* out of fear. On the one hand, the great mass (those who got a bad deal from life, and the mediocre) want to use it to defend themselves against the stronger ones (— and to *destroy* them while they are still developing…). On the other hand, they want all the drives with which they themselves thrive best to be made holy and to be the only ones held in honor. Compare the Jewish priesthood.

157.

(109)

I. The deliberate, systematic *faking of history*, so that it provides *proof* for moral ways of valuing.

a) The decline of a people, and corruption

b) The rise of a people, and virtue

c) A people reaches its peak ("its culture") as a result of its high moral standing

II. The basic faking of the *great human beings*, the *great creators*, the *great ages*

a) People want *faith* to be the thing that sets great people apart. But in truth, what belongs to greatness is a lack of scruples, doubt, the freedom to be able to drop a belief, and "immorality." Think of Caesar, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe. People always hide the main thing about them: their "freedom of the will."

158.

What *I* am fighting against is this: that an exceptional kind of person makes war on the rule, instead of understanding that the rule must go on existing if *the exception is to have any value*. Take, for example, those women who, instead of feeling that their unusual needs set them apart as special, want to shift the place of women in general…

159.

(110)

Whose

will to power is morality?

What runs through the whole history of Europe since *Socrates* is the attempt to make *moral values* rule over all other values. The idea is that they should not only guide and judge life, but also

1. knowledge

2. the arts

3. the goals of the state and of society

"Becoming better" is treated as the only task. Everything else is only a *means* to that end. Or else it is seen as a disturbance, a block, a danger, and must therefore be fought, even to the point of destroying it…

A similar movement in *China*

A similar movement in *India*.

What does it mean, this *will to power on the part of moral values*, which so far has played itself out on earth in three huge developments?

Answer: three powers are hiding behind it. 1) the instinct of *the herd* against the strong and independent; 2) the instinct of *those who suffer* and those who got a bad deal in life against the happy; 3) the instinct of *the mediocre* against the exceptions. This movement has brought a *huge advantage*, however much cruelty, falseness and narrow-mindedness helped it along. (For the story of *morality's fight against the basic instincts of life* is itself the greatest immorality that has ever existed on earth…)

160.

(111)

Moral values inside the theory of knowledge itself

trust in reason: why not distrust?

the 'real' world is supposed to be the good one: why?

mere appearance, change, contradiction and struggle are judged to be immoral. So people long for a world where all of this is *missing*.

a world beyond this one was invented *so that* there would still be room for "moral freedom" (in Kant)

logical argument as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates). Clearly this was because the clever debating of the Sophists was seen as the road to immorality.

Time and space are only in the mind. So there is "oneness" at the heart of things. So there is no "sin," no evil, no imperfection. All of this is a way of *justifying* God.

Epicurus *denies* that real knowledge is possible, so that he can keep moral values (or rather, pleasure-based values) as the highest ones. Augustine does the same. Later Pascal does it too (with his "spoiled reason"), in favor of Christian values.

Descartes's contempt for everything that changes; and Spinoza's too.

161.

(112)

Moral values ruling over the values of beauty and art (or being placed *above* them, or standing against them as their *deadly enemy*)

162.

(113)

Reasons for the *rise of pessimism*

1)

that the most powerful drives of life, the ones with the most future in them, have so far been *slandered*, so that life carries a curse on itself

2)

that human beings, with their growing courage and honesty and their bolder distrust, come to see that *these instincts cannot be separated* from life, and so they turn against life itself

3)

that only the *most mediocre* people, who do not even *feel* that conflict, do well, while the higher kind of person fails and, looking like a product of decay, turns people against itself. And that, on the other hand, the mediocre, by setting itself up as the goal and meaning of

everything, makes people *indignant* (so that nobody can answer the question "*What for?*" anymore)

4)

that the shrinking of people, their sensitivity to pain, their restlessness, their rush, the crowded swarming, all keep growing. And that it keeps getting easier to *picture* this whole bustle, "so-called civilization," all at once, so that the single person, faced with this huge machine, *loses heart* and *gives in*.

163.

(114)

The great *fakings* under the rule of *moral values*.

1)

in history (including politics)

2)

in the theory of knowledge

3)

in judging art and artists

4)

in judging the worth of people and actions (of *peoples* and *races*)

5)

in psychology

6)

in the building of philosophies (a "moral order of the world" and the like)

7)

in biology and the theory of evolution ("perfecting," "socializing," "selection")

164.

The Will to Power.

An Attempt at Rethinking All Values.

Book One:

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)

as the end result of the highest values so far.

Book Two:

A Critique of the Highest Values So Far,

seeing what it was that said yes and no through them.

Book Three:

Nihilism Overcoming Itself,

an attempt to say yes to everything that has been denied until now.

Book Four:

The Conquerors and the Conquered.

A Prophecy.

165.

(115)

The *lack of discipline in the modern mind,* dressed up in all sorts of moral decorations:

The fancy slogans are:

tolerance (meaning "being unable to say yes or no")

"broad sympathy" (la largeur de sympathie) = one third not caring, one third curiosity, one third sick over-excitement

"objectivity" = lacking a personality, lacking will, being unable to love

"freedom" against the rules (Romanticism)

"truth" against faking and lying (naturalism)

"being scientific" (the "human document"), which in plain words means the cheap pulp novel, and just adding things up instead of building a real composition

"passion" in place of disorder and lack of self-control

"depth" in place of confusion and a jumble of symbols

On "Modern Times"

a)

the lack of discipline of the mind

b)

play-acting

c)

sick over-sensitivity (the surroundings seen as "fate")

d)

the colorful mix of everything

e)

overwork

The *most helpful brakes* and *remedies* for

"*modern times*"

1.

universal compulsory military service, with real wars, where the fun stops

2.

national narrow-mindedness (it simplifies and concentrates things, though for now it also wears people out and drains them through overwork)

3.

better *food* (meat)

4.

homes growing ever *cleaner* and healthier

5.

the science of the body, *physiology*, taking charge over theologians, moralists, economists and politicians

6.

military strictness in demanding and carrying out one's "duty" (people no longer *praise* it...)

166.

(116)

On Art.

To be a *classic*, you must

have *all* the strong gifts and desires, even ones that seem to contradict each other: but in such a way that they pull together under one yoke, like oxen in a single team

come at the *right* time, so that you bring one *kind* of literature, art or politics to its height and peak (: not *after* this has already happened...)

mirror a *whole way of life* (whether a people or a culture) in its deepest, innermost soul, at a time when it still exists and has not yet been painted over by copying foreign things (or is still dependent on them...)

be a mind that does not just react, but one that *completes* things and leads forward, saying *yes* in every case, even with its hatred

"Doesn't this also *not* require the highest personal worth?"... Perhaps we should consider whether moral prejudices are playing their game here, and whether great *moral* height might in itself be a *contradiction* of the classical?...

Make music "*Mediterranean*": that is *my* motto...

Mustn't moral monsters necessarily be *Romantics*, in word and in deed?... When one trait outweighs all the others like that (as in a moral monster), it works directly against the classical power, which lives in balance. Suppose someone had reached that moral height and was still a classic: then we could boldly conclude that he also had immorality on the same level. Perhaps this is the case with Shakespeare (assuming it really was Lord Bacon: — — —

167.

(117)

The upper hand held by *traders* and *go-betweens*, even in the most spiritual things

the

literary writer

the

"representative"

the

the historian (as someone who blends the past and the present together)

the

lovers of the exotic and citizens of the world

the

go-betweens between natural science and philosophy

the

the half-theologians.

168.

(118)

What marks "*modern times*".

far too many in-between forms

clear types withering away

traditions and schools breaking off,

instincts ruling over everything (after the *willpower* has *grown weak*, the power to want both a goal *and* the means to it...) (prepared by philosophy: the idea that the unconscious is *worth more*)

169.

(119)

Schopenhauer as an

after-echo

: the state of things before the Revolution.

..Pity, sensuality, art, weakness of will, a Catholic streak in the most spiritual desires — at bottom, that is the good old eighteenth century. *Schopenhauer's* basic misunderstanding of the *will* is typical: he acts as if desire, instinct and urge were the *essence* of the will. The will is so worn out in its value that it shrivels away. Along with this comes a hatred of wanting anything; an attempt to see something higher, indeed *the* highest, the truly valuable, in no longer wanting, in "being a subject *without* goal or purpose" ("the pure subject, free of will"). This is a great sign of *tiredness*, or of *weakness* of the *will*: because the will is precisely the thing that treats desire as its master would, showing it its path and its limits...

170.

(120)

On Art.

the modern *faking (like forging money)* in the arts: understood as *necessary*, that is, as fitting the *deepest need* of the *modern soul*

people stuff up the gaps in their *talent*, and even more the gaps in their *education*, their tradition, their *training*

first: you look for a *less artistic* audience, one whose love has no conditions (— and which soon kneels down before the *person*...). This is

what our century's superstition serves, the superstition of the "*genius*"...

second: you make fiery speeches to the dark instincts of the dissatisfied, the ambitious, the people who hide themselves from themselves in a democratic age: hence the importance of *striking a pose*

third: you take the methods of one art into another, and you mix the aims of art with those of knowledge, or of the Church, or of racial interest ("nationalism"), or of philosophy — you ring all the bells at once and stir up the vague suspicion that you are a "god"

fourth: you flatter women, the suffering, the outraged; even in art you make drugs and painkillers win out. You tickle the "educated", the readers of poets and old stories

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Note. There is a split between the "public" and the "inner circle": with the first, you *must* be a fraud nowadays; with the second, you *want* to be a skilled performer and nothing more! Our particular "geniuses" of this century reach across this split and are great at both. Victor Hugo and R. Wagner were great frauds, but paired with so much real *skill as performers* that they satisfied even the most refined people in matters of art itself

That is why they *lack greatness*: 1) their way of seeing keeps shifting, sometimes aimed at the crudest needs, sometimes at the most refined

172.

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At Fort Gonzaga, outside Messina.

For the preface. A state of the deepest reflection. I have done everything to set myself at a distance; no longer tied by love, nor by hate. Like being at an old fortress. Traces of wars; also of earthquakes. Forgotten

173.

(123)

Morality in how races and social classes are valued.

Considering that the *emotions* and *basic drives* of every race and every class express something about the conditions they need to exist (— at least the conditions under which they held their own for the longest time:)

: to demand that they be "virtuous" means demanding that they change their character, jump out of their own skin, and wipe out their past.

: it means that they should stop being different from one another

: it means that they should become alike in their needs and demands — to put it more plainly: *that they should perish…*

So the will to have *one single* morality turns out to be the *tyranny* of one kind of people, for whom this one morality was tailor-made, over other kinds. It means wiping them out, or making them all uniform, for the benefit of those in power (either so that they are no longer a threat to it, or so that they can be used by it)

"Abolishing slavery" — supposedly a tribute to "human dignity", but in truth the *destruction* of a fundamentally different species (— undermining its values and its happiness —)

Whatever an *opposing* race or class draws its strength from is interpreted as its *most evil*, its worst trait: because that is how it harms us (— its "virtues" are slandered and given new names)

It counts as an *objection* against a person or a people when they *harm us*: but from their point of view, *we* are welcome to them, because we are the kind of people one can profit from.

The demand to "make people more humane" (which very naively believes it holds the answer to "what is human?") is pious hypocrisy. Behind it, one very particular kind of person is trying to come to power: more exactly, one very particular instinct, the *herd instinct*.

"Equality of human beings": what *hides* behind the tendency to *treat* more and more people *as equal* simply because they are human.

The "self-interest" behind common morality (*the trick:* turning the great desires, the lust for power and greed, into protectors of virtue)

To what extent all kinds of *businessmen* and greedy people, everyone who has to give credit and ask for it, *need* to push for everyone having the same character and the same idea of value: *world trade* and *exchange* of every kind forces virtue into being and, so to speak, *buys* it.

The same goes for the *state* and every kind of lust for power, when it comes to officials and soldiers; the same for science, so that it can work with trust and without wasting energy

The same goes for the *priesthood*:

— So here common morality is forced on people because it brings an advantage; and to make it win, war and violence are used against immorality — by what "right"? By no right at all: but following the instinct of self-preservation. These very same classes make use of *immorality* wherever it serves them.

174.

(124)

the *growth of strength* even though the individual goes downhill for a time

—

to lay down a *new level*

—

a method for gathering strength and for saving small achievements, as opposed to wasteful squandering

—

For the time being, destructive nature is to be tamed and made into a *tool* of this economy of the future

—

keeping the weak alive, because a huge amount of *small* work has to be done

—

keeping alive a way of thinking in which the weak and the suffering can still *manage* to exist

—

planting *solidarity*, sticking together, as an instinct to work against the instinct of fear and of servility, the urge to bow and obey

—

the struggle against chance, including the chance appearance of the "great man"

175.

(125)

Who Protects Virtue

Greed

Lust for power

Laziness

Simple-mindedness

Fear

all of these have something to gain from the cause of virtue: that is why virtue stands so firm.

176.

(126)

Spinoza, about whom Goethe said, "I feel very close to him, even though his mind is much deeper and purer than mine." Now and then Goethe calls him his saint.

177.

(127)

To have walked all the way around the modern soul, to have sat in every one of its corners: that is my ambition, my torture, and my happiness

To really *overcome* pessimism. And as the result, a way of looking at things like Goethe's, full of love and good will.

Note: my work should contain an *overall verdict* on our century, on all of modern times, on the "civilization" we have *reached*

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The Three Centuries

The different way each of them *feels* things is best put like this:

Aristocratism: Descartes,

the rule of *reason*, proof that the *will* is in charge

Feminism: Rousseau,

the rule of *feeling*, proof that the *senses* are in charge (a lie)

Animalism: Schopenhauer,

the rule of *craving*, proof that what is in charge is

our animal nature (more honest, but gloomy)

The seventeenth century is *aristocratic*. It puts things in order. It looks down proudly on everything animal-like. It is strict with the heart. It is "not cozy", even without warmth of feeling, "un-German". It dislikes the silly and comic, and it dislikes the natural. It likes to generalize, and it acts like a ruler towards the past, because it believes in itself. Deep down there is a lot of the beast of prey in it, and a lot of self-denying habit, so that it can stay master. It is the century of *strong will*, and also the century of strong passion.

The eighteenth century is ruled by *woman*. It is dreamy and gushing, witty, shallow, but with a mind that serves wishful ideals and the heart. It is loose and pleasure-seeking even when it enjoys the most intellectual things. It digs away at every authority. It is drunk with excitement, cheerful, clear, humane, dishonest with itself, deep down full of riff-raff, sociable…

The nineteenth century is more *animal-like*, more underground, *uglier*, more realistic, more like the mob. And for exactly that reason it is "better", "more honest", more ready to bow before every kind of "reality", *truer*. There is no doubt about it: it is *more natural*. But it is weak-willed, sad, full of dark cravings, and fatalistic, believing everything is fated. It neither fears nor deeply respects "reason", nor the "heart". It is deeply convinced that craving rules. (Schopenhauer said "will"; but nothing is more typical of his philosophy than that the "will" is missing from it, the absurd denial of real *willing*.) Even morality is reduced to an instinct ("pity")

Auguste Comte is a *continuation of the eighteenth century*: the heart rules over the head, the theory of knowledge rests on the senses, and there is gushing enthusiasm for unselfishness.

The fact that *science* has become so much in charge proves how far the nineteenth century has *broken free* from the rule of *ideals*. A certain "wanting little" in our wishes is what first makes our scientific curiosity and strictness possible. This is our own kind of virtue…

Romanticism is an *aftertaste* of the eighteenth century, a kind of piled-up longing for that century's grand-style enthusiasm. (In fact it was a good deal of play-acting and self-deception: people wanted to portray the *strong character* and *great passion*.)

The nineteenth century searches by instinct for *theories* that make it feel justified in its *fatalistic surrender to the facts*. Even *Hegel's* success over "sentimentality" and romantic idealism came from the fatalism in his way of thinking: his belief that the winning side has the greater reason on its side, and his justification of the actual "state" (instead of "humanity" and so on). Schopenhauer said: we are something stupid and, at best, something that cancels itself out. Then came the success of determinism, the belief that everything is caused in advance; tracing back the origins of *duties* that used to count as absolute; the

theory of surroundings and adaptation; reducing the will to reflex movements; denying that the will is a "cause that does something"; and finally a real renaming: people see so little will that the word *free* comes to mean something else.

More theories: the teaching that *objective*, "will-less" looking at things is the only way to truth, *and also to beauty*; mechanism, the stiff, calculable process of machines; so-called "naturalism", the principle of removing the person who chooses, judges and interprets. And also the belief in the "*genius*", so that one has a right to *submit*

Kant, with his "practical reason" and his *fanatical morality*, belongs entirely to the eighteenth century. He is still completely outside the movement of history. He has no eye at all for the reality of his own time, for example the Revolution. He is untouched by Greek philosophy. He is a dreamer about the idea of duty. He relies on the senses. And behind it all hangs the spoiled habit of dogma, of fixed beliefs. The *return to Kant* in our century is a *return to the eighteenth century*. People want to win back a right to the *old ideals* and the old dreamy enthusiasm. That is why they want a theory of knowledge that "sets limits", which means: one that allows you to place a *world beyond reason wherever you like*…

Hegel's way of thinking is not very far from *Goethe's*. Just listen to Goethe on *Spinoza*. There is a will to make the universe and life divine, so as to find *peace* and *happiness* in looking at it and exploring it. Hegel looks for reason everywhere, and before reason one may *give in* and *be humble*. In Goethe there is a kind of almost *joyful* and *trusting fatalism*, one that does not rebel and does not grow tired, one that tries to make a whole out of itself, believing that only in the whole is everything set free and seen to be good and justified.

Goethe found his eighteenth century inside himself and *fought* it: the sentimentality, the gushing over nature, the lack of history, the ideal-

ism, the impractical and unreal side of revolution. He called on history, natural science and the ancient world for help, and also Spinoza (as the greatest realist). Above all, he called on practical work with clear, fixed limits. He does not cut himself off from life. He is not timid, and he takes as much as possible on himself, above himself, into himself. He wants *wholeness*. He fights against splitting reason, the senses, feeling and will apart. He disciplines himself, he *shapes* himself… He says yes to all the great realists (Napoleon was the greatest experience of Goethe's life).

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Goethe: a magnificent attempt to *overcome the eighteenth century (a return to a kind of Renaissance man)*, a kind of self-overcoming by that century itself. He set its strongest drives loose inside himself and pushed them to their logical end. But what he achieved for himself was *not* our nineteenth century…

He imagines a highly educated person who keeps himself in check and has deep respect for himself. Such a person may dare to allow himself the *whole richness of the soul and of naturalness* (even down to the silly and clownish), because he is strong enough for it. He is a person who is tolerant not out of weakness but out of strength, because he knows how to use for his own growth the very things that would destroy an average nature. He is *the broadest person, yet not chaotic for that reason*. His counterpart is *Napoleon* (and on a smaller scale Frederick the Great), who also takes up the *fight against the eighteenth century*.

Note: in a certain sense the nineteenth century also strove for everything *that Goethe did for himself*. It has a universal way of understanding, approving, letting things come close. It has a daring realism and a respect for facts. So how is it that the overall result is not a

Goethe, but a *chaos*, a *nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)*, a *failure that keeps teaching people to reach back to the eighteenth century* (for example as Romanticism, as unselfishness, as feminism, as naturalism)?

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Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, Bismarck are typical of the *strong German type*. They live without worry between opposites. They are full of that flexible strength which is wary of convictions and doctrines, using one against the other while keeping its own freedom for itself.

181.

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A *system-builder*: a philosopher who no longer wants to admit that his mind is *alive*. His mind grows like a tree, reaching out around itself, strong and wide and never satisfied. But he simply cannot rest until he has carved something dead out of it, something wooden, a square-cut piece of stupidity: a "system".

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"*Without the Christian faith*," said Pascal, "you will become, to yourselves, just like nature and history, a monster and a chaos." We have *fulfilled* this prophecy. That happened after the weak, optimistic eighteenth century had *prettied up* human beings and *explained them away with reason*.

Schopenhauer and *Pascal*. In an important sense, *Schopenhauer* is the first person to *pick up again* the line of thought that *Pascal* started: a mon-

ster and a chaos, and therefore something that must be *denied*… History, nature, the human being itself!

Pascal says that *our inability to know the truth* is the result of our *corruption*, of our moral *fall* away from goodness. And deep down, Schopenhauer says the same. "The deeper the corruption of reason, the more we need the teaching of salvation." Or, to put it in Schopenhauer's terms, the more we need denial.

183.

(133)

The seventeenth century *suffers from the human being* as if from a *heap of contradictions*, "the pile of contradictions" that we are.

Schopenhauer tries to discover the human being, to *put it in order*, to dig it out. The eighteenth century, on the other hand, tries to forget what people know about human nature, so that it can make human beings fit its dream of a perfect world. It is "shallow, soft, humane", and it gushes over "Man".

The seventeenth century tries to wipe out any trace of the individual artist, so that the work will look as much like life as possible. The eighteenth century uses the work to *make people interested in the author*.

The seventeenth century looks in art for art, for a piece of culture. The eighteenth century uses art as propaganda for social and political reforms.

The dream of a perfect world, the "ideal human being", the worship of nature as if it were a god, the vanity of putting yourself on stage, the bowing down to propaganda for *social* goals, the cheap trickery of a quack: all of that we got from the eighteenth century.

The style of the seventeenth century: clean, precise and free.

On one side, the strong individual, who is enough for himself or who strives hard before God. On the other side, that pushy, in-your-face manner of modern authors. These are *opposites*. Think of "showing yourself off", and compare it with the scholars of Port-Royal.

Alfieri had a feeling for the *grand style*.

Hating what is *clownish* (what has no dignity), and *having no feeling for nature*: both belong to the seventeenth century.

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Rousseau:

He bases the rules on feeling.

He sees nature as the source of justice.

He thinks a human being becomes more perfect the more he *gets closer to nature*.

(According to Voltaire, it is the more he moves away from

nature

that he becomes more perfect.)

The very same periods of history: for one of them, they are times when *humanity* made progress; for the other, they are times when injustice and inequality got worse.

Voltaire still understands *humanity* in the sense of the Renaissance, and the same goes for Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing (meaning "high culture"). He fights for the cause of decent, well-bred people and of good society. He fights for the cause of taste, of science, of the arts, for the cause of progress itself, and of civilization.

The fight broke out around 1760: the citizen of Geneva, Rousseau, against the lord of Tourney, Voltaire. Only from then on does Voltaire become the man of his century: the philosopher, the champion of tolerance, the piper who leads the way into unbelief. Until then he was just *a clever wit*. Envy and hatred of Rousseau's success drove him forward, "upward".

"For 'the rabble', a God who rewards and punishes." That is Voltaire.

A critique of both points of view on *the value of civilization*.

For Voltaire, *society, as something humans invented*, is the most beautiful invention there is. There is no higher goal than to keep it going and make it better. That is exactly what decency means: respecting the customs of society. Virtue is obeying certain necessary "prejudices" so that "society" can survive.

Voltaire is a *missionary of culture*, an aristocrat, a spokesman for the winning, ruling classes and their way of valuing. But Rousseau remained a *man of the common people*, even as a writer, and that was *unheard of*. Then there was his shameless contempt for everything that was not himself.

What was *sick* in Rousseau was what people admired and *copied* most. (Lord Byron was related to him. He too worked himself up into lofty poses and into bitter, spiteful grudges, which are signs of "commonness". Later, when *Venice* brought him into balance, he understood what *gives more relief* and *does you good*: … not caring, a lightness of heart.)

Rousseau is proud of what he is, in spite of where he came from. But he loses his temper when anyone reminds him of it…

In Rousseau there is no doubt a *mental disorder*. In Voltaire there is unusual health and lightness. Rousseau has *the bitter grudge of the sick*.

The times when he was mad were also the times of his contempt for people and of his distrust.

Rousseau defended *God's providence,* God's caring plan for the world, against Voltaire's pessimism. He *needed* God so that he could put the curse on society and civilization. Everything had to be good in itself, because God had created it. *Only man has spoiled man*. The "good" person as a natural human being was pure fantasy. But with the belief that God was the author of everything, it became something that seemed likely and had a basis.

The effect of Rousseau:

Madness was counted as greatness. Romanticism (the first example, *not* the *strongest*).

"The supreme right of passion"

"The monstrous swelling of the 'I'"

"The feeling for nature"

"In politics, for a hundred years people have taken a sick man as their leader."

Romanticism in Rousseau's style

passion,

"naturalness",

the spell that madness casts,

the bitter grudge of the mob acting as *judge,*

the senseless vanity of the weak.

185.

(135)

The unsolved problems that I raise again:

The problem of civilization: the fight between Rousseau and Voltaire around 1760.

The human being becomes deeper, more suspicious, more "immoral", stronger, more self-confident, and in that sense *more "natural"*. *That* is "progress".

(At the same time, through a kind of division of labor, the layers of people who have grown more wicked and the layers who have grown gentler and tamer drift apart. So *the overall fact* is not easy to see at first glance.)… It is part of *strength*, of self-control and of the spell that strength casts, that these stronger layers have the skill to make their growing wickedness feel like something *higher*. Every kind of "progress" includes a reinterpretation of the elements that have grown stronger, so that they are seen as "good" (that is, — — —

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The problem of the nineteenth century. Do its strong side and its weak side belong together? Is it carved from one single piece of wood? Are its different ideals, and the way they contradict each other, caused by a higher purpose, and so are they something higher? Because it could be a *destiny for greatness* to grow like this, under such fierce tension. The dissatisfaction, the nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning), *could* be a *good sign*.

187.

Beyle (Stendhal), born on 23 January 1783.

188.

A book for thinking, nothing more. It belongs to those who *enjoy* thinking, nothing more…

The fact that it is written in German is, to say the least, out of step with the times. I wish I had written it in French, so that it would not look like support for any ambitions of the German Empire.

Books for thinking: they belong to those who enjoy thinking, nothing more… The Germans of today are no longer thinkers. Something else gives them pleasure and impresses them. The will to power as a basic principle would be hard for them to understand… That is exactly why I wish I had not written my Zarathustra in German.

I distrust all systems and all system-builders, and I stay out of their way. Maybe someone will still discover, behind this book, the system that I *avoided*…

The will to build a system: in a philosopher, if you put it in moral terms, it is a subtle kind of corruption, a sickness of character. If you put it in non-moral terms, it is his wish to act more stupid than he is. More stupid, that is: stronger, simpler, more commanding, less educated, more bossy, more like a tyrant…

I no longer respect readers. So how could I write for readers?… But I take notes about myself, for myself.

189.

It is precisely among Germans that the least thinking goes on today. But who knows! In just two generations, people will no longer need the sacrifice that comes with the nation wasting its strength on power, they will no longer need to be made stupid.

190.

I am reading Zarathustra. But how could I have thrown my pearls before the Germans like that! How could I have wasted something so precious on people who could not value it!

Notebook 10: Autumn 1887

1.

Halcyon Days.

Afternoons of a happy man.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

2.

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My five "No"s.

1. My fight against the *feeling of guilt*, and against mixing the idea of *punishment* into the physical world and into the world beyond the physical, and also into psychology and into the way we explain history. Seeing clearly how all philosophy so far, and every way of valuing so far, has been *turned into morality*.

2. My recognizing and pulling out into the open the *inherited* ideal, the Christian one, even in places where people have already finished with Christianity's fixed set of beliefs. The *danger of the Christian ideal* lies in its feelings about what is valuable, in the part of it that can get along without being put into ideas or words. So my fight is against *hidden Christianity* (for example, in music, and in socialism).

3. My fight against the 18th century of *Rousseau*: against his "nature," his "'good' person," his belief that feelings should rule. I fight against making people soft, weak, and moralized. This is an ideal born out of *hatred for aristocratic culture*. In practice, it means letting unchecked

feelings of resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) take control. It was invented to serve as a flag to carry into battle.

— the guilt-feeling morality of the Christian

the resentment morality (an attitude of the mob)

4. My fight against *Romanticism*, where Christian ideals and Rousseau's ideals meet. But at the same time Romanticism longs for the *old days* of a culture led by priests and aristocrats, for Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing, for the "strong man." It is something extremely mixed and mongrel. It is a false, imitation kind of *stronger* humanity, one that values extreme states of mind as such and sees them as a sign of strength ("the worship of passion").

— the craving for stronger people, for extreme states

an imitation of the most expressive forms, a *frenzy of expression* that comes *not* from having too much, but from *lacking* something

(among poets, for example, Stifter and G. Keller are signs of more strength and inner well-being than — — —)

5. My fight against the *over-rule of herd instincts*, now that science has joined forces with them; and against the recent hatred with which every kind of ranking of people and values, and every kind of distance between people, is treated.

— the things in the 19th century that were, comparatively, born out of abundance, out of a feeling of *comfort and ease*…

technique, cheerful music, and so on; great technical skill and inventiveness

the natural sciences

history (?)

relative products of strength,

of self-confidence

of the 19th century.

3.

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My new path to "Yes."

My new understanding of *pessimism*: it means choosing, of your own free will, to go looking for the terrible and questionable sides of existence. Seeing it this way made similar things in the past clear to me. "How much 'truth' can a mind bear, and how much does it dare to face?" That is the question of its strength. A pessimism like this *could lead* into a Dionysian (joyfully life-affirming) kind of *saying yes to life*, a yes to the world just as it is, to the point of wishing that it would return again and again, completely and forever. That would give us a new ideal of philosophy and of feeling.

The task is to understand the sides of existence that have so far been *denied* not only as necessary, but as desirable. And not only desirable for the sake of the sides that have so far been approved of (say, as their complements and preconditions), but desirable for their own sake, as the more powerful, more fruitful, truer sides of existence, the sides in which its will speaks out more clearly.

The task is also to weigh up the sides of existence that until now were the only ones approved of, and to bring out what is really saying yes there. On the one hand, it is the instinct of those who suffer. On the other hand, it is the instinct of the herd. And then there is a third instinct: the instinct of the majority against the exception.

The idea of a *higher* kind of being as one that would count as "immoral" by the ideas we have had so far. There are first beginnings of this in history (the pagan gods, the ideals of the Renaissance).

4.

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How did people manage to overpower the *ideal of the Renaissance*? The person of the 17th century, the person of the 18th century, the person of the 19th century. The *flaring up again* of Christianity, like a disease coming back (that is, the Reformation). *The Jesuits* and *monarchy* working together as allies.

5.

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Instead of Rousseau's "natural man," the 19th century discovered a *truer picture* of "the human being." It had the *courage* to do that… All in all, this has brought the Christian idea of "the human being" back into its own. What people did *not* have the courage to do was to approve of *this very* "human being as such," and to see in him the guarantee of humanity's future. In the same way, people did *not* dare to understand that human beings growing *more terrible* goes hand in hand with every growth of culture. On this point people still bow down to the Christian ideal, and take *its* side against paganism, and also against the Renaissance idea of Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing. But in this way they do not hold the key to culture. And in practice, what remains is the faking (like forging money) of history in favor of the "'good' person" (as if he alone were the *progress* of humanity), and the *socialist ideal* (that is, the *leftover* of Christianity and of Rousseau in a world that has stopped being Christian).

The fight against the 18th century: the *highest overcoming* of it came through *Goethe* and *Napoleon*. *Schopenhauer* also fights against it. But without meaning to, he steps back into the 17th century. He is a modern Pascal, with Pascal's judgments about what has value, but

without Christianity… Schopenhauer was not strong enough for a new Yes.

Napoleon: he grasped that the higher human and the terrible human necessarily belong together. He brought back the "man." He won back for women the tribute of contempt and fear that, in this view, was owed to them. He rediscovered "wholeness" as health and the highest activity, the straight line, the grand style in action. And he said yes to the most powerful instinct, the instinct of life itself: the lust to rule.

6.

(141)

Note: You do not belong with us as long as you are not ashamed when you catch yourself having some small Christian feeling. *With us, the old ideal has our conscience against it*…

7.

(142)

Something to think about: To what extent does the fateful belief in *divine providence*, the belief that God is guiding everything, still live on? It is the belief that has done more than any other to *cripple* both what we do with our hands and what we do with our reason. To what extent do the Christian assumption and the Christian way of explaining things still live on, hidden under the labels "nature," "progress," "perfection," "Darwinism," and under the superstition that happiness and virtue somehow belong together, and so do misfortune and guilt? That absurd *trust* in the way things go, in "life," in the "instinct of life"; that *resigned acceptance* of the decent, ordinary citizen, who believes that if everybody just does his duty, then *everything* will turn out well. Such things only make sense if you assume that things are being steered toward the good. Even *fatalism*, our present form of philo-

sophical feeling, is a result of that *longest-lasting* belief in God's guiding hand. It is an unconscious result: as if it does not depend on *us* how everything turns out (as if we were *allowed* to let things run however they run, with every *single person* being just one form or mode of the one absolute reality).

What we owe to Christianity:

mixing the ideas of guilt and punishment into all our ideas

cowardice before morality

the *stupid* trust in the way things go (toward "something better")

psychological dishonesty toward ourselves.

8.

(143)

A *division of labor* among the *emotions* within society, so that individuals and social classes breed an *incomplete* kind of soul, but one that is for that very reason *more useful*. To what extent, in each type of person in society, some emotions have become almost *shrunken and useless*, like a body part that no longer works (because some other emotion has been developed more strongly).

In defense of morality:

the

economic defense (the aim of making the fullest possible use of each individual's strength, and avoiding the waste of everything exceptional)

the

aesthetic defense (shaping fixed types of people, together with the pleasure each takes in his own type)

the

political defense (as the art of putting up with the difficult tensions between different levels of power —

the

the physiological defense (as an imagined extra weight in valuing, given in favor of those who have come off badly or only middling in life — to keep the weak alive

9.

(144)

Every ideal assumes *love* and *hate*, *respect* and *contempt*. Either the positive feeling is the first driving force, or the negative feeling is. In all ideals that come from resentment (bitter grudge of the weak), for example, *hate* and *contempt* are the first driving force.

10.

(145)

The *economic* assessment of the ideals we have had so far

The lawmaker (or society's instinct) picks out a number of states of mind and feelings. When these are at work, they guarantee a steady, regular output. (It works like a machine, because those feelings and states have regular needs that keep coming back.)

Suppose these states and feelings contain some ingredients that are painful. Then a way has to be found to overcome this pain with an idea of value. People have to be made to feel the unpleasant thing as valuable, and so as something honorable, which means as something pleasant. Put as a formula: "How does something unpleasant become pleasant?" For example, when it can serve as proof of strength, power,

or mastering oneself. Or when our obedience, our fitting ourselves into the law, gets honored through it. In the same way, it can serve as proof of public spirit, of caring for our neighbor, of love for our country, of our being "more humane," of our "altruism," our "heroism."

Getting people to do unpleasant things gladly: that is the purpose of ideals.

11.

(146)

I am trying to justify virtue in economic terms. The task is to make human beings as useful as possible, and to bring them as close as can be managed to a machine that never makes mistakes. For this purpose, they must be equipped with machine-virtues. They must learn to feel that the states in which they work usefully, like machines, are the most valuable states of all. For that, the other states have to be spoiled for them as much as possible, made to seem as dangerous and as shameful as possible…

Here the first stumbling block is boredom, the sameness that all machine-like work brings with it. To learn to put up with this, and not only to put up with it, but to learn to see boredom surrounded by a higher kind of charm: that has so far been the job of all higher schooling. To learn something that has nothing to do with us; and to feel, in exactly this "objective" activity, that we are doing our "duty"; to learn to judge pleasure and duty separately from each other: that is the priceless task and achievement of higher schooling. That is why, up to now, the philologist, the scholar of ancient languages and texts, has been the educator in the purest sense. His own work is the very model of a dullness and sameness that reaches a grand scale. Under his banner, the young man learns to "cram," to grind away. That is the first condition for later being good at doing his duty like a machine: as

a government official, a husband, an office clerk, a newspaper reader, and a soldier. Such a life perhaps needs a philosophical justification and a glorifying glow even more than any other. Some authority that cannot be wrong has to declare that pleasant feelings in general are of lower rank. There has to be "duty in itself," perhaps even a solemn feeling of awe toward everything that is unpleasant. And this demand has to speak as a command, as something above all usefulness, all enjoyment, all purpose… The machine-like way of living becomes the highest and most honorable way of living, and it worships itself. (Example of this type: Kant, as a fanatic of the empty formula "you shall.")

12.

the philosophers and other high-class nursemaids, at whose breast young people drink the milk of wisdom

13.

(147)

Make fun of the false "altruism" the biologists talk about. When amoebas reproduce, it looks like throwing off dead weight, purely to their own advantage. It is getting rid of useless material.

14.

How to Help Virtue Come to Power

A Political Essay

By

Friedrich Nietzsche

15.

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The continuum, the unbroken chain: "marriage, property, language, tradition, tribe, family, people, state" are unbroken chains of lower and higher order. Their economics works like this: the advantages of uninterrupted work and of multiplying the parts are greater than the disadvantages. The disadvantages are the bigger costs of replacing the parts or of making them last. (The working parts are multiplied, even though many of them often sit idle. So there are higher costs to set them up and quite large costs to keep them going.) The advantage is that interruptions are avoided, and the losses that come from them are saved. Nothing is more expensive than starting over.

"The greater the advantages of an existence, the greater also the costs of keeping it going and of creating it (food and reproduction). And the greater also the dangers, and the chance of dying before reaching the full height of life."

16.

(149)

"Telling apart a lower and a higher kind of existence makes no sense in technical terms. Every animal and every plant fits its task in the most perfect way possible. The flight of the clumsy beetle is no less perfect than the floating of the butterfly is for butterfly tasks. The difference is an economic one. Complex living things can do more work and more perfect work, and the advantages from this work are so large that they outweigh the much higher costs of keeping them going and creating them."

17.

(150)

I want to prove that something is necessary. People and humanity are being used up more and more efficiently, and interests and jobs are tied together into a tighter and tighter "machinery." To this there must belong a countermovement. I call it the setting apart of a luxury surplus of humanity, a part that is extra, like a luxury. In it, a stronger kind, a higher type, is meant to come to light, one that needs different conditions to arise and different conditions to survive than the average human. My idea, my image for this type, as people know, is the word "higher human being."

On that first path, which can now be seen completely, we get adapting, flattening out, a higher kind of Chinese-style sameness, modest instincts, contentment with making human beings smaller: a kind of standstill in the level of humanity. Once we have that worldwide economic management of the earth, which is surely coming, then humanity can find its best meaning as a machine serving it. It would be a huge set of gears, made of smaller and smaller wheels, ever more finely "adapted." All the elements that rule and give orders would become more and more unnecessary. It would be a whole of enormous power, whose single parts stand for tiny powers, tiny values. Against this shrinking of human beings and their fitting into ever more specialized usefulness, we need the opposite movement. We need to produce the human being who brings things together, who sums them up, who justifies them. For him, turning humanity into a machine is a basic condition for his existence. It is a base, a platform, on which he can invent his higher form of being…

He needs just as much the opposition of the masses, of the "leveled" people who have been made all the same. He needs the feeling of distance compared to them. He stands on them; he lives off them. This

higher form of aristocracy, of rule by the best, is the one of the future. Speaking in moral terms, that whole machinery, with all its wheels pulling together, means the greatest possible exploitation of human beings. But it presupposes people for whose sake this exploitation has a meaning. Otherwise it would really just be an overall shrinking, a shrinking in value, of the human type: a decline on the grandest scale.

So you can see that what I am fighting against is economic optimism. That is the belief that as the costs of everyone grow, the gain for everyone must also grow. The opposite seems true to me. Everyone's costs add up to a total loss. The human being becomes smaller, so that you no longer know what this huge process was good for in the first place. A "what for?" A new "what for!" That is what humanity needs…

18.

(151)

Modern times, pictured as eating and digesting.

Our sensitivity is unbelievably easy to irritate (dressed up in moral clothing, as an increase in pity). The flood of mismatched impressions is bigger than ever: the worldwide mixing of foods, of literatures, newspapers, styles, tastes, even landscapes, and so on.

The speed at which all this pours in is extremely fast. The impressions wipe each other out. By instinct, people resist taking anything in, taking anything deeply, "digesting" anything.

The result is that our power to digest gets weaker. A kind of adapting to this pile-up of impressions sets in. People forget how to act. They only react to stimulation from outside. They spend their strength partly on taking things in, partly on defending themselves, partly on answering back.

A deep weakening of the ability to act on one's own: the historian, the critic, the analyst, the interpreter, the observer, the collector, the reader. All of them are reactive talents, talents for responding. All of science!

People artificially shape their nature into a "mirror." They are interested, but only skin-deep, so to speak. Underneath there is a basic coolness, a balance, a low temperature held steady just below the thin surface. Only on that surface is there warmth, movement, "storm," and the play of waves.

The contrast between restless movement on the outside and a certain deep heaviness and tiredness.

19.

(152)

The idea of "substance" comes from the idea of a "subject", and not the other way round! If we give up the soul, "the subject", then there is nothing left to support the idea of a "substance" at all. What we get instead are degrees of being, more or less of it. What we lose is "being" as one solid thing.

A critique of "reality": where does it come from, this "more or less reality", this scale of being, that we believe in?

How strongly we feel alive and how strongly we feel our power gives us our measure of "being", of "reality", of what is not just appearance. By this feeling we mean the logic and connection we find in what we live through.

"Subject" is just the word we use for our belief that there is a single unity behind all the different moments when we feel most strongly that something is real. We take this belief to be the effect of one

single cause. We believe in our own belief so much that, for its sake, we go on to imagine "truth", "reality" and "substance" in general.

The "subject" is a made-up story. It pretends that many similar states inside us are the effect of one single thing underneath them. But it was we who first created the "sameness" of these states. The real fact is that we treat them as the same and arrange them to fit. The sameness itself is not the fact. In truth, that sameness should rather be denied.

20.

(153)

There are cases where sympathy shown to us makes us angry. For example, right after we have done something extraordinary, something that has its value in itself. And then people congratulate us that "we have got it over with", and so on.

With my critics I have often felt I was dealing with a rabble. What interests them is not what is being said. It is only the fact that I am the one saying it, and how I in particular might have come to say such a thing. That seems to be their only interest. It is the pushiness of a dog sniffing at you, and in real life the answer to that is a kick. They judge me, so that they do not have to deal with my work at all. They explain how the work came about, and with that they think it is enough: the work is dismissed and done with.

21.

(154)

Religion

In the inner household of the early, primitive human's soul, fear of evil is the strongest thing. What is this evil? Three things: chance, the

uncertain, and the sudden. How does the primitive human fight evil? He imagines it as having a mind, as a power, even as a person. That gives him a way to make a kind of deal with these powers, and in general to influence them ahead of time, to head them off before they strike.

Another way out is to claim that their wickedness and harm are only on the surface. People explain the results of chance, of the uncertain, of the sudden, as meant well, as having a good purpose…

Above all, people explain bad things as "deserved". They justify evil by calling it punishment…

In short: people give in to it. The whole moral and religious way of explaining things is just a form of giving in to evil.

To believe that evil has a good meaning is to give up fighting it.

Now, the whole history of culture shows this fear of chance, of the uncertain, of the sudden, slowly getting smaller. Culture means exactly this: learning to calculate, learning to think in terms of cause and effect, learning to prevent things, learning to believe in necessity. As culture grows, humans no longer need that primitive way of giving in to bad things, which is called religion or morality. They no longer need that "justification of evil". Now they wage war on "evil": they get rid of it. In fact, a state becomes possible where people feel so safe, and believe so much in laws and in being able to predict things, that this safety starts to feel boring. Then a delight in chance, in the uncertain and in the sudden pops up, like a thrilling tickle…

Let us stop for a moment at this sign of the very highest culture. I call it the pessimism of the strong.

Now people no longer need a "justification of evil". In fact, they find all "justifying" disgusting. They enjoy evil pure and raw. They find meaningless evil the most interesting kind. Once they needed a God.

Now they are delighted by a world in disorder without God, a world of chance, where the terrible, the double-edged and the tempting belong to its very nature…

In such a state it is the good that needs a "justification". That means it must have something evil and dangerous underneath it, or contain some great stupidity. Only then do people still like it.

The animal side of humans no longer fills people with horror. In such times, a witty and happy high spirits in favor of the animal in humans is the most triumphant form of the mind at work.

Humans are now strong enough that they can afford to be ashamed of believing in God. They may now once again play the devil's advocate.

If in practice such a person still supports keeping virtue alive, he does it for reasons that show virtue to be a kind of subtlety, of cunning, a form of chasing profit and chasing power.

This pessimism of the strong also ends in a defense of the world as good, a theodicy. That means it ends in an absolute saying yes to life and to the world. But it says yes for the very reasons people once used to say no to it. And so it comes to see this world as the highest possible ideal, one that has actually been reached…

22.

(155)

The overall insight.

In fact, every great growth also brings with it a huge crumbling away and dying off:

suffering and the signs of decline belong to times of enormous progress.

every fruitful and powerful movement of humankind has, at the same time, also helped create a nihilistic movement, one driven by the belief that nothing has meaning.

under certain conditions, the arrival in the world of the most extreme form of pessimism, real nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning), could be a sign of a deep and most essential growth, a sign of moving into new conditions of life.

This I have understood.

23.

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The overall insight: our modern world has a double character. The very same signs could point to decline and to strength. And the marks of strength, of having grown up and come of age, could be misunderstood as weakness, because of old, inherited ways of looking down on certain feelings, ways that have been left behind by time. In short, feeling, as the feeling for what is valuable, has not caught up with the times.

To put it more generally: the feeling for values always lags behind. It expresses the conditions for survival and growth of much earlier times. It fights against new conditions of life that it did not grow out of. It necessarily misunderstands them and teaches people to look at them with suspicion, and so on. It holds things back. It stirs up distrust of anything new…

Examples: …

24.

(157)

How the arts were made moral. Art as freedom from the narrowness of morality and its cramped, small-corner view of things; or art as mockery of that narrowness. The escape into nature, where beauty goes hand in hand with terror. The idea of the great human being.

Against the fragile, useless luxury souls, which cloud over at the slightest breath: the so-called "beautiful souls".

To wake up the faded ideals in all their merciless hardness and brutality, as the magnificent monsters they really are.

A gleeful delight in seeing, through psychology, the twisting and winding paths and the unknowing play-acting of all artists who have been made moral.

To drag into the light the falseness of art, its immorality.

To drag into the light the basic forces that "idealize": sensuality, intoxication, an overflowing animal nature.

25.

(158)

The false "strengthening"

in Romanticism: this constant expressive, emotional style is not a sign of strength, but of a feeling that something is missing.

painting-like music, the so-called dramatic kind, is above all easier to make. It is just like the crude cheap sensationalism and the simple lining up of facts and details in the naturalist novel.

"passion" is a matter of nerves and of tired souls. So is the enjoyment of high mountains, deserts, storms, orgies and horrors, of everything huge and massive (for example, among historians).

In fact, there is a cult of feelings run wild. How is it that strong times need the opposite in art, something that lies beyond passion?

the colors, the harmony, the nervous brutality of the orchestra's sound; the screaming colors in the novel

the preference for exciting subjects, whether erotic, socialist or sick and medical. All of these are signs of who people are working for today: for the overworked, the distracted, or the weakened.

You have to bully and tyrannize people just to have any effect at all.

26.

(159)

Conclusion. At last we dare to justify the rule!

27.

(160)

Science and its two sides:

as it concerns the individual

as it concerns the whole web of culture (its "level")

Science is valued in opposite ways from the one side and from the other.

28.

(161)

Instead of "society," it is the whole *web of culture* that I care about most (as a whole, so to speak, and also in its separate parts).

29.

(162)

What kind of methods you need to handle wild, untamed peoples, and why the "barbarism" of those methods is not random or a matter of whim: you can grasp this with your own hands, in real life. All it takes is for someone, with all his soft European pampering, to be put in a position where he has to stay in control over barbarians, on the Congo or somewhere like that.

30.

(163)

Understanding how *total power grows*: working out how far even the decline of single people, of social classes, of whole eras and peoples, is *part of* this growth.

The way a culture's *center of gravity* shifts.

The *costs* of every great growth: who pays them!

*How far those costs must now

be enormous.*

31.

The French Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is what justifies it. For a similar prize, we would have to wish for the anarchic collapse of our whole civilization. Napoleon made nationalism possible: that is what limits nationalism's worth.

Leaving aside, as is only fair, morality and immorality: because these ideas do not even touch the *worth* of a human being.

One begins — — —

A person's worth does not lie in how useful he is. It would still be there even if there were nobody he could be useful to. And why couldn't it be exactly the person who caused the most destructive effects who is the peak of the whole human type? So high, so superior, that everything around him would be ruined by envy.

32.

(164)

A. *The paths to power:* bringing in the new virtue under the name of an *old* one

: stirring up people's "interest" in it (presenting "happiness" as its result, and the other way round)

: the art of slandering whatever stands against it

: using advantages and lucky chances to make it look glorious

: turning its followers into fanatics through sacrifice and by setting them apart from others

: the *great symbolism*

B. Power once *gained*

1) The ways virtue forces people

2) The ways virtue seduces people

3) The etiquette of virtue (its royal court, so to speak)

33.

(165)

— Artists are *not* people of great passion, whatever they may tell us and themselves. And there are two reasons for that. First, they have

no shame in front of themselves: they watch themselves *while they are living*; they lie in wait for themselves, they are too curious… And second, they also have no shame in front of great passion: they exploit it as performers, out of their talent's greed…

But secondly: 1) their talent, which is like a vampire, usually begrudges them the kind of wasteful spending of strength that we call passion. 2) Their artist's *stinginess* protects them from passion.

If you have a talent, you are also the victim of that talent: you live with your talent sucking you dry like a vampire, — you live — — —

You do not get finished with your passions by portraying them. Rather, you are already finished with them *when* you portray them. (Goethe teaches it differently: he *wanted* to be misunderstood on this point. Someone like Goethe felt how tactless it would be

34.

— a gap between two nothings —

35.

(166)

— You link a vice with something truly unpleasant, so that in the end people run away from the vice just to get away from what is linked to it. This is the famous case of Tannhäuser. Tannhäuser's patience has been worn down by Wagner's music, and so he can't stand it any longer, not even with Lady Venus. All at once virtue becomes attractive. A young maiden from Thuringia suddenly goes up in value. And, to say the most shocking thing of all, he even starts to enjoy the songs of Wolfram von Eschenbach…

36.

(167)

— For us fatalists of today, people who accept fate, the sensual sadness of a Moorish dance might in the end touch our hearts more than the Viennese sensuality of the German waltz. That waltz sensuality is too blond, too dull-witted.

37.

(168)

Modern art as an art of bullying, of acting like a tyrant. — It has a crude, strongly exaggerated logic of outlines. The main idea is simplified until it becomes a formula, and then the formula rules like a tyrant. Inside those outlines there is a wild variety, an overwhelming mass of things that leaves the senses confused. There is brutality in the colors, in the material, in the desires. Examples: Zola and Wagner, and, on a more intellectual level, Taine. So: logic, mass and brutality…

38.

(169)

People value a thing according to how much effort and cost they have spent on it. To make a virtue seem valuable to them, you have to force them — or tempt them — to spend a lot on it.

How do you spoil a pleasant vice for people? Only by making it unpleasant for them. How do you convince a drunk that alcohol is disgusting? You make it disgusting: you mix in gentian, a bitter herb. You have to mix the vice with — something bitter: that is the moralist's first trick.

39.

(170)

The herd instinct values the middle and the average as the highest and most precious thing: the place where most people are, and the way they live there. Because of this, it is the enemy of every ranking of people and values. It sees any climb from the bottom to the top as also a climb down, from the large majority to the smallest number. The herd feels that the exception, whether it stands below the herd or above it, is something hostile and harmful to it. Its trick for dealing with the exceptions at the top, the stronger, more powerful, wiser and more creative people, is to talk them into playing the role of guardians, shepherds and watchmen — into being its first servants. In this way the herd has turned a danger into something useful. In the middle, fear stops. Here you are not alone with anything. Here there is little room for misunderstanding. Here there is equality. Here your own way of being is not felt as a reproach, but as the right way of being. Here contentment rules. Distrust is aimed at the exceptions; being an exception counts as a crime.

40.

(171)

Would a single link be missing from the whole chain of art and science if woman, if the work of woman, were missing from it? Let us admit the exceptions — they prove the rule. Woman reaches perfection in everything that is not a profession: in letters, in memoirs, even in the most delicate handicrafts there are — in short, in everything that is not a trade. She does so exactly because in these things she perfects herself, because here she obeys the one artistic drive she has: she wants to please… But what does woman have to do with the passionate indifference of the true artist, who gives more importance to a

sound, a breath, a bit of tra-la-la than to himself? Who reaches with all five fingers for his deepest secrets and his innermost self? Who gives no value to anything unless it knows how to become form — unless it gives itself away and makes itself public? Art, as the artist practices it — don't you women understand what it is: an attack on every kind of modesty?… Only in this century has woman dared to make that turn toward literature — 'toward the rabble of pen-pushers and scribblers,' as old Mirabeau put it. She writes books, she makes art, and she loses her instinct. But what for? If one may ask.

41.

the peak of modern poetry, climbed by two brother geniuses, Heinrich Heine and Alfred de Musset

Our immortals — we don't have too many: Alfred de Musset, Heinrich Heine, page 267.

Schiller was a master of the theater: but what do we care about the theater!

42.

(172)

Main thesis. To what extent complete nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) is the necessary result of the ideals people have held until now.

— incomplete nihilism and its forms: we are living right in the middle of it

— the attempts to escape nihilism without rethinking those values: they produce the opposite effect and make the problem worse.

43.

(173)

The complete nihilist — the eye of the nihilist, which idealizes things in the direction of ugliness, making them uglier than they are, and which is unfaithful to its own memories. It lets them drop and lose their leaves like a dying plant. It does not protect them from the corpse-pale fading that weakness pours over everything distant and past. And what he does not do for himself, he does not do for the whole past of humanity either — he lets it drop.

44.

(174)

What becomes of a person who no longer has any reasons to defend himself and to attack? What is left of his feelings and passions when he loses the very ones that served as his shield and his weapon?

45.

(175)

We should make the realm of morality smaller and fence it in, step by step. We should drag into the light the real names of the instincts that are actually at work here, and give them honor, after they have been hidden for so long under hypocritical names of virtue. Out of shame before our own 'honesty,' which speaks to us more and more commandingly, we should unlearn the other kind of shame, the kind that wants to deny our natural instincts and lie them away. How far you can free yourself from virtue is a measure of your strength. And one could imagine a height where the idea of 'virtue' is felt so differently that it sounds like virtù — Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing. But for now — how far we still are from this ideal!

Shrinking the territory of morality: a sign of its progress. Wherever people were not yet able to think in terms of cause and effect, they thought in terms of morals.

46.

(176)

On morality's turning against nature. It means separating the action from the person who does it; turning hatred or contempt against the 'sin'; and believing that there are actions that are good or bad in themselves.

47.

(177)

Bringing back 'nature': an action in itself has no value at all. Everything depends on who does it. One and the same 'crime' can be, in one case, the highest privilege, and in another, a mark of shame burned into the skin. In fact it is the selfishness of the people judging that interprets an action, or rather the person who did it, according to how much it helps or harms them — or according to how similar or unrelated that person is to themselves.

48.

What a time that was, when people demanded rain from the deity, when they believed that prayer worked on it the way a medicine works that makes you pee!

49.

(178)

On the idealism of those who despise themselves.

"Faith" or "works"? But think about it. When you do certain deeds, and get used to doing them, a certain way of valuing grows out of them all by itself, and in the end a whole attitude of mind. That is just as natural as it is unnatural for "works" to grow out of nothing but a way of valuing. You have to practice. Not by making your feelings about values stronger, but by doing. First you have to be able to do something… Luther's Christianity was the Christianity of an amateur. Faith is a crutch for people who can't manage the real thing, a short-cut for the slow. Behind it lies a deep conviction. It is also an instinctive awareness, in Luther and people like him, that they were simply unable to do Christian works. That was a personal fact about them. But they covered it up with an extreme distrust: they suspected that maybe every single action at all was sin and came from the Devil. So the value of life came to rest on a few intense states of doing nothing, like prayer or emotional outpourings, and so on. And in the end he would have been right: the instincts that show up in everything the Reformers did are the most brutal instincts there are. They could only bear to live by turning completely away from themselves, by sinking into the very opposite of what they were, only as an illusion, that is, as "faith".

50.

(179)

Crime belongs under the idea of "rebellion against the order of society". You don't "punish" a rebel. You put him down. A rebel may be a miserable and contemptible person. But there is nothing contemptible about a rebellion in itself. And being a rebel against our kind of society does not, in itself, lower a person's worth. There are cases where we would even have to honor such a rebel, because he senses something in our society that needs to be fought against. In those cases he wakes us up from our sleep.

The criminal does one particular thing to one particular person. But that does not disprove that his whole instinct is at war with the whole order of things. The deed is only a symptom.

We should shrink the idea of punishment down to this: putting down a rebellion, and taking safety measures against the person who was put down, meaning full or partial imprisonment. But punishment should not express contempt. A criminal is, after all, a person who risks his life, his honor, his freedom. He is a man of courage. In the same way, we should not treat punishment as penance, or as paying off a debt, as if guilt and punishment could be traded against each other. Punishment does not make you clean, because crime does not make you dirty.

We should not shut off the criminal's chance to make his peace with society, provided that he does not belong to the "race of born criminals". In that second case, we should make war on him even before he has done anything hostile. The first operation, as soon as we have him in our power, would be to castrate him.

We should not hold the criminal's bad manners or his low level of intelligence against him. Nothing is more common than for a criminal to misunderstand himself. In particular, his rebellious instinct, the bitter grudge of someone who has dropped out of his social class, often never becomes clear to him, because he has not read enough to put it into words. Then, under the pressure of fear or failure, he slanders his own deed and makes it look shameful. And that is not even counting the cases where, if you work out the psychology, the criminal is giving in to an urge he does not understand, and he slips in a false motive for his deed by adding a side action. For example, he robs someone, when what he really wanted was blood…

We should be careful not to judge a person's worth by a single deed. Napoleon warned against that. Deeds that stand out sharply, like

carvings in high relief, are especially meaningless. If someone like us has no crime on his conscience, for example no murder, what is the reason? Only that a few helpful circumstances were missing. And if we did commit one, what would that say about our worth? Would our worth be lower if we committed a few crimes? Quite the opposite. Not everyone is capable of committing a few crimes. In fact, people would despise us if they did not believe we had the strength to kill a person under certain circumstances. In almost every crime, qualities show up that a man should not be without. Dostoevsky was not wrong when he said that the prisoners in those Siberian prison camps made up the strongest and most valuable part of the Russian people. If, in our society, the criminal is like a badly fed and stunted plant, that is a disgrace to the way our society is arranged. In the time of the Renaissance, the criminal thrived and earned his own kind of virtue. Of course, that was Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing.

You can only lift up people whom you do not treat with contempt. Moral contempt degrades and damages a person more than any crime does.

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Think of the great lovers of the ideal, the saints of a sensuality that has been transformed and that they did not understand, those typical apostles of "love", like Jesus of Nazareth, Saint Francis of Assisi, and Saint Francis of Paola. In them, the sex drive misses its target. Out of ignorance it wanders off course, so to speak, until in the end it has to satisfy itself with phantoms: with "God", with "humanity", with "nature". And this satisfaction is not just imaginary. In the ecstatic mystics who seek union with God, it actually happens, however much it lies outside what they want and "understand". It comes with the

bodily signs that go along with the most sensual and most natural sexual satisfaction.

52.

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The nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) of artists

Nature is cruel in its cheerfulness. It is cynical with its sunrises.

We are hostile to being moved and touched by feelings.

People run away to places where nature stirs our senses and our imagination. Places where we have nothing to love. Places where we are not reminded of the moral mere appearances and delicate sensitivities of this northern landscape. And the same goes for the arts. We prefer whatever no longer reminds us of "good and evil". Our moralistic touchiness and our readiness to feel pain are, as it were, set free in a nature that is terrible and happy, in the fate-driven play of the senses and of forces. Life without goodness.

What does us good is the sight of nature's magnificent indifference to good and evil.

There is no justice in history, no goodness in nature. That is why the pessimist, if he is an artist, goes to those parts of history where even the absence of justice shows itself with a grand innocence, where it is exactly perfection that comes to light…

And in the same way, in nature he goes to those places where its evil and indifferent character does not hide itself, where nature shows the character of perfection…

The nihilist artist gives himself away by wanting and preferring cynical history and cynical nature.

53.

(182)

How humans became more natural

in the 19th century

(The 18th century was the century of elegance, refinement, and noble, generous feelings.)

Not a "return to nature". There has never yet been a natural humanity. A rigid school system of unnatural values, of values that go against nature, is the rule. It is the starting point. Humans reach nature only after a long struggle. They never go "back"… Nature means daring to be immoral, the way nature is.

We are rougher, more direct, full of irony toward generous feelings, even when we give in to them.

Our upper society, the rich and the idle, is more natural. People hunt each other. Sexual love is a kind of sport, where marriage acts both as an obstacle and as an extra thrill. People amuse themselves and live for the sake of pleasure. They value physical qualities first of all. They are curious and daring.

Our attitude toward knowledge is more natural. We let our minds run free and wild, in all innocence. We hate solemn, priestly manners. We take delight in what is most forbidden. We would hardly have any interest in knowledge at all if we had to be bored on the way to it.

Our attitude toward *morality* is more natural too. Principles have become laughable. Nobody talks about their "duty" anymore without a touch of irony. But people still value a helpful, kindly attitude. (We see morality in *instinct*, and we look down on the rest.) Besides that, there are a few ideas about personal honor.

Our attitude toward *politics* is more natural: we see problems of power, of one amount of power set against another amount. We don't believe in any right that doesn't rest on the power to get its way. We feel that all rights are things that were won by conquest.

Our way of judging *great people and great things* is more natural: we count passion as a privilege. We find nothing great unless a great crime is somehow part of it. We think of all greatness as placing oneself outside of morality.

Our attitude toward *nature* is more natural: we no longer love it for its "innocence," "reason," or "beauty." We have nicely turned it into something "devilish" and "stupid." But instead of despising it for that, we have felt more related to it and more at home in it ever since. Nature does *not* strive to be virtuous, and that is why we respect it.

Our attitude toward *art* is more natural: we don't ask it for beautiful, lying illusions and so on. What rules now is a brutal positivism, a cold factual attitude that simply states what is, without getting worked up.

In short: there are signs that the European of the nineteenth century is less ashamed of his instincts. He has taken a good step toward finally admitting his complete naturalness, that is, his immorality, and doing so *without bitterness*. On the contrary, he is strong enough that he alone can still bear this sight.

To certain ears this sounds as if *corruption* had grown worse. And it is certain that people have not moved closer to the "*nature*" that Rousseau talks about. Instead they have taken one more step into the very civilization that Rousseau *was horrified by*. We have *grown stronger*. We have come closer again to the seventeenth century, and especially to the taste of its final years (the writers Dancourt, Le Sage, and Regnard).

54.

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Protestantism is that mentally unclean and drawn-out form of decadence in which Christianity has so far managed to preserve itself in the mediocre North. As something half-way and mixed, it has been valuable for knowledge, because it brought experiences of different kinds and origins together inside the same heads.

The value of *complex structures*, of a soul made like a mosaic of many pieces, even of a mind that keeps a messy and neglected household.

The *homeopathic Christianity*, watered down to tiny doses, of the Protestant country pastor.

The *immodest Protestantism* of the court preachers and the antisemitic schemers.

55.

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— It can be a sign of a *lofty* soul when a philosopher stays silent. It can be *love* when he contradicts himself. And a seeker of knowledge can have a kind of *godliness* that lies…

Someone once said, quite cleverly, in French: "It is unworthy of great hearts to spread the turmoil they feel inside." But one has to add that *not being afraid of the most unworthy thing* can also be a sign of a great heart… A woman who loves sacrifices her honor…; a seeker of knowledge who "loves" sacrifices his honesty; a God who loves becomes a Jew…

56.

How much grumpy heaviness, lameness, dampness, how much bathrobe, how much "beer" there is in the German mind! The heavy drinking of young German students is almost a disgrace, and in any case a serious question mark about how spiritual and sharp their minds really are. Beer brings about a gentle decline. I once pointed my finger at this in a case that became almost notorious: the decline of David Strauss into the author of the book "The Old Faith and the New." You could always count the German scholars who have real "wit" and spirit on your fingers. (And it isn't enough to have it. You first have to take it for yourself, to *dare* to show some spirit…) The rest of the scholars have common sense, and some of them, luckily, have that famous "childlike soul" that *senses things vaguely*… That is our special privilege: with this "vague sensing," German science has discovered things that are hard to grasp and that perhaps don't exist at all. You almost have to be a Jew to be a German who doesn't just *sense things vaguely*.

57.

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The History of How Things Were Made Moral

and Made Un-Moral Again

First claim: there are no moral actions at all. They are completely imaginary.

It isn't only that they *cannot be proven* (which Kant, for example, admitted, and Christianity did too). It is that they are *not possible at all*. Through a psychological misunderstanding, people invented an *opposite* to the forces that drive us, and they believe they have named a different kind of driving force. They made up a "first mover," a first

cause of action, that doesn't exist at all. By the very standard that first created the opposition between "moral" and "immoral," one has to say:

there are only immoral intentions and actions.

Second claim. This whole distinction between "moral" and "immoral" starts from the idea that both moral and immoral actions are acts that spring freely from ourselves. In short, it assumes that such free spontaneity exists. Or, put another way, it assumes that moral judgment only applies to one kind of intentions and actions: *the free ones*.

But this whole kind of intentions and actions is purely imaginary. The world that the moral measuring stick could be applied to doesn't exist at all.

there are neither moral nor immoral actions.

The psychological mistake out of which the *pair of opposites* "moral" and "immoral" arose.

"Selfless," "unselfish," "self-denying": all of these are *unreal*, made up.

A faulty dogma about the "ego," the self. The self was taken to be like an atom, a separate unit, set in a false opposition to the "not-I," everything outside it. It was also pulled out of change and treated as something with fixed being. This is the *false turning of the self into a solid substance*. Especially under the pressure of *religious and moral training*, this was made into an article of faith, in the belief that each individual is immortal. After the self had been artificially cut loose like this and declared to exist all on its own, people faced an opposition of values that seemed impossible to argue against: the *single self* and the enormous *not-I*. It seemed obvious that the value of the single self could only lie in relating itself to the enormous "not-I," or rather in placing itself beneath it and existing for *its* sake. — Here the *herd instincts* were in control: nothing goes against these instincts as much as an individual

ruling over himself. But once the self is understood as something existing all on its own, its value must lie in *self-denial*.

So: 1) the false idea that the "individual" stands on its own, like an *atom*;

2) the herd's way of judging, which is horrified by anyone wanting to stay a separate atom and feels this as hostile;

3) as a result: the individual is overcome by moving his goal outside himself;

4) Now there seemed to be actions that were *self-denying*. People imagined a whole realm of opposites around them.

5) People asked: in which actions does a person *say yes to himself* most strongly? These actions (sexuality, greed, the lust to rule, cruelty, and so on) were heaped with bans, hatred, and contempt. People *believed* that there are unselfish drives. They *rejected* all selfish drives. They *demanded* the unselfish ones.

6) The result: what had they done? They had banned the strongest and most natural drives, and even more, the *only real* drives. From then on, in order to find an action praiseworthy, they had to *deny* that such drives were present in it.

An enormous faking in matters of psychology. Even every kind of "being pleased with oneself" could only become possible again by misunderstanding it and bending it into shape as something "good."

On the other hand, there was a kind of people who profited from *taking away* people's satisfaction with themselves: the representatives of the herd instinct, for example priests and philosophers. They became subtle and sharp-eyed in psychology, so as to show how selfishness rules everywhere after all. The Christian conclusion: "*Everything* is sin, even our virtues. Human beings are utterly worthless and to be

condemned. The selfless action is *not possible*." Original sin. In short: after man had set his instinct against a purely imaginary world of the good, he ended up despising himself, as someone *unable* to do actions that are "good."

Note: In this, Christianity marks a step *forward* in how sharply people could see into the human mind, as in La Rochefoucauld and Pascal. It understood that all *human actions* are *the same in nature*, and that in the main they are equal in worth too (— all of them *immoral*).

Now people got *serious* about shaping human beings in whom selfishness has been killed off: the *priests*, the *saints*. And even if people doubted whether anyone could become "perfect," they did *not* doubt that they knew what perfect means.

Of course, the psychology of the saint, of the priest, of the 'good' person had to turn out to be pure fantasy, like a ghostly illusion. People had declared the *real* reasons why we act to be *bad*. So in order to act at all, and in order to be able to tell others how to act, they had to describe actions that are not even possible as if they were possible, and in a way make them *holy*. With the same *falseness* they had used to slander, they now worshipped and turned things into ideals.

Raging against the instincts of life was called "holy," something worthy of worship.

Total chastity, total obedience, total poverty: that is the priest's ideal.

Giving to beggars, pity; self-sacrifice, knightly honor; rejecting beauty, reason and the senses; a gloomy, sour look at every strong quality one has: that is the ideal for ordinary believers.

Things move on: the *slandered instincts* also try to win themselves a right to exist. For example, Luther's Reformation, which was the crudest form of moral lying, under the banner of "the freedom of the Gospel." People rename these instincts and give them holy names.

Next: the *slandered instincts* try to prove that they are *necessary*, so that *virtuous* people can exist at all. One has to live in order to live for others. Selfishness becomes a *means* to an end…

Next, people go further: they try to give both selfish and unselfish impulses a right to exist. *Equal* rights for both sides, seen from the point of view of usefulness.

Next, people go further still: they look for a *higher usefulness* in putting the selfish point of view ahead of the unselfish one. They say it is more useful for the happiness of the greatest number, or for helping humanity forward, and so on. So the self gets more rights than the other side, but seen through an extremely unselfish lens: "the overall good of humanity."

Next: people try to make unselfish behavior fit with *nature*. They look for the roots of unselfishness at the very base of life. They try to show that selfishness and unselfishness are both equally rooted in the nature of life and of the world.

Next: people dream that the opposition will vanish someday in the future, when, through constant adapting, what is selfish will at the same time be unselfish…

Finally, people understand that unselfish actions are only one *kind* of selfish action. They see that how much a person loves and gives himself away is a measure of how much *power* and *strength of personality* he has. In short: *by making people more wicked, you make them better*, and you cannot be the one without the other… And with that the curtain rises on the enormous *faking of psychology* that humans have lived with until now.

Conclusions: there are *only* immoral intentions and actions.

So the so-called moral ones have to be shown to be *immoral* acts.

(— this is the task of the Tractatus politicus, Spinoza's political treatise)

(— tracing all emotions back to the one will to power: they are all the same in nature

(— the idea of life: what looks like an opposition between "good and evil" really expresses *different degrees of power among the instincts*. It is a temporary ranking of people and values, in which certain instincts are kept on a leash or put to work.

(— *justifying* morality: in terms of thrift and good management, and so on.

Against the second statement. Determinism, the belief that everything is fixed in advance by causes, is an attempt to *rescue* the moral world by *moving* it somewhere else, into the unknown. Determinism is just a way of letting us make our way of valuing disappear like a magic trick, once it no longer has any place in a world we picture as a machine. That is why we must *attack* determinism and *undermine* it. In the same way, we must *challenge* our right to split the world into a world of things in themselves and a world of appearances.

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In the first book:

nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) as the result of our ideal values

The problem of civilization

the 19th century, and how it is two-faced and unclear:

Up to now, we have not been free from morality. Pessimists are people who rebel out of moral passion.

Morality as the cause of pessimism

pessimism as an early form of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)

In the second book:

The history of how everything was made into a question of morals: how virtue is brought into power

Morality as the witch Circe who bewitches philosophers

In the third book:

The problem of truth

In the fourth book:

The history of the higher types of people, after we have

taken God out of the world

the means for tearing open a gap between people: the ranking of people and values

The ideal of the teaching that says yes to the world more than any other: the tragic age.

the psychological childishness hidden in the ideal called "God"

59.

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The ranking of human values.

a) You should not judge a person by single deeds. Most actions are only skin-deep, done on the surface. Nothing is rarer than an action

that truly comes from the person. A social class, a rank, a people or race, a surrounding, a chance event — all of these show up in a work or a deed sooner than a "person" does.

b) You should not assume at all that many people are "persons". On top of that, some people are actually several persons, and most are none. Wherever average qualities win out — the qualities a type needs in order to keep going — being a person would be a waste, a luxury. It would make no sense at all to ask for a "person" there. Such people are carriers, tools for passing things on.

c) The "person" is a fairly isolated fact. Compared with the far greater importance of things flowing on and of being average, it is therefore almost something that goes against nature. For a person to come into being, you need to be cut off early, forced into a life of defending yourself and carrying weapons, something like being walled in, a greater power to shut yourself off. And above all, you need to be far less easily affected by others than the average person is, whose humanness spreads like a contagion.

First question about the ranking of people and values: how much of a loner someone is, or how much they belong to the herd

(in the second case, a person's worth lies in the qualities that keep their herd and their type going. In the other case, it lies in what sets them apart, isolates them, defends them, and makes it possible for them to live alone.

Conclusion: you should not judge the lone type by the standards of the herd type, and you should not judge the herd type by the standards of the lone type.

Seen from above, both are necessary. Their conflict is necessary too. And nothing should be thrown out more firmly than that wishful ideal that some third thing might grow out of the two of them (a

"type" that is half and half, like a creature of both sexes). That is just as little "to be wished for" as men and women growing closer and making peace. Keep developing what is typical of each, and tear the gap open ever deeper…

The idea of decline, of going bad, applies in both cases: when the herd takes on the qualities of the loners, and the loners take on the qualities of the herd — in short, when they move closer to each other. This idea of decline has nothing to do with moral judgment.

60.

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Compared with music, all communication through words is somehow shameless. Words thin things out and make them stupid. Words take away what is personal. Words make the uncommon common.

61.

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Where you

have to look for

the stronger natures.

The lone kind of people are destroyed and go bad far more often and far more terribly. They have the herd instinct and the traditional values against them. Their tools for defending themselves, their instincts for protection, are from the start not strong enough and not sure enough. It takes a lot of lucky chance for them to thrive. (They thrive most often among the lowest people, the ones society has most given up on. If you are looking for a real person, that is where you will find one — and how much more surely than in the middle classes!)

Then there is the struggle between social ranks and classes, which aims at "equal rights". Once that struggle is more or less settled, the fight begins against the lone person. In a certain sense, such a person can survive and develop most easily in a democratic society: that is, when the rougher means of self-defense are no longer needed, and when a certain habit of order, honesty, fairness and trust is part of ordinary life.

The strongest must be tied down most tightly, watched, put in chains and kept under guard: that is what the herd instinct wants. For them it wants a life of overpowering themselves, of living apart like a monk, or of "duty" in work that wears them out, so that they never get the chance to come back to themselves.

62.

To hide your envy of the Jews' business skill behind moral slogans is antisemitic, is low and vulgar, is itself the behavior of riffraff.

63.

Main point of view:

Tear open distances, but do not create opposites.

Separate out the in-between forms and reduce their influence: that is the main way to keep distances.

64.

(190)

There is an absurd and contemptible kind of idealism that does not want mediocre people to be mediocre. Instead of feeling triumph at being an exception, it is outraged about cowardice, falseness, smallness and wretchedness. You should not want it to be any different!

And tear the gap even wider! You should force the higher kind of people to set themselves apart, through the sacrifices they have to make for the sake of what they are.

65.

(191)

Note: in what ways the Christian centuries, with their pessimism, were stronger centuries than the 18th century

— in the same way as the tragic age of the Greeks —

weaker, more scientific, and — — —

— the 19th century compared with the 18th century —

in what ways

heir

in what ways

a step back from it: with less "spirit" and wit, with less taste

in what ways

in what ways a step forward beyond it

(gloomier, more realistic, stronger —

66.

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I now see your Henrik Ibsen very clearly. For all his "will to truth", he did not dare to free himself from the moral illusion that says "freedom" but will not admit to itself what freedom is. Freedom is the second stage in how the "will to power" changes shape among those who lack power. In the first stage, people ask for justice — even from

those who have the power. In the second stage, people say "freedom", which means they want to get away from those who have the power. In the third stage, people say "equal rights", which means that, as long as they do not yet have the upper hand, they also want to stop their rivals from growing in power.

67.

I have never for a moment failed to see the embarrassing mediocrity of Protestantism, of its theologians and its preachers.

68.

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Do not try to make people "better". Do not preach any kind of morality to them, as if there were such a thing as "morality in itself" or an ideal kind of human being in general. Instead, create conditions in which stronger people are needed — people who, for their part, need a morality that makes them strong (to say it more clearly: a discipline of body and mind), and who will therefore have one!

Do not let yourself be seduced by blue eyes or a heaving bosom. Greatness of soul has nothing romantic about it… And sadly, nothing lovable at all!

69.

(194)

Let us look at what "the first Christian" does with everything his instinct turns him against. He dirties and casts suspicion on what is beautiful, what shines, what is rich, what is proud, what is sure of itself, what knows, what is powerful — in short, on the whole of culture. His aim is to take away its good conscience…

Just try reading Petronius, the Roman writer, right after the New Testament: how you can breathe again, how you blow away that cursed air of sanctimonious hypocrites!

70.

(195)

There is a way of thinking that calls itself idealism, which will not allow mediocrity to be mediocre, and will not allow a woman to be a woman. Do not make everyone the same! Let us make clear to ourselves how expensive a virtue is. Virtue is not something the average person should want. It is a noble madness, a beautiful exception, with the special right to be put in a strong mood…

71.

(196)

the little women who wait until the priest or the mayor gives them permission to satisfy their sex drive, and who promise while doing so to satisfy it only ever with one man

that satisfying the sex drive and the question of having children are completely different things and different interests, and that "marriage", like all institutions, is something false at its very core…

72.

(197)

The cunning Jewish cleverness of the first

Christians

Don't let yourself be fooled. "Do not judge," they say, but they send everyone who doesn't share their faith to hell. By letting God do the

judging, they are judging themselves. By praising God, they are praising themselves. They *demand* the virtues they are able to have — even more, the virtues they need just to get by — and in doing so they put on a grand show of *war* and *fighting for the good*, while really they are only fighting to keep their own kind alive. When they are peaceful, gentle, mild, friendly and cheerful with one another, they are simply obeying their deepest needs as herd animals. But cleverness tells them to *demand* this of themselves as well. That way, even what they could not avoid anyway looks like obedience and merit — and it boosts their *sense of self-worth*…

— *always praising themselves, but never admitting it to themselves*. It is total *pious hypocrisy of a party*, which keeps virtue, and the contest for virtue, for itself alone. It *also* claims knowledge, the "truth," for itself. And it *also* claims the future rule over everything, and revenge on all its enemies.

— oh, this humble, chaste, gentle lying! Who can stand it!… "*Let our virtue, our happiness, our modesty speak for us*!"*

— making room for themselves *within* the world, *getting their way*: you can tell they have Jewish blood and Jewish cleverness in them. 1) You must set yourself apart, so that people can see it. 2) You must treat yourself as the "chosen people," in secret. 3) You must not set up a ranking of people and values, but *opposites*: "we" — and "the world."

73.

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Try reading the New Testament as a *book of seduction*:

virtue is taken over and claimed, out of an instinct that with it you can win public opinion to your side

and it is the most modest kind of *virtue* at that, the kind the ideal herd sheep recognizes and nothing more (the shepherd included —): a small, tender, kindly, helpful and dreamily cheerful sort of virtue, which asks for absolutely nothing from the outside, — and which draws a line between itself and "the world"

the *most absurd arrogance*, as if the fate of humanity revolved around them in such a way that the church community on one side was what is right, and the world on the other side was what is wrong, what is forever to be condemned and already rejected.

the *most absurd hatred* of everything that holds power — but without ever touching it! A kind of *inner breaking away*, which on the outside leaves everything as it was (being servants and being slaves; knowing how to turn *everything* into a means of serving God and virtue)

74.

woman: a small hearth fire surrounded by a lot of smoke and lies.

75.

Christianity as the *breeding of herd animals*; the small virtues of the herd animal passed off as *the* only virtue (— the conditions and tools that the smallest kind of human uses to survive, relabeled as virtues; the New Testament as the *best book of seduction*)

76.

A marriage is worth exactly as much as the people who enter into it. So on average it is worth little —; "marriage in itself" has no value at all yet, — and the same goes, by the way, for every institution.

77.

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Christianity as a *turning against nature* of the herd-animal morality: done in complete misunderstanding and self-deception

democratization is a *more natural* form of the same thing, a less dishonest one

A fact: the oppressed, the lowly, the huge mass of slaves and half-slaves *want power*

Stage 1: they set themselves free — they break away, at first only in their imagination; they recognize one another; they assert themselves

Stage 2: they start to fight; they want recognition, equal rights, "justice"

Stage 3: they want the privileges (— they win the people who represent power over to their side)

Stage 4: they want power *for themselves alone*, and they *get* it…

In Christianity you can tell apart *three elements*:

a) the oppressed of every kind

b) the mediocre of every kind

c) the dissatisfied and the sick of every kind

with the *first* element it fights against the politically noble, high-minded people and their ideal

with the *second* element it fights against the exceptions and the privileged of every kind (in mind, in the senses —)

with the *third* element it fights against the *natural instinct* of the healthy and happy.

Once it wins, the *second* element moves to the front. For by then Christianity has talked the healthy and happy into joining it (as soldiers for its cause), and the powerful too (because they have an interest in keeping the masses under control). And now it is the *herd instinct*, the *mediocre type of person* — valuable in every respect — that gets its highest blessing from Christianity. In the end this *mediocre type* becomes so aware of itself (— finds the courage to be itself —) that it grants itself *power* in *politics* as well…

— democracy is Christianity *made natural again*: a kind of "return to nature," after the opposite way of valuing could only be overcome by going to an extreme against nature. — The result: *the aristocratic ideal now turns against nature itself* ("the higher human," "noble," "artist," "passion," "knowledge," and so on). Romanticism as the worship of the exception, of genius, and so on.

78.

"Beware of your first impulse; it is always generous." Talleyrand, speaking to the young embassy secretaries.

79.

(200)

The Jewish priesthood knew how to present everything *it* demanded as a *divine law*, as obedience to a command from God… In the same way, it knew how to present whatever served to *keep Israel alive*, whatever *made* its existence *possible* (for example, a set of *works*: circumcision, the cult of sacrifice as the center of national identity), not as nature but as "God." — *This process continues. Inside* Judaism, where the need for "works" was no longer felt (that is, as a way of setting oneself apart from outsiders), a priestly type of person could be imagined, one who relates to the priest the way the "noble nature" relates

to the aristocrat: a priestliness of the soul without any caste, arising almost on its own. And to set itself sharply apart from its opposite, it now put value not on "works" but on "inner attitude"…

At bottom it was once again a matter of *pushing through a certain kind of soul* — something like a *popular uprising within* a priestly people, a pious movement from below (sinners, tax collectors, women, the sick). Jesus of Nazareth was the sign by which they *recognized* one another. And once again, in order to be able to believe in themselves, they needed a *theological transformation*: nothing less than "the Son of God" would do for them to build up their faith… And just as the priesthood had falsified the whole history of Israel, another attempt was made here to *rewrite falsely* the whole history of humanity, so that Christianity could appear as its most central event. This movement could only arise on the soil of Judaism. Judaism's main achievement was to tie *guilt and misfortune* together and to reduce all guilt to *guilt toward God*: *Christianity is that same thing raised to a higher power*.

80.

(201)

these small herd-animal virtues do not lead to "eternal life" at all. Putting them on stage like this, and oneself along with them, may be very clever. But for anyone who still keeps their eyes open, it remains, in spite of everything, the most ridiculous of all shows. You do not earn any special right on earth or in heaven just because you have perfected being a sweet little sheep. At best you will always stay just a sweet little absurd sheep with horns — provided you don't burst with vanity like the court preachers and cause scandal by striking judging poses.

the enormous, glowing coloring with which the small virtues are lit up here — as if they were a reflection of divine qualities

the *natural* purpose and usefulness of every virtue is *kept silent* on principle. A virtue counts as valuable only in relation to a *divine* command, a divine model, only in relation to goods in the next world and spiritual goods. (Splendid: as if it were about the "*salvation* of the *soul*" — but it was really a means of "getting by" here on earth with as many beautiful feelings as possible.)

On *morality turning against nature*.

81.

Clearly, the new Germany has no sense of shame. Even the emperor's court has so far shown an unwillingness to keep itself clean of the most contemptible and most embarrassing product of Christian sanctimonious hypocrisy. And yet everything should push it to do so: decency, good taste, and plain good sense.

(What has done more harm to the court than the court preachers?)

82.

(202)

Individualism is a modest kind of "will to power", and one that is not yet aware of itself. Here it already seems enough for a single person to *break free* from the overwhelming power of society, whether that power belongs to the state or the church. He does not set himself against it *as a person*, but only as one single individual. He stands for all individuals against the whole group. That means he instinctively puts himself *on the same level as every other individual*. Whatever he wins in the fight, he does not win for himself as a person, but for himself as one unit against the whole.

Socialism is simply a *tool the individualist uses to stir people up*. He understands that, to get anything done, you have to organize yourselves

into a joint action, into a "power". But what he wants is not society as the goal that the individual serves. He wants society as *a means that makes it possible for many individuals to exist*. That is the socialists' instinct, and they often fool themselves about it (not to mention that, to get their way, they often have to fool others). Preaching a selfless morality in the service of each person's own selfishness: that is one of the most common lies of the *nineteenth* century.

Anarchism, in turn, is just a *tool socialism uses to stir people up*. With it, socialism spreads fear. With that fear, it begins to fascinate people and to terrorize them. Above all, it wins the brave and daring over to its side, even those who are brave and daring only in their minds.

In spite of all this: *individualism* is the *most modest* stage of the will to power.

Once you have gained a certain independence, you want more. Then people start to *separate out* according to how strong they are. The individual no longer simply treats himself as equal to everyone. Instead, he *looks for his equals*, and he sets others apart from himself. After individualism comes the forming of *groups and organs*, like parts of a living body. Similar tendencies join together and act as a power. Between these centers of power there is friction and war, each side learns how strong the other is, and then come balancing out, moving closer, and agreeing on an *exchange of services*. At the end: a *ranking of people and values*.

Note.

1.

Individual people set themselves free.

2.

They start to fight. Then they agree on "equal rights" (in other words, justice) as their goal.

3.

Once that goal is reached, the real differences in strength between people start to matter even more. This is because, on the whole, there is peace now, and much smaller amounts of strength are already enough to make a difference. Before, such small differences counted for almost nothing. Now individuals organize themselves into groups. The groups try to win special privileges and to get the upper hand. The fight starts raging again, only in a milder form.

Note: people want freedom as long as they do not yet have power. Once they have power, they want more power than everyone else. If they cannot get that, because they are still too weak for it, they want "justice", which means: equal power.

83.

(203)

Above all, my virtuous gentlemen, you do not rank any higher than we do. We would like to remind you, nicely, to be modest. What advises you to be virtuous is nothing but miserable self-interest and calculation. If you had more strength and courage in your bodies, you would not push yourselves down like this into being virtuous nobodies. You make of yourselves whatever you can. Partly you make what

you must, what your situation forces you to be. Partly you make what gives you pleasure. And partly you make what seems useful to you. But if you only do what suits your likings, or what your needs demand of you, or what benefits you, then you should neither be allowed to praise yourselves for it, nor let others praise you for it!… If you are only virtuous, you are a thoroughly small kind of human being. Let nothing fool you about that! People who have ever counted for anything were never such donkeys of virtue. Their deepest instinct, the instinct of the amount of power they had, did not find its reward in virtue. But your tiny amount of power makes nothing look wiser to you than virtue. Still, you have numbers on your side. And to the extent that you act as tyrants over others, we intend to make war on you…

84.

(204)

All the ordinary institutions of middle-class society are painted over with a hypocritical look, as if they were born out of morality. Take marriage, for example; work; one's job; the fatherland; the family; order; the law. But all of them are built for the most mediocre kind of human being. They are there to protect against the exception and against the needs of exceptional people. So it is only fair to expect a lot of lying here.

85.

(205)

A virtuous person is a lower kind of being for this reason alone: he is not a real "person". Instead, he gets his value by fitting a pattern of what a human should be, a pattern that was set up once and for all. He has no value of his own, on his own terms. He can be compared

with others. There are others just like him. He is not supposed to be one of a kind…

Count up the qualities of the 'good' person. Why do they make us feel good? Because with him we do not need to fight. He does not force us to be suspicious, careful, focused or strict. Our laziness, our easygoing good nature and our carelessness get to have a nice relaxed day. It is this comfortable feeling of ours that we project outward from ourselves. Then we credit it to the 'good' person as if it were his quality, his value.

86.

(206)

I do not like it at all about that Jesus of Nazareth, or about his apostle Paul, that they put so many ideas into the heads of ordinary little people, as if their modest virtues were something important. We have had to pay too high a price for that. For they gave a bad name to the more valuable qualities of virtue and of humans. They set the guilty conscience against the self-respect of the noble, high-minded soul, making the two fight each other. They led astray the brave, generous, daring and excessive drives of the strong soul, even to the point where it destroyed itself…

Touching, childlike, devoted, in love like a woman, and shy; the charm of a virgin's dreamy, longing state before sensuality awakens. For chastity is only a form of sensuality. It is the form sensuality has before it has fully come into being.

87.

(207)

These are all questions of strength. How far can a person assert himself against what society needs in order to survive, and against its prejudices? How far can he unleash his own frightening qualities, the ones that ruin most people? How far can he go to meet the truth and take in its most troubling sides? How far can he go to meet suffering, self-contempt, pity, sickness and vice, not knowing whether he will master them?… (Whatever does not kill us makes us stronger…) And finally: how far can he accept inside himself the rule, the ordinary, the petty, the good, the honest decency of the average kind of person, without letting it make him common?… The strongest test of character is not letting yourself be ruined by the temptation of the good. The good seen as a luxury, as a refinement, as a vice…

88.

(208)

Marriage is a form of living together as lovers that middle-class society gives its permission for. Of course, it does so out of self-interest, not out of morality… Marriage is the kind of living together that society prefers, because here the instinct does not act without caution and consideration. Instead, it first applies for a permit… Society is grateful for this lack of courage and self-confidence. It honors marriage because marriage is a way of bowing down to society… Marriage is a form of living together in which, as a basic principle, far too much is promised. Here something is promised that nobody can promise, namely "love forever". Here sex is set down as a "duty" that one partner can demand from the other… But that is "modern marriage".

89.

(209)

Until now, moral values have been the highest values. Does anyone want to doubt that?… If we remove these values from that top position, we change all values. That overturns the whole principle on which their ranking of people and values has rested until now…

90.

(210)

Let us remove the highest goodness from the idea of God. It is not worthy of a god. Let us also remove the highest wisdom. It was the vanity of philosophers that is to blame for this crazy idea of God as a monster of wisdom: they wanted him to look as much like them as possible… No! God as the highest power: that is enough! Everything follows from that. From that follows "the world"! Put in a symbol, so that we have a sign to recognize it by:

D.O. (God, the Best)

omnipotens (all-powerful)

91.

(211)

Christianity as Judaism set free. It is like the way a nobility that was tied to one place and one race finally frees itself from those limits and goes out looking for related elements elsewhere…

1)

As a church, a community, living inside the state, but as something that is not political.

2)

As a way of life, a discipline, a practice, an art of living.

3)

As a religion of sin. Here sin, meaning a wrong done against God, is the only kind of wrongdoing there is, and the only cause of all suffering whatsoever. And this religion comes with a cure-all against sin. There is only sin against God. When someone wrongs another human being, humans are not supposed to judge it or demand payback for it, unless they do so in the name of God. In the same way, all the commandments, such as love, are tied to God. Everything done for a human being is done for God's sake. There is great cleverness in this. Life in very tight quarters, like that of the Eskimos, can only be borne if people are extremely peaceful and forgiving toward each other. The Jewish-Christian teaching turned against sin, for the good of the "sinner".

92.

(212)

The *Christian* life, as Paul pictured it as an ideal and preached it, is really the *Jewish* life. Maybe not the life of the ruling families, but the life of the ordinary little people, especially the Jews living scattered outside their homeland, in the Diaspora. This ideal was lived and seen. It grew out of what these people honored and loved most. And Paul recognized it as a model for people of other races too, as long as they lived under similar conditions. That is what Paul achieved: he saw that *the private life of Jews could be applied* to the private lives of little people everywhere. From Judaism he knew how a type of person can win through without having power, and without even being allowed to aim for power. What did that involve? A belief in an absolute special privilege, the happiness of being chosen, which makes every misery and hardship seem noble, because it counts as a payment in return and as a spur. Then the virtues of the family and the small con-

gregation. Then a total seriousness about one thing: keeping their way of life untouchable by the enemies they lived among. And everything that soothes, softens and refreshes: prayer, music, shared meals and pouring out one's heart, patience, forgiveness, helping and serving one another. Above all, that *keeping still* of the soul, so that feelings like anger, suspicion, hatred, envy and revenge do not rise to the top… Self-denial and harsh self-discipline are *not* the heart of this life. Sin stands in the front of the mind only in one sense: it means that being saved and bought back from sin is always close at hand. (That was already Jewish. A Jew deals with sin on his own; that is exactly what his faith was for. Sin is the one thing you can fully deal with. And if all misfortune is linked to sin, or to sinfulness, then there is a cure for misfortune itself. On top of that, misfortune is then *justified*, not *meaningless*…

93.

(213)

What a relief it is, after the New Testament, to pick up something like Petronius, the Roman writer! How quickly you feel healthy again! How you feel close to a mind that is healthy, cocky, sure of itself and mischievous! And in the end you are left standing before the question: "Isn't even the filth of the ancient world worth more than this whole petty, arrogant Christian wisdom and sanctimonious hypocrisy?"

94.

(214)

The princes of Europe really ought to think hard about whether they can do without our support. We immoralists (those who reject morality) are today the only power that needs no allies to win. That makes

us by far the strongest of the strong. We don't even need lies. What other power could do without them? A strong temptation fights on our side, maybe the strongest there is: the temptation of truth… Of truth? Who put that word in my mouth? I take it back. I reject that proud word. No, we don't need truth either. We would come to power and victory even without truth. The magic that fights for us, the eye of Venus that charms our enemies themselves and makes them blind, is the *magic of the extreme*. It is the pull that everything extreme has on people. We immoralists are *the most extreme of all*…

95.

"Oh Ariadne, you yourself are the labyrinth: once inside you, no one finds the way out again"…

"Dionysus, you flatter me, you are divine"…

96.

(215)

The *Christian-Jewish* way of life: here resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) did *not* dominate. Perhaps only the great persecutions drove passion out to such a degree, both the *fire* of *love* and the fire of *hatred*.

When you see your loved ones sacrificed for your faith, you become *aggressive*. Christianity owes its victory to the people who persecuted it.

Note: *Self-denial and harsh self-discipline* are not something specific to Christianity. Schopenhauer misunderstood this. They only grew into Christianity in places where such self-denial already existed without Christianity.

Note: In the same way, *gloomy, sickly* Christianity, the cruel tormenting and torturing of one's own conscience, belongs only to certain soil

where Christian values took root. It is *not* Christianity itself. Christianity soaked up all sorts of diseases from sick soils. The only thing you could blame it for is that it had no way to defend itself against any infection. But *that* is exactly its nature: Christianity is a type of decadence.

The *deep contempt* with which Christians were treated in the ancient world, which had stayed noble, belongs in the same category as the gut dislike of Jews that still exists today. It is the hatred of the free and self-confident classes toward people *who push their way in*, and who combine shy, clumsy manners with a ridiculous sense of their own importance.

The New Testament is the gospel of a completely *un-noble* type of person. Their claim to be worth more, even to hold all worth, really has something outrageous about it, even today.

97.

(216)

How someone who fits in perfectly with respectable middle-class honesty can still, now and then, let his need for *immorality* out:

how far we today, as people seeking knowledge, have put all our *wicked urges* to work, and how far we are from wanting to make some wishful ideal of an alliance between virtue and knowledge

all wicked urges have become intelligent and curious in a scientific way

Someone who finds virtue easy will even make fun of it. Being serious about virtue can't be kept up: that seriousness reaches virtue and then jumps right past it. Where to? Into devilry.

In reaching virtue, he leaps over it, and along the way he turns it into a little piece of devilry for himself, and he honors his God in no other way than as God's clown.

How intelligent all our bad leanings and urges have become in the meantime! How much scientific curiosity torments them! They are nothing but fishing hooks for knowledge!

98.

(217)

What am I protesting against? Against treating this small, peaceful mediocrity as something lofty, this calm balance of a soul that never knows the great drives that come from great build-ups of strength. And worse, against treating it as the *measure of what a human should be*.

Note: *Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam*, wrote in Latin: "The common people praise the lowest virtues, admire the middle ones, and have no feeling at all for the highest." But Christianity, as a religion, belongs to the common people. It has no feeling for the highest kind of virtue.

99.

(218)

Schopenhauer's way of turning the artistic *genius* against nature: he called it "an intellect that has become unfaithful to its purpose"

100.

One could bring in castration in the fight against criminals and the sick (for example, for everyone with syphilis). But why bother! We should think more *economically*!

101.

(219)

Existence as punishment and penance: "The myth of the Fall of Man is the only thing that makes me feel at peace with the Old Testament," says Schopenhauer.

102.

(220)

Note.

my *positive*

main points: what are they?

And my main *negative points*: what are they?

And the realm of my *new*

questions and *far-reaching views*: what are they?

103.

(221)

To the people *who matter to me*, I wish suffering, loneliness, sickness, mistreatment and humiliation. I wish that they come to know deep self-contempt, the torture of not trusting themselves, and the misery of being defeated. I feel no pity for them, because I wish them the only thing that can prove today whether someone is *worth* anything or not: *that he holds his ground*…

I have never yet met an idealist, but I have met many liars — —

104.

(222)

Schopenhauer wishes that *scoundrels* be castrated and *silly geese*, meaning foolish women, be locked up in convents. From what point of view could that be desirable? The scoundrel has one advantage over mediocre people: he is not mediocre. And the fool has one advantage over *us*: he doesn't suffer from looking at mediocrity… It would be more desirable for the gap to grow wider, so that rascality and stupidity increased… That way human nature would *stretch wider*… But in the end, that is exactly what has to happen anyway. It happens, and it does not wait to see whether we want it or not. Stupidity and rascality are growing: that is *part of* "progress".

105.

(223)

On the strength of the 19th century.

We are *more like the Middle Ages* than the 18th century was. And it is not just that we are more curious, or more easily excited by things that are foreign and rare. We have rebelled against the *Revolution* itself…

We have freed ourselves from the *fear of reason*, that ghost that haunted the 18th century. We dare once again to be emotional and poetic, absurd and childish… in a word: "we are musicians."

— We are no more *afraid* of looking *ridiculous* than we are of being *absurd*.

— The *devil* finds that God's tolerance works in his favor. More than that: he has a special claim on our interest, as the one who has been

misunderstood and slandered since ancient times. We are the ones who are restoring the devil's good name.

— We no longer separate what is great from what is terrifying.

— We count the *good* things together with the *worst* ones, as one tangled whole. We have *gotten past* the absurd "wishful ideal" of earlier times (the wish that wanted the good to grow without the bad growing too —).

— The *cowardice* in the face of the Renaissance ideal has faded. We dare to aim for *the very way those people lived* ourselves —

— At the same time, the *intolerance* toward priests and the Church has come to an end. "It is immoral to believe in God," people say — but for us, that is exactly the best way of justifying this belief.

We have given all of this a *right* to exist within us. We are not afraid of the *other side* of the "good things" (— in fact we *go looking* for it… we are brave and curious enough for that). Take, for example, the ancient Greek world, morality, reason, good taste. (— We add up the losses that come with all such treasures: *a treasure like that almost makes you poor* —) In the same way, we do not hide from ourselves the other side of the *bad* things…

106.

"*Opinion* is half of reality," Napoleon said.

107.

(224)

Have I harmed virtue by doing this?… No more than the anarchists have harmed the kings and princes. Only since people started shooting at them have they been sitting firmly on their thrones again… —

Because that is how it has always been, and how it will always be: there is no better way to help a cause than to persecute it and hunt it down with every dog you have… And that — is what I have done.

108.

(225)

Against *regret*. I do not like this kind of cowardice toward one's own deeds. You should not abandon yourself when sudden shame and trouble come crashing down on you. In that situation, *extreme* pride is more fitting. In the end, what good does regret do? No deed becomes undone because someone regrets it. Nor does it become undone because it is "forgiven" or "made up for." You would have to be a theologian to believe in a power that wipes away guilt. We immoralists (people who reject morality) prefer not to believe in "guilt" at all. We hold that every kind of action is, at its root, of the same value. We also hold that actions which turn *against* us can, for that very reason, still be useful and *desirable for everyone*, if you look at the whole economy of things. — In a single case we will admit that we could easily have been *spared* a certain deed — it was only the circumstances that pushed us toward it. — Which of us, if the circumstances had *favored* it, would not already have gone through the whole range of crimes?… So you should never say, "You should not have done this or that." You should only ever say, "How strange that I have not already done this a hundred times." — After all, very few actions are *typical* actions, actions that truly sum up a person in short form. And considering how little real personality most people have, a person is rarely *defined* by one single deed. It is a deed of circumstance, only skin-deep, happening simply as a reflex, a reaction to some trigger — before the depths of our being have been touched by it or asked about it. A fit of anger, a grab, a stab with a knife: what is there in that of the "person"? — A deed often brings with it a kind of fixed stare and loss of freedom. The

one who did it is as if spellbound by the memory of it, and feels like he is now just an *accessory* attached to the deed. This mental disturbance, a kind of hypnosis, is what you must fight above all. A single deed, whatever it may be, compared with everything else you have done, may be counted as *zero*. It may be *subtracted* without making the sum wrong. Society may have a fair interest in tallying up our whole existence in only one direction, as if its whole meaning were to produce one single deed. But that interest should not infect the doer himself. Sadly, it almost always does. This is because every deed with unusual consequences is followed by a mental disturbance — no matter whether those consequences are good or bad. Look at a lover who has just been given a promise, or a poet whom a theater is applauding. When it comes to that numbness of the mind, they are no different at all from an anarchist whose home is suddenly raided by the police. — There are actions that are *unworthy* of us: actions that, if we took them as typical of us, would push us down into a lower kind of being. Here the only mistake to avoid is *taking* them as typical. Then there is the opposite kind of action, actions that *we* are not worthy of. These are exceptions, born of a special overflow of happiness and health. They are our highest tidal waves, which a storm or a lucky chance once drove that high. Such actions and "works" (—) are not typical either. You should never measure an artist by the size of his works.

109.

(226)

Virtue must be defended against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal *for everyone*. They strip virtue of its charm — the charm of being rare, impossible to copy, exceptional, and above the average. They take away its *aristocratic magic*. In the same way, you should take a stand against the stubborn

idealists, who eagerly knock on every pot and feel satisfied when it sounds hollow. How naive it is to *demand* greatness and rareness, and then to note its absence with fury and contempt for people! — It is obvious, for example, that a *marriage* is worth only as much as the people who enter into it. That means that, on the whole, it will be something pitiful and unseemly. No priest and no mayor can make anything else out of it.

Virtue has all the instincts of the average person against it. It does not pay off, it is not clever, it isolates you. It is related to passion and hard to reach through reason. It spoils your character, your mind, your good sense — at least when measured by the standard of the middling sort of person. It sets you against the established order, against the *lie* that is hidden in every order, every institution, every reality. It is the *worst vice* there is — if you judge it by how harmful its effects are on *other people*.

— I recognize virtue by these signs. 1) It does not ask to be recognized. 2) It does not assume that virtue is everywhere, but rather something else. 3) It does *not suffer* when virtue is missing in others. On the contrary, it sees that absence as the distance that makes virtue worth honoring in the first place: it does not share itself. 4) It does not make propaganda for itself… 5) It does not let anyone act as its judge, because it is always a virtue *for itself alone*. 6) It does exactly the things that are otherwise *forbidden*. Virtue, as I understand it, is the true forbidden thing within all the laws of the herd. 7) In short, it is virtue in the Renaissance style: Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing…

110.

(227)

In the end, what have I achieved? Let's not hide from ourselves this strangest of results: I have given virtue a new *appeal*. It now feels like something *forbidden*. Our sharpest honesty is against it. It comes seasoned with the "grain of salt" of our scientific bad conscience, meaning we can only take it with doubt. It smells old-fashioned and ancient, so that now, at last, it attracts sophisticated people and makes them curious. In short, it works like a vice. Only after we have seen that everything is a lie and an illusion have we also been given permission again for this most beautiful of falsehoods, the falsehood of virtue. There is no longer any authority that has the right to forbid it to us. Only by showing that virtue is a *form of immorality* have we *justified* it again. It has been put in its place and made equal to everything else in its basic meaning. It shares in the basic immorality of all existence, as a luxury of the very first rank, the most snobbish, most expensive and rarest form of vice. We have smoothed out its wrinkles and taken off its monk's robe. We have rescued it from the pushiness of the many. We have taken away its dull-witted stiffness, its empty eyes, its stiff hairdo, and its rigid, priestly muscles.

111.

(228)

On the ranking of people and values

What is *mediocre* about the typical person? It is that he does not understand that the *other side of things* is necessary. He fights against bad things as if we could do without them. He won't accept the one thing together with the other. He wants to blur and erase the *typical character of a thing*, of a situation, of an age, or of a person, by approving only some of its qualities and wanting to *get rid of* the others. The "wishful ideal" of mediocre people is exactly what the rest of us fight against: the *ideal* understood as something in which nothing harmful,

evil, dangerous, questionable or destructive is supposed to remain. Our insight is the opposite. Every time a human being grows, his dark side must grow too. The *highest human being*, if such an idea is even allowed, would be the person who shows most strongly *the contradictory character of existence*, its clash of opposites, and who would be its glory and its only justification… Ordinary people can only show a tiny little corner of this natural character. They quickly fall apart when the variety of elements inside them and the tension between opposites increase, and that is exactly the precondition for *human greatness*. That a human being must become better *and* more evil: that is my formula for this unavoidable fact…

Most people show only pieces and details of what a human being is. Only when you add them all together does a whole human being come out. Whole ages and whole peoples are, in this sense, something like fragments. Perhaps it is part of how human development works that humans develop piece by piece. That is why we must not fail to see that, even so, the whole point is the making of the complete, combined human being. The lower people, the huge majority, are just warm-ups and practice runs. From all of them working together, here and there the *whole human being* arises: the milestone human, who shows how far humanity has come so far. Humanity does *not* move forward in one straight line. Often a type of human that has already been reached gets lost again…

For example, with all the effort of three centuries, we still have not caught up again with the *people of the Renaissance*. And in turn, the people of the Renaissance fell short of the *people of ancient times*…

You need a *standard of measurement*. I make these distinctions: I pick out the *grand style*. I tell apart *acting* from merely reacting. I tell apart those who are *overflowing and generous with their wealth of strength* from

those who are passionate because they suffer (the so-called "idealists").

112.

(229)

Every society tends to shrink its enemies down into a *cartoon*, a caricature, and to starve them out, so to speak, at least in the way it *imagines* them. One such caricature, for example, is our idea of the "*criminal*". Within the aristocratic Roman order of values, the *Jew* was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, the "respectable, middle-class citizen" becomes a caricature. Among religious people, the unbeliever does. Among aristocrats, the man of the common people does. Among immoralists, people who reject morality, the moralist *becomes* one: Plato, for example, turns into a caricature in my hands.

113.

(230)

Spreading propaganda for your ideas is not decent. But it is clever! Very clever!

Whatever kind of strange, bizarre ideal you follow (for example as a "Christian", or as a "free spirit", or as an "immoralist (one who rejects morality)", or as a loyal citizen of the new German Empire), you should not demand that it be THE ideal for everyone. If you did, you would take away what makes it a privilege, a special right. You should have your ideal in order to stand out from others, not in order to make yourself the same as them.

So how is it that most idealists start spreading propaganda for their ideal right away? They act as if they had no right to their ideal unless everyone else accepted it too. Take, for example, all those brave little

women who give themselves permission to learn Latin and mathematics. What drives them to do this? I'm afraid it is the herd instinct, the fear of the herd. They fight for "women's liberation" because that is the cleverest way to push through their own small, private wish to be different. They do it disguised as a generous activity, under the flag of working "for others"...

Idealists are clever when they become missionaries and spokespeople for an ideal. By doing so, they make themselves look glorious and shining in the eyes of people who believe in selflessness and heroism. But real heroism is something else. It does not mean fighting under the banner of sacrifice, devotion and selflessness. It means not fighting at all... It means saying: "This is how I am. This is how I want it. And as for you, you can all go to the devil!"

114.

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I declare war on the soft, sentimental idea of what it means to be noble. A certain extra amount of brutality cannot be left out of it, and neither can a certain closeness to crime. Being pleased with yourself is not part of nobility either. You have to stand by yourself in an adventurous way, even when you are tempting and dangerous, even when you bring ruin. None of that gushing talk about a "beautiful soul"! I want to make room for a tougher, more robust ideal.

115.

Occasional remarks

about the

about the

Greeks

116.

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On Art and Beauty.

About our modern music: melody has withered away. This is the same thing as the withering of the "idea", of clever argument, of the free movement of the mind at its most spiritual. What we get instead is clumsiness and a stuffed, overloaded feeling. And this clumsiness then turns itself into bold new experiments, and even into principles. In the end, a person's principles are only the principles of his own talent, of the narrow limits of that talent.

When it comes to the basic conditions needed to be a genius, Offenbach was more of a genius than Wagner...

"Dramatic music"? Nonsense! That is simply bad music, as surely as — — —

the substitutes people use when they lack a mocking, scornful mind that dances with contempt

People use "feeling" and "passion" as substitutes when they no longer know how to reach a high, sparkling intellect and the happiness that comes with it (like Voltaire's, for example). Put in technical terms, "feeling" and "passion" are easier. They only require much poorer artists. When an artist turns to drama, it gives away that he is better at handling tricks that only create an appearance than at handling the real means of art. And so now we have dramatic painting, dramatic poetry, and so on.

117.

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I have declared war on the pale, sickly "Christian ideal", along with everything closely related to it. I don't mean to destroy it. I only want to end its tyranny and free up space for new ideals, for tougher, more robust ideals... In fact, it is one of the most desirable things there is that the Christian ideal should continue to exist. If only for the sake of the ideals that want to stand next to it, and maybe above it: they need opponents, strong opponents, in order to become strong themselves. In the same way, we immoralists (we who reject morality) need the power of morality. Our instinct to survive wants our opponents to stay strong. It only wants us to become their masters.

118.

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Schopenhauer explained a high intellect as a breaking free from the will. He did not want to see that when a great mind is unchained, it frees itself from moral prejudices. He did not want to see that a genius is typically immoral. The one thing he really honored was the moral value of self-denial. And he artificially made this self-denial the condition for the highest mental activity, for seeing things "objectively". For him, "truth", in art too, only appears once the will has been taken away...

Cutting right through all these moral quirks, I see a completely different way of valuing. I simply do not recognize this absurd separation of "genius" from the world of the will, of morality and immorality. The moral person is a lower species than the immoral one, a weaker one. Yes: by the standards of morality, he is a type, a standard model, and not his own type. He is a copy, a good copy at least, but his value is

measured by something outside himself. I judge a person by the amount of power and fullness in his will, not by how much it has been weakened and snuffed out. I see any philosophy that teaches the denial of the will as a teaching that drags people down and slanders life...

I measure the power of a will by how much resistance, pain and torture it can stand, and by how well it can turn these into an advantage. By this measure, I would never blame existence for being evil and painful. On the contrary, I hold on to the hope that one day it will be even more evil and painful than it has been until now...

The highest peak of the mind that Schopenhauer could imagine was to come to the insight that nothing has any meaning. In short, it was to know with the head what the 'good' person already does by instinct... He denies that there could be any higher kinds of intellect. He took his own insight as the very last word, with nothing beyond it... Here the mind is placed far below goodness. Its highest value (in art, for example) would be to advise and prepare people for a moral turnaround. This means the total rule of moral values...

Next to Schopenhauer, I want to describe Kant (see Goethe's passage about Kant's idea of "radical evil"). There is nothing Greek about him. He is completely against history (see the passage about the French Revolution), and he is a fanatic about morality. In his case too, holiness lurks in the background...

I need a critique of the holy man, the saint...

Hegel's way of valuing "passion"

The shopkeeper philosophy of Mr. Spencer: a complete lack of any ideal, except the ideal of the average person.

There is a basic instinct shared by all philosophers, historians and psychologists. They feel that everything valuable in people, art,

history, science, religion and technology has to be proven to be morally valuable, to be shaped by morality, in its goals, its means and its results. They try to understand everything in relation to this highest value. Take Rousseau's question about civilization, for example: "Does it make people better?" That is a funny question. The opposite is obvious, and that is exactly what speaks in favor of civilization.

119.

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We "Objective" Ones.

It is not pity that opens the gates for us to the most distant and foreign kinds of life and culture. What opens them is our openness and our lack of prejudice. This openness does not "suffer along with" others, which is what pity literally means. On the contrary, it takes delight in a hundred things that people used to suffer from, things that once made them outraged or deeply moved, or that they looked at with hostility and coldness. Suffering in all its shades is now interesting to us. That certainly does not make us more full of pity. Even when the sight of suffering shakes us to the core and brings us to tears, we are still not, for that reason, any more inclined to help.

In this willingness to look at every kind of misery and wrongdoing, a willingness we choose freely, we have become stronger and more powerful than people were in the 18th century. It is proof that our strength has grown. (We have come closer to the 17th and 16th centuries...) But it is a deep misunderstanding to take our "romanticism" as proof that our souls have become more beautiful...

We want strong sensations, just as all rougher ages and rougher classes of people want them... This must be kept clearly apart from

the need felt by people with weak nerves and by decadent people. They need pepper, something sharp to stimulate them, even cruelty...

All of us look for situations where middle-class morality *no longer has a say*, and priestly morality even less. (Whenever a book still carries a whiff of the air of pastors and theologians, it strikes us as pitifully silly and poor in spirit.) The "good society" is the one where, deep down, nothing is interesting except what ordinary middle-class society *forbids* and what gives you a bad name. The same goes for books, for music, for politics, and for how women are valued.

120.

People to question about their *values*:

Plato. Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius. Epicurus.

Augustine. Pascal.

Bentham. Comte. Hegel.

Books:

Reuter's book on Augustine and the religious enlightenment of the Middle Ages

Sainte-Beuve's Port-Royal

Teichmüller's Greek Philosophy.

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How is it possible for someone to respect himself *only* when it comes to moral values? How can he put everything else *below* them and think little of it compared with good, evil, self-improvement, the salvation of the soul, and so on? Take Amiel, for example. What does this *odd*

fixation on morality mean? I am asking as a psychologist, and also as a student of the body. Take Pascal, for example. I mean cases where great *other* qualities are not missing. Take also the case of Schopenhauer, who clearly prized what he did not have and *could not* have. Isn't this simply the result of a habit of *reading morality into* real states of pain and discomfort? Isn't it a certain kind of *sensitivity* that *does not understand* the cause of its many bad feelings, but *believes it can explain them with moral guesses*? So that even an occasional sense of well-being and *strength* is immediately seen again in a borrowed light, as a "good conscience", as being close to God, as the feeling of being *saved*? So the person with this *odd fixation on morality* has

1) *either* really found his own worth by coming close to the type of person society calls virtuous: "the decent fellow", "the *upright* man". This is a middling state of high respectability: *mediocre* in everything he is able to do, but honest, conscientious, steady, respected and proven in everything he wants to do;

2) *or* he believes he has this worth, because he thinks he cannot understand any of his states in any other way. He does not know himself, and so he explains himself like this.

Morality as the only *way of explaining things* that a person can stand to live with… Is it a kind of pride?

122.

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How could anyone spoil mediocrity for the mediocre! As you can see, I do the opposite. For every step away from it, so I teach, leads *into the immoral*…

123.

(238)

The longest-lasting part of the old medieval school philosophy: good, evil, conscience, virtue. These are all things that exist only in the mind, things of imaginary origin.

124.

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Thinking about the most general questions always lags behind. For example, the philosophers have never really treated the final wishful ideals about humankind as a problem. All of them naively assume the "improvement" of human beings, as if some kind of intuition had lifted us above the question mark: *why* "improve", of all things? In what way is it *desirable* for people to become *more virtuous*? Or *cleverer*? Or *happier*? Unless we already *know* the "why" of human beings in general, every such aim makes no sense. And if you want the one thing, who knows? Perhaps then you are not allowed to want the other. Can an increase in virtue go together with an increase in cleverness and insight? I doubt it. I will have only too many chances to prove the opposite. Hasn't virtue, taken strictly as a goal, actually been at odds with becoming happy so far? On the other hand, doesn't it need unhappiness, going without, and mistreating oneself as necessary tools? And if the *highest insight* were the goal, wouldn't one have to reject more happiness for that very reason? And wouldn't one have to choose danger, adventure, distrust and temptation as the road to insight?

And if you want *happiness*, well, then perhaps you have to join the "poor in spirit".

125.

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Kind, helpful and generous attitudes did *not* come to be honored at all because of the usefulness that comes from them. They were honored because they are the states of *rich souls*, souls that can give away and whose worth lies in the feeling that life is full to overflowing. Just look at the eyes of someone who does good to others! That is the opposite of denying oneself, of hating one's own self, of "Pascal's way".

126.

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Everything that comes from weakness, from doubting oneself and from a sickly soul, is worthless, even if it shows itself by giving away every last thing one owns. For as an *example*, it poisons life. The look of a priest, his pale standing apart from the world, has done life more harm than all his devotion does good. Such standing apart *slanders* life.

127.

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Being wrapped up in oneself and one's "eternal salvation" is *not* the sign of a rich and self-confident nature. Such a nature couldn't care less whether it goes to heaven. It has no such interest in happiness of any kind. It is strength, action, desire. It presses itself onto things, it *grabs hold* of things. Christianity is a romantic, gloomy worry about one's health, felt by people who do not stand on firm legs. Wherever the outlook that puts pleasure first comes to the front, you can conclude that there is suffering and a certain *failure to turn out well*.

128.

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How, under the pressure of the strict morality of self-denial, the very feelings of love, kindness, pity, and even justice, generosity and heroism had to be *misunderstood*: a *main chapter*.

It is a person's *richness*, the fullness within, the overflowing and giving away, the instinctive feeling of well-being and saying yes to life and to oneself, that makes great sacrifices and great love. These feelings grow out of a strong and godlike selfhood, just as surely as the wish to become master, to reach out and take, and the inner certainty of having a right to everything. Attitudes that are commonly seen as *opposites* are really *one* attitude. And if you do not sit firmly and bravely in your own skin, you have nothing to give away, no hand to hold out, and you cannot be a shelter and a support for anyone.

How could these instincts be *reinterpreted* so that a person feels that what goes against his own self is valuable? That he hands his own self over to another self!

Oh, the psychological misery and lying that until now have done all the talking in the Church and in the philosophy that has caught the Church's sickness!

If a human being is sinful through and through, he may only hate himself. Strictly speaking, he should treat his fellow humans with no other feeling than he treats himself. Love for other people needs a justification, and the justification is that *God commanded it*. From this it follows that all of a person's natural instincts (toward love and so on) seem forbidden to him in themselves. Only after they have been *disowned* do they become allowed again, on the grounds of obedience to God. Pascal, the admirable *logical thinker* of Christianity, went this far!

Think about his relationship with his sister, page 162: to him it seemed Christian to make sure people did *not* love him.

129.

Note well: proving a hypothesis and explaining things on the basis of a hypothesis are two different things. Do not confuse them!

130.

"In Islam, sharing the slaughtered meat is still a sacred bond: whoever takes part in our worship and eats the meat we slaughter is a Muslim."

131.

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"A rule of worship turns into a rule of *culture*." Muhammad forbade eating blood. (The pagans used to drain blood from animals so that, in times of famine, they could make a kind of blood sausage.)

Main ritual: letting the blood flow away without using it.

Wine and oil are not Arab (in sacrifices).

132.

… for it is our values up to now from which nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) follows as the logical conclusion.

133.

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All the emotions are *useful*. Some are useful more directly, others less directly. When it comes to usefulness, it is simply impossible to rank

them in order of value. In the same way, if you measure things by how they work in the big household of nature, all the forces in nature are good, that is, useful, even though so much terrible fate that can never be undone comes from them. At most you could say that the most powerful emotions are the most valuable, because there are no greater sources of strength.

134.

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Moral judgment, with its "useful" and "harmful," thinks like a small country village and clings to its own patch of ground. Still, this narrow way of thinking makes good sense. It is the view that society needs, because society can only see the near and the nearest when it looks at *what will happen as a result*. The state and the politician already need a way of thinking that is more *beyond morality*, because they have to work out much bigger webs of effects. In the same way, a world economy could exist that looks so far ahead that all its separate demands might seem unfair and random at the moment they are made.

135.

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Christianity is possible as the *most private* way of living. It needs a small, withdrawn society that has nothing at all to do with politics. It belongs in a little secret prayer group. But a "Christian state" or "Christian politics"? Those are just big, puffed-up words in the mouths of people who have *reasons* for using big, puffed-up words. Such people may even talk about a "God of armies" as if he were the army's chief commander. They fool nobody with this. In real life, even

the Christian ruler follows the ruthless politics of Machiavelli, at least if he is not doing politics badly.

136.

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Morality looks down on the *self*, the "ego." Hand in hand with this, even natural science rates the *species* too highly. But the species is just as much an illusion as the self. People have drawn a false line between them. The self is a hundred times more than just one link in a chain. It is the whole *chain* itself, completely. The species is just an idea pulled out of the many such chains and the ways they partly look alike. People have often claimed that the individual is *sacrificed* for the species. But this is not a fact at all. It is only an example of a wrong way of explaining things.

137.

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Why we need to set values in an objective way.

The whole life of any living being is a huge, many-sided struggle of forces working with and against each other. Compared to that, its *conscious* world of feelings, plans and ways of valuing is only a tiny slice. We have no right at all to treat this bit of consciousness as the goal, as the "why," of the whole thing called life. Clearly, becoming conscious is just one more tool that life uses to unfold and to grow in power. That is why it is naive to treat pleasure, or the mind, or morality, or any single part of the world of consciousness as the highest value, and perhaps even to use them to justify "the world." This is my *basic objection* to all the philosophical and moral explanations of the universe and of God's goodness, and to all the "whys" and "highest values" in philosophy and in the philosophy of religion so far. *One kind of tool has*

been mistaken for the goal. And life and its growth in power were turned upside down and pushed down into being a mere *tool*.

If we wanted to set a goal for life wide enough to fit it, that goal could not match any category of conscious life. Instead, it would have to *explain* every one of them as a *means of reaching itself*…

Some say that "saying no to life" is the goal of life and the goal of development, and that existence is one big stupidity. Such a *crazy interpretation* is only born from *measuring* life by things that belong to *consciousness*, like pleasure and pain, good and evil. Here the means are used as arguments against the goal. People say: look at these "unholy," absurd and, above all, *unpleasant* means. How can a goal be any good if it uses such means! But the mistake is this. Instead of *looking for* the goal that explains why such means are *necessary*, we start by assuming a goal that *rules out* exactly these means. In other words, we take a wishful ideal about certain means, namely pleasant, rational and virtuous ones, and make it the *rule*. Only then do we use that rule to decide which *overall goal is desirable*…

The *basic mistake* is always this. Consciousness is only a tool and a small part of life as a whole. But we treat it as the measuring stick and as the highest-valued state of life. In short, it is the faulty view of judging the whole from one part. That is why all philosophers instinctively try to imagine a consciousness of the whole, something that consciously lives along with and wills along with everything that happens: a "spirit," a "God." But someone has to tell them that *exactly this* turns *existence* into a *monster*. A "God" like that, a mind that feels everything, would simply be a reason why existence would have to be *condemned*… The fact that we have *gotten rid of* such an all-seeing consciousness that sets goals and means: that is our *great relief*. With that, we no longer *have to* be pessimists. *Our* biggest *charge* against existence was the *existence of God*…

138.

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The only way to keep any meaning for the idea of "God" would be this: God *not* as the driving force, but God as the *highest state*, as an *era*… A point in the development of the *will to power*, from which you could explain both what comes after it and everything that came before it, up to it…

Seen mechanically, the energy of all change stays the same. Seen in terms of how it is spent and managed, it rises to a high point and sinks back down again, in an endless circle. This "will to power" shows itself in how energy is *interpreted*, in the *way force is used*. So the goal seems to be turning energy into life, and into life at its highest power. The same amount of energy means different things at different stages of development.

What makes life grow is a way of managing things that keeps getting thriftier and keeps planning further ahead, reaching more and more with less and less force… The ideal is the rule of the least effort…

The one thing that *has been proven* is that the world does *not* aim for a permanent, unchanging state. So we *must* imagine its highest state in such a way that it is not a state of balance…

The same events happen with total necessity in one cycle of the world as in all the others, for all eternity. But this is *not* some fate standing above events and controlling them. It only says that the impossible is not possible… that a certain force can only be exactly that force, nothing else; that when it meets a certain amount of resistance, it can only act according to its strength. To say that something happens and to say that it happens by necessity is to say the *same thing twice*.

139.

"Better to be the last in Rome than the first in the countryside." Even this is still a thought worthy of *Caesar*.

140.

Life in its *smallest form* is the easiest to make perfect. Goethe says, for example… But to be first in the smallest things — — —

141.

(251)

I love unhappy people who *feel ashamed*. People who do not empty their chamber pots full of misery out onto the street. People who still have enough good taste in their hearts and on their tongues to tell themselves: "You must treat your misfortune with respect. You must hide it"…

142.

You need to have lived through worse and deeper things than today's gentlemen pessimists, these skinny monkeys to whom nothing bad or deep will ever happen. Only then do you have the right to respect their pessimism.

143.

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Nothing comes easier to us than being wise, patient, superior, and full of forgiveness, patience and sympathy. We are absurdly, inhumanly fair about everything and everyone. We forgive everything. Forgiving is exactly *our* natural element. That is just why we should be a bit stricter with ourselves, and at least now and then grow in ourselves a

small passion, a little vice of a passion. It may be hard for us. And, just between us, we laugh at how we look while doing it. But what else can we do! We have no other way left of overcoming ourselves…

144.

(253)

Cruelty has been refined into tragic pity, so that people *deny* it is cruelty at all. The same goes for sexual love, dressed up as amour-passion, the great romantic passion. Slavish attitudes are dressed up as Christian obedience. Wretchedness is dressed up as humility. And a disease of the nervus sympathicus, the nerves that run the body's automatic reactions, is dressed up as pessimism, as Pascalism, as Carlylism, and so on.

145.

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Questions to ask when judging by *my* values: Does it come from abundance or from craving… Do you stand and watch, or do you lend a hand… or do you look away and step aside… Is the built-up strength stirred 'spontaneously', or is it merely *reacting*, being prodded and provoked? Is it *simple* because it has only a few parts, *or* because it rules so powerfully over many parts that it can put them to work whenever it needs them… Are you a *problem* or a *solution*… Are you *perfect* because your task is small, or *imperfect* because your goal is extraordinary… Are you *genuine*, or only an *actor*? And if an actor, are you a genuine actor, or only a copy of an actor? Are you a 'representative', or are you the thing being represented? — Are you a 'person', or merely a meeting place of several persons… Are you *sick* from sickness, or from *too much* health… Do you go ahead as a shepherd, or as an 'exception' (and there is a third kind: as a runaway)… Do you need

dignity — or do you need 'the clown'? — Do you look for resistance, or do you avoid it? Are you imperfect because you came 'too early' or 'too late'… By nature, do you say yes, or say no, or are you like a peacock's fan, a spread of many colorful things? Are you proud enough not to be ashamed even of your vanity? Are you still capable of a pang of conscience? (That kind of person is getting rarer: in the past, conscience had too much to bite on; now, it seems, it no longer has enough teeth for the job.) Are you still capable of a 'duty'? (— There are people who would lose the last bit of joy they have in living if they let 'duty' be *taken* from them… especially the little women, the ones born to obey…)

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Note. I leave it to a different kind of mind than mine to go further at this point. I am not narrow-minded enough for a system — not even for *my own* system…

147.

'Necessities of thought *are* necessities of morality.' And the claim 'The final test of whether a statement is true is that we cannot even imagine its denial' (Herbert Spencer) is nonsense.

'To make something produced by the *mind* into the *test* of *objective* truth; to take the abstract wording of a belief and treat it as proof that the belief is true, as its justification.'

148.

There are delicate, sickly natures, so-called idealists, who can rise no higher than committing a crime, a raw and crude one (cru, vert). For them it is the great justification of their small, pale existence, a way of

paying off a long stretch of cowardice and dishonesty, at least one *moment* of strength. Afterwards, it destroys them.

149.

(In the past, conscience had too much to bite on; now, it seems, it no longer has enough teeth for the job.)

150.

Morality as the Greatest Devaluing

Either our world is the work and expression (the 'mode') of God. Then it must be *utterly perfect* (this is Leibniz's conclusion…) — and nobody doubted that they knew what perfection includes. In that case, evil and suffering can only *seem* to exist (Spinoza handles the ideas of good and evil even more *radically*), *or* they must come from God's highest purpose. (— For example, as the result of a special favor from God, who lets us choose between good and evil: the privilege of not being a robot; 'freedom', even at the risk of going wrong and choosing badly… as you find, for instance, in Simplicius's commentary on Epictetus.)

Or our world is imperfect, and evil and guilt are real, fixed, and belong completely to its very nature. Then it cannot be the 'real' world. Then knowledge is simply the path to denying it, and the world is a mistake that can be recognized as a mistake. This is Schopenhauer's view, built on Kant's assumptions. How naive! That would just be another miracle! Pascal was even more desperate: he understood that in that case knowledge itself must also be corrupt and falsified — that *revelation* from God is needed just to understand that the world deserves to be denied…

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How Schopenhauer's Nihilism Still Comes from the Same Ideal That Created Christian Belief in God

People were so certain about the highest wishful ideal, the highest values, the highest perfection, that philosophers started from it as if it were an *absolute certainty, known before any experience (a priori)*: 'God' stood at the top as a *given* truth. 'To become like God', 'to be absorbed into God' — for thousands of years these were the most naive and most convincing wishful ideals. (— But something that convinces us is not true just because of that: it is merely *convincing*. A note for donkeys.)

People stopped granting that this ideal was also a real *person*: they became atheists. But did they really give up the ideal? — The last metaphysicians, the philosophers of what lies beyond the physical world, still look to it, deep down, as the true 'reality', the 'thing in itself', compared with which everything else is mere appearance. Their fixed belief is this: since our world of appearances so clearly is *not* an expression of that ideal, it is simply not 'true' — and at bottom it cannot even be traced back to that metaphysical world as its cause. The unconditioned, the absolute, insofar as it is that highest perfection, cannot possibly be the foundation of everything conditioned. Schopenhauer, who wanted it differently, had to imagine that metaphysical foundation as the opposite of the ideal, as an 'evil, blind will'. That way it could be 'what appears', the thing that shows itself in the world of appearances. But even so, he did not give up that absolute ideal — he sneaked his way around it… (Kant thought he needed the idea of 'intelligible freedom', a freedom beyond the senses, in order to free the ens perfectum, the perfect being, from responsibility for this world being the way it is — in short, to explain evil and suffering: a scandalous kind of logic for a philosopher…)

151.

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The *moral theory* meant to *justify God*, laid out very well in Simplicius's commentary on Epictetus, said this: evil must be done freely (only so that people can believe that *good is done freely*), and on the other hand: behind all harm and suffering there is a saving purpose.

The idea of guilt as something that does *not* reach all the way down to the deepest foundations of existence, and the idea of punishment as an educational kindness, and therefore as the act of a *good* God.

Moral judgment ruled absolutely *over* every other kind of judgment: nobody doubted that God could not be evil and could not do anything harmful. In other words, when people thought of perfection, they thought only of *moral* perfection.

152.

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Think about the *loss* that all human institutions suffer once people assume a divine *higher realm* beyond this world, which is what first gives these institutions their *approval*. When people get used to seeing the value of something in this approval (in marriage, for example), they *push aside its natural worth*, and sometimes even *deny* it… Nature has been judged with ill will to exactly the degree that what goes against nature, in the form of a God, has been held in honor. 'Nature' came to mean the same as 'contemptible' and 'bad'…

The disaster of believing that *the highest moral qualities are real, in the form of God*: with that, all real values were denied and treated, as a matter of principle, as *worthlessness*. And so what goes against nature climbed onto the throne. With relentless logic, people arrived at the absolute demand to *deny nature*.

153.

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The *leftovers* of *devaluing nature* through *a morality that points beyond this world*:

The value placed on *self-denial*, the worship of altruism, of living for others

The belief in *payback*, in reward and punishment, built into the chain of causes and effects

The belief in 'goodness', and even in 'genius', as if both were *results of self-denial*.

The Church still giving its blessing and approval to ordinary everyday life

a total, deliberate wish to misunderstand history (treating it as a school for making people moral), or else pessimism when looking at history. And this pessimism is just as much a result of making nature worthless as that fake justification is — that refusal to see what the pessimist does see…

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My aim is to show that everything that happens is completely of one kind, and that we only split things into moral and immoral from a certain point of view. I want to show that everything people praise as moral is, at heart, the same as everything immoral. Like every step in the growth of morality, it only became possible through immoral means and for immoral purposes… And the other way round: I want to show that everything with a bad reputation as immoral is, if you look at how things really work, the higher and more basic thing. And

I want to show that any growth toward a fuller, richer life must also bring with it more immorality… "Truth" is simply how far we allow ourselves to see this fact…

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These days there is also a kind of musician's pessimism, even among people who are not musicians. Who hasn't run into it, and who hasn't cursed it? I mean that miserable young man who tortures his piano until it screams in despair, and who shoves ahead of him, with his own hands, a mud of the gloomiest, greyest, brownest harmonies. That is how you get recognized as a pessimist… But does that also get you recognized as musical? I really can't bring myself to believe it. The pure-blooded Wagner fan is unmusical. He gives in to the raw, basic forces of music roughly the way a woman gives in to the will of the man hypnotizing her. And to be able to do this, he must not have any strict, refined conscience about music and musicians that would make him suspicious. I said "roughly the way" — but maybe this is more than just a comparison. Think about the tricks Wagner loves to use to get his effects, many of which he first had to invent himself: the kinds of movement he chooses, the sound colors of his orchestra, the awful way he dodges the logic and the regular, square beat of rhythm, the creeping, stroking, mysterious quality, the hysteria of his so-called "endless melody." All of these are strangely similar to the methods a hypnotist uses to work on people. And is the state that, for example, the prelude to his opera Lohengrin puts the listener in — and the female listener even more — really so different from the trance of a sleepwalker? I once heard an Italian woman, after listening to that prelude, say with those pretty, enraptured eyes that Wagner's female fans are so good at: "How well one sleeps to this music!"

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"Free marriage" makes no sense. Making divorce easier is a step along the road toward it. Really, it is only the dangerous result of two things: when marriages were set up, individuals were given too much say, and society has more and more let go of its responsibility for bringing marriages about.

Marriage is a solid, unprejudiced institution based on force. It was thought up with plenty of common sense and without sentimentality. It is rough and blocky, designed for average people and ordinary natural needs, which is what all the main institutions ought to be designed for. But I don't think there is any reason, because of marriage, to look at adultery with superstitious horror. On the contrary: we should be thankful that, to help this institution last as long as possible, there is a natural safety valve, so that nothing makes it burst. Besides, a good marriage can put up with a small exception. It can even be the test of how good it is. Speaking in principle: between adultery and divorce, the first one is — — —

Marriage is the piece of nature that society honors with the highest value, because society itself grows out of this institution, which it looks after and protects. Nothing is more out of place in marriage than silly idealism. Even turning the "marriage for love" into a basic rule is that kind of idealism.

The relatives should have more say in a marriage than the famous "two hearts."

You don't build an institution out of love. You build it out of the sex drive and other natural drives that marriage satisfies.

For that very reason, the priest should be kept out of it. You disgrace the nature in marriage when you give a sworn enemy of nature the

power to add something to the blessing of a marriage — or even to be the one who puts the blessing there in the first place.

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Moral self-castration. The ideal of the eunuch.

1.

Take the *law*. It is a very down-to-earth way of writing down certain conditions a community needs in order to survive. It forbids certain actions when they point in a certain direction, namely when they are turned against the community. But it does *not* forbid the attitude these actions come from. That is because the community needs those very same actions when they point in another direction, namely against the *enemies* of the community. Now along comes the moral idealist and says: "God looks into the heart. The action itself means nothing yet. You must root out the hostile attitude it comes from…" In normal circumstances, people laugh at this. Only in those rare exceptional cases, where a community lives *completely* free from any need to fight wars for its survival, do people even have an ear for such things. You let go of an attitude once you can no longer see what it is *useful* for.

This was the case, for example, when Buddha appeared, in a very peaceful society that was even mentally worn out.

It was also the case with the first Christian community, and with the Jewish community too. They rested on Jewish society, which had become completely *unpolitical*. Christianity could only grow on Jewish soil, that is, among a people who had already given up on politics and lived a kind of parasite's life inside the Roman order of things. Christianity goes one step *further*: here people may "unman" themselves, cut out their manliness, even much more. The circumstances allow it.

Note: when someone says "love your enemies," they drive *nature* out of morality. For now the *natural* rule, "you shall *love* your neighbor and *hate* your enemy," which lived in the law and in instinct, has become meaningless. And now even *love for your neighbor* has to find a new

reason for itself, as a kind of *love for God*. Everywhere *God* gets stuffed in, and "*usefulness*" gets pulled out. Everywhere people deny *where* all morality really comes from. The respect for nature, which lies precisely in *accepting a natural morality*, is *destroyed* down to its roots…

Where does the *seductive charm* of such an unmanned ideal of humanity come from? Why doesn't it disgust us, the way the idea of a castrated man disgusts us?… And that is exactly where the answer lies. The voice of a castrated singer does *not* disgust us either, even though a cruel mutilation was needed to produce it. Instead, the voice has become sweeter… In just the same way, by cutting off virtue's "male parts," a feminine tone of voice was brought into virtue that it did not have before.

On the other hand, think of the terrible hardness, danger and unpredictability that a life of manly virtues brings with it. Think of the life of a Corsican even today, or the life of the pagan Arabs, which is like the Corsican life down to the details: their songs could have been written by Corsicans. Then you understand how exactly the toughest kind of person is fascinated and deeply moved by this sweet, sensual sound of "goodness" and "purity"… A shepherd's tune… a peaceful country scene… the 'good' person: things like that work most powerfully in times when the opposite causes harm. (The Romans invented the peaceful shepherd play, which means they *needed* it.)

2.

With this, we have also understood in what way the "idealist" (that is, the castrated man of ideals) also starts out from a very *specific* reality and is not just a dreamer… He has come to see that, for his kind of reality, such a crude rule *forbidding* certain actions, in the crude popular style of the law, makes no sense. That is because his instinct for those very actions has been *weakened*, through a long lack of practice

and a long lack of any need to practice. The one who preaches castration writes down a set of new survival conditions for people of a very specific species. In that, he is a realist. The *tools* he uses to make his laws are the same as those of older lawmakers: appealing to every kind of authority, to "God," and using the idea of "guilt and punishment." In other words, he puts all the equipment of the older ideal to use, only with a new interpretation. Punishment, for example, is moved inward, perhaps as the sting of conscience.

In practice, this species of human *perishes* as soon as the exceptional conditions of its existence come to an end. Those conditions are a kind of Tahiti, a happy-island life, like the life of the small-town Jews in the provinces. Their only *natural* opponent is the soil they grew out of. They have to fight against it, and against it they must let their attacking and *defending feelings* grow back again. Their opponents are the followers of the old ideal. (This kind of hostility is shown on a grand scale by Paul in his relation to Judaism, and by Luther in his relation to the priestly ideal of self-denial.) That is why Buddhism is the most perfect form of moral self-castration: it has no opponent, and from the start it can aim all its strength at rooting out hostile feelings. The fight against resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) seems almost to be the Buddhist's first task. Only then is *peace* of the soul guaranteed. To break free, but without bitterness: this, of course, requires an amazingly softened, sweetened humanity, which is goodness…

3.

The *cleverness* of *moral self-castration*. How do you wage war against manly feelings and manly ways of judging value? You have no physical means of force. You can only wage a war of cunning, of enchantment, of lies, in short, a war "of the spirit."

First recipe: you claim virtue as a whole for your own ideal. You *deny* the older ideal so completely that it becomes *the opposite of any ideal at all*. This takes skill in slander.

Second recipe: you set up your own type of person as *the measure of all value*. You project it into things, behind things, behind the fate of things, as God.

Third recipe: you treat the opponents of your ideal as opponents of God. You invent for yourself the *right* to grand passion, to power, to curse and to bless.

Fourth recipe: you explain all suffering, everything eerie, terrible and fateful in life, as coming from opposition to *your* ideal. All suffering follows as *punishment*, even among your own followers (unless it is a *test*, and so on).

Fifth recipe: you go so far as to strip nature of anything divine, as the opposite of your own ideal. You see it as a great test of patience, a kind of martyrdom, to put up with the natural world for so long. You train yourself to show contempt, in your face and your manners, toward all "natural things."

Sixth recipe: the victory of what goes against nature, of idealized castration, the victory of the world of the pure, the good, the sinless, the blessed, is projected into the future. It becomes the end, the finale, the great hope, the "coming of the kingdom of God."

I hope we can still *laugh* at this cranking up of a small species into the absolute measure of the value of all things?…

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"There is thinking, so there is something that thinks." That is what Descartes's argument comes down to. But that means already treating our belief in the idea of a substance, a thing underneath, as "true before any experience." The idea that when there is thinking, there must be something "that thinks" is simply a way of putting our grammar habits into words, habits that set a doer behind every deed. In short, a logical and metaphysical demand is already being made here, and *not just a fact being noted*… Descartes's path does *not* lead to something absolutely certain. It only leads to the fact of a very strong belief.

If you shrink the sentence down to "there is thinking, so there are thoughts," you just have a statement that says the same thing twice. And exactly what is in question, the "*reality* of thought," is not touched at all. In this form, you cannot rule out that thought is mere appearance. But what Descartes *wanted* was for thought to have not just an *apparent reality*, but a reality *in itself*.

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"Pretending" grows the higher a creature stands in the ranking of people and values. In the world of non-living things it seems to be missing. In the living world, cunning begins: plants are already masters at it. Then come the highest humans, like Caesar and Napoleon (think of what Stendhal said about Napoleon), and likewise the higher races (the Italians), and the Greeks (think of Odysseus). Craftiness belongs to the very nature of how humans rise higher… The problem of the actor. My Dionysus ideal… The way all living functions see things, all the strongest life instincts: in all life there is a force that *wants* error. Error is a precondition even of thinking. Before anything is "thought," something must already have been "made up," like a poet

makes things up. Shaping things to fit, so that different cases count as the same, so that they have the mere appearance of being alike, comes earlier than actually *recognizing* that things are the same.

160.

Scary ghosts, moral throat-gargling noises, a tragic farce

161.

Truths *you can dance to* — truths for *our* feet…

162.

There are storm clouds here. But is that any reason why we free, airy, cheerful spirits shouldn't give ourselves a good day?

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Note well: they have gotten rid of the Christian God — and now they believe all the more that they *must* hold on to the Christian moral ideal? That is English logic. We'll leave that to the little moral ladies like George Eliot. (In England, for every small step of freedom from theology, you have to win back your good name in a terrible way, by becoming a *moral fanatic*…) Over there, that is the penalty you pay…

When you give up Christian faith, you pull the ground out from under your right to Christian moral judgments. Those judgments are by no means obvious on their own. This has to be brought out into the open today, in spite of the tasteless shallowness of the English free thinkers. Christianity is a well-thought-out and *complete* view of things. If you break out of it the belief in the Christian God, you make its whole system of values collapse. You have nothing solid left

between your fingers! Christianity assumes that humans do *not* know, and *cannot* know, what is good and evil for them. The Christian believes in a God who alone knows it. Christian morality is a command from the world beyond, and as such it lies *beyond* human judgment. — The fact that the English now believe they know on their own what is good and evil, and so no longer need Christianity, is itself a *result* of the rule of Christian value judgments. Those judgments ruled so long that people forgot where they came from, and forgot that their right to exist depends entirely on certain *conditions*.

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Note well: there are quite naive peoples and individuals who believe that constant *good weather* would be something to wish for. Even today, in matters of morals, they believe that the 'good' person alone, and nothing but the 'good' person, is something to wish for — and that the whole path of human development leads toward a point where only *he* is left (and that all our efforts *must* aim at that alone). That is thinking in the most *wasteful* way, against all good management, and, as I said, the height of naivety. Such good weather is a *comfort* that the 'good' person provides (he causes no fear, he lets you relax, he gives what you can take; — — —

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Things that have been *spoiled* by the way the Church misused them:

1) *Self-discipline and self-denial (asceticism)*: people hardly have the courage anymore to point out how naturally useful it is, how necessary it is for *training the will*. Our absurd world of educators (who picture the "useful civil servant" as the model to follow) thinks it can get by with

"teaching," with drilling the brain. It doesn't even have the idea that something else is needed *first* — training *willpower*. People take exams in everything except the main thing: whether you *can will*, whether you are able to *make a promise* and keep it. The young man is declared *finished* without ever having a single question, a single bit of curiosity, about this highest question of value in his own nature.

2) *Fasting*: in every sense, including as a way to keep your fine ability to enjoy all good things (for example, not reading for a while; not listening to music for a while; not being nice for a while; you should also have fasting days for your virtue).

3) *The "monastery"*: going into isolation for a while and strictly refusing, for example, letters. It is a kind of deepest reflection on yourself and finding yourself again — not to run away from "temptations," but from "duties." It means stepping out of the round dance of your surroundings, stepping out of the tyranny of harmful little habits and rules. It is a fight against wasting our strength on mere reactions, an attempt to give our strength time to build up and become *spontaneous* again. Take a close look at our scholars: they only think *reactively*, that is, they have to read something first before they can think.

4) *Festivals*. You would have to be very thick-skinned not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian values as a *weight* pressing down, under which every real festive mood goes to the devil. A festival includes: pride, high spirits, wildness; foolishness; mockery of every kind of seriousness and stuffy respectability; a godlike saying yes to life, to oneself, out of animal fullness and perfection — all states that a Christian is not honestly allowed to say yes to.

The festival is paganism in its purest form.

5) *Lack of courage in the face of one's own*

nature: *dressing it up as "moral"* —

the idea that you need no *moral formula* in order to *approve* of a feeling or passion in yourself

A measure: how far someone can say yes to the nature inside himself — how much or how little he has to fall back on morality…

6) *Death*

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Examples of the moralists'

art of slander

Until now, morality has been the great slanderer and poisoner of life.

Just think how badly someone must have been spoiled by it to write the following sentence:

"Every great pain, whether of the body or the mind, tells us what we deserve; for it could not come to us if we did not deserve it." Schopenhauer, volume II, page 666.

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On Beauty

On how the *beautiful* and the *ugly* came about. What we instinctively *dislike*, in terms of taste, is something that the longest human experience has shown to be harmful, dangerous, and worth distrusting. When the sense of taste suddenly speaks up (in disgust, for example), it contains a *judgment*. In that sense, the *beautiful* belongs to the general group of biological values: what is useful, helpful, and makes life stronger. But it works in such a way that many stimuli that only very

faintly remind us of useful things and conditions, or link to them, give us the feeling of beauty — that is, the feeling that our sense of power is increasing. (So it is not only things themselves, but also the feelings that come along with such things, or their symbols.)

This shows that the beautiful and the ugly are *conditional* — that is, they depend on our highest values for *survival*. Apart from that, trying to set up a beautiful and an ugly is meaningless. *The* Beautiful exists no more than *the* Good or *the* True. In each case it is again a matter of the *conditions of survival* for a certain kind of human being. So the *herd person* will feel *the value of beauty* in different things than the *exceptional* person and the higher human being will.

The value of the beautiful (and also of the good, and also of the true) comes from a *short-sighted way of seeing*, one that looks only at what's in the foreground and considers only the *nearest consequences*.

All instinctive judgments are *short-sighted* when it comes to the chain of consequences: they advise what to do *right now*. Reason is basically a *braking device* against reacting immediately to an instinctive judgment. It holds things up, it thinks further, it sees the chain of consequences farther and longer.

Judgments of beauty and ugliness are *short-sighted* — they always have reason *against* them — but they are *extremely persuasive*. They appeal to our instincts at the point where those instincts decide fastest and say their yes and no *before* reason even gets a chance to speak…

The most familiar ways we say "this is beautiful" *stir each other up and set each other off*. Once our sense of beauty gets to work, a whole crowd of other perfections, coming from all sorts of other places, gathers around "the one beautiful thing," the way crystals grow around a single grain. It is impossible to stay *objective*, or to switch off the power in us that interprets, adds things, fills in the gaps and makes

things up like a poet. (That power is nothing other than this chain of beauty-judgments linking up with each other.) Just think of the sight of a "beautiful woman"…

So, first: the judgment that something is beautiful is *short-sighted*. It only sees the most immediate effects.

Second: it *piles* a kind of *magic spell* onto the thing that sets it off. This spell comes from many different beauty-judgments getting linked together in our minds, but it has *nothing at all to do with what that thing really is*.

To feel that a thing is beautiful means you are bound to feel it falsely… (And that, by the way, is why marrying for love is, from society's point of view, the least sensible kind of marriage.)

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On Aesthetics.

Whether and *where* we call something "beautiful" is a question of *strength*, the strength of a single person or of a whole people. There is a feeling of fullness, of *built-up strength*, which lets us face many things boldly and cheerfully, things that make the weakling *shudder*. This feeling of *power* still calls things and situations beautiful when the instinct of weakness can only judge them as something *hateful*, as "ugly." We have a kind of nose for what we could more or less handle if it actually stood in front of us in the flesh, as a danger, a problem or a temptation. This sense also decides our yes to beauty. ("That is beautiful" is a way of *saying yes*.)

From this it follows, roughly speaking, that a *taste for questionable and terrifying things* is a sign of *strength*, while a liking for the *pretty and dainty* belongs to the weak and the delicate. *Enjoying* tragedy is a sign

of *strong* ages and strong characters. The very peak of this is perhaps Dante's Divine Comedy. It is the *heroic* spirits who say yes to themselves in the cruelty of tragedy. They are hard enough to feel suffering as *pleasure*… Now suppose, on the other hand, that *the weak* want to enjoy an art that was not made for them. What will they do to make *tragedy* taste good to them? They will read *their own feelings about values* into it. For example, they will see in it "the triumph of the moral order of the world," or the teaching that existence is worthless, or a call to give up and resign themselves. (Or else they will treat it, the way Aristotle did, as a half-medical, half-moral way of letting off pent-up emotions.) And finally, the *art of the terrifying*, because it excites the nerves, can be valued by the weak and the worn-out as a stimulant, a kind of pick-me-up. Today, for example, that is the reason people *value* Wagner's art.

How much a person can allow things to keep their terrifying, questionable character is a sign of how *well and how powerful he feels*. And so is *whether* he needs "solutions" at the end at all.

This kind of *artist's pessimism* is the exact *opposite* of *moral and religious pessimism*, which suffers from the "corruption" of humankind and from the riddle of existence. That kind of pessimism absolutely demands a solution, or at least the hope of one… The suffering, the desperate, those who distrust themselves, in a word, the sick, have at all times needed delightful *visions* in order to bear it all. (The idea of "heavenly bliss" comes from *this* source.)

A related case: the artists of decadence, who deep down have a nihilistic attitude toward life, a belief that nothing has meaning, *run away* into the *beauty of form*… into those *carefully chosen* things where nature became perfect, where it is *great* and *beautiful* without caring about anything…

So the "love of beauty" can be something other than the *ability* to *see* something beautiful or to *create* beauty. It can actually be a sign of being *unable* to do so.

The overwhelming artists, the ones who can bring a *harmonious sound* out of every conflict, are those who let their own power and their own self-rescue spill over onto things and benefit them. They express their deepest inner experience in the symbols of every work of art. Their creating is a way of giving thanks for their being.

The *depth of the tragic artist* lies in this: his sense of beauty sees the more distant consequences. He does not stop short at what is closest and most immediate. He says yes to the *grand overall household of the world*, the big picture, which justifies what is *terrifying, evil* and *questionable*, and does more than just… justify it.

169.

There is a *great literature of slander against life*. It includes the New Testament, the Church Fathers, The Imitation of Christ, Pascal and Schopenhauer. Alongside it there is also an art of slander, which backs it up. Wagner's Parsifal, for example, belongs to that.

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Note well: More hidden ways of worshipping the Christian moral ideal. First, the *soft* and *cowardly idea* of "nature" that nature-lovers dreamed up. It ignores all the instincts for what is terrifying, merciless and brutally shameless even in the "most beautiful" sides of nature. It is a kind of attempt to *read* that moral, Christian "humaneness" *into* nature. Take Rousseau's idea of nature, as if "nature" meant freedom, goodness, innocence, fairness, justice, a peaceful *idyll*… Deep down, it is always *worship of Christian morality*…

To do: collect passages showing *what* the poets really worshipped, for example in the high mountains and so on. What Goethe wanted to find in nature, and why he admired Spinoza. They were completely *unaware* of what this *worship* was based on…

Then the *soft* and *cowardly idea* of "humanity," in the style of Comte, and after Stuart Mill even, if possible, turned into something to be worshipped… It is again and again the worship of Christian morality under a new name… Free thinking, for example, as in Guyau.

Then the *soft* and *cowardly idea* of "art" as sympathy for everything that suffers and everyone who has come off badly (even *history writing*, for example Thierry's). It is again and again the worship of the Christian moral ideal.

And then the whole *socialist ideal*: nothing but a clumsy, foolish misunderstanding of that Christian moral ideal.

171.

The belief that the number of *errors* has gone down: the naive faith of the free thinkers.

Progress seen as an improvement of life you can *feel*,

as a *triumph of logic*,

as a triumph of *love* (Guyau), Fouillée,

as moving toward complete knowledge of oneself and of things, and from there toward thinking that is more *consistent with itself*.

I find that absolute monarchy, the divine right of kings, caste and slavery are all treated as *huge, obvious mistakes*.

172.

Books: The Imitation of Christ, Christian morality.

173.

Schopenhauer says of the authors of the Upanishads that they are "hardly imaginable as human beings."

174.

Desire *makes bigger* whatever we want to have. It even grows by not being satisfied. The *greatest ideas* are the ones created by the fiercest and longest-lasting desire. The more our desire for things grows, the *more value we give* them. So if "moral values" have become the *highest values*, this shows that the *moral ideal* has been the *least fulfilled* of all. That is, in so far as it *counted* as something *beyond all suffering*, as a means to *heavenly bliss*. Humankind has hugged a *cloud* with ever-growing passion, embracing something with nothing solid in it. In the end it called its own despair, its own helplessness, "God"…

175.

Hating mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher. It almost puts a question mark over his *right* to call what he does "philosophy." Precisely because he is the exception, he must protect the rule. He must help everything ordinary keep its good confidence in itself.

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Today in society there is a great deal of consideration, tact and gentleness. People widely and willingly stop short of trampling on other people's rights, and even on other people's claims. Even more wide-

spread is a certain kindly instinct that human beings in general have worth, which shows itself in all kinds of trust and credit. *Respect* for people, and not at all just for virtuous people, is perhaps the thing that separates us most sharply from a Christian way of valuing. We feel quite a bit of irony when we hear moral preachers at all. In our eyes, anyone who preaches morality lowers himself and becomes a bit of a joke.

This *moral open-mindedness* is one of the best signs of our time. When we find cases where it is clearly missing, it strikes us as a kind of sickness (the case of Carlyle in England, the case of Ibsen in Norway, the case of the Catholic priest all over Europe). If anything makes us feel at peace with our time, it is the large amount of *immorality* it allows itself, without thinking any less of itself because of it. Quite the opposite! — So what is it that makes a culture superior to a lack of culture? What makes the Renaissance, for example, superior to the Middle Ages? — Always just one thing: the large amount of immorality it *openly allows*. From this it follows, necessarily, how all the *high points* of human development must look to the eyes of moral fanatics: as the very worst of corruption, the absolute limit of decay. (— Just think of Plato's judgment of Athens in the age of Pericles, Savonarola's judgment of Florence, Luther's judgment of Rome, Rousseau's judgment of Voltaire's circle of society, and the German judgment *against* Goethe.)

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You have to add up everything that had piled up as a result of the *highest moral ideal*: how almost all *other values* had gathered and hardened around that ideal, like crystals forming around a core.

This proves that it was desired the *longest* and *most strongly* — and that it was never reached. Otherwise it would have *disappointed* people (or, put another way, it would have led to a more modest way of valuing it).

It brought the highest honor and power among people: even from the most powerful.

It was seen as the only real kind of happiness.

It gave a special right of access to God, to immortality, and sometimes even to union with God.

It gave power over nature — the 'miracle worker' (as in Wagner's Parsifal).

It gave power over God, over whether a soul is saved or damned, and so on.

The *saint* as the *most powerful kind* of human being —: *this* idea is what raised the value of moral perfection so high.

You have to imagine all of human knowledge working hard to prove that the *most moral* person is the *most powerful* and the *most godlike*.

— Conquering the senses and the desires — all of this made people *afraid*… What went against nature looked like something *above nature*, something from the *world beyond*…

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'*The Christian ideal*': staged with Jewish cleverness.

Its *basic psychological drives*, its 'nature':

: the revolt against the ruling religious power

: the attempt to take the virtues that make the *happiness of the lowest people* possible and turn them into the ideal that judges all values — and to call this *God*: the survival instinct of the layers of society with the least life in them

: the attempt to justify, through the ideal, staying completely *away* from war and resistance — and the same with obedience

: love for one another, as a result of love for God

The trick: deny all *natural motives and drives*, and twist them around into something spiritual and from the world beyond… take *virtue* and the *respect* for it and use them entirely for itself, and step by step *deny* that anything non-Christian has any virtue.

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What a sermon of resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) looks like

Samples of holy shamelessness.

Paul, First Corinthians, chapter 1, verse 20

Hasn't God turned the wisdom of this world into foolishness?

21 Because the world, with all its wisdom, did not recognize God in his wisdom, God was pleased to use foolish preaching to save those who believe in it.

26 Not many who are wise by worldly standards, not many who are powerful, not many who are of noble birth, have been called.

27 Instead, God has chosen what the world thinks is foolish, to put the wise to shame; and God has chosen what the world thinks is weak, to put to shame what is strong;

28 And God has chosen what the world thinks is low-born and despised, and what is nothing, to bring to nothing what is something;

29 So that no human being can boast in front of him.

Paul, First Corinthians, chapter 3, verse 16

Don't you know that you are God's temple, and that the Spirit of God lives in you?

17 If anyone destroys God's temple, God will destroy him; for God's temple is holy, and that temple is you.

First Corinthians, chapter 6, verse 2: Don't you know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world is going to be judged by you, aren't you good enough to judge smaller matters?

Don't you know that we will judge the angels? How much more, then, the things of this life!

*

Humanity has had to pay dearly for the way *these little people* made gods of themselves: it is Judaism *all over again*.

'The chosen people'; the world and sin standing *against* them; the holy God as an 'obsession'; sin as the only cause of suffering; everything that is *not sin* counted as only fake suffering. And against sin, a remedy that is always ready and easy…

180.

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Isn't it true that the very same bold and pious way of twisting *history* also applies to the Jewish-Christian writers who explained and told the *story of Jesus*? By that I mean outright forgery, done to prove that the priests' rulebook is valid. —

Rearranged by Paul: a) death *for* our sins; b) the meaning of the resurrection.

181.

(278)

The real thing that Christianity was able to build on was the small *Jewish family* living scattered abroad. It had warmth and tenderness. It was ready to help, to stand up for one another, in a way that was unheard of in the whole Roman Empire and perhaps not even understood there. It had the hidden pride of the "chosen ones," disguised as humility. And deep inside, it said no, without envy, to everything that was on top and had glory and power on its side. *To have seen this as a power*, to have seen that this *state of the soul* could be passed on, that it was tempting and catching, even for pagans — that was the *genius* of Paul. He guessed what his task was: to take this treasure of hidden energy and clever happiness and use it for a "Jewish church with a looser creed." He would use the whole Jewish experience and mastery of *keeping a community alive* under foreign rule, and Jewish missionary work too. What he found was exactly that completely unpolitical, set-apart kind of *little people*. Their skill at holding their ground and getting their way had been bred into them as a number of virtues. These virtues expressed the only real meaning of virtue: "a means of keeping alive and strengthening a certain kind of human being."

The principle of *love* comes from the small Jewish community. Here a *more passionate* soul glows under the ashes of humility and poverty. It was not like this among the Greeks, nor the Indians, and certainly not among the Germanic peoples. The song in praise of love that Paul wrote is not something Christian. It is a Jewish flaring-up of the eternal flame, which is Semitic. If Christianity did anything important for the human mind, it was *raising the temperature of the soul* among the

colder and nobler, more high-minded races who were on top at that time. It was the discovery that even the most miserable life can become rich and priceless if its temperature is raised…

Of course, this kind of passing-on could *not* happen with the ruling classes. The Jews and Christians had their bad manners against them. And strength and passion of the soul combined with bad manners puts people off and is almost disgusting. (— I *see* these bad manners when I read the New Testament.) You had to be related to the kind of lower-class people speaking there, through being low and in need, to feel any attraction… How you feel about the New Testament is a test of whether you have some *classical taste* in your body (compare Tacitus). If you are not revolted by it, if you do not honestly and deeply feel something of a *foul* superstition, something you pull your hand back from so as not to get dirty — then you do not know what classical means. You have to feel about the "cross" the way Goethe did —

182.

"*Salvation comes from the Jews*" — that is what the founder of Christianity said (Gospel of John 4:22). And people *believed* him!!!

183.

(279)

Let's admit what our first impression of the New Testament is: something disgusting and nasty, in bad taste, a sanctimonious hypocrite's sentimentality, nothing but nasty symbols up front; and the stale air of the back corner and the secret prayer meeting. — You do *not* feel any sympathy. Pilate, the Pharisees —

184.

(280)

The idea that it does not matter *whether something is true*, only how it *works* on people — that is a total *lack of honesty of the mind*. Everything is fine — lying, slander, the most shameless twisting of facts — as long as it helps raise that level of warmth, until people "believe" —

It is a regular school in *the means of luring people* into a faith. It holds, as a basic rule, *contempt* for all the areas where an objection might come from — reason, philosophy and wisdom, suspicion, caution. It praises and glorifies its teaching shamelessly, always claiming that it is God who gives it. It says the apostle himself means nothing. It says there is nothing here to criticize, only to believe and accept. It says that receiving such a teaching of salvation is the most extraordinary grace and favor. And it says that the deepest gratitude and humility is the state in which you must receive it…

It keeps on betting on the resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) that these low-placed people feel against everything that is honored. What draws them in is that this teaching is presented to them as the opposite of the world's wisdom and the world's power. It talks round the outcasts and the losers of every kind. It promises bliss, first place, special privilege to the most unnoticed and the humblest. It whips up the poor, small, foolish heads into a crazy self-importance, as if they were the meaning and the salt of the earth —

All of this, I say again, cannot be despised deeply enough. We will spare ourselves a *critique of the teaching* itself. It is enough to look at the means it uses to know what we are dealing with. In the whole history of the human mind there is no bolder, more naked lie, no more carefully planned wickedness, than Christianity. — But — it struck a deal with *virtue*. It shamelessly claimed the whole *magnetic power of virtue* for itself alone… It struck a deal with the power of paradox, with the craving of old civilizations for spice and for things that make no sense.

It amazed people, it outraged them, it provoked them into persecution and cruelty, —

It is exactly the same kind of *carefully planned wickedness* with which the Jewish priesthood made its power secure and with which the Jewish church was created…

We should tell two things apart: 1) that warmth of the passion called "love" (which rests on a base of heated sensuality); 2) the complete *lack of nobility* in Christianity:

— the constant exaggeration, the chattering;

— the lack of cool intelligence and irony (— there is not a single bad joke in it, and so not even a good one);

— the unsoldierly quality in all its instincts;

— the priestly prejudice against manly pride, against sensuality, against the sciences and the arts.

185.

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There is absolutely nothing of the mind in this book. "Spirit" itself only shows up as a misunderstanding.

This contrast is very central: "spirit and flesh." Here "spirit" is interpreted in a priestly way:

"It is the spirit that gives life; the flesh is of no use" — Gospel of John 6:63.

186.

The *Christians* did the same as the Jews. They took what they felt was a condition of their survival and something new, put it into their

master's mouth, and built it up around his life like a crust. In the same way, they gave all the wise sayings back to him. In short, they presented their actual life and doings as *obedience*, and so made them holy for their recruiting.

What everything depends on comes out in Paul: it is *very little*. The rest is the shaping of a type of holy man, made out of whatever counted as holy to them.

The whole "teaching of miracles," including the resurrection, comes from the community glorifying itself. Whatever it believed it could do itself, it believed its master could do to a higher degree (or rather, it drew its own strength *from* him…).

187.

The deep vulgarity of words like these: "Because of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband: it is better to marry than to burn with lust." 1 Corinthians 7:2.

188.

(282)

How even "the masters" can become

Christians. —

It is in the instinct of a *community* (tribe, family line, the herd, congregation) to feel that the states and desires it owes its survival to are *valuable in themselves* — for example obedience, give-and-take, consideration, moderation, pity. And so it is also its instinct to *push down* everything that stands in their way or goes against them.

In the same way, it is part of the instinct of those who rule (whether single people or whole social classes) to support and reward the vir-

tues that make the people under them easy to handle and obedient. These may be states of mind and feelings that are as foreign as possible to the rulers' own.

The herd instinct and the instinct of the rulers agree in praising a certain number of qualities and states of mind. But they do so for different reasons. The first does it out of direct selfishness, the second out of indirect selfishness.

The fact that the master races gave in to Christianity is mainly because they understood that Christianity is a religion of the herd, that it teaches obedience. In short, they saw that Christians are easier to rule than non-Christians. Even today, the Pope recommends Christian missionary work to the Emperor of China with exactly this hint.

On top of that, the seductive power of the Christian ideal may work most strongly on people who love danger, adventure and opposites. These are people who love anything where they put themselves at risk, but where they can also reach the very highest feeling of power. Think of Saint Teresa among the heroic instincts of her brothers. There, Christianity looks like a form of wild excess of the will, of strength of will, like a Don Quixote–style heroism, a brave but crazy fight against windmills…

189.

(283)

Paul: the unrestrained, even insane ambition of a rabble-rouser. He has a cunning cleverness that never admits to itself what he really wants, and he uses lying to himself by instinct, as a way to fascinate people. He humbles himself, and at the same time he secretly feeds others the seductive poison of feeling chosen…

190.

(284)

In Buddhism, this thought is the main one: "All desires, everything that stirs up feeling and heats the blood, pushes us to act." Only for that reason are people warned against evil. For acting has no point. Acting keeps us tied to existence, and all existence has no point. Buddhists see in evil the urge toward something illogical: saying yes to means whose goal you reject. They are looking for a way to not exist, and that is why they are horrified by every urge that comes from the feelings. For example: never take revenge! Never be anyone's enemy! Here the pleasure-seeking of tired people sets the highest standards of value. Nothing is further from the Buddhist than the Jewish fanaticism of someone like Paul. Nothing would go more against his instincts than the tension, the fire, the restlessness of the religious person. Above all, he would be repelled by the kind of sensuality that Christianity made holy under the name of "love." On top of all this, it is the educated and even over-intellectual classes who find what they need in Buddhism. They are a race that has been boiled down and worn out by centuries of philosophical battles, but they are not below all culture, like the layers of society that Christianity grew out of… In the ideal of Buddhism, getting free even of good and evil seems essential. Here a refined state beyond morality is invented, and it is the same thing as perfection. This rests on the idea that even good actions are only needed for a while, only as a tool: namely, to get free of all action.

191.

(285)

I see Christianity as the most disastrous lie of seduction there has ever been, as the great unholy lie. I drag its offspring and its out-

growths of ideals out from under every other disguise. I refuse every half-way or three-quarters attitude toward it. I force people into war with it.

The morality of little people used as the measure of all things: that is the most disgusting decline that culture has shown so far. And this kind of ideal is still left hanging over mankind as "God"!!

192.

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For the Plan

Radical nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning) is the conviction that existence simply cannot stand up, when measured by the highest values we accept. Added to that is the insight that we have not the slightest right to assume a world beyond, or a thing in itself, that would be "divine" or morality made flesh.

This insight is a result of the "truthfulness" that we have raised and trained in ourselves. So it is itself a result of believing in morality.

This is the contradiction: as long as we believe in morality, we condemn existence.

The logic of pessimism all the way to final nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning): what is driving it? The idea of worthlessness and meaninglessness. And how far moral judgments are hidden behind all other high values.

The result: moral judgments of value are condemnations and denials. Morality is turning away from the will to exist…

The problem: but what is

morality?

193.

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Pagan versus Christian

Pagan means saying yes to what is natural, feeling innocent in what is natural, "naturalness."

Christian means saying no to what is natural, feeling unworthy in what is natural, going against nature.

Petronius, for example, is "innocent." Compared with this happy man, a Christian has lost his innocence once and for all.

But in the end the Christian state must also be just a natural state, only it is not allowed to understand itself that way. So "Christian" means faking (like forging money) in how we explain the mind, turned into a basic rule…

194.

(288)

"Morality for morality's sake!" This is an important step in morality turning against nature: it now looks like the final, highest value in itself. In this phase, morality has soaked religion through with itself, as in Judaism, for example. And there is also a phase where it separates religion from itself again, and where no God is "moral" enough for it. Then it prefers an impersonal ideal… That is where we are now.

"Art for art's sake" is an equally dangerous principle. It puts a false opposite into things. In the end it comes down to slandering reality, an "idealizing" that turns things ugly. When you cut an ideal off from what is real, you push the real down, you make it poorer, you slander it. "Beauty for beauty's sake," "truth for truth's sake," "good for

goodness' sake": these are three forms of the evil eye, a hostile way of looking at what is real.

Art, knowledge and morality are tools. Instead of seeing that their purpose is to make life stronger and greater, people have linked them to something opposed to life, to "God." It is as if they were revelations of a higher world that peeks through them here and there…

"Beautiful and ugly," "true and false," "good and evil": these divisions and conflicts give away the conditions for surviving and growing. Not for human beings in general, but for certain fixed, long-lasting groups that cut their opponents off from themselves. The war that this creates is the essential thing about it. It is a way of setting oneself apart, which makes the isolation stronger…

195.

(289)

The consequence of struggle: the fighter tries to reshape his opponent into his exact opposite, in his imagination, of course.

He tries to believe in himself so strongly that he can have the courage of "the good cause," as if he himself were the good cause. It is as if reason, good taste and virtue were what his opponent is fighting against…

The faith he needs, as his strongest weapon for defense and attack, is faith in himself. But he knows how to misunderstand it as faith in God.

He never pictures the advantages and the usefulness of winning, but always only victory for victory's sake, as "God's victory."

Every small group in a fight, even single people, tries to convince itself: "We have good taste, good judgment and virtue on our side…"

The fight forces this kind of exaggeration of how highly one rates oneself…

196.

(290)

The introduction for pessimists, and at the same time against the pessimists… To those who today do not suffer from how questionable our existence is, I have nothing to say. Let them read newspapers and think about the Battle of Sedan. A word about total loneliness: anyone who does not come to me with at least a hundredth of passion and suffering has no ears for me… So far I have fought my way through on my own…

197.

(291)

"Be simple": that is a demand made of us, complicated and hard-to-pin-down people who probe into the deepest hearts of others. And the demand itself is just plain stupid… Be natural! But what if you simply *are* "unnatural"…

198.

(292)

"Unless you become like little children": oh, how far we are from that kind of childlike, naive view of the human mind!

199.

(293)

The *psychological starting point*: *lack of knowledge* and *lack of culture*, an ignorance that has forgotten all shame. Just picture these shameless saints in the middle of Athens

: the *Jewish "chosen-people instinct"*: they simply claim *all the virtues* for themselves and count the rest of the world as their opposite. That is a deep sign of a *low and vulgar soul*

: the *complete lack of real goals*, of real *tasks*, the kind that need other virtues than those of a sanctimonious hypocrite. *The state took this work off their hands*. Even so, these shameless people acted as if they had no need of the state.

The *lying* opposites

"What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of the Spirit is spirit." Gospel of John, chapter 3, verse 6

"earthly" versus "heavenly"

Truth, light, darkness, judgment: "Whoever does evil hates the light and does not come into the light, so that his deeds will not be punished. But whoever does what is true comes into the light, so that his deeds can be seen openly… And this is the judgment: that the light has come into the world, and people loved the darkness more than the light."

The horrible misuse of the

future:

The *Last Judgment* is a Christian idea, *not* a Jewish one. It is the basic idea of resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) that all rebels share.

The *deep lack of dignity* with which they judge all life outside Christian life: it is not enough for them to picture their actual enemies as low and vulgar. They need nothing less than a total slander of everything

that is not *them*… A mean and sly soul fits perfectly well with the arrogance of holiness. The first Christians are the proof.

The *future*: they make sure they get *paid well* for it… It is the *dirtiest kind of mind* there is:

Christ's whole life is told in such a way that he is helping the *prophecies* come true. He acts as he does *so that* they will be proved right…

200.

(294)

Matthew, chapter 5, verse 46: "For if you love those who love you, *what reward will you get*? Don't even the tax collectors do the same?"

"And if you are friendly only to your brothers, *what are you doing that is so special*? Don't the tax collectors do that too?"

Two motives: reward and setting yourself apart

The whole sixth chapter of Matthew works with this fine morality: if you are smart, take care never to let your good deeds become public. Because otherwise you get no reward from your Father in heaven. "Your Father, who sees what is hidden, will repay you, openly."

Chapter 6, verse 14: "For if you do not forgive people their wrongs, your Father will not forgive your wrongs either."

Every word here speaks of a deep

hostility

toward the religious practice of the ruling classes

This whole way of boiling everything down to hypocrisy and greed (chapter 6, verse 19: "Do not pile up treasures for yourselves on earth," and so on; and verse 24: "You cannot serve both God and Mammon," that is, money)

"Seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things will be given to you" (meaning food, clothes, everything you need to live, all the care for your daily life): this is simply *nonsense*. "Living from one day to the next" is actually encouraged, as a way of testing God, as a test of faith (verse 30: "If God dresses the grass of the field like this, won't he do much more for you? Oh, you people of little faith!")

Matthew, chapter 7, verse 1: "Do not judge, *so that* you will not be judged… The same measure you use on others will be used on you."

Luke, chapter 6, verse 35: "But love your enemies; do good and lend without hoping to get anything back. *Then your reward will be great*, and you will be children of the Most High."

This whole *morality of selflessness* is a grudge against the Pharisees. But the Jew gives himself away, because in the end this selflessness is also presented as the more *profitable* choice…

The gospel for the poor, the hungry, those who weep, the hated, the outcasts, those with a bad reputation

Said to encourage the disciples: "Be glad then and jump for joy, for look, your reward in heaven is great. *Their fathers treated the prophets the same way.*" (What wild cheek, to hint to this poor rabble of disciples that they may feel equal in rank to the prophets just because they share the same fate!)

And now the curse on the rich, the well-fed, the cheerful, the learned, the honored! (It is always the Pharisees: "their fathers treated the false prophets the same way.")

It is all just plain, decent, small-town respectability, and nobody needs to come down from heaven for that. Preaching morals, for example: telling the tax collectors, "Don't collect more than you are supposed

to!" or telling the soldiers, "Don't use force against anyone, and don't do anyone wrong."

This priestly intolerance

Mark, chapter 6, verse 11: "And wherever people do not welcome you or listen to you, leave that place and shake the dust off your feet, as a sign against them. I tell you truly: on Judgment Day, Sodom and Gomorrah will be better off than that town."

And now picture this poor rabble of sanctimonious hypocrites sneaking through the countryside, with curses about the Last Judgment like these in their pockets

Who can read this book without taking the side of everything it attacks? For example, the Pharisees and the scribes, the experts in religious law.

And these shameless promises, for example Mark, chapter 9, verse 1: "Truly, I tell you, some of the people standing here will not taste death before they see the kingdom of God come with power."

The New Testament gives itself away with its "for"s, its "because" reasons…

There is always holy Jewish selfishness hidden behind the self-sacrifice and self-denial. For example, Mark, chapter 8, verse 34:

"Whoever wants to follow me must deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me. *For*" (notice the "for"s in the New Testament: they hold its own disproof) "whoever wants to save his life will lose it, and whoever loses his life for my sake and for the gospel's sake will keep it."

Everything is faked and spoiled:

death as punishment; the flesh; earthly things; knowledge; eternal life as a reward

all acts of love, of charity and of a gentle, delicate soul are turned into clever tricks by the chosen ones, aimed at getting the biggest possible reward

all virtue has been robbed of its "innocence"…

The disproof of the Gospel speeches lies in *their* "for"

"And whoever causes one of these little ones who believe in me to fall, it would be better for him to have a millstone hung around his neck and be thrown into the sea." So says Jesus in Mark, chapter 9, verse 42.

"If your eye leads you into sin, throw it away. It is better for you to enter the kingdom of God with one eye than to have two eyes and be thrown into the fire of hell, where the worm never dies and the fire never goes out." Mark, chapter 9, verse 47

This is a call for *castration*, as you can see from the matching passage in Matthew, chapter 5, verse 28: "*Whoever looks at a woman and desires her has already committed adultery with her in his heart*. And if your right eye leads you into sin, tear it out and throw it away. It is better for you to lose *one part of your body* than for your whole body to be thrown into hell." (In verse 31 he is still on the subject of sex and his overly refined idea of adultery, namely that divorce already counts as adultery…)

If Christianity is nothing more than clever self-interest, then it is even cleverer self-interest to get rid of it —

201.

(295)

This was the most disastrous kind of megalomania, the most dangerous belief in one's own greatness, that has ever existed on earth. These lying little misfits, these sanctimonious hypocrites, began to claim for themselves the words "God," "Last Judgment," "truth," "love," "wisdom," and "Holy Spirit," and used them to set themselves apart from "the world." This kind of person began to *turn values around to suit themselves*, as if *they* were the meaning, the salt, the measure, and the *judge* of everyone else. When that happens, one should simply build madhouses for them and do nothing more. The fact that people *persecuted* them was a stupidity of the ancient world on a grand scale: it took them too seriously, and in doing so it turned them into something serious.

The whole disaster was made possible because a related kind of megalomania *already existed in the world*: the *Jewish* one. Once the gap had opened up between the Jews and the Christian Jews, the Christian Jews could only gain a *right to exist* by way of the Jews. So the Christian Jews *had to* use once again, for their own survival, the method of self-preservation that the Jewish instinct had invented, only pushed to its last and most extreme degree —. On the other hand, Greek moral philosophy had done everything it could to prepare a *moral fanaticism* even among Greeks and Romans, and to make it appealing to them… Plato was the great bridge that let this corruption pass across. He was the first who chose to misunderstand nature in terms of morality, who treated morality as the meaning and purpose — — —. He had already lowered the worth of the Greek gods with his idea of the *Good*, and he had already been *infected by Jewish sanctimonious hypocrisy* (— perhaps in Egypt?)

202.

(296)

The "thing in itself" makes no sense. If I imagine away all of a thing's relations, all its "qualities," and all its "activities," then the thing does *not* remain left over. That is because "thingness" is something *we have made up and added on* ourselves, out of logical needs. We did it for the sake of naming things and making ourselves understood, *not* — — — (to tie together that whole crowd of relations, qualities, and activities)

203.

(297)

Modern people have mostly used their power to idealize, when it comes to a *God*, by making him more and more *moral*. What does that mean? Nothing good. It means that human strength is shrinking —

In itself, the opposite would actually be possible, and there are signs of it. Imagine God as the state of having become free from morality: a God who pulls into himself the *whole* richness of life's opposites and, through divine suffering, *redeems* them and *justifies* them. God as what lies beyond and above the miserable street-corner morality of "good and evil," the morality of idle loafers.

The same kind of person who only wants "good weather" also only wants "good people" and good qualities in general — or at least the ever-growing rule of the good. But someone who looks with a higher, superior eye wishes for exactly the opposite: for an ever greater *rule of evil*. He wishes for people to become more and more free from the tight, fearful corset of morality. He wishes for strength to grow, so that people can put the greatest forces of nature, their passions, to work for them…

204.

(298)

However modest your demands for intellectual cleanliness may be, you cannot help feeling something like an unspeakable disgust when you come into contact with the New Testament. For the dirty, unrestrained cheek of these utterly unqualified people, who want to have their say about the great problems and even claim the right to be judges in such matters, goes beyond all limits. Look at the shameless carelessness with which they talk here about the most inaccessible problems — life, the world, God, the purpose of life — as if these were not problems at all, but simply things that these little sanctimonious hypocrites *know*

205.

(299)

To claim that things *exist* at all, things we know absolutely nothing about, precisely because there is an advantage in not being able to know anything about them — that was a naive move by Kant. It came from leftover needs that kept echoing in him, especially moral and metaphysical ones…

206.

(300)

The intolerance of morality is a sign of human *weakness*. A person is afraid of his own "immorality." He has to *deny* his strongest drives because he does not yet know how to use them… In the same way, the most fertile stretches of land stay unfarmed the longest: the strength that could master them is missing…

Notebook 11: November 1887 to March 1888

Nice, November 24, 1887

1.

(301)

You shouldn't demand anything of yourself that you can't actually do. Ask yourself: do you want to lead the way? Or do you want to go your own way? In the first case you become, at best, a shepherd, which means something the herd needs when it is in trouble. In the second case you need a different ability. You must be able to go your own way, on your own. You must be able to go differently, and to go somewhere else. In both cases you have to be able to do it. And if you can do the one, you must not want the other.

2.

(302)

Making do with whatever people come along, and keeping your heart open like a house anyone can walk into: that is generous and liberal, but it is not noble, high-minded. You can recognize the hearts that are capable of noble, high-minded hospitality by their many curtained windows and closed shutters. At the very least, they keep their best rooms empty. They are waiting for guests you do not simply 'make do' with...

3.

(303)

The price of being an artist is this: what all non-artists call 'form', you feel as the content, as 'the thing itself'. Of course, that puts you in an upside-down world. Because from then on, the content turns into something that is merely about form — and that includes our own lives.

4.

A letter reminds me of young German men, horned Siegfrieds and other Wagner fans. All respect to how easily satisfied Germans are! There are modest minds in northern Germany who are satisfied even by the intelligence of the Kreuzzeitung newspaper. Someone looking in from outside might sometimes start to suspect something. The young German Empire, in its ravenous hunger for colonies and for every bit of Africa the earth has to offer, may have accidentally swallowed those two famous dark-brown islands as well: Horneo and Borneo... ('Horneo' being a joke on 'horned', that is, a blockhead.)

5.

If you are a philosopher in the way philosophers have always been, you have no eye for what was, or for what is coming into being. You see only fixed being, what simply 'is'. But since nothing simply 'is', the only thing left over for the philosopher was the imaginary, and that became his 'world'.

6.

You hit rock bottom if you are always trying to get to the bottom of things.

7.

A caterpillar between two springs, already growing a little wing: — — —

8.

'An urge toward something better' — a polite phrase for 'going to the toilet'.

9.

(304)

Sainte-Beuve: There is nothing of a man about him. He is full of a dishonest hatred of every manly mind. He drifts around, cowardly, nosy, bored, slanderous. At bottom he is a womanish creature, with a woman's thirst for revenge and a woman's sensuality. (That sensuality keeps him hanging around monasteries and other breeding grounds of mysticism, and for a while even around the Saint-Simonians.) Apart from that, he is a true genius of médisance, of malicious gossip, with endless tricks for it. He is able, for example, to praise someone in a way that kills. He has a graceful, show-off readiness to display his skill wherever it fits, namely in front of any audience that he has some reason to fear. Of course, afterwards he takes revenge on his listeners too, inside himself, secretly, pettily, dirtily. Above all, every undeniably noble, high-minded nature has to pay for having respect for itself — because he has none! Anything manly, proud, whole, or self-assured irritates him and shakes him up until he is in revolt. So this is the psychologist 'as he ought to be': that is, measured by the standards and needs of today's French spirit. That spirit is as late in its history, as sick, as nosy, as eavesdropping, and as lustful as he is. It sniffs out secrets, as he does. It instinctively tries to get to know people from below and from behind, not much differently from the

way dogs do with each other (and dogs, after all, are psychologists too, in their way). He is common and coarse at heart, and his instincts are related to Rousseau's: and therefore he is a Romantic. For underneath all Romanticism, the mob grunts and lusts after 'nobility'. He is a revolutionary, but fear still keeps him fairly well in check. He is not free in front of anything that has strength: public opinion, the Academy, the court, even Port-Royal. In the end he is sick of himself. Early on he already stopped believing in his right to exist. He is a mind that wasted itself from youth onward, that feels itself wasted, that seems to itself to grow ever thinner and older. That thing lives on in the end, from one day to the next, purely out of cowardice. That thing grows bitter against everything great in people and in things, against everything that believes in itself. For, sadly, it is poet enough and half-woman enough still to feel greatness as power. It keeps writhing, like that famous worm, because it constantly feels trampled by something great. As a critic, he has no standards, no backbone, nothing to stand on. He has the tongue of the cosmopolitan libertine, the free-living pleasure-seeker, ready to enjoy all sorts of things, but he lacks the courage even for an openly admitted libertine life. And so he submits to a vague classicism. As a historian, he has no philosophy and no power in his gaze. He instinctively refuses the job of judging in all the important matters, and he holds up the mask of 'objectivity' in front of himself (which makes him one of the worst role models that recent France has had). The exception, of course, is small matters, where a refined and worn-out taste is the highest authority. There he really does have the courage to be himself and the pleasure of being himself. (In this he is related to the Parnassian poets, who, like him, represent the most refined and vain form of modern self-contempt and self-surrender.) 'Sainte-Beuve once saw the first Emperor, Napoleon. It was in Boulogne, and the Emperor was in the middle of peeing. Isn't it more or less in that position that he has seen and judged all great men ever since?' (Journal of the Goncourts, volume 2,

page 239) — that is the story told by his spiteful enemies, the Goncourt brothers.

10.

Types of decadence.

The Romantics

The 'free spirits' — Sainte-Beuve

The actors.

The nihilists (people who believe nothing has meaning).

The artistes.

The brutal ones

The delicate ones.

11.

'In love, the only victory is running away.' — Napoleon.

12.

'A dog going back to its own vomit.'

13.

'Philosophers are not made to love one another. Eagles do not fly in flocks. Leave that to partridges and starlings... To soar high above and to have claws: that is the fate of great geniuses.' — Galiani.

14.

'Chance: the father of good fortune, and often the stepfather of virtue.' — Galiani.

15.

('Neither love nor the gods: this double pain is killing us.' — Sully Prudhomme.)

16.

Behind all the moralizing scribbles of this little country woman, George Eliot, I always hear the excited voice of every beginner woman writer: 'I will look at myself, I will read myself, I will go into raptures and say: Is it possible that I was so clever?...'

17.

The newspapers: the morning vomit.

18.

'If you have a garden and a library, you will lack nothing.' — Cicero.

19.

'We know what a woman in a rage can do.' — Virgil, Aeneid, Book 5, line 6.

20.

'A cheerful monster is better than a boring sentimental person.'

21.

'How a human being makes himself eternal' (Dante, Inferno, Canto 15, line 85)

22.

'I am my own successor — I keep following after myself,' I say, like that old man in a play by Lope de Vega, and I smile the way he did. Because I honestly no longer know how old I already am, or how young I am still going to be...

23.

— even then you still have plenty of reasons to be content and even grateful, even if only in the way of that old flirt who came home from a romantic date as if it had gone splendidly. 'Even if the strength is missing,' he told himself, with the gentleness of a saint, 'the pleasure still deserves praise.'

24.

(305)

George Sand. I read the first of her 'Letters of a Traveler'. Like everything that comes from Rousseau, they are false, false to the core, full of moralizing lies, just like she herself was, this so-called 'artist'. I can't stand this colorful, wallpaper-like style. Nor can I stand this worked-up ambition of common people to have 'noble, high-minded' passions, heroic poses, and thoughts that come across as just more poses. How *cold* she must have been the whole time, cold like Victor Hugo, like Balzac, like all true Romantics. And how pleased with herself she must have lain there, this broad, fertile cow. There was something German about her, just like Rousseau himself. In any case, she was only *possible* at the very end of all French taste and French wit… And yet Ernest Renan worships her…

25.

(306)

There are people who are destinies. By carrying themselves, they carry destinies. They are the whole kind of *heroic* load-bearers. Oh, how gladly they would like to rest from themselves for once! How they thirst for strong hearts and strong shoulders, so that for a few hours at least they could be free of what weighs on them! And how hopelessly they thirst!… They wait. They look closely at everything that passes by. But no one comes toward them with even a thousandth of their suffering and passion. No one guesses *in what way* they are waiting… At last, at last they learn their first lesson in how to live wisely: *not* to wait any longer. And soon after that they learn their second: to be friendly, to be modest, to put up with everyone from now on, to put up with everything. In short, to *carry* a little bit *more* than they have already been carrying…

26.

(307)

And anyone who looks without prejudice at the conditions under which any kind of *perfection* is reached here on earth will notice how much that is strange and embarrassing belongs to those conditions. It seems that every great growth needs dung and manure of some kind. To take a surprising example: on the question of how the modern woman becomes more perfect, there is an expert who should perhaps not be underestimated on this touchy subject. That is the Duke de Morny, the most experienced and 'most lived' judge of women in recent France. He claimed that even a vice could help with this, namely love between women. In his words, it 'refines a woman, perfects her, completes her.'

Nice, November 25, 1887.

27.

(308)

Mrs. Cosima Wagner is the only woman of a larger caliber that I have ever met. But I hold it against her that she *spoiled* Wagner. How did that happen? He did not 'deserve' such a woman, and as his thanks for that, he *fell under her spell*. Wagner's opera Parsifal was, first and foremost, Wagner lowering his taste to suit the Catholic instincts of his wife, the daughter of Liszt. It was a kind of gratitude and humility from a weaker, more complicated, more suffering creature, looking up to one who knew how to protect and encourage, that is, to one who was stronger and more narrow-minded. In the end it was even an act of man's eternal *cowardice* before everything 'eternally feminine'. Have not all great artists so far been *spoiled* by worshipping women? These senselessly vain and sensual apes, for that is what nearly all of them are, experience for the first time and up close the *idol worship* that a woman knows how to practice in such cases, with all her lowest and highest desires. Then it is over soon enough. The last bit of critical judgment, of self-contempt, of modesty, and of shame before something greater is gone. From then on they are capable of any kind of *decline*. These artists, in the harshest and strongest period of their growth, had reasons enough to despise their followers wholesale. These artists who have grown silent inevitably become the victims of the first *intelligent* love that comes along. Or rather, of any woman who is intelligent enough to *act* intelligently about what is most personal to the artist, to 'understand' him as a sufferer, to 'love' him…

28.

A man falls under the spell of the woman he does not deserve.

Woman, born to worship idols, spoils the idol, that is, her husband.

29.

The cause of the fact *that* there is any development at all cannot itself be found by studying development. One should not try to understand it as something 'still becoming', and even less as something that has 'become'…

the 'will to power' cannot have come into being over time

30.

(309)

To reach a height, a bird's-eye view, from which you understand how everything really goes just *the way it ought to go*. From there you see how every kind of 'imperfection', and the suffering it causes, also belongs within the *highest wishful ideal*…

31.

(310)

The overall picture of the future European: the most intelligent slave animal, very hard-working, at bottom very modest, curious to the point of excess, many-sided, pampered, weak-willed. A worldwide chaos of feelings and minds. How could a *stronger* kind of human rise up out of him? A kind with *classical* taste? Classical taste means this: the will to simplify, to strengthen, to make happiness visible, to be fearsome, and the courage to be psychologically *naked*. (Simplifying follows from the will to strengthen. Letting happiness be seen, and nakedness too, follows from the will to be fearsome…) To fight your way up out of that chaos into this *shape*, you need to be *forced*. You must face the choice of either going under or *winning through*. A ruling

race can only grow up out of terrible and violent beginnings. The problem is: where are the *barbarians* of the 20th century? Clearly they will only become visible and get established after enormous socialist crises. They will be the people who are capable of the *greatest hardness toward themselves* and who can guarantee the *longest-lasting will*…

32.

(311)

On the Psychology of the 'Shepherds'. The Great Average Men.

Can we hide from ourselves the fact that a mind and a taste must be *average* in order to leave deep, broad, popular effects behind? For example, it must *not* be taken as an insult to Voltaire that the Abbé Trublet, with every right, called him 'the perfection of mediocrity'. (If he had not been that, if he had been *the exception*, the way the Neapolitan Galiani was an exception, that deepest and most thoughtful clown that cheerful century produced, where then would his power to *lead* have come from? Where would his dominance over his age have come from?) By the way, one could claim the same thing about a much more popular case. The founder of Christianity, too, must have had something of a 'perfection of mediocrity' about him. Just try letting the main statements of that famous gospel, the Sermon on the Mount, take shape as a single *person*. Afterward you will no longer doubt why exactly such a shepherd and mountain preacher was so tempting to every kind of *herd* animal.

33.

(312)

'I have an almost instinctive belief that every powerful man lies when he speaks, and all the more so when he writes.' — Stendhal.

34.

(313)

Flaubert could stand neither Mérimée nor Stendhal. You could make him furious by quoting 'Monsieur Beyle', that is, Stendhal, in front of him. The difference is this: Beyle comes from Voltaire, Flaubert comes from Victor Hugo.

The 'men of 1830' (men?…) worshipped *love* in a senseless way, people like Alfred de Musset and Richard Wagner. They did the same with wild living and vice…

'I am a man of 1830! I learned to read from Hugo's play Hernani, and I would have wanted to be Byron's hero Lara! I loathe all the cowardice of our times, the dullness of everyday life, and the disgrace of easy happiness.' Flaubert.

35.

(314)

Sexuality, the urge to rule, the delight in illusion and in deception, the great joyful gratitude for life and its typical states: these are essential to pagan worship, and they have a clear conscience on their side. What goes against nature (already in ancient Greece) fights against the pagan, in the form of morality and of logical argument.

Nice, December 15, 1887

36.

What decides your rank is the amount of power that you are. Everything else is cowardice.

37.

Anyone whose instinct is set on a ranking of people and values hates the in-between things and the people who make in-between things. Everything *middling* is his enemy.

38.

(315)

Sometimes we are so full that it presses on us. Forces keep growing inside us, but they don't yet know how to let themselves out. From this pressure and tension comes a state like the one before a thunderstorm: the nature that we are grows *dark and gloomy*. That, too, is pessimism… Now imagine a teaching that puts an end to this state by *giving an order* of some kind. Imagine a rethinking of values that shows all that piled-up force a path, a direction to go in, so that it bursts out in lightning and in deeds. Such a teaching doesn't have to be a teaching about happiness at all. By setting free a force that was squeezed and dammed up until it hurt, *it brings happiness*.

39.

— people I have little sympathy for. I count them among the crabs. First of all, if you have anything to do with them, they pinch you. And second — they walk backwards.

40.

— soft hearts made of milk, as warm as it comes from the cow

41.

A tired traveler who is greeted by the harsh barking of a dog.

42.

— a runaway who sat in prison for a long time, afraid of a jailer with a stick. Now he goes on his way full of fear, and even the shadow of a stick is enough to make him stumble.

43.

— virtue in the Renaissance style: Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing

44.

(316)

When someone risks his life, his health, or his honor, it comes from high spirits and from a will that overflows and spends itself freely. It is not done out of love for other people. It is done because every great danger challenges our curiosity: how much strength do we have, and how much courage?

45.

(317)

Emerson is much more enlightened, more many-sided, more refined, and happier. He is the kind of person who by instinct feeds on the food of the gods and leaves behind whatever in things can't be digested. Carlyle loved him very much, but still said of him: "He doesn't give *us* enough to chew on." That may be true, but it is in no way a point against Emerson.

Carlyle is a man of strong words and odd, showy poses. He is a speechmaker because he *has* to be. He is constantly irritated by a longing for a strong faith, and by the feeling that he isn't capable of it — and that is exactly what makes him a typical Romantic. But longing

for a strong faith is no proof of having a strong faith. In fact, it shows the opposite. If you *have* a strong faith, it shows in the fact that you *can afford* the luxury of doubt and of light-hearted unbelief — you are simply rich *enough* for that. Carlyle numbs something inside himself through the violence of his worship for people with strong faith, and through his rage against everyone who is less simple-minded. This constant, passionate *dishonesty* toward himself — to put it in moral terms — disgusts me about him. That the English admire him precisely for his honesty is very English. And since they are the people of perfect cant — of empty, pious talk — it is even fair, not just understandable. Deep down, Carlyle is an atheist who doesn't want to be one. —

46.

In these fighting essays, in which I carry on my campaign against the most disastrous value judgment we have had so far — against our *overrating of morality* —

A word of peace like this, as is only fair, stands at the end of these warlike essays, with which I began my campaign against one of our most disastrous value judgments: against the way we have valued morality so far, and *overrated it*.

47.

— Soggy ideals and other thawing winds

48.

(318)

A mind that wants something great, and that also wants the means to get it, is necessarily a skeptic — though that doesn't mean it has to look like one. Being free of every kind of conviction is part of its

strength: being *able* to look at things freely. Its great passion is the ground and the power of its being, and that passion is even more enlightened and more of a tyrant than the mind itself. It puts the mind's whole intelligence to work in its service (and doesn't just own it). It frees the mind from hesitation. It gives the mind the courage to use unholy means (and even holy ones). It allows convictions, it uses convictions and uses them up, but it never submits to them. That is because the passion alone knows that it is the ruler. It is the other way around with the need for faith, the need for something absolute, a plain yes or no. That is a need that comes from weakness. All weakness is weakness of will. And all weakness of will comes from having no passion, no absolute command, giving the orders. The person of *faith*, the "believer" of any kind, is necessarily a dependent kind of person. That means a person who cannot set *himself* up as a goal, and cannot set up goals on his own at all — a person who has to let himself be *used up* as a means for someone else… This kind of person instinctively gives the highest honor to a morality of self-denial. Everything talks him into it: his cleverness, his experience, his vanity. And *faith*, too, is just another form of self-denial. —

49.

(319)

There is a huge realm of art that is anti-German and will stay that way, and German young men, horned Siegfrieds, and other Wagner fans are shut out of it once and for all. From that realm comes Bizet's stroke of genius. He gave a voice and a sound to a new — oh, and yet so old — kind of feeling, one that had never yet found a language in Europe's *educated* music. It is a more southern feeling, browner, more sunburnt, which of course can't be understood from the soggy idealism of the North. It is African happiness, a cheerfulness that accepts fate, with an eye that looks at you in a way that is seductive, deep,

and terrifying. It is the sensual sadness of the Moorish dance. It is passion that flashes, sharp and sudden like a dagger. And it is scents drifting in from the yellow afternoons by the sea, which make the heart jump with fright, as if it remembered forgotten islands where it once lived, where it should have stayed forever…

Anti-German:

The comic singer. The Moorish dance

The other anti-German treasures of artistic pleasure

50.

The 'real' world, however people have imagined it so far, has always been just the world of appearances *all over again*.

51.

You need guts to allow yourself something wicked. Most people are too cowardly for it.

52.

"Caesar among pirates"

53.

and among these poets you find stallions that neigh in a chaste way

54.

(320)

On the Rule

of Virtue.

How to Help Virtue

Come to Power.

A political treatise.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Preface.

This political essay is not meant for everyone's ears. It is about the politics of virtue: the tools and paths virtue uses to gain power. Virtue wants to rule. Who would forbid it that? But how it goes about it! You would not believe it... That is why this essay is not meant for everyone's ears. We have written it for the benefit of those who want to learn, not how to become virtuous, but how to make others virtuous. In other words, how to bring virtue to power. I even want to prove this: if you want this one thing, the rule of virtue, then on principle you must not want the other thing. And by doing so, you give up on becoming virtuous yourself. That is a big sacrifice. But a goal like this may be worth sacrifices. Even bigger ones!... And some of the great moralists have risked that much. For they had already seen and grasped ahead of time the truth that this essay means to teach openly for the first time. That truth is this: you can reach the rule of virtue only by the very same means you use to reach any kind of rule at all. In any case, not by means of virtue... As I said, this essay is about the politics inside virtue. It sets up an ideal of this politics. It describes it as it would have to be if anything on this earth could be perfect. Now, no philosopher will doubt what the model of perfection in politics is: it is Machiavellianism, the cunning, ruthless art of power taught by Machiavelli. But Machiavellianism in its pure form, unmixed, raw, fresh, in all its strength and all its harshness, is beyond human, godlike, out of this world. Humans never reach it. At most

they brush against it... In this narrower kind of politics too, the politics of virtue, the ideal seems never to have been reached. Even Plato only brushed against it. If you have eyes for hidden things, you can find traces even in the most open-minded and self-aware moralists. And 'moralists' is the name for such politicians of morality, for every kind of founder of new moral powers. You find traces that they too paid their tribute to human weakness. All of them, at least when they were tired, also wanted virtue for themselves. That is the first and biggest mistake a moralist can make. For a moralist must be an immoralist (one who rejects morality) in his actions. That he must not look like one is another matter. Or rather, it is not another matter. Such a basic denial of oneself, in moral terms, such pretending, belongs to the rulebook of the moralist and to his very own sense of duty. Without it he will never reach his kind of perfection. Freedom from morality, and also from truth, for the sake of that goal which outweighs every sacrifice: the rule of morality. That is what the rulebook says. Moralists need the pose of virtue, and the pose of truth too. Their mistake only begins where they give in to virtue, where they lose control over virtue, where they themselves become moral and truthful. Among other things, a great moralist must also be a great actor. His danger is that his act might quietly become his true nature. For his ideal is to keep what he is and what he does apart in a godlike way. Everything he does, he must do as if it were good, in the light of goodness. What a lofty, distant, demanding ideal! A godlike ideal!... And in fact people say that the moralist is copying no lesser model than God himself. God, the greatest immoralist in action there is, who nevertheless knows how to remain what he is: the good God...

55.

(321)

Christianity should never be forgiven for ruining people like Pascal. We should never stop fighting this very thing in Christianity: that it has the will to break precisely the strongest and most noble, high-minded souls. We should never rest as long as this one thing has not been completely wiped out: the ideal of the human being that Christianity invented. All the rest of the absurd Christian fairy tales, the cobwebs of ideas spun by theology, does not concern us. It could be a thousand times more absurd, and we would not lift a finger against it. But we do fight that ideal. With its sickly beauty and its seductive, womanly charm, with its secret slanderous way of talking, it sweet-talks all the cowardice and vanity of souls that have grown tired. And even the strongest have tired hours. It persuades them that everything that may seem most useful and desirable in such moods is also the most useful and desirable in itself: trust, innocence, modesty, patience, love for one's equals, surrender, devotion to God, a kind of unharnessing and giving up of one's whole self. It persuades them that the small, humble, misshapen soul, the virtuous average animal, the human being as a sheep of the herd, not only ranks above the stronger kind of human being, but is actually the ideal, the goal, the measure, the highest wishful ideal for humanity as a whole. That stronger kind is more wicked, more greedy, more defiant, more wasteful, and for that very reason a hundred times more endangered. Setting up this ideal has so far been the most sinister temptation that humans have ever faced. For it threatened with ruin the stronger, better-made exceptions and lucky strokes among humans, those in whom the will to power and the growth of the whole human type take a step forward. With its values, it meant to dig away at the roots of these 'more-than-humans', who, for the sake of their higher demands and tasks, willingly accept a more dangerous life as well. In business terms, that means both higher investment costs and a lower chance of success. What do we fight in Christianity? That it wants to break the strong. That it wants to discourage their courage, take advantage of

their bad hours and their tiredness, and turn their proud confidence into worry and a troubled conscience. That it knows how to make noble instincts poisoned and sick, until their strength, their will to power, turns backwards and against itself. Until the strong are destroyed by wild excesses of self-contempt and self-abuse. That horrible way of being destroyed, whose most famous example is Pascal.

56.

(322)

Zola: he is in a kind of contest with Taine. He learns Taine's methods for becoming a sort of dictator in a world full of doubters. That is why he makes his principles cruder on purpose, so that they work like orders.

57.

To understand something: does that mean to approve of it?

58.

(323)

Not knowing yourself is the clever trick of the idealist. The idealist is a creature that has reasons to stay in the dark about itself. And it is clever enough to stay in the dark about those reasons too.

59.

(324)

Then there is the literary woman. She is unsatisfied and restless, and empty in her heart and in her gut. All the time she listens, with painful curiosity, for the command that rises from deep inside her body and states flatly, in Latin: "either children or books." She is

educated enough to understand the voice of nature even when it speaks Latin. And she is ambitious enough to also speak French to herself in secret: "I will see myself, I will read myself, I will go into raptures, and I will say: Is it possible that I had so much wit?"

The perfect woman commits literature the way she commits a small sin. She does it as an experiment, in passing, glancing around to see whether anyone notices, and making sure that someone does. She knows how well a small spot of rot and brown decay suits a perfect woman. She knows even better how writing books works on a woman: it puts a question mark over all her other kinds of feminine modesty.

60.

(325)

The Confusion of Modern Times

I cannot see what people plan to do with the European worker. He is doing far too well not to demand more and more, step by step, and to demand it more boldly. After all, in the end he has the numbers on his side. All hope is gone that a modest, contented kind of person could grow out of this: a kind of slavery in the mildest sense of the word, in short, a fixed social class, something that stays the same. People have trained the worker to be a good soldier. They have given him the right to vote and the right to form unions. They have done everything to ruin the instincts on which a calm, obedient working class could have been built, the kind of patient labor class people imagine in China. So today the worker already feels his life is an emergency, or in moral terms an injustice, and he makes others feel it too. But what do people actually want? I ask again. If you want a goal, you have to want the means to reach it. If you want slaves, and we do need them, then you must not raise them to be masters.

61.

(326)

"The total amount of pain outweighs the total amount of pleasure. So it would be better if the world did not exist than if it does." Chatter like this calls itself pessimism today.

"The world is something that, if things were reasonable, would not exist, because it causes the feeling creature more pain than pleasure."

Pleasure and pain are side effects, not causes. They are second-rank judgments of value, which only come from some ruling value above them. They are a "useful" or "harmful" that speaks in the form of a feeling, and so they are completely fleeting and dependent. For with every "useful" or "harmful" you still have to ask a hundred different questions: useful for what? Harmful for what?

I despise this pessimism of oversensitive feelings. It is itself a sign that life has grown deeply poor. I will never allow a scrawny ape like Hartmann to talk about his "philosophical pessimism."

62.

(327)

The actor Talma said:

"Yes, we actors must be sensitive. We must feel emotion, but only so that we can imitate it better, so that we can grasp its character better through study and thought. Our art demands deep study and thought. On stage, you cannot make things up on the spot, or you will fail. Everything is calculated. Everything must be planned ahead: the emotion that seems sudden, and the confusion that looks involuntary. The tone of voice, the gesture, the look that seem inspired have all been rehearsed a hundred times. The dreaming poet searches for a beauti-

ful line of verse, the musician for a melody, the mathematician for a proof. None of them cares more about it than we care about finding the gesture and the tone that best express the meaning of a single half-line. A real actor who loves his art carries this study with him everywhere. Shall I tell you more? When we love our art, you see, we become objects of study for ourselves. I have suffered very cruel losses. I have often felt deep grief. Well, after the first moments, when the pain comes out in cries and tears, I felt that, without meaning to, I was turning back to look at my own suffering. Inside me, without my knowing it, the actor was studying the man and catching nature in the act. That is how we must feel emotion so that one day we can show it. But not on the spur of the moment, and not on stage when all eyes are on us. Nothing would put us more at risk. Just recently I was acting in the play 'Misanthropy and Repentance' with a wonderful actress. Her acting was so carefully thought out, and yet so natural and so true, that it carried me away. She noticed it. What a triumph! And yet she whispered to me: 'Careful, Talma, you are moved!' Because it is true: emotion leads to confusion. The voice fails, the memory gives out, the gestures are wrong, and the effect is ruined! Ah, we are not nature. We are only art, and art can only try to imitate."

63.

Lessing ranked Molière below Destouches.

Lessing's play Minna von Barnhelm is "a carefully reasoned piece of fancy, flirtatious chatter in the style of Marivaux."

64.

A Chinese saying: "Since my beloved has moved into my heart, I take care not to eat hot food, so that the heat will not bother him."

"Even if you saw your own mother dying of hunger, do nothing that goes against virtue."

"Be like the turtle, which pulls its five limbs back into its shell. If you pull your five senses back into yourself, this will still help you after death: you will receive heavenly happiness."

65.

"People are surprised by how much Montaigne hesitates and holds back in his arguments. But his book had been put on the Vatican's list of banned books, and all sides had long been suspicious of him. So perhaps he chose, on his own, to soften his dangerous tolerance and his slandered fairness, the way a mute softens an instrument, by turning them into a kind of question. That was already a lot for his time: a humane spirit that doubts."

66.

Mérimée, who is excellent as a jeweler of vices and as an engraver of deformities, belongs to the movement of 1830. But he belongs to it not through passion, which he lacks, but through the newness of his calculated technique and his bold choice of subjects.

67.

"Inner baths," to put it modestly, the way Madame Valmore would.

68.

"Nothing brings bad luck like a good deed."

69.

(328)

Sainte-Beuve said: "Young people are too fiery to have good taste.

To have taste, it is not enough to have the ability to enjoy the beautiful and gentle things of the mind. You also need free time, and a soul that is free and open, that has become almost innocent again. It must not be handed over to passions, not be busy, not be tormented by harsh worries and practical anxieties. It must be a soul that wants nothing for itself, and is even free from the too-hot fire of creating its own work, not in the grip of its own cheeky inspiration. You need rest, forgetting, silence, and space around you. So many conditions, even when you have the ability to find them, just to enjoy delicate things!"

70.

At a performance of the play Christine by Alexandre Dumas: the actor Joanny's character holds a pass signed by the queen. Just as he is about to use it, he changes his mind and tucks the paper away, saying: "Let us save its power for greater needs."

71.

(329)

Displeasure and pleasure are the dumbest possible *ways of expressing* judgments. Of course, that does not mean the judgments that get voiced this way have to be dumb themselves. Leaving out every reason and every bit of logic, boiling a yes or a no down to a passionate wanting-to-have or pushing-away, a short command whose usefulness is obvious: that is what pleasure and displeasure are. They come from the central part of the intellect. They depend on an incredibly sped-up process of noticing, sorting, grouping, calculating and drawing conclusions. Pleasure and displeasure are always end results, never 'causes'…

What is going to cause displeasure or pleasure depends on how much power someone has. The very same thing that looks like a danger to someone with only a little power, forcing him to defend himself as fast as he can, can bring a thrilling, delicious excitement, a feeling of pleasure, to someone who is more aware of having plenty of power.

All feelings of pleasure and displeasure already assume a *measuring by overall usefulness and overall harm*. So they belong to an area where someone wants a goal (a certain state) and chooses the means to reach it. Pleasure and displeasure are never 'basic, original facts'.

Feelings of pleasure and displeasure are *reactions of the will (emotions)*. In them, the thinking center settles how much certain changes that have happened are worth compared to the overall worth, and at the same time it starts off counter-actions.

72.

(330)

If the movement of the world had a final goal state, it would have to have reached it already. But the one basic fact is that it has *no* goal state. And any philosophy or scientific theory (for example mechanism, the idea that the world is a machine) that needs such a goal state is *disproved* by this one fact… I am looking for a picture of the world that does justice to *this* fact. Change should be explained without running to such final purposes. Change must look justified at every single moment (or *impossible to value lower*, which comes to the same thing). The present must absolutely not be justified for the sake of some future, and the past must not be justified for the sake of the present. 'Necessity' should not be pictured as one overarching, ruling total force, or as a first mover that set everything going; and even less as something needed in order to bring about something valuable. For this, we have to deny any total consciousness of change, any 'God', so

that events are not seen through the eyes of a being who feels along with everything, knows along with everything, and yet *wants* nothing. A 'God' is useless if he does not want something. And on the other hand, such a God would mean an *adding up of displeasure and illogic*, which would lower the total value of 'change'. Luckily, just such an adding-up power is missing. (A suffering, all-seeing God, a 'total sense organ' and 'all-mind', would be the *greatest objection against being*.)

To put it more strictly: we *must not allow anything with fixed being at all*, because then change loses its value and looks downright meaningless and pointless.

So we have to ask how the illusion of fixed being could come about (and indeed had to come about),

and likewise, how all judgments of value that rest on the assumption that there is fixed being lose their worth.

But in doing this we realize that this *assumption of fixed being* is the source of all *slandering of the world*:

'the better world, the "real" world, the world "beyond", the thing in itself'

1)

change has *no goal state*; it does not flow into a

'fixed being'.

2)

change is *not a state of mere appearance*; maybe it is the world of *fixed being* that is the appearance.

3)

change has equal value at every moment: the sum of its value always stays the same. *In other words: it has no value at all*, because there is

nothing to measure it against, nothing in relation to which the word 'value' would make sense.

the *total value of the world cannot be valued lower*, and so philosophical pessimism belongs among the comical things

73.

(331)

The point of view of 'value' is the point of view of the *conditions for preserving and increasing* complex structures that last a relatively long time as living things inside the flow of change:

— there are no lasting final units, no atoms, no monads (tiny basic units of being). Here too, 'fixed being' is something we ourselves *put into* things (for practical, useful reasons that come from our own point of view)

— 'structures of rule'; the area that does the ruling keeps growing, or shrinks and grows again in cycles; or it does so depending on whether circumstances are favorable or unfavorable (food supply —)

— 'value' is basically the point of view for the growing or shrinking of these ruling centers ('multitudes' in any case, but 'unity' does not exist at all in the nature of change)

— *a quantity of power*, a change, in so far as nothing in it has the character of 'fixed being'; in so far as

— the tools of language are useless for expressing change. It is part of our *unbreakable need to survive* that we keep setting up a coarser world of lasting things, of 'things' and so on. In a relative sense, we may talk about atoms and monads. And one thing is certain: the *tiniest world is the one that lasts the longest*…

there is no will: there are only points of will that keep increasing or losing their power

74.

(332)

— that in the 'process of the whole', the work of humanity does not count, because there is no overall process at all (thought of as a system —):

— that there is no 'whole'; that *all lowering of the value of human existence* and of human goals cannot be done by comparing them to something that does not even exist…

— that necessity, cause and effect, and purposefulness are useful *mere appearances*

— that the goal is *not* more consciousness, but more power; and the usefulness of consciousness is counted as part of that increase, with pleasure just as much as with displeasure

— that we must not take the *means* as the highest measure of value (so not states of consciousness like pleasure and pain, if consciousness itself is only a means —)

— that the world is not an organism at all, but chaos; that the development of 'mind' is a means for an organization to last for a relatively long time…

— that every 'wishful ideal' has no meaning when it comes to the overall character of being.

75.

(333)

It is *not* the satisfying of the will that causes pleasure. I especially want to fight against this most shallow theory. The absurd psychological faking (like forging money) about the things closest to us…

Rather, the will wants to push forward and keeps becoming master over whatever stands in its way. The feeling of pleasure lies precisely in the will *not* being satisfied, in the fact that without limits and resistance it is not yet full enough…

'The happy person': an ideal of the herd

76.

(334)

The normal *lack of satisfaction* of our drives, for example hunger, the sex drive, the urge to move, has nothing depressing about it at all. Instead, it stirs up and teases our feeling of being alive, just as any rhythm of small painful stimuli *strengthens* that feeling, whatever the pessimists may try to tell us. This lack of satisfaction, instead of spoiling life for us, is life's great *stimulant*.

— Maybe we could describe pleasure in general as a rhythm of small stimuli of displeasure…

77.

(335)

The more resistance a force looks for in order to master it, the bigger the amount of failure and disaster it invites. And since every force can only let itself out on something that resists it, every action necessarily contains an *ingredient of displeasure*. But this displeasure works as a stimulus of life, and it strengthens the *will to power*!

78.

(336)

The most *intellectual and spiritual* people, as long as they are also the bravest, also go through by far the most painful tragedies. But that is exactly why they honor life: because it sets the *greatest opposition* against them…

79.

(337)

The means Julius Caesar used to defend himself against sickliness and headaches were enormous marches, a simple way of life, staying outdoors without a break, and constant hardships. Seen in broad terms, these are the conditions that keep genius alive in general.

80.

(338)

Beware of morality: it makes us worth less in our own eyes —

Beware of pity: it loads us down with other people's troubles —

Beware of 'intellectuality': it spoils character by making a person extremely lonely: lonely, that is, unbound, not tied to anything…

81.

— only change is felt, but not dying (?) —

82.

The meaning of change must be fulfilled, reached and completed at every single moment.

83.

(339)

What people call a good deed is just a misunderstanding. Deeds like that are not even possible.

"Selfishness" is a made-up idea that ordinary people believe in, and so is "selflessness." The same goes for the individual, and for the soul.

Inside a living body, a huge number of things are happening all at once. The part we are aware of is only a tiny corner of it. And the little bit of "virtue," "selflessness" and similar made-up ideas is proven completely false by everything else that goes on in the body. We would do well to study our body as it really is: totally without morals…

The basic animal functions, like eating and growing, are in principle a million times more important than all our lovely moods and high states of mind. Those higher states are something extra, a leftover, except where they have to serve as tools for the animal functions.

All of our conscious life, the mind along with the soul, along with the heart, along with kindness, along with virtue: whom does it really work for? It works to make the tools of our basic animal functions as good as possible, the tools for feeding and for growing stronger. Above all, it works for making life stronger and greater.

So much more depends on what people used to call "the body" and "the flesh." The rest is just a small add-on. The task is to keep spinning the whole chain of life, and to do it in such a way that the thread keeps getting stronger. That is the task. But now look how the heart, the soul, virtue and the mind practically plot together to turn this basic task upside down, as if they themselves were the goals… The main reason life goes bad is that consciousness is extraordinarily

good at making mistakes. Instincts keep it on the shortest leash of all, so it goes wrong for the longest time and in the deepest way.

Imagine judging whether life is worth living by whether this consciousness feels pleasant or unpleasant. Can you think of a wilder piece of vanity? Consciousness is only a tool, and pleasant or unpleasant feelings are also only tools! So what is the true, objective measure of value? Only the amount of power that has grown and become organized. In other words, it is measured by what happens in everything that happens: a will to have more…

84.

The "mind" taken as the true nature of the world; logic taken as the very essence of things

85.

(340)

With alcohol and hashish, people take themselves back to earlier stages of human culture, stages they have left behind, or at least outlived. Every kind of food reveals something about the past that we grew out of.

86.

Even the wise man often acts like those foolish women who think milk is not real food, but turnips are:

87.

(341)

All the beauty and greatness that we have lent to things, real and imagined, I want to claim back as what belongs to humans and was

made by humans. That would be the finest defense of humankind. Humans as poets, as thinkers, as God, as love, as power: oh, how royally generous they have been! They gave all these gifts away to things, only to make themselves poor and to feel miserable! Until now, this was humankind's greatest selflessness: they admired and worshipped, and they managed to hide from themselves that it was they who had created the very things they admired.

88.

(342)

In the emotional jumble of German music, old religious needs are still being satisfied, more than anyone admits, and often without anyone even knowing it! How much prayer, virtue, holy oil, virginity, incense, sanctimonious hypocrisy and "praying alone in your little room" still speak through it! Music itself does without words, ideas and pictures. And oh, how cleverly it uses that to its advantage, that sly, womanly "Eternal Feminine"! Even the most honest conscience does not need to feel ashamed when that religious instinct gets satisfied, because the conscience stays out of it. This is healthy and smart. And since it shows shame about how poor all religious judgments are, it is a good sign… In spite of all that, it is still pious hypocrisy…

But it is different when someone puts religious symbols right next to the music, as Wagner did in his last days with dangerous dishonesty. In Parsifal, for example, he hints at the superstitious nonsense of Holy Communion, and does more than just hint. Then music like that makes people outraged…

89.

(343)

People have always misunderstood love. They believe they are being selfless in love, because they want what is good for another being, often even against what is good for themselves. But in return, they want to own that other being… In other cases, love is a subtler kind of living off someone else, like a parasite. One soul settles into another soul, dangerously and without any consideration, and sometimes into the other's body too… oh, and how much it costs "the host"!

How much a person gives up of what would be good for them! How little "selfish" they really are! All their feelings and passions want to get their way, and a strong feeling is very far from the smart, useful calculations of self-interest!

People do not actually want their "happiness." You have to be English to believe that humans always look out for their own advantage. Our desires want to grab hold of things with a long-lasting passion. Their built-up strength goes looking for things to push against.

90.

What Richard Wagner is really worth will only be told to us by the person who has made the best use of him. For now, people try to believe in a value of Wagner's that he himself would very much have liked to believe in…

91.

(344)

Make prostitution more noble, do not get rid of it…

For the longest time, marriage had a guilty conscience working against it. Would you believe that? Yes, you should believe it.

In honor of old women

92.

I am taking the liberty of forgetting myself. The day after tomorrow I want to be back home with myself again.

93.

(345)

Everything that humans so far have not known how to deal with, everything no one has yet been able to digest, the "dung of existence": for wisdom, at least, it remains the best fertilizer…

94.

(346)

That emperor kept reminding himself that all things pass away, so that he would not take them too seriously and could stay calm among them. To me it seems the other way around. Everything seems far too valuable to be allowed to be so short-lived. I look for an eternity for every single thing. Would anyone pour the most precious oils and wines into the sea? And my comfort is that everything that ever existed is eternal: the sea washes it back up onto the shore again.

95.

(347)

As is well known, people pestered Voltaire even in his last moments. "Do you believe that Christ is God?" his priest asked him. Voltaire made it clear that he wanted to be left in peace, but the priest was not satisfied with that and asked his question again. Then the dying man was seized by one last burst of fury. In a rage, he pushed the priest away, who had no right to ask, and shouted in his face: "In God's name, do not talk to me about that man!" Those were undying last

words, and they sum up everything this bravest of minds had fought against.

Voltaire's judgment was: "There is nothing godlike about this Jew from Nazareth." It was his classical taste that was speaking through him when he judged like that.

Classical taste and Christian taste understand the word "godlike" in completely different ways. Anyone who has classical taste in their very bones cannot help feeling that Christianity is a "disgusting superstition," and that the Christian ideal is a cartoon of the divine, something that drags the divine down.

96.

(348)

That we put the doer back into the doing, after first pulling the doer out of it in our thinking and so leaving the doing empty;

that we put the doing-of-something, "the goal," "the intention," "the purpose," back into the doing, after first pulling it out artificially and so leaving the doing empty;

that all "purposes," "goals" and "meanings" are only ways of expressing, and changed forms of, the one single will that is present in everything that happens: the will to power. That having purposes, goals and intentions, that wanting anything at all, is the same as wanting to grow stronger, wanting to grow, and for that reason also wanting the means to do it;

that the most general and most basic instinct in everything we do and want has stayed the least recognized and the most hidden for exactly this reason: in real life we always obey its command, because we *are* that command… Every way of valuing is only a result of it, a narrower point of view *serving this one will*. Valuing itself is nothing but this will

to power. So to judge existence from the standpoint of any one of these values is something absurd and based on a misunderstanding. And even if such judging starts a process of decline, that process is still *serving this will*…

To put a value on existence itself: but the act of valuing is itself still part of that existence. And when we say no to it, we are still doing what we *are*… We have to see how *absurd* this gesture is, the gesture of sitting in judgment over existence. And then we have to try to guess *what* is really going on when someone does it. It is a symptom of something.

97.

(349)

The philosophical nihilist is convinced that everything that happens is meaningless and in vain, and that there ought not to be any existence that is meaningless and in vain. But where does this "ought not" come from? Where does one get *this* "meaning", *this* standard of measurement? Deep down, the nihilist thinks that looking at such an empty, useless existence leaves a philosopher *unsatisfied*, bleak and in despair. Such an insight goes against our more delicate feelings as philosophers. In the end it comes down to an absurd way of judging: the nature of existence *would have to give the philosopher pleasure*, or else it has no right to exist…

Now it is easy to understand that pleasure and pain, within what happens, can only have the role of means, of tools. What would be left to ask is whether we *could* see any "meaning" or "purpose" at all, and whether the question of meaninglessness, or of its opposite, is simply impossible for us to answer.

98.

(350)

The value of things passing away: something that does not last, that contradicts itself, has little value. But the things we believe to be *lasting* are, as such, *pure fictions*. If everything flows and changes, then passing away is a real quality of things (the "truth"), and lasting and never passing away are only an *appearance*.

99.

(351)

A Critique of Nihilism (Belief That Nothing Has Meaning)

1.

Nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning), as a state of mind, is bound to set in, first of all, when we have searched for a "meaning" in everything that happens, and that meaning simply is not there. In the end, the one who is searching loses heart. In that case, nihilism means becoming aware of a long waste of strength. It is the torment of "all for nothing". It is the uncertainty, the lack of any chance to recover somehow, or to find peace about anything at all. It is being ashamed of yourself, as if you had fooled yourself for far too long… That meaning might have been this: that everything that happens "fulfils" some highest moral law, a moral order of the world. Or that love and harmony keep growing in the way living beings deal with each other. Or that the world is moving closer to a state of happiness for everyone. Or even that it is heading toward a state of nothingness for everyone. After all, a goal is still a meaning. What all these ideas have in common is that something is supposed to be reached through the process itself. And now we realize that change aims at nothing and reaches nothing… So the cause of nihilism is disappointment about a supposed purpose of change. This may be about one quite specific purpose. Or, more broadly, it may be the insight that all the ideas so far about a purpose for the whole "development" of the world fall short. (Human beings are no longer helpers in this change, let alone its center.)

Second, nihilism as a state of mind sets in when we have assumed that there is a whole, a system, even an organization in everything that happens and beneath everything that happens. The soul, thirsty to admire and worship, then revels in the grand picture of a supreme form of rule and management. (If it is the soul of someone devoted to logic, then perfect consistency and a logic built into reality itself are already enough to make peace with everything…) Some kind of unity,

some form of "monism", the idea that everything is one. And as a result of this belief, a human being feels deeply connected to, and dependent on, a whole that is endlessly greater than himself, a kind of form of God… "The good of the whole demands that the individual give himself up"… but look: there is no such whole! Deep down, a person has lost faith in his own worth if no endlessly valuable whole is working through him. In other words, he imagined such a whole in the first place so that he could believe in his own worth.

Nihilism as a state of mind has a third and final form. Suppose we have reached two insights: that change is not meant to aim at anything, and that beneath all change there is no great unity in which the individual may completely sink, as if into an element of the highest value. Then the only way out left is to condemn this whole world of change as an illusion, and to invent a world that lies beyond it, as the 'real' world. But as soon as a person figures out that this world was put together only to meet psychological needs, and that he has no right at all to it, the last form of nihilism appears. It includes disbelief in any world beyond nature, beyond this one. It forbids itself to believe in a 'real' world. From this point of view, you accept that the reality of change is the only reality. You forbid yourself any kind of sneaky path to worlds hidden behind this one and to false gods. But you cannot bear this world, even though you no longer want to deny it…

So what has really happened? The feeling of worthlessness came about when people understood that the overall nature of existence must not be explained by the idea of "purpose", nor by the idea of "unity", nor by the idea of "truth". Existence aims at nothing and reaches nothing. There is no overarching unity holding together the many things that happen. The nature of existence is not "true", it is false…, and there is simply no reason anymore to talk yourself into believing in a 'real' world…

In short: the categories "purpose", "unity" and "fixed being", with which we put value into the world, are now pulled back out again by us. And now the world looks worthless…

2.

Let us say we have recognized why the world may no longer be explained with these three categories, and that after this insight the world starts to seem worthless to us. Then we must ask where our belief in these three categories comes from. Let us try to see whether it is possible to stop believing in them instead. If we have taken away the value of these three categories, then proving that they do not apply to the universe is no longer a reason to take away the value of the universe.

*

Result: belief in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world by categories that refer to a purely made-up world.

*

Final result: think of all the values with which we first tried to make the world seem valuable to us, and with which, in the end, we made it seem worthless, once it turned out they did not fit it. If you work out their psychology, all these values turn out to be results of certain points of view about what is useful. They are useful for keeping up and strengthening human structures of power. And they were only wrongly projected into the nature of things. It is still the wildly exaggerated innocence of human beings to set themselves up as the meaning and the measuring stick of the value of things…

100.

(352)

Take the highest values that people were supposed to live in service of, especially when those values ruled over them in a hard and costly way. These social values were built up above human beings to make them sound louder and more forceful, as if they were God's commands: they were presented as "reality", as the 'real' world, as hope and a world to come. Now that the petty, shabby origin of these values is becoming clear, the universe seems to us to have lost its value and to have become "meaningless"… but that is only a stage in between.

101.

I have absolutely no wish to take part in the contemptible comedy that is still called "philosophical pessimism" today, especially in Prussia. I do not even see why I should have to talk about it. People should long ago have turned away in disgust from the show put on by that scrawny ape, Mr. von Hartmann. In my eyes, anyone who mentions his name in the same breath as Schopenhauer's is crossed off for good.

102.

(353)

Do not be a coward toward your own actions. Do not abandon them afterwards… Feeling remorse is indecent.

103.

(354)

Let us finally put human values neatly back in the corner where they alone have a right to be: as values that just loiter on street corners, idlers' values. Many kinds of animals have already disappeared. Suppose human beings disappeared too: nothing in the world would be missing. You have to be enough of a philosopher to admire even this nothing. (As the Latin saying goes: "Nil admirari", be amazed at nothing.)

104.

(355)

If you are clear with yourself about the "why?" of your life, then you can easily let go of the "how?". When pleasure and pain start to seem the most important things, and teachings that judge life by pleasure, or that are gloomy and pessimistic, find listeners, this is already a sign that people no longer believe in a "why?", in purpose and meaning. It is a lack of will. And giving things up, resigning yourself, virtue, and "objectivity" can at the very least already be signs that the main thing is starting to be missing.

Knowing how to give yourself a goal — — —

105.

Note: a vulgar mob-person, a person full of grudges, a spiteful little schemer…

106.

Do not confuse these two: Disbelief as the inability to believe at all, and, on the other hand, disbelief as the inability to still believe in something. In the second case, it is usually a sign of a new belief —

Disbelief that comes from inability has, as its mark, the incapacity to say no. It cannot defend itself against either a yes or a no…

107.

Idleness is the beginning of all philosophy. So, then — is philosophy a vice?…

108.

A philosopher rests in a different way, and in different things. For example, he rests in nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning). The belief that there is no truth at all, the nihilist's belief, is like a great stretch of the arms and legs for someone who, as a soldier of knowledge, is constantly at war with nothing but ugly truths. Because the truth is ugly.

109.

If you take dramatic music away from music, there is still plenty of good music left over.

110.

We believe in virtue too, but in virtue in the style of the Renaissance: Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing.

111.

(356)

How is it that the basic articles of faith in psychology are, every one of them, the worst twistings and faking (like forging money)? Take "Man strives for happiness." What is true about that? To understand what life is, and what kind of striving and tension life is, the formula has to

hold just as well for trees and plants as for animals. "What does the plant strive for?" But here we have already made up a false unity that does not exist. The fact of a growth happening millions of times over, with its own and half-its-own starting impulses, is hidden and denied when we put a clumsy single thing called "the plant" in front of it. That the tiniest, final "individuals" cannot be understood as a "metaphysical individual" or as an atom, and that the area of their power is always shifting, is the very first thing we can see. But when each of them changes in this way, is it striving for "happiness"? No. All spreading out, all taking things into oneself, all growing is a striving against something that resists. Movement is, at its core, something tied up with states of discomfort. So whatever is driving here must want something else, if it wants discomfort this way and keeps looking for it. What do the trees of a wild, ancient forest fight each other for? For "happiness"? For power…

Man has become master over the forces of nature, master over his own wildness and lack of self-control. His desires have learned to obey and to be useful.

Compared to an earlier, pre-human creature, man represents a huge amount of power, not an extra amount of "happiness." So how can anyone claim that he strove for happiness?…

112.

(357)

The higher person is different from the lower person in being unafraid and in challenging bad luck and suffering. It is a sign of decline when measures of value based on happiness begin to count as the highest ones. That points to tiredness of the body and a weakening of the will. Christianity, with its focus on "blessed happiness" in heaven, is a typical way of thinking for a suffering and impoverished kind of

human being. A full, strong force wants to create, to suffer, and to go under while suffering. To such a force, the Christian salvation of the sanctimonious hypocrite sounds like bad music, and solemn priestly gestures are just annoying.

113.

(358)

On Psychology and the Theory of Knowledge

I hold that the inner world, too, is only appearance. Everything that we become aware of has first been arranged, simplified, fitted into patterns, and interpreted, through and through. The real process of inner "perception", the chain of cause and effect between thoughts, feelings and desires, just like the link between subject and object, is completely hidden from us, and may be pure imagination. This apparent inner world is handled with exactly the same forms and methods as the "outer" world. We never come across "facts". Pleasure and discomfort are late, secondary products of the intellect…

"Cause and effect" slips away from us. To assume a direct causal link between thoughts, as logic does, comes from the crudest and clumsiest observation. Between two thoughts, all sorts of feelings and emotions are still playing their game. But these movements are too fast, so we fail to recognize them, and we deny them…

"Thinking", as the theorists of knowledge describe it, does not happen at all. It is a completely made-up fiction. It is reached by picking out one single element from the process and taking away all the rest. It is an artificial arrangement, made so that things can be understood…

The "mind" as something that thinks, maybe even "the mind, absolute, clean, pure": this idea is a secondary result that comes from the false self-observation that believes in "thinking". Here, first, an act is

imagined that never happens, namely "thinking". And second, a subject is imagined underneath it, as a base, where every act of this thinking, and nothing else, has its origin. In other words, both the doing and the doer are made up.

114.

"Willing" is not the same as "desiring", striving, or longing. What sets it apart from them is the feeling of giving a command.

There is no such thing as "willing" on its own, only willing something. You must not cut the goal off from the state, as the theorists of knowledge do. "Willing", the way they understand it, happens just as little as "thinking". It is a pure fiction.

That something is commanded is part of willing. Of course, that does not mean the will actually gets carried out…

That general state of tension, in which a force tries to release itself, is not "willing".

115.

(359)

In a world that is false at its core, truthfulness would be a tendency that goes against nature. It could only make sense as a tool for a special, higher level of falseness. In order for a world of truth and fixed being to be made up, the truthful person had to be created first. And that includes such a person believing that he himself is "truthful".

Simple, see-through, not contradicting himself, lasting, always the same, without folds, twists, curtains, or outward form: a person of this kind imagines a world of fixed being as "God", made in his own image.

For truthfulness to be possible, a person's whole world has to be very tidy, small, and respectable. The advantage must lie, in every sense, on the side of the truthful person. Lies, tricks, and pretending must cause amazement…

There is a hatred of lying and pretending that comes from pride, from a touchy sense of honor. But there is also such a hatred that comes from cowardice, because lying is forbidden. With another kind of person, all the moralizing, all the "you shall not lie", does nothing against the instinct that constantly needs lies. The proof of this is the New Testament.

116.

(360)

There are people who go looking for where something is immoral. When they judge "that is wrong," they believe it must be done away with and changed. I am the opposite. I can find no peace with something as long as I am not yet clear about what is immoral in it. Once I have figured that out, my balance is restored.

117.

A playful, high-spirited mind, for whom dancing is the most natural movement, and who loves to touch every reality only with the tips of its toes, hates to dwell on sad things.

118.

We Hyperboreans

(361)

My conclusion is this. The real human being is worth much more than the "desired" human being of any ideal so far. All the wishful

ideals about humans have been absurd and dangerous excesses, through which one single kind of human tried to hang its own conditions for survival and growth over all of humanity as a law. Every wishful ideal of that origin that came to power has, up to now, pushed down the worth of humans, their strength, and their confidence in the future. The poverty and narrow, backroom thinking of humans shows itself most clearly, even today, when they wish. Humanity's ability to set values has so far been too poorly developed to do justice to the actual worth of humans, not merely the "wished-for" worth. And the ideal has, until now, been the true force that slanders the world and humanity, a poisonous breath hanging over reality, the great temptation toward nothingness…

119.

(362)

For the Preface

I am describing what is coming: the coming of nihilism. I can describe it here because something necessary is happening. The signs of it are everywhere; only the eyes to see these signs are still missing. I am not praising it here, and I am not blaming it, that it is coming. I believe it is one of the greatest crises, a moment of the very deepest self-reflection for humanity. Whether humanity recovers from it, whether it becomes master of this crisis, is a question of its strength. It is possible…

Modern people try out one value for a while, then another, and then drop it. The pile of values that have grown old and been dropped keeps getting bigger. People feel more and more how empty things are, how poor they have become in values. This movement cannot be stopped, even though there are big, grand attempts to slow it down.

In the end, a person dares to question and judge values as such. He sees where they came from. He understands enough that he can no longer believe in any value at all. The deep feeling is there, the new shiver of dread…

What I am telling is the story of the next two hundred years…

120.

(363)

People have believed that the one who knows, the subject, and the thing known, the object, fit each other properly. They have believed that an object is something that, seen from the inside, would itself be a subject. That is a kind-hearted invention, and I think its time is over. After all, how much we become conscious of depends entirely on how roughly useful it is for us to become conscious of it. Our consciousness sees things from a narrow corner. So how could that narrow view ever let us say things about "subject" and "object" that actually touch reality?

121.

(364)

You cannot explain the lowest, most basic activity in protoplasm, the living stuff of cells, as a will to keep itself alive. That is because it takes in far more than it would need just to survive, in a way that makes no sense. And above all, by doing this it does not keep itself alive at all. Instead it breaks apart… The drive at work here has to explain exactly this: that it does not want to preserve itself. Calling it "hunger" is already an interpretation, borrowed from far more complicated living things. Hunger is a specialized, later form of this drive. It is a result of the division of labor inside a body, working in the service of a higher drive that rules over it.

122.

(365)

What sets us apart is not that we cannot find God again, not in history, not in nature, and not behind nature. What sets us apart is how we feel about what people have worshipped as God. We do not feel it is "divine." We feel it is a holy grimace, a sheep-like following of the flock, an absurd and pitiful silliness, a principle that slanders the world and slanders humans. In short, we deny God as God. It is the peak of human self-deception about the mind to do the following: to take whatever seems good, wise, powerful and valuable from one's own narrow corner, and from that to work out a being who is the beginning of everything and exists "in itself." And while doing this, people leave out the whole chain of causes that allows any goodness, any wisdom, any power to exist and have value at all. In short, they take things that came very late and depend on many conditions, and they treat them as never having come into being, as existing "in themselves," and maybe even as the cause of everything that ever came into being… Let us start from experience. Take every case where a person has risen far above the normal human level. We see that every high degree of power includes being free of good and evil, and also free of "true" and "false." Such power cannot take into account what goodness wants. We see the same thing again with every high degree of wisdom. In it, goodness is canceled out, just like truthfulness, justice, virtue and the other half-hearted wishes of the common people about what is valuable. And finally, take every high degree of goodness itself. Isn't it obvious that it already requires a kind of mental shortsightedness and coarseness? And also an inability to tell true from false, or useful from harmful, when looking further ahead? Not to mention that a high degree of power in the hands of the highest goodness would bring the most disastrous results, such as "the abolishing of evil." Indeed, just look at the tendencies that the "God of love" puts

into his believers: they ruin humanity for the sake of "the good." In practice, when faced with what the world is really like, this same God has proven to be a God of the greatest short-sightedness, of devilishness, and of powerlessness. From this you can see how much his concept is worth.

In themselves, knowledge and wisdom have no value, and neither does goodness. You always first need a goal, and only from that goal do these qualities gain value or worthlessness. There could be a goal from which extreme knowledge would be highly worthless. For example, this would be true if extreme deception were one of the conditions for life to grow stronger. The same would be true if goodness could paralyze and discourage the springs that drive great desire…

Given human life as it is, every "truth," every "goodness," every "holiness," every "divinity" in the Christian style has so far turned out to be a great danger. Even now, humanity is in danger of being destroyed by ideals that work against life.

123.

(366)

The coming of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

Nihilism is not only brooding over the thought "It's all for nothing!" And it is not only the belief that everything deserves to be destroyed. People actually lend a hand. They destroy… You could say that is illogical. But the nihilist does not believe he is forced to be logical… This is the state of strong minds and strong wills. Such people cannot stop at saying no only in their judgment. Saying no through action comes from their very nature. Destroying things in thought gets backed up by destroying things by hand.

124.

(367)

If we are "disappointed" people, it is not about life. It is because our eyes have been opened about all kinds of wishful ideals. We watch whatever is called an "ideal" with mocking, bitter anger. We only look down on ourselves because we cannot, at every hour, hold down that absurd urge called "idealism." Being spoiled by old habits is stronger than the bitter anger of the disappointed…

125.

(368)

Moralists are completely immature. They expect our hidden self, which has many layers like many skins, to be simple. They say "Show yourself as you are." As if you didn't first have to be something that actually is…

126.

(369)

Part four. Note: Choosing those who are equal to you, "leaving" the crowd, isolation.

127.

(370)

Note: against justice… Against John Stuart Mill: I am horrified by his commonness. He says "What is right for one person is fair for another. Do not do to others what you would not want done to you," and so on. He wants to base all human dealings on giving the same back in return. That way, every action looks like a kind of repayment for

something that was done for us. The basic assumption here is low and not noble in the worst sense. It assumes that actions have equal value, whether I do them or you do them. Here the most personal value of an action is simply erased, the part that can never be balanced out or paid for by anything. This "give and take" is a great commonness. I believe something different. What I do should not and could not be done by someone else. There must be no balancing out, except in the most select circle of "my equals," among peers. In a deeper sense, you never give back, because you are something one of a kind and you only do one-of-a-kind things. This basic belief is the reason why aristocrats keep themselves apart from the crowd. The crowd believes in "equality," and therefore in balancing things out and "give and take."

128.

(371)

It is the feeling of being related that binds the children of one people together. In the body, this kinship is a thousand times stronger than people usually think. Language, customs, shared interests and shared fate are all small compared to that ability to understand each other because of having the same ancestors.

129.

The decline of the German mind, which has kept pace with the rise of flag-waving patriotism and nationalism.

130.

You do not talk to a woman about truthfulness. When you say "Show yourself as you are" to a woman, it means almost the opposite of what it means when you say it to a man.

131.

He is not burned for his faith, on a fire of small green sticks. He is burned because he no longer has the courage to stand by his faith.

132.

— A human being as he *ought* to be: to us that sounds just as silly as saying "a tree as it ought to be."

133.

Note: People admit that the Greek human being and the Renaissance human being were *superior*. But they want to have that kind of person without the causes and conditions that made him. To this day, we still lack any deeper understanding of the Greeks.

134.

"Things that have a nature of their own, in themselves": this is a fixed, unquestioned belief that we must break with completely.

135.

Toward a critique of the grand words. I am full of suspicion and spite toward what people call an "ideal." This is where *my pessimism* lies: I have seen that the "higher feelings" are a source of disaster. That is, they make human beings smaller and lower their worth.

— People fool themselves every time they expect an ideal to bring "progress." Up to now, every time an ideal has won, it has been a *step backward*.

— Christianity, revolution, the end of slavery, equal rights, love of humanity, love of peace, justice, truth: all these grand words are only worth something in a fight, as a flag to rally behind. They are *not*

worth anything as real things. They are *fancy slogans* for something completely different (in fact, for the very opposite!).

136.

Critique of the Grand Words

"Freedom" used to mean *will to power*

"Justice"

"Equal rights"

"Brotherhood"

"Truth" (among sects, and so on)

137.

"The growing independence of the individual": that is what these Paris philosophers talk about, people like Fouillée. They should just take a look at the sheep-like breed that they themselves are!…

Open your eyes, you gentlemen who study the society of the future!

The "individual" became strong under the *opposite* conditions. What you are describing is the most extreme weakening and shrinking of the human being. You actually want that, and you need the whole lying machinery of the old ideal to get it! You are *the kind* of people who truly feel the needs of herd animals as an *ideal*!

A total lack of honesty about the human mind!

138.

(372)

Where the ideal comes from. A look at the soil it grows in.

A.

Start from the "aesthetic" states, the moods of beauty, in which the world is *seen* as fuller, rounder, more perfect —

the *pagan* ideal: here saying yes to oneself is the main thing, all the way down to the clown of comic opera.

—

the highest type: the *classical* ideal, the sign that *all* the main instincts have turned out well.

—

And within it, the highest style: *the grand style*, the expression of the "will to power" itself. (Here the most feared instinct *dares to show itself openly*.)

— one gives out of one's fullness —

B.

Start from states in which the world is *seen* as emptier, paler, thinner. In these states, being "spiritual" and turning away from the senses is ranked as perfection. Here what is rough, animal, direct and close at hand is avoided most of all. Examples are "the wise man" and "the angel" (priestly = virginal = ignorant). One should describe the bodily makeup of such "idealists"…

the *bloodless* ideal: under certain conditions, it can be the ideal of people who themselves *embody* the first one, the pagan one. (That is how Goethe sees Spinoza as his "saint.")

— one calculates, one subtracts, one chooses —

C.

Start from states in which we feel the world is too absurd, too bad, too poor, too deceptive for us still to suspect or wish for the ideal inside it. Then the ideal is projected into what goes against nature, against the facts, against logic. Think about the state of the person who judges this way. (The world seems "poorer" because of suffering: one *takes*, one no longer *gives*.)

This is the ideal of *what goes against nature*.

— *one says no*, one *destroys* —

(The *Christian ideal* is something *in between* the second and the third. Sometimes one side is stronger in it, sometimes the other.)

The three ideals

A.

Either

a

strengthening

(pagan)

of life

B.

or

a

thinning out

(bloodless)

C.

or

a

disowning

(going against nature)

the feeling of being 'made divine'

in

the greatest fullness

in

the most delicate choosing

in

the destruction of life and contempt for it.

139.

The degree of tension, of resistance, of danger, of justified distrust. The degree to which human lives are sacrificed, to which the chance of failure is great and yet the risk is taken anyway: —

140.

The ideals of the herd animal — now reaching their peak as the *highest value* placed on 'society'. This is an attempt to give society a value that belongs to the whole universe, even a value beyond the physical world.

Against these ideals I defend *aristocracy*, the rule of the best few.

A society that keeps among its own members that *consideration* and *tact* when it comes to freedom must feel itself to be an exception. It must have some power facing it, a power it stands out against, a power it is hostile to and looks down on.

— The more of my rights I give up and the more I make myself equal to others, the more I fall under the rule of the most average people, and in the end of the most numerous.

— What an aristocratic society needs in order to keep a high degree of freedom among its members is extreme tension. This tension comes from the fact that all its members carry the *opposite* drive inside them: the will to rule…

141.

If you want to get rid of strong opposites and differences in rank, then you also get rid of strong love, of a high-minded attitude, and of the feeling of standing on your own.

142.

On the *real* psychology of a society built on freedom and equality:

What becomes weaker?

The will to be *responsible for oneself* — a sign of the

decline of self-rule

the *ability to defend oneself* and *to fight*, even in the most mental matters — the strength to give orders

the sense of *deep respect*, of placing oneself below others, of being able to keep silent.

great passion, the great task, tragedy, cheerfulness

143.

Chapter:

Critique of the grand words.

Where the ideal comes from.

the ideal of the herd animal

How virtue is brought to power.

The witch Circe who bewitches philosophers.

the ideal of self-denial and strict self-discipline

The religious ideal.

The body's role in the ideal, parts I, II, III

the ideal of the masters

The political ideal.

'Science'

the ideal of the mind and spirit

III

the ideal of the herd animal

III

the ideal of the masters

I

the ideal of what goes against nature

II

the ideal of the mind and spirit

I

the pagan ideal

III

the hermit ideal (the Stoics and others)

II

the ideal of making things physical and sensual

Table:

Where the ideal comes from

A.

the ideal of the herd animal

the ideal of the master animal

the ideal of the hermit animal

B.

the pagan ideal

the ideal of what goes against nature

C.

the ideal of making things physical and sensual

the ideal of making things spiritual

the ideal of the ruling passion

Critique of the grand words.

Truth.

Justice.

Love.

Peace.

Virtue

Freedom.

Kindness

Honesty

Genius

Wisdom

144.

Pascal says: the worst evil is the evil we do with good intentions.

145.

The role of 'consciousness'

It is important not to get the role of 'consciousness' wrong. It is *our relationship with the 'outside world' that developed it*. On the other hand, the *steering* of the body, that is, the care and planning for how all the body's functions work together, does *not* reach our consciousness. Neither does the way the mind *stores things up*. We should not doubt that there is a highest authority in charge of all this: a kind of steering committee, where the different *main desires* make their voices and their power felt. 'Pleasure' and 'pain' are signals sent from this area. … So is the act of *willing*. So are *ideas*.

In short: whatever becomes conscious stands in chains of cause and effect that are completely hidden from us. When thoughts, feelings and ideas follow one another in consciousness, this says nothing about whether one actually causes the next. But it *looks* that way, very strongly. On this *mere appearance we have built our whole idea of mind, reason, logic* and so on. (None of these things exists: they are made-up combinations and made-up units.) … And then we projected these again *into* things, and *behind* things!

People usually take *consciousness* itself to be the central organ that senses everything, the highest authority. But it is only a *tool for communicating*. It developed through dealings with others, and to serve the needs of those dealings… Here 'dealings' also means the effects the outside world has on us and the reactions we must make to them, as well as the effects we have *on* the outside. Consciousness is *not* the steering itself, but an *organ that the steering uses* —

146.

The means by which a stronger kind of human keeps itself going.

Giving yourself the right to act as an exception, as an experiment in overcoming yourself and in freedom.

Putting yourself in situations where you are not allowed *not* to be a barbarian.

Using every kind of strict self-discipline to gain mastery over yourself and to become sure of how strong your will is.

Not opening up to others; silence; being on guard against charm and gracefulness.

Learning to obey in such a way that it becomes a test of keeping your own self intact. Working out the fine points of honor down to the smallest detail.

Never concluding 'what is fair for one is fair for the other' — but the opposite!

Treating revenge, the *right* to pay someone back, as a privilege, and granting it as a mark of honor —

Not striving for the virtues of *other* people.

147.

A theory of the *sex drive*: 'the tiny little humans who long to come into existence join their desire for life into one shared desire, which consciousness notices and takes to be its *own* need' —

Renan's words. *Hartley*. Fouillée, page 217.

148.

The time is coming when we will have to *pay* for having been *Christians* for two thousand years. We are losing the *weight that kept us steady*, the thing that let us live. For a while we will not know which way to turn. We will suddenly plunge into the *opposite* ways of valuing, with the same amount of energy with which we were Christians — with which we pushed the Christian … to senseless extremes — — —

1)

the 'immortal soul'; the eternal value of the 'person' —

2)

the answer, the direction, and the judging of values placed in the 'next world' —

3)

moral value as the highest value, the 'salvation of the soul' as the main concern —

4)

'sin', 'earthly', 'flesh', 'lusts' — all branded with shame as 'the world'.

Now everything is false through and through, mere 'words', all mixed up, either weak or overstrained.

a)

People try for a kind of *earthly answer*, but in the same spirit as before, the spirit of a *final victory* of truth, love and justice. This is socialism, with its 'equality of persons'.

b)

People also try to hold on to the *moral ideal* (with first place given to unselfishness, self-denial, and the denial of the will).

c)

People even try to hold on to the 'next world', even if only as an unknown x that goes against logic. But right away they dress it up so that some old-style comfort beyond this world can be drawn from it.

d)

People try to read into events the *old-style guidance of God*: an order of things that rewards, punishes, educates, and leads toward *something better*.

e)

People still believe in good and evil, in such a way that they feel the victory of good and the destruction of evil to be their *task*. (This is English. A typical case is that shallow thinker John Stuart Mill.)

f)

Contempt for 'naturalness', for desire, for the self. An attempt to understand even the highest achievements of mind and art as the result of setting the self aside, as a lack of personal interest.

g)

People still allow the *Church* to push its way into all the important experiences and main moments of a person's life, to give them a *holy blessing* and a *higher meaning*. We also have a 'Christian state' and Christian 'marriage' —

149.

Complete nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)

its signs:

the great *contempt*

the great *pity*

the great *destruction*

its high point: *a teaching* that takes exactly the kind of life that stirs up disgust, pity and the urge to destroy, and teaches that this life is *absolute* and *eternal*.

150.

On the history of European nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

The period of unclearness: the time of all kinds of attempts to preserve the old while not letting go of the new.

The period of clarity: people *understand* that the old and the new are basic opposites. The old values were born from life that is going downhill, and the new ones from life that is rising. People see that what we now know about nature and history no longer lets us have such

"hopes." They see that *all the old ideals* are hostile to life. Those ideals were born from decadence and they push things further into decadence, no matter how much morality dresses them up in splendid Sunday best. We *understand* the old, but we are far from strong enough to create something new.

The period of the

three great feelings:

contempt,

pity,

destruction.

The period of the

catastrophe:

the arrival of a teaching which

sifts people, like grain through a sieve… a teaching which

forces the weak to make decisions,

and the strong as well.

151.

Here is an insight that the "free spirits" *lack*: the same *discipline* that makes a strong nature even stronger, and makes it able to take on great tasks, *breaks and stunts the mediocre ones*.

: doubt

: a big, generous heart

: experiment

: independence.

152.

my "future"

a strict, technical-college kind of education

military service, so that, as a rule, every man of the upper classes is an officer, whatever else he may be

153.

The *depraved* and the *unrestrained*: they have a depressing effect on how *desires are valued*. It is the horrible, brutal crudeness of custom, mostly in the Middle Ages, that forces people into a real "league of virtue." Along with it come equally horrible exaggerations about what gives a human being his *worth*. "Civilization," while it is still fighting its battle *(the taming of humans)*, needs every kind of iron chain and torture to hold its ground against how terrifying humans are and against their nature as beasts of prey.

Here a mix-up happens quite naturally, even though it has a very bad effect. What *people of power and will* can demand of themselves also sets a measure for what they may allow themselves. Such people are the opposite of the depraved and the unrestrained. And yet, under certain conditions, they do things for which a lesser person would be found guilty of vice and excess.

Here the idea that all people are "*of equal worth before God*" does enormous damage. People banned actions and attitudes that, in themselves, belong to the special rights of those who turned out strong, as if these things were in themselves unworthy of a human being. They gave the whole drive of the strong person a bad name by making the ways the weakest protect themselves (even against what is weakest in themselves) into the standard for all values.

The mix-up goes so far that people branded the great *masters* of the art of living with the most shameful names, even though their proud self-rule is the sharpest possible opposite of the depraved and "unrestrained" person. Even now people think they have to disapprove of a Cesare Borgia: that is simply laughable. The Church excommunicated German emperors because of their vices, as if a monk or a priest had any right to a say in what a Frederick the Second may demand of himself. A Don Juan is sent to hell: that is very naive. Has anyone noticed that all the interesting people are missing from heaven?… Just a little hint to the ladies about where they will best find their salvation… If you think a bit consistently, and also with a deeper understanding of what a "great human being" is, then there is no doubt at all that the Church sends all "great human beings" to hell. It fights *against* all "greatness in humans"…

154.

The idea of "honor": it rests on belief in "good society," in the main qualities of a knight, and in the duty to keep showing oneself in a dignified way at all times. What matters most: that you do not take your own life too seriously; that you insist, without exception, on the most respectful manners from everyone you deal with (at least as far as they do not belong to "*us*"); that you are not familiar, or good-natured, or jolly, or modest, except among equals; that you *always keep up your dignified front*…

155.

The New Testament

The war against the noble and the powerful, as it is fought in the New Testament, is a war like the one waged by *Reynard the Fox*, and with the same weapons: cunning tricks. The only difference is that it is

always done with a priest's holy, oily solemnity, and with a firm refusal to admit, even to itself, how sly it is.

156.

People talk about the "deep injustice" of the social contract. They talk as if it were unjust that one person is born into good circumstances and another into bad ones, or even that one person is born with these qualities and another with those… This must be fought against without exception. The false idea of the "individual" leads to this nonsense. It comes from the miserable old theory of the soul to cut a person off from the circumstances he grows out of, and to treat him like a separate little "soul unit" that has simply been dropped or placed *into* those circumstances. Nobody *gave* him his qualities, not God, *and not* his parents either. Nobody is responsible for the fact that he *exists*, that he is the way he is, or that he lives in these circumstances… The thread of life that he now is cannot be pulled loose from everything that was and has to be. He is not the result of some long-held plan, nor of any will at all aiming at an "ideal human," an "ideal of happiness," or an "ideal of morality." So it is absurd to want to shift the blame onto something somewhere, as if there were a *responsibility* lying anywhere.

The *revolt* of the "sufferer" against

God,

society,

nature,

ancestors,

upbringing, and so on,

imagines *responsibilities* and *forms of will* that do not exist at all. We should not speak of an *injustice* in cases where the *basic conditions for right and wrong* are not even there. The idea that *one* soul is in itself equal to *every* soul, or *should* be equal, is the worst kind of starry-eyed optimism. The opposite is what we should wish for: the greatest possible *unlikeness* between people, and so friction, struggle, and contradiction. And luckily, what we should wish for is also what is *real*!

157.

The goal of *equal rights*, and finally of *equal needs*, is an almost unavoidable result of our kind of civilization, built on trade and on every person's vote counting the same in politics. This goal leads to the shutting out and slow dying off of the higher, more dangerous, stranger, and, in short, *newer* kinds of human beings. *Experimenting* more or less stops, and a kind of standstill is reached.

158.

Rebel pessimism (instead of "outraged pessimism")

159.

On the "*great disgust*": *partly* suffering from it, *partly*

producing it themselves:

the

nervous, Catholic, erotic literature,

the

literary pessimism of France | Flaubert. Zola. Goncourt. Baudelaire.

the

dinners at the Magny restaurant

On the "*great pity*":

Tolstoy, Dostoevsky

Parsifal

160.

True civilization, according to Baudelaire, consists in making original sin smaller. Baudelaire

161.

The Frenchman is a farmyard animal so well tamed that he does not dare to jump over any fence. Baudelaire

He is an animal of the Latin breed: filth in his home does not bother him, and in literature he feeds on dung. He is crazy about excrement… Baudelaire

162.

Tartuffe. Not a comedy, but an attack pamphlet. An atheist, if he happens to be a well-brought-up man, will think, when it comes to this play, that certain serious questions should never be handed over to the rabble. Baudelaire

163.

Baudelaire, speaking about Petronius, talks of his "terrifying impurities" and his "saddening clowning."

Nonsense, but it tells us something about the times…

164.

"the touchy, easily irritated tribe of poets"

165.

like Trimalchio, who wipes his hands on his slaves' hair…

166.

books that were lived, poems that were lived.

167.

Byron: talks too much. But, on the other hand, he has those sublime faults that make a great poet: melancholy, which always goes hand in hand with the feeling for beauty, and a fiery, devilish personality, a spirit like a salamander, the creature said to live in fire.

168.

"… among humans, the only great ones are the poet, the priest, and the soldier: the man who sings, the man who blesses, the man who sacrifices others and sacrifices himself. The rest are made only for the whip…"

169.

"The only sensible and secure form of government is the aristocratic one. Monarchy or republic, if they are based on democracy, are equally absurd and weak."

170.

"Above all, be a great man and a saint for yourself."

171.

"God is the only being who, in order to rule, does not even need to exist."

172.

On the theory of "devotion" and self-giving…

Love is a taste for prostitution, a taste for giving yourself away to others. There isn't even a single noble pleasure that can't be traced back to prostitution. The being who gives himself to the most people is the greatest being of all: that is God. At a show, or at a ball, everyone enjoys everyone else. What is art? Prostitution.

Love can grow out of a generous feeling: the taste for prostitution, for giving yourself to others. But it is soon spoiled by the taste for owning someone.

173.

On the womanly nature of the Church as the reason for its total power.

174.

That love is like torture, or like a surgical operation. That one of the two people is always the executioner, or the surgeon.

Someone once asked, while Baudelaire was there: what is the greatest pleasure in love? One person answered: in receiving. Another said: in giving yourself. This one said: the thrill of pride. That one said: the thrill of humility. All these dirty-minded talkers sounded like the old religious book 'The Imitation of Christ'. In the end, one shameless dreamer of perfect societies spoke up and claimed that the greatest pleasure of love was in producing citizens for the fatherland.

Baudelaire says: As for me, I say this: the one and highest pleasure of love lies in knowing for sure that you are doing something evil. And both man and woman know, from the day they are born, that all pleasure is found in evil.

175.

We love women to the degree that they are strange and foreign to us. Loving intelligent women is a pleasure for a man who prefers men.

176.

Thinness is more naked, and more indecent, than fat.

177.

Enthusiasm aimed at anything other than abstract ideas is a sign of weakness and sickness.

178.

Prayer. So get to know the joys of a hard, harsh life, and pray, pray without stopping. Prayer is a storehouse of strength.

179.

Whole peoples do everything they can to avoid having great men. So, in order to exist at all, a great man must have a power to attack that is stronger than the power to resist that millions of individuals put up against him.

180.

About sleep, that sinister adventure we go on every evening, you could say this: people fall asleep with a boldness that would be im-

possible to understand, if we didn't know that it comes from not knowing the danger.

181.

These big, beautiful ships, rocking ever so slightly on the calm water, these strong vessels that look idle and homesick, aren't they telling us in a silent language: 'When do we set off for happiness?'

182.

In politics, the true saint is the one who whips and kills the people, for the good of the people.

183.

Beauty as Baudelaire understands it (and Richard Wagner too): something glowing and sad, a little uncertain, leaving room for guessing.

184.

Baudelaire writes: a beautiful, attractive head, a woman's head, is a head that makes you dream, at the same time but in a blurry way, of pleasure and of sadness. It carries an idea of gloom, of weariness, even of having had too much. Or else it carries the opposite idea: a burning eagerness, a desire to live, mixed with a bitterness that keeps flowing back, as if it came from going without, or from losing hope. Mystery and regret are also features of the Beautiful.

185.

A handsome man's head doesn't need to hold this idea of sensual pleasure (except perhaps in the eyes of a woman). In a woman's face, that idea is all the more tempting a challenge because a woman's face is usually more gloomy. But a man's head too will hold something

glowing and sad: spiritual needs, ambitions kept hidden in the dark, the idea of a power that rumbles deep down and has nothing to be used on, sometimes the idea of a cold, vengeful lack of feeling, sometimes, in the most interesting case, mystery, and finally, misfortune.

186.

Self-worship. A poetic harmony of character. A balanced rhythm of character and abilities. Keep all your abilities. Make all your abilities grow. A form of worship.

187.

What enchants us in a woman and makes up her beauty:

a bored, been-there-done-that look; a weary look; a flighty, absent-minded look; a shameless look; a cold look; the look of someone gazing inward; a look of command; a look of strong will; a nasty look; a sickly look; a cat-like look; childishness, carelessness and mischief all mixed together.

188.

In Protestant countries, two things are missing that a well-brought-up man cannot be happy without: gallantry toward women, and religious devotion.

189.

What is intoxicating about bad taste: the aristocratic pleasure of displeasing people.

190.

Stoicism, which has only one sacred rite: suicide…

191.

Woman is natural, which means disgusting. And so she is always vulgar, which means the opposite of the dandy.

192.

In every change there is something shameful and pleasant at the same time, something that is a bit like being unfaithful and a bit like moving house.

193.

There are people who can only have fun in a crowd. The true hero has fun all by himself.

194.

You have to work, if not because you like it, then at least out of despair, since, when you think it all through, working is less boring than having fun.

195.

Baudelaire writes: While I was still just a child, I felt two opposite feelings in my heart: horror of life, and ecstasy about life. That is exactly what you would expect from a nervous, lazy person.

196.

Baudelaire says of himself: 'De Maistre and Edgar Poe taught me how to reason.'

197.

The death penalty is the result of a mystical idea that nobody understands anymore today. The death penalty does not aim to save society in a physical, practical way. It wants to save both society and the guilty person spiritually. For the sacrifice to be perfect, the victim must agree to it and feel joy in it. Giving chloroform to a man condemned to death would be an insult to God: because it would take away his awareness of his greatness as a victim, and take away his chances of winning paradise.

As for torture, it comes from the shameful part of the human heart, the part that thirsts for pleasure. Cruelty and sensual pleasure are the same feeling, just as extreme heat and extreme cold feel the same.

198.

What is low and shameful about any job at all.

A dandy does nothing. Can you picture a dandy speaking to the common people, except to mock them?

There are only three beings worth respecting: the priest, the warrior, and the poet. To know, to kill, and to create.

All other people are there to be taxed or forced into unpaid labor. They are made for the stable, that is, for doing what people call professions.

199.

That woman Sand, George Sand, was a moralist.

She has that famous smooth, flowing style that the middle class loves so much.

She is stupid, she is heavy, she is a chatterbox. When it comes to morals, her judgment is just as deep, and her feelings just as delicate, as those of doormen and kept women.

She is a naive old woman who refuses to get off the stage.

She has talked herself into trusting her 'good heart' and her 'good sense', and she talks other big fools into doing the same.

I can't think of this stupid creature without a shudder of disgust.

200.

Baudelaire says: I am bored in France, because everybody there is like Voltaire. Voltaire, or the anti-poet (Emerson forgot about him): the king of gawking idlers, the prince of shallow people, the anti-artist, the preacher for doormen.

201.

Voltaire made fun of the immortal soul, which for nine months lives between excrement and urine. Baudelaire guesses that this choice of location is 'a nasty trick or a satire by Providence against love, and that the way we are conceived is a sign of original sin. In fact, we can only make love with organs that also get rid of waste.'

202.

How the Church disinfects love: marriage.

203.

Dandyism. What is the higher person? It is not a specialist. He is the man of leisure and of broad, general education. To be rich and to love work.

204.

Here is the boring thing about love: it is a crime where you can't avoid having a partner in crime.

205.

If you were a Jesuit and a revolutionary, as every true politician has to be, or ends up being anyway…

206.

Dictators are the servants of the people, nothing more. And fame is the result of fitting in: a mind adapting itself to the stupidity of its nation.

207.

What is love? A need to go outside of yourself.

Man is a worshipping animal. To worship is to sacrifice yourself and to sell yourself. And so all love is prostitution.

The cruelty of human beings, which can never be destroyed, which is eternal, found everywhere, and full of clever tricks. Love of blood, the drunken thrill of blood, the drunken thrill of crowds.

208.

Note well: Let us not trust the people, common sense, the heart, inspiration, or what seems obvious.

How can anyone let women into church? What kind of conversation could they possibly have with God?

The eternal Venus, goddess of love (meaning whims, hysteria, fantasy), is one of the tempting shapes the devil takes.

209.

In love, the warm friendly agreement between two people comes from a misunderstanding. That misunderstanding is pleasure. The gap between them is never bridged.

210.

"Let us be mediocre!" said Saint-Marc Girardin, out of a passionate hatred for the sublime, for anything lofty and grand.

211.

You should not give the rulers in power the credit or the blame for the good points and the faults of the people they rule over. Those good points and faults nearly always belong to the atmosphere left by the government that came before.

Louis the Fourteenth inherits the people of Louis the Thirteenth: glory.

Napoleon inherits the people of the Republic: glory.

Napoleon inherits the people of Louis-Philippe: dishonor.

212.

Deep in the human heart there is a taste for prostitution that can never be wiped out. That is why people are so horrified by being alone. A person wants to be two.

The genius, the man of genius, wants to be one, and therefore alone.

Glory means staying one, while selling yourself in a special way.

213.

It is this horror of being alone, this need to forget your own self in someone else's body, that man, in grand words, calls the need to love.

214.

On the necessity of beating women.

215.

Trade is, by its very nature, satanic. Trade is give-and-take. It is a loan that comes with an unspoken message: Give me back more than I give you.

The mind of every trader is completely spoiled and corrupted.

Trade is natural, and therefore it is shameful.

The least wicked of all traders is the one who says: let us be virtuous, so that we make much more money than the fools who are wicked. For the businessman, even honesty is a bet placed in hope of profit.

Trade is satanic, because it is one of the forms of selfishness.

216.

The whole world gets along only because of misunderstandings. If, unluckily, people truly understood one another, they would never be able to agree with each other.

A clever, thinking man, which means a man who will never agree with anyone, should train himself to enjoy talking with fools and reading bad books. He will get bitter pleasures out of it, and those pleasures will more than make up for the tiredness it costs him.

217.

An official, a government minister: these can be worthy, respectable people. But they are never divine. They are people without personality, beings without originality, born for their job, that is, born to serve the public like house servants.

218.

Every newspaper shows signs of the most horrible human wickedness: a web of horrors. Civilized man has this disgusting appetizer with his breakfast. Everything in this world drips with crime: the newspaper, the wall, and the human face. How can a clean hand touch a newspaper without shuddering in disgust?…

219.

Without love for others, I am nothing but a clanging cymbal.

220.

My humiliations have been gifts of God's grace.

221.

I have never yet known the pleasure of a plan carried through.

222.

Every time the will backs down, a small piece of what we are made of is lost.

223.

like Baudelaire, who one day felt the wind from the wing of madness brush over him

224.

To be cured of everything, of poverty, of sickness, and of gloom, the only thing missing is a taste for work.

225.

"The ruins will strike him while he is laughing", written on his portrait.

226.

1.

The idea that humanity has one shared task to carry out, that as a whole it is running toward some goal, is a very unclear and random idea, and it is still very young. Maybe people will get rid of it again before it turns into a "fixed idea," an obsession… This humanity is not one whole. It is a huge tangle of life processes that can't be pulled apart, some rising and some sinking. It does not have a youth, then a grown-up stage, and finally an old age. The fact is, the layers lie mixed up and piled on top of one another. In a few thousand years there may still be younger types of human beings than any we can point to today. Decadence, on the other hand, belongs to every era of humanity. Everywhere there is waste and rotting material. Getting rid of what is declining and what is refuse is itself a process of life.

2.

While Christian prejudice was in power, *this question did not even exist*. The meaning of life lay in saving each individual soul. Whether humanity lasted a longer or shorter time did not matter at all. The best Christians wished it would come to an end as soon as possible. About what each single person needed, *there was no doubt*… The task was now set for every single person, just as it would be for some future person in any future at all. Value, meaning, and the whole range of values were fixed, absolute, eternal, one with God… Whatever strayed from this eternal type was sinful, devilish, condemned…

For each soul, the whole weight of value lay inside itself: saved or damned! The salvation of the *eternal* soul! The most extreme form of *making oneself the center of everything*… For every soul there was only one way to become perfect, only one ideal, only one road to being saved… The most extreme form of *equal rights*, tied to blowing up

one's own importance, as if through a magnifying glass, until it became nonsense… Nothing but ridiculously important souls, each spinning around itself in terrible fear…

3.

Today nobody believes in this absurd self-importance anymore. We have poured our wisdom through a sieve of contempt. And yet one *habit of seeing* stays firmly in place: we look for a person's value in how close they come to an *ideal human being*. Deep down, people still keep both the *view that puts the self at the center* and the idea of *everyone being equal before the ideal*. In short: *people think they know* what the *ultimate wishful ideal* is when it comes to the ideal human being…

But this belief is only the result of being hugely *spoiled* by the Christian ideal. Whenever you carefully examine the "ideal type," that is exactly what you pull out of it again right away. People think, *first*, that they know it is good to come closer to one single type. *Second*, they think they know what kind of type that is. Third, they think that every step away from this type is a step backward, a blockage, a loss of strength and power for humanity… Dreaming of a world where this *perfect human being* makes up the vast majority by numbers: our socialists, and even the gentlemen who preach usefulness, the utilitarians, have not reached any higher than that. — This seems to give the development of humanity a *goal*. In any case, believing in *progress toward the ideal* is the only way people today can imagine any kind of *goal* in human history. In short: people have moved the arrival of the "*kingdom of God*" into the future, down onto the earth, into human life. But at bottom they have held on to their belief in the *old* ideal…

227.

What we need to understand:

That every kind of decline and sickness has always helped shape our overall judgments about value. That in the value judgments which came to rule, decadence has even gained the upper hand. That we have to fight not only the after-effects of all the present misery of degeneration, but also the fact that *all* past decadence has been left over, which means it has stayed *alive*. Such a total straying of humanity away from its basic instincts, such a total decadence in how we judge values, is the question mark above all others. It is the real riddle that the animal called "human" sets for the philosopher —

228.

The main kinds of pessimism: the pessimism of *sensitivity* (being far too easily irritated, with unpleasant feelings outweighing pleasant ones)

The pessimism of the "*unfree will*" (in other words: lacking the strength to hold yourself back when something stirs you)

The pessimism of *doubt* (that is: shying away from anything firm, from grabbing hold of or touching anything)

You can watch all the mental states that go with these in a madhouse, though in a somewhat exaggerated form. The same goes for "nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning)" (the piercing feeling of "nothingness").

But where do these belong:

the

moral pessimism of Pascal?

the

metaphysical pessimism of the Vedanta philosophy?

the

social pessimism of the anarchist (or of Shelley)?

the

pessimism of *sympathy* (like that of Tolstoy, or of Alfred de Vigny)?

— Aren't all of these signs of decline and sickness too?… Taking moral values far too seriously, or made-up stories about a "world beyond," or social hardship, or *suffering* in general: every such *exaggeration* of a *single* point of view is already a sign of sickness in itself. So is letting the *No* outweigh the *Yes*!

What must not be confused with this: the joy of saying no and doing no that comes from an enormous strength and tension of saying yes to life. This is typical of all rich and powerful people and times. It is a kind of luxury. It is also a form of bravery that stands up to what is terrifying. It is a liking for the frightening and the questionable, because, among other things, you are frightening and questionable yourself: the *Dionysian (joyfully life-affirming)* in will, mind, and taste.

229.

Leopardi complains, and he has good reason to complain. But precisely because of that, he does not belong to the type of the complete nihilist.

230.

"I write for about ten souls whom I may never see, but whom I adore without ever having seen them." Stendhal.

231.

Around 1844, Baudelaire, who was influenced by Sainte-Beuve (by his book Joseph Delorme), says… Sainte-Beuve says to him: "You are right, my poetry is connected to yours. I had tasted the same bitter fruit, full of ashes deep inside."

232.

Baudelaire: ("Volupté," the story of Amaury)

and in front of the mirror, I have perfected

the cruel art that a demon gave me when I was born,

— to turn pain into true pleasure —

to make one's own suffering bleed and to scratch at one's wound.

233.

Sketch out a plan for a lyrical farce, and turn it into a serious novel. Drown the whole thing in a strange, dreamy atmosphere, in the atmosphere of the *great days*. Let it be something that rocks you gently, like a cradle, and is even calm in the middle of passion. — Regions of *pure poetry*. —

234.

Where humanity is heading, as Baudelaire imagined it. He does not mean that we would slip back into a wild state, something like the clownish chaos of South American republics, where people hunt for their food with a rifle in hand among the ruins of our civilization. That would still require a certain energy for life. Machines will have made us so 'Americanized', and progress will have so withered the spiritual part of us, that all the crazy things socialists ever dreamed of

will fall short of the actual reality. No religion, no property, not even revolution any more. The general ruin will not show itself in political institutions (or 'universal progress': the name hardly matters). Do I need to say that the little bit of politics left over will struggle painfully in the grip of a general animal-like state? And that those who govern, to keep themselves in power and to create a mere ghost of order, will be forced to use methods that would make people today shudder, even though we are already so hardened? (Hair-raising!) Then the son will run away from his family at twelve, set free by his greedy, early ripeness, to get rich and to compete with his shameful father, as the founder and shareholder of a newspaper that 'spreads enlightenment', and so on. Then even prostitutes will be a kind of merciless wisdom that condemns everything except money, everything, even the mistakes of the senses! Then everything we call virtue will be seen as something hugely ridiculous: everything that is not a hunger for Plutus, the god of wealth. Justice will ban citizens who do not know how to make their fortune, and so on. Degradation.

As for me, says Baudelaire, I sometimes feel the ridiculous side of a prophet in myself, but I know I will never find in it the kindness of a doctor. Lost in this miserable world, pushed and shoved by the crowds, I am like a tired man. When he looks back, he sees nothing but disappointment and bitterness through long, deep years. Ahead of him he sees a storm with nothing new in it, neither a lesson nor pain. On the evening when this man has stolen a few hours of pleasure from fate (that is: the evening on which this man has stolen an hour of pleasure from fate), lulled by his digestion, forgetting the past as much as he can, content with the present and resigned to the future, drunk on his own coolness and his dandy style, proud not to be as low as the people walking past, he watches the smoke of his cigar and says to himself: 'What do I care where all these consciences are going?'

235.

A little fresh air! This absurd state of Europe must not go on any longer! Is there any thought at all behind this dumb-as-cattle nationalism? What could be the point of stirring up these crude feelings of self-importance now, when everything points to bigger, shared interests?… And this calls itself a 'Christian state'! And close to the highest circles, that rabble of court preachers!… And the 'new German Empire', once again built on the most worn-out and most despised idea of all: equal rights and equal votes…

And all this at a time when it is plain to see that minds are not independent and that nations are losing their separate character, and when the real value and meaning of today's culture lies precisely in peoples melting into one another and enriching one another!

The economic union of Europe is bound to come, and so, as a reaction to it, is the peace party…

The struggle for first place inside a situation that is worthless: this culture of big cities, of newspapers, of fever and of 'pointlessness'.

236.

A party of peace, without sentimentality. It forbids itself and its children to wage war. It forbids them to use the courts. It calls down struggle, opposition and persecution on itself. It is a party of the oppressed, at least for a while, and soon the great party. It is against feelings of revenge and of holding grudges.

A war party, acting toward itself with the same firm principles and the same strictness, but in the opposite direction.

237.

Buddhism and Christianity: a fight against resentment (bitter grudge of the weak).

238.

Doing away with 'punishment'. 'Making things even' instead of using force of any kind.

239.

Original Christianity means doing away with the state:

it forbids

the

oath,

the

military service,

the

courts of law,

the

defending yourself, and defending any larger group,

the

difference between your own people and foreigners; and likewise the division of society into classes.

The example of Christ: he does not resist those who do him harm (he forbids self-defense). He does not defend himself. He does even more:

'he offers the left cheek'. (When he is asked, 'Are you the Christ?', he answers, 'And from now on you will see', and so on.)

He forbids his disciples to defend him. He points out that he could have help, but that he does not want it.

Christianity also means doing away with society. It favors everything that society has pushed aside. It grows out of the shunned and the condemned, out of outcasts of every kind: the 'sinners', the 'tax collectors' and prostitutes, the most simple-minded folk (the 'fishermen'). It looks down on the rich, the educated, the high-born, the virtuous, the 'proper' people…

240.

On the psychological problem of

Christianity

The driving force stays the same: resentment (bitter grudge of the weak), the uprising of the common people, the revolt of those who got a bad deal in life.

(Buddhism is different: it was not born from a movement of resentment. It fights resentment because resentment pushes people into action.)

This peace party understands that giving up hostility, in thought and in deed, is what sets it apart and what keeps it alive

: and this is the psychological difficulty that has kept people from understanding Christianity.

The very drive that created it forces it to fight against itself, on principle.

This revolt has a chance of success only as a party of peace and innocence. It has to win through extreme mildness, sweetness and gentleness. Its instinct understands this.

The clever trick: to deny and condemn the very drive you are an expression of, and to keep showing off the opposite of that drive, in your deeds and in your words.

241.

A right to exist, a right to work, a right to be happy!!!

242.

a sweet dream of the 'charming doctor', Renan.

243.

Christians have never actually done the things Jesus told them to do. All the shameless talk about 'faith', about 'being made right with God through faith', and about faith being the highest and only thing that matters, is simply the result of this: the Church had neither the courage nor the will to stand by the deeds that Jesus demanded.

244.

A Buddhist acts differently from someone who is not a Buddhist. A Christian acts like everybody else, and has a Christianity made of ceremonies and moods.

245.

The deep and contemptible dishonesty of Christianity in Europe: we really deserve to be looked down on by the Arabs, the Hindus, the Chinese… Just listen to the speeches of Germany's leading statesman

about what has really kept Europe busy for the last forty years… Listen to the language of that court preacher with his pious hypocrisy.

246.

Not resisting 'evil'…

But if you do not believe in good and evil, what does that even mean?

247.

The old law, which resists evil and pays back evil with evil, and the new law, which does not pay back and does not fight back.

248.

Things only get better if you pay back everything bad with good, and stop treating one person differently from another.

249.

Jesus denies church, state, society, art, science, culture and civilization.

All wise men, in their own time, have denied the value of culture and of the organized state.

Plato, Buddha,

250.

This temple must be torn down and built up again in three days.

251.

I have not been a Christian for a single hour of my life. Everything I have seen called Christianity, I see as a contemptible double game

with words, a real cowardice before all the powers that rule everywhere else…

Christians who accept compulsory military service, parliamentary voting and newspaper culture, and who in the middle of all that keep talking about 'sin', 'salvation', 'the next world' and death on the cross: how can anyone stand such a dirty mess!

252.

None of you has the courage to kill a person, or even to whip one, or even to — but the enormous madness of the state overpowers the individual, so that he *refuses* to take responsibility for what he does (because of obedience, oaths, and so on).

— Everything a person *does* in the service of the state goes against his nature…

— and in the same way, everything he *learns* with a view to serving the state in the future goes against his nature.

This is achieved through the *division of labor*: so that nobody carries the whole responsibility anymore.

: the one who makes the law, and the one who carries the law out

: the teacher of discipline, and those who have grown hard and strict through that discipline

The state as *organized violence*…

253.

That Jesus said something so dark and mysterious that you need faith just to believe it is true:

254.

"What is *high* and admired among people is something God finds disgusting."

255.

The state of the European mind: our *barbarism*

the contemptible, pitiful nonsense that each individual person lives on after death: a point of view that Hindus, Jews and Chinese people are supposed to have left behind long ago

belief in God

256.

Stepping into the *true* life —

— you save your personal life from death by living the shared life of all —

257.

— the *Church* is exactly what Jesus preached against — and what he taught his followers to fight against —

258.

— *give-and-take,* the hidden motive of wanting to be paid back: this is one of the sneakiest ways of lowering a person's worth. It brings with it that kind of "equality" which runs down the gap of distance between people as *immoral*…

259.

— nobody has a right to anything: not to existence, not to work, and certainly not to "happiness". In this, the single human being is no different from the lowest worm.

260.

— "What should I do in order to believe?" — a ridiculous question.

261.

What is missing in Christianity is actually keeping to everything that Christ commanded people to *do*.

It is petty, shabby life, but looked at and explained with an eye full of contempt.

262.

God created human beings happy, idle, innocent and immortal: our real life is a false, fallen, sinful existence, a life of punishment… Suffering, struggle, work and death are judged as objections and question marks against life, as something unnatural, something that should not last; something you need a cure for — and that you *have* a cure for!…

263.

From Adam until now, humanity has been in an abnormal state. God himself gave up his Son to pay for Adam's guilt, so as to put an end to this abnormal state. The natural character of life is a *curse*. Christ gives those who believe in him their normal state back: he makes them happy, idle and innocent. — But the earth has not started to bear fruit without work. Women do not give birth to children without

pain. Sickness has not stopped. The most faithful believers are just as badly off here as the worst unbelievers. The only thing is that man is supposedly freed from *death* and from *sin* — claims that nobody can check — and the Church has insisted on these all the more firmly. "He is free from sin" — not through what he does, not through a hard struggle of his own, but *bought free by the act of redemption*, as if someone paid his ransom — and therefore perfect, innocent, back in paradise…

The *true* life is only a belief (that is, a self-deception, a madness). The whole real existence, wrestling and fighting, full of brightness and darkness, is supposedly only a bad, false existence: and the task is to be *rescued* from it.

264.

Religion has *faked* the way we understand life: and science and philosophy have only ever made themselves the servant girl of this teaching…

Whether you believe in God, in Christ and in Adam or not: everyone agrees that life is only an *illusion*, nothing true or real —

265.

Life is bad: but it is not up to us to make it better. Change comes from laws that lie outside of us. — On this point, the determinism of science, which says everything is fixed by cause and effect, and the belief in the act of redemption stand on the same ground.

They also agree in granting man a *right to happiness*, and in using this yardstick to condemn the life we have now —

266.

Everyone asks: "Why is life not the way we want it, and *when* will it be?"

267.

Note well, note well: "man, innocent, idle, immortal, happy" — this idea of the "highest wishful ideal" is what needs to be criticized above all.

Why should guilt, work, death and suffering (*and*, speaking in Christian terms, *knowledge*…) be *against* the highest wishful ideal?

The rotten, lazy Christian ideas of "blessedness", "innocence", "immortality" — — —

268.

"Peace among people" as the highest good you can imagine: the kingdom of God

269.

Be at peace with the whole world, and do not look at anyone as if he were a nobody or a fool! If the peace is broken, do everything you can to restore it. Worshipping God consists entirely in wiping out hostility among people. Make up with each other at the smallest argument, so that you do not lose your inner peace, which is the *true life*. What disturbs peace most of all? First, sexual desire: against it there is marriage to one partner, and a marriage that cannot be broken. The second temptation is the oath: it drags a person into sin. Never swear an oath to anyone under any circumstances, so that you have no master over you except God. The third temptation is revenge, which calls itself justice: put up with wrongs done to you, and do not pay back

evil with evil! The fourth temptation is making a difference between your own people and foreigners: do not break peace with anyone because of your nationality or where you come from!

Practicing these 5 commands brings about the state the human heart longs for: everyone brothers with one another, each at peace with all, each enjoying the good things of the earth until his end…

Luke 4:18

"The year of the Lord's favor" — the lovely, gracious words that came out of his mouth —

270.

Man has a right to nothing. He has duties because of the good things he has received. He has no business arguing with anyone about what he is owed. Even if he gave his life, he would not pay back everything he has received: that is why his master cannot be unfair to him. But when a person insists on his right to life, when he argues with the source of everything, the source his life comes from, he proves only one thing — he does not understand the *meaning* of life. People who have received a gift still *demand* something more. The workers in the parable were idle and unhappy: the master gives them the greatest happiness of life — work. They accept the gift and are still not satisfied. They came along with their false theory of a right to work, and so with the idea of a *reward* for their work. They do not understand that they have received the highest good for free, that they ought to show gratitude for it — and *not* demand payment. Matthew 20:1; Luke 17:5, 10.

The teaching consists in giving up your personal life: and you demand personal fame — a personal reward… In the world there is fame and personal power; but you, my students, should know that the true

meaning of life is not found in personal happiness, but in serving everyone and making yourself lower than everyone… Christ does not tell them to believe: he teaches them the true difference between good and evil, between what matters and what is secondary…

Peter does not understand the teaching, and that is why he lacks faith. *A reward that matches the amount of work done* only matters if you are thinking about your own personal life. Believing that work gets rewarded, and rewarded in proportion to how much was done, comes from the idea of *the personal life*…

271.

Faith cannot come from trusting his words. It can only come from *seeing clearly the situation we are in*. You cannot create faith by promising rewards and threatening punishments. The kind of faith that "moves mountains" can only rest on knowing that we are sure to be shipwrecked, that we are headed for ruin, unless we accept the rescue that is still open to us… — and that rescue is living *in line with the will of the Lord* —

272.

Matthew, chapter 21, verse 18

— Early the next morning, as he was going back into the city, he was hungry. He saw a fig tree beside the road, went up to it, and found nothing on it but leaves. So he said to it: "From now on, no fruit will ever grow on you again." And at once the fig tree dried up and died. When the disciples saw this, they were amazed and asked: "How did the fig tree wither so quickly?" —

273.

The five commands are: do not get angry; do not cheat on your husband or wife; do not swear oaths; do not defend yourselves with force; do not go to war. Now and then you may break these rules, just as you now break the rules of the civil law code and the rules of polite society. But in calm moments you will no longer do what you do now. You will no longer *set up* a way of life that makes it so hard not to get angry, not to cheat on your partner, not to swear oaths, not to fight back with force, and not to go to war. *Instead, set up a way of life that would make it hard for you to do these things!*

274.

Tolstoy speaks to the unbelievers, to us philosophers, and says: For this life you are living now, you actually have no rules at all, except the ones written by people you do not respect and enforced by the police. The teaching of Jesus gives you those rules. And they certainly agree with your own law, because your law of "altruism", of living for others, or of the one single will, is nothing more than a poor retelling of that very same teaching of Jesus.

Tolstoy, My Religion.

Moscow, January 22, 1884

275.

No God who died for our sins. No salvation through faith. No rising again after death. All of these are faking (like forging money): fake versions of real Christianity, and the blame for them must be laid on that disastrous, stubborn crank;

The *model life* is made of love and humility. It is a heart so full that it does not shut out even the lowest person. It means clearly giving up

any wish to be proven right, any wish to defend yourself, any wish to win in the sense of personal triumph. It means believing that happiness is here, on earth, in spite of hardship, opposition and death. It means being ready to forgive, and being free of anger and contempt. It means not wanting to be rewarded, and not being tied to anyone. It is the most spiritual kind of freedom from any master. It is a very proud life, lived with the will to be poor and to serve.

The Church had let the *whole practice of Christianity* be taken away from it. In fact, it had given its blessing to life in the state, the very kind of life Jesus had fought against and condemned. After that, the Church had to place the *meaning* of Christianity somewhere else: in *believing* things that cannot be believed, and in the ceremonies of prayer, worship, holy days and so on. The ideas of "sin", "forgiveness", "punishment" and "reward" had been completely unimportant in the earliest Christianity, almost *left out* of it. Now they move to the front.

A horrible jumble of Greek philosophy and Judaism; self-denial and harsh self-discipline; constant judging and condemning; the ranking of people and values; — — —

276.

If you do not understand that the Church is not just a cartoon version of Christianity, but an organized *war against Christianity*: — — —

277.

Tolstoy, page 243

"The teaching of Jesus cannot in any way clash with how people of our century see the world. It already agrees with their deepest ideas about reality. But it gives them what they do not have, what they cannot do without, and what they are looking for: it gives them the path of life.

And it is not an unknown path, but one that has been explored and that everyone knows well."

Page 236

The conflict between the Church's explanations, which are taken to be faith, and the true faith of our generation, which consists in obeying the rules of society and of the state, has become very sharp. Most civilized people have nothing to guide their lives except faith in the police officer on the street and the armed police. This situation would be terrible if that were all there was. But luckily there are people, the best people of our time, who are not satisfied with this religion. They have a completely different faith about what human life should be. These people are seen as the most harmful, the most dangerous, and above all the most unbelieving of all beings. And yet they are the only people of our time who believe in the teaching of the Gospels, if not all of it, then at least part of it… Often they even hate Jesus… People may persecute them and tell lies about them all they like, but they are the only ones who do not obey the orders of just anyone without protesting. So they are the only people in our time who live a thoughtful life, not the life of an animal. They are the only ones who have faith.

278.

Note. You cannot respect human beings enough when you look at how they manage to get by, how they hold out, how they make use of their circumstances, and how they know how to knock down their enemies. But if you look at human beings in terms of what they *wish* for, they are the most ridiculous beasts there are… It is as if they needed a playground of cowardice, laziness, weakness, sugary sweetness and servility, a place where their strong and manly virtues could rest. Just look at what humans wish for, at their wishful ideals, their "ideals."

The *wishing* person takes a break from what is truly and lastingly valuable in him, which is his doing. He rests in things that are empty, absurd, worthless and childish. In this animal, which is otherwise so inventive and so full of solutions, the poverty of mind and the lack of imagination here are shocking. The "ideal" is like a penalty that people pay for the enormous effort they must spend on all their real and urgent tasks. When reality stops, then come dreaming, tiredness and weakness. "The ideal" is simply a form of dreaming, tiredness and weakness… The strongest natures and the most powerless natures become alike once this state comes over them. They make a god out of *stopping*: stopping work, struggle, passion, tension, opposites, in short, stopping "*reality*"… stopping the struggle for knowledge, the *hard work* of knowing.

"Innocence": that is what they call the ideal state of being made stupid.

"Blessedness": that is what they call the ideal state of laziness.

"Love": that is what they call the ideal state of the herd animal, which no longer wants to have any enemy.

And so everything that lowers and drags people down has been lifted up and turned into an *ideal*.

279.

Jesus set a real life, a life lived in truth, against ordinary everyday life. Nothing was further from his mind than the clumsy nonsense of an "immortal Peter," of each person living on forever. What he fights against is the self-importance of the "person." So how could he want to make exactly that last forever?

In the same way, he fights against ranks and hierarchy inside the community. He does not promise any reward measured by how much

someone has achieved. So how could he possibly have meant punishment and reward in an afterlife!

280.

I cannot see what the revolt started by Jesus was aimed at, if it was not a revolt against the Jewish church, and I mean "church" in exactly the sense we give the word today… It was a revolt against "the good and the just," against "the holy ones of Israel," against the ranks of society. It was *not* against the corruption of that order, but against the tyranny of caste, of custom, of fixed formulas, of order, of privilege, of spiritual pride, of strict puritanism in religious matters. What led to the uprising here was disbelief in the "higher people," in the religious sense of the word. It was an attack on everything that is priest and theologian. But the hierarchy that was being questioned in this way was the very foundation on which the Jewish people still managed to survive at all. It was their *last* chance to go on existing, won with great effort, the leftover relic of their old separate political life. An attack on it was an attack on the deepest national instinct, on the Jewish will to keep themselves alive. This holy anarchist called the lowly people, the outcasts and the "sinners" to rise up against the "ruling class," using language that would still get you sent to Siberia today. So he was a political criminal, as far as a political crime was even possible under those conditions. That is what brought him to the cross. The proof is the sign on the cross: "The King of the Jews." There is no reason at all to claim, as Paul did, that Jesus died "for the sins of others"… he died for his own "sin." Put the same kind of person in other conditions, for example right in the middle of today's Europe, and he would live, teach and speak as a nihilist (someone who believes nothing has meaning). And in that case too, his followers would tell us that their master died for justice and for love between people. Not because of his own guilt, they would say, but

because of *our* guilt. By "our" they would mean the classes now in power, since among anarchists, ruling at all already counts as guilt.

281.

Paul had an instinct for what non-Jews needed. He translated the great symbols of the first Christian movement into something solid and literal, no longer symbolic. For one thing, he took the contrast between the *true* life and the *false* life and turned it into a contrast between this earthly life and that other, heavenly life beyond, with death as the bridge between them. In other words, he placed the two lives in time, as "now" and "later." To do this, he reached deep into paganism and took the idea of *each person living forever*, an idea just as anti-Jewish as it is anti-Christian. But all over the world, wherever there were secret cults, people believed in this living on after death, and they saw it in terms of reward and punishment. This darkening of paganism by the shadow of paying off your guilt in the afterlife was exactly what Epicurus, for example, fought against… Paul's trick was to take the belief that Christ had been seen again after his death (that is, the fact of a *group hallucination*) and blow it up into a theological logic. He made it look as if immortality and resurrection were the *main facts*, the keystone, so to speak, of Jesus's plan of salvation. To do this, the whole *teaching* and *practice* of the early community had to be turned upside down.

That is the joke of the whole thing, a tragic joke: Paul rebuilt, on a grand scale, exactly what Christ had canceled out through his life. In the end, once the church is complete, it even gives its blessing to the *existence of the state*…

282.

Note: it began as a naive start of a Buddhist-like *peace movement*, coming right out of the very heart of resentment (the bitter grudge of the weak)… but Paul twisted it into a pagan mystery religion. In the end this religion learned to get along with the whole *organization of the state*… and it wages wars, condemns, tortures, swears oaths and hates.

Paul starts from the need for mysteries felt by the great masses who were stirred up about religion. He looks for a *sacrifice*, a bloody fantasy spectacle that could compete with the images of the secret cults: God on the cross, the drinking of blood, the mystical union with the "sacrifice."

He tries to link *living on after death* (the blessed, cleansed life after death of each individual soul), in the form of resurrection, as a cause-and-effect result of that *sacrifice*. He follows the model of Dionysus, Mithras and Osiris.

He needs to put the ideas of *guilt* and *sin* in the foreground. What he offers is *not* a new way of living (like the one Jesus himself showed and taught), but a new cult, a new faith, a faith in a miracle-like transformation: "salvation" through believing.

He understood the *great need of the pagan world*. From the facts of Christ's life and death he made a completely arbitrary selection. He put new stress on everything and shifted the weight everywhere… On principle, he *canceled out* the original Christianity…

The attack on *priests* and *theologians*, thanks to Paul, ended up as a new priesthood and a new theology: a *ruling* class, and a *church* as well.

The attack on the excessive self-importance of the "*person*" ended up as the belief in the "eternal person" (as worry about one's "eternal salva-

tion"…). It ended up as the most absurd exaggeration of personal selfishness.

You can see what had happened with the death on the cross. *Paul* appears as the demon of the "bad news," the opposite of the gospel's good news…

283.

As if the fact that a person is *harmful* should already count as an *argument* against him!… As if, among the great promoters of life, there were no room for the great criminal too!…

With our wishes, we leave animals untouched, and nature too. But human beings, we absolutely want to be different…

Suppose the most extraordinary people could only come into being through an act of will, a decision, a vote. Then no one would ever aim for them…

This much I have understood: suppose the birth of great and rare people had depended on the approval of the many. Suppose, too, that the many actually *knew* which qualities go into greatness, and also at whose expense all greatness grows. Well then, they would never have stopped a single important person from coming into being…

Things take their course *without* asking the approval of the vast majority. That is the reason why a few astonishing things have managed to sneak their way onto the earth…

284.

In Morocco you get to know the Middle Ages. In Corsica you get to know Jewish and Arab history at the time when it was most concentrated. In Arabia you get to know the age of the patriarchs, the ancient tribal fathers. — — —

285.

Feeling stronger — or, to put it another way, joy — always involves a comparison. But it is *not* necessarily a comparison with other people. It can be a comparison with yourself, in the middle of a state of growth, without your even *knowing* in what way you are comparing —

— then there is the *artificial* boost to strength: either through stimulating chemicals, or through stimulating mistakes, that is, delusions.

For example, the feeling of *safety* that the Christian has. He feels strong because he is allowed to trust, allowed to be patient and calm. He owes this artificial boost to the delusion that a God is protecting him.

For example, the feeling of *superiority*. Take the Caliph of Morocco, who is only ever shown globes on which his three united kingdoms cover four-fifths of the earth's surface.

For example, the feeling of being *unique*. Take the European who imagines that the story of culture is played out in Europe, and who sees himself as a kind of shortened version of the whole history of the world. Or take the Christian, who makes all existence revolve around the "salvation of mankind" —

It depends on where you feel the pressure, the lack of freedom. Depending on that, a different feeling of *being stronger* arises. A philosopher, for example, in the middle of the coldest, most far-off mental exercises of abstract thought, feels like a fish that has found its water. Meanwhile colors and sounds weigh on him, not to mention dull, vague desires — not to mention what other people call "the ideal".

286.

The different shapes of *self-esteem*:

First point of view

A: To what extent the *feelings of sympathy and of belonging to a group* are the lower stage, the preparing stage. They come at a time when personal self-esteem, and the individual's power to set values on his own, are not yet possible at all.

B: To what extent the *high self-esteem of a group* is a school for *the self-esteem of the individual*. By this I mean the clan's pride in keeping its distance, its feeling of being unequal to others, its dislike of compromise, equal rights and making peace. This is a school mainly because it forces the individual to *represent* the pride of the whole group… He has to speak and act with extreme respect for himself, because he stands for the community in his own person…

Likewise: when the individual feels himself to be the *tool and mouthpiece of the godhead*.

C: To what extent these forms of *self-denial* actually give the person enormous importance: because higher powers are using him. This brings a religious awe in front of oneself. It is the state of the prophet, the poet…

D: To what extent being responsible for the whole group *trains* the individual and *allows* him to have certain things that he would never grant himself for his own sake alone: a wide view, a strict and terrible hand, a calm and cool mind, and a grand way of carrying himself and moving.

In short: the self-esteem of the group is the great preparatory school for the personal independence and rule of the individual.

The noble, high-minded class is the one that inherits the results of this training —

287.

The idea of power, whether the power of a god or of a human being, always includes two abilities at once: the ability to *help* and the ability to *harm*. So it was with the Arabs. So it was with the Hebrews. So it was with all peoples who turned out strong.

It is a fatal step when you split things into two and *separate* the strength for one from the strength for the other… With that, morality becomes a poisoner of life…

288.

My friends, these days you already have to crawl on all fours in this "state" and bray like a donkey. It is necessary to fool the plague into thinking you are a donkey. That is the only way to keep from catching this madness.

289.

Eve is the snake. She stands at the top of the family tree in the Bible. And among the Hebrews, the word for snake also commonly appears as a personal name.

290.

The meaning of circumcision is a test of manhood of the very highest order. It is like a *certificate of adulthood* that you need before you are allowed to marry. The Arabs call it "skinning". The scene takes place outdoors. The father and the friends stand around the young man. The cutter draws his knife. After cutting off the foreskin, he strips all the skin from the *penis*, and from the belly from the navel up to the hips. While this happens, the young man swings a knife in his right hand above the cutter's back and shouts, "Cut without fear!" Woe to

the cutter if he hesitates and his hand trembles! But the father kills his son on the spot if the son cries out in pain. At the end, the young man starts singing a hymn of glory to God and goes into the tent, where he falls to the ground in pain. Some die from the terrible infection and pus. Out of ten, usually eight survive. They have no pubic hair, and their belly is covered with pale skin. (This is among the 'Asîr people.)

291.

Calling someone barbaric meaning uncircumcised is both a Jewish and an Arab idea.

292.

Christianity did not understand the Last Supper. It was a sharing, a communion, through meat and drink, which in a natural way are turned into flesh and blood —

All community is a community of blood. This is not only something you are born with; it can also be gained. In the same way, blood is not only something you are born with, but also something you gain. People who eat and drink together renew their blood from the same source; they bring the same blood into their veins. A stranger, even an enemy, who shares our meal, even without our wanting it or against our will, is taken into the community of our flesh and blood by doing so, at least for a while.

293.

Sharing blood together is the oldest way of forming an alliance, of making a bond. A group that eats together is a sacred community. The animal that provides the blood of the bond is a sacrifice. And every sacrifice makes a bond.

294.

"Christianity" has become something completely different from what its founder did and wanted.

It is the great *anti-pagan movement* of the ancient world. It was put into words by using the life, the teaching and the "words" of the founder of Christianity, but in a completely *arbitrary* interpretation, shaped by *entirely different needs*. It was translated into the language of all the *underground religions* that already existed —

It is the rise of pessimism, while Jesus wanted to bring the peace and happiness of lambs.

And to be exact, it is the pessimism of the weak, of those who lost, of those who suffer, of the oppressed.

Their deadly enemy is, first, *power* in character, mind and taste — "worldliness". Second, it is classical "happiness": the noble, high-minded lightness and doubt, the hard pride, the wild excesses, and the cool self-sufficiency of the wise man; the Greek refinement in gesture, word and form. Their deadly enemy is the *Roman* just as much as the *Greek*.

Then comes the attempt of *anti-paganism* to give itself a philosophical foundation and make itself possible. It had a nose for the ambiguous figures of the old culture, above all for Plato, this enemy of the Greek spirit and Semite by instinct… It had the same nose for Stoicism, which is mainly the work of Semites. For in Stoicism, "dignity" means strictness and law, and virtue means greatness, responsibility for oneself, authority, the highest personal self-rule — and that is Semitic.

The Stoic is an Arab sheik wrapped up in Greek baby clothes and Greek ideas.

295.

From the very beginning, Christianity turned what was symbolic into *crude, literal things*:

1)

The contrast between "true life" and "false life" was misunderstood as "life here on earth" and "life in the beyond".

2)

The idea of "eternal life", as opposed to the passing personal life, was misunderstood as "personal immortality".

3)

Becoming brothers by sharing food and drink, following Hebrew and Arab custom, was misunderstood as "the miracle of transubstantiation", where bread and wine supposedly turn into body and blood.

4)

The 'resurrection' was first meant as stepping into 'true life', as being 'born again'. Out of that came something else: a historical event that is supposed to happen at some point after death.

5)

The teaching about the Son of Man as the 'Son of God' meant a living relationship between a human being and God. Out of that came 'the second person of the Godhead'. And exactly the important thing was *taken away*: the idea that every person, even the lowliest, stands to God as a child to a father.

6)

Salvation through faith first meant this: there is no other way to become a child of God than the *way of living* that Christ taught. This

was turned upside down into the belief that you must believe in some miraculous *paying off* of *sin*, a payment made not by the person but by what Christ did.

Because of this, 'Christ on the cross' had to be given a new meaning.

In itself, this death was *not* the main thing at all. It was just one more sign of how a person should behave toward the authorities and the laws of the world: *without fighting back*. *That was the example to follow.*

Christianity simply took up a fight that was already going on against the *classical* ideal, against the *noble, high-minded* religion.

In fact, this whole *reshaping* is a translation into the needs and the level of understanding of the *religious masses* of that time. These were the masses who believed in Isis, Mithras, Dionysus and the 'Great Mother', and who demanded the following from a religion:

1)

the hope for a life beyond this world

2)

the bloody, dreamlike spectacle of the sacrificed animal, 'the mystery'

3)

the saving *deed*, the holy legend

4)

self-punishing strictness, turning away from the world, superstitious 'cleansing'

5)

a chain of rank, a way of forming a congregation

In short: Christianity adapted itself to the *anti-paganism* that already existed and had taken root everywhere. It adapted to the cults that Epicurus had fought against. More exactly, it adapted to the *religions of the lower masses*: of *women*, of *slaves*, of the classes that were *not noble*.

So what we have as *misunderstandings* is this:

1)

the idea that each individual person lives forever

2)

the supposed *other* world

3)

the absurd idea of punishment and making up for guilt, placed at the very center of how existence is explained

4)

stripping the human being of anything godlike, instead of making him *godlike*; tearing open the deepest gap between man and God, a gap that only a miracle can bridge, only throwing yourself down on the ground in the deepest self-contempt

5)

the whole world of a spoiled imagination and sick emotions, instead of a loving, simple way of living, instead of a Buddhist kind of happiness that can be reached here on earth…

6)

a church system, with priests, theology, rituals and sacraments; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth had *fought against*

7)

the *miracle* in each and every thing, superstition: while what set Judaism and the earliest Christianity apart was exactly its *dislike* of miracles, its relative *reasonableness*

296.

The Goncourt Journal, Volume One.

"A God in the American style, a God who is God in a completely human way, who wears glasses, and about whom the little newspapers print reports." A God in a photograph.

… She asks for news about your soul, "Are you in a state of grace?", just as if she were asking, "Do you have a cold?"

Joubert: his thoughts lack the French sharpness and certainty. It is neither clear nor frank. It smells of the little school of Geneva: Madame Necker, Tracy, Jouffroy. The *bad* side of Sainte-Beuve comes from there. Joubert carves his ideas the way a craftsman turns little ornaments out of boxwood on a lathe.

From time to time, one feels the need to let one's mind go slumming, to mix with the low and vulgar.

His conversation lacks the broad brush; it is all pretty, small, timid things. (Said about Sainte-Beuve.)

Did the ancient Greeks and Romans work from a beautiful reality? Were they perhaps not 'idealists' at all?

They look for a *zero* to put next to themselves, so that their value is multiplied by ten.

In early youth, when all the liveliness of reaching out into the world is *pushed back* by deep loneliness…

"In a synagogue you feel as if you were in the East, in a happy religion. There is a kind of easy closeness with God. It is not like prayer in the Christian church, where people always want to be forgiven for something…"

'The Four Syndics' by *Rembrandt*, and 'The Martyrdom of Saint Mark' by *Tintoretto*: for the Goncourt brothers, these were the most beautiful paintings in the world.

English comfort shows a wonderful understanding of bodily well-being. But it is a kind of happiness that blind people could use: the eye finds nothing in it to satisfy it.

Note: nothing is as badly written as a fine speech.

In 'Salammbô' the real Flaubert shows himself: puffed up, preachy, melodramatic, in love with thick, heavy colors.

The only one who has found a language in which one can talk about ancient times is Maurice de Guérin, in 'The Centaur'.

The common people love neither what is true nor what is simple. They love the made-up story and the con man.

It is very strange that the four men who were the purest of any trade and of any money-making, the four pens most completely devoted to art, are exactly the ones who ended up in front of the benches of the criminal court: Baudelaire, Flaubert, and the two Goncourt brothers.

We have made all our means of travel ten times faster. But at the same time, we have made our need for speed a hundred times greater…

"I hate everything that is *heart* put into print, set down on paper." Gavarni.

It is a sign of the decay of old civilizations: people only take pleasure in the works of man, and are bored by the works of God.

We are the century of masterpieces of disrespect.

Happiness in the light of Algiers, a flattering kind of light: the way you breathe in cheerfulness…

Today's French sadness is not a sadness that leads to suicide, not one that curses God, not one that despairs. It is a sadness that has some sweetness in it, and in one corner of it, a little irony is laughing. The sadnesses of Hamlet, Lara, Werther, and even René are the sadnesses of peoples who live further *north* than we do.

The type of man from 1830: strong features, a gentle expression, a soft smile that seems to stroke you. He is used to battle, to noble fights, to burning loyalties, to the loud applause of a young audience. And yet deep inside he carries grief and regret; he cannot be comforted, his heart is torn. The political ideas of 1848 set him on fire again for a moment. Since then, boredom, and nothing to do with his thoughts and hopes. A refined mind, suffering from a quiet homesickness for an ideal in politics, literature, and art. He complains in a low voice, and takes revenge only on himself for having seen how imperfect things are down here on earth.

In the modern law book, the Code, honor is forgotten just as much as wealth. Not one word about settling questions of honor: the duel and so on. As for today's wealth, which is almost all in stock market dealings, in brokerage, in speculation, in unofficial trading or in currency exchange offices, nothing is set up to protect and defend it. There are no rules for these daily dealings. The courts have no authority over any stock market deals. The exchange agent does not even give a receipt.

La Bruyère: "You can make use of scoundrels, but you should do it quietly."

How can anyone have the courage to speak to a theater audience? The play is judged by a mass of humanity gathered together, a lump of stupidity all stuck together… (A book, on the other hand, you get to know when you are alone.)

"If you are good, you seem cowardly. You have to be wicked to be thought brave." A theme for Napoleon the Third.

"In front of a good landscape painting, I feel more like I am in the countryside than I do out in an open field or deep in the woods." We are too civilized, too old, too much in love with the fake and the artificial to be entertained by the green of the earth and the blue of the sky.

Flaubert felt the same way: he felt horror up on the Rigi mountain.

Literature of the twentieth century: crazy and mathematical at the same time, both analytical and full of fantasy. Things become more important and move to the front, no longer living beings. Love is done away with (already in Balzac, money steps into the foreground). It tells more of the story that goes on in the head than of the story in the *heart*.

"These moments of despair, these doubts, are not about ourselves or our ambitions, but about the times and the means we have. Yet instead of pushing us down into giving in, they make our *sense of duty as writers* stronger in us: more complete, more stubborn, more prickly. And for a moment we ask ourselves whether we should think and write purely for ourselves, and leave the noise, the publisher and the public to other people. But, as Gavarni says: nobody's perfect."

From the Journal of the Goncourt brothers, volume one, page 147.

The café is an early, primitive stage of this: for 40 centimes you buy cheerfulness, maybe with a gas thrown in (laughing gas): half a cup of paradise.

Gavarni says: it's cruel, but that's how it is, I don't have two pennies' worth of reverence in me. (But he does have plenty of sensitivity.)

Flaubert: "the idea is born out of the form." That is the highest rule of this school of writers, following Théophile Gautier.

"Men like us need a woman of low rank and little education, a woman who is nothing but cheerfulness and natural wit. Because a woman like that will delight and charm us the way a pleasant animal does, one we can grow attached to."

When the time comes that all men read and all women play the piano, the world will be falling completely apart. That time has forgotten a line from the last testament of Cardinal Richelieu: "Just as a body with eyes in every one of its parts would be a monster, so a State would be a monster if all its subjects were educated. In such a State you would see as little obedience as you would see pride and arrogance everywhere."

No real painters anymore. Instead, an army of people hunting for clever ideas. The wit is not in the brushstroke, but in the choice of subject. It is literature done with a paintbrush.

Raphael found the classic image of the Virgin Mary by perfecting the common, everyday type of face. This is the exact opposite of the beauty that Leonardo da Vinci looked for, which lay in the *exquisite* refinement of the type and the *rareness* of the expression. With Raphael there is a kind of completely human cheerfulness, a full, rounded beauty, a health almost like that of the goddess Juno. She will stay popular forever.

Voltaire was the last great mind of old France, Diderot the first great mind of the new France. Voltaire carried the epic poem, the fable, light little verses and tragedy to their grave. Diderot started the modern novel, modern drama and art criticism.

Being a skeptic, openly admitting that you doubt everything, is a bad way to get ahead in life! The tool of skepticism is irony, isn't it, the form that is hardest for the thick-headed, the dull, the stupid, the simple-minded and the masses to understand? And then this denial, this doubting of everything, shocks everyone's illusions, or at least the illusions everyone shows off. It shocks humanity's smug satisfaction with itself, which depends on each person being satisfied with himself. It shocks that peace of the human conscience which the middle-class man puts on for show, just as he passes off his own private conscience as being at peace.

Deep down in this metaphysical monologue, I sense a worry, "the worry and the terror about what comes after death, which a religious upbringing leaves even in the most freed minds."

Man created woman by giving her all his poetry… So says Gavarni.

With clowns and tightrope walkers, their craft is their duty. They are the only performers whose talent cannot be argued with and is absolute, like the talent of mathematicians, or even more like a dangerous somersault. Because here there is no faking the look of talent: either you fall, or you don't.

"Nothing is more charming or more exquisite than French wit in the mouths of foreigners: the wit of Galiani, of the Prince de Ligne, of Heinrich Heine."

Flaubert: "After all, work is still the best way to make life disappear, like a magic trick."

What strikes you about Victor Hugo, who is ambitious to be seen as a thinker, is the *absence* of thought. He is not a thinker, he is a creature of nature ("a naturalist," Flaubert says): he has the sap of trees running in his veins.

On the fashionable lover. In 1830 it was the *dark, gloomy* type, under the influence of "Antony." The leading actor of the day sets the style for how to seduce someone in love. In 1860 it is the joker (modeled on Grassot).

There are no more hands left to work the land. Education destroys the *breed* of workers, and so it destroys farming too…

An individual only has true freedom as long as he has not yet been drilled into line, like a soldier, in a fully civilized society. In such a society he loses all ownership of himself, of his goods, of his *good*. Since 1789 the State has swallowed up everyone's rights like a devil, and I wonder whether the future, under the name of complete rule by the State, is saving for us a whole new kind of tyranny, carried out by the despotic power of a French bureaucracy.

297.

Being good at only half of things: or, the 'good' person.

People tried to imagine God without any 'evil' qualities or intentions. In the same way, they tried to cut the human being down to just one half, the half made up of his 'good' qualities. Such a person must never, under any circumstances, do harm, or even want to do harm…

How to get there: cut away, as if by castration, the very ability to be an enemy. Pull resentment (bitter grudge of the weak) up by the roots. Make peace the one and only inner state, the only one that is approved…

The starting point is pure ideology, an idea in the head. People have set up 'good' and 'evil' as complete opposites. From there they think it only logical that the good person must give up and fight 'evil' down to its very last root. They believe this will bring them back to wholeness, to unity, to strength. They believe it will end the chaos inside them, where they keep falling apart because they are pulled between values that push in opposite directions.

But here is the catch: they call war evil, and yet they still wage war!… In other words, now more than ever they never stop hating, saying no, and acting against things. The Christian, for example, hates the sin (but not the sinner, as a pious trick keeps the two apart). And it is exactly this false split between 'good' and 'evil' that has made the world of things to hate, things to fight forever, grow enormously. In practice, 'the good' person sees himself surrounded by evil. He sees evil in every action. In the end he comes to believe that nature is evil, that people are rotten, and that being good is only possible as a gift of grace from God.

— This is how a type of person comes about who is loaded with hate and contempt, but who has cut himself off from the means to actually fight a war, with real weapons. The result is a worm-eaten, rotten kind of 'chosen ones', preachers of peace.

I. The perfect 'thick-headed ox'

The Stoic type. Or: the perfect thick-headed ox. Firmness, self-control, being impossible to shake. Peace understood as a long, steady will that refuses to bend. Deep calm, always on the defensive, like a mountain, with a soldier's distrust. Firm principles. Will and knowledge joined as one. Great respect for oneself. The type of the hermit.

The consistent type. This type understands that you must not hate even evil. You must not resist it. You must not even wage war against

yourself. It means not only putting up with the suffering that this way of living brings. It means living completely in positive feelings. It means taking the side of your opponents, in words and in deeds. It means piling up more and more peaceful, kind, forgiving, helpful and loving states, so that the soil for all the other states grows poor and nothing else can grow there…, and it means you need constant practice.

So what has been achieved here? — The Buddhist type: or the perfect cow.

This point of view is only possible where there is no moral fanaticism. That means evil is not hated for its own sake. It is hated only because it leads to states that hurt us: restlessness, work, worry, complications, depending on others.

This is the Buddhist point of view: here sin is not hated, because here the very idea of 'sin' does not exist.

II.

The inconsistent type. This type wages war against evil. He believes that a war fought for the sake of good does not have the effects on morals and character that war usually has (the very effects that make people hate war as evil). In fact, such a war against evil corrupts a person far more deeply than any hostility between one person and another. And usually a 'person' even sneaks back in as the enemy, at least in the imagination: the devil, evil spirits and so on. Being hostile toward everything inside us that is bad, or might have a bad origin, constantly watching it and spying on it, ends in the most tormented and restless state of mind. So much so that now 'miracles', rewards, ecstasy, and a rescue from beyond this world become things to long for…

The Christian type: or the perfect sanctimonious hypocrite.

298.

How false, how full of lies people have always been about the basic facts of their own inner world! Having no eyes for it here, keeping your mouth shut here or opening your mouth here —

299.

The grand words

The great men

The great ages

300.

'Objectivity' in a philosopher: not caring morally about himself. Being blind to the good and bad results. Having no second thoughts about using dangerous means. Guessing that a twisted and many-sided character is an advantage, and making use of it —

My deep indifference toward myself: I want no profit from what I come to understand, and I also do not dodge the harm it brings me. That includes what might be called the corruption of my character. That way of looking at things lies outside my concern. I handle my character, but I never think of understanding it or changing it. Keeping a personal account of my own virtue has not crossed my mind for a single moment. It seems to me that you shut the gates of knowledge the moment you get interested in your own personal case — or, worse still, in the 'salvation' of your soul!… You must not take your own morality too seriously. And you must not let anyone take away your modest right to its opposite…

Maybe this assumes a kind of inherited wealth of morality. You sense that you can waste a lot of it, throw it out of the window, without becoming much poorer. Never feel tempted to admire 'beautiful souls'. Always know that you are above them. Meet the monsters of virtue with inner mockery. To strip virtue of its naive innocence — a secret pleasure.

To spin around yourself. No wish to become 'better', or even just 'different'. Too curious and too interested not to cast out the grabbing arms and nets of every kind of morality to catch things —

301.

This figure is not made all of one piece. It is not only that people have dressed him up in all sorts of wisdom and proverbs, like a decent, respectable fellow, so that he has been cheapened almost into a 'moralist', a preacher of morals. The worse thing is that the type itself was not left untouched. You can guess how early this figure had to serve different purposes from the very start. In a short time, all that was left was a tradition about a figure that had already been reshaped. It seems the old typical prophet of Israel strongly colored this picture: the features that do not fit the Gospel message, the anger, the curses, the whole very unlikely prophecy of 'Judgment Day', the whole type of the man from the desert, the wild, unrestrained language against the Pharisees and the scribes, the driving out of people from the Temple

— also the cursing of the fig tree — the typical example of where and how you should NOT perform a miracle

You shall not curse. You shall not do magic. You shall not take revenge. You shall not lie. (For it is a lie to say that something becomes true just because people believe it is true, as if it were kind enough to do so. We see this proved absurd three times every day —

302.

Here every word is a symbol. At bottom there is no reality left. The danger of getting these symbols wrong is huge. Almost all the ideas and values of the Church lead you astray. Nobody could misunderstand the New Testament more deeply than the Church has misunderstood it. The Church lacked everything needed to understand it: above all the neutral attitude of a historian, who does not give a damn whether 'the salvation of the soul' depends on the words

The Church never honestly wanted to understand the New Testament. It wanted to use it to prove itself right. It looked, and still looks, for a theological system behind it. It simply assumes that such a system is there. It believes in the One Truth. It took the nineteenth century — the century of disrespect — to win back a few of the most basic conditions for understanding it. Only then could people read the book as a book (and not as the truth). Only then could they see this story not as 'sacred history' but as a devilish mess of fable, reshaping, forgery, older writing scraped off and written over, and confusion. In short, they could recognize it again as reality…

People do not realize clearly enough how barbaric and primitive the ideas still are that we Europeans live by.

Note: Just think that people could believe that "the salvation of the soul" depends on a book!… And I am told that people still believe it today.

What good is all our scientific education, all our critical study and all our skill at explaining texts, if the nonsense of Bible interpretation that the Church still keeps alive has not yet made us blush so much that red with shame has become our permanent skin color?

303.

Love

Look closely: this love, this pity that women feel — is there anything more selfish?… And when they sacrifice themselves, their honor, their good name, to whom are they really sacrificing themselves? To the man? Or is it not rather to a need they cannot control?

— these are desires that are just as selfish: even when they do good to others and plant gratitude in them…

— how far such an overgrown swelling of one single way of valuing can make everything else seem holy!!

304.

We would be right to be shocked by it: an enthusiasm like Thekla's is something that one simply cannot approve of as a principle. The poet's talent can sweep us along, so that we feel sympathy for one single person who goes through it. But it cannot serve as the basis for a general system, and in France we only love what can be applied to everyone.

The morality of the theater in France is much stricter than in Germany. This comes from the fact that the Germans take feeling as the basis of morality, while for us the basis is reason. To them, a feeling that is sincere, complete and without limits seems not only to excuse whatever it leads to, but to make it noble and, if I may use the word, to make it holy. We have much stricter principles, and in theory we never move away from them. A feeling that ignores a duty seems to us just one more fault. We would more easily forgive self-interest, because self-interest goes about its wrongdoing with more skill and more decency. Feeling challenges public opinion, it defies it, and opinion gets angry because of that. Self-interest tries to fool public

opinion by treating it gently, and even when opinion sees through the trick, it is still grateful for this kind of respect.

305.

"We see love only the way we see the other human passions: that is, as something whose effect is to lead our reason astray, and whose aim is to bring us pleasures." B. Constant.

306.

The rule of the unities makes writing a play very difficult: these rules squeeze tragedies, especially historical ones, into a narrow space. They often force the poet to neglect, in the events and the characters, the true step-by-step development and the delicate shades of difference. The result is gaps, and changes that are too sudden.

The French paint only one single event or one single passion. They need unity. They cut out of their characters everything that does not help to bring out the passion they want to show. They remove from their heroes' earlier lives everything that is not necessarily linked to the event they have chosen.

The French system presents the event that forms the subject, and likewise the passion that drives each tragedy, in complete isolation. One unity of interest, one single point of view. The audience realizes that this is not a historical person, but an artificial hero, a made-up creature —

307.

Does love need restlessness and fears? Does it need jealousy as fertilizer to grow? Or does it gently reach up into the pure and peaceful air of dreams? — If it were the other way, then a clever and unselfish

selfishness would be the first of all virtues, the most reasonable of all duties —

308.

Circumstances matter very little; character is everything.

309.

You can change your situation, but you do not become a better person just by moving somewhere else.

310.

The whole idea of how the passions rank: as if the right and normal thing were to be guided by reason — while the passions are the abnormal, dangerous, half-animal things, and besides, when you look at their goal, nothing but cravings for pleasure…

Passion is degraded in two ways. First, by acting as if it were only an improper driving force, and not the necessary one, the one that is always at work. Second, by saying that it aims at something of no great value, namely pleasure…

Passion and reason are misunderstood, as if reason were a thing all by itself, and not rather a balance, a relationship between different passions and desires; and as if every passion did not contain its own share of reason…

311.

By painting only one single passion (and not a whole individual character), you get tragic effects, because individual characters, which are always mixed, spoil the single, unified impression. But truth loses out in the process. You ask yourself what would be left of these heroes if

they were not driven by this passion: surely very little… Characters come in countless kinds. Theater passions come in only a small number. "Polyphontes the tyrant is a type; the tyrant Richard III is an individual."

312.

The future. Against the romantic cult of great "passion".

We need to understand that every "classical" taste requires a certain amount of coldness, clearness and hardness: logic above all, happiness in the life of the mind, the "three unities", concentration — a hatred of feeling, of soft emotion, of mere wit; a hatred of what is many-sided, uncertain, wandering and vaguely sensed, just as much as of what is short, sharp, pretty and kindly.

We should not play around with artistic formulas: we should reshape life itself, so that afterwards it has no choice but to take on a form…

It is a cheerful comedy that we are only now learning to laugh at, that we are only now able to see: that the people living in the time of Herder, Winckelmann, Goethe and Hegel claimed to have rediscovered the classical ideal… And at the very same time, they were wild about Shakespeare!

— and that same generation had turned its back on the classical school of the French in a contemptuous way!

— as if the essential things could not have been learned just as well from the French as from the ancients!…

But they wanted "nature", "naturalness": how dull-witted! They believed that being classical was a kind of naturalness!

We must think it through to the end, without prejudice and without softness: on what kind of soil can a classical taste grow?

Making people harder, simpler, stronger and more wicked: these things belong together. A simplifying of logic and of the mind. Contempt for detail, for what is complicated, for what is uncertain —

The Romantics in Germany did not protest against classicism, but against reason, the Enlightenment, good taste, the eighteenth century.

The sensitivity of romantic, Wagnerian music: its opposite is classical sensitivity…

the will to unity (because unity rules like a tyrant over the listeners and the audience), but an inability to let unity rule like a tyrant in the main thing: that is, over the work itself (in giving things up, cutting, clarifying, simplifying).

overpowering people with sheer mass (Wagner, Victor Hugo, Zola, Taine), and never with greatness

313.

"Did you perhaps imagine that I would hate life and flee into the deserts, just because not all my blossoming dreams came true?" — says Goethe's Prometheus.

314.

Wagner's art: a compromise between the three most modern needs: the need for what is sick, for what is brutal, and for what is innocent (idiotic)…

315.

Why does German music reach its peak in the time of German Romanticism? Why is Goethe missing from German music? And how much Schiller, or more exactly how much "Thekla", there is in Beethoven by comparison!

— Schumann has Eichendorff, Uhland, Heine, Hoffmann and Tieck inside him

— Richard Wagner has inside him the opera "Der Freischütz", Hoffmann, the Brothers Grimm, romantic legend, the mystical Catholicism of instinct, symbolism, the "free-thinking of passion", and Rousseau's aims

"The Flying Dutchman" tastes of France, where around 1830 the dark, gloomy man was the typical seducer

— The worship of music: the revolutionary Romanticism of form

Wagner sums up Romanticism, both the German and the French kind —

316.

The grand words:

"Peace of the soul"

"love"

"classical taste"

317.

Nationalism has ruined character in France, and in Germany it has ruined the mind and good taste. To bear a great defeat — and a final one at that — you have to be younger and healthier than the winner.

318.

Wagner's love of the foreign and exotic, found among the people who make a big show of being 'true Germans'

319.

The joke of European culture: people hold one thing to be true, but then do *something else*. For example, what good is all the skill of careful reading and criticism, if the church's way of explaining the Bible (the Protestant way just as much as the Catholic one) is still kept up as before!

320.

The Wagner fan, who rushes to admire everything in Wagner that is not wonderful at all, but simply 'Wagnerish' —

321.

— this senseless overloading with details, this underlining of the little features, the mosaic effect, as the French writer Paul Bourget described it

The ambition to have a grand style — and at the same time the refusal to give up what he did better, the small things, the very smallest things. This overloading with details. This fine engraver's work, done at moments when nobody *should* have eyes for small things. This restlessness of the eye, which is supposed to adjust one moment to a tiny mosaic, and the next moment to huge wall paintings thrown down boldly and roughly.

I have traced the strange torment I feel when I listen to Wagner's music back to this: his music is like a painting that won't let me stay in one spot… My eye constantly has to refocus in order to understand. One moment it must be short-sighted, so it doesn't miss the most refined little mosaic engraving. The next moment it must adjust to bold, brutal wall paintings that need to be seen from very far away. Not being able to hold on to one way of seeing is exactly what makes

up the style of Wagner's music. And here I use 'style' to mean the inability to have a style.

322.

Wagner:

1)

Do not be fooled by the *German*

tendency in his work.

— His way of feeling is as un-German as possible. On the other hand, his kind of mind and intellect is all the more German (and that includes his style).

— He feels the deepest sympathy for the great symbols of *medieval* Europe, and he looks for people to 'carry' them —

— The type of his heroes is as un-German as possible: Tannhäuser, the Flying Dutchman, Rienzi, Lohengrin, Elsa, Tristan, Siegfried, Parsifal. Just try to — — —: what is left is 'The Mastersingers'.

— The worship of 'passion' is not German.

— The worship of 'drama' is not German. He has a huge power to convince people, through the force and frightfulness of his gestures.

2)

What is German?

— Vague symbolism, a love of things only half thought through, fake 'deep thinking', arbitrariness, a lack of fire, wit and grace, the inability to draw a *great line*, to reach what is necessary in — — —

3)

On the main point, you must not let yourself be misled: Wagner's musical drama is a step backwards. Worse, it is a form of decadence in music —

— He sacrificed everything musical, music itself, in order to turn it into an art of expression, of making things stronger, of planting suggestions in people's minds, of painting psychological pictures.

His extraordinary instinct for acting and the theater was also something that, until then, was not German. (You understand nothing about Wagner unless you grasp that this instinct was his master skill, his ruling instinct.)

German depth, variety, arbitrariness, richness, uncertainty: the great symbols and riddles, rumbling with soft thunder from a huge distance; the gray, nasty German sky, which knows happiness only as a cartoon and as a wish —

323.

Where does he get his followers? From the great mass of people, men and women alike, who are unmusical, half-musical, three-quarters educated, and whose vanity is flattered by thinking they understand Wagner.

It is the victory of the unmusical, half-musical culture enthusiast, who is flattered by Wagner's grand posing, as if it were a sign of being superior to 'understand' him.

He appeals to beautiful feelings and to the heaving bosom.

Above all, he stirs up that dreamy, gushing — German — feeling for nature — — —

— He hypnotizes the mystical, erotically minded little women, because his music lets them feel the spirit of a hypnotist right down into

their spinal cord. (Just watch the physical effects of the Lohengrin prelude on the body's secretions and — — —

— Every time, he reaches the peak of emotion together with a breadth, a wide flowing like a river, that sets him apart from all short-winded dramatists who only live for the moment.

324.

The church's misunderstandings

The Last Supper

'The Son of God'

Death on the cross as a *paying off of a debt*

of the story of the Fall of Man

of 'faith'

325.

Toward a critique of the 'good' person

Honesty in dealings, dignity, sense of duty, justice, humanity, truthfulness, straightforwardness, a good conscience — when we use these fine-sounding words, are we really saying yes to these qualities for their own sake and approving of them? Or are these qualities and states, which in themselves are neither valuable nor worthless, just being put in a certain light where they gain value? — Does the value of these qualities lie in the qualities themselves, or in the usefulness and advantage that follow from them (or seem to follow, or are expected to follow)?

Of course, I don't mean here a contrast between 'me' and 'the other person' in judging these things. The question is whether it is the *res-*

ults — whether for the person who has these qualities, or for those around them, society, 'humanity' — that are supposed to give these qualities their value. Or whether they have value in themselves…

To ask it another way: is it *usefulness* that tells us to condemn, fight and deny the opposite qualities (— unreliability, falseness, oddness, uncertainty about oneself, inhumanity —)? Is it the very nature of such qualities that is condemned, or only what they lead to?

Put another way: would it be *desirable* for people with these second kinds of qualities not to exist? — *That, at any rate, is what people believe* —

but here lies the mistake, the short-sightedness, the narrow-mindedness of a *small-corner selfishness*, the selfishness of people who see only their own little patch.

Expressed another way: would it be desirable to create conditions in which all the advantage is on the side of the upright people — so that the opposite natures and instincts would be discouraged and slowly die out?

— At bottom, this is a question of taste and of *aesthetics*, of what we find beautiful. Would it be desirable for only the most 'respectable' — that is, the most boring — kind of human being to be left over? The square-cornered ones, the virtuous ones, the worthy plain folk, the well-behaved ones, the straight ones, the 'dumb oxen'?

— If you imagine the huge abundance of 'the others' taken away, then even the upright person no longer has any right to exist. He is no longer needed. And here you understand that only crude usefulness has brought such an *unbearable virtue* into honor.

What is desirable may lie exactly on the opposite side: creating conditions in which the 'upright person' is pushed down into the modest position of a 'useful tool' — as the 'ideal herd animal', at best a

shepherd of the herd. In short, conditions in which he no longer gets to stand in the upper ranks —: for those ranks demand *other qualities* —

326.

Headings

1. Toward a critique of the 'good' person.

2. From the school of the strong.

3. The grand words.

4. Toward a critique of 'Christian-ness'.

5. How virtue is brought to power.

6. Values of beauty and art: where they come from and where they are going.

7. The coming of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning).

8. On 'modern times'

327.

Diary of a nihilist…

The shudder at the 'falseness' that has been discovered

Empty:

no thought anymore; strong feelings spinning around things that have no value:

— being a spectator of these absurd stirrings for and against

— superior, mocking, cold toward oneself

— the strongest feelings seem like liars: as if they wanted us to believe in the things they are about, as if they were trying to seduce us —

— the strongest power no longer knows: what for?

— everything is there, but there are no goals —

Atheism as having no ideals

Phase

of passionate saying no and acting no: in it, the stored-up hunger to say yes, to worship, bursts out…

Phase

of contempt

even for the no…

even for doubt…

even for irony…

even for contempt…

Catastrophe:

whether

the lie might not be something divine…

whether

the value of all things might not lie in the fact that they are false?…

whether

despair might not simply be the result of believing that *truth is a god*

whether

it might not be exactly *lying* and *making things false* (falsifying them), the

putting of meaning into things, that is a value, a meaning, a purpose

whether

we should not believe in God, not because he is true (*but because he is false* — ?

328.

I.

What nihilism means

On the psychology of the nihilist

On the history of European nihilism

Critique of 'modern times'

The grand words

From the school of the strong

The 'good' person

Christian-ness

Where Ideals Come From

The Witch Circe Who Bewitches Philosophers

Values of Beauty and Art: Where They Come From, and a Critique

Art and artists: new question marks.

329.

Note: a critique of *flag-waving patriotism* (under the topic "modern times").

330.

Winckelmann's and Goethe's Greeks, Victor Hugo's people of the East, Wagner's characters from the old Norse Edda poems, Walter Scott's Englishmen of the 1200s — some day people will see through the whole play-acting. All of it was wildly, hugely wrong as history, *but* — it was modern, and true to its own time!

331.

"*Demons*" *(Dostoevsky's novel)*.

Blame no one —

My wishes are not strong enough to guide me —

I am even jealous of these people who deny everything: jealous of their *hopes* — jealous that they can take a hatred so seriously!

"What should I use this strength for?" —

What kept me from joining them was not the fear of looking ridiculous — I am past that. It was the hate and contempt they make me feel. In spite of everything, I still have the habits of a proper gentleman, and spending time with them disgusts me.

"If I had felt even more hate and jealousy toward them, maybe I would have come to an agreement with them."

"I am afraid of suicide, because I am afraid of showing greatness of soul… I see that this would be one more trick, one more deception — a final lie added to all the countless lies of the past! What good would it do to fool myself, just to play the part of someone grand? Since I have never known what it is to feel outrage or shame, I will never come to know despair either…"

Notice too that I do not call for you because I pity you, and I do not wait for you because I respect you… And yet I call for you and wait for you —

I can feel the need to do a good deed, as I always could, and I enjoy it. But at the same time I also want to do harm, and I get satisfaction from that too. All these feelings, when they come at all, which is rare enough, are, as always, very light and shallow…

"You can cross a river on a solid beam, but not on a wood shaving." I have tried wild, reckless living on a grand scale and used up my strength on it. But I do not love it; it was never my goal.

Once you no longer feel tied to your homeland, you have no more gods — that is, no more goals in life…

You can argue endlessly about everything, but all that has come out of *me* is a "*no*" *without greatness and without strength*. Even by talking like this, I am still flattering myself. Everything is always weak and limp.

Big-hearted Kirillov was defeated by an idea: he shot himself. I see the greatness of his soul in the fact that he lost his head over it. I could never act like that. I could never believe in an idea so passionately… What is more, I am not even able to get that deeply absorbed in ideas… Never, never could I shoot myself…

I know that I ought to kill myself, that I ought to wipe myself off the earth like a miserable insect.

332.

On the Psychology of the Nihilist

"The thing most worth honoring in a human being," according to Goethe, is: — — — being consistent, following things through to their logical end. That belongs to the nihilist.

Around this time he talks himself into a life of wild excess. Don't underestimate the logic in this. You have to be a philosopher to understand it. Ideas are trickery. Sensations, the raw feelings of the body, are the last thing that is real… It is the final hunger for "truth" that tells him to go to excess. It couldn't be "love". All the veils and prettifying touches, which means all the fakes, have to be wiped away. That is why it has to be excess, pain, and the combination of excess and pain.

A step up: pain is more real than pleasure… The yes-saying part of pleasure has the character of a way of valuing, of cheating and exaggerating…

Pain does not easily make you drunk. It is sober…

—

Beware of the kinds of pain that make you drunk and cloud your mind…

—

The pain you cause is more real than the pain you suffer —

333.

The total change that happens once God is denied —

We have absolutely no master above us anymore. The old world of values was built on religion, and it has been knocked over —

To put it more briefly: there is no higher authority above us. As far as anyone could be God, we ourselves are now God…

We have to give ourselves the qualities that we used to give to God…

334.

The Logic of Atheism

If God exists, everything depends on his will, and I am nothing outside his will. If he does not exist, then everything depends on me, and I have to prove that I am independent —

Suicide is the most complete way of proving your independence —

God is necessary, so he must exist.

But he does not exist.

So it is no longer possible to live.

This thought also ate away at Stavrogin: "If he believes, he doesn't believe that he believes. If he doesn't believe, he doesn't believe that he doesn't believe."

The classic formula of Kirillov, in Dostoevsky's novel:

"I am bound to declare my unbelief. In my eyes there is no greater idea than the denial of God. What is the history of humanity? Humans have done nothing but invent God so that they would not kill themselves. I am the first to push away this made-up story of God…"

"To kill someone else would be independence in its lowest form. I want to reach the highest point of independence."

"Earlier people who killed themselves had reasons to do it. But I have no reason, except to prove my independence —"

335.

The beginning of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning):

breaking loose,

the break with your home soil, the land you came from.

It begins with feeling homeless,

it ends with feeling terror.

336.

"If nature did not even spare her own masterpiece, if she let Jesus live in the middle of a lie and for the sake of a lie (and the earth owes him everything it has allowed to live), then without him this planet, with everything on it, would be plain foolishness. Well then, the planet rests on a lie, on a stupid mockery. So the laws of nature themselves are a fraud and a devilish joke. Then why live, if you are a human being?…"

"But what if you are disappointed? What if you have understood that the whole mistake lay in believing in the old God?"

"The salvation of humanity depends on proving this thought to it —"

"I don't understand how, until now, an atheist could know that there is no God and not kill himself right away…"

"To feel that God does not exist, and not to feel at the same time that this very fact has made you God, is absurd. Otherwise you would certainly kill yourself. If you feel this, you are a tsar, a king, and far from killing yourself, you will live at the very peak of glory…"

"I am God only because I am forced to be, and I am unhappy, because I am obliged to prove my freedom. Everyone is unhappy because they are afraid to prove their freedom. If humans have been so unhappy and so poor until now, it is because they did not dare to show themselves free in the highest sense of the word. They made do with the kind of disobedience a schoolboy shows… For I am terribly unhappy, because I am terribly afraid. Fear is the curse of humankind —"

"This will save all people and will physically reshape the next generation. Because, judging by myself, in his present bodily form man cannot do without the old God… For three years I have been searching for the quality that shows I am divine, and I have found it: independence. I want to kill myself to prove my disobedience, my new and terrible freedom." —

337.

"Five, six seconds and no more: then you suddenly feel the presence of eternal harmony. A human being, in his mortal body, cannot bear it. He has to change physically or die. It is a clear feeling, beyond all argument. You seem to be in touch with the whole of nature, and you say: 'Yes, this is true!' When God had created the world, he said at the end of each day: 'Yes, this is true, this is good!' This is not being moved to tears, this is joy. You forgive nothing, because there is nothing to forgive. You no longer love. Oh, this feeling is higher than love. The most terrible thing is the frightening certainty with which it speaks, and the joy it fills you with. If it lasted longer, the soul could not bear it; it would have to vanish. In these five seconds I live a whole human life. I would give my whole life for them, and it would not be too high a price. To bear this for longer, you would have to change your body. I believe humans would stop having children. What use are children if the goal has been reached? —"

Understanding the symbol of the resurrection:

"After the resurrection people will no longer have children; they will be like the angels of God." That means: the goal has been reached, so what use are children?… In a child, the woman's lack of fulfilment finds its expression…

338.

If people had consistency in their bodies, they would also have consistency in their heads. But their muddled mixture…

339.

What has annoyed me most? Seeing that nobody has the courage anymore to think things through to the end…

340.

The warning signs of a great revolt: cynicism on command, a thirst for scandal, things that grate on the nerves, irritation, weariness. The public, worn out and on the wrong paths, no longer recognized itself.

In times of crisis you can feel a crowd of individuals rising up from the lowest layers of the population. They have no goal, no idea of any kind, and the only thing that marks them out is their love of disorder. Almost always they are pushed along by the small group of "progressives", who make of them whatever they want…

The nobodies suddenly became important. They loudly criticized everything respectable, they who until then had not dared to open their mouths. And the most gifted people listened to them in silence, often even with a little smile of approval.

341.

— looking for a bond of shared crime, and gaining power over him that way?

Spying. In his system, every member keeps an eye on every other member, and reporting on each other is a duty. Each person belongs to everyone, and everyone belongs to each person. All are slaves, and all are equal in being slaves. Slander, and in the most extreme cases

murder, but everywhere "*equality.*" First of all, lower the level of learning and talent, drag it down! A high level of science is open only to the brightest minds, but there must be no brighter minds. People with great abilities have always grabbed power and have always been tyrants. They simply cannot be anything but tyrants; they have always done more harm than good. So drive them out, or hand them over to be tortured and executed. Cut out Cicero's tongue, blind Copernicus, stone Shakespeare to death… Slaves are allowed to be equal: without tyranny there has never yet been either freedom or equality, but *in the herd, equality may rule*… The mountains must be flattened; down with schooling and science! There is enough of that already to last a thousand years. What we must do is *organize obedience*, the one thing the world is missing. The thirst for learning is an aristocratic thirst. When family or love disappears, the thirst for owning things disappears too. We will kill this thirst: we will encourage drunkenness, noise and informing on others, we will spread a wildness and debauchery like nothing ever seen, we will smother every genius in the cradle. "Bring everyone down to the same common level, total equality!"

"We have learned a trade and we are honest people; we don't need anything else" — that is what some English workers said recently. Only what is necessary is necessary: from now on, that is to be the motto of the whole planet. But people also need violent upheavals, and *we* will take care of that, we others, the leaders and the ones who steer… Slaves must have masters. Total obedience, people stripped completely of their own personality: but every thirty years the signal will be given for an upheaval, and suddenly everyone will set about devouring one another, only up to a certain point of course, and for the single purpose of not getting bored. *Boredom* is an aristocratic feeling; under socialism there will be no *desire*. We keep pain and desire for *ourselves*; the slaves will get socialism… I have thought about

handing the world over to the Pope. Let him walk out of his palace barefoot and say to the people: "Look what they have brought me down to!" — and everyone, even the army, will throw themselves at his feet. The Pope at the top, us around him, and socialism beneath us… The Internationale, the workers' movement, must come to an agreement with the Pope. He will agree at once; he has no other way out…

You are beautiful! Sometimes you forget how much there is in you that is exquisite! Even your good-natured kindness and your innocence! No doubt you suffer, you suffer deeply, because of that good nature. I am a nihilist, someone who believes nothing has meaning, but I love beauty — as he says in French, "I am a nihilist, but I love beauty." Don't nihilists love beauty? What they don't love are idols: but I, I love idols, and you are mine!

You insult no one, and yet everyone hates you. You treat all people as your equals, and everyone is afraid of you: that is just as it should be. No one will dare to slap you on the shoulder in a friendly way. You are a terrible aristocrat, and when an aristocrat comes among democrats, he becomes a charmer. You don't care at all, either way, whether you sacrifice your own life or someone else's. You are exactly the man we need…

We are getting right into the people themselves; we are already terribly strong. Our people are not only the ones who strangle, set fires and pull off the classic kind of attacks. Those ones actually get in our way more… I can't understand anything without discipline. I have counted them all: the teacher who mocks the children about their God and the home they came from; the lawyer who defends a well-educated murderer by proving that the killer had a better upbringing than his victim and that, to get money, he had no other way than to kill; the students who kill a peasant just to try out the thrill; the

jurors who let every criminal go free as a matter of habit; the state prosecutor who trembles in court for fear of not looking liberal enough… Among the officials, among the scholars — how many of them belong to us! (— and they don't even know it!)… On the other side, everywhere there is enormous vanity and a beastly appetite… Do you know how much we owe to the famous theories? When I left Russia, the theory of Littré, which put crime close to madness, was all the rage. I come back, and already crime is no longer madness but plain common sense itself, almost a duty, or at the very least a noble protest. "Well then, how could an enlightened man not commit murder if he needs money?" But that is nothing yet. The Russian God has made way for drink; everyone is a drunk, the churches are empty… When we are the masters, we will *cure* them… if we have to, we will send them off for forty years into a desert, like the hermits of old. But for two generations, wild debauchery is necessary, a vile, unheard-of, filthy debauchery — that is what is needed!… Until now the Russian people, for all the coarseness of their angry swearing, have never known cynicism. Do you know that the serf had more self-respect than Turgenev has?… They beat him, but he stayed faithful to his gods — and Turgenev has abandoned his…

The people must believe that we all know the goal. We will preach destruction: that idea is so tempting. We will call on fire to help us — and pistol shots… He is hiding… It takes an unheard-of strength…

342.

The Craze for Theater

343.

"This will kill that"

344.

The Decembrist (from the Russian uprising of 1825) spent his whole life looking for danger: the feeling of danger made him drunk with excitement and had become a need of his nature… The brave heroes of legend were surely very open to fear: otherwise they would have been much calmer and would not have turned the feeling of danger into a need of their nature. But to beat their own cowardice inside themselves, to know they had won that victory, and to think that nothing could ever scare them back — that is what tempted them!… This included fighting in every form; not only in bear hunting and in duels did he value his own calm toughness and strength of character.

But the nervous makeup of the newer generation no longer allows for the need for these free and direct thrills, which some restless characters of the good old days hunted for so passionately. Nicolas would have been just as brave as that Decembrist in every situation: only, he would have found no pleasure in the fight. He would have accepted it lazily and with boredom, the way you put up with an unpleasant necessity. When it came to anger, no one could be compared to him: he was cold, calm, *reasonable* — and for that very reason he was more frightening than anyone else.

345.

Rome preached a Christ who gave in to the third temptation, the devil's offer of all the kingdoms of the world. Rome declared that Christ could not do without an earthly kingdom, and by doing that it proclaimed the *Antichrist*…

346.

God as a Feature of the Nation

The people are the body of God. A nation deserves that name only as long as it has a god of its own and stubbornly pushes all other gods away; only as long as it counts on winning with its god and on driving the foreign gods out of the whole world.

Peoples are driven forward by a hunger to reach their goal, a hunger that is never satisfied. It is a tireless, constant saying yes to their own existence and saying no to death. People have called it "the spirit of life," "the stream of living water," the beauty-principle or the moral principle of the philosophers, or, as the French put it, "the search for God." For every people, at every stage of its existence, the goal of all its movement is this search for God: a God of its own, whom it believes to be the only true one. God is the whole people rolled into one person, seen from its beginning to its end. When forms of worship start to become general and shared, the destruction of nations is close. When the gods lose their own special character, they die, and the peoples die with them. The stronger a nation is, the more its God stands apart from all others. No one has ever found a people without religion (that is, *without an idea of good and evil*). Every people understands these words in its own way. When several peoples come to understand these ideas in the same way, the ideas die, and the difference between good and evil begins to fade and disappear. Reason has never been able to define these ideas. It has not even managed to roughly *separate* them. It has always mixed them up in a shameful way. In the end, science ruled in favor of brute force. This happened above all through *half-knowledge*, the greatest curse of all, a tyrant before whom everything bows, *even science itself*…

347.

The Jews lived only to wait for the true God. The Greeks turned nature into something divine, and they handed down their religion to

the world, and that religion was philosophy and art. Rome turned the people, organized as a state, into something divine.

348.

"If a great people does not believe that the truth is found in it alone, if it does not believe that it alone is called to bring the world back to life and save it through its truth, then it at once stops being a great people. It becomes nothing more than material for people who study races and tribes."

A truly great people has never been content with a second-rank role. Even an influential role is not enough for it. It absolutely needs the first place. A nation that gives up this conviction gives up its very existence…

349.

Here there is a bold challenge to common sense: that is what seduced you!…

350.

The second half of life is made up of the habits you picked up in the first half.

351.

You have to be a great man to know how to resist plain good sense: either a great man or a fool.

352.

Malebranche said that God, because he is God, could only act by the simplest means.

"God, because he was God, could act only in the simplest ways."

Therefore — there is no God.

353.

"*Follow your feelings?*"

Suppose you risk your life because you *give in* to a generous feeling, driven by the urge of one moment. That is worth little… and it does not even show what kind of person you are… Everyone is equally able to do that. And when it comes to being determined enough to do it, the criminal, the bandit and the *Corsican* surely beat us respectable people…

The higher level is this: to overcome even this rush of feeling inside yourself, and to do the heroic deed *not* because of an impulse, but coldly, sensibly, without any stormy flood of pleasant feelings while doing it…

The same goes for pity. It first has to become a habit that is *strained through reason*, like water through a sieve. Otherwise it is as dangerous as any other strong emotion…

Blindly giving in to an emotion is the cause of the *greatest evils*. And it hardly matters whether the emotion is generous and full of pity, or hostile…

Greatness of character does not mean that you do not have these emotions. On the contrary, you have them to a terrifying degree. It means that you keep them on a tight rein, like a rider with a horse… and even that without any pleasure in taming them, but simply because…

354.

Christian Misunderstandings

Think of the *thief on the cross*. He is a criminal himself, dying a painful death. Yet he judges: "The way this Jesus suffers and dies, without rebellion, without hatred, kind and accepting, that alone is the right way." In saying that, he has said yes to the Gospel, and so *he is in paradise*…

The kingdom of God is a state of the heart. (It is said of children, "for theirs is the kingdom of God.") It is nothing that lies "above the earth."

The kingdom of God does not "come" at a point in history or on a date in the calendar, as something that would be here one day and not the day before. Instead, it is "a change of mind in the single person." It is something that can come at any time, and at any time is still not here…

The moral: the founder of Christianity had to pay the price for turning to the lowest layer of Jewish society and Jewish minds…

— that layer pictured him according to the kind of spirit it could understand…

— It is a real disgrace. Out of a teaching that denies that anything personal or historical is real, they cooked up a story of salvation, a personal God, a personal savior, and personal life after death. And they kept all the pettiness of the "person" and of "history"…

They put the legend of salvation in place of the symbol, which meant "now and always, here and everywhere." They put the miracle in place of the symbol of what goes on inside a person.

355.

If I understand anything at all about this great teacher in symbols, it is this: he saw and accepted only *inner realities*. He took *everything else* (everything natural, historical and political) only as signs and as chances to tell a parable. He did *not* take it as reality, not as the 'real' world…

In the same way, the Son of Man is not a real person from history. He is an "eternal fact," a symbol of the inner life that is not locked up inside time…

And finally, the same is true, to the highest degree, of the *God* of this typical teacher in symbols… of the kingdom of God, yes, the "kingdom of God" too…

The "Father" and the "Son": the Son stands for entering that state in which all things are made glorious together, and the Father is that very state itself…

— And people misunderstood this idea so badly that they put the Amphitryon story (the old tale of a god fathering a child with a married woman, which is just badly disguised adultery) at the very top of the new faith. Along with it came the disgusting idea of an immaculate conception, as if being conceived were something dirty in itself —

The deep corruption

1)

through *wanting to understand it as history*

2)

through *wanting to see miracles* (— as if it were about laws of nature being broken and overcome!)

3)

— — —

356.

You could not misunderstand Christianity more than by assuming that at the beginning stood the *crude story of a miracle worker and savior*, and that taking it in a spiritual and symbolic way only came later, as a transformation…

It is the other way round. The history of Christianity is the history of a lofty, delicate symbolism that, step by step, *had to be misunderstood more and more crudely*… Christianity kept spreading over wider and rougher masses of people who were far from its original instincts (— people who lacked everything needed to understand it —). And with each spread, a legend-story, a theology and the founding of a church came into view. The needs of the lowest classes, and later of barbarian peoples, made it necessary first to *make Christianity common and cheap*, and then to *make it barbaric*…

The Church is the will to keep the common, barbaric language of Christianity standing as "the truth" —… and it still does so today!

The Platonism of Paul, the Platonism of Augustine —: until at last this shameless cartoon of philosophy and rabbi-style hair-splitting was finished: Christian theology…

the unworthy parts of Christianity:

the miracle

the ladder of souls, the ranking of people and values

the story of salvation, and believing in it…

the idea of "sin"

the history of Christianity shows that a faith is bound to become just as low and common as the needs it is supposed to satisfy —

…just think of Luther! What could a nature so loaded down with crude cravings possibly do with the original Christianity?

The Jewish stage of turning against nature: "falling away, misfortune, repentance, making peace with God" left over as a pattern, and apart from that, hatred of "the world."

Jesus goes straight for the inner state, the "kingdom of God" in the heart. He does not find the way to it by following the rules of the Jewish church. He even counts the reality of Judaism, its need to keep itself alive, as nothing. He is purely inward.

In the same way, he cares nothing for all the crude formulas people use in dealing with God. He fights against the whole teaching of repentance and making peace with God. He shows how a person has to live in order to feel "made divine," and that you do not get there by repenting and feeling crushed over your sins. "Sin does not matter" is his main judgment. To become "divine," the main thing is to be fed up with yourself. In that sense, the sinner is even better off than the righteous person…

Sin, repentance, forgiveness: none of that belongs here… that is Judaism mixed in, or else it is pagan.

357.

The deep instinct for how you must live in order to feel "in heaven," while if you live any other way you do not feel in heaven at all… that is the psychological reality of Christianity.

358.

Our nineteenth century finally has what it takes to understand something that has basically been misunderstood for nineteen centuries: Christianity…

People were unspeakably far from that loving and careful neutrality, a state full of sympathy and mental discipline. In every age of the Church, people were shamefully blind in their selfishness, pushy, and shameless, always while wearing a look of the most humble worship.

359.

The symbolism of Christianity rests on the Jewish one, which had already dissolved all of reality, both history and nature, into something holy, unnatural and unreal… a symbolism that no longer wanted to see real history, and that no longer cared about natural success.

360.

You should not resist someone who is evil to you, neither by what you do nor in your heart.

You should accept no reason at all for divorcing your wife. Maybe also: "you should castrate yourself."

You should make no difference between strangers and locals, between foreigners and your own people.

You should not get angry with anyone, you should not look down on anyone… Give to the poor in secret. You should not want to become rich.

You should not swear oaths. You should not judge. You should make peace, you should forgive. Do not pray in public.

Let your good deeds be seen, let your light shine! Who will get into heaven? The one who does the will of my Father in heaven…

"Blessed happiness" is not something promised for later. It is there when you live and act in such and such a way:

Isn't the Church exactly that: "false prophets in sheep's clothing, but inside they are ravenous wolves"?…

"Predicting the future, working miracles, driving out devils: none of that is worth anything"…

In a completely absurd way, the teaching of reward and punishment has been mixed into it, and that spoils everything.

Likewise, the actual practice of the first fighting church, of the apostle, and the way he behaved, are presented in a thoroughly falsifying way, as if they had been commanded, as if they had been laid down in advance…

The glorifying, after the fact, of how the first Christians actually lived and taught: as if everything had been prescribed like that… and simply obeyed…

The whole pose of the prophet and miracle-worker, the anger, the calling down of judgment, is a disgusting corruption. For example, Mark 6:11: "and those who will not welcome you… truly I tell you, it will be more bearable for Sodom and Gomorrah," and so on.

The fig tree.

"A prophet is respected everywhere except at home, among his own people": that is nonsense. The opposite is the truth…

And then there is the "fulfillment" of the prophecies: how much has been faked and doctored to fit there!

361.

Note. Because of his nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning), Schopenhauer had every right to keep pity as the only virtue left. After all, pity does more than anything else to push forward the denial of the will to live. Pity, or Christian charity, works against the natural laws of development, because it lets the depressed and the weak go on living and have children. It speeds up decline, it destroys the species — it says no to life. Why do the other kinds of animals stay healthy? Because they have no pity.

362.

Note. The urge to turn against society, mental disorder, and pessimism: these are the three typical forms of decadence. Christianity, as a religion of decadence, grew up on soil that was swarming with degenerate people of all three kinds.

363.

We have now rebuilt the Christian ideal as it really was. What is left is to decide what it is worth.

1. Which values does it reject? What does the opposite ideal contain?

Pride, the proud sense of distance, great responsibility, high spirits and daring, splendid animal strength, the instincts for war and conquest, treating passion as something divine — and the same for revenge, cunning, anger, lust, adventure, and knowledge…

So the noble, high-minded ideal is rejected: the beauty, wisdom, power, splendor, and dangerousness of the human type — the human being who sets goals, the human being "of the future." (Here Christianity shows itself to be the final conclusion drawn from Judaism.)

2. Can it actually be lived out?

Yes, but only under certain climates… Similar to the Indian ideal… Work is missing from it… It pulls people out of their nation, their state, their shared culture, their courts of law. It rejects schooling, knowledge, being raised to have good manners, earning money, and trade… It cuts away everything that makes a person useful and valuable. Through a strange, private way of feeling, it shuts the person off from the world. It is unpolitical and anti-national, neither attacking nor defending. It is only possible inside a state and a society that are extremely well ordered — a society that lets these holy parasites thrive at everyone else's expense…

3. It remains a result of the will to pleasure — and of nothing more! "Blessedness," or perfect happiness, is treated as something that proves itself and needs no further justification. Everything else, the way of living and letting live, is just a means to that end…

But that is a low way of thinking. Fear of pain, fear of being made unclean, fear of corruption itself, is taken as a good enough reason to let go of everything… This is a poor way of thinking… A sign of a worn-out race… We should not let ourselves be fooled by sayings like "become like little children." Look at the related natures: Francis of Assisi — nervous, epileptic, a man who saw visions, just like Jesus.

364.

On the History of Christianity

The surroundings keep changing all the time, and so the Christian teaching keeps shifting where it puts its main weight…

favoring the lowly and the small

people…

the growth of charity…

Step by step, the type called "Christian" takes back everything it first rejected — even though rejecting those things was what it consisted of.

The Christian becomes a citizen, a soldier, a judge, a worker, a merchant, a scholar, a theologian, a priest, a philosopher, a farmer, an artist, a patriot, a politician, a "prince"… He takes up again all the activities he had sworn off: defending himself, sitting in judgment, punishing, swearing oaths, telling one nation apart from another, looking down on others, being angry…

In the end, the whole life of the Christian is exactly the life that Christ preached people should break free from…

The Church is just as much a part of the victory of what is anti-Christian as the modern state and modern nationalism are…

The Church is Christianity turned barbaric.

The things that took control of Christianity were: Judaism, through Paul; Platonism, through Augustine; the mystery cults, with their teaching of salvation and the symbol of the "cross"; and asceticism, the harsh self-denial that is hostile to "nature," "reason," and "the senses" — something from the East…

365.

The odd, extreme idea of "holiness" is missing —

"God" and "man" are not torn apart from each other

The "miracle" is missing — that whole realm simply does not exist…

The only realm that counts is the "spiritual" one, meaning the symbolic and psychological one, as a form of decadence. It is a counterpart to Epicureanism, the ancient philosophy of quiet pleasure… Paradise, in the Greek sense, is also a "Garden of Epicurus."

There is no task in such a life

It wants nothing…

It is a version of the "Epicurean gods," who live untroubled and do nothing —

There is no reason left to set any more goals, or to have children… Everything has already been reached…

Christianity is still possible at any moment… It is not tied to any of the shameless dogmas that have decorated themselves with its name. It needs neither the teaching of a personal God, nor of sin, nor of immortality, nor of salvation, nor of faith. It has absolutely no need for metaphysics, the big theories about what lies beyond the world. It needs asceticism even less, and a Christian "natural science" even less than that…

Anyone today who said, "I don't want to be a soldier," "I don't care about the courts," "I don't make use of the police" — that person would be a Christian… Or someone who said, "I don't want to do anything that disturbs the peace inside me. And if I have to suffer for it, nothing will keep my peace better than suffering"…

The whole Christian teaching about what people are supposed to believe, the whole Christian "truth," is nothing but lies and deception. It is the exact opposite of what got the Christian movement started in the first place…

The very thing that counts as Christian in the Church's sense is anti-Christian from the very start. It is all things and persons instead of symbols, all history instead of eternal facts, all formulas, rituals, and dogmas instead of a way of living… What is truly Christian is complete indifference to dogmas, worship services, priests, the Church, and theology.

Living as a Christian is not a fantasy, any more than living as a Buddhist is. It is a means of being happy…

366.

In a certain sense our age is ripe — that is, decadent — just as the age of the Buddha was…

That is why a Christianity without the absurd dogmas is possible…

the most disgusting freaks born from the mixing of ancient cultures

Christianity turned barbaric

367.

The Essence of Christianity and Buddhism (A comparison of the earliest Buddhism and the earliest Christianity)

Buddhism and Christianity are end-point religions: they stand beyond culture, philosophy, art, and the state.

A. What they share: the fight against hostile feelings, which are seen as the source of evil. "Happiness" is only something inside you. They don't care about how happiness looks from outside or about its showy displays.

Buddhism: the wish to get free of life, with philosophical clarity. It came from a high level of intellect and arose right out of the upper classes…

Christianity: deep down it wants the same thing — even the "Jewish Church" was already a sign of life in decadence. But because of a deep lack of culture, it does not know what it wants… It gets stuck on "blessedness," perfect happiness, as its goal…

B. The strongest instincts of life are no longer felt as pleasant, but rather as causes of suffering.

For the Buddhist, this is because these instincts drive people to act — and acting is seen as unpleasant…

For the Christian, this is because they lead to hostility and conflict — and being an enemy and hurting others are seen as unpleasant, as a disturbance of the "peace of the soul."

(A good soldier, on the other hand, finds no joy except in waging war honestly and in wanting to have enemies.)

368.

What Kind of Person Jesus Was

It is a mistake to imagine a fanatical streak in Jesus… Renan, for example, called him "impérieux," that is, commanding and domineering.

There is no torment at all in this faith. It is good news, and the state of mind of someone who brings good news…

This faith was not won through struggle. It has no development, no crisis… It is childlike instead… In natures like this, childhood comes back, the way an illness can come back —

This faith does not get angry, does not blame, does not punish, does not defend itself —

This faith does not bring "the sword"… It has no idea that it could divide people…

This faith does not prove itself by miracles, nor by promising rewards… At every moment it is itself its own proof, its own reward, its own miracle —

This faith does not put itself into words, because it is lived… It takes nothing else to be real… "True" here means alive…

The chance things in his upbringing and in what he read (the prophets) decided the words and ideas he used. What is Jewish about Christianity is above all the Jewish world of ideas. Jewish psychology was the vehicle that carried it. But we must be careful not to confuse things here. A Christian in India would have used the formulas of the Sankhya philosophy. A Christian in China would have used those of Laozi. None of that matters at all.

Christ as a "free spirit": he cares nothing for anything fixed and solid, like words, formulas, the church, the law, or official teachings. "Everything that is fixed kills..." He believes only in life and in what is living. And that does not simply "exist" as something fixed; it keeps changing and growing...

He stands outside all metaphysics, religion, history, natural science, psychology and ethics. He never even guessed that such things exist...

He speaks only about what is deepest inside, about things lived and felt. Everything else only has meaning as a sign, as a way of putting things into words.

369.

On what kind of person Jesus was

What has to be taken away? The whole way Christ's wisdom is given reasons, and the same goes for the things he did in his life. His actions are supposed to have been done out of obedience to the old promises. He "fulfills" them. He is given a plan of everything the Messiah has to do and suffer, a program... On the other hand, every "because" in the mouth of Jesus goes against the gospel... usefulness, cleverness, reward, punishment...

What has to be taken away: the large dose of bitterness, of bile, that spilled over from the worked-up state of the first missionaries onto the picture of their master... They made him in their own image. They justified themselves by turning him into a prophet who judges, quarrels, rages and hates... They needed a "role model" like that. The same goes for the belief in his "return" and in the "Last Judgment". That is Jewish; see the Book of Revelation.

The psychological madness and contradiction in the way Jesus is shown acting against the priests and theologians of the Jewish church...

The same goes for the judging way he is shown behaving toward those who do not accept him...

The same goes for the typical story of the fig tree.

The psychological problem about the teacher of such a teaching is exactly this: "How does he relate to other teachings and teachers?"

His teaching itself did not grow out of opposing or contradicting anything. I doubt that a nature like his even can know about anything that opposes or contradicts his teaching... It completely lacks the free imagination needed to picture being able to value and want things differently... It cannot imagine judging the opposite way... Where it meets such a view, it will only grieve with the deepest sympathy over a kind of "blindness", but it will not argue against it...

There is no logical arguing. There is no belief that the teaching can be proven in any way, except through its "inner effects" (its "fruits", the "proof of strength").

A teacher like this cannot contradict anyone... He does not even understand how anyone could be allowed to fight against error... He does not defend himself, he does not attack...

Instead, what he does is explain the old, carry it on, refine it, and transform it into something higher... and shorten it...

370.

A nihilistic religion (one based on the belief that nothing has meaning). It sprang from a people who were like a tough old man, who had outlived all their strong instincts, and it suited them. Step by step it was carried over into other surroundings, and finally it entered young peoples who had not yet really lived at all.

Very strange! A happiness of the end, a shepherd's happiness, an evening happiness, preached to barbarians, to Germanic tribes! How all of it first had to be made Germanic, made barbaric! Preached to people who had dreamed of Valhalla... who found all their happiness in war! A religion above nations, preached into a chaos where there were not even any nations yet.

371.

This nihilistic religion gathers together the elements of decadence, and things related to them, from the ancient world. Namely:

a)

the party of the weak and the badly turned out... (the rejects of the ancient world, the things it pushed away from itself most strongly...)

b)

the party of those soaked in morality, those against paganism...

c)

the party of those tired of politics and the indifferent (bored, jaded Romans...), of those who had lost their nation and were left with an emptiness inside

d)

the party of those who are fed up with themselves, who like to join in an underground conspiracy.

372.

In the ancient world, Christianity was the great nihilistic movement, and it ended up winning. And from then on it ruled...

373.

The two great nihilistic movements: a) Buddhism, b) Christianity. Christianity has only now roughly reached the stage of culture in which it can fulfill what it was originally meant for. It has reached a level where it belongs... a level at which it can show itself in its pure form...

374.

Our advantage: we live in the age of comparison. We can check and calculate things as they have never been checked before. We are history as a whole becoming aware of itself...

We enjoy things differently, we suffer differently. Comparing an enormous variety of things is our most instinctive activity...

We understand everything, we live through everything, we no longer have any hostile feelings left... Even if we come off badly ourselves, our open and almost loving curiosity goes boldly after the most dangerous things...

"Everything is good." It takes effort for us to say no...

We suffer when, for once, we are so unintelligent as to take sides against something...

Deep down, we scholars of today are the ones who best fulfill the teaching of Christ.

375.

A critique of Greek philosophy

The appearance of the Greek philosophers, starting with Socrates, is a sign of decadence. The instincts that go against the Greek spirit come to the top...

The "Sophist" is still completely Greek, and that includes Anaxagoras, Democritus, and the great thinkers of Ionia.

But as a form of transition: the city-state loses its belief that its culture is unique, and its belief in its right to be master over every other city-state...

People exchange cultures, that is, they exchange "the gods". In doing so, they lose their belief that the god native to their own soil has the sole right to rule...

The good and evil that come from different origins get mixed together. The border between good and evil becomes blurred...

That is the "Sophist".

The "philosopher", on the other hand, is the reaction against this. He wants the old virtue back...

He sees the reasons for the decline in the decline of the institutions. He wants the old institutions back.

He sees the decline in the decline of authority. He looks for new authorities (trips abroad, into foreign literatures, into exotic religions...).

He wants the ideal city-state, after the very idea of the "city-state" had already outlived itself (rather like the Jews held on to being a "people" after they had fallen into slavery).

They are interested in all tyrants. They want to bring back virtue by overwhelming force.

Little by little, everything truly Greek is blamed for the decline (and Plato is just as ungrateful toward Homer, tragedy, the art of speech-making and Pericles as the prophets were toward David and Saul).

The fall of Greece is understood as an argument against the foundations of Greek culture. That is the basic mistake of the philosophers.

Conclusion: the Greek world is going under. The cause: Homer, myth, the ancient morals, and so on.

How the philosophers' judgments about value developed against the Greek spirit:

The Egyptian element ("life after death" as a judgment...)

The Semitic element (the "dignity of the wise man", the "sheikh")

The Pythagoreans, the underground cults, the silence, the tools for making people afraid of the afterlife; mathematics, valued religiously, as a kind of contact with the whole universe

The priestly, the self-denying, the otherworldly

Logical arguing: I think that already in Plato it is a disgusting and fussy hair-splitting over ideas, isn't it?

A decline of good intellectual taste: people no longer even notice how ugly and clattering all direct logical arguing is.

The two decadence movements, the two extremes, run side by side:

a) the lavish, charming yet spiteful decadence that loves luxury and art,

b) and the darkening of religious and moral passion, the Stoic hardening of oneself, Plato's slandering of the senses, the preparing of the ground for Christianity...

376.

Note: our holiest beliefs, the things we never change about our highest values, are judgments made by our muscles.

377.

From J. Wellhausen

Justice as a need of society:

"The justice of the Sermon on the Mount can only have its turn once ordinary civil law and order is taken for granted"...

With the arrogance of a spiritual aristocracy, which was the foundation that first made their artificial structure of rule by priests possible, the Jews looked down on the state... Without the state, no "church" can exist... Being ruled by foreigners keeps alive the proud sense of distance.

The stages of turning against nature:

: Only when the kingship was set up did a nation exist at all, a unity, a shared sense of who they were as a people. But with that, the 'God of the desert', and also the nature god of farming and cattle-raising that had been taken over from the Canaanites (Baal-Dionysus), — — — The festival worship did stay half-pagan for a long time. But more and more it was about what happened to the nation, and it shed its connection to nature. Yahweh was bound to the people and the kingdom

by necessity. Even the worst idol worshippers held firmly to this belief: victory and rescue came from no one else. The civil state was the *miracle*, it was 'the *help of God*'. 'Providence through the rulers' remained an ideal for them (— obviously because they did not have it…)

When the kingdom falls into division and danger, when people go on living in chaos and in ruins from outside attacks, afraid of the Assyrians, they dream all the harder of the *return of perfect royal rule*, of a national state that is completely independent. This kind of fantasy is the prophetic kind. Isaiah is the highest example of it, with his so-called *messianic prophecies*. The prophets were critics and satirists, anarchists. Basically they had no say; the leadership was in other hands. What they wanted was to rebuild the civil state. They did not wish for a 'golden age' at all, but for tight, strict government: a ruler with military and religious instincts who would restore trust in Yahweh. That is the 'Messiah'. Any modern king would have more than satisfied the prophets' longing, perhaps even too much so, as one has to fear…

But nothing came true. People had a choice: give up their old God, or turn him into something else. The second option is what Elijah and Amos, for example, chose. They cut the bond, or more exactly the unity, between the people and God. They did not just separate the two; they lifted one side high up and pushed the other side down. They came up with a new relationship between the two parties: a *relationship of making amends*. Until then Yahweh had been the God of Israel, and for that reason the God of justice. Now he became first and foremost the *God of justice*, and only on the side, after that, the God of Israel. Yahweh's Torah, his law, had at first been, like everything he did, a way of helping, of setting things right, of showing the way, of solving tangled problems. Now it became the sum of his *demands*, and his relationship to Israel depended on them.

A law became legally binding when the people it applied to promised to keep it. 'Contract' in place of law. At first, the various representatives of the people had promised to keep the 'law'. Now Yahweh and Israel were supposed to be the two parties to the contract… Ever since the solemn ceremony in which King Josiah brought in the law, the idea of a covenant, a binding deal between Yahweh and Israel, moved to the center of religious thinking. The exile in Babylon, and the Assyrian exile too, helped people get used to the idea that the deal had conditions and could possibly be cancelled.

The fall of the kingdom let wild, dreamy fantasies run free. *The feeling of being opposed to everyone else spreads*. Since the exile, people fantasize about all the nations joining together against the 'new Jerusalem'. Before, a national state had been the highest wish. Now they dream of ruling the whole world, a rule that was supposed to rise up in Jerusalem on top of the ruins of the pagan empires.

The danger was that the Jewish exiles would be swallowed up by the pagans, just as the people of Samaria had been before them. So now the holy remnant is organized, so that it survives as the bearer of the promise and lasts through the storms of the time in between…

That the two parties to the contract have equal rights is *not* essential. The Hebrew word 'berith', covenant, is also used for a surrender, where the stronger side sets the terms —

Continued from Wellhausen.

On what basis could they organize? Rebuilding a real state was impossible; the foreign rulers would not allow it. That was when the importance of institutions became clear.

The men who led the restoration thought badly of the old community from the time of the kings. Clearly Yahweh had *rejected* it… People re-

membered the prophets, who had said that fortresses, horses, soldiers, kings, princes, none of that helps at all…

The Jewish national temple in Jerusalem: the priests of Jerusalem had grown powerful in the shadow of the kingship. The weaker the state, the higher the temple's standing, and the more independent the power of the priesthood. Worship boomed in the seventh century. Expensive materials such as incense were brought in, and the hard, costly offerings were preferred (the sacrifice of children, and sacrifices to make up for sin). *Deadly seriousness* in the way worship was carried out.

When the kingdom collapsed, the priestly class already had the pieces needed to organize the '*congregation*'. The customs and rules were mostly there already. They were put into a system, as a means of building an organization *for the remnant*…

The 'holy constitution of Judaism': an *artificial product*… Israel was *reduced* to being 'a kingdom of priests and a holy people'. Before, the natural order of society had found its support in belief in God. Now God's state was supposed to be shown visibly in an artificial sphere, in any case within ordinary everyday life. The idea that used to run all through *nature* was now supposed to have a holy body of its own. An outward split between holy and unholy arose. Lines were drawn, and the *realm of nature* was pushed back further and further… (resentment, the bitter grudge of the weak, *at work* here —) Holiness, empty and defined only by what it is against, becomes the ruling idea. At first holy meant divine; now it means priestly, churchly, — *as if the divine were set against the worldly and the natural by outward signs* —

Rule by priests… an artificial product, pushed through under bad conditions with an energy that will always be astonishing, and not political. The theocracy of Moses, God's rule through the priests, is what was left over from a state that had died. It needs foreign rule as its

precondition. It is the closest relative of the early Catholic Church, and in fact its *mother*…

Where the *step backward* lay. Yahweh's law stood for what made the Jews special compared with the pagans. But in truth that did not lie in worship. You cannot find any essential difference between Greek and Hebrew rituals. Worship is the pagan part of Israel's religion, and in the Priestly Code it becomes the main thing. Is that not a *step backward into paganism*? — it is exactly what the prophets fought against most deeply. — Also: through the priests' laws, worship is cut off from its own nature and overcome from within. The festivals have lost all memory of harvest and cattle-raising. They have turned into days for remembering history. They deny that they came from nature; they celebrate the founding of a supernatural religion and the kind deeds of Yahweh's grace. What is common to all humans, what grows freely, disappears. The festivals become fixed by rule and specifically Israelite… They no longer draw the god into earthly life so that he can share its joys and sorrows. They are no longer attempts to do something nice for him and put him in a kind mood. They are *nothing but means of divine grace*, which Yahweh set up as sacraments of the priestly hierarchy. They are not based on the real value of the thing itself or on fresh occasions, but on the painfully exact command of a will that gives no reasons. The tie between worship and the senses is cut. Worship becomes an exercise in piety. It has no natural meaning, only a meaning beyond this world, one that cannot be compared with anything or put into words. Its main effect is *atonement*, making up for sin. Since the exile, the sense of sin is constant: Israel is *rejected* from God's presence…

What made the offerings valuable was no longer the offerings themselves. It was *obedience* to the rules. The real weight of worship was moved into a field that had nothing to do with it: morality. Sacrifices and gifts stepped into the background. In their place came *acts of*

self-denial and discipline, which were tied even more simply to morality. Rules that at first were mostly meant to make the priests *holy* for their duties in worship were now stretched to cover ordinary people too. Keeping the rules about bodily cleanliness mattered more, and reached deeper, than the great public worship. It led straight to the ideal of holiness and to the idea that everyone is a priest. All of life was *squeezed* into a narrow holy track, because there was always some command of God to carry out. That kept people from following their own thoughts and their heart's wishes. This small private worship, which demanded attention all the time, kept the *feeling of sin* awake and alive in each single person.

The great expert on the sickness of Judaism is right: worship had become a tool for training and discipline. It meant nothing to the heart. It no longer grew out of a simple, natural feeling. It was a *dead* work, even though it was so important, or rather *because* it was so fussy and so strictly done. The old customs were patched together into a *system*. This system served as a form, as a hard shell, to save something nobler inside it. Paganism was defeated on its own home ground, in worship. After *nature* had been killed off inside it, worship was nothing more than the armor of a *monotheism that stood above nature*, a belief in one God beyond the natural world. *End.*

378.

My Theory of What Kind of Person Jesus Was

The picture of the "Savior" was spoiled, even destroyed…

Causes: the mental level of those people, where everything is constantly made cruder, twisted and shifted around. Their total blindness about themselves (here not even the first step toward knowing oneself has been taken). The enormous lack of scruples that all members of sects have when they use their master to defend themselves and

their cause… Christ's death as a criminal, which was a riddle to them…

The picture of him will be *behind the times*, it will drag him backward: the crudeness of mind around him. You cannot walk among fishermen without paying a price for it.

Another cause: the false lumping of him together with the everyday type of the miracle man, the prophet, the Messiah.

Another cause: the later history and psychology of the young church, which painted its own strongest feelings into the picture of its master.

Another cause: sick, wild emotion and self-indulgence in place of any reason at all, so that the instincts at once take control again. There is not the smallest trace of intellect, of discipline and strictness in thinking, of honesty with oneself.

What a pity there was no Dostoevsky among these people! In fact, the whole story belongs best in a *Russian novel*: things that are *sick*, things that are touching, single features of a lofty strangeness, right in the middle of wild, dirty, mob-like things… (like Mary Magdalene)

Only the *death*, the unexpected, shameful death, only the cross, which was usually kept for the lowest scum, only this most horrifying contradiction brought the disciples face to face with the real riddle: "*Who was that?*", "*What was that?*"

Their feelings were shaken and deeply insulted. They had a suspicion that such a death might *disprove* the whole cause. There was the terrible question mark: "Why like this?" For here everything had to be necessary, had to have meaning, reason, the highest reason. A disciple's love does not accept that anything could be chance.

Only now did the gap open up: "Who killed him?" "Who was the natural enemy?" The answer: the ruling Judaism, its top class.

They felt that *they themselves* were *in revolt against the* "*order*", against the way things were run.

And looking back, they understood *Jesus* as having been *in revolt against the

order*.

Up to then this *warlike* streak was missing in Jesus. More than that: it was impossible, given the way he thought. In practice, the way he behaved when he was sentenced and when he died was probably the complete opposite. He does not resist, he does not defend himself, he prays for them. His words to the criminal on the cross mean nothing else but this: if you feel that this is the right way, not fighting back, not being angry, not blaming anyone, but instead suffering, feeling for others, forgiving, praying for those who hunt us and kill us, well then, you have the one thing that is needed, peace of soul. *Then you are in paradise.*

Clearly, the main point was exactly what they did *not* understand: the example he gave of being free from all resentment (bitter grudge of the weak).

After all, Christ's death has no other meaning than to be the *strongest example* and the *strongest test* of his teaching…

His disciples were all far from forgiving this death. The feeling most opposed to the Gospel, *revenge*, came out on top…

The matter could not possibly be over. They needed "payback", a "judgment". (And nothing is less in the spirit of the Gospel than reward and punishment!)

Only now did the popular hopes for a Messiah move back into the foreground. People waited for a moment in history when "the Judge" would come to pass judgment on his enemies…

Only now did they *misunderstand* the coming of the "kingdom of God" as if it were a prophecy about a final act of history.

Only now did they carry all their contempt and bitterness against the Pharisees and the religious scholars into their picture of the master.

They did not understand the main point: that such a death was itself the *highest victory* over the "world" (over feelings of hatred, revenge and so on), over evil, over *the* Evil One. And all of this was always meant only as something real inside the mind, an inner psychological reality.

These souls, thrown completely off balance, worshipped him in a way that could not bear to believe what Jesus had taught: that everyone has the same true right to be a "son of God". Their revenge was to *lift Jesus up* in an extreme, over-the-top way. (This was just like the Jews had raised up the role of Israel, as if the whole rest of the world were its enemy.) That is the origin of the absurd theology of One God and his One Son.

The problem was: "How *could* God allow this?" To that they found the absurd answer: "He gave his Son as a sacrifice, so that sins would be forgiven." How *everything* was misunderstood!!! Nothing goes more against the Gospel than a sacrifice to pay for guilt, and least of all the sacrifice of an innocent person for the sins of the guilty.

But Jesus had done away with sin! Not through "faith", but through the feeling of being divine, of being equal to God.

These things now crept into the picture of him:

a) the teaching about judgment and about his second coming

b) the teaching that his death was a sacrifice

c) the teaching about rising from the dead. With this, the whole "blessedness", the whole meaning of the Gospel, is suddenly made to

vanish, like in a magic trick, in favor of a state that comes "after death"…

Paul made this view into a logical argument, with the cheek of a rabbi: "If Christ has not risen from the dead, then our faith is in vain."

And finally, on top of all that, the "immortality of the individual person".

And so, already in the second generation after Jesus, people counted as Christian everything that went most deeply against the instincts of the Gospel:

sacrifice, even blood sacrifice, as the first and foremost offering

punishment, reward, judgment…

a splitting apart of this world and the next, of time and eternity

a theology instead of a practice, a "faith" instead of a way of living

a deep and deadly hostility against everything that is not Christian

The whole *hard situation of the missionary* was carried into the teaching of Jesus. All the harsh and nasty things said against those who refuse to accept his missionaries were now supposed to have been announced by the master himself.

Once judgment, punishment and reward had been accepted again as the main thing, the whole teaching of Jesus and his wise sayings were soaked through with them…

379.

The Nihilist.

The Gospel is the news that the poor and the lowly have a way open to happiness. It says all you have to do is break free from the institutions, from tradition, and from being bossed around by the upper

classes. In that sense, the rise of Christianity is nothing more than the *typical socialist teaching*.

Property, earning money, the fatherland, class and rank, courts, police, the state, the church, schooling, art, the military: all of these are just so many things that block happiness. They are mistakes, traps, works of the devil, and the Gospel announces that judgment is coming for them… All of this is typical of socialist teaching.

In the background there is rebellion. There is an explosion of disgust against the "masters" that has been building up for a long time. There is a gut feeling for how much happiness might lie simply in feeling free, after being held down for so long…

Most of the time this is a sign that the lower classes have been treated too kindly, so that they can already taste on their tongues a happiness that is forbidden to them… It is not hunger that causes revolutions. It is that the people, while eating, have worked up an appetite…

380.

The So-Called Youth

You are fooling yourself if you dream that here we have a simple, young, common people standing out against an old culture. There is a superstition going around that in these lowest layers of society, where Christianity grew and took root, a deeper spring of life came bubbling up again. But you understand nothing about the psychology of Christianity if you take it as the sign of a people becoming young again, or of a race growing stronger. The opposite is true: it is a typical form of decadence. It is the moral softening and the hysteria of a sickly, mixed-up population that had grown tired and had lost its goals. This strange crowd that gathers here around this master at leading the common people astray really belongs, every last one of them, in a

Russian novel. Every nervous illness seems to have arranged to meet up among them… There is the lack of any tasks to do, the gut feeling that everything is really over, that nothing is worth the effort anymore, and a contentment in sweet idleness, in doing nothing at all.

Meanwhile, the power and the confidence in the future that the Jewish instinct has, the enormous strength of its stubborn will to exist and to have power, is found in its ruling class. The layers of society that young Christianity lifts up are marked more clearly by one thing than by anything else: their instincts are worn out. People are fed up: that is the one thing. And people are content to stay by themselves, within themselves, for themselves: that is the other.

381.

Being unable to express *political* ideals in any way other than with religious formulas

382.

Renan.

In the East, the fool is a privileged person. He walks in before the highest councils, and no one dares to stop him. People listen to him and ask him questions. He is someone believed to be closer to God. Because his own personal reason has gone out, people assume that he shares in God's reason instead. The kind of sharp wit that uses fine mockery to point out every flaw in someone's reasoning is missing in Asia.

People cared less about these writings than about the spoken tradition, and that was still true in the first half of the second century. That is why these writings had so little authority. People adjusted them to suit themselves and filled them in, using one to complete another —

In the Gospel of John, the parables are missing, and so are the driving out of demons…

383.

My own view:

"I was hungry and you gave me no food — get away from me, you cursed ones," and so on. Matthew 25, verse 41, and so on.

this outrageous language: "whatever you did not do for one of the least of these my brothers, you did not do for me either"

"the spirit of propaganda," which presents itself as the spirit of Christ…

"the spirit of unsatisfied revenge," which lets itself rage in words, in curses, and in predictions of scenes of judgment…

"the spirit of strict self-denial" ("keeping the commandments" as a way to discipline yourself, as a road to a reward in the next world, just as in Judaism), instead of that *Christian indifference* which pushes all such good things away out of pure "blessedness"… the Essenes, John the Baptist, and so on.

"the spirit of feeling sinful and needing to be saved"

With the death of Christ, and with the psychological need not to see it as the end, all the *popular tendencies* came back. All the *crude ideas* came back, the very ones that this typical spiritual man had worked to turn into *spirit* —

These were: the belief in a coming Messiah, the arrival of the "kingdom of God," the spirit of hostility and revenge, the expectation of "reward" and "punishment," and the arrogance of the "chosen ones" (they judge, they curse, they condemn; the Jewish idea of sacrifice…

the socialist leaning in favor of the poor, the "dishonorable," the despised).

Jesus lived as the *fulfillment* of all the popular hopes. He did nothing except say: "the kingdom of God *is* here." He turned the *crudeness* of these hopes into *spirit*:

— but with his death, all of this was forgotten (in plain words: *proven wrong*). People had no choice but to *translate* this kind of person *back* into the popular picture of the "Messiah," the future "Judge," the prophet fighting a battle — ——

As an after-effect of this blow, which this unsure and overexcited gang could not cope with, *complete decay* set in at once: it had all been for nothing…

an absurd *coarsening* of all spiritual values and formulas

the *anarchist* instincts against the ruling class shamelessly push their way to the front.

This means hatred against the rich, the powerful, and the learned. The "kingdom of God" and "peace on earth" were finished. What had been a psychological *reality*, something lived inside a person, becomes a *belief*, an *expectation* of a *reality that will come someday*, "a second coming." *A life lived in the imagination* becomes the permanent form of "salvation." Oh, how differently Jesus had understood it!

384.

The first decay of Christianity is the mixing-in of Jewish elements, a sliding back into forms that had already been *left behind*…

385.

"My kingdom is not of this world"

"I will destroy the temple of God and build it up again in three days"

the legal procedure against the "seducer" (in Hebrew, "mesith"), the one who questions the religion: the law called for stoning

— against every prophet, every miracle worker, who led the people away from the old faith —

"*this great master of irony*"

Renan finds it fair that he paid for this triumph with his life.

386.

"He only becomes an arguer when he argues against the Pharisees. The opponent forces him, as almost always happens, to take on the opponent's own tone" —

387.

Renan, volume one, page 346

His exquisite mockeries and his sly challenges always struck right to the heart. Like everlasting wounds, they have stayed stuck in the flesh. Think of the poisoned shirt of Nessus from the old Greek legend, a shirt of ridicule that burns whoever wears it. The Jew, son of the Pharisees, has been dragging it behind him in rags for eighteen centuries, and it was Jesus who wove it with godlike skill. His barbs are masterpieces of high mockery. They are written in lines of fire on the flesh of the hypocrite and the fake believer. They are barbs beyond compare, barbs worthy of a son of God! Only a god knows how to kill like that. Socrates and Molière only scratch the skin. This one drives fire and fury right down to the bone.

And this is the very same one about whom Isaiah, chapter 42, verses 2 to 3, could say what he said!!

388.

He never had any idea of a "person" or an "individual." To him, people are one when they love each other, when each lives only through the other. He and his disciples were one.

389.

The claim that he was God, or equal to God, was presented as a slander made up by the Jews (compare John, chapter 5, verse 18, and chapter 10, verse 33). He is less than the Father: the Father has not revealed everything to him. He resists being called equal to God. He is the Son of God, but everyone can become that. (This is a *Jewish* way of thinking: in the Old Testament, being a son of God is given to several people, and no one at all claims they are equal to God.) In the Semitic languages, the word "*son*" is an extremely vague and loose idea.

390.

The great movement in Umbria in the thirteenth century, the one most closely related to the movement of the man from Galilee, happened in the name of poverty:

Francis of Assisi: exquisite kindness, his delicate, fine and tender bond with all of life in the universe.

391.

In the language the rabbis used at that time, "heaven" meant the same as "God". People avoided saying God's name.

392.

"The kingdom of God is *among* us." Luke 17:20.

393.

"Blessed are those who hear God's words and *do* them." Luke 11:27 and following.

394.

The idea of "nature" or a "law of nature" is completely missing. Everything happens for moral reasons. "Miracles" are nothing "against nature", because there is no such thing as nature at all.

395.

"The Law has been destroyed: he is the one who will destroy it." This split his first followers, and a large part of them stayed Jewish… The trial against him leaves no doubt…

396.

"Your neighbor", in the Jewish sense, means someone who shares your faith.

397.

There is no kind of person *further from the spirit of the Gospel* than the scholars of the Greek Church, who, from the fourth century on, pushed Christianity down the road of an absurd metaphysics, meaning far-fetched theories about the ultimate nature of things. And the same goes for the scholastic thinkers of the *Latin* Middle Ages.

398.

Renan, volume one, page 461.

"…The feeling that Jesus brought into the world is truly ours. His perfect idealism is the highest rule for a life that is virtuous and

detached from the world. He created the heaven of pure souls. There you find what people ask of the earth in vain: the perfect nobility of the children of God, complete holiness, total separation from the dirt of the world, and finally freedom, which real society rules out as impossible and which only reaches its full size in the realm of thought. The great master of everyone who takes refuge in this ideal paradise is still Jesus. He was the first to announce that the spirit is king. He was the first to say, at least through his actions: 'My kingdom is not of this world.' Founding the *true religion* really is his work…"

399.

"Christianity" has come to mean the same as "religion". Anything people do outside the great and good Christian tradition will bear no fruit.

400.

Our civilization, ruled by a police force that watches every tiny detail, gives us no idea of what a human being does in times when each person's originality has more room to move.

"Our petty little harassments meant to prevent trouble, which kill the things of the mind far more surely than torture does, did not exist back then." Jesus was able to live, for three years, a life that in our societies would have dragged him before a court twenty times…

"Free of our polite customs, untouched by the one-size-fits-all education that refines us but shrinks our individuality so badly, these whole, undivided souls brought an astonishing energy to what they did… The breath of God moved freely in them. In us, it is chained by the iron chains of a petty society that is doomed to a mediocrity that cannot be cured."

"So let us place the person of Jesus at the very highest peak of human greatness": that is what Mr. Renan urges us to do.

401.

Medicine, which sees in a certain moral delicacy the first sign of a wasting disease… (or does he mean consumption, the lung disease?)

402.

"Philosophy is not enough for the great mass of people. They need holiness." A nice little piece of spite from Renan.

403.

"Who would not rather be sick like Pascal than healthy like the common crowd?" Renan.

404.

"Just imagine Jesus forced to carry the burden of being divine until he was sixty or seventy, losing his heavenly flame, slowly wearing himself out under the demands of a role no one had ever played before!" Renan.

"Devoted to his idea without holding anything back, he put everything beneath it, so completely that the universe no longer existed for him. It was through this burst of heroic will that he conquered heaven. There has never been a man, except perhaps the Buddha, who trampled so hard on family, on the joys of this world, and on every worldly concern… As for us, eternal children doomed to be powerless, let us bow down before these half-gods!" Renan.

405.

Renan, page 187.

"The most fired-up democratic movement that humanity remembers had been stirring the Jewish people for a long time. The idea that God takes revenge for the poor and the weak against the rich and the powerful shows up on every page of the Old Testament writings. Of all peoples' histories, the history of Israel is the one where the spirit of the common people ruled most steadily. The prophets were real champions of the common people, and, you could say, the boldest champions of all. They had thundered without stopping against the great and powerful. They tightly linked the words 'poor, gentle, humble, pious' on one side, and on the other side the words 'rich, godless, violent, wicked.' Under the Seleucid kings, almost all the aristocrats abandoned their faith and went over to Greek culture, and so these links between ideas only grew stronger. The Book of Enoch contains curses against the world, the rich and the powerful that are even more violent than the ones in the Gospel. The word 'poor' (ebion) had come to mean the same as 'holy' and 'friend of God.'"

406.

Pierre Loti, An Iceland Fisherman.

407.

The *state*, or *immorality* put into an organized form…

On the inside: as police, criminal law, social classes, trade, family.

On the outside: as will to power, will to war, to conquest, to revenge.

How do you get a *large crowd* to do things that a *single person* would never agree to do?

—

By splitting up the responsibility

—

between giving the orders and carrying them out

—

By *putting in between* the virtues of obedience, of duty, of love for your country and love for your ruler

keeping alive pride, harshness, strength, hatred, revenge, in short all the typical traits that *go against* the herd type…

The *tricks* that make possible actions, measures and emotions which, judged by the standard of one single person, are no longer "allowed", and no longer "to our taste" either —

— *art* "makes them tasty to us", by letting us step into such "strange, foreign" worlds

— the *historian* shows that they have their own kind of right and reason; and so do travel, the love of the exotic, psychology, criminal law, the madhouse, criminals, sociology

— "*impersonality*": so that we allow ourselves these emotions and actions as mere *channels* of a collective being (panels of judges, the jury, the citizen, the soldier, the minister, the prince, society, the "critic")… This gives us the feeling that *we are making a sacrifice*…

Keeping the military state going is the very last means of either taking up or holding on to the *great tradition* of the *highest type* of human being, the *strong type*. And on that basis, all the *ideas* that make the hostility and the difference in rank between states last forever may appear to be approved…

For example, nationalism, protective tariffs on imports, — — —

the strong type is kept alive as the one that *decides what things are worth*…

408.

We should not decorate Christianity and dress it up, the way this two-faced Mr. Renan does. It has waged a war to the death against the *strong type* of human being.

It has put a ban on all the basic instincts of this type.

Out of these instincts it manufactured evil, and *the* evil one.

The strong person became the typical *shameful* and *condemned* person.

It took the side of everything weak, low, and badly turned out.

It made an ideal out of *opposing* the instincts that keep strong life alive…

It spoiled the reason even of the most spiritual and thoughtful people, by teaching them to feel the highest instincts of the mind as sinful, as misleading, as *temptations*…

The saddest example is the ruin of Pascal, who believed his reason had been ruined by original sin, when in fact it had only been ruined by his Christianity…

409.

Authors whom it is now, once and for all, shameful to still enjoy: Rousseau, Schiller, George Sand, Michelet, Buckle, Carlyle, and the "Imitation of Christ".

410.

Note: I don't trust anyone who builds big systems of thought, and I stay away from them. Wanting to build a system is, at least for a

thinker, something that gives you away and makes you look bad. It is a kind of dishonesty, even a kind of immorality… Maybe, if you take a look underneath and behind this book, you can guess which system-builder it barely managed to escape: me myself…

411.

Preface.

1.

Great things demand that we either stay silent about them or speak about them in a great way. And "great" here means blunt and shameless, yet innocent.

2.

What I am telling is the story of the next two hundred years. I am describing what is coming, what can no longer come any other way: the coming of nihilism (belief that nothing has meaning). This story can already be told today, because necessity itself is at work here. This future is already speaking through a hundred signs. This fate is announcing itself everywhere. For this music of the future, every ear is already pricked up and listening. For a long time now, our whole European culture has been moving along under a torturing tension that grows from decade to decade, as if it were rushing toward a disaster. It is restless, violent, in a headlong hurry. It is like a river that wants to reach its end, that no longer stops to think, that is afraid to stop and think.

3.

— The one who is speaking here has, on the contrary, done nothing so far except stop and think. He is a philosopher and a hermit by instinct, who found his advantage in standing apart, in staying outside, in patience, in delay, in lagging behind. He is a daring, experimenting spirit, who has already lost his way once in every maze of the future. He is like a bird of prophecy that looks backward while it tells what is going to come. He is the first complete nihilist of Europe, but one who has already lived nihilism through to its end inside himself — who has it behind him, beneath him, outside of him…

4.

So let no one misunderstand the meaning of the title this gospel of the future wants to carry. "The Will to Power. An Attempt at Rethinking All Values" — this phrase expresses a counter-movement, both in its basic idea and in its task. It is a movement that, at some point in the future, will replace that complete nihilism. But it needs nihilism to come first, both logically and psychologically. It can only come after it and out of it. Why is the coming of nihilism now necessary? Because it is our own values up to now that draw their final conclusion in it. Because nihilism is the logic of our great values and ideals, thought through to the very end. Because we first have to live through nihilism to find out what the value of these "values" really was… At some point, we will need new values…

412.

Read books that could have been written by many different people. They show most clearly the mental habits of the typical scholar of a given time. They are "impersonal."

413.

The higher human being

: my question is not what will come after humans and replace them. My question is which kind of human should be chosen, wanted and bred as the more valuable kind…

Humanity does not show a development toward something better, or stronger, or higher, in the way people believe today. The European of the 19th century is worth far less than the European of the Renaissance. Further development does not at all, by any necessity, mean rising higher, growing, or becoming stronger…

In another sense, there is a constant success of single cases, in the most different places on earth and out of the most different cultures. In these cases, a higher type of human really does appear: something that, compared to humanity as a whole, is a kind of "higher human being." Such lucky cases of great success have always been possible, and perhaps they always will be. And under certain conditions, even whole tribes, families, and peoples can be such a lucky hit…

From the oldest times of Indian, Egyptian and Chinese culture that we can still guess at, right up to today, the higher type of human has been far more alike than people think…

People forget how little humanity belongs to one single movement. They forget that youth, old age and decline are not at all ideas that apply to humanity as a whole.

To give one example: people forget that only today is our European culture coming close again to that state of philosophical weariness and late culture that explains how something like Buddhism could arise.

If it ever becomes possible to draw lines through history that connect cultures at the same stage of development, then the modern idea of progress will end up neatly standing on its head — and so will the very measure by which progress is judged, namely democracy.

414.

Preface.

*

What is good? — Everything that increases in a person the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself.

What is bad? — Everything that comes from weakness.

What is happiness? — The feeling that power is growing, that some resistance is being overcome.

Not contentment, but more power. Not peace at any price, but war. Not virtue, but ability — virtue in the Renaissance style, Renaissance-style virtue, free of moralizing.

The weak and the failed should perish: that is the first rule of society. And we should even help them do so.

What is more harmful than any vice? — Active pity for everything failed and weak — "Christianity"…

*

The problem I am raising here is not what should replace humanity in the line of living beings. It is which type of human we should breed and want — the type that is more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of a future.

This more valuable type has already existed often enough. But it came as a lucky accident, as the exception — never as something wanted on purpose. In fact, it is exactly this type that has been feared the most. Until now it has almost been the frightening thing itself. And out of that fear, people wanted, bred and actually achieved the opposite type: the tame house animal, the herd animal, the animal of "equal rights," the weak animal called man — the "Christian"…

*

The Will to Power.

An Attempt at Rethinking All Values.

415.

The picture of the world that you run into in the background of this book is strangely dark and unpleasant. Of all the kinds of pessimism known so far, none seems to have reached this level of nastiness. Here there is no contrast between the 'real' world and the world of appearances. There is only one world, and it is false, cruel, full of contradictions, seductive, and without meaning… A world made like this is the real world… We need lies in order to win out over this reality, this "truth" — that is, in order to live… And the fact that lies are necessary in order to live is itself part of this frightening and questionable nature of existence…

In this book, metaphysics, morality, religion and science are looked at only as different forms of lying. With their help, people believe in life. "Life ought to inspire trust": put this way, the task is enormous. To solve it, a human being must already be a liar by nature. More than anything else, he must be an artist… And he is one. Metaphysics, morality, religion, science — all of them are just offspring of his will to art, to lying, to running away from "truth," to denial of "truth." This ability itself, which lets him overpower reality by means of lies, this artist's ability, the human talent above all others — he shares it with everything that exists. After all, he himself is a piece of reality, truth and nature. So he himself is also a piece of the genius of lying…

That the true nature of existence should be *misunderstood*: this is the deepest and highest secret aim of science, of religious devotion, and of art. Never to see many things, to see many things wrongly, to add many things that aren't there... Oh, how clever we still are in the very moments when we are furthest from thinking ourselves clever! Love, excitement, "God": these are all fine tricks of the final self-deception, all temptations that lure us into living! In the moments when a person lets himself be fooled, when he believes in life again, when he has

outsmarted himself: oh, how he swells up then! What delight! What a feeling of power! How much of an artist's triumph there is in that feeling of power!... Once again, the human being has become master over the "raw material", master over the truth!... And whenever a person feels joy, he is always the same in his joy: he rejoices as an artist, he enjoys himself as power. *The lie is power...*

Art, and nothing but art. Art is the great thing that makes life possible, the great temptress that lures us into living, the great stimulant to life...

416.

Rethinking of Values.

Book 1: *The Antichrist.*

Book 2: *The Hater of Wisdom.*

Book 3: *The Immoralist (one who rejects morality).*

Book 4: *Dionysus.*

Rethinking All Values.

417.

I have given the Germans the deepest book they own, my Zarathustra. Today I am giving them the most independent one. "What?" my guilty conscience says to me. "How can you throw pearls before the Germans!" In other words: why waste something so precious on people who can't value it?...

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