sun

Original edition | Faithful translation

Late notebooks · 1888-1889

Nachlass: Writings from the Late Notebooks

Friedrich Nietzsche

Read and listen to this book on SUN.

Open the book page

sunapp.ai/books/nachlass-writings-from-the-late-notebooks-by-friedrich-nietzsche

Full text, credits and source notices follow.

SUN | sunapp.ai

FRIEDRICH
NIETZSCHE

Nachlass: Writings from the Late Notebooks



sun | *Intelligent Audio*



sunapp.ai/download

SUN / FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

Nachlass, Late Notebooks 1888-1889

Friedrich Nietzsche

Original English edition

Translated from the German by Blue Energy People, Inc. (SUN), with AI assistance from Claude Opus 5.5.

Nietzsche Source, eKGWB NF-1888, notebooks 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 (German original)

SUN edition / 2026

Contents

Notebook 12: Early 1888 4
Preface: The Advent of Nihilism 59
Notebook 13: Beginning of 1888 — Spring 1888 65
Notebook 14: Spring 1888 70
Notebook 15: Spring 1888 270
Notebook 16: Spring–Summer 1888 357
Notebook 17: May–June 1888 402
Notebook 18: July–August 1888 415
Notebook 19: September 1888 424
Notebook 20: Summer 1888 435
Notebook 21: Autumn 1888 474
Notebook 22: September–October 1888 478
Notebook 23: October 1888 497
Notebook 24: October–November 1888 515
Notebook 25: December 1888 — Early January 1889 537

Posthumous Fragments, Late Notebooks 1888–1889

Notebook 12: Early 1888

1.

Index to the first book.

(1)

The entire previous history of the development of philosophy as the history of the development of the will to truth.

IV

(2)

Temporary predominance of social value-feelings comprehensible, in order to establish a substructure.

IV

(3)

Critique of the good man, *not* of the hypocrisy of the

good…

II

(4)

Value of Kant

I

(5)

Toward a characterization of the *national genius*.

I

(6)

Aesthetica

III

(7)

“Spirituality”, not merely commanding and leading

III

(8)

Formulation of God as culmination point; retreat from it

III

(9)

Offenbach music

IV

(10)

Priest

II

(11)

Toward a critique of the Christian morality of the New Testament.

II

(12)

every *intensified* type of man standing on the level of a

lower one

IV

(13)

War against the *Christian ideal, not* merely against the Christian God

II

(14)

Francis of Assisi fighting against the hierarchy

II

(15)

Socrates against the noble instincts, against

art

II

(16)

the vices and *culture*

II

(17)

the great lies in history

II

(18)

the Christian interpretation of *dying*

II

(19)

the eternally-unchanging, question of value

III

(20)

Replacement of morality by the will to our goal and

consequently to its means

To renounce praise…

IV

(21)

Falsifications in psychology.

II

(22)

Renan blunders about “science”

I

(23)

Correction of the concept “egoism”

IV

(24)

military expressions

IV

(25)

Future of asceticism

IV

(26)

Future of the worker

IV

(27)

Nihilism

I

(28)

"Truth", our conditions of preservation projected as predicates of *being*

III

(29)

Degree of unbelief, of permitted "freedom of spirit" as measure of power

IV

(30)

Critique and rejection of the concept “objective”

III

(31)

most extreme form of nihilism: to what extent a divine way of thinking

IV

(32)

Dionysian: new path to a type of the divine; my difference from Schopenhauer from the beginning.

IV

(33)

“what for?” the question of nihilism and the attempts to obtain answers

I

(34)

the order of rank is lacking, cause of nihilism.

the attempts to devise *higher types*…

I

(35)

what the great man has *cost*.

IV

(36)

the will to truth

III

(37)

Ascertaining and putting-meaning-in

III

(38)

more a child of one's grandparents

(39)

New Testament: caution!

II

(40)

modern condemnation of the *will to power*

IV

(41)

courage as the limit at which the “true” is acknowledged…

III

(42)

Music — the strong tradition. Offenbach; against German music as a *degenerating* one.

(43)

the *value of a man not* measurable by his effects.

"Noble"

IV

(44)

Philosophy the art of living, *not* an art for discovering

the truth Epicurus.

Toward the history of philosophy.

IV

(45)

good expressions…

(46)

Will to truth: tremendous self-reflection.

III

(46)

Will to truth

IV

(47)

the fundamental epistemological positions and their relation to the supreme values

III

(48)

Colportage philosophy. Toward the ideal of the psychologist

IV

(49)

what sense it makes to *revalue* values.

IV

(50)

Larochefoucauld and J. Mill: the latter absolutely shallow, the former *naive*… "selfishness"

III

(51)

"Utility" dependent on "goals": utilitarianism.

III

(52)

God's fear of man knowledge as a means to power, to "likeness to God". *Value*. Toward the history of philosophy —

III

(53)

Apparentness, meaninglessness, the “real”

III

(54)

Toward a characterization of the “strong”

IV

(55)

the “posthumous” — question of comprehensibility and of *authority*

II

(56)

Precondition for a revaluation of values

IV

(57)

How the glory of virtue arises

II

(58)

praise, gratitude — as *will to power*

III

(59)

the psychological falsifications under the dominion of the herd instinct

II

(60)

Herd instinct: which states and desires it praises.

II

(61)

The *denaturalization of morality* and its steps

II

(62)

the *suppressed* morality

II

(63)

the New Testament

II

(64)

Knowledge and becoming

III

(65)

Combating determinism

III

(66)

Restoration of ascetics.

IV

(67)

Principle of contradiction

III

(68)

Derivation of our faith in reason

III

(69)

Superstition of the “species”

II

(70)

Aesthetica

III

(71)

toward the plan

I

(71)

"Subject", thing in itself

III

(72)

Nihilism

I

(73)

Future of the Jews

(74)

The descriptive, the picturesque — its *nihilistic*

element.

I

(75)

Aesthetica

III

(76)

toward the plan.

(77)

the 18th century.

I

(78)

Future of art

IV

(79)

the great man, the criminal

III

(80)

Progress of the renaturalization of the 19th century.

I

(81)

my “nihilism”

I

(82)

Morality

as a means of seduction,

II

as will to power

(83)

Voltaire and Rousseau

I

(84)

Chief symptoms of pessimism

I

(85)

critical tension: extremes preponderant.

19th century.

I

(86)

Critique of modern man, his psychological mendacity — his *romantic* attitude

I

(87)

18th century.

I

(88)

Thierry, the popular uprising even in scholarship.

I

(89)

Future of education: culture of the exception

IV

(90)

“answerable to his conscience” Luther's cunning: his will to power

II

(91)

Instinct of civilized humanity against *great*

men

III

(92)

all good an evil of former times made serviceable

III

(93)

toward the justification of morality. Recapitulation.

IV

(94)

modern vices

I

(95)

“Culture” in *opposition* to “civilization”

I

(96)

New Testament and Petronius.

II

(97)

on logical apparentness

III

(98)

Morphology of the will to power

II

(99)

against Rousseau

I

(100)

how a virtue comes to power

II

(101)

Metamorphoses and sublimations (cruelty, lying, etc.

II

(102)

how tendencies hostile to life come to be honored.

II

(103)

Optics of valuation

III

(104)

Duality, physiologically, as consequence of the will to power

III

(105)

the strong of the future

IV

(106)

growth toward the heights and toward the worse belong together

III

(107)

Virtue without esteem today: unless someone were to put it into circulation as a vice

IV

(108)

the great falsifications in psychology

II

(109)

falsification of *history* on principle, so that it may furnish a *proof* for morality

II

(110)

Total reckoning with morality: what in it wants to power?

III

(111)

the moral values in the theory of knowledge

III

(112)

the moral values master over the aesthetic ones

II

(113)

Causes for the advent of pessimism

I

(114)

the great falsifications under the dominion of morality: *schema*.

II

(115)

Modernity

I

(116)

classical: toward the aesthetics *of the future*

IV

(117)

Modern the traders and middlemen

I

(118)

Modernity

I

(119)

18th century and Schopenhauer

I

(120)

modern counterfeiting of the artists.

I

(121)

modern separation of “public” and “cenacle”

I

(122)

for the *preface*. Deepest reflection.

Pref.

(123)

whose selfishness finds its account in the maintenance of the tyranny of morality

II

(124)

justifying retrospect on the evil consequence

of the tyranny of morality.

IV

(125)

the patronage of virtue (avarice, lust for dominion, etc.

II

(126)

Spinoza as Goethe's saint

(127)

in conclusion: a Goethean gaze full of love, genuine overcoming of pessimism

IV

(128)

the 3 centuries

I

(129)

Goethe's attempt at an overcoming of the 18th century

IV

why is Goethe lacking as an expression of the 19th century?

IV

(130)

the German *strong* type

IV

(131)

Scorn for the systematizers

(132)

Schopenhauer as the one who takes up Pascal again

I

(133)

the 17th and 18th centuries.

I

(134)

Rousseau and Voltaire c. 1760; influence of Rousseau on Romanticism.

I

(135)

the problem of “civilization”

I

(136)

Question of the value of *modern* man?

Whether his strong and weak sides belong together.

I

2nd book.

(137)

my five Noes: for the preface?

IV

(138)

my new path to Yes

IV

(139)

how one became master over the ideal of the Renaissance

I

(140)

in honor of the 19th century.

IV

(141)

to be ashamed of being a Christian

IV

(142)

After-effect of *Christian* providence

what one owes to Christianity…

I

(143)

toward the justification of *morality*

IV

(144)

"reactive" idealism and its counterpart

II

(145)

the economic appraisal of previous ideals

IV

(146)

Making man useful through virtue:

machine-virtue

IV

(147)

altruism in biology!

III

(148)

Advantage of the continuum

IV

(149)

"lower" and "higher" existence?

IV

(150)

Secretion of a luxury surplus of mankind.

the *two* movements

IV

(151)

"Modernity"

I

(152)

Subject, substance

III

(153)

Sympathy as impertinence

likewise the "objectivity" of the critic

I

(154)

Pessimism of strength.

I

(155)

Overall insight into nihilism

I

(156)

Overall insight into the ambiguous character of our modern world

I

(157)

To fight with art *against* moralization

IV

(158)

romantisme: the false intensification

I

(159)

Justifying the *rule*

IV

(160)

Science, *two* values

IV

(161)

Cultural complex, *not* society

IV

(162)

Barbarism *not* a matter of choice

IV

(163)

Increase in the total power of man: to what extent it conditions every kind of decline.

IV

(164)

On the *politics of virtue*:

how it comes to power

how, once power has been attained, it rules

II

(165)

Artists not the men of great passion

(166)

Means of bringing a virtue to victory

II

(167)

lascivious melancholy of the Moorish dance: *modern*

fatalism.

I

(168)

modern art, as an art of tyrannizing.

I

(169)

Means of bringing a virtue to victory.

II

(170)

Herd instinct: esteem for the middling

II

(171)

woman, literature, art (nineteenth

century, *uglification*

I

(172)

On I. Nihilism. Plan

I

(173)

Perfection of the nihilist.

I

(174)

Affects as defence and weapon: what becomes of man *without* the compulsion to defence and weapons?

IV

(175)

Shrinking of the domain of morality: progress

IV

(176)

Stages of the *denaturalization* of morality

II

(177)

Restoration of "nature" in morality

II

(178)

Faith or works? *Luther.* Reformation.

"Despisers of the self".

II

(179)

Problem of the *criminal*

IV

(180)

Metamorphoses of sensuality

III

(181)

Nihilism of the artists

I

(182)

the renaturalization of the man of the 19th century.

IV

(183)

Protestantism in the 19th century.

I

(184)

On the ideal of the *philosopher*. Conclusion

IV

(185)

History of moralization and demoralization

III

(186)

Plan of the 1st book "Plan"

I

(187)

Order of rank among men

IV

(188)

Music against word

I

(189)

where one has to look for the *stronger* natures

IV

(190)

Scorn for the idealism that will not have mediocrity be mediocre: toward a critique of the "idealist".

I

(191)

the tragic age

IV

(192)

the "idealist" (Ibsen)

I

(193)

not "wanting to make better, but stronger

IV

(194)

the Christian art of slander

II

(195)

no uniforming! "Virtue" nothing mediocre, something mad

IV

(196)

Marriage, sexual drive

III

(197)

the Jewish shrewdness of the first Christians

II

(198)

the New Testament as a book of seduction

II

(199)

the three elements in Christianity. Its progress toward democracy: as *renaturalized* Christianity.

II

(200)

Christianity as the *continuer* of Judaism

II

(201)

Irony at the little Christians

II

(202)

Individualism as "will to power"

On metamorphoses of the will to power.

III

(203)

Irony at the virtuous

Critique of "the good man"

III

(204)

the scope of the moral hypothesis

III

(205)

Critique of "the good man"

II

(206)

against Jesus of Nazareth as seducer…

II

(207)

The test of strength

IV

(208)

Marriage as concubinage

II

(209)

Principle of the *order of rank*…

IV

(210)

Concept of God, after the reckoning with the "good"

IV

(211)

Christianity as emancipated Judaism

II

(212)

Jewish life as the background of the "first Christian communities"

II

(213)

Petronius

II

(214)

whether princes can do without us immoralists?

IV

(215)

Christ: ideal of the ignoble type of man.

II

(216)

we knowers — how immoral!

IV

(217)

Protest against Christ as the type of man: whereas he is only a caricature…

IV

(218)

the denaturalization of *genius* (Schopenhauer) under the

influence of morality.

II

(219)

what reconciles Schopenhauer with the Old Testament: the myth of the Fall

II

(220)

To make a register of my Yeses, my Noes, my question marks.

IV

(221)

Type of my "disciples"

IV

(222)

against Schopenhauer, who wants to castrate scoundrels and geese. On the "order of rank".

IV

(223)

on the strength of the 19th century.

IV

(224)

whether I have *harmed* virtue?

IV

(225)

against *remorse*

IV

(226)

Virtue translated into the *noble*

IV

(227)

my kind of justification of virtue

IV

(228)

on the order of rank

IV

(229)

the power of *caricature* in every social *valuation*: a means of its will to power

II

(230)

toward a critique of the idealists: as the opposite of me

IV

(231)

War against "noble" in the soft-womanly-effeminate sense

IV

(232)

our music, on the concept "classical", "genial" etc.

IV

(233)

to what extent I do *not* desire the annihilation of the ideals

that I combat — I want only to become master over them…

IV

(234)

my position and Schopenhauer's a controversy, likewise toward Kant, toward Hegel, Comte, Darwin, toward the historians etc.

IV

(235)

I link up with the strong sides of the century.

IV

(236)

what does the moral idiosyncrasy signify even in an extraordinary individual, like Pascal?

II

(237)

to what extent I help mediocrity to new honours.

IV

(238)

moral scholasticism is the longest-lasting.

III

(239)

the naivety regarding the ultimate "*desirabilities*", while one does not know the "Why?" of man.

IV

(240)

Restoration of the correct concept of the "good, helpful, benevolent disposition": honoured *not* for the sake of utility, but from the standpoint of those who felt it

III

(241)

against the altruism of *weakness*

III

(242)

against preoccupation with oneself and with "eternal salvation"

III

(243)

Misunderstanding of love, of pity, of justice under the pressure of the morality of unselfing.

II

(244)

Cult-commandments passing over into culture-commandments

(245)

all affects are *useful*: here no measure of value.

III

(246)

what sense the *myopic* perspective of society

has with regard to "utility"

II

(247)

where today "Christianness" has absolutely no right any longer… In politics…

II

(248)

against the overestimation of the "species" and the underestimation of the "individual" in natural science

III

(249)

the "conscious world" cannot count as the starting point of value: necessity of an "*objective* positing of value".

IV

(250)

"God" as maximal state

IV

(251)

to be ashamed of misfortune

IV

(252)

we knowers — our last kind of self-overcoming

IV

(253)

the sublimations, e.g. of dyspepsia.

II

(254)

my points of view regarding values

IV

(255)

not narrow-minded enough for a system

(256)

Morality as the supreme devaluation even still in Schopenhauerian nihilism.

I

(257)

absolute dominion of morality over all other values: in the conception of God

(258)

the loss suffered by all natural things through the positing of supposedly higher spheres — up to the dominion of the "anti-natural"

(259)

the remnants of the devaluation of nature through moral transcendence.

(260)

my intention, the absolute homogeneity of all that happens: the moral distinction merely a perspectival one

IV

(261)

Music-pessimism

I

(262)

Marriage, adultery

IV

(263)

Christian-Buddhist castratism as "ideal": whence the seductive charm?

II

(264)

the "apparentness" of thought…

III

(265)

The art of dissimulation increasing in the order of rank of beings. On "thinking"…

III

(266)

the moral fanatics, after one has emancipated oneself from religion: insisting that morality falls *with* the Christian God…

(267)

"the dominion of the good" irony, as uneconomical, like "good weather"

(268)

what has been spoiled by the Christian ideal: asceticism, fasting, monastery, feast, faith in oneself, death…

(269)

Samples of the moralistic art of slander

(270)

On the origin of the beautiful: critique of its value judgments

sun | *Intelligent Audio*



sunapp.ai/download

III

(271)

the tragic artist

IV

(272)

the more concealed form of the Christian ideal, e.g. in the nature-cult, socialism, "metaphysics of love" etc.

(273)

our *benevolent* estimation of man, in

relation to the moral-Christian one.

I

moralistic liberality as a sign of the increase in culture

IV

(274)

the *most moral* man as the *most powerful*, most godlike: all knowledge was bent on proving *this*. this relation to *power* has raised morality above all values

II

(275)

the Christian ideal Jewish-clever

II

(276)

the self-deification of the little people (80 a)

II

(277)

Paul: the doctoring of history in order to *prove*…

II

(278)

the reality behind the Christian communities: the *small Jewish* family

II

(279)

first impression of the New Testament. One takes sides with Pilate and then, almost, with the scribes and Pharisees…

II

(280)

on the psychology of the *New Testament*

II

(281)

"Spirit" in the New Testament

II

(282)

to what extent Christianity could be patronized by the *ruling* classes.

II

(283)

Paul

II

(284)

Buddhism and Christianity

II

(285)

I tolerate no compromise with Christianity —

IV

(286)

on the plan of the *first* book

I

(287)

Pagan — Christian

(288)

Form of "denaturalization": the good for the sake of the good, the beautiful for the sake of the beautiful, the true for the sake of truth —

II

(289)

the psychological falsification under the necessity of having to *fight* for one's ideal

II

(290)

my absolute isolation: for the introduction.

IV

(291)

be "natural"!

I

(292)

"suffer the little children": oh

(293)

the psychological presupposition of Christianity.

II

(294)

Critique of the idealism of the Sermon on the Mount

II

(295)

the stupidity of antiquity in the face of Christianity

II

(296)

"thing in itself" absurd

III

(297)

the conception of the gods, why moralized?

II

(298)

the immodesty of wanting to have a say in the New Testament

II

(299)

Kant's naivety in asserting existence

III

(300)

the *intolerance* of *morality*, judged quite

generally — an expression of man's *weakness*

IV

(301)

go ahead of others? no, go by oneself

(302)

making do with human beings

(303)

Artist: form : content

(304)

Sainte-Beuve

(305)

George Sand

III: 22

IV: 73

(306)

Men who are destinies

(307)

"Modern woman" Duc de Morny

(308)

woman and the artist

(309)

Highest point of contemplation

(310)

the stronger type in the Europe of the future

(311)

"Shepherd": the great average man

(312)

Stendhal: "the strong man lies"

(313)

on the history of Romanticism

(314)

Pagan

(315)

our pessimism (for the book of prescriptions)

(316)

that one puts something at stake, why? (for the book of prescriptions)

(317)

Emerson, Carlyle

(318)

Skepticism, the *great* man (for the book of prescriptions)

(319)

Bizet: the African sensibility ("Moorish")

(320)

how one brings virtue to dominion

(321)

Christianity: how it destroys Pascal.

(322)

Taine, Zola: tyranny

(323)

the "idealist"

(324)

the literary woman

(325)

the modern "worker"

(326)

against the pessimism of Herr von Hartmann: pleasure as standard of measure

(327)

The actor (Talma) —

that which *is to become true must not be true*…

(328)

"good taste": Sainte-Beuve's judgment.

(329)

Pleasure and displeasure secondary.

(330)

no goal — no *final* state: to do justice to *this* fact!

(331)

"Values": with regard to what?

(332)

Values: with regard to what *not*?

(333)

it is not "the will" that wants satisfaction, *that* is not "pleasure"

(334)

*dis*satisfaction pleasurable

(335)

the measure of *necessary* displeasure as a sign of the *degree* of strength

(336)

why *we* experience tragedies (book of prescriptions)

(337)

Caesar hygiene (book of prescriptions)

(338)

Book of prescriptions: caution

(339)

by what is value measured? *not* by consciousness

(340)

dietary orders contain revelations about "cultures"

(341)

the royal munificence of man

(342)

religious need masked as *music*

(343)

Love, unselfishness, advantage —

(344)

Prostitution, marriage

(345)

"Dung": what one *cannot get done with* —

(346)

"Transience": value —

(347)

Voltaire's *last* words: Christian and classical

(348)

Value of all *devaluing*

(349)

Hidden meaning of philosophical nihilism

(350)

Value of "transience"

(351)

Causes of nihilism! Concluding résumé!

(352)

Nihilism as an *intermediate* state

(353)

against remorse (book of prescriptions)

(354)

"nil" admirari (book of prescriptions)

(355)

Kinds of *unbelief*: symptom of incipient

nihilism

(356)

it is *not* happiness that man strives for! but *power*!

(357)

the challenging of misfortune (book of prescriptions)

(358)

on the theory of knowledge: *inner* phenomenality

(359)

Truthfulness — what is it?

(360)

Joy in rediscovering immorality everywhere

(361)

the real man worth more than the *desirable* one!

(362)

Preface: The Advent of Nihilism

(363)

Subject, object

(364)

"Hunger" in protoplasm

(365)

the absurdity in the concept of *God*: we deny "God" in

God

(366)

the *practical* nihilist

(367)

We — disappointed in the "ideal"

(368)

Mockery: "be *simple*!"

(369)

Selection of equals, the "exodus", isolation (book of recipes)

(370)

against "justice" (book of recipes)

(371)

People: kinship-instinct

(372)

the *three ideals*

pagan; anaemic; anti-natural

2.

12.

4.

Recipes for life for us.

1.

1.

Nihilism, thought through to its very end.

2.

1.

Culture, Civilization, the ambiguity of the "modern."

3.

2.

The Origin of the Ideal.

4.

2.

Critique of the Christian Ideal.

5.

2.

How Virtue Comes to Victory.

6.

2.

The Herd Instinct.

10.

4.

The "Eternal Recurrence"

11.

4.

Great Politics.

7.

3.

The "Will to Truth."

8.

3.

Morality as the Circe of Philosophers

9.

3.

Psychology of the "Will to Power" (pleasure, will, concept etc.

Notebook 13: Beginning of 1888 — Spring 1888

1.

Becoming and Being.

The standpoint of value. What are values?

To what extent pleasure and displeasure are not ultimate measures of value.

How one brings virtue to dominion.

Characterization

of Christianity

of Greek philosophy

Egoism as a misunderstanding.

The European of the future.

Metamorphoses of nihilism:

the libertinage of the spirit, the vagabondage

the descendants of Rousseau:

the herd instinct

2.

The lack of *meaning*; value of the neighbour, the petty sense;

Order of rank.

The Great Noon (— the two ways.) On the *prerogative of the very few*.

Psychology (doctrine of the affects) as morphology of the will to power. (*Not* "happiness" as motive)

The metaphysical values reduced.

Physiology of the will to power.

On the history of nihilism (— eudaemonism as a *form* of the feeling of the *meaninglessness of the whole*).

What do moralists and moral systems signify?

Doctrine of structures of domination. Egoism. Altruism. "Herd".

The will to power in history

(dominion over the forces of nature, economic life

Cosmological perspective.

Dependence of art-values. What is *classical*? *"beautiful"*? *romantic*? etc.

The eternal recurrence.

3.

I.

On the history of European nihilism.

(Misunderstanding of pessimism.

what is *lacking*?

Essentially: meaning is lacking)

Decline of all the remaining highest values

The idealizing power has thrown itself upon the reverse

I.

The will to truth.

Point of departure: decline of the value "truth".

—

The ruling types hitherto. Decline of the ruling type.

IV

On the doctrine of the eternal recurrence. As hammer.

—

On the history of the order of rank

1

Physiology: the organic functions

2

Psychology of the affects

II.

What moralists and moral systems signify.

IV

We who are of the future. On the prerogative of the very few and on the prerogative of the most

II

Origin of the highest concepts of value ("metaphysics")

"Herd"; "good man" etc. *Structures of domination*.

II

The *aesthetic* values, origin, critique.

IV

Order of rank of values.

4.

A. On the advent of nihilism.

1. "Truth". On the value of truth. The faith in truth. — Decline of this highest value. Summation of everything that has been done against it.

2. Decline of every kind of faith.

3. Decline of all ruling types

B. On the necessity of nihilism.

4. Origin of the highest values hitherto.

5. What moralists and moral systems signify.

6. Toward a critique of the aesthetic values.

C. On the self-overcoming of nihilism.

7. The will to power: psychological consideration.

8. The will to power: physiological consideration.

9. The will to power: historical-sociological consideration

D. The overcomers and the overcome.

10. On the prerogative of the very few.

11. The hammer: doctrine of the eternal recurrence.

12. On the order of rank of values.

Each book 150 pages.

Each chapter 50

5.

You are far away:

neither love nor hate.

As upon an old fortress,

Bethink yourself!

Notebook 14: Spring 1888

Nice, 25 March 1888.

1.

Art. Preface

With me, talking about art does not go together with sour-faced gestures: I want to talk about it the way I talk to myself, on wild and solitary walks, where now and then I snatch down into my life a wanton happiness and ideal. To spend one's life among tender and absurd things; a stranger to reality; half artist, half bird and metaphysician; without Yes or No for reality, unless it be that now and again one acknowledges it with the tips of one's toes, after the manner of a good dancer; always tickled by some sunbeam or other of happiness; frolicsome and emboldened even by affliction — for affliction *preserves* the happy man —; hanging a little tail of farce even on the holiest of things — this, as goes without saying, is the ideal of a heavy spirit, a spirit weighing a hundredweight, a *spirit of gravity*…

2.

Homoeopathica

The effect of *infinitesimal doses* is specific in those with nervous disorders: *ego*.

"one is the more unhappy, the more intelligent one is"

Schopenhauer

3.

The *imperceptible* phases: that of excitation, soon that of exhaustion

Hypnotic slumber can be brought about by every sort of sensory excitation (of sight, hearing, smell), only they must be sufficiently strong and long: the first effect is always that of a general heightening of mobility. But finally *exhaustion* de l'influx cérébral. Excitation brings into play a force that *exhausts itself*…

4.

Psychologica

Desire, pleasant when one believes oneself strong enough to attain its objects

as an idea of that which will increase our feeling of power: the first beginning of pleasure

otherwise *unpleasant*; and soon prejudicing one against *oneself*. *Desire becomes a state of distress*: *as with Schopenhauer*.

5.

Religion. décadence

The Dangerousness of Christianity

Although Christianity has pushed the doctrine of selflessness and love into the foreground, its actual historical effect remains the *heightening of egoism*, of individual egoism, to its uttermost extreme — the extreme is the belief in individual immortality. The individual had become so important that one could no longer *sacrifice* him: before God "souls" were equal. But that means calling the life of the species into question in the most dangerous way: it favoured a practice which is the opposite of the interest of the species. The altruism of

Christianity is a conception *dangerous to life*: it makes everyone equal to everyone else…

With this, however, the natural course of development… and all natural *values* are overturned. If the sick man is to have as much value as the healthy one (or even more, according to Pascal)

This universal *love of mankind*, in praxi the preferential treatment of all who suffer, of the ill-constituted, of the sick

has in fact weakened the strength to *sacrifice men*: it has sought to reduce responsibility to sacrificing oneself: — but precisely this absurd *personal* altruism has, from the standpoint of breeding, *no value whatsoever*. If one wanted to wait and see how many sacrifice themselves for the preservation of the species, one would be *made a fool of*…

all great movements, wars and so on bring men to sacrifice themselves: it is the *strong* who in this way continually *diminish* their numbers…

the *weak*, on the other hand, have a terrifying instinct to *spare* themselves, to preserve themselves, to hold *one another* up…

this "reciprocity of preservation" is *supposed* to be well-nigh virtue and in any case love of mankind!… *typical:* they want to be *protected* by the state; they think that "is its highest duty!"

beneath the universal praise of "altruism" there hides the instinct that if all care for one another, the individual is best kept safe… it is the *egoism of the weak* that has created the praise, the exclusive praise, of altruism…

The dangerous anti-naturalness of Christianity:

— it thwarts *selection* —

1)

it invents an *imaginary* value of the person, so extravagant and important that roughly everyone is of equal worth

2)

it sets up the *protective self-preservation drive of the weak among themselves* as the highest measure of value; it is hostile to nothing so much as to whatever deals with the weak and ill-constituted as *nature* does: injuring, exploiting, destroying…

3)

it will not admit that the highest type of man is the well-constituted and happy one… it is the slander, the poisoning, the crumbling away of all natural valuation

6.

Will to Power as Morality

To grasp how all forms of corruption belong together; and in doing so not to forget Christian corruption

Pascal as type

nor socialist-communist corruption either (a consequence of the Christian)

the *highest* conception of society among the socialists is the *lowest* in the order of rank of societies

the *"Beyond"*-corruption: as if, apart from the real world, the world of becoming, there were a world of being

Here there must be no *treaty*: here one must root out, annihilate, wage war — one must still *drag* the Christian-nihilistic measure of value *out* everywhere and combat it under every mask… Out of present-day *so-*

ciology, for example, out of present-day music, e.g., out of present-day pessimism (— all forms of the Christian ideal of value —)

Either the One *or* the Other is *true*: true, i.e. here, raising up the type man…

The priest, the pastor of souls, as reprehensible forms of existence

all education hitherto helpless, without footing, without centre of gravity, afflicted with the contradiction of values —

7.

On *Modernity*.

Cowardice before consequences — the modern vice.

Romanticism: hostility

towards

the *Renaissance* (Chateaubriand, R. Wagner)

towards

the ancient ideal of value

towards

dominating spirituality

towards

classical taste, the simple, the severe, the grand style

towards

the "happy"

towards

the "warlike"

8.

Value…

The highest quantum of power that man is able to incorporate into himself

man: *not* mankind…

mankind is far rather still a means than an end. What matters is the type: mankind is merely the experimental material, the monstrous surplus of the failures, a field of ruins…

9.

Nihilism

Nothing would be more useful and more to be encouraged than a consistent *nihilism of the deed*

: as I understand all the phenomena of Christianity, of pessimism, they express "we are ripe not to be; for us it is reasonable not to be"

this language of "reason" would in this case also be the language of *selective nature*

What, on the other hand, is to be condemned beyond all conception is the ambiguous and cowardly half-heartedness of a religion such as that of *Christianity*: more precisely, of the *Church*: which, instead of encouraging death and self-annihilation, protects everything that has turned out badly and sick, and makes it propagate itself —

Problem: by what sort of means would a rigorous form of the great contagious nihilism be achieved: one which, with scientific conscientiousness, teaches and practises voluntary death… (and *not* the feeble vegetating-on with an eye to a false post-existence —)

One cannot condemn Christianity enough, because it devalued the *value* of such a *purifying* great nihilistic movement, as was perhaps under way, through the idea of the immortal private person: likewise through the hope of resurrection: in short, always by holding people back from the *deed of nihilism*, suicide… It substituted slow suicide; by degrees a small, poor but durable life; by degrees a quite ordinary, bourgeois, mediocre life, etc.

10.

Religion as décadence

Critique of Christianity

Great *crises of selection and purification* are needed: in any case introduced by *nihilistic* religions and philosophies.

One comprehends that Christianity *is something immortally botched and failed*: from a means of breeding it became its adversary, drag-shoe and poisonous growth

11.

the *Yes-saying* affects

Pride

joy

health

the love of the sexes

enmity and war

reverence

beautiful gestures, manners, objects

the strong will

the discipline of high spirituality

the will to power

gratitude towards earth and life

: everything that is rich and wants to give away and bestows gifts upon life and gilds it and eternalizes it and deifies it — the whole might of *transfiguring* virtues… everything that approves, says Yes, does Yes —

12.

Priests and other ink-wipers, inkfish —

13.

Physiology of the nihilistic religions

a typical course of illness

NB the *nihilistic* religions one and all: *systematized case histories of illness* under a religious-moral nomenclature.

— in the pagan cult it is the great *cycle of the year* around whose interpretation the cult revolves

— in the Christian cult a cycle of *paralytic phenomena* around which the cult revolves…

"faith", a form of mental illness

repentance

redemption

prayer

all of it *neurasthenic*

sin, an idée fixe

hatred against nature, against reason

Christianness as illness

Christianity as a symptom of physiological décadence

14.

Countermovement *art*

Birth of Tragedy

III

These two natural powers of art: are set against each other by Nietzsche as the Dionysian and the Apollinian: he maintains that — — — With the word "Dionysian" is expressed: an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond person, everyday life, society, reality, as an abyss of forgetting, the passionate-painful overswelling into darker, fuller, more floating states; an enraptured saying Yes to the total character of life, as that which in all change is the same, equally mighty, equally blissful; the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sharing of suffering, which approves and hallows even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life, out of an eternal will to procreation, to fruitfulness, to eternity: as a feeling of unity with respect to the necessity of creating and annihilating… With the word Apollinian is expressed: the urge to perfect being-for-oneself, to the typical "individual", to everything that simplifies, distinguishes, makes strong, clear, unambiguous, typical: freedom under the law.

To their antagonism the further development of art is just as necessarily bound as the further development of mankind is to the antagonism

of the sexes. The fullness of power and moderation, the highest form of self-affirmation in a cool, noble, aloof beauty: the Apollinianism of the Hellenic will

the origin of tragedy and comedy as a *seeing-as-present* of a divine type in a state of collective rapture, as a living-through-together of the local legend, of the visitation, the miracle, the act of founding, of the "drama" (—

This opposition of the Dionysian and the Apollinian within the Greek soul is one of the great riddles by which Nietzsche felt himself drawn in the face of the Greek nature. Nietzsche at bottom strove for nothing but to divine why precisely Greek Apollinianism had to grow up out of a Dionysian subsoil: why the Dionysian Greek had need to become Apollinian, that is: to break his will to the monstrous, the manifold, the uncertain, the horrifying upon a will to measure, to simplicity, to subordination under rule and concept. The measureless, the wild, the Asiatic lies at his foundation: the bravery of the Greek consists in the struggle with his Asiaticism: beauty is not given him as a gift, any more than logic, than the naturalness of custom — it is conquered, willed, won by fighting — it is his victory…

15.

This book is antipessimistic: it teaches a counterforce against all saying No and doing No, a remedy for the great weariness

16.

Type of God after the type of the creative spirit, of the "great man"

17.

Birth of Tragedy.

2.

Beginning of the section two pages later: II.

Art counts here as the sole superior counterforce against all will to the negation of life: as the anti-Christian, anti-Buddhist, anti-nihilistic par excellence…

It is the *redemption of the knower* — of him who sees, who wants to see, the terrible and questionable character of life, of the *tragic* knower.

It is the *redemption of the man of action* — of him who not only sees the terrible and questionable character of life but lives it, *wants* to live it, of the tragic man, of the hero…

It is the redemption of the *sufferer* — as a way to states where suffering is willed, transfigured, deified, where suffering is a form of the great rapture…

18.

III

There are two states in which art itself appears in man as a kind of natural power: on the one hand as vision, on the other as the Dionysian orgiasm. These are physiologically prefigured in dream and in intoxication: the former understood as the practice of that power of vision, as a delight in seeing forms, in shaping forms.

The will to semblance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and changing is deeper, more "metaphysical" than the will to truth, to reality, to being: pleasure is more primordial than pain; the latter is itself only the consequence of a will to pleasure (— to creating, shaping, ruining, destroying) and, in its highest form, a *kind* of pleasure…

19.

6.

This work is antimodern: it believes in modern art, otherwise in nothing, and at bottom not even in modern art, but in modern music, and at bottom not in modern music as a whole, but only in Wagner… And at bottom perhaps not even in Wagner, unless faute de mieux.

p. 116. "What else would we know how to name, it says with a pained gesture — — —

Schopenhauer, Dürer.

It believes that a music *will come*… in a *Dionysian* music…

20.

7.

This work comports itself as German, even loyal to the Reich — it still believes even in the German spirit!… Its nuance is that it is German-anti-Christian: "the most painful thing for us, it says on p. 142, is the long degradation under which the German spirit, estranged from house and homeland, lived in the service of treacherous dwarfs." These treacherous dwarfs are the *priests*. — In another passage the question is raised whether the German spirit is still strong enough to return to itself; whether it can still make earnest of the expulsion of foreign elements; or whether it will go on consuming itself like a sickly, stunted plant in morbid toil. In this book the transplanting of a profoundly anti-German myth, the Christian one, into the German heart counts as the true *German fatality*.

21.

4.

This book is thus even antipessimistic: namely in the sense that it teaches something that is stronger than pessimism, that is more divine than "truth": art.

No one, it seems, would plead so strongly for a radical negation of life, for a real doing No to life even more than saying No, as the author of this book: only he knows — he has experienced it, he has perhaps experienced nothing else — that art *is worth more* than "truth".

Already in the preface, in which Richard Wagner is invited as if to a dialogue, the confession of faith appears, the artists' gospel: "*art* as the real task of life, art as *metaphysical activity*"…

22.

5.

What, under such a presupposition, must become of science? How does it stand? In a significant sense almost as an adversary of truth: for it is optimistic, for it believes in logic. It is reckoned up physiologically that it is the times of decline of a strong race in which the type of the scientific man ripens within it. The critique of Socrates makes up the main part of the book: Socrates as the adversary of tragedy, as the dissolver of those daemonic-prophylactic instincts of art; Socratism as the great misunderstanding of life and art: the morality, dialectic, frugality of theoretical man a form of fatigue; the famous Greek cheerfulness only an *evening glow*… The strong races, so long as they are still rich and over-rich in strength, have the courage to see things as they are: *tragically*… For them art is more than an entertainment and amusement; it is a *cure*…

The book teaches, "in defiance of all modern ideas and prejudices of democratic taste", that the Greeks — p. X of the preface.

23.

II

What is essential in this conception is the concept of art in relation to life: it is understood, psychologically as much as physiologically, as the great *stimulant*, as that which eternally *urges* toward life, toward eternal life…

24.

3.

One sees that in this book pessimism, let us say more plainly, nihilism, counts as the "truth": but truth does not count as the supreme measure of value, still less as the supreme power.

The will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and changing counts here as deeper, more primordial, more "metaphysical" than the will to truth, to reality, to being: — the latter is itself merely a form of the will to illusion. Likewise pleasure counts as more primordial than pain: pain is only conditioned, as a consequence of the will to pleasure (of the will to become, to grow, to give form, consequently to overpower, to resist, to war, to destroy). A supreme state of the affirmation of existence is conceived, in which even pain, every kind of pain, is eternally included as a means of enhancement: the *tragic-Dionysian* state.

25.

On "The Birth of Tragedy".

VIII.

The new conception of the Greeks is what distinguishes this book; we have already indicated its two other merits — the new conception of art as the great stimulant of life, toward life; likewise the conception of *pessimism*, a pessimism of strength, a *classical* pessimism: the word classical used here not as a historical but as a psychological demarcation. The opposite of classical pessimism is the *romantic*: that in which weakness, weariness, the décadence of race formulates itself in concepts and valuations: the pessimism of Schopenhauer, for example, likewise that of de Vigny, Dostoevsky, Leopardi, Pascal, that of all the great nihilistic religions (of Brahmanism, Buddhism, Christianity — they may be called nihilistic because they have all glorified the concept opposite to life, nothingness, as goal, as highest good, as "God")

What distinguishes Nietzsche: the spontaneity of his psychological *vision*, a dizzying breadth of survey, of things lived through, divined, inferred, the will to consistency, the fearlessness before hardness and dangerous consequence.

26.

Birth of Tragedy

But let us come to the main thing, to what distinguishes the book and sets it apart, to its originality: it contains three new conceptions. The first we have already named: *art* as the great stimulant of life, toward life. The second: it brings a new type of pessimism, the *classical*. Third: it poses anew a problem of psychology, the *Greek* one.

27.

Philosophy as décadence

On the Psychology of the *Psychologist*

Psychologists such as have become possible only from the 19th century onward: no longer those street-corner loafers who look three, four paces ahead of them and are almost content to dig down into themselves. We psychologists of the future — we have little good will toward self-observation: we take it almost as a sign of degeneration when an instrument seeks "to know itself": we are instruments of knowledge and would like to have all the naïveté and precision of an instrument; — consequently we may not analyse ourselves, may not "know" ourselves. First mark of an instinct of self-preservation in the great psychologist: he never seeks himself, he has no eye, no interest, no curiosity for himself… The great egoism of our dominating will wants it so of us, that we nicely shut our eyes before ourselves, — that we must appear as "impersonal", "désintéressé", "objective"… oh how very much we are the opposite of that! Only because we are psychologists to an eccentric degree

28.

The Psychologist.

1) We are no Pascals, we are not especially interested in the "salvation of the soul", in our own happiness, in our own virtue… —

2) We have neither time nor curiosity enough to revolve thus around ourselves. Seen more deeply, the matter stands otherwise still: we mistrust all navel-gazers for the reason that self-observation counts for us as a *form of degeneration* of psychological genius, as a question mark against the instinct of the psychologist: as surely as a painter's eye is degenerate behind which stands the *will* to see for the sake of seeing

29.

Origin of Moral Values.

Egoism is worth as much as he who has it is worth physiologically.

Each individual is still the whole line of development (and not merely, as morality conceives him, something that begins with birth): if he represents the ascent of the line man, then his value is in fact extraordinary; and the care for the preservation and furtherance of his growth may be extreme. (It is the care for the future promised in him that gives the well-constituted individual so extraordinary a right to egoism.) If he represents the descending line, decay, chronic sickness: then little value belongs to him: and the first fairness is that he take away as little room, strength and sunshine as possible from the well-constituted. In this case society has as its task the *holding down of egoism* (— which at times expresses itself absurdly, morbidly, seditiously —): whether it be a matter of individuals or of whole degenerating, stunted strata of a people. A doctrine and religion of "love", of the *holding down* of self-affirmation, of enduring, bearing, helping, of reciprocity in deed and word, can be of the highest value within such strata, even seen with the eyes of the rulers: for it holds down the feelings of rivalry, of ressentiment, of envy, the all-too-natural feelings of the ill-constituted, — it deifies for them, under the ideal of humility and obedience, being a slave, being ruled, being poor, being sick, standing below. From this it follows why the ruling classes or races and individuals have at all times upheld the cult of selflessness, the gospel of the lowly, "the God on the cross".

The preponderance of an altruistic mode of valuation is the consequence of an instinct for being a failure. The value judgment at the very bottom says here: "I am not worth much": a merely physiological value judgment, more plainly still: the feeling of powerlessness, the lack of the great affirmative feelings of power (in muscles, nerves,

motor centres). This value judgment translates itself, according to the culture of these strata, into a moral or religious judgment (— the predominance of religious and moral judgments is always a sign of low culture —): it seeks to ground itself, out of spheres from which the concept "value" is known to them at all. The interpretation by which the Christian sinner believes he understands himself is an attempt to find the lack of power and self-assurance *justified*: he would rather find himself guilty than feel bad for nothing: in itself it is a symptom of decay to need interpretations of this kind at all. In other cases the ill-constituted seeks the reason for it not in his "guilt" (like the Christian) but in society: the socialist, the anarchist, the nihilist, inasmuch as they feel their existence as something for which someone is supposed to be *to blame*, is thereby still the nearest kin of the Christian, who likewise believes he can better endure feeling bad and being a failure once he has found someone whom he can hold *responsible* for it. The instinct of *revenge* and of *ressentiment* is in both cases, appears here as a means of holding out, as an instinct of self-preservation: just like the preference for *altruistic* theory and practice. *Hatred of egoism*, whether against one's own, as with the Christian, or against another's, as with the socialist, thus turns out to be a value judgment under the predominance of revenge; on the other hand, a prudence of self-preservation on the part of sufferers through the heightening of their feelings of mutuality and solidarity… Finally, as already indicated, even that discharge of ressentiment in judging, condemning, punishing egoism (one's own or another's) is still an instinct of self-preservation among the ill-constituted. In sum: the cult of altruism is a specific form of egoism which regularly appears under certain physiological preconditions.

30.

When the socialist, with a fine indignation, demands "justice", "right", "equal rights", he is merely under the pressure of his inadequate culture, which does not know how to comprehend why he suffers: on the other hand he gives himself a pleasure by it; were he better off, he would take care not to scream like that: he would then find his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds for the Christian: "the world" is condemned, slandered, cursed by him — he does not except himself. But that is no reason to take his screaming seriously. In both cases we are still among sick people for whom it *does good* to scream, for whom slander is a relief.

31.

Value…

The concept "reprehensible action" gives us difficulty: there can be nothing reprehensible in itself. Nothing of all that happens at all can be reprehensible in itself: *for one could not wish it away:* for everything is so bound up with everything that to wish to exclude anything means to exclude everything. A reprehensible action: means a rejected world altogether…

And even then: in a rejected world rejecting too would be reprehensible… And the consequence of a way of thinking that rejects everything would be a practice that affirms everything… If becoming is a great ring, then everything is of equal value, eternal, necessary…

In all correlations of Yes and No, of preferring and refusing, loving and hating, there is expressed only a perspective, an interest of particular types of life: in itself everything that is speaks the Yes.

32.

Value…

a nihilistic valuation says: "*I* deserve not to be". If it goes further and says: "*you* deserve not to be".

33.

As regards the tragic pathos, Nietzsche does not take up again the old misunderstanding of Aristotle —

as transfiguration of lust and cruelty into the Greek: elements which in the orgiastic festivals — — —

the Dionysian as an overflowing and unity of manifold, in part terrible excitements

34.

Drama

drama is not, as the half-learned believe, the action, but, in keeping with the Doric origin of the word "drama", is to be understood in a Doric-hieratic sense as well: it is the happening, the "event", the sacred story, the founding legend, the "meditation", the *making-present* of the task of the hieratic.

35.

Art as countermovement.

The orgiastic element in the art of the Greeks had hitherto been underestimated; but that orgiasm signifies one of the deepest movements and crises for the Greek soul itself — — —

One perhaps recalls the frivolous and cold manner in which Lobeck kept the whole domain of rites, myths and mysteries at arm's length p. 564. 565.

One might say that the concept "classical" —, as Winckelmann and Goethe had formed it, not only did not explain that Dionysian element but excluded it from itself: and — — —

there was a time when among philologists one regarded Lobeck with particular gratitude — — —

36.

Apollinian, Dionysian

III

There are two states in which art itself appears in man like a force of nature, disposing of him whether he will or not: on the one hand as compulsion to vision, on the other as compulsion to orgiasm. Both states are present in normal life too, only more weakly, in dream and in intoxication, as in — — —

But the same opposition exists still between dream and intoxication: both unleash artistic powers in us, but each differently: dream those of seeing, connecting, poetizing; intoxication those of gesture, of passion, of song, of dance.

37.

On *modernity*.

What does us honour.

If anything does us honour, it is this: we have placed *seriousness* elsewhere: we take seriously the *lowly* things despised and set aside by all

ages — we, on the other hand, give the "beautiful feelings" away cheap…

Is there a more dangerous aberration than contempt for the body? As if with it all spirituality were not condemned to become sickly, to the vapeurs of "idealism"!

Nothing that has been thought up by Christians and idealists has hand or foot: we are more radical. We have discovered the "smallest world" as what is everywhere decisive: we have in a dangerous way into the — — —

Street paving, good air in the room, the den not poisoned, foods understood according to their value, we have got serious about all the *necessities* of existence and *despise* all "beautiful-souledness" as a kind of "levity and frivolity".

What was hitherto most despised has moved into the front rank.

I add immorality: morality is only a form of immorality which, with regard to the advantage that a particular kind derives from it, — — —

38.

Type "Jesus"…

Jesus is the *counterpart of a genius*: he is an *idiot*. Feel his inability to understand a reality: he moves in a circle around five, six concepts which he heard earlier and gradually understood, i.e. misunderstood — in them he has his experience, his world, his truth, — the rest is foreign to him. He speaks words such as everyone uses — he does not understand them as everyone does, he understands only his five, six floating concepts. That the genuinely manly instincts — not only the sexual ones, but also those of struggle, of pride, of heroism — never awoke in him, that he remained backward and stayed childlike at the age of puberty: this belongs to the type of certain epileptoid neuroses.

Jesus is unheroic in his deepest instincts: he never fights: whoever sees something like a hero in him, as Renan does, has vulgarized the type beyond recognition.

one should feel, on the other hand, his incapacity to understand anything spiritual: the word spirit becomes a misunderstanding in his mouth! Not the remotest breath of science, taste, intellectual discipline, logic has ever wafted over this holy idiot: as little as life has touched him. — Nature? Laws of nature? — No one has betrayed to him that there is such a thing as nature. He knows only moral effects: signs of the lowest and most absurd culture. One must hold fast to this: he is an *idiot* in the midst of a very clever people… Only that his disciples were not — Paul was by no means an idiot! — on that hangs the history of Christianity.

39.

Critique of Christianity.

Morality as the Circe of philosophers

The struggle for the "I".

40.

The unconscious effect of décadence on the ideals of science

There is a profound and wholly unconscious effect of décadence even on the ideals of science: our entire sociology is the proof of this proposition. The reproach that remains against it is that it knows from experience only the *formation of decay* in society and unavoidably takes its own instincts of decay as the norm of sociological judgment.

The *declining* life in present-day Europe formulates its social ideals in them: they all look confusingly like the ideal of *old, outlived* races…

The *herd instinct*, moreover — a power that has now become sovereign — is something fundamentally different from the instinct of an *aristocratic society*: and it depends on the value of the *units* what the sum is to signify…

Our entire sociology knows no other instinct at all than that of the herd, i.e. of *summed-up zeros*… where every zero has "equal rights", where it is virtuous to be a zero…

The valuation by which the various forms of society are judged today is entirely one with that which assigns a higher value to *peace* than to war: but this judgment is antibiological, is itself a spawn of the décadence of life… Mr. Herbert Spencer is a décadent as a biologist, — mostly as a moralist too (— he sees in the *victory* of altruism something desirable!!!). Life is a consequence of war, society itself a means to war.

41.

Renan, who has this in common with women, that he becomes dangerous to life only when he loves; he who has never embraced an old idol of an ideal without little murderous ulterior intentions, always curious whether what he embraces is not already tottering…

42.

— German =

(4) Religion in music.

How much unacknowledged and even uncomprehended satisfaction of all religious needs there still is in Wagner's music! How much prayer, virtue, unction, "virginity", "redemption" still speaks along with it!… That music may disregard the word, the concept — oh how she draws her advantage from it, this cunning saint, who leads back,

seduces back, to everything that was once believed!… Our intellectual conscience need not be ashamed, — it stays outside — when some old instinct drinks with trembling lips from *forbidden* cups… That is clever, healthy, and, insofar as it betrays shame before the satisfaction of the religious instinct, even a good sign… Insidious Christianity: type of the music of the "late Wagner".

43.

Through alcohol and music one carries oneself back to stages of culture and unculture which our forefathers overcame: in this respect nothing is more instructive, nothing more "scientific" than to intoxicate oneself… Certain dishes, too, contain revelations about something from which we come. How much mystery lies, for instance, in the correlation between German dumplings and the German "childlike soul"!… When one has the former in one's belly, the latter stirs at once: one begins to *divine*!… Oh how far one soon is from the "understanding of the understanding"! —

44.

Against this corruption of music I defend myself with every means, and like a handsome devil — — —

45.

What has the German spirit made of Christianity! — And to stop at Protestantism, how much beer there is again in Protestant Christianity! Is a spiritually more muddled, lazier, more limb-stretching form of Christian faith even conceivable! than that of an average German Protestant?… That is what I call a modest Christianity! a homeopathy of Christianity is what I call it! — I am reminded that today there is also an *immodest* Protestantism, that of the court preachers and anti-Semit-

ic speculators: but no one has yet claimed that any "spirit" "moves" upon these waters… That is merely a more indecent form of Christianity, by no means yet a more sensible one…

46.

In Dionysian intoxication there is sexuality and voluptuousness: it is not lacking in the Apollinian. There must also be a difference of tempo in the two states… *The extreme calm of certain sensations of intoxication* (more strictly: the slowing of the feeling of time and space) likes to be mirrored in the vision of the calmest gestures and kinds of soul. The classical style essentially represents this calm, simplification, abbreviation, concentration — the *highest feeling of power* is concentrated in the classical type. Slow to react: a great consciousness: no feeling of struggle:

The intoxication of nature:

47.

Countermovement of *art*.

Pessimism in art? —

the artist gradually comes to love for their own sake the means in which the state of intoxication reveals itself: the extreme subtlety and splendour of colour, the distinctness of line, the nuance of *tone*: the *distinct*, where otherwise, in the normal, all distinction is lacking

— : all distinct things, all nuances, insofar as they recall the extreme intensifications of strength which intoxication produces, awaken in reverse this feeling of intoxication.

— : the effect of works of art is the *arousal of the art-creating state*, of intoxication…

— : what is essential in art remains its *perfecting* of existence, its bringing forth of perfection and fullness

Art is essentially *affirmation, blessing, deification of existence*…

— : What does a *pessimistic art* mean?… Is that not a contradictio? — Yes.

Schopenhauer *errs* when he places certain works of art in the service of pessimism. Tragedy does *not* teach "resignation"…

— To represent terrible and questionable things is itself already an instinct of power and magnificence in the artist: he does not fear them…

There is no pessimistic art… Art affirms. Job affirms.

But Zola? But de Goncourt?

— the things they show are ugly: but *that* they show them comes from *pleasure in this ugliness*…

— it's no use! you deceive yourselves if you claim otherwise

How redeeming Dostoevsky is!

48.

Inscriptions over a modern madhouse.

Necessities of thought are moral necessities.

Herbert Spencer.

The ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivability of its negation.

Herbert Spencer.

49.

Modernity.

The *uglification of music*.

the dominion of the abstract: "that signifies": indifferent to the "swamp", to which the senses are not supposed to say Yes at all…

Music must at all costs signify something that is *not* music:

in the process, out of it come

the rhythm

the melody

the colour

the structure

false profundity as stillness of thoughts; rage, remorse, convulsion, ecstasy — all easy things, playthings, which one can still blend to perfection

50.

5.

The means by which the actor comes out on top

6.

The danger of the theatre as the place of corruption of *all* the arts.

7.

The superfluity of all Wagner's innovations, even in opera

8.

Carmen: and the depressing effect of Wagner: *physiological objection* to Wagner

9.

the great ambiguity of the *tragic tendency* in Wagner: my *realism* in aestheticis…

10.

Restoration of the concept "tragic"

11.

The significance of this psychological-aesthetic phenomenon for the history of the "modern soul".

12.

: essentially *un*-German, — therein lies his *distinction*…

13.

: Critique of "Romanticism".

51.

Wagner as a Problem.

A Word of Enlightenment.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

52.

— — — whose cleverness made peace at the right time with the German character, composed the Kaisermarsch, aspired to posts as general music director

who condescended to every filth with which the German spirit, this so corrupt German spirit, has sullied itself

who with his Parsifal spoke encouragement to all the cowardices of the modern soul.

This personage, grown very ambiguous, on whose grave a Wagner Society — the Munich one — nonetheless laid a wreath with the inscription:

Redemption for the Redeemer!…

One sees, the problem is great, the misunderstanding monstrous.

If Wagner could become a redeemer,

Who will redeem us from this redemption?

who will redeem us from this redeemer?…

53.

There are instruments with which one persuades the bowels, others have their success in the spinal cord… It has been confided to me that the effect of Wagnerian music is strongest after a cure in Carlsbad…

54.

But Wagner is not a model only here… And he has been understood all over the world… Since Wagner one makes a *new* music, one makes it in Russia, in Paris, in South America, one makes it even in Ger-

many… I myself could give instruction in how one makes this new music. Would you like a little lesson?…

55.

Among Musicians.

We are late musicians. A monstrous past is inherited in us. Our memory quotes constantly. Among ourselves we may allude in an almost scholarly fashion: we understand one another already. Our listeners too love it when we allude: it flatters them, it makes them feel learned.

56.

First principle of all theatrical optics: what is to have the effect of truth must not be true.

The actor does not have the feeling he portrays; he would be lost if he had it

One knows, I hope, the famous remarks of Talma

57.

Conviction

On the psychology of *Paul*.

The fact is the death of Jesus. This remains to be *interpreted*…

That there is a truth and an error in interpretation has never even entered the minds of such people: one day a sublime possibility rises to their heads, "this death *could* mean such and such"

and at once it *is* that! A hypothesis proves itself through the sublime *élan* it gives its originator…

"The proof of power": i.e. a thought is proved by its *effect*, — ("by its fruits", as the Bible naïvely says)

what inspires enthusiasm must be *true* —

what one sheds one's blood for must be *true* —

Here everywhere the sudden feeling of power that a thought arouses in its originator is credited to that thought as its *value*: — and since one knows no other way of honouring a thought than by calling it true, the first predicate it receives in its honour is that it is *true*… How else could it have an effect? It is imagined as coming from a power: supposing that power were not real, it could have no effect… It is conceived as *inspired*: the effect it exerts has something of the overwhelming force of a demonic influence —

A thought which such a décadent is unable to resist, to which he utterly succumbs, is thereby "proved" *to be true*!!!

All these holy epileptics and seers of visions possessed not a thousandth part of that integrity of self-criticism with which a philologist today reads a text or tests a historical event for its truth…

compared with us, they are moral cretins…

58.

Carlyle..

The origin of *science*: let us pay attention. It does *not* arise among the priests and the philosophers, its natural opponents. It arises among the sons of craftsmen and businessmen of every kind, among advocates, etc.: those in whom the *competence of the craft and its presupposition* carried over to such questions too and to their answering.

59.

Conviction and lie.

"Improvement".

How one brings virtue to power.

Pity.

"Altruism".

Renunciation.

Desensualization

60.

A faith that claims to make one "blessed" after it has made one sick. A faith that appeals to books, — a faith that lays claim to a revelation for itself — a faith that regards doubt of itself as "sin", a faith that proves itself through martyrs' deaths — — —

Another hallmark of the theologian is his *incapacity for philology*. I understand the word philology here in a very general sense: being able to read off facts without falsifying them through interpretation, without — — —

61.

Will to power as art

"Music" — and the grand style

The greatness of an artist is not measured by the "beautiful feelings" he arouses: let the little women believe that. But by the degree to which he approaches the grand style, to which he is capable of the grand style. This style has in common with great passion that it disdains to please; that it forgets to persuade; that it commands; that it

wills… To become master over the chaos that one is; to compel one's chaos to become form; to become necessity in form: logical, simple, unambiguous, to become mathematics; to become *law* —: that is the great ambition here. With it one repels; nothing any longer stirs love for such men of violence — a wilderness settles about them, a silence, a fear as before some great sacrilege…

All the arts know such aspirants to the grand style: why are they lacking in music? Has never yet a musician built as did that architect who created the Palazzo Pitti?… Here lies a problem. Does music perhaps belong to that culture in which the reign of men of violence of every kind had already come to an end? Would the very concept of the grand style ultimately contradict the soul of music, — the "woman" in our music?…

I touch here upon a cardinal question: where does our whole music belong? The ages of classical taste know nothing comparable to it: it blossomed when the Renaissance world reached its evening, when "freedom" had departed from manners and even from desires: does it belong to its character to be Counter-Renaissance? And, put otherwise, to be an art of décadence? somewhat as the Baroque style is an art of décadence? Is it the sister of the Baroque style, since it is in any case its contemporary? Is music, modern music, not already décadence?…

Music is Counter-Renaissance in art: it is also décadence as an expression of society

I once before laid my finger on this question: whether our music is not a piece of Counter-Renaissance in art? whether it is not the next of kin to the Baroque style? whether it has not grown up in contradiction to all classical taste, so that in it every ambition toward classicism would forbid itself of its own accord?…

To this question of value of the first rank the answer could not be in doubt, had the fact been rightly appraised that music attains its highest ripeness and fullness as Romanticism — once again as a movement of reaction against classicism…

Mozart — a tender and amorous soul, but wholly eighteenth century, even in his seriousness… Beethoven the first great Romantic, in the sense of the *French* concept of Romanticism, as Wagner is the last great Romantic… both instinctive adversaries of classical taste, of the strict style, — not to speak here of the "grand" one… both — — —

62.

Modernity

German *Romantic* music, its *unspirituality*, its hatred *of "Enlightenment" and "reason"*

The atrophy of melody the same as the atrophy of the "idea", of dialectic, of the freedom of the most spiritual movement, — how much struggle against *Voltaire* there is in German music!…

how much clumsiness, stuffedness, which develops into new concepts and even into principles —

one always has the principles of one's talent

against the higher tragedy and mocking spirituality, against the buffo

I have seen beer-drinkers and army doctors who "understood" Wagner…

Wagner's ambition to compel even idiots to understand Wagner

63.

The hero as Wagner conceived him, how modern! how bold! how ingeniously complex he conceived him! How well Wagner understood how to meet, with his heroes, the three basic needs of the modern soul — it wants the brutal, the morbid and the innocent…

these magnificent monsters, with bodies from primeval times and nerves from the day after tomorrow; these blond saints, whose scarcely pre-existent sensuality inspires in women so much tender curiosity and *permits* so much obligingness… Beaumarchais made a present of Cherubino, Wagner of Parsifal, to beautiful women:

And as for the hysterical-heroic creatures whom Wagner conceived as woman, *deified* as woman, the type Senta, Elsa, Isolde, Brünnhilde, Kundry: they are interesting enough in the theatre — but who would *want* them?…

that this type has not entirely disgusted even in Germany has its reason (though by no means its right:) in the fact that an incomparably greater poet than Wagner, the noble Heinrich von Kleist, had already given it there the advocacy of genius

64.

Question: is it *depersonalization* through a truth when one immerses oneself in a thought?

… Herzen asserts this: he thinks it something quite ordinary that one should forget one's moi and let it go —

Question: whether here too there is not mere *appearance*; whether that which finds a question interesting is not our whole manifold *I*…

65.

décadence

What is inherited is not the illness but the *morbidity*: the lack of strength to resist the danger of harmful intrusions, etc.; the broken power of resistance — expressed *morally*: resignation and humility before the enemy.

I have asked myself whether one could not compare all these supreme values of philosophy, morality and religion hitherto with the values of the weakened, the *mentally ill* and the neurasthenic: they represent, in a milder form, *the same ills*…

the value of all morbid states is that they show, as through a magnifying glass, certain states which are normal but, being normal, are hard to see…

Health and *illness* are nothing essentially different, as the old physicians and some practitioners even today believe. One must not make them into distinct principles or entities that fight over the living organism and turn it into their battlefield. That is old stuff and chatter that is good for nothing any longer. In fact there are only differences of degree between these two kinds of existence: exaggeration, disproportion, non-harmony of the normal phenomena constitute the morbid state. Claude Bernard.

Just as *evil* can be regarded as exaggeration, disharmony, disproportion, so *the good* can be a *protective diet* against the danger of exaggeration, disharmony and disproportion

Hereditary weakness, as the *dominant* feeling: cause of the supreme values.

NB One *wills* weakness: why?… mostly because one is *necessarily* weak…

Weakening as a *task*: weakening of the desires, of the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of the will to power, to the feeling of pride, to having and wanting-to-have-more; weakening as humility; weakening as faith; *weakening* as aversion and shame toward everything natural, as negation of life, as illness and habitual weakness…

weakening as renunciation of revenge, of resistance, of enmity and anger.

the *blunder* in treatment: one does not want to combat weakness by a système *fortifiant*, but by a kind of justification and *moralization*: i.e., by an *interpretation*…

The *confusion* of two entirely different states: e.g., the *repose of strength*, which is essentially abstention from reaction, the type of the gods whom nothing moves…

and the repose of exhaustion, rigidity, to the point of anaesthesia.

: all philosophical-ascetic procedures strive for the second, but in fact mean the first… For they attribute to the state attained the predicates as if a divine state had been attained.

66.

Morality as décadence

Why weakness is not *combated* but only "justified"

The decline of the instinct for *healing power* in the weakened: so that they desire as a remedium what hastens their ruin. E.g., most vegetarians would need a fortifying diet to give energy back to the slackened fibre: but they take their penchant for the mild and gentle for a *hint* from nature: — and weaken themselves still further ὑπὲρ μόρον…

67.

Woman reacts more slowly than man, the Chinese more slowly than the European…

68.

Religion as décadence

The most dangerous misunderstanding.

There is one concept which apparently admits of no confusion, no ambiguity: that is the concept of exhaustion. It can be acquired; it can be inherited — in either case it changes the aspect of things, the *value of things*…

In contrast to him who, out of the fullness which he represents and feels, involuntarily *gives* to things, sees them fuller, mightier, richer in future — who at any rate *can* bestow, the exhausted one diminishes and botches everything he sees, — he *impoverishes* value: he is harmful…

About this no blunder seems possible: nevertheless history contains the dreadful fact that the exhausted have always been *confused* with the fullest — and the fullest with the most harmful.

He who is poor in life, the weak one, impoverishes life still further: he who is rich in life, the strong one, enriches it…

The first is its parasite; the second a giver of more…

How is a confusion possible?…

When the exhausted one appeared with the gesture of the highest activity and energy: when degeneration brought about an excess of mental or nervous discharge, then one *confused* him with the rich one… He aroused fear…

the cult of the *fool* is still the cult of the one rich in life, of the mighty

the fanatic, the possessed, the religious epileptic, all eccentrics have been felt to be the highest types of power

: as *divine*

this kind of strength, which arouses *fear*, was above all held to be divine: here authority took its point of departure, here one interpreted, heard, sought *wisdom*…

Out of this there developed, almost everywhere, a *will* to "deification", i.e., to the typical degeneration of mind, body and nerves: an attempt to find the way to this higher kind of being

to make oneself sick, to make oneself mad: to provoke the symptoms of derangement — that meant becoming stronger, more superhuman, more terrible, wiser:

— one believed one thereby became so rich in power that one could *give*: wherever there has been worship, one sought someone who can give.

that one took the fool for something superhuman

that one believed terrible powers to be at work in the nervously ill and in epileptics

What misled here was the experience of *intoxication*…

this *increases* the feeling of power to the highest degree

consequently, naively judged, *power* itself —

on the highest rung of power must stand the *most intoxicated*, the ecstatic

there are two points of departure for *intoxication*: the overgreat fullness of life and a state of morbid nourishment of the brain

Nothing has been paid for more dearly than confusion in matters physiological. —

69.

The physiological misunderstandings.

1.

illness misunderstood as a higher form of life

2.

intoxication

3.

impassibility.

70.

Pleasure appears where there is a feeling of power

Happiness in the consciousness of power and victory that has become dominant

Progress: the strengthening of the type, the capacity for great willing: everything else is misunderstanding, danger, — — —

71.

Will to power as "law of nature"

Will to power as life

Will to power as art.

Will to power as morality.

Will to power as politics

Will to power as science.

Will to power as religion

72.

Will to Power.

Morphology.

Will to power

as "nature"

as life

as society

as will to truth

as religion

as art

as morality

as mankind

The Countermovement

Will to nothingness

the *overcome*. The *refuse*, the *degenerate*

73.

Consequences of décadence.

Vice, viciousness

illness, sickliness

crime, criminality

celibacy, sterility

hysteria, weakness of will, alcoholism

pessimism

anarchism

74.

Degeneration:

First principle: what has hitherto been regarded as the *causes of degeneration* are its *consequences*.

:vice: as consequence;

:illness

:crime

sterility

the slanderers

underminers

doubters

destroyers

scepticism

asceticism

nihilism

otherworldliness

: libertinage (the spiritual kind too) — celibacy.

:weakness of will: pessimism; anarchism; — — —

But what is regarded as a *remedy* against degeneration is likewise merely a *palliative* against certain of its effects: the "*cured*" are only one *type of the degenerate*.

75.

The concept "décadence"

Refuse, decay, waste is nothing that ought to be condemned in itself: it is a necessary consequence of life, of the growth of life. The phenomenon of décadence is as necessary as any rising and advance of life: it is not in our power to *abolish* it. Reason, on the contrary, demands that *it be given its due*…

It is a disgrace to all socialist systematizers that they suppose there could be circumstances, social combinations, under which vice, illness, crime, prostitution, *want* would no longer grow… But that means condemning *life*… A society is not free to remain young. And even in its prime it must produce filth and waste matter. The more energetically and boldly it advances, the richer it will be in the miscarried, in the misshapen, the nearer it will be to decline… Old age is not abolished by institutions. Nor is illness. Nor is vice.

76.

Formerly one said of every morality: "by their fruits ye shall know them"; I say of every morality: it is a fruit by which I recognize the *soil* from which it grew.

77.

We Hyperboreans.

A Preface.

The Will to Power.

First Part.

Psychology of décadence.

Theory of décadence.

Second Part.

Critique of the Spirit of the Age.

Third Part.

The Great Noon.

Fourth Part.

The Strong.

The Weak.

Where Do We Belong?

The Great Choice.

78.

The Will to Power.

Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.

First Part.

What Stems from Strength.

Second Part.

What Stems from Weakness.

Third Part.

And from What Do *We* Stem? —

Fourth Part.

The Great *Choice.*

79.

Will to Power

Philosophy

Quanta of power. *Critique of Mechanism*

let us here set aside the two popular concepts "necessity" and "law": the first puts a false compulsion into the world, the second a false freedom. "Things" do not behave regularly, not according to a *rule*: there are no things (— that is our fiction); just as little do they behave under a compulsion of necessity. Here there is no obeying: for *that something is as it is*, so strong, so weak, is not the consequence of an obeying or of a rule or of a compulsion…

The degree of resistance and the degree of superior power — this is what is at issue in all happening: if *we*, for our domestic use in calculation, know how to express this in formulas of "laws," so much the better for us! But we have not thereby put any "morality" into the world by imagining it as obedient —

There is no law: every power draws its ultimate consequence at every moment. It is precisely on the fact that there is no mezzo termine that calculability rests.

A quantum of power is designated by the effect it exerts and the effect it resists. Adiaphoria is lacking: though it would be conceivable in itself. It is essentially a will to violate and to defend oneself against violation. Not self-preservation: every atom acts out into the whole of being, — it is thought away if one thinks away this radiation of power-will. That is why I call it a quantum of "*will to power*": this expresses the character that cannot *be* thought away from the mechanical order without thinking away that order itself.

A translation of this world of effect into a *visible* world — a world for the eye — is the concept "motion." Here it is always tacitly understood that *something* is moved, — here, whether in the fiction of a little lump-atom or even in its abstraction, the dynamic atom, a thing is still always thought which acts, — i.e., we have not stepped out of the habit into which senses and language seduce us. Subject, object, a doer for the doing, the doing and what it does kept separate: let us not forget that this is mere semiotics and designates nothing real. Mechanics as a doctrine of *motion* is already a translation into the sense-language of man.

We need unities in order to be able to calculate: that is no reason to assume that such unities exist. We have borrowed the concept of unity from our concept of the "I," — our oldest article of faith. If we did not take ourselves for unities, we should never have formed the concept "thing." Now, rather late, we are amply convinced that our conception of the concept of the I guarantees nothing in favour of a real unity. In order to uphold the mechanism of the world theoretically, therefore, we must always add the proviso as to how far we carry it out with two fictions: the concept of motion (taken from our sense-language) and the concept of the atom = unity (derived from our psychical "experience"): it has a *sense-prejudice* and a *psychological prejudice* as its presupposition.

The *mechanistic* world is imagined in the way the eye and touch alone represent a world to themselves (as "moved")

in such a way that it can be calculated, — that unities are invented,

in such a way that causal unities are invented, "things" (atoms), whose effect remains constant (— transference of the false concept of subject onto the concept of the atom)

Concept of number.

Concept of thing (concept of subject

Concept of activity (separation of being-a-cause and acting)

Motion (eye and touch)

: that all effect is *motion*

: that where there is motion, *something* is moved

What is *phenomenal*, then, is: the intrusion of the concept of number, of the concept of subject, of the concept of motion: we still have our *eye*, our *psychology* in it.

If we eliminate these additions, no things remain, but dynamic quanta in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: whose essence consists in their relation to all other quanta, in their "acting" upon them — the will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* is the most elementary fact, from which a becoming, an acting first results…

mechanics formulates consequent phenomena, and semiotically at that, in sensual and psychological means of expression; it does not touch the causal force…

80.

If the innermost essence of being is will to power, if pleasure is every growth of power, displeasure every feeling of not being able to resist and become master: may we not then posit pleasure and displeasure as cardinal facts? Is will possible without these two oscillations of Yes and No? But *who* feels pleasure?… But *who* wills power?… Absurd question: if the essence itself is will to power and consequently a feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nevertheless: it requires opposites, resistances, thus, relatively, *overarching units*… Localized - - -

if A acts upon B, then A is only localized as separate from B

81.

Critique of the concept "cause"

Reckoned up psychologically: the concept "cause" is our feeling of power from so-called willing — our concept "effect" the superstition that the feeling of power is the power itself, which moves…

a state that accompanies an event, and is already an effect of the event, is projected as its "sufficient reason"

the relation of tension in our feeling of power: pleasure as the feeling of power: of resistance overcome — are these illusions?

if we translate the concept "cause" back into the only sphere known to us, from which we took it: then no *change* is conceivable to us in which there is not a will to power. We do not know how to derive a change unless there takes place an encroachment of power upon other power.

Mechanics shows us only consequences, and moreover in images (motion is a figurative speech)

Gravitation itself has no mechanical cause, since it is itself the ground of mechanical consequences

The will to the accumulation of force as specific to the phenomenon of life, to nourishment, procreation, heredity,

to society, state, custom, authority

should we not be permitted to assume this will as the moving cause in chemistry too?

and in the cosmic order?

not merely constancy of energy: but maximal economy of expenditure: so that the *will to become stronger on the part of every centre of force* is the sole reality, — not self-preservation, but appropriation, the will to become master, to become more, to become stronger.

That science is possible — is this supposed to *prove* to us a principle of causality?

"from like causes like effects":

"a permanent law of things"

"an invariable order"

because something is calculable, is it therefore already necessary?

if something happens thus and not otherwise, there is in that no "principle", no "law", no "order"

quanta of force, whose essence consists in exercising power upon all other quanta of force

In the belief in cause and effect the main thing is always forgotten: the *happening* itself.

one has posited a doer, one has hypostatized the deed once more

82.

Can we assume a *striving for power* without a sensation of pleasure and displeasure, i.e. without a feeling of the increase and diminution of power?

is mechanism only a sign-language for the *internal* world of facts of struggling and overcoming quanta of will?

all the presuppositions of mechanism, matter, atom, pressure and impact, gravity, are not "facts in themselves", but interpretations with the aid of *psychical* fictions.

life, as the form of being best known to us, is specifically a will to the accumulation of force

: all the processes of life have their lever here

: nothing wants to preserve itself, everything is to be summed up and accumulated

Life, as a single case: hypothesis from there to the overall character of existence.

: strives for a *maximal feeling of power*

: is essentially a striving for more power

: striving is nothing other than striving for power

: the lowest and innermost thing remains this will: mechanics is a mere semiotics of consequences.

83.

Problem of the *philosopher* and of the

scientific man.

Ascending type Strength in repose. In relative indifference and difficulty in reacting. The great affects, *all* of them, and wonderfully coming to one another's aid…

Influence of age

depressive habits (sitting indoors à la Kant)

Overwork

insufficient nourishment of the brain

Reading

More essential: whether a *symptom of décadence* is not already given in the tendency toward such *generality*: *objectivity* as *disgregation of the will* (to *be able* to keep so *distant*… this presupposes a great adiaphoria toward the strong drives:

a kind of isolation

exceptional position

resistance

against the normal drives

Type: the detachment from one's *homeland*, in ever wider circles, the growing exoticism, the falling silent of the old imperatives — — indeed this constant question "whither?" ("happiness") is a sign of *extrication* from forms of organization, a breaking out.

Problem: whether the *scientific* man is not rather a symptom of décadence than the philosopher — he is not detached as a *whole*, only a *part* of him is absolutely consecrated to knowledge, trained for one corner and one optic — — here he needs *all* the virtues of a strong race and of health — great severity, manliness, shrewdness — — here one could speak of a division of labour and a training that is greatly to the benefit of the whole and possible only at a very high degree of culture. He is more a symptom of the high multiplicity of a culture than of its weariness. The décadence scholar is a *bad* scholar. Whereas the décadence philosopher has hitherto at least counted as the typical philosopher.

84.

Compared with the *artist*, the appearance of the *scientific* man is indeed a sign of a certain damming up and lowering of the level of life.

But also of a *strengthening, severity, strength of will*.

: to what extent falseness, indifference to the *true* and the *useful* in the artist may be signs of youth, of "*childishness*"…

: their habitual manner, their unreasonableness, their ignorance about themselves, their indifference to eternal values, seriousness in "play"… their lack of dignity; buffoon and god side by side; the saint and the canaille…

: *imitation* as instinct, commanding

The *affirming* artists, the artists of decline.

Artists of ascent — artists of decline: whether they do not belong to all phases… Yes.

85.

Pyrrho, a Greek Buddhist

Plato, perhaps went to school with the Jews

86.

On the concept "décadence" —

1.

skepticism is a consequence of décadence: just like the libertinage of the spirit.

2.

the corruption of morals is a consequence of décadence: weakness of the will, need for strong stimulants…

3.

the methods of cure, the psychological, the moral, do not alter the course of décadence, they do not halt it, they are physiologically *nil*: insight into the *great nullity* of these presumptuous "reactions": they are forms of narcotization against certain fatal consequent phenomena, they do not get the morbid element out: they are often heroic attempts to annul the man of décadence, to enforce a minimum of his *harmfulness*.

4.

nihilism is not a cause, but only the logic of décadence

5.

the "good" and the "bad" are only two types of décadence: they hold together in all fundamental phenomena.

6.

the

social

question is a consequence of décadence

7.

illnesses, above all the illnesses of the nerves and the head, are signs that the *defensive* strength of the strong nature is lacking; the irritability speaks for precisely this, so that *pleasure* and *displeasure* become the foreground problems.

87.

the ancient philosopher from Socrates on bears the *stigmata of

décadence*: moralism and happiness.

Culmination Pyrrho. Stage of Buddhism reached

Epicureanism in *Christianity*

Paths to happiness: sign that all the chief forces of life are exhausted

88.

The *accumulative* ages and individuals

the *squandering* ones: the men of genius, the victorious, the conquering, the discovering, the adventurous

after the latter there necessarily follows the décadent

89.

Countermovement: religion

The two types:

Dionysus and the *Crucified*.

To be determined: the typical *religious* man — whether a form of décadence?

The great innovators are one and all morbid and epileptic

: but are we not leaving out here one type of religious man, the *pagan*? Is the pagan cult not a form of thanksgiving and affirmation of life? Would its highest representative not have to be an apology for and deification of life?

Type of a fully well-constituted and rapturously overflowing spirit…

Type of a type that takes into itself the contradictions and questionable aspects of existence and *redeems* them?

— Here I place the *Dionysus* of the Greeks:

the religious affirmation of life, of the whole of life, not denied and halved

typical: that the sexual act awakens depth, mystery, reverence

Dionysus against the "Crucified": there you have the antithesis. It is *not* a difference with regard to martyrdom, — only it has a different meaning. Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and return, conditions torment, destruction, the will to annihilation…

in the other case suffering, the "Crucified as the innocent one", counts as an objection to this life, as the formula of its condemnation.

One guesses: the problem is that of the meaning of suffering: whether a Christian meaning, whether a tragic meaning… In the first case it is supposed to be the path to a blessed existence, in the latter *existence counts as blessed enough* to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering

The tragic man affirms even the harshest suffering: he is strong, full, deifying enough for it

The Christian denies even the happiest lot on earth: he is weak, poor, disinherited enough to suffer from life in every form…

"the God on the cross" is a curse upon life, a pointer to redeem oneself from it

Dionysus cut to pieces is a *promise* into life: it will be eternally reborn and come home out of destruction

90.

The *physiological falseness* in the pictures of Raphael.

A woman with normal secretions has no need of redemption. That all these well-constituted and favoured natures should eternally concern themselves with that anaemic saint of Nazareth goes against natural history. He belonged among another species: such a one as Dostoevsky knows, — touching, corrupted and twisted abortions with idiocy and enthusiasm, with *love*…

91.

religion as décadence

Buddha against the "*Crucified*"

Within the nihilistic movement one may still sharply distinguish the *Christian* and the *Buddhist*

: the *Buddhist* expresses a *beautiful evening*, a consummate sweetness and mildness, — it is gratitude toward everything that lies behind, included in the reckoning; bitterness, disappointment, rancour are lacking

: finally, the lofty spiritual love, the refinement of physiological contradiction lies behind it, from this too it rests: but from this it still

has its spiritual glory and sunset glow. (— Descent from the highest castes. —

: the *Christian* movement is a movement of degeneration out of refuse and reject elements of every kind: it does *not* express the decline of a race, it is from the beginning an aggregate formation of morbid growths crowding together and seeking one another… It is therefore *not* national, *not* conditioned by race: it turns to the disinherited of every place

at bottom it harbours rancour against all the well-constituted and ruling, it needs a *symbol* that represents the curse upon the well-constituted and ruling…

it stands in opposition also to every *spiritual* movement, to all philosophy: it takes the side of the idiots and pronounces a curse against the spirit. Rancour against the gifted, the learned, the spiritually independent: it divines in them the *well-constituted*, the *masterly*

92.

The Problem of Socrates.

The two antitheses:

the *tragic* disposition

the *Socratic* disposition

measured against the law of life

: to what extent the Socratic disposition is a phenomenon of décadence

: to what extent, however, a strong health and strength still shows itself in the whole habitus, in the dialectic and efficiency, the tautness of the scientific man (— the health of the *plebeian*, whose malice, es-

prit frondeur, whose acuteness, whose *canaille au fond* is held in check by *cleverness*: "ugly"

Uglification:

self-mockery

dialectical aridity

cleverness as *tyrant* against "the tyrant" (instinct)

everything about Socrates is exaggerated, eccentric, caricature, a buffo, with the instincts of Voltaire in his body;

—

he discovers a new kind of *agon* —

—

he is the foremost fencing master in the noble circles of Athens

—

he represents nothing but the *highest cleverness*: he calls it "virtue" (— he divined it as *rescue*: he was not free to be *clever*, it was *de rigueur*

—

to have oneself under control, so as to enter the fight with reasons and *not* with affects — the *cunning* of Spinoza — the unravelling of the errors of affect… discovering how one catches anyone whom one brings into a state of affect, discovering that affect proceeds illogically… practice in self-mockery, in order to damage the *feeling of rancour* at its root

I seek to grasp from what partial and idiosyncratic states the Socratic problem is to be derived: his equation of reason = virtue = happiness. With this absurdity of a doctrine of identity he *enchanted*: ancient philosophy never got free again…

Problem of Socrates. Cleverness, clarity, hardness and logicality as a weapon against the *wildness of the drives*. The latter must be dangerous and threaten ruin: otherwise there is no sense in developing *cleverness* to this pitch of tyranny. *To make a tyrant* out of cleverness: but *for that* the drives must be tyrants. This is the problem. — It was very timely then. Reason became = virtue = happiness.

absolute lack of objective interests: hatred of science: idiosyncrasy of feeling oneself to be a *problem*

Acoustic hallucinations in Socrates: morbid element

Occupying oneself with morality is most repugnant where the spirit is rich and independent. How does it come about that Socrates is a *moral monomaniac*?

All "practical" philosophy steps at once into the foreground in situations of distress. Morality and religion as chief interests are signs of a state of emergency

Solution: the Greek philosophers stand upon the same fundamental fact of their inner experiences as Socrates: five steps away from excess, from anarchy, from debauchery, all of them men of décadence. They perceive him as a physician:

Solution: The wildness and anarchy of the instincts in Socrates is a *symptom of décadence*. The superfetation of logic and of rational clarity likewise. Both are abnormalities, both belong together

Logic as will to power, to self-mastery, to "happiness"

Critique. Décadence betrays itself in this preoccupation with "happiness" (i.e. with the "salvation of the soul", i.e. feeling *one's condition* as a *danger*)

their fanaticism of interest in "happiness" shows the pathology of the substratum: it was a vital interest. *To be rational or* to perish was the *alternative* before which they all stood

the moralism of the Greek philosophers shows that they felt themselves *in danger*…

93.

Will to power as knowledge

Critique of the concept "true and apparent world"

of these the first is a mere fiction, formed of nothing but fictitious things

"apparentness" itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being, i.e.

in a world where there is no being, a certain calculable world of *identical* cases must first be created through *appearance*: a tempo in which observation and comparison are possible, etc.

"Apparentness" is a world trimmed into shape and simplified, upon which our *practical* instincts have worked: it is perfectly right for *us*: namely, we *live*, we are able to live in it: *proof* of its truth for us…

: the world, apart from our condition of living in it, the world which we have not reduced to our being, our logic and psychological prejudices

does *not* exist as a world "in itself"

it is essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has, from each point, its *different face*: its being is essentially different at every point: it presses upon every point, every point resists it — and these summations are in every case wholly *incongruent*.

The *measure of power* determines what *being* the other measure of power has: under what form, force, compulsion it acts or resists

Our particular case is interesting enough: we have made a conception in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just enough that we can still *endure* it…

94.

Philosophy as décadence

Toward a critique of the philosopher

It is a self-deception on the part of philosophers and moralists to suppose that they step out of décadence by fighting *against* it.

That lies beyond their will: and, little as they acknowledge it, one later discovers how they were among the most vigorous promoters of décadence.

The philosophers of Greece, for example: Plato, the man of the good — but he *detached* the instincts from the polis, from the contest, from military prowess, from art and beauty, from the mysteries, from faith in tradition and forefathers…

— he was the seducer of the nobles: himself seduced by the roturier Socrates…

— he negated all the presuppositions of the "noble Greek" of the true stamp, took dialectic up into everyday practice, conspired with the tyrants, pursued a politics of the future, and gave the example of the most complete *detachment of the instincts from the old*.

He is profound, passionate in everything *anti*-Hellenic…

They represent in succession the *typical* forms of décadence, these great philosophers:

the moral-religious idiosyncrasy

anarchism

nihilism

ἀδιάφορα

cynicism

hardening

hedonism,

reactionism

the question of "happiness", of "virtue", of the "salvation of the soul" is the expression of the *physiological contradictoriness* in these natures of decline: the instincts lack the *centre of gravity*, the *whither*?

: why does no one *dare* to deny the freedom of the will? They are all preoccupied with *their* "salvation of the soul" — what do they care about truth?

95.

Two successive states: the one cause, the other effect

: is false.

the first state has nothing to effect

the second has been effected by nothing.

: it is a matter of a struggle between two elements unequal in power: a new arrangement of forces is attained, according to the measure of power of each. the second state is something fundamentally different from the first (*not* its "effect"): the essential thing is that the factors engaged in the struggle come out with different quanta of power.

96.

[+ + +] They despise the body: they left it out of the reckoning: more than that, they treated it as an enemy. Their madness was to believe that one could carry a "beautiful soul" about in a monstrosity of a cadaver… In order to make this credible to others as well, they needed to set down the concept "beautiful soul" differently, to revalue the natural value, until at last a pallid, sickly, idiotically rapturous creature was felt to be perfection, to be "angelic", to be transfiguration, to be the higher man.

97.

"Will to power"

"The will to power" is so hated in democratic ages that their entire psychology seems directed toward belittling and slandering it…

The type of the great ambitious man: that is supposed to be Napoleon! And Caesar! And Alexander!… As if these were not precisely the greatest *despisers* of honour!…

And Helvétius explains to us that one strives for power in order to have the pleasures which are at the command of the powerful…: he understands this striving for power as will to pleasure, as hedonism…

Stuart Mill: — — —

98.

Will to power in principle

Critique of the concept "cause"

I need the *starting-point* "will to power" as the origin of motion. Consequently motion may not be conditioned from without — not *caused*…

I need beginnings and centres of motion, from which the will reaches out around itself…

We have absolutely no experience of a *cause*

: reckoned up psychologically, the whole concept comes to us from the subjective conviction that *we* are cause, namely, that the arm moves… *But that is an error*

: we distinguish ourselves, the doers, from the doing, and we make use of this schema everywhere, — we seek a doer for every event…

: what have we done? we have *misunderstood* as cause a feeling of force, tension, resistance, a muscular feeling that is already the beginning of the action

: or understood as cause the will to do this or that, because the action follows upon it — cause, i.e. — — —

"Cause" does not occur at all: in the few cases where it seemed to be given to us, and from which we projected it for the *understanding of events*, the self-deception has been demonstrated.

Our "understanding of an event" consisted in our inventing a subject that was made responsible for the fact that something happened and how it happened.

We have gathered together our feeling of will, our "feeling of freedom", our feeling of responsibility and our intention of a doing into the concept "cause":

: causa efficiens and finalis are one in the fundamental conception.

We thought an effect was explained when a state was pointed out in which it already inhered

In fact we invent all causes according to the schema of the effect: the latter is known to us… Conversely, we are incapable of predicting of any thing what it will "effect".

The thing, the subject, the will, the intention — all inhere in the conception "cause".

We look for things in order to explain why something has changed. Even the *atom* is such a "thing" and "primal subject" thought in addition…

At last we comprehend that things, and consequently atoms too, effect nothing: *because they are not there at all*… that the concept of causality is completely unusable — From a necessary sequence of states there does *not* follow their causal relation (— that would mean making their *effective capacity* leap from 1 to 2, to 3, to 4, to 5)

The causal interpretation a deception…

motion is a word, motion is not a cause —

a "thing" is a sum of its effects, synthetically bound together by a concept, an image…

There are neither causes nor effects.

Linguistically we do not know how to get free of them. But that does not matter. If I think of the *muscle* as separated from its "effects", I have negated it…

In sum: *an event is neither effected nor effecting*

Causa is a *capacity to effect*, invented and added on to the event…

there is not, as Kant thinks, *any* sense of causality

one is astonished, one is disquieted, one wants something familiar to hold on to…

as soon as something old is shown to us in the new, we are reassured.

The supposed instinct of causality is only the *fear of the unaccustomed* and the attempt to discover in it something *familiar*

a search not for causes but for the familiar…

Man is at once reassured when he, faced with something new — — — he does *not* trouble himself to understand in what way the little match causes fire

In fact science has emptied the concept of causality of its content and kept it over as a formula of likeness, in which it has at bottom become a matter of indifference on which side cause or effect stands. It is asserted that in two complex states (constellations of force) the quanta of force remain equal.

The *calculability of an event* does not lie in the fact that a rule was followed

or a necessity was obeyed

or a law of causality was projected by us into every event:

it lies in the *recurrence of identical cases*

99.

Philosophy as décadence

The *wise* weariness. Pyrrho. The Buddhist. Comparison with

Epicurus.

Pyrrho. To live among the lowly, lowly. No pride. To live in the common way; to honour and believe what all believe. On guard against science and spirit, and against everything that *puffs up*… Simple: indescribably patient, unconcerned, mild.

ἀπάθεια, still more πραΰτης.

A Buddhist for Greece, grown up amid the tumult of the schools; come late; wearied; the protest of the weary man against the zeal of the dialecticians; the weary man's unbelief in the importance of all things. He has seen *Alexander*, he has seen the *Indian penitents*. Upon such late and refined men everything lowly, everything poor, even everything idiotic acts seductively. That narcotizes: that makes one stretch out: Pascal. On the other hand, in the midst of the throng and mistaken for anyone at all, they feel a little warmth: they have need of *warmth*, these weary ones…

To overcome contradiction; no contest; no will to distinction: to deny the *Greek* instincts. — Pyrrho lived together with his sister, who was a midwife. —

To disguise wisdom so that it no longer distinguishes; to give it a cloak of poverty and rags; to do the lowliest tasks: to go to market and sell sucking-pigs…

Sweetness; brightness; indifference; no virtues that need gestures. To make oneself equal even in virtue: final self-overcoming, final indifference.

Pyrrho, like Epicurus, two forms of Greek décadence: akin in their hatred of dialectic and of all *actorly* virtues — the two together were then called philosophy —; deliberately making what they love lowly; choosing for it ordinary, even despised names; representing a state in which one is neither sick nor healthy, neither alive nor dead… Epicurus, more naive, more idyllic, more grateful; Pyrrho, more travelled, more worn out by living, more nihilistic…

His life was a protest against the great *doctrine of identity* (happiness = virtue = knowledge).

The right life is not found through science: wisdom does not make one "wise"…

The right life does not want happiness, looks away from happiness…

100.

The real *philosophers of the Greeks* are those before Socrates: with Socrates something changes

they are all noble personages, standing apart from the people and from custom, travelled, earnest to the point of gloom, with a slow eye, no strangers to affairs of state and diplomacy. They anticipate for the sages all the great conceptions of things: they themselves represent them, they bring themselves into a system.

Nothing gives a higher idea of the Greek spirit than this sudden fertility in types, than this unintended completeness in setting up the great possibilities of the philosophical ideal.

I see only one more original figure among those who come after: a latecomer, but necessarily the last… the nihilist *Pyrrho*,… he has the instinct *against* all that had meanwhile come out on top, the Socratics, Plato

Pyrrho reaches back past Protagoras to Democritus…

the artists' optimism of Heraclitus, — — —

101.

décadence *in general*

If *pleasure* and *displeasure* relate to the feeling of power, then life would have to represent a growth of power, so that the difference of the "more" would enter consciousness… If a level of power were held fixed, pleasure would have to measure itself only against diminutions

of the level, against states of displeasure — *not* against states of pleasure… The will to more lies in the essence of pleasure: that power grows, that the difference enters consciousness…

From a certain point on, in décadence, the *reverse difference* enters consciousness, the decrease: the memory of the strong moments of former times depresses the present feelings of pleasure — comparison now *weakens* pleasure…

102.

On the hygiene of the "weak". — Everything that is done in weakness fails. Moral: do nothing. Only the trouble is that precisely the strength to suspend action, *not* to react, is most gravely sick under the influence of weakness: that one never reacts more quickly, never more blindly, than just when one ought not to react at all…

The strength of a nature shows itself in waiting and postponing the reaction: a certain ἀδιαφορία is as proper to it as to weakness belong the unfreedom of the countermovement, the suddenness, the unrestrainability of the "action"…

the will is weak: and the prescription for preventing stupid things would be to have a strong will and to do *nothing*…

Contradictio…

A kind of self-destruction, the instinct of preservation is compromised… *The weak man harms himself*… that is the type of décadence…

In fact we find an enormous amount of reflection on practices for inducing *impassibility*. The instinct is on the right track insofar as doing nothing is more useful than doing something…

All the practices of the orders, of the solitary philosophers, of the fakirs are inspired by the correct standard of value that a certain kind

of man still *benefits himself most* when he hinders himself as much as possible from acting —

Means of relief: absolute obedience

mechanical activity

separation from men and things that would encourage immediate resolve and action

103.

1.

I see with astonishment that science today resigns itself to being confined to the apparent world: a true world — be it as it may, certainly we have no organ of knowledge for it.

Here one might already ask: with what organ of knowledge does one even posit this antithesis?…

That a world accessible to our organs is also understood as dependent on these organs, that we understand a world as subjectively conditioned — this does *not* express that an objective world is at all *possible*. Who forbids us to think that subjectivity is real, essential?

the "in itself" is even an absurd conception: a "constitution in itself" is nonsense: we have the concept "being", "thing" only ever as a concept of relation…

The trouble is — that along with the old antithesis "apparent" and "true" the correlative value judgement has propagated itself: lesser in value and absolutely "valuable"

the apparent world does not count for us as a "valuable" world; appearance is supposed to be an argument against supreme value. Only a "true" world can be valuable in itself…

First: one asserts that it exists

secondly: one has a quite definite idea of its value

Prejudice of prejudices! First, it would in itself be possible that the true constitution of things were so harmful to the preconditions of life, so opposed to them, that appearance itself were needed in order to be able to live… This is indeed the case in so many situations: e.g. in marriage

Our empirical world would be conditioned by the instincts of self-preservation even in the limits of its knowledge: we would hold to be true, good, valuable whatever benefits the preservation of the species…

a.

we have no categories by which we might separate a true and an apparent world. There might be merely an apparent world, but not only *our* apparent world…

b.

supposing the *true* world, it could still be the one *lesser in value* for us: precisely the quantum of illusion might be of higher rank for us in its value for preservation. Unless *appearance* in itself grounded a judgement of rejection?

c.

that a correlation exists between the *degrees of value* and the *degrees of reality*, so that the highest values would also have the highest reality: this is a metaphysical postulate proceeding from the presupposition that we *know* the order of rank of values: namely, that this order of rank is a *moral* one… Only on this presupposition is *truth* necessary for the definition of everything of highest value "appearance" would be an objection to a value as such

2.

It is of cardinal importance that one abolish the *true world*. It is the great doubter and depreciator of the *world that we are*: It has hitherto been our most dangerous *assault* upon life

War against all the presuppositions on the strength of which a true world has been feigned. Among these presuppositions is that *moral values are the highest*

Moral valuation as the highest would be refuted if it could be proved to be the consequence of an *immoral* valuation

: as a special case of real immorality

: it would thereby reduce itself to a mere *semblance*

and as *semblance* it would, of itself, no longer have any right to condemn appearance.

3.

"The will to truth" would then have to be examined psychologically: it is no moral force, but a form of the will to power. This would be proved by its making use of every *immoral* means: metaphysics foremost —

: the *methodology of research* is only attained when all *moral prejudices* have been overcome… it would represent a victory over morality…

NB. We are today faced with testing the assertion that moral values are the highest values.

104.

Moral values as *apparent values*, compared with the *physiological*

105.

Our knowledge has become scientific to the extent that it can apply number and measure…

The attempt should be made to see whether a scientific order of values might not simply be built upon a *numerical and quantitative scale of force*…

— all other "*values*" are prejudices, naiveties, misunderstandings…

— they are everywhere *reducible* to that numerical and quantitative scale of force

— *upward* movement on this scale signifies every *increase in value*:

downward movement on this scale signifies *diminution of value*

Here one has appearance and prejudice against one.

a morality, a way of life tested and tried through long experience and trial, *proven*, comes at last to consciousness as law, as *dominant*…

and with that the whole group of related values and states enters into it: it becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true

it belongs to its development that its origin be *forgotten*… It is a sign that it has become master…

*

Exactly the same could have happened with the *categories of reason*: they could, amid much groping and fumbling about, have proved themselves through relative usefulness… There came a point where they were gathered together, brought to consciousness as a whole, — and where they were *commanded*… i.e. where they acted as *commanding*…

From then on they counted as a priori…, as beyond experience, as irrefutable…

And yet perhaps they express nothing but a certain expediency of race and species, — their usefulness alone is their "truth" —

On the origin of *reason* —

A.

The highest values have hitherto been the moral ones.

B.

Critique of these values.

C.

— — —

106.

Precept for the young theologian:

1. that he abstain from woman and from every fermented substance whatever; that he wear neither boots nor parasol; that he abstain from every stimulus of the senses (song, dance and music)

2. If the candidate involuntarily incurs a pollution during his slumber, he shall at the rising of the sun dip himself three times in the holy swamp, with the words "may that which went from me against my will return to me!"

3. If his teacher interrupts him, he shall answer him neither lying, nor sitting, nor eating, nor running, nor from afar, nor with a sidelong glance:

4. Rather he shall come to him and, upright, respectful, look at him and give answer.

If he is in a carriage and notices his teacher, he shall at once alight in order to pay him his honneurs.

The pupil may not attend his teacher's wife at her bath, nor perfume her, nor massage her, nor arrange her coiffure, nor anoint her

Nor may he prostrate himself before his teacher's young wife and respectfully touch her feet, provided, that is, that by his age he already has the knowledge of good and evil.

It lies in the nature of woman that she please men and wish to tempt them. But the wise never let themselves go so far as to yield to this attraction, namely in cases where this is blameworthy.

One should not dwell in lonely places alone with one's mother, one's sister, one's daughter and other female kin: the senses, excited by solitude, are so mighty that at times they prevail over the wisest.

This was the case with the wise Vasta, who, to flee the malice of the people of Gotha, withdrew with his 2 daughters into a cave: where he made mothers of them both.

107.

Theory and Practice

Critique of the value of morality

Dangerous distinction between "theoretical" and "practical" e.g. in Kant, but also among the ancients

— they act as if pure spirituality set before them the problems of knowledge and metaphysics

— they act as if, however theory's answer might turn out, practice were to be judged by its own measure of value.

Against the first I direct my *psychology of philosophers*: their most estranged calculation and "spirituality" always remains merely the last, palest imprint of a physiological fact; voluntariness is absolutely lacking in it, everything is instinct, everything is steered from the very outset into definite channels…

— against the second I ask whether we know of any other method for acting well than always thinking well: the latter *is* an acting, and the former presupposes thinking. Do we possess a faculty for judging the value of a way of life otherwise than the value of a theory, through induction, through comparison?… The naïve believe that here we are better off, that here we know what "good" is, — the philosophers repeat it after them. We conclude that here a *faith* is present, nothing more…

"One must act; *consequently* one needs a guiding rule" — said even the ancient sceptics

the *urgency* of a decision as an argument for holding anything here to be *true*!…

One must *not* act: — said their more consistent brothers, the Buddhists, and devised a guiding rule for how one might free oneself from acting…

To fall into line, to live as the "common man" lives, to hold good and right what he holds right: that is *submission* to the *herd instinct*.

One must drive one's courage and one's severity so far as to feel such a submission as a *shame*

Not to live by a double measure!… Not to separate theory and practice! —

108.

Will to power as morality

The predominance of moral values.

Consequences of this predominance, the corruption of psychology, etc.

the fatality everywhere that hangs upon it

What does this predominance *mean*? To what does it point?

— a certain *greater urgency* of a definite Yes and No in this domain

— every kind of *imperative* has been employed to make moral values appear fixed: they have been commanded the longest: — they *seem* instinctive, like inner commands…

— *conditions for the preservation of society* express themselves in the fact that moral values are felt to be *beyond discussion*

— practice: that is to say, the *usefulness* of coming to an understanding with one another about the highest values, has here attained a kind of sanction

— we see *every means employed* by which reflection and criticism in this domain are *paralysed*: — what an attitude Kant still adopts, not to speak of those who reject it as immoral to "inquire" here —

How morality was brought to dominion

109.

Science and philosophy

All these values are empirical and conditioned. But he who believes in them, who reveres them, *will* not acknowledge precisely this character…

the philosophers one and all believe in these values, and one form of their reverence was the endeavour to make *a priori truths* out of them

falsifying character of *reverence*…

reverence is the high test of intellectual *integrity*: but in the whole history of philosophy there *is* no intellectual integrity

but rather the "love of the good"…

: the absolute *lack of method* for testing the measure of these values

secondly: the aversion to testing these values, to taking them as conditioned at all

In the case of moral values all the *anti-scientific* instincts came together into play in order to *exclude* science here…

How the incredible scandal that morality represents in the history of science is to be explained…

110.

Formula of the "*progress*" *superstition* of a famous physiologist of cerebral activities

"L'animal ne fait jamais de progrès comme espèce; l'homme seul fait de progrès comme espèce."

No: — — —

111.

Philosophy as *décadence*

The great reason in all education towards morality was always that one sought here to attain the *certainty of an instinct*: so that neither the good intention nor the good means as such ever first entered consciousness. As the soldier drills, so man was to learn to act. In fact this unconsciousness belongs to every kind of perfection: even the mathematician handles his combinations unconsciously…

What, then, does the *reaction* of Socrates mean, who recommended dialectic as the way to virtue and made fun of morality when it did not know how to justify itself logically?… But precisely the latter

belongs to its *goodness*… without it, *it is good for nothing*!… To arouse *shame* was a necessary attribute of the perfect!…

It means precisely the *dissolution* of the *Greek instincts* when *demonstrability* was placed foremost as the precondition of personal excellence in virtue. They are themselves types of dissolution, all these great "virtuous ones" and word-makers…

In praxi it means that moral judgements are torn out of their conditionality, out of which they grew and in which alone they have meaning, out of their Greek and Greek-political ground and soil, and, under the semblance of *sublimation*, are *denaturalized*. The great concepts "good", "just" are cut loose from the presuppositions to which they belong: and, as "ideas" *become free*, they become objects of dialectic. One seeks a truth behind them, one takes them as entities or as signs of entities: one *invents* a world where they are at home, whence they come…

In summa: the mischief is already at its peak in Plato… And now one also needed to invent in addition the *abstractly perfect* man

good, just, wise, a dialectician — in short, the scarecrow of the ancient philosopher,

a plant detached from every soil; a humanity without any definite regulating instincts; a virtue that "proves" itself with reasons.

the perfectly *absurd* "individual" in itself! *unnature* of the highest rank…

In short, the denaturalization of moral values had as its consequence the creation of a degenerating *type of man* — "the good man", "the happy man", "the wise man"

Socrates is a moment of the *deepest perversity* in the history of mankind

112.

It would make us doubtful about a man to hear that he needs *reasons* in order to remain decent: what is certain is that we avoid his company. The little word "for" compromises in certain cases; one sometimes even *refutes* oneself by a single "for". If we now hear further that such an aspirant to virtue needs *bad* reasons in order to remain respectable, that still furnishes no reason for increasing our respect for him. But he goes further, he comes to us, he tells us to our face: "You disturb my morality with your unbelief, my dear Mr. Unbeliever; so long as you do not believe in my *bad reasons*, that is to say in God, in a punishing beyond, in a freedom of the will, you *hinder* my virtue… Moral: the unbelievers must be abolished, they hinder the *moralization of the masses*".

113.

Morality as décadence

Today, when every "man *ought* to be thus and so" puts a little irony in our mouths, when we hold fast to the conviction that, in spite of everything, one *becomes* only what one *is* (in spite of everything: that is to say, upbringing, instruction, milieu, accidents and mishaps), we have learned, in matters of morality, to *reverse* the relation of cause and effect in a curious way — nothing perhaps distinguishes us more fundamentally from the old believers in morality. We no longer say, for instance, "vice is the *cause* of a man's perishing physiologically as well"; just as little do we say "through virtue a man prospers; it brings long life and happiness." Our opinion is rather that vice and virtue are not causes but only *consequences*. One becomes a decent man because one is a decent man: that is, because one was born a capitalist of good instincts and thriving circumstances… If one comes into the world poor, from parents who in everything only squandered and gathered

nothing, then one is "incorrigible," that is to say, ripe for the penitentiary and the madhouse… Today we no longer know how to think of moral degeneracy as separate from physiological degeneracy: it is a mere symptom-complex of the latter; one is necessarily bad, as one is necessarily sick… Bad: the word here expresses certain *incapacities* that are physiologically bound up with the type of degeneracy: for example, weakness of will, the uncertainty and even multiplicity of the "person," the inability to suspend one's reaction to any stimulus and to "control" oneself, the unfreedom before every kind of suggestion from a foreign will. Vice is not a cause; vice is a *consequence*… Vice is a rather arbitrary conceptual delimitation for summing up certain consequences of physiological degeneration. A general proposition such as Christianity taught, "man is bad," would be justified if it were justified to take the type of the degenerate as the normal type of man. But that is perhaps an exaggeration. Certainly the proposition is in the right wherever Christianity in particular thrives and is on top: for that proves a morbid soil, a territory for degeneracy.

114.

Growth or exhaustion

Critique of Christian values.

Critique of ancient philosophy.

Toward a history of European nihilism.

Christianity nihilistic

the preparatory work for it: ancient philosophy

115.

Science and philosophy

How far the corruption of psychologists by the moral idiosyncrasy goes:

None of the old philosophers had the courage for the theory of the "unfree will" (that is, for a theory negating morality)

No one had the courage to define what is typical of pleasure, of every kind of pleasure ("happiness"), as the feeling of power: for pleasure in power was considered immoral

No one had the courage to conceive of virtue as a *consequence of immorality* (of a will to power) in the service of the species (or of the race or of the polis) (for the will to power was considered immorality, for thereby it would have been recognized what the truth — — — that virtue is only a form of immorality)

In the whole development of morality no truth occurs: all the conceptual elements with which one works are fictions, all the psychologica one holds to are falsifications; all the forms of logic one drags into this realm of lies are sophisms. What distinguishes the moral philosophers themselves is the complete absence of all cleanliness, of all self-discipline of the intellect: they take "beautiful feelings" for arguments: their "heaving bosom" seems to them the bellows of the godhead… Moral philosophy is the scabrous chapter in the history of the spirit.

The first great example: under the name of morality, under the patronage of morality, an unheard-of mischief practised, in fact a *décadence* in every respect.

116.

Philosophy as décadence

One cannot insist strictly enough that the great Greek philosophers represent the *décadence of every kind of Greek excellence* and make it *conta-*

gious… This "virtue," made wholly abstract, was the greatest seduction to make oneself abstract: that is, to *detach* oneself…

The moment is very remarkable: the Sophists verge upon the first *critique of morality*, the first *insight* into morality…

— they set side by side the multiplicity (the local conditionality) of moral value judgments

— they give it to be understood that every morality can be justified dialectically — that it makes no difference: that is, they divine how every grounding of a morality must necessarily be *sophistical* —

— a proposition subsequently proved in the very grandest style by the ancient philosophers from Plato onward (up to Kant)

— they set up the first truth, that "a morality in itself," a "good in itself," does not exist, that it is swindle to speak of "truth" in this domain

Where, then, was *intellectual integrity* in those days?

the Greek culture of the Sophists had grown out of all the Greek instincts: it belongs to the culture of the Periclean age as necessarily as Plato does *not* belong to it: it has its predecessors in Heraclitus, in Democritus, in the scientific types of the old philosophy; it finds its expression in the high culture of Thucydides, for example

— and it has in the end been proved right: every advance in epistemological and moralistic knowledge has *restored* the Sophists…

our present-day way of thinking is to a high degree Heraclitean, Democritean and Protagorean… it would suffice to say that it is *Protagorean*, because Protagoras gathered the two pieces, Heraclitus and Democritus, together in himself

Plato: a *great Cagliostro* — consider how Epicurus judged him; how Timon, the friend of Pyrrho, judged him — —

Is Plato's integrity perhaps beyond doubt?… But we know at the very least that he wanted to have *taught* as absolute truth what he did not hold to be true even conditionally: namely, the separate existence and separate immortality of "souls"

117.

the countermovement: *art*

The feeling of intoxication, corresponding in fact to a *surplus of force*:

strongest in the mating season of the sexes:

new organs, new skills, colours, forms…

"beautification" is a consequence of *heightened* force

Beautification as the necessary consequence of the heightening of force

Beautification as the expression of a *victorious* will, of an intensified coordination, of a harmonizing of all strong desires, of an infallibly perpendicular centre of gravity

logical and geometrical simplification is a consequence of the heightening of force: conversely, the *perception* of such simplification in turn heightens the feeling of force…

Summit of the development: the grand style

Ugliness signifies the *décadence of a type*, contradiction and lack of coordination among the inner desires

signifies a decline in *organizing* force, in "will," physiologically speaking…

the state of pleasure one calls *intoxication* is precisely a high feeling of *power*…

the sensations of space and time are altered: tremendous distances are surveyed and, as it were, first become *perceptible*

the *extension* of the gaze over greater multitudes and expanses

the *refinement of the organ* for perceiving much that is smallest and most fleeting

divination, the power of understanding at the slightest hint, at every suggestion, "intelligent" *sensuality*…

strength as a feeling of mastery in the muscles, as suppleness and delight in movement, as dance, as lightness and presto

strength as delight in the proof of strength, as bravura piece, adventure, fearlessness, indifferent nature…

All these high moments of life stimulate one another; the world of images and ideas of the one suffices, as suggestion, for the others… In this way, states have finally grown into one another which would perhaps have had reason to remain strangers. For example

the religious feeling of intoxication and sexual arousal (two deep feelings, coordinated by now almost astonishingly. What pleases all pious women, old and young? Answer: a saint with beautiful legs, still young, still an idiot…)

cruelty in tragedy and pity (— likewise normally coordinated…

Spring, dance, music, all a contest of the sexes — and even that Faustian "infinity in the bosom"…

artists, if they are any good, are strongly built (bodily too), over-abundant, beasts of power, sensual; without a certain overheating of the sexual system no Raphael is conceivable… Making music is still a

kind of making children; chastity is merely the economy of an artist: — and in any case, with artists too, fruitfulness ceases along with procreative power…

artists ought to see nothing as it is, but fuller, but simpler, but stronger: for this they must have in their bodies a kind of eternal youth and spring, a kind of habitual intoxication.

Beyle and Flaubert, two men without scruple in such questions, did in fact recommend chastity to artists in the interest of their craft: I might also name Renan, who gives the same advice; Renan is a priest…

118.

the epidemics

,

the hallucinations,

,

the dances and gesture-signs

,

song (remnant of dance

,

— — —

normal functions:

exercising themselves

:

the dream (a state akin to intoxication introduces it)

:

the optical visual images

:

auditory images

:

tactile images

119.

Countermovement

art

all art works as suggestion upon the muscles and senses, which are originally active in the naive artistic man: it speaks only ever to artists, — it speaks to this kind of subtle excitability of the body. The concept "layman" is a blunder. The deaf man is not a species of the keen-eared.

All art works *tonically*, increases strength, kindles pleasure (i.e. the feeling of strength), stirs all the subtler memories of intoxication, — there is a memory of its own that descends into such states: a distant and fleeting world of sensations returns there…

The ugly, i.e. the contradiction of art, that which is *excluded* by art, its No — each time that decline, impoverishment of life, impotence, dissolution, decay is even remotely suggested, the aesthetic man reacts with his *No*

The ugly works *depressively*, it is the expression of a depression. It *takes away* strength, it impoverishes, it weighs down…

The ugly *suggests* the ugly; one can test on one's own states of health how variously ill-being also heightens the capacity for imagining the

ugly. The selection becomes different, of things, interests, questions: there is a state closely akin to the ugly in the logical sphere too — heaviness, dullness… Mechanically, what is lacking here is the centre of gravity: the ugly limps, the ugly stumbles: — the opposite of a divine lightheartedness of the dancer…

The aesthetic state has a superabundance of *means of communication*, together with an extreme *receptivity* to stimuli and signs. It is the summit of communicativeness and transmissibility between living beings, — it is the source of languages.

languages have their birthplace here: the languages of tone, as well as the languages of gesture and glance. The fuller phenomenon is always the beginning: our capacities as men of culture are subtracted from fuller capacities. But even today one still hears with the muscles, one even still reads with the muscles.

Every mature art has an abundance of convention as its foundation: insofar as it is language. Convention is the condition of great art, *not* its hindrance…

Every elevation of life heightens man's power of communication, and likewise his power of understanding. *Living one's way into other souls* is originally nothing moral, but a physiological susceptibility to suggestion: "sympathy", or what is called "altruism", are mere elaborations of that psychomotor rapport which is reckoned as spirituality (induction psycho-motrice, Ch. Féré calls it) One never communicates thoughts, one communicates movements, mimetic signs, which we then *read back* into thoughts…

*

I set down here a series of psychological states as signs of full and flourishing life, which one is accustomed today to judge as *morbid*. Now we have meanwhile unlearned speaking of an opposition

between healthy and sick: it is a matter of degrees, — my assertion in this case is that what is today called "healthy" represents a lower level of what under favourable circumstances *would be* healthy… that we are relatively sick… The artist belongs to a still stronger race. What would already be harmful to us, what would be morbid in us, is nature in him ---

the *superabundance* of saps and forces can bring with it symptoms of partial unfreedom, of sensory hallucinations, of refinements of suggestion, just as well as an impoverishment of life can… the stimulus is differently conditioned, the effect remains the same…

Above all, the *after*-effect is not the same; the extreme exhaustion of all morbid natures after their nervous eccentricities has nothing in common with the states of the artist: who does not have to *atone* for his good times…

He is rich enough for it: he can squander without becoming poor…

Just as one might today judge "genius" as a form of neurosis, so perhaps also the artistic power of suggestion, — and our *artistes* are indeed only too closely related to hysterical little women!!! But that speaks against "today", and not against "artists"…

But it is objected to us that precisely the *impoverishment* of the machine makes possible the extravagant power of understanding for any suggestion whatever: witness our hysterical little women, "our investigators of the beyond"

*

Inspiration: description.

*

The unartistic states: those of *objectivity*, of mirroring, of the suspended will…

the scandalous misunderstanding of *Schopenhauer,* who takes art as a bridge to the negation of life…

*

The unartistic states: the impoverishing, subtracting, draining ones, under whose gaze life suffers… the Christian…

*

Problem of *tragic* art.

*

The *Romantics*: an ambiguous question, like everything modern.

*

the *actor*

120.

Love

Would one have the most astonishing proof of how far the transfiguring power of intoxication extends? "Love" is this proof, that which is called love in all the languages and silences of the world. Intoxication here gets the better of reality in such a way that in the consciousness of the lover the cause is extinguished and something else seems to stand in its place — a trembling and a flashing-up of all the magic mirrors of Circe… Here man and beast make no difference; still less do spirit, goodness, integrity… One is subtly fooled if one is subtle, one is coarsely fooled if one is coarse: but love, and even the love of God, the saintly love of "redeemed souls," remains at the root one thing: a fever that has reasons to transfigure itself, an intoxication that does well to lie about itself… And in any case one lies well when one loves, to oneself and about oneself: one seems to oneself

transfigured, stronger, richer, more perfect, one *is* more perfect… We find here *art* as an organic function: we find it embedded in the most angelic instinct of life: we find it as the greatest stimulant of life, — art, therefore, sublimely purposive even in this, that it lies… But we would err were we to stop at its power to lie: it does more than merely imagine, it even displaces values. And not only does it displace the feeling of values… The lover is worth more, is stronger. In animals this condition drives forth new substances, pigments, colours and forms: above all new movements, new rhythms, new mating calls and seductions. In man it is no different. His whole economy is richer than ever, mightier, more *whole* than in one who does not love. The lover becomes a squanderer: he is rich enough for it. He now dares, becomes an adventurer, becomes an ass of magnanimity and innocence; he believes in God again, he believes in virtue because he believes in love: and on the other hand this idiot of happiness grows wings and new capacities, and even the door to art opens before him. Let us subtract from lyric poetry in tone and word the suggestion of that intestinal fever: what remains of lyric poetry and music?… L'art pour l'art perhaps: the virtuoso croaking of frogs put out in the cold, despairing in their swamp… All the *rest* was created by love…

121.

Will to power, psychologically

Unitary conception of psychology.

We are accustomed to holding the development of an immense abundance of forms to be compatible with an origin out of unity.

That the will to power is the primitive form of affect, that all other affects are merely its developments:

That it is a significant enlightenment to put power in place of the individual "happiness" for which every living thing is supposed to strive: "it strives for power, for more in power" — pleasure is only a symptom of the feeling of power attained, a consciousness of difference —

— it does not strive for pleasure, but pleasure sets in when it attains what it strives for: pleasure accompanies, pleasure does not move…

That all driving force is will to power, that there is no physical, dynamic or psychic force besides it…

— in our science, where the concept of cause and effect is reduced to the relation of equation, with the ambition of proving that on each side there is the same quantum of force, the *driving force* is *lacking*: we consider only results, we posit them as equal in respect of their content of force, we spare ourselves the question of the *causation* of a change…

it is a mere matter of experience that change *does not cease*: in itself we have not the slightest reason to understand that one change must be followed by another. On the contrary: an *attained state* would seem bound to preserve itself, were there not in it a capacity precisely *not* to want to preserve itself…

Spinoza's proposition concerning self-preservation ought really to put a halt to change: but the proposition is false, the *opposite* is true. It is precisely in all that lives that it can be shown most clearly that it does everything *not* to preserve itself but to become *more*…

is "will to power" a kind of "will" or identical with the concept "will"? does it mean as much as desiring? or commanding?

is it the "will" of which Schopenhauer holds that it is the "in-itself of things"?

: my proposition is: that the *will* of previous psychology is an unjustified generalization, that this will *does not exist at all*, that instead of grasping the development of one *particular* will into many forms, one has *struck out* the character of the will by *sub*tracting from it its content, its Whither?

: this is the case in the highest degree with *Schopenhauer*: what he calls "will" is a mere empty word. Still less is it a matter of a "will *to life*": for life is merely a *single case* of the will to power, — it is entirely arbitrary to assert that everything strives to pass over into this form of the will to power

122.

On the theory of knowledge: merely empirical:

There is neither "spirit," nor reason, nor thinking, nor consciousness, nor soul, nor will, nor truth: all fictions, which are useless. It is not a matter of "subject and object" but of a particular species of animal which thrives only under a certain relative *correctness*, above all *regularity* of its perceptions (so that it can capitalize experience)…

Knowledge works as an *instrument* of power. So it is obvious that it grows with every increase of power…

Meaning of "knowledge": here, as with "good" or "beautiful," the concept is to be taken strictly and narrowly in an anthropocentric and biological sense. In order for a particular species to preserve itself — and to grow in its power —, it must grasp in its conception of reality so much that is calculable and constant that a scheme of its conduct can be constructed upon it. *The utility of preservation, not* some abstract-theoretical need not to be deceived, stands as the motive behind the development of the organs of knowledge… they develop in such a way that their observation suffices to preserve us. In other words: the

measure of the will to know depends upon the measure of the growth of the species' *will to power*: a species seizes so much reality *in order to become master over it, in order to take it into service*.

the mechanistic concept of *motion* is already a translation of the original process into the *sign-language of eye and touch*.

the concept "atom," the distinction between a "seat of the driving force and the force itself," is a *sign-language derived from our logical-psychical world*.

It is not at our discretion to change our means of expression: it is possible to comprehend to what extent it is mere semiotics.

The demand for an *adequate mode of expression* is *senseless*: it lies in the essence of a language, of a means of expression, to express a mere relation… The concept "truth" is *absurd*… the whole realm of "true" and "false" refers only to relations between beings, not to the "in-itself"… *Nonsense*: there is no "being in itself," it is relations that first constitute beings, just as little as there can be a "knowledge in itself"…

123.

Countermovement

Anti-Darwin.

What surprises me most when I survey the great destinies of man is always to see before my eyes the opposite of what Darwin and his school see today, or *want* to see: selection in favour of the stronger, the better-off, the progress of the species. Precisely the opposite is palpable: the striking-out of the lucky strokes, the uselessness of the more highly turned-out types, the inevitable mastery of the middling, even of the *below-middling* types. Unless someone shows us the reason why man should be the exception among creatures, I incline to the

prejudice that Darwin's school has been mistaken everywhere. That will to power in which I recognize the ultimate ground and character of all change puts into our hands the means of explaining why selection in favour of the exceptions and lucky strokes does not take place: the strongest and most fortunate are weak when they have organized herd instincts against them, when they have against them the timidity of the weak, of the majority. My overall view of the world of values shows that in the highest values which are hung up over mankind today it is *not* the lucky strokes, the selection types, that have the upper hand: rather the types of décadence — perhaps there is nothing more interesting in the world than this *undesired* spectacle…

Strange as it sounds: one must always arm the strong against the weak; the fortunate against the unfortunate; the healthy against the degenerating and the hereditarily tainted. If one wishes to formulate reality as a *morality*, this morality runs: the middling are worth more than the exceptions, the products of decadence more than the middling, the will to nothingness has the upper hand over the will to life — and the overall goal is

now, expressed in Christian,

Buddhist, Schopenhauerian terms:

better *not* to be than to be

Against this formulating of reality as morality I *rebel*: that is why I abhor Christianity with a deadly hatred, because it created the sublime words and gestures to cloak a horrible reality in the mantle of right, of virtue, of divinity…

I see all philosophers, I see science on its knees before the reality of a struggle for existence that is the *reverse* of the one Darwin's school teaches — namely, that everywhere those come out on top, those survive, who compromise life, the value of life. — The error of Darwin's

school became a problem for me: how can one be so blind as to see wrongly precisely *here*?… That *species* represent progress is the most unreasonable assertion in the world: for the time being they represent a level, —

that the higher organisms have developed out of the lower has not yet been attested by a single case —

I see that the lower predominate through their numbers, through their cleverness, through their cunning — I do not see how a chance variation yields an advantage, at least not for so long a time; that would again be a new motive requiring explanation, why a chance variation has become so strong —

— I find the "cruelty of nature", of which so much is said, in another place: she is cruel towards her children of fortune, she spares and protects and loves les humbles — just as — — —

*

In sum: the growth of the *power* of a species is perhaps less guaranteed by the preponderance of its children of fortune, of its strong ones, than by the preponderance of the middling and lower types… In the latter lies the great fertility, the duration; with the former the danger grows, the rapid devastation, the swift diminution of numbers.

*

124.

Countermovement

On the Origin of Religion

In the same way in which the uneducated man still believes today that anger is the cause of his being angry, spirit the cause of his thinking, soul the cause of his feeling — in short, just as even now a mass of

psychological entities is unhesitatingly posited that are supposed to be causes: so man, at a still more naive stage, explained these very same phenomena with the help of psychological personal entities. The states that seemed strange, ravishing, overwhelming to him he interpreted as obsession and enchantment under the power of a person. Thus the Christian, today the most naive and regressed kind of man, traces hope, calm, the feeling of "redemption" back to a psychological inspiration by God: for him, as an essentially suffering and disquieted type, the feelings of happiness, elevation and calm quite reasonably appear as the *strange*, as what stands in need of explanation. Among clever, strong and vital races it was above all the epileptic who aroused the conviction that a *foreign power* was at play here; but every related unfreedom too, e.g. that of the enthusiast, the poet, the great criminal, of passions such as love and revenge, serves for the invention of extra-human powers. One concretes a state into a person: and asserts that this state, when it appears in us, is the effect of that person. In other words: in the psychological formation of gods a state, in order to be an effect, is personified as a cause.

The psychological logic is this: the *feeling of power*, when it suddenly and overwhelmingly comes over a man — and this is the case in all great affects — arouses in him a doubt about his own person: he does not dare think himself the cause of this astonishing feeling — and so he posits a *stronger* person, a deity, for this case.

In sum: the origin of religion lies in the extreme feelings of power which surprise man as *foreign*: and like the sick man who feels one of his limbs to be too heavy and strange and concludes that another man is lying on top of him, the naive homo religiosus divides himself into *several persons*. Religion is a case of "altération de la personnalité". A kind of feeling of *fear* and *terror* before oneself…

But equally an extraordinary feeling of *happiness and elevation*…

among the sick the *feeling of health* suffices for believing in God, in the nearness of God

125.

Rudimentary Psychology of the Religious Man

all changes are effects,

all effects are effects of will. The concept "nature", "law of nature", is lacking.

to every effect belongs a doer

rudimentary psychology: one is oneself a cause only in the case where one knows that one has willed.

Result: the states of power impute to man the feeling of *not* being the cause, of being *unaccountable* for them

: they come without being willed: consequently we are not their originators

: the unfree will (i.e. the consciousness of a change in us without our having willed it) requires a *foreign* will

Consequence: man has not dared to ascribe all his strong and astonishing moments *to himself* — he has conceived them as "passive", as "suffered", as being overpowered

: religion is the offspring of a *doubt* about the unity of the person, an altération of the personality

: inasmuch as everything great and strong was conceived by man as *superhuman*, as *foreign*, man belittled himself — he divided the two sides, a very wretched and weak one and a very strong and astonishing one, into two spheres, and called the first "man", the second "God".

He has always continued to do so; in the period of *moral idiosyncrasy* he did not interpret his high and sublime moral states as "willed", as the "work" of the person. The Christian too divides his person into a mean and weak fiction which he calls man and another which he calls God (Redeemer, Saviour) —

Religion has debased the concept "man"; its extreme consequence is that everything good, great, true is superhuman and bestowed only through a grace…

126.

Countermovement: Religion

Morality as an Attempt to Restore Human Pride

The theory of "free will" is antireligious. It seeks to create for man a right to think of himself as the cause of his high states and actions; it is a form of the growing *feeling of pride*

Man feels his power, his "happiness," as they say: there must be "will" before this state — otherwise it does not belong to him

virtue is the attempt to posit a fact of willing and having-willed as the necessary antecedent of every high and strong feeling of happiness

if the will to certain actions is regularly present in consciousness, then a feeling of power may be interpreted as its effect

This is a mere *optics of psychology*: always under the false presupposition that nothing belongs to us which we do not have in consciousness as willed

The whole doctrine of responsibility hangs on this naive psychology, that only the will is a cause and that one must know one has willed in order to be permitted to believe *oneself* a cause

man may have respect for himself only insofar as he is virtuous.

Then comes the countermovement: that of the moral philosophers, still under the same prejudice, that one is responsible only for what one has willed.

The value of man posited as *moral value*: consequently his morality must be a causa prima

consequently there must be a principle in man, a "free will" as causa prima

Here there is always the ulterior thought: if man is not causa prima as will, then he is irresponsible — consequently he does not belong before the moral tribunal at all — virtue or vice would be automatic or mechanical…

In summa: in order that man may have respect for himself, he must be capable of becoming evil as well

127.

A form of religion for producing the pride of a people

Another way of drawing man out of his abasement, which the departure of the high and strong states, as alien states, brought with it, was the theory of kinship

: these high and strong states could at least be interpreted as influences of our ancestors; we belonged to one another, in solidarity; we grow in our own eyes by acting according to a norm known to us.

Attempt of noble families to reconcile religion with their self-esteem

The transfiguration, the temporary metamorphosis

— The poets and seers do the same: they feel proud to be deemed worthy and *chosen* for such intercourse — they set store by not counting at all as individuals, by being mere mouthpieces (Homer)

Yet another form of religion. The god chooses, the god becomes man, or God dwells together with men and leaves behind great benefactions, the local legend, eternally represented as "drama"

Gradual taking-possession of one's high and proud states, taking-possession of one's actions and works

— formerly one believed one honoured oneself if one knew oneself not responsible for the highest things one did, but rather — God —

the *unfreedom of the will* counted as that which lent an action a higher value: in those days a god was made its author…

128.

Will to power — Morality

Play-acting as a consequence of the morality of "free will"

It is a step in the *development of the feeling of power* itself to have also caused one's high states (one's perfection) oneself — consequently, one at once concluded, to have *willed* them…

Critique: all perfect doing is precisely unconscious and no longer willed; consciousness expresses an imperfect and often morbid personal state. *Personal perfection as conditioned by will*, as *consciousness*, as reason with dialectic, is a caricature, a kind of self-contradiction… The degree of consciousness indeed makes perfection *impossible*… A form of *play-acting*…

129.

Philosophy as décadence

Why everything came down to play-acting.

The rudimentary psychology which reckoned only the *conscious* moments of man as causes, which took "consciousness" as an attribute of the soul, which sought a will (i.e., an intention) behind all doing

: it needed only to answer: first, *what does man want?*

Answer: *happiness* (— one was not permitted to say "power": that would have been *immoral*) — consequently in all of man's acting there is an intention of attaining happiness by it

— secondly, if man in fact does not attain happiness, what is the reason? Mistakes with regard to the means.

What is infallibly the means to happiness? Answer: *virtue*.

Why virtue? Because it is the highest rationality, and because rationality makes impossible the error of mistaking the means

as *reason*, virtue is the way to happiness…

dialectic is the constant craft of virtue, because it excludes all clouding of the intellect, all affects

In fact man does *not* want "happiness"…

Pleasure is a feeling of power: if one excludes the affects, one excludes the states that give the highest feeling of power, and consequently pleasure.

the highest rationality is a cold, clear state, far from giving that feeling of happiness which *intoxication* of every kind brings with it…

the ancient philosophers combated everything that intoxicates — everything that impairs the absolute coldness and neutrality of consciousness…

they were consistent, on the basis of their false presupposition: that consciousness is the *high*, the *supreme* state, the precondition of perfection,

whereas the opposite is *true* - - -

Insofar as there is willing, insofar as there is knowing, there is no perfection in doing of any kind. The ancient philosophers were the *greatest bunglers in practice*, because they condemned themselves theoretically to *bungling*… In praxi everything came down to play-acting: — and whoever saw through it, Pyrrho for example, judged as everyone did, namely that in goodness and integrity the "little people" are far above the philosophers

All the deeper natures of antiquity felt disgust at the *philosophers of virtue*:

one saw in them squabblers and actors.

Judgement on *Plato*:

on the part of *Epicurus*

on the part of *Pyrrho*

Result: in the practice of life, in patience, goodness and mutual furtherance, the little people are above them: roughly the judgement that Dostoevsky or Tolstoy claims for his muzhiks: they are more philosophical in practice, they have a more courageous way of coming to terms with what is necessary…

130.

Countermovement: religion

Morality as décadence

Reaction of the *little people*:

love gives the highest feeling of power

To be understood: to what extent it is not man in general but a type of man that speaks here. This is to be dug out more closely

"we are divine in love, we become 'children of God', God loves us and wants nothing at all from us but love"

that is to say: all morality, all obeying and doing, does not produce that feeling of power and freedom which love produces

— out of love one does nothing bad, one does much more than one would do out of obedience and virtue —

— here the happiness of the herd, the feeling of community in great things and small, the living feeling of oneness, is felt as the *sum of the feeling of life*

— helping and caring and being useful continually arouse the feeling of power; visible success, the expression of joy, underscores the feeling of power

— pride is not lacking, as a congregation, as the dwelling-place of God, as the "chosen". —

In fact man has once again undergone an *alteration of personality*: this time he called his feeling of love God

one must imagine an awakening of such a feeling, a kind of rapture, a strange speech, a "gospel" —

it was this novelty that did not permit him to ascribe love to himself —: he believed that God walked before him and had come alive within him —

"God comes to men", the "neighbour" is transfigured, into a god (insofar as the feeling of love is released in him) *Jesus is the neighbour*,

just as the latter was reconceived as the godhead, as the cause *that arouses the feeling of power*

131.

Science and Philosophy

Scientific spirit: as *drill* or as

instinct.

In the Greek philosophers I see a *decline of the instincts*: otherwise they could not have blundered so badly as to rank the *conscious* state as the *more valuable*

the *intensity* of *consciousness* stands in *inverse* proportion to the ease and speed of cerebral transmission.

There the *inverse opinion* about instinct reigned: which is always the sign of *weakened* instincts.

We must in fact seek *perfect life* where it becomes least conscious (i.e., where it least sets before itself its logic, its reasons, its means and intentions, its *usefulness*)

The return to the fact of bon sens, of the bon homme, of "little people" of every kind

integrity and prudence stored up for generations, which never becomes conscious of its principles and even has a slight shudder before principles

the demand for a *reasoning virtue* is not reasonable… A philosopher is compromised by such a demand.

132.

When, through practice over a long chain of generations, enough subtlety, bravery, caution and moderation has been accumulated, then the instinct-power of this incorporated virtue radiates even into the most spiritual things — and that rare phenomenon becomes visible, *intellectual integrity*. It is very rare: it is lacking in the philosophers.

one can weigh the scientific spirit, or, morally expressed, the *intellectual integrity of a thinker*, his subtlety, bravery, caution, moderation become instinct, which translates itself even into the most spiritual things, on a goldsmith's scale: just make him talk morality…

and the most famous philosophers then show that their *scientific spirit* is as yet only a *conscious* affair, a beginning, a "good will", a toil — and that precisely at the moment when their instinct begins to speak, when they moralize, it is all over with the discipline and subtlety of their conscience

the scientific spirit, whether mere drill and outward surface or the end result of a long discipline and *moral exercise*:

in the first case it at once steps aside as deputy when instinct speaks (e.g., the religious instinct or the instinct for the concept of duty)

in the other case it stands in place of these instincts and no longer admits them, feels them as *uncleanliness* and *seductions*…

133.

Anti-Darwin

The *domestication of man*: what definitive value can it have? or does any domestication at all have a definitive value? — There are reasons for denying the latter.

Darwin's school, to be sure, makes great efforts to persuade us of the contrary: it would have it that the *effect of domestication* can become deep, indeed fundamental. For the time being we hold fast to the old view: nothing has been proved so far but an entirely superficial effect through domestication — or else degeneration. And everything that escapes the human hand and breeding returns almost at once to its natural state. The type remains constant: one cannot "dénaturer la nature".

One counts on the struggle for existence, the death of the feeble creatures and the survival of the most robust and best endowed; consequently one imagines a *constant growth of perfection in creatures*. We, on the contrary, have assured ourselves that in the struggle for life chance serves the weak as well as the strong, that cunning often substitutes itself for strength to advantage, that the *fertility* of species stands in a remarkable relation to the *chances of destruction*…

To *natural selection* one attributes at once slow and infinite metamorphoses: one wants to believe that every advantage is inherited and expresses itself ever more strongly in successive generations (whereas heredity is so capricious…); one observes the fortunate adaptations of certain creatures to very particular conditions of life and declares that they were attained through the *influence of milieux*. But one finds examples of *unconscious selection* nowhere (absolutely not at all). The most disparate individuals unite, the extremes mingle into the mass. Everything concurs to maintain the type; creatures that have outward marks protecting them against certain dangers do not lose them when they come into circumstances where they live without danger… When they inhabit places where their coat ceases to conceal them, they by no means grow closer to the milieu.

The *selection of the most beautiful* has been exaggerated in a way that goes far beyond the beauty-drive of our own race! In fact the most

beautiful mates with very disinherited creatures, the greatest with the smallest. Almost always we see male and female profit from every chance encounter and show themselves not at all choosy.

Modification through climate and nourishment. But in truth absolutely indifferent.

There are no *transitional forms*…

Different species traced back to one. Experience says that the union is condemned to sterility and one type becomes master again.

One asserts the growing development of creatures. Every foundation is lacking. Every type has its *limit*: beyond this there is no development. Up to that point, absolute regularity.

The primitive creatures are supposed to be the ancestors of the present ones. But a glance at the fauna and flora of the Tertiary period permits us only to think as of a still unexplored land, where there are types that do not exist elsewhere, and are related to one another, and even those that do exist elsewhere.

My Consequences

My overall view. — First proposition: man as a species is *not* progressing. Higher types are indeed attained, but they do not last. The level of the species is *not* raised.

Second proposition: man as a species represents no progress compared with any other animal. The entire animal and plant world does not develop from the lower to the higher… But everything at once, and over one another and through one another and against one another.

The richest and most complex forms — for the expression "higher type" means no more than this — perish more easily: only the lowest hold fast to an apparent imperishability. The former are rarely at-

tained and keep themselves on top only with difficulty: the latter have a compromising fertility on their side. — In mankind too, amid changing favour and disfavour, the higher types, the lucky strokes of development, perish most easily.

They are exposed to every kind of décadence: they are extreme, and thereby themselves almost décadents already… The brief duration of beauty, of genius, of the Caesar, is sui generis: such things are not inherited. The *type* is inherited; a type is nothing extreme, no "lucky stroke"…

This is due to no particular fatality and "ill will" on nature's part, but simply to the concept "higher type": the higher type represents an incomparably greater complexity — a greater sum of coordinated elements: and with that, disgregation also becomes incomparably more probable.

"Genius" is the most sublime machine there is — consequently the most fragile.

Third proposition: the domestication ("culture") of man does not go deep… Where it goes deep, it is at once degeneration (type: the Christian). The "wild" man (or, morally expressed: the *evil* man) is his return to nature — and, in a certain sense, his restoration, his *cure* from "culture"…

134.

Philosophy as *décadence*

Why are philosophers *slanderers*?

The treacherous and blind hostility of philosophers towards the *senses*

It is *not* the senses that deceive! —

— our nose, of which, so far as I know, no philosopher has ever yet spoken with reverence, is for the time being the most delicate physical instrument there is: it is able to detect vibrations even where the spectroscope is powerless.

How much *rabble and philistine* there is in all this hatred!

The people always regard an abuse whose bad consequences they feel as an *objection* to the thing that has been abused: all insurrectionary movements against principles, whether in the sphere of politics or of economics, always argue in this way, with the ulterior motive of representing an abusus as necessary and inherent to the principle.

It is a *lamentable* story: man seeks a principle from which he can despise man, — he invents a world in order to be able to slander and besmirch this world: in fact he reaches each time for nothingness, and constructs nothingness into "God", into "truth", and in any case into the judge and condemner of *this* existence…

If one wants proof of how deeply and thoroughly the truly *barbaric* needs of man seek satisfaction even in his taming and "civilization": let one look at the "leitmotifs" of the whole development of philosophy. A kind of revenge on reality, a malicious ruination of the valuation in which man lives, an *unsatisfied* soul that feels the conditions of taming as torture and takes its voluptuous delight in a morbid unravelling of all the bonds that tie it.

The history of philosophy is a *secret raging* against the preconditions of life, against the value-feelings of life, against taking sides in favour of life. Philosophers have never hesitated to affirm a world, provided that it contradicts this world, that it furnishes a pretext for speaking ill of this world. It has hitherto been the great *school of slander*: and it has so impressed that even today our science, which presents itself as the advocate of life, has *accepted* the basic position of slander and

treats this world as apparent, this chain of causes as merely phenomenal. *What* is it, really, that hates here?…

I fear it is always *the Circe of philosophers*, morality, that has played this trick on them, of having to be slanderers at all times… They believed in moral "truths", they found there the highest values, — what was left for them but, the more they comprehended existence, the more to say No to it?… for this existence is *immoral*… And this life rests on immoral preconditions: and all morality *negates* life —

— Let us abolish the true world: and in order to be able to do this, we must abolish the highest values hitherto, morality

It suffices to demonstrate that morality too is *immoral*, in the sense in which the immoral has hitherto been condemned. If in this way the tyranny of the values hitherto is broken, if we have abolished the "true world", then a *new order of values* will have to follow of its own accord.

NB NB. The apparent world and the *lying* world: that is the antithesis: the latter has hitherto been called the "true world", "truth", "God". *These* we must abolish.

135.

Logic of my conception:

1.

Morality as the highest value (mistress over *all* phases of philosophy, even of the sceptics): *Result:* this world is good for nothing, it is not the "true world"

2.

What determines the highest value here? What actually is morality? The instinct of décadence; it is the exhausted and the disinherited who in this way *take revenge Historical* proof: the philosophers are always décadents… in the service of the *nihilistic* religions.

3.

The instinct of décadence, which appears as *will to power*. Proof: the absolute *immorality* of the *means* throughout the whole history of morality.

II In the whole movement we have recognized only a *special case* of the *will to power*.

136.

The Will to Power.

Attempt

at a Revaluation of All Values.

I.

Critique of the values hitherto.

II.

The new principle of value.

Morphology of the "will to power"

III.

Question of the value of our modern world

: measured according to this principle

IV.

The great war.

137.

First Book.

which values have hitherto been uppermost.

1. Morality as the highest value, in all phases of philosophy (even among the sceptics)

Result: this world is good for nothing, there must be a "true world"

2. *What* actually determines the highest value here? What actually is morality? The instinct of décadence; it is the exhausted and the disinherited who in this way *take revenge* and play the *masters*…

Historical proof: the philosophers always décadents, always in the service of the nihilistic religions.

3. The instinct of décadence, which appears as will to power. Exhibition of its system of means: absolute immorality of the means.

Overall view: the highest values hitherto are a special case of the will to power; morality itself is a special case of *immorality*.

Second Book.

why the opposing values always succumbed.

1. How was this actually *possible*? Question: why did life, physiological well-constitutedness, succumb everywhere? Why was there no philosophy of *Yes*, no religion of *Yes*?… The historical signs of such movements:

the pagan religion.

Dionysus against the "Crucified"

the Renaissance.

Art —

2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and the rule. There is no doubt *who* is the stronger…

Overall aspect of history. Is man thereby an *exception* in the history of life? — Objection to *Darwinism*. The means of the weak for keeping themselves on top have become instincts, have become "humaneness", have become "institutions"…

3. Proof of this dominion in our political instincts, in our social value judgments, in our arts, in our *science*.

We have seen two "wills to power" in combat; *in the special case*: *we have a principle* for declaring right the one that has hitherto succumbed, and declaring wrong the one that has hitherto triumphed: we have recognized the "true world" as a "*lied-up world*" and morality as a *form of immorality*. We do *not* say: "the stronger is in the wrong"…

Third Book

what is the cause of all values and of the diversity of values

1.

the nihilistic values are on top

2.

the countermovement is always defeated, — soon degenerated…

3.

The countermovement known hitherto only in half and degenerate forms. *Purification* and *restoration* of its type. Precise expression of the system:

Psychology

History

Art

Politics

138.

3. Purification of the hitherto defeated values

We have grasped *what* has hitherto determined the highest value

and *why* it has become master over the opposing valuation

: it was *stronger*…

Let us now purify the *opposing valuation* of the infection and half-heartedness, of the *degeneration* in which it is known to us all.

Theory of its *denaturalization* and *restoration of nature*: *moraline-free*

Theory of knowledge, will to truth

Theory of psychology

Origin of religion

Origin of art

Theory of structures of domination

Theory of life

Life and nature

History of the

countermovements:

Renaissance

Revolution

Emancipation of science

139.

The corrupt and mixed condition of values corresponds to the physiological condition of present-day men: theory of *modernity*

140.

The *instincts of decline* have become master over the *instincts of ascent*…

the *will to nothingness* has become master over the *will to life*…

— is that *true*? is there not perhaps a greater guarantee of life, of the species, in this victory of the weak and the middling?

— is it perhaps only a means in the total movement toward life, a retardation of tempo? a self-defence against something still worse?

— supposing the strong had become masters in everything, in valuations too: let us draw the consequence — how would they think

about sickness, suffering, sacrifice? A *self-contempt of the weak* would be the result; they would seek to disappear and to extinguish themselves… And would this perhaps be *desirable?*…

— and would we really want a world in which the after-effect of the weak, their subtlety, consideration, spirituality, *pliancy*, were lacking?…

141.

Science

Science combated by the philosophers

That is extraordinary. From the beginning of Greek philosophy onward we find a struggle against science, by means of a theory of knowledge, or rather scepticism: and to what end? always in favour of *morality*…

The hatred against the physicists and physicians

Socrates, Aristippus, the Megarians, the Cynics, Epicurus, Pyrrho — a general assault upon knowledge in favour of *morality*…

Hatred against dialectic too…

There remains a problem: they draw near to sophistry in order to be rid of science

On the other hand the physicists are all so far subjugated as to take the schema of truth, of true being, into their foundations: e.g. the atom, the 4 elements (*juxtaposition* of something that is, in order to explain multiplicity and change —)

Contempt taught for the *objectivity* of interest: return to practical interest, to the personal utility of all knowledge…

The struggle against science is directed against

1) its pathos (objectivity),

2) its means (i.e. against its utility

3) its results (as childish

It is the same struggle that is waged again later on the part of the *Church*, in the name of piety:

: it inherits the whole ancient armoury for the struggle.

The theory of knowledge plays the same role here as in Kant, as among the Indians…

One does not want to have to trouble oneself about it: one wants to keep one's hand free for one's "way"

what are they really resisting? Obligation, lawfulness, the compulsion to go hand in hand —

: I believe that is called *freedom*…

In this *décadence* expresses itself: the instinct of solidarity has so degenerated that solidarity is felt as *tyranny*:

: they want

no authority

no solidarity

no falling into rank and file and infinite slowness of movement

they hate the step-by-step, the tempo of science, they hate the not-wanting-to-arrive, the long breath, the personal indifference of the scientific man —.

142.

Theory and *practice*

Fateful distinction, as though there were a distinct *drive to knowledge* which, without regard to questions of use and harm, went blindly straight for the truth: and then, separated from it, the whole world of *practical* interests…

Against this I seek to show what instincts have been active behind all these *pure* theoreticians, — how they all, fatalistically, under the spell of their instincts, went straight for something that was "truth" *for them*, for them and *only* for them. The struggle of systems, together with that of epistemological scruples, is a struggle of quite definite instincts (forms of vitality, of decline, of classes, of races, etc.)

The so-called *drive to knowledge* is to be traced back to a drive to *appropriate* and *overpower*: following this drive the senses, memory, the instincts, etc. have developed…

— the quickest possible reduction of phenomena, economy, the accumulation of the acquired treasure of knowledge (i.e. of world appropriated and made manageable

Morality is so curious a science because it is in the highest degree practical: so that the pure standpoint of knowledge, scientific integrity, is at once abandoned as soon as morality demands its answers.

Morality says: I *need* certain answers, — reasons, arguments. Scruples may come afterwards, or not at all —

"How ought one to act?"

If one now reflects that one is dealing with a sovereignly developed type that has been "acting" for countless millennia, and in which everything has become instinct, purposiveness, automatism, fatality, then the *urgency* of this moral question strikes one as positively comical.

"How ought one to act?" — Morality was always a misunderstanding: in fact a kind that had in its body a fate to act thus and thus wanted to justify itself by *seeking to decree* its norm as the universal norm…

"How ought one to act?" is not a cause but an *effect*. Morality follows; the ideal comes at the end.

On the other hand the appearance of moral scruples, in other words: the *becoming conscious of the values* by which one acts, betrays a certain *morbidity*; strong ages and peoples do not reflect upon their right, upon principles of action, upon instinct and reason —

becoming conscious is a sign that genuine morality, i.e. instinctive certainty of action, is going to the devil…

The moralists, as every time a *new world of consciousness* is created, are signs of an injury, an impoverishment, a disorganization —

the *deeply instinctive* have a shyness of logicizing duties: among them one finds Pyrrhonist opponents of dialectic and of knowability in general… A virtue is *refuted* with an "in order to"…

Thesis: the appearance of the moralists belongs to the times when morality is coming to an end

Thesis: the moralist is a dissolver of the moral instincts, however much he believes himself their restorer

Thesis: what actually guides the moralist are not moral instincts but the *instincts of décadence*, translated into the formulas of morality: he feels the growing uncertainty of the instincts as *corruption*: in fact — — —

Thesis: the *instincts of décadence*, which through the moralists seek to become master over the instinct-morality of strong races and ages, are

1)

the instincts of the weak and the ill-constituted

2)

the instincts of the exceptions, the solitaries, the detached, of the abortus in high and low

3)

the instincts of the habitually suffering, who need a noble interpretation of their condition and therefore may be physiologists as little as possible

Morality as *décadence*

143.

A philosopher is clever when he is "impractical": he awakens belief in his genuineness, simplicity, innocence in dealing with thoughts, — impractical in his case means "objective". Schopenhauer was clever when he once had himself photographed with his waistcoat wrongly buttoned: he was saying thereby: "I do not belong in this world: what does the convention of parallel seams and buttons matter to a philosopher!… I am too objective for that!…"

It is not enough to prove that one is *impractical*: most philosophers believe they have thereby done enough to raise the objectivity and purity of reason above all doubt.

1. The supposedly pure drive to knowledge of all philosophers is commanded by their moral "truths", — is only apparently independent…

2. the "moral truths" "thus *ought* one to act" are mere forms of consciousness of an instinct that is growing weary: "thus and thus *is* it done among us". The "ideal" is meant to restore an instinct, to strengthen it: it flatters man to be obedient where he is merely an automaton.

144.

Wherever there is a certain unity in the grouping, *spirit* has always been posited as the cause of this coordination: for which every reason is lacking. Why should the idea of a complex fact be one of the conditions of that fact? or why must the representation of a complex fact precede it? —

We shall beware of explaining purposiveness through spirit: there is no reason whatever to ascribe to spirit the peculiar property of organizing and systematizing.

The nervous system has a far more extensive realm: the world of consciousness is an addition. In the total process of adaptation and systematization it plays no part.

Nothing is more erroneous than to make of psychical and physical phenomena the two faces, the two revelations of one and the same substance. Nothing is explained by this: the concept "substance" is utterly useless when one wishes to explain.

Consciousness, in a secondary role, almost indifferent, superfluous, destined perhaps to disappear and to make way for a perfect automatism —

When we observe only the inner phenomena, we are comparable to the deaf-mutes who guess from the movement of the lips the words they do not hear. From the appearances of the inner sense we infer visible and other phenomena, which we would perceive if our means of observation were adequate, and which are called the nervous current.

145.

That a world for which we lack all the finer organs, so that we still feel a *thousandfold complexity* as a unity, so that we invent a causality

into it where every ground of motion and change remains invisible to us (the succession of thoughts, of feelings, is after all only their becoming-visible in consciousness; that this sequence should have anything to do with a causal chain is wholly unbelievable: consciousness never furnishes us with a single example of cause and effect) — — —

146.

Science against Philosophy

The monstrous blunders:

1)

the absurd *overestimation of consciousness*, a unity made of it, a being made of it, "the spirit", "the soul", something that feels, thinks, wills —

2)

spirit as *cause*, especially wherever purposiveness, system, coordination appear

3)

consciousness as the highest attainable form, as the supreme kind of being, as "God"

4)

will read in wherever there is effect

5)

the "true world" as a spiritual world, as accessible through facts of consciousness

6)

knowledge absolutely as a faculty of consciousness, wherever

there is knowledge at all

Consequences:

every progress lies in progress toward becoming conscious; every regress in becoming unconscious.

One approaches reality, "true being", through dialectic; one *withdraws* from it through instincts, senses, mechanism…

To dissolve man into spirit would mean to make him God: spirit, will, goodness — One

All that is *good* must stem from spirituality, must

be a fact of consciousness

Progress toward the *better* can only be a progress in becoming *conscious*

Becoming unconscious was regarded as falling prey to the *desires* and *senses* — as *becoming bestial*…

The struggle against Socrates, Plato, all the Socratic schools proceeds from the profound instinct that one does not make man *better* by presenting virtue to him as demonstrable and as demanding reasons…

In the end it is the paltry fact that the agonal instinct compelled all these born dialecticians to glorify their *personal faculty* as the *supreme quality*, and to represent all other good as conditioned by it. The *anti-scientific* spirit of this whole "philosophy": *it wants to be in the right*.

147.

The *Struggle of Science*

Sophists

The Sophists are nothing more than realists: they formulate the values and practices current among all to the rank of values, — they have the courage, which all strong spirits have, to *know* their own immorality…

Does one perhaps believe that these little Greek free cities, which would gladly have devoured one another out of rage and jealousy, were guided by philanthropic and upright principles? Does one perhaps reproach Thucydides for the speech he puts into the mouths of the Athenian envoys when they negotiate with the Melians over destruction or submission?

In the midst of this terrible tension, to speak of virtue was possible only for consummate Tartuffes — or for those *set apart*, hermits, fugitives and emigrants from reality… all people who negated in order to be able to live themselves —

The Sophists were Greeks: when Socrates and Plato took the side of virtue and justice, they were *Jews* or I know not what — *Grote*'s tactic in defending the Sophists is wrong: he wants to raise them to men of honour and standard-bearers of morality — but their honour was precisely not to practise any swindle with grand words and virtues…

148.

Parmenides said "one does not think that which is not" — we are at the other end and say "what can be thought must surely be a fiction". Thinking has no grip on the real, but only on — — —

149.

The followers of Pyrrho also occupied themselves with the *Jews*, especially Hecataeus of Abdera, who lived at the Egyptian court and wrote on the philosophy of the Egyptians.

150.

"For practical life a faith is necessary"

151.

"improvement"

Morality as décadence

The universal deception and deceit in the domain of so-called moral improvement. We do not believe that a man becomes another if he is not already that other: i.e. if he is not, as happens often enough, a multiplicity of persons, at least of beginnings of persons. In that case one achieves that another role steps into the foreground, that "the old man" is pushed back… The aspect is altered, not the essence… Not even this is always achieved, that it abolishes the habituation to a certain doing, removes the best ground for it. He who is a criminal by fatum and by capacity unlearns nothing, but keeps learning more: and a long deprivation even acts as a tonicum upon his talent… That someone ceases to do certain actions is a mere fatum brutum which admits of the most various interpretations. For society, to be sure, precisely this alone is of interest, that someone no longer does certain actions: to this end it removes him from the conditions in which he *can* do certain actions: this is in any case wiser than attempting the impossible, namely to break the fatality of his being-thus-and-so.

The Church — and it has done nothing but relieve and inherit ancient philosophy in this — proceeding from another standard of value and wishing to save a "soul", the "salvation" of a soul, believes first in the atoning power of punishment and then in the effacing power of forgiveness: both are deceptions of religious prejudice — punishment does not atone, forgiveness does not efface, what is done is not made undone. That someone forgets something by no means achieves that

something no longer *is*… A deed draws its consequences, in man and outside man, regardless of whether it counts as punished, "atoned", "forgiven" or "effaced", regardless of whether the Church has meanwhile promoted its doer himself to a saint. The Church believes in things that do not exist, in "souls"; it believes in effects that do not exist, in divine effects; it believes in states that do not exist, in sin, in redemption, in the salvation of the soul; everywhere it stops at the surface, at signs, gestures, words, emblems, to which it gives an arbitrary interpretation: it possesses a methodology of psychological counterfeiting thought through to the end.

152.

Will to power as *knowledge*

not to "know," but to schematize, to impose upon chaos as much regularity and as many forms as suffice for our practical need

In the formation of reason, of logic, of the categories, need was the decisive factor: the need not to "know," but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of communication, of calculation…

the arranging, the inventing-into-the-similar, the same — the very process that every sense impression undergoes is the development of reason!

Here no pre-existent "idea" was at work: but rather utility, the fact that only when we see things coarsened and made equal do they become calculable and manageable for us…

the *finality* in reason is an effect, not a cause: with every other kind of reason, toward which there are continual beginnings, life fails, — it becomes unsurveyable — too unequal —

The categories are "truths" only in the sense that they are conditions of life for us: just as Euclidean space is such a conditional "truth."

(Speaking in itself, since no one will uphold the necessity that there should be human beings at all, reason, like Euclidean space, is a mere idiosyncrasy of certain species of animal, and one among many others…)

The subjective compulsion not to be able to contradict here is a biological compulsion: the instinct of utility, to infer as we infer, is lodged in our body, we almost *are* this instinct… But what naïveté, to draw from this a proof that we thereby possess a "truth in itself"…

Not-being-able-to-contradict proves an incapacity, not a "truth."

*

One must not seek phenomenalism in the wrong place: nothing is more phenomenal (or more plainly so), nothing is so much *deception*, as this inner world which we observe with the famous "inner sense."

We have believed in the will as cause, to such a degree that, on the basis of our personal experience, we have put a cause into events at all (i.e., intention as the cause of events —)

We believe that thought and thought, as they follow one after another in us, stand in some causal concatenation: the logician in particular, who in fact speaks of nothing but cases that never occur in reality, has grown accustomed to the prejudice that thoughts *cause* thoughts, — he calls this — thinking…

We believe — and even our physiologists still believe it — that pleasure and pain are causes of reactions, that it is the meaning of pleasure and pain to give occasion for reactions. For millennia, pleasure and the avoidance of displeasure have been set up outright as the *motives* of every action. With some reflection we might admit that everything would proceed just the same, according to exactly the same concatenation of causes and effects, if these states "pleasure and pain" were

absent: and one simply deceives oneself in asserting that they cause anything at all: — they are *accompanying phenomena* with an altogether different finality than that of calling forth reactions; they are already effects within the initiated process of reaction…

In summa: everything that becomes conscious is a terminal phenomenon, a conclusion — and causes nothing — every succession in consciousness is completely atomistic. And we have attempted to understand the world with the *reverse* conception, — as though nothing were effective and real but thinking, feeling, willing…

153.

science

Chapter I

Origin of the "*true world*"

The aberration of philosophy rests on this: that instead of seeing in logic and the categories of reason means for arranging the world for purposes of utility (thus, "in principle," for a useful *falsification*), one believed one possessed in them the criterion of truth, or rather of *reality*. The "criterion of truth" was in fact merely the *biological utility of such a system of falsification in principle*: and since a species of animal knows nothing more important than to preserve itself, one might indeed speak here of "truth." The naïveté was only this: to take the anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the *measure of things*, as the rule for "real" and "unreal": in short, to make something conditional absolute. And behold, now all at once the world fell apart into a true world and an "apparent" one: and precisely the world which man had invented his reason to dwell in and to settle himself in, precisely that same world was discredited for him. Instead of using the forms as a handle for making the world manageable and calculable for oneself, the in-

sane acuity of the philosophers hit upon the idea that in these categories the concept of that world is given to which the other world, the one in which one lives, does not correspond… The means were misunderstood as a measure of value, even as a condemnation of the intention…

The intention was to deceive oneself in a useful way: the means to this, the invention of formulas and signs with whose help one reduced the confusing multiplicity to a purposive and manageable schema.

But alas! now a *moral category* was brought into play: no being wants to deceive itself, no being may deceive, — consequently there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?

The law of contradiction supplied the schema: the true world, to which one seeks the way, cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot become, has no origin and no end.

This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the true fatality of error on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion of reality in the forms of reason, whereas one had them in order to become master over reality, in order to *misunderstand* reality in a clever way…

And behold: now the world became false, and precisely on account of the qualities *that constitute its reality*: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war

And now the whole fatality was there:

1) how does one get free of the false, the merely apparent world? (— it was the real, the only one

2) how does one oneself become as far as possible the opposite of the character of the apparent world? (concept of the perfect being as an opposite to every real being, more plainly as *contradiction of life*…

3) the whole direction of values aimed at *slander of life*

4) one created a confusion of idealist dogmatism with knowledge in general: so that the *opposing party* now always abhorred *science* as well

- - - the way to science was in this manner *doubly* barred: once by the belief in the true world, and then by the opponents of this belief.

Natural science, physiology was 1) condemned in its objects 2) robbed of its innocence…

In the real world, where absolutely everything is linked and conditioned, to condemn and *think away* anything means to think away and condemn everything.

The phrase "that should not be," "that ought not to have been" is a *farce*… If one thinks the consequences through, one would ruin the source of life if one sought to abolish what is in any sense *harmful, destructive*. Physiology, after all, demonstrates it *better*!

154.

Morality as décadence

We see how *morality*

a)

poisons the whole conception of the world

b)

cuts off the way to knowledge, to *science*

c)

dissolves and undermines all real instincts (by teaching that their roots be felt as *immoral*

We see a fearful instrument of décadence at work before us, which keeps itself upright with the holiest names and gestures

155.

décadence

Religion as décadence

Against remorse and its purely psychological treatment (I recommend treating the *sting of conscience* with the *Mitchell cure* — —)

Not being able to have done with an experience is already a sign of décadence. This tearing open of old wounds again, this wallowing in self-contempt and contrition, is one more sickness, out of which never the "salvation of the soul" but only ever a new form of its sickness can arise…

these "states of redemption" in the Christian are mere alternations of one and the same morbid state, — interpretations of the epileptic crisis under a particular formula, supplied *not* by science but by religious delusion.

one is *good* in a morbid manner when one is sick… we now reckon the greater part of the psychological apparatus with which Christianity has worked among the forms of hysteria and of epilepsoidism.

this whole practice of spiritual restoration must be set back upon a *physiological* foundation: the "sting of conscience" as such is a hindrance to recovery, — one must seek to counterbalance everything by new actions and, as quickly as possible, the infirmity of *self-torture*…

one ought to bring the purely psychological practice of the Church and the sects into disrepute as dangerous to health…

one does not heal a sick man by prayers and by the exorcism of evil spirits: the states of "calm" that set in under such influences are far from inspiring confidence in the physiological sense…

one is *healthy* when one laughs at one's own earnestness and zeal, with which some particular detail of our life has so *hypnotized* us, when at the sting of conscience one feels something like a dog's biting upon a stone, — when one is ashamed of one's remorse, —

The practice hitherto, the purely psychological and religious one, aimed only at a *change of symptoms*: it held a man to be restored when he abased himself before the Cross and swore oaths to be a good man… But a criminal who with a certain sombre earnestness holds fast to his fate and does not slander his deed after the fact has *more health of soul*… The criminals with whom Dostoevsky lived together in the penitentiary were, one and all, unbroken natures, — are they not worth a hundred times more than a "broken" Christian?

156.

The Will to Power

Attempt

at a revaluation of all values.

First Chapter:

the true and the apparent world

Second Chapter:

how is such a blunder possible? What does the will to misunderstand life signify?

Critique of the philosophers, as types of décadence.

Third Chapter.

Morality as the expression of décadence.

Critique of altruism, of pity, of Christianity, of desensualization

Fourth Chapter.

Are there no beginnings of a *contrary* position?

1. The pagan in religion

2. "art"

3. The State

The war against them: what always *conspires* against them…

Fifth Chapter.

Critique of the present: where does it belong?

its nihilistic badge

its *yes-saying* types: one must grasp the *tremendous fact* that a *good conscience of science* exists…

Sixth Chapter.

The will to power, as life

Seventh Chapter.

We Hyperboreans.

Nothing but absolute positions, e.g. *happiness*!! e.g. history a tremendous enjoyment and triumph at the end, *to have nothing but clear Yeses and Noes*… Redemption from *uncertainty*!

157.

Morality as décadence

décadence

"*Senses*", "*Passions*"

Fear of the senses, of the desires, of the passions, when it goes so far as to *counsel against* them, is already a symptom of *weakness*: extreme measures always mark abnormal states. What is lacking here, or rather *crumbling*, is the strength to *inhibit* an impulse: if one has the instinct of having to yield, i.e. of *having* to react, then one does well to avoid the occasions ("seductions").

A "stimulus of the senses" is a *seduction* only insofar as it concerns beings whose system is too easily moved and determined: in the opposite case, where the system is very sluggish and hard, strong stimuli are needed to set the functions going…

Debauchery is for us an objection only against him who has no right to it; and almost all the passions have been brought into ill repute on account of those who are not strong enough to turn them *to their own advantage* —

One must come to an understanding that whatever may be objected against *sickness* can be objected against *passion*: nevertheless — we could not do without sickness, and still less without the passions…

We *need* the abnormal, we give life a tremendous choc through these great sicknesses…

*

In particular, one must distinguish

1) the *dominant passion*, which even brings with it the supremest form of health altogether: here the coordination of the inner systems and

their working in One service is best achieved — but that is almost the definition of health!

2) the opposition of the passions to one another, the twoness, threeness, manyness of "souls in One breast": very unhealthy, inner ruin, disintegrating, betraying and intensifying an inner discord and anarchism —: unless one passion at last becomes master. *Return of health* —

3) the side-by-side, *without* being against-one-another or for-one-another: often periodic, and then, as soon as it has found an order, healthy too… The most interesting men belong here, the chameleons; they are not in contradiction with themselves, they are happy and secure, but they have no development, — their states lie side by side, even if they are seven times separated. They change, they do not *become*…

158.

Morality as *décadence*

The "good man" as *tyrant*

Mankind has always repeated the same mistake: that it has made of a means to life a *standard* of life

: that, instead of finding the measure in the highest enhancement of life itself, in the problem of growth and exhaustion, it has used the *means* to a quite particular life for the exclusion of all other forms of life, in short for the critique and selection of life

: i.e. man at last loves the means for their own sake and *forgets* them as means: so that they now enter his consciousness as goals, as standards of ends…

: i.e. *a particular species of man* treats its conditions of existence as conditions to be imposed by law, as "truth", "good", "perfect": it *tyrannizes*…

: it is a *form of faith*, of instinct, that a kind of man does not perceive the conditionality of its own kind, its relativity in comparison with others:

: at least it seems to be over with a kind of man (people, race) when it becomes tolerant, grants equal rights, and no longer thinks of wanting to be master —

159.

Religion as décadence

Critique of faith

Conviction and lie.

1. "Between a lie and a conviction there exists an opposition": there is none greater…

2. But it has rightly been said that convictions are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies (H.AH.)

3. Ought perhaps the conviction stated first also to be counted among the enemies of truth? And among its most dangerous?

Every conviction has its history, its preliminary forms, its tentatives and blunders: it becomes a conviction after it has long *not* been one and has for *longer still scarcely* been one…

might not the lie, too, be among these embryonic states of conviction?…

it often requires a change of persons (— only in the son does that become conviction which in the father was still a tendency —)

What is it that makes a liar sell us an error as a truth? His "practical reason" (— his advantage, to speak more popularly)

What is it that makes one decide between different possibilities? One's practical reason, one's advantage…

What is it that makes one choose this way or that between different hypotheses? Advantage.

What difference remains between one who is convinced and one who has been lied to? None, if he has been lied to well.

What is it, what determines all philosophers to take their convictions for truths? Their advantage, their "practical reason"

Fiction, usefulness, conjecture, probability, certainty, conviction — a history of the inner pathos, at whose beginning stands the lie, its god…

"I want to hold something to be true": is that the instinct for truth, or is it not rather another instinct, one that takes truth very lightly but knows the advantage that belief brings with it?…

Supposing one has an advantage in lying to oneself, in what does the pathos of self-deceivedness differ from the pathos of conviction?…

In faith, as Christianity understands it, is it cleverness or truth that has been brought to dominion? The proof of strength (i.e., of the advantages that a faith brings with it), or the — — —

And what makes martyrs, is that the instinct for truth, or is it not, on the contrary, a gap in the inner organization, the lack of such an instinct? We regard martyrs as a lower species: to prove a conviction makes no sense at all; what matters, rather, is to prove that one has a right to be so convinced… Conviction is an objection, a question mark, a défi; one has to prove that one is not merely convinced — that one is not merely a *fool*…

death on the cross proves no truth, only a conviction, only an idiosyncrasy (— a very popular error: to have the courage of one's conviction —? but rather to have the courage for an attack on one's conviction!!!

160.

Religion as décadence — *conviction*

Critique of Sacrificial Death

Today we would go to our deaths for many things without taking this sacrifice very solemnly; it is far from us to make idols of such things merely because they demand human lives… The famous "fatherland," for example, a concept for which a peculiarly high price is paid in Europe today: the still more famous "science," which, as I presume, may at some point become even more costly than the concept "fatherland"

A death for a — — —

Is it necessary to be right in order to stay in the right? On the contrary! And apart from that, it means being immodest. One must not want too much honour… But all these great sages were modest: — they merely stayed in the right…

You think a cause becomes *honourable* because you pay for it with your life?… An error that becomes honourable is an error that possesses one more art of seduction! Do you believe that we shall wish to encourage you to a sacrificial death for your "truth"?… Precisely this was the world-historical stupidity of all persecutors: they forced their opponents to become heroes… they have made all stupidities into fetishes for mankind… *Woman* still lies on her knees today before a doctrine whose teacher died on the cross… is the cross a proof?

A certain degree of faith suffices for us today as an *objection* to what is believed, still more as a question mark against the mental health of

the believer: "rock-solid convictions" almost always belong in the madhouse.

161.

I do not at all see how someone can make it good again who has neglected to go to a *good school* at the right time. Such a one does not know himself; he goes through life without having learned to walk; the slack muscle still betrays itself at every step. Now and then life is merciful enough to make up for this hard schooling: years of sickness, perhaps, which challenge the utmost strength of will and self-sufficiency; or a suddenly descending state of need, for wife and child as well, which compels an activity that gives energy back to the slackened fibres and *wins back toughness* for the will to life… What remains most desirable under all circumstances is a hard discipline *at the right time*, that is to say, still at that age when it makes one proud to see much demanded of oneself. For this is what distinguishes the hard school, as a good school, from every other: that much is demanded; that it is demanded strictly; that the good, the excellent itself, is demanded as normal; that praise is rare, that indulgence is lacking; that censure is voiced sharply, objectively, without regard for talent and origin. Such a school is necessary in every respect: this holds of what is most bodily as of what is most spiritual: it would be fateful to want to make a separation here! The same discipline makes the soldier and the scholar capable: and looked at more closely, there is no capable scholar who does not have the instincts of a capable soldier in his body… to stand in rank and file, yet capable at any time of going on ahead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh the permitted and the forbidden on a shopkeeper's scale; to be more hostile to the mean, the sly, the parasitic than to the evil…

— What does one *learn* in a hard school? To *obey* and to *command*, — — —

162.

Philosopher

Pyrrho, the gentlest and most patient man who ever lived among the Greeks, a Buddhist although a Greek, a Buddha himself, was once, a single time, driven out of all bounds — by whom? — by his sister, with whom he lived: she was a midwife. Ever since, philosophers have feared nothing so much as the sister — the sister! Sister! it sounds so dreadful! — *and* the midwife!… (Origin of celibacy)

163.

(For the chapter: Religion as décadence)

Religious Morality

Affect, great desire, the passions of power, of love, of revenge, of possession —: the moralists want to extinguish them, tear them out, "cleanse" the soul of them

The logic is: these desires often wreak great havoc, — consequently they are evil, reprehensible. Man must get free of them: before that he cannot be a *good* man…

This is the same logic as: "if a member offend thee, pluck it out." In the particular case that that dangerous "innocent from the country," the founder of Christianity, recommended to his disciples for practice, the case of sexual irritability, what unfortunately follows is not only that a member is missing, but that the character of the man is *emasculated*… and the same holds of the moralists' madness which, instead of the taming of the passions, demands their extirpation. Their conclusion is always: only the emasculated man is the good man.

The great sources of strength, those wild waters of the soul that so often gush forth so dangerously and overwhelmingly — instead of

taking their power into service and *economizing* it, this most short-sighted and most pernicious way of thinking, the moral way of thinking, wants to make them *run dry*

164.

The Christian Moral Quacks

Pity and contempt follow one another in quick alternation, and at times I am indignant, as at the sight of a vile crime. Here error has been made a duty — a virtue — the blunder has become a technique, the instinct of destruction systematized as "redemption"; here every operation becomes an injury, an excision even of organs whose energy is the precondition of any return of health. And at best, there is no healing, but merely one series of symptoms of the ill exchanged for another… And this dangerous nonsense, the system of defilement and castration of life, counts as holy, as inviolable; to live in its service, to be an instrument of this art of healing, to be a *priest*, sets one apart, makes one venerable, makes one holy and inviolable oneself. Only the deity can be the author of this highest art of healing: only as revelation is redemption comprehensible, as a kind of grace, as the most unmerited gift bestowed upon the creature.

First proposition: the health of the soul is regarded as sickness, with mistrust…

Second proposition: the preconditions for a strong and flourishing life, the strong cravings and passions, count as objections to a strong and flourishing life

Third proposition: everything from which danger threatens man, everything that can become master over him and ruin him, is evil, is reprehensible, — is to be torn out of his soul by the root.

Fourth proposition: man made harmless, to himself and to others, weak, cast down in humility and modesty, conscious of his weakness, the "sinner" — this is the most desirable type, the one which, with a little surgery of the soul, one can also *produce*…

165.

Courage.

1.

I distinguish courage before persons, courage before things, and courage before paper. The last was, for example, the courage of David Strauss. I distinguish further between courage before witnesses and courage without witnesses: the courage of a Christian, of a believer in God generally, can never be courage without witnesses — by that alone it is already degraded. I distinguish finally between courage from temperament and courage from fear of fear: a particular case of the latter species is moral courage. To this must be added courage from despair.

Wagner as Seducer.

2.

Wagner had this courage. His situation with regard to music was at bottom desperate. He lacked both of the things that equip one to be a *good* musician: nature and culture, the predestination for music and the discipline and schooling for music. He had courage: he made a principle out of this lack — he invented for himself a genre of music. "Dramatic music," as he invented it, is the music that *he was able to make*… its concept is the limits of Wagner.

And he has been misunderstood — Has he been misunderstood?… Five-sixths of modern artists are in his case. Wagner is their saviour: five-sixths, by the way, is the "lowest figure." Every time nature has shown itself inexorable and culture, on the other hand, has remained an accident, a tentative, a dilettantism, the artist now turns with instinct — what am I saying? with enthusiasm — to Wagner: "half she drew him, half he sank," as the poet says.

2.

Wagner's success is a great *seducer*. Let us suppose for once that this seducer learns to speak, that he joins, in the guise of a clever friend and counsellor of conscience, young musicians who carry a little fatality in the depths of their selves — and already we hear him speak, confidingly, in a worthy, honest-man fashion, with an angelic tolerance for all "little fatalities"…

166.

Motif for a picture. A carter. Winter landscape. The carter, with an expression of the most contemptuous cynicism, relieves himself against his own horse. The poor, maltreated creature looks round at it — grateful, very grateful…

167.

Wagner as Problem.

Wagner the Actor.

That which has become popular

Wagner as Model.

Wagner as Seduction.

Music as mimicry. Every thought — — —

168.

The true and the apparent world

Draft of the first chapter

A.

The *seductions* that proceed from this concept are of three kinds:

an *unknown* world: — we are adventurers, curious — the known seems to make us weary (— the danger of the concept lies in its insinuating to us that "this" world is *known*…

an *other* world, where things are otherwise: — something in us reckons it up, our quiet resignation, our silence thereby lose their value — perhaps all will be well, we have not hoped in vain… the world where things are otherwise, where we ourselves — who knows? — are otherwise…

a *true* world: — this is the strangest trick and assault that is made upon us; so much has encrusted itself onto the word "true" that involuntarily we make a present of it to the "true world" as well: the *true* world must also be a *truthful* one, one that does not deceive us, does not make fools of us: to believe in it is almost to *have to* believe (— out of decency, as happens among beings worthy of trust —)

the concept "the unknown world" insinuates to us that *this* world is "known" (— as boring —)

the concept "the other world" insinuates that the world *could be otherwise* — it abolishes necessity and fact (— useless to *resign* oneself, to *adapt* oneself —)

the concept "the true world" insinuates that this world is an untruthful, deceptive, dishonest, inauthentic, inessential one — and *consequently* also a world not well disposed to our advantage (— inadvisable to adapt oneself to it, *better*: to resist it)

we thus *withdraw* ourselves from this world in three ways:

with our *curiosity*, as though the more interesting part were elsewhere

: with our *resignation*, as though it were not necessary to resign oneself — as though this world were not a necessity of the ultimate rank

: with our sympathy and respect: as though this world did not deserve them, as impure, as not honest with us…

In sum: we are in *revolt* in a threefold way: *we have made an x into the critique* of the "known world."

B.

First step of sober reflection: to grasp to what extent we have been *seduced* —

namely, it could in itself be exactly the *reverse*.

a) the *unknown* world could be so constituted as to give us a taste for this world — as a perhaps stupid and lesser form of existence

b) the *other* world, far from taking account of our wishes, which found no fulfilment here, could be among the mass of that which makes *this* world possible for us: to come to know it would be a means of making us content

3) the *true* world: but who actually tells us that the apparent world must be of less value than the true one? Does not our instinct contradict this judgement? Does not man eternally create for himself a fictitious world because he wants to have a better world than reality?…

Above all: how do we come to think that *our* world is *not* the true one?… to begin with, the other world could just as well be the "apparent" one… in fact the Greeks, for example, conceived a *realm of shades*, an *apparent existence* alongside true existence — And finally: what gives us a right to posit, as it were, *degrees of reality*? that is something other than an unknown world, that is already *wanting-to-know-something about the unknown*.

NB. The "other," the unknown world — very well! but to say "*true* world" means "to *know* something of it" — that is the opposite of assuming an x-world…

In sum: the world x could be more boring, more inhuman and more unworthy in every sense than this world.

It would be otherwise if it were asserted that there are x worlds, i.e. every possible world besides this one. But that has never *been asserted*…

The "true" world

=

the *truthful* one, which does not lie to us, which is

honest

=

the *right* one, which alone matters

=

genuine, in contrast to something imitated and counterfeited

C.

Problem: why the *idea of the other world* has always turned out to the disadvantage, or rather as a critique, of this world — what does that point to? —

Namely: a people that is proud of itself, that is in the ascent of life, always conceives *being-other* as being-lower, being-of-less-worth; it regards the foreign, the unknown world as its enemy, as its opposite; it feels itself without curiosity, in complete rejection of the foreign…

a people would not concede that another people was the "true people"…

the very fact that such a distinction is possible — that one takes this world for the "apparent" one and *that* one for the "true" one — is symptomatic

The breeding-grounds of the idea: "other world"

the philosopher, who invents a world of reason, where *reason* and the *logical* functions are adequate: — this is the origin of the "true" world

the religious man, who invents a "divine world" — this is the origin of the "denaturalized, anti-natural" world

the moral man, who feigns a "free world" — this is the origin of the "good, perfect, just, holy" world.

What the three breeding-grounds have *in common*… the *psychological* blunder… the physiological confusions

"the other world," as it actually appears in history, with what predicates — marked with the stigmata

of philosophical

of religious

of moral

prejudice.

the other world, as it emerges from these facts, as *a synonym for not-being*, for not-living, for not-*wanting*-to-live…

Overall insight: it is the instinct of *weariness with life*, and not that of life, which created the other world.

Consequence: philosophy, religion and morality

are *symptoms of décadence*.

Chapter 2

Historical proof that religion, morality and philosophy are décadence-forms of mankind.

3rd *Chapter*

1. the grounds on which "this" world has been designated as "apparent" establish, rather, its reality: — any *other* kind of reality is absolutely undemonstrable.

2. the marks which have been assigned to the "true being" of things are the marks of non-being, — the "true world" has been constructed out of the contradiction of the "actual world": an "apparent world" in fact, one that is an *optical-moral illusion*

3. In sum: to tell fables of a world other than this one has no sense whatever, — provided that an instinct for slandering, belittling, casting suspicion on life is not powerful in us: in the latter case we *take revenge* on life *with* the phantasmagoria of a "better life"…

4. To divide the world into a "true" and an "apparent" one is a suggestion of décadence: — to esteem *appearance* more highly than *reality*, as the artist does, is no objection to this. For appearance here means only this reality once more, in selection, intensification, correction… Or are there pessimistic artists? — Is the *tragic* artist a *pessimist*?…

169.

1.

The true and the apparent world.

2.

The philosopher as a type of décadence.

3.

The religious man as a type of décadence.

4.

The good man as a type of décadence.

5.

The countermovement: *art*.

Problem of the tragic.

6.

The pagan in religion.

7.

Science against philosophy.

8.

Politica.

9.

Critique of the present.

10.

Nihilism and its counter-image: those who recur.

11.

The will to power

1)

Supposing it is *worth more,* why should it be *more real* than this one? … is *reality* a quality of perfection? — But that is indeed the *ontological proof of God*…

2)

But supposing it is *true,* then it could be *worth

less* than our world…

170.

The countermovements: *art*.

It is the exceptional states that condition the artist: all of them deeply related to and intergrown with morbid phenomena: so that it seems impossible to be an artist and not to be sick.

The physiological states which in the artist have been bred, as it were, into a "person," and which in themselves cling in some degree or other to man in general:

1. *intoxication*: the heightened feeling of power; the inner compulsion to make of things a reflex of one's own fullness and perfection —

2. the *extreme sharpness* of certain senses: so that they understand an entirely different sign-language — and create one… — the same that appears bound up with many nervous diseases — the extreme mobility out of which comes an extreme communicativeness; the will to

speak of everything that knows how to give signs… a need to get rid of oneself, as it were, through signs and gestures; the ability to speak of oneself through a hundred means of language… an *explosive* state — one must think of this state first as a compulsion and urge to rid oneself of the exuberance of inner tension through every kind of muscular labour and mobility: then as an involuntary *coordination of this movement* with the inner processes (images, thoughts, desires) — as a kind of automatism of the whole muscular system under the impulse of strong stimuli working from within — inability to *prevent* the reaction; the apparatus of inhibition *unhinged*, as it were. Every inner movement (feeling, thought, affect) is accompanied by *vascular changes* and consequently by changes of colour, of temperature, of secretion; the *suggestive* power of music, its "suggestion mentale";

3. the compulsion to imitate: an extreme irritability in which a given model communicates itself contagiously, — a state is already divined from signs and *represented*… An image, surfacing within, already acts as a movement of the limbs… a certain unhinging of the *will*… (Schopenhauer!!!!)

A kind of deafness, blindness toward the outside, — the realm of *admitted* stimuli is sharply bounded —

*

This distinguishes the artist from the layman (the one artistically receptive): the latter has his high point of irritability in receiving; the former in giving — in such a way that an antagonism between these two endowments is not only natural but desirable. Each of these states has a reversed optics, — to demand of the artist that he train himself in the optics of the listener (critic, —) means to demand that he *impoverish* himself and his specific power… It is here as with the difference of the sexes: one should not demand of the artist, who *gives*, that he become woman — that he "*conceive*"…

Our aesthetics has hitherto been a woman's aesthetics insofar as only those receptive to art have formulated their experiences of "what is beautiful?" In the whole of philosophy up to today the artist is missing… This is, as the foregoing indicated, a necessary error; for the artist who began to comprehend himself would thereby *misapprehend* himself — he is not to look back, he is not to look at all, he is to give — It honours an artist to be incapable of criticism… otherwise he is half-and-half, he is "modern"…

171.

Religion as décadence

sleep as the consequence of every exhaustion, exhaustion as the consequence of every excessive stimulation…

the need for sleep, the deification and adoration even of the concept "sleep" in all pessimistic religions and philosophies —

the exhaustion in this case is a racial exhaustion; sleep, taken physiologically, only a parable of a far deeper and longer *need to rest*… In praxi it is death that works so seductively here under the image of its brother, sleep…

172.

Religious monomania usually appears in the form of folie circulaire, with two contradictory states, that of depression and that of tonicity.

Féré p 123.

173.

The *will to power as life*

Psychology of the will to power.

Pleasure Displeasure

Pain is something other than pleasure, — I mean to say, it is *not* its opposite. If the essence of pleasure has been aptly described as a *plus-feeling* of power (hence as a feeling of difference, which presupposes comparison), then the essence of displeasure has not yet been defined by that. The false opposites in which the people and *consequently* language believe have always been dangerous fetters on the path of truth. There are even cases where a kind of pleasure is conditioned by a certain *rhythmic sequence* of small stimuli of displeasure: in this way a very rapid growth of the feeling of power, of the feeling of pleasure, is attained. This is the case, e.g., with tickling, also with sexual tickling in the act of coitus: in this way we see displeasure at work as an ingredient of pleasure. It seems that a small obstruction which is overcome and is immediately followed by another small obstruction which is again overcome — this play of resistance and victory most strongly arouses that total feeling of surplus, superfluous power which constitutes the essence of pleasure. — The reverse, an increase of the sensation of pain through small interposed stimuli of pleasure, is lacking: pleasure and pain are simply not reverses of each other. — Pain is an intellectual process in which a judgement has decidedly made itself heard, — the judgement "harmful", in which long experience has been summed up. In itself there is no pain. It is *not* the wound that hurts; it is the experience of what evil consequences a wound can have for the organism as a whole that speaks in the form of that deep shock which is called displeasure (in the case of harmful influences that remained unknown to older mankind, e.g. from newly combined poisonous chemicals, the testimony of pain is also lacking, — and we are lost…) In pain what is actually specific is always the long shock, the after-tremor of a terrifying choc in the cerebral centre of the nervous system: — one does *not* actually suffer from the cause of the pain (some injury, for example), but from the long disturbance

of equilibrium that sets in as a result of that choc. Pain is a disease of the cerebral nerve-centres — pleasure is by no means a disease… — That pain is the cause of countermovements has appearance and even the prejudice of philosophers on its side; but in sudden cases, if one observes closely, the countermovement plainly comes earlier than the sensation of pain. It would go badly with me if, on making a false step, I had to wait until the fact struck the bell of consciousness and a hint of what to do were telegraphed back… Rather, I distinguish as clearly as possible that first the countermovement of the foot follows, to prevent the fall, and then, at a measurable interval of time, a kind of painful wave suddenly becomes perceptible in the front of the head. So one does *not* react to pain. The pain is afterwards projected into the wounded spot: — but the essence of this local pain nonetheless remains not the expression of the kind of local wound; it is a mere sign of place, whose strength and tone accord with the wound which the nerve-centres have received from it. That as a result of that choc the muscular strength of the organism measurably declines gives as yet no ground whatever for seeking the *essence* of pain in a diminution of the feeling of power… One does, to say it once more, *not* react to pain: displeasure is no "cause" of actions, pain itself is a reaction, the countermovement is another and *earlier* reaction, — both take their point of departure from different places. —

174.

The will to power as *life*

Man does *not* seek pleasure and does *not* avoid displeasure: one understands which famous prejudice I am contradicting herewith. Pleasure and displeasure are mere consequences, mere accompanying phenomena, — what man wants, what every smallest part of a living organism wants, is a plus of power. In striving for it, both pleasure and displeasure follow; out of that will he seeks resistance, he needs something

that opposes itself to him. Displeasure, as an obstruction of his will to power, is therefore a normal fact, the normal ingredient of every organic happening; man does not evade it, rather he needs it continually: every victory, every feeling of pleasure, every happening presupposes a resistance overcome.

Let us take the simplest case, that of primitive nutrition: the protoplasm stretches out its pseudopodia in order to search for something that resists it — not from hunger, but from will to power. Thereupon it makes the attempt to overcome it, to appropriate it, to incorporate it: — what is called "nutrition" is merely a consequent phenomenon, a practical application of that original will to become *stronger*

It is not possible to take *hunger* as the primum mobile: any more than self-preservation: hunger understood as a consequence of undernourishment means: hunger as a consequence of a will to power that *no longer becomes master*

duality as a consequence of a too weak unity

it is by no means a matter of restoring a loss, — only late, as a result of the division of labour, after the will to power learns to take quite other paths to its satisfaction, is the organism's need to appropriate *reduced* to hunger, to the need to replace what has been lost.

Displeasure, then, so little necessarily results in a *diminution of our feeling of power* that, in average cases, it acts precisely as a stimulus upon this feeling of power, — the obstacle is the *stimulus* of this will to power.

Displeasure has been confused with one kind of displeasure, with that of exhaustion: the latter does indeed represent a profound diminution and lowering of the will to power, a measurable loss of strength. That is to say: displeasure as a means of stimulation for the strengthening of power, and displeasure after a squandering of power; in the first

case a stimulus, in the latter the consequence of an excessive stimulation… Incapacity for resistance belongs to the latter displeasure: the challenge of what resists belongs to the former… The only pleasure still felt in the state of exhaustion is falling asleep; the pleasure in the other case is victory…

The great confusion of the psychologists consisted in their not keeping apart these two *kinds of pleasure*, that of *falling asleep* and that of *victory*

the exhausted want rest, the stretching out of limbs, peace, stillness —

it is the *happiness* of the nihilistic religions and philosophies

the rich and living want victory, opponents overcome, the overflowing of the feeling of power over wider domains than before:

all healthy functions of the organism have this need, — and the whole organism, up to the age of puberty, is such a complex of systems struggling for the growth of feelings of power —

175.

Plato: — — —

but *Manu* says: the act by which the soul aspires to the unknown is a *remembrance* of Swarga, of which it has retained a trace, as one often uncertainly sees on waking the images that came upon us in dreams

176.

Alcoholism.

The Brahmin who becomes drunk, in forgetfulness of the divine substance from which his person is formed, sinks to the rank of the impure Sudra.

The dwidja who gives himself over to fermented drinks shall be inwardly burned by their fire. Let him purify himself by *drinking boiling urine of cows*

177.

May he save a cow: this meritorious deed atones for the murder of a Brahmin.

178.

Priest

— The Brahmin is an authority in this world and in the other; the Brahmin is an object of veneration for the gods.

The slayer of a cow shall remain covered for three months with the hide of this cow and then spend three months in the service of a cowherd. Then he shall make the Brahmins a gift of ten cows and a bull, or better still, of everything he possesses: then his fault is atoned for.

Whoever kills a *circumcised man* purifies himself by a simple offering (whereas killing any animal at all demands six months of penance in the forest, with beard and hair left to grow.)

179.

On Christian *practice*.

Man did not know himself physiologically, all along the whole chain of the millennia: nor does he know himself even today. To know, for example, that one has a nervous system (— but no "soul") still remains the privilege of the best-informed. But man does not suspect himself of not knowing here; — one must be very humane to say "I do not know that", to *allow* oneself ignorances… suppose he suffers or he

is in good spirits: he has no doubt that he will find the reason for it, if only he looks. So he looks for it… In truth he cannot find the reason, because he does not even suspect where he would have to look… What happens?… He takes a *consequence* of his condition for its *cause*

e.g. a work undertaken in good spirits (at bottom undertaken because the good spirits already gave the courage for it) succeeds: ecco, the work is the *reason* for the good spirits…

In fact the success was in turn conditioned by the same thing that conditioned the good spirits, — by the happy coordination of the physiological forces and systems

He feels unwell: and *consequently* he cannot get over a worry, a scruple, a self-criticism… In truth man believes his bad condition to be the consequence of his scruple, of his "sin", of his "self-criticism"…

But the condition of recovery, often after a deep exhaustion and prostration, returns. "How is it possible that I am so free, so released? It is a miracle, only God can have done this for me" Conclusion: "he has forgiven me my sin"…

From this a practice follows: in order to stir up feelings of sin, in order to prepare contritions, one has to bring the body into a morbid and nervous condition. The methodology for this is well known. As is only to be expected, one does not suspect the causal logic of the facts — one has a religious interpretation for the *mortification of the flesh*, it appears as an end in itself, whereas it turns out to be merely a *means* of making possible that morbid indigestion of remorse (the "idée fixe" of sin, the hypnotizing of the hen by the chalk line "sin")

The maltreatment of the body prepares the ground for the series of "feelings of guilt"… i.e. a general suffering that *will be explained*…

On the other hand there follows likewise the methodology of "redemption": one has provoked every excess of feeling through prayers,

movements, gestures, oaths, — exhaustion follows, often suddenly, often in epileptic form. And, behind the state of deep somnolence, there comes the semblance of recovery — religiously speaking: "redemption"

180.

Mohammedanism, as a religion for *men*, has a profound contempt for the sentimentality and mendacity of Christianity… a woman's religion, which is how it feels it to be —

181.

The *religious man* as a type of décadence

religious states in their kinship with insanity, with neurasthenia

the moment at which the religious crisis seizes a people — historically —

the imagination of the religious man as the imagination of the *enervated* and the *overexcited*

the "*moral nervousness*" of the Christian.

We now have the task of presenting the difficult phenomenon of Christianity, which is ambiguous not only to us.

The whole Christian training in penance and redemption can be understood as an arbitrarily produced *folie circulaire*; as is only to be expected, producible only in individuals already predestined for it (namely, morbidly disposed).

182.

Why the weak are victorious.

In sum: the sick and the weak have more *fellow-feeling*, are "more human" —

: the sick and the weak have more *spirit*, are more changeable, more manifold, more entertaining, — more malicious: the sick alone have invented *malice*.

(a morbid precocity frequent among the rachitic, the scrofulous and the tubercular. —)

esprit: the property of late races (Jews, Frenchmen, Chinese) The anti-Semites do not forgive the Jews for having "spirit" — and money: anti-Semitism, a name for the "ill-constituted")

: the fool and the saint — the two most interesting kinds of man…

closely related, the "genius", the great "adventurers and criminals"

: the sick and the weak have had *fascination* on their side, they are *more interesting* than the healthy

And all men, the healthiest foremost, are *sick* at certain times of their lives: — the great emotions, the passion for power, love, revenge are accompanied by profound disturbances…

And as for *décadence*: every man who does not die too early represents it in almost every sense: — so he also knows from experience the instincts that belong to it —

: for *half of almost every* human life man is décadent.

Finally: *woman*! *The one half of mankind* is weak, typically sick, changeable, inconstant — woman needs strength in order to cling to it, — and a religion of weakness that glorifies as divine being *weak*, loving, humble…

or, better, she makes the strong weak, — she *rules* when she succeeds in overpowering the strong…

woman has always conspired together with the types of décadence, the priests, against the "powerful", the "strong", the *men* —

woman sets the *children* aside for the cult of piety, of pity, of love — the *mother* represents altruism *convincingly*…

Finally: increasing civilization, which at the same time necessarily brings with it the increase of the morbid elements, of the *neurotic-psychiatric* and of the *criminal*…

an *intermediate species* arises, the *artist*, separated from the criminality of the deed by weakness of will and social timidity, likewise not yet ripe for the madhouse, but reaching curiously into both spheres with his antennae: this specific cultural plant, the modern artist, painter, musician, above all romancier, who employs for his way of being the very improper word "naturalisme"…

The insane, the criminals and the "naturalists" are increasing: sign of a growing culture that rushes headlong *forward* — that is to say, the refuse, the waste, the excrement gain importance, — the downward *keeps pace*…

Finally: *the social hodgepodge*, consequence of the Revolution, of the establishment of equal rights, of the superstition of "equal men". In the process the bearers of the instincts of decline (of ressentiment, of discontent, of the destructive drive, of anarchism and nihilism), including the slave instincts, the instincts of cowardice, cunning and canaille of the strata *long kept down*, mix themselves into all the blood of all classes: two, three generations later the race is no longer recognizable — everything has become *mob*. From this results a collective instinct against *selection*, against *privilege* of every kind, of such power and assurance, hardness, cruelty in practice, that in fact even the *privileged* soon submit:

— whatever still wants to hold on to power flatters the mob, must have the mob on its side —

the "geniuses" foremost: they become *heralds* of the feelings with which one inflames the masses — the note of pity, of reverence even for everything that has lived suffering, lowly, despised, persecuted, rings out over all other notes (types: V. Hugo and R. Wagner).

the rise of the mob signifies once more the rise of the *old values*…

Amid so extreme a movement with respect to tempo and means as our civilization represents, the centre of gravity of human beings shifts: of those human beings who matter most, who have, as it were, taken it upon themselves to compensate for the whole great danger of such a morbid movement; — these will be the retarders par excellence, the slow to take in, the slow to let go, the relatively durable in the midst of this tremendous changing and mixing of elements. Under such circumstances the centre of gravity necessarily falls to the *mediocre*: against the dominion of the rabble and of the eccentrics (the two mostly in league) *mediocrity* consolidates itself, as the guarantor and bearer of the future. From this there arises for the *exceptional human beings* a new adversary — or else a new seduction. Supposing that they do not adapt themselves to the rabble and sing songs to please the instincts of the "disinherited", they will find it necessary to be "mediocre" and "solid". They know: the mediocritas is also aurea, — indeed it alone has command of money and gold (— of all that *glitters*…)… And once again the old virtue, and in general the whole *worn-out* world of the ideal, wins a gifted advocacy… Result: mediocrity acquires spirit, wit, genius, — it becomes entertaining, it seduces…

Result. I shall say one more word about the third force. Handicraft, trade, agriculture, science, a great part of art — all this can stand only

upon a broad foundation, upon a strongly and soundly consolidated mediocrity. In its service and served by it, *science* works — and even art. Science could wish for nothing better: as such it belongs to a middling kind of human being, — it is out of place among exceptions, — it has nothing aristocratic and still less anything anarchistic in its instincts. — The power of the middle is further upheld by trade, above all by trade in money: the instinct of the great financiers goes against everything extreme, — the Jews are for that reason, for the time being, the most *conserving* power in our so threatened and insecure Europe. They can make no use of revolutions, nor of socialism, nor of militarism: if they want to have power, and need it, even over the revolutionary party, this is only a consequence of what has been said and not in contradiction to it. They find it necessary, now and then, to arouse fear in other extreme tendencies — by showing *what* all lies in their hands. But their instinct itself is unalterably conservative — and "mediocre"… Wherever there is power, they know how to be powerful: but the exploitation of their power always goes in One direction. The honorific word for *mediocre* is, as is well known, the word "*liberal*"…

something that is not witty and not even true…

Reflection. — It is absurd to presuppose that this whole *victory of values* is antibiological: one must seek to explain it from an interest of *life*

the *preservation* of the type "man" itself through this methodology of the *pre*dominance of the weak and the ill-constituted —

: otherwise man would no longer exist?

Problem - - -

The *enhancement* of the type fatal to the *preservation of the species*?

why?

the experiences of *history*:

the strong races *decimate one another*: war, lust for power, adventure; their existence is costly, short, — they wear one another out *among themselves* —

the strong affects: *squandering* — force is no longer *capitalized*…

mental disturbance through excessive tension — periods of *deep relaxation* and slackness set in all great ages are *paid for*…

afterwards the strong are weaker, more will-less, more absurd than the average weak

They are *prodigal* races. —

"*Duration*" in itself would of course have no value: one might well prefer a shorter but more *value-rich* existence of the species.

It would remain to prove that even so a richer yield of value would be attained than in the case of the shorter existence.

i.e. man as a summation of force gains a far higher quantum of mastery over things if it goes as it goes…

We stand before a problem of economy - - -

183.

I give my argumentation in all its essential steps, point by point. With a little logic in one's body and an energy akin to mine, with a courage for what one actually knows… one could have drawn this argumentation from my earlier writings as well. People have done the opposite and complained that these lacked consistency: this hodgepodge rabble of today dares to take the word consistency into its mouth!

184.

"apparentness" = specific action-reaction activity

the apparent world, i.e. a world viewed according to values, ordered, selected according to values, i.e. in this case according to the standpoint of utility with respect to the preservation and enhancement of power of a particular species of animal.

it is thus the *perspectival* that yields the character of "apparentness"!

As if a world would still remain if one subtracted the perspectival! In doing so one would indeed have subtracted *relativity*, the —

every centre of force has its *perspective* for the whole *rest*, i.e. its wholly determinate *valuation*, its mode of action, its mode of resistance

The "apparent world" thus reduces itself to a specific kind of action upon the world, proceeding from a centre

Now there is no other kind of action at all: and the "world" is only a word for the total play of these actions

Reality consists exactly in this particular action and reaction of every single one against the whole…

Not a shadow of *right* remains to speak here of *appearance*…

The *specific way of reacting* is the only way of reacting: we do not know how many and what kinds of ways there are in all.

But there is no "other", no "true", no essential being — for that would express a world without action and reaction…

The antithesis of the apparent world and the true world reduces itself to the antithesis "world" and "nothing" —

185.

Morality

That the value of an action should depend on what preceded it *in consciousness* — how false that is! — And morality has been measured by this, even criminality…

It was thought that one must know its consequences: and the naive psychologists of former times said — — —

The value of an action must be measured by its consequences — say the utilitarians: — to measure it by its origin implies an impossibility, namely to *know* that origin.

But does one know the consequences? Five paces ahead, perhaps. Who can say what an action stirs up, excites, provokes against itself? As a stimulant? as the igniting spark, perhaps, for an explosive?… The utilitarians are naive… And in the end we would first have to *know what* is useful: here too their gaze reaches only five paces ahead… They have no conception of the great economy, which does not know how to do without evil —.

One does not know the origin, and one does not know the consequences: — consequently, does an action have any value at all?…

There remains the action itself: its accompanying phenomena in consciousness, the Yes and the No that follow its execution: does the value of an action lie in the subjective accompanying phenomena —? Certainly feelings of value accompany it, a feeling of power, of compulsion, of impotence, for example, freedom, ease; to put the question differently: could one reduce the value of an action to physiological values: whether it is an expression of complete or of inhibited life? the biological value of an action?

is it permissible to measure its value by accompanying phenomena, by pleasure and displeasure, the play of the affects, the feeling of discharge, explosion, freedom…

it may be that its *biological* value expresses itself therein…

that would mean measuring the value of music by the pleasure or displeasure it gives us… that it gives its *composer*…

If, then, the action can be valued neither by its origin, nor by its consequences, nor by its accompanying phenomena, its value is x, unknown…

Therefore: an action has no value.

In summa, in the language of the hymn: "Creep, fly and crawl upon God's ways"

186.

Philosophy

The physicists believe in a "true world" after their own fashion: a fixed systematization of atoms, the same for all beings, in necessary motions — so that for them the "apparent world" reduces itself to that side of universal and universally necessary being which is accessible to each being according to its kind (accessible and also adjusted — made "subjective") But in this they go astray: the atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of that perspectivism of consciousness — and is therefore itself a subjective fiction as well. This world-picture which they sketch is by no means different in essence from the subjective world-picture: it is merely constructed with senses thought further out, but entirely with *our* senses… And in the end they have left something out of the constellation without knowing it: precisely the necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every centre of force — and not man alone — constructs the whole rest of the

world from itself, i.e., measures it by its own force, feels it, shapes it… They have forgotten to reckon this perspective-*positing* force into "true being"… To speak in the language of the schools: being-a-subject. They suppose this to have been "developed", added on later —

But even the chemist needs it: it is indeed *specific being* that determines acting and reacting thus-and-so, as the case may be

Perspectivism is only a complex form of specificity

My notion is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (— its will to power:) and to thrust back everything that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar strivings on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those that are sufficiently akin to it: — thus they then *conspire together for power*. And the process goes on…

187.

Philosophy

There is nothing unchangeable in chemistry; that is mere appearance, a mere prejudice of the schools. We have *dragged in* the unchangeable, still from metaphysics, gentlemen physicists. It is quite naively read off the surface to assert that diamond, graphite and carbon are identical. Why? Merely because no loss of substance can be ascertained by the scales! Very well, so they still have something in common; but the molecular work in the transformation, which we cannot see and cannot weigh, is precisely what makes of the one substance something else — with specifically different properties

188.

The New Conception of the World

1) The world endures; it is nothing that becomes, nothing that passes away. Or rather: it becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased to pass away — it *maintains* itself in both… It lives on itself: its excrements are its nourishment…

2) The hypothesis of a *created* world ought not to trouble us for a moment. The concept "create" is today utterly indefinable, unrealizable; merely a word still, a rudiment from the ages of superstition; with a word one explains nothing. The latest attempt to conceive a world that *begins* has lately been made several times with the help of a logical procedure — mostly, as may be guessed, from a theological ulterior motive

The Eternal Recurrence.

Philosophy

3) Lately people have several times sought to find a contradiction in the concept of the temporal infinity of the world *backwards*: they have even found it, at the price, to be sure, of confusing the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me from reckoning backwards from this moment and saying "I shall never come to an end in doing so": just as I can reckon forwards from the same moment, out into the infinite. Only if I wished to commit the error — I shall take care not to — of equating this correct concept of a regressus in infinitum with the *utterly unrealizable* concept of an infinite *pro*gressus up to now, if I posited the *direction* (forwards or backwards) as logically indifferent, would I get hold of the head, this moment, as the tail: that I leave to you, my dear Herr Dühring!…

4) I have come upon this thought in earlier thinkers: each time it was determined by other ulterior thoughts (— mostly theological, in favour of the creator spiritus) If the world could at all grow rigid, dry up, die off, become *nothing*, or if it could reach a state of equilibrium,

or if it had any goal at all that enclosed within itself duration, unchangeability, the once-for-all (in short, to speak metaphysically: if becoming *could* issue into being or into nothingness) then this state would have to have been reached. But it has not been reached: from which it follows… That is our sole certainty, which we hold in our hands to serve as a corrective against a great number of world-hypotheses possible in themselves. If, e.g., mechanism cannot escape the consequence of a final state which Thomson drew for it, then mechanism is thereby *refuted*.

Philosophy

5) If the world *may* be thought of as a definite quantity of force and as a definite number of centres of force — and every other notion remains indefinite and consequently *useless* — then it follows that it must pass through a calculable number of combinations in the great dice game of its existence. In an infinite time every possible combination would at some point have been reached; more than that, it would have been reached an infinite number of times. And since between every "combination" and its next "recurrence" all combinations still possible at all would have to have run their course, and each of these combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a circular course of absolutely identical series would thereby be proved: the world as a circular course which has already repeated itself infinitely often and which plays its game in infinitum.

This conception is not simply a mechanistic one: for were it so, it would condition not an infinite recurrence of identical cases but a final state. *Because* the world has not reached it, mechanism must count for us as an imperfect and merely provisional hypothesis.

189.

The *philosopher* as a further development of the *priestly* type

— has its inheritance in his body

— is, even as a rival, compelled to struggle for the same thing with the same means as the priest of his time.

— he aspires to the *highest authority*

what confers *authority* when one does not hold physical power in one's hands (no armies, no *weapons* whatever…)?

how, above all, does one gain authority *over* those who possess physical force and authority?

they compete with the reverence for the prince, for the victorious conqueror, for the wise statesman.

Only by awakening the belief that they hold in their hands a higher, stronger power — *God* —

Nothing is strong enough: one needs the mediation and the services of the priest.

They set themselves *in between* as indispensable: — as a condition of their existence they need,

1) that the absolute superiority of their God be believed in, that *their God* be believed in

2) that there be no other direct approaches to God

The *second* demand alone creates the concept of "heterodoxy"; the *first* that of the "unbeliever" (i.e., one who believes in another god —)

What, then, is backward in the philosopher?

That he teaches *his* qualities as the necessary and sole qualities for attaining the "highest good" (e.g., dialectic, like Plato

That he has all kinds of men ascend *gradatim* to *his* type as the highest

That they disdain what is otherwise esteemed — that they tear open a chasm between the supreme *priestly* values and the *worldly* ones

that he *knows* what is true, what God is, what the goal is, what the way is… the typical philosopher is here an absolute dogmatist; — if he *needs* scepticism, it is in order to be permitted to speak dogmatically about *his main concern*

190.

The Problem of the *Oppressed*

I cannot rule out that the Semites, already in very ancient times, lay under the dreadful servitude of the Hindus: as Chandalas, so that even then certain peculiarities took firm root that belong to the type of the *enslaved* and the *despised* (— as later in Egypt).

Later they *ennoble* themselves, to the degree that they become warlike… And conquer for themselves lands of their own, *gods of their own*. The Semitic *formation of gods* coincides historically with their entrance into history…

The "spirit", the tenacious patience, the despised trades

The official concept of the Chandala is precisely that of a *refuse and excrement* of the noble classes…

191.

Plato is wholly in the spirit of Manu: he was initiated in Egypt. The morality of the castes, the god of the good, the "eternal single soul"

— Plato the Brahmanist

— Pyrrho the Buddhist

copied: the type of the philosopher.

the castes

the division of the doctrine into *esoteric* and *exoteric*

the "great soul"

the transmigration of souls as an inverted Darwinism (— is not Greek)

192.

The concept "egoism"

It belongs to the concept of the living that it must grow, — that it extends its power and consequently must take alien forces into itself. People speak, befogged by the moral narcotic, of a right of the individual to defend himself: in the same sense one might also speak of his right to attack: for *both* — and the second even more than the first — are necessities for every living thing — aggressive and defensive egoism are not matters of choice, let alone of "free will", but the *fatality* of life itself.

Here it makes no difference whether one has in view an individual or a living body, an upward-striving "society". The right to punish (or society's self-defence) has, at bottom, come by the word "right" only through a misuse: a right is acquired through contracts, — but warding oneself off and defending oneself do not rest on the basis of a contract. At the very least a people might with just as much good sense designate as a right its need for conquest, its lust for power, whether by arms or through trade, commerce and colonization, — a right of growth, say. A society that definitively and by its *instinct* rejects war and conquest is in decline: it is ripe for democracy and the rule of shopkeepers… In most cases, to be sure, assurances of peace are mere narcotics

193.

In the old penal law a *religious* concept was powerful: that of the atoning force of punishment. Punishment purifies: in the modern world it defiles. Punishment is a paying-off: one is truly rid of that for which one *willed* to suffer so much. Supposing this force of punishment is believed in, there follows afterwards a *relief* and a *breathing-again* that truly comes close to a new health, a restoration. One has not only made one's peace with society again, one has also become worthy of respect again in one's own eyes, — "pure"… Today punishment isolates even more than the offence; the *doom* behind an offence has grown to such a degree that it has become incurable. One comes out of punishment as an *enemy* of society… From now on there is one enemy more…

The jus talionis *can* be dictated by the spirit of retribution (that is, by a kind of moderation of the instinct of revenge); but in *Manu*, for example, it is the need to have an equivalent in order to *atone*, in order to be religiously "free" again

194.

The philosopher against his *rivals*, for example against science

: there he becomes a sceptic

: there he reserves for himself a *form of knowledge* which he denies to the man of science

: there he goes hand in hand with the priest, so as not to arouse the suspicion of atheism, materialism

: he regards an attack on himself as an attack on morality, virtue, religion, order — he knows how to bring his opponents into disrepute as "seducers" and "underminers"

— there he goes hand in hand with power

The philosopher in struggle with other philosophers:

: he seeks to push them into appearing as anarchists, unbelievers, opponents of authority

In sum: insofar as he *fights*, he fights exactly like a priest, like a priesthood.

195.

What a Yes-saying Aryan religion, the offspring of the *ruling* classes, looks like:

the Law-Book of Manu.

What a *Yes-saying* Semitic religion, the offspring of the *ruling* classes, looks like:

the law-book of Muhammad. The Old Testament, in its older parts

What a *No-saying* Semitic religion, as the offspring of the *oppressed* classes, looks like:

by Indo-Aryan concepts: the New Testament — a *Chandala religion*

What a *No-saying* Aryan religion looks like, grown up among the *ruling* estates

: Buddhism.

It is perfectly in order that we have no religion of *oppressed* Aryan races: for that is a contradiction: a master race is on top or it perishes.

196.

Egoism

Principle: only individuals feel themselves *responsible*. Multiplicities were invented in order to do things for which the individual lacks the courage.

Precisely for this reason all commonwealths, all societies are a hundred times more *sincere* and more *instructive* about the nature of man than the individual, who is too weak to have the courage of his desires…

All "altruism" turns out to be the *prudence of the private man*: societies are not "altruistic" towards one another…

The commandment of love of one's neighbour has never yet been extended into a commandment of love of one's neighbouring peoples. Rather, what stands in Manu still holds there…

"Tolerance"

The study of society is so invaluable because man as society is far more *naïve* than man as "unit".

"Society" has never regarded *virtue* otherwise than as a means of strength, of power, of order.

How simply and with what dignity Manu says it: — — —

197.

"Reward and punishment"… These live together, these decay together. Today one does not wish to be rewarded, one wishes to *acknowledge* no one who punishes…

A war footing has been established: one *wants* something, one has opponents in the matter, one perhaps attains it most reasonably *if one comes to terms*, — if one makes a *contract*

A modern society in which every individual has made his "contract": the criminal is a breaker of contract… That would be a clear concept. But then one could not tolerate anarchists and opponents *on principle* of a form of society within that very society…

198.

"With God nothing is impossible," thinks the Christian. But the Indian says: with piety and knowledge of the Veda nothing is impossible: the gods are subject and obedient to these. Where is the god who could withstand the pious earnestness and prayer of a Yati withdrawn into the forest?

As a stone that one throws into the lake vanishes in an instant, so sins sink down and vanish in the knowledge of the Veda.

199.

Origin of morality

The priest wants to make it prevail that he counts as the *highest type* of man

that he rules, — even over those who hold *power* in their hands

that he is inviolable, unassailable…

that he is the *strongest power* in the community, absolutely not to be replaced or underestimated

Means.

He alone is the *knowing one*.

He alone is the *virtuous one*.

He alone has the *highest mastery over himself*

He alone is in a certain sense God and returns into the Godhead

He alone is the intermediary between God and the *others*

The Godhead punishes every harm, every thought directed against a priest

Means

Truth exists.

There is only one way to attain it: to become a priest

Everything that *is good*, in order, in nature, in custom, goes back to the wisdom of the priests.

The holy book is their work. All of nature is merely an execution of the statutes therein

There is no other source of the *good* than the priest

Every other kind of excellence differs in *rank* from that of the priest, e.g. that of the *warrior*

Consequence:

if the priest is to be the *highest* type: then the *gradation* towards his *virtues* must constitute the gradation of value among men.

Study, *desensualization*, the *non-active*, the *impassible*, the *affectless*, the *solemn*. — *Antithesis* (the *lowest* species of man: — — —

The instilling of fear

the gestures, the hieratic manners

the excess of *contempt* for the body and the senses

— *anti-nature* as a sign of the *super-natural*

The *priest* has taught *one* kind of morality: in order that he himself be felt to be the *highest type*

He conceives an *antithetical* type: the Chandala. To make *this one* contemptible by every means provides the *foil* for the caste order

his extreme fear of *sensuality* is at the same time conditioned by the *insight* that it is here that the *caste order* (i.e. *order* as such) is most gravely threatened… Every "freer tendency" in puncto *puncti overturns* the marriage legislation —

200.

There is *something admirable* in this conception: e.g. the absolute separation of the refuse-matter of society, with the tendency *to destroy it*. They grasped what a living body needs — *to cut out the diseased limbs*…

1) It is in an admirable way far removed from the slack degeneration of instinct that is nowadays called "humanity"…

Then the degradation from one caste into another…

Then the formulation of marriage: the position of the "love match" (the kind of the "heavenly musicians": — — —

2) the struggle against *alcoholism*… p. 332.

3) their perfect appreciation of old age, of woman p 127

4) they start from the aim of *making man venerable* in his own eyes: they need to transfigure even the *most natural*, by leading duty, as holy observance, towards feeling

201.

The castes understood as a *division of labour*, on the other hand as the only form for making *perfect* performance *instinctive*…

the essential thing is the tradition of work, the *mechanics*, which precisely thereby, through generations, becomes perfect…

202.

When the union of a young man and a young maiden is the fruit of a mutual choice, then this union, born as it is of love and having love as its end, is called:

the kind of the "heavenly musicians"

The 4 latter kinds of marriage bring forth as children only squanderers, quarrel-seekers, liars, who know neither the holy scripture nor the duties it prescribes

From honest and praiseworthy marriages arise honest and praiseworthy children; but bad marriages see only a contemptible progeny.

The praise of the virgin: p. 225

203.

Critique of Manu:

Reduction of *nature* to morality: to a state of punishment for man: there are no natural effects — the cause is Brahman.

Reduction of *human motives* to *fear of punishment* and *hope of reward*: i.e. fear of the law, *which holds both in its hand*…

One has to live in absolute conformity with the law: the reasonable is done *because* it is commanded; the most natural instinct is satisfied because the law has prescribed it.

That is a school of *stupefaction*: in such a hatchery of theologians (where even the young soldier and farmer must go through a nine-year course of theology in order to become "constant" — the nine-year "military service" of the 3 highest castes) the Chandalas must have had intelligence and even the interesting on their side. They were the

only ones who had access to the true source of knowledge, *empiricism*… Add to this the *inbreeding* of the castes…

Missing are nature, technique, history, art, science, — — —

204.

People speak a great deal today of the *Semitic* spirit of the *New Testament*: but what is so called is merely priestly — and in the Aryan lawbook of purest race, in Manu, this kind of "Semitism", i.e. *priestly spirit*, is worse than anywhere else.

*

The development of the Jewish priestly state is *not* original: they came to know the scheme in Babylon: the scheme is Aryan. When the same thing later dominated again in Europe, under the preponderance of Germanic blood, this was in accordance with the spirit of the *ruling* race: a great atavism. The Germanic Middle Ages were bent on restoring the *Aryan caste order*.

*

Mohammedanism in turn learned from the Christians: the use of the "beyond" as an organ of punishment.

The scheme of an *unchangeable commonwealth*, with priests at its head: the oldest great cultural product of Asia in the domain of organization — *must* naturally have invited reflection and imitation in every respect.

Even Plato: but above all the Egyptians.

205.

One thing is forgiven with the greatest difficulty: that one respects oneself. Such a being is simply abominable: for he brings to light what toleration, the sole virtue of the rest and of all, really amounts to…

I wish one would begin by *respecting* oneself: everything else follows from that. To be sure, *with this very thing* one ceases to exist for others: for this is precisely what they forgive last. What? A man who respects himself?

That is something other than the blind drive to *love* oneself: nothing is more common, in the love of the sexes as in the duality called "I", than *contempt* for what one loves, fatalism in love —

206.

Against the contagion of neurosis

Choice of places, things, books,

Alcoholism

and music…

choose the climatic and meteorological optimum; likewise the culinary

Reduction of the number of impressions:

reserve times when no book and no thing speaks to us — let alone a human being…

Times of recovery, régime Genoa; the healthiest man needs such times today: — times of fasting —

Against vegetarianism: — — —

207.

We are *Chandala*: and our artists and performers foremost…

208.

why does everything become

play-acting

?

modern man lacks:

sure *instinct* (consequence of a *long uniform

form of activity* of a kind of man)

the inability to achieve anything *perfect* is merely the consequence of this: — as an individual one can never make up for the schooling

209.

The times in which one *steers* men with *reward* and *punishment* have in view a low, still primitive kind of man: it is as with *children*…

In the midst of our late culture, fatality and degenerescence are something that completely *cancels* the meaning of reward and punishment…

— it presupposes young, strong, vigorous races, this real *determining* of action by the prospect of reward and punishment…

in old races the impulses are so *irresistible* that a mere idea is utterly powerless…

being unable to offer resistance where a stimulus is given, but *having* to follow it: this extreme irritability of the décadents makes such systems of punishment and *improvement* completely senseless…

The concept of "improvement" rests on the presupposition of a normal and strong man whose single action is somehow to be *balanced out* again, so as *not to lose* him, so as not to have him as an *enemy*…

210.

The décadence moralities have this peculiarity, that they recommend a practice, a regimen, which *accelerates* décadence…

— physiologically as well as psychologically: the instinct of *reparation* and plasticity no longer functions…

— they believe in *healing*, in *redemption*, even of a kind that borders on nothingness, on the deepest exhaustion

— they gather together what is *akin* from all things, states and times: example, the brothers Goncourt…

211.

The *energy of health* betrays itself in the sick through *brusque resistance* against the elements that *make one ill*…

a reaction of instinct, e.g. against music in my case —

212.

The destiny of woman is to continue the family through children, that of man to beget them: this twofold duty, for which man and woman work together, has its sanctification through scripture.

Who are to be regarded as the most guilty? The murderer of a Brahmin, the drinker of spirits, he who seduces the wife of his spiritual counsellor

After the prescribed expiation he shall condemn these to death or to other bodily punishments. He shall brand the forehead of him who

has seduced the wife of his counsellor with the image of the female sexual organ, the drinker of spirits with the sign of the distilling apparatus, the murderer of a Brahmin with the image of a body without a head.

213.

Such a law-book sums up the experience, prudence and experimental morality of long centuries: it concludes, it brings an epoch to an end, it *creates* nothing more —

The means of creating authority for a truth acquired with difficulty and at great cost are fundamentally different from the means by which one would *prove* it. A law-book never proves the utility or the harm of a precept: it shows only the evil consequences for the individual if he does not keep a law as law, — if he is disobedient.

All the natural *evil* consequences of a transgression of the law are never considered with regard to this naturalness: rather, the evil consequence is a *supernatural* punishment for the non-observance of a precept.

The problem is this: at a certain moment in the history of a people, its most intelligent stratum declares the experience according to which one may or may not live to be concluded. Its aim is to bring home the harvest, as rich and complete as possible, from the long periods of experiment and of *evil* experience…

What above all is now to be prevented is further experimenting, the wanting-to-continue in testing and choosing: against this a double wall is set up: 1) *revelation* 2) *tradition*. Both are *holy lies*: the intelligent class that invents them understands them as well as Plato understood them.

Revelation: that is the assertion that the reason of those laws is not of human origin, not sought and found slowly and with blunders, but that it was communicated all at once by the *Godhead*…

Tradition: that is the assertion that it has been so already since primeval times. In short, a counterfeiting, on principle, of the whole history of a people. (Example: the Jewish reinterpretation after the Exile, — the *will* to misunderstand their past)

a)

it is *godless* to criticize the law

b)

it is *impious*, — it is a crime against the ancestors — one rouses them against oneself —

214.

The woman who thrusts her husband away because he has the passion for gambling or for spirituous drinks, instead of nursing him like a sick man, shall be shut up for three months in the inner chambers, without any finery or ornament whatsoever (avis to George Eliot!)

215.

Transfiguration of the *natural* consequences of an action

there are no longer any natural consequences: instead disobedience is punished, and virtue is rewarded.

happiness, long life, progeny — all are consequences of virtue, mediated through the eternal order of things —

uncleanliness, for example, is forbidden not because its consequences harm health: rather, *because it is forbidden*, it harms health…

Thus, *in principle*: the natural consequence of an action is represented as reward or punishment, according to whether something is commanded or forbidden…

for this it is necessary that the greatest number of punishments be precisely *not* natural, but supernatural, otherworldly, merely future…

Thus, in principle: every disadvantage, every misfortune is proof of *guilt*: even every lowly form of existence (animals, for example)

The world is perfect: provided that the law is satisfied. *All imperfection* comes from disobedience to the law.

*

The highest caste, as the perfect one, has also to represent happiness: therefore nothing is more unbecoming than *pessimism* and *indignation*…

no anger, no retort in adversity —

asceticism only as a means to higher happiness, to redemption from many things

the highest class has to uphold a *happiness*, at the price of representing unconditional obedience, every kind of hardness, self-mastery and severity toward itself — it wants to be felt as the most venerable kind of man, — also as the most admirable: consequently it cannot make use of every kind of happiness —

216.

Critique of the Law.

The higher *reason* of such a procedure is to push *consciousness* back step by step from the life recognized as right: so that a *perfect automatism* of instinct is attained

— i.e. the precondition of every *kind of mastery*

It is pious, it is customary, it is the badge of upright and high-minded men to act thus and thus: — that is what remains:

the origin, the utility, the reason of the precept is *pushed out* of consciousness.

The most essential means to this *suppression* is that two other concepts step into the foreground with tremendous force: both *excluding* actual reflection on the origin and the critique of the law…

1) reward

2) punishment

"Every man who has received a punishment for a transgression at the king's command goes to heaven free of every stain, just as pure as he who has ever practised only the good."

It becomes a matter of supreme self-preservation, of the "one thing needful", to obey absolutely here… Not to obey here is restamped as the highest *imprudence* —

Egoism is drawn into play, in such a way that obeying and not obeying confront each other as *happiness* and *deepest self-injury*

To this end the whole of life is set within a perspective of the beyond, so that it is understood as *fraught with consequences* in the most terrifying sense of all…

— relative immortality is the great *magnifying glass* for enhancing the concept punishment… reward to an unheard-of degree.

These sages do not believe in it: — otherwise they would not invent it…

217.

A caste which has rejected all work of defence and attack, even in its disposition, — and takes the concept "good" strictly…

218.

The "good man" as a product of décadence, who "surrenders", who grasps the disadvantage of all enmity, all anger and wanting revenge, — who is too weak, too *weak in his nerves* for it…

The "good man" out of strength, out of fullness of power, as a ruling type, who has *chosen* for himself an existence that relieves him of the necessity of having aggressive and defensive affects…; who has entrusted a caste of its own with these affects… Such a man now also creates for himself a "God" in his own image —

— for him the world too is justified: evil has a pedagogical purpose, i.e. a *punitive* purpose…

219.

Weakness of will: that is a metaphor that can mislead. For there is no will, and consequently neither a strong nor a weak will. The multiplicity and disgregation of the impulses, the lack of system among them, results as "weak will"; their coordination under the predominance of a single one results as "strong will"; — in the former case it is the oscillation and the lack of a centre of gravity; in the latter, the precision and clarity of direction

220.

The Yes-saying Religion.

The highest reverence for the act of procreation and for the family:

One has to pay the debts of one's forebears…

the *instinct of tradition*, the deepest contempt for everything that interrupted tradition…

The instinct against *degeneracy*…

This is to be studied: *what* all was reckoned together as degenerate.

The vicious

The insane.

The grievously leprous

Whores.

Artists.

221.

The *order of castes* rests on the observation that there are three or four kinds of man, destined for different activity and best developed, as this activity through division of labour falls to each of them…

a kind of being as a *prerogative*, a kind of activity likewise

the *order of castes* is only the sanctioning of a natural distance between several *physiological types* (characters, temperaments, etc.)

— it is only the sanction of experience, it does not precede it, still less does it abolish it…

a)

the *more spiritual* men, (— the scholars, the counsellors, the judges, the philosophers —) — the teaching estate

b)

the *muscular* men, the warrior estate — the defending estate

c)

those who pursue trade, agriculture and cattle-breeding — the nourishing estate

d)

finally a *lowly* (subjugated kind) of natives, acknowledged as a servant race.

Here everywhere the presupposition is a real *natural separation*: the concept of caste merely sanctions the natural separation.

The *sanctity of the family*, the solidarity of generation with generation, is the presupposition of the whole edifice: — consequently it must be *translated* precisely and entirely into the beyond.

One needs a son, because only a son *redeems*… one marries "to pay the debt of the forebears"

222.

The *modern pessimists* as décadents:

Schopenhauer

Leopardi Baudelaire

Mainländer Goncourt

Dostoevsky

the tasteless attempt has been made to subsume Wagner and Schopenhauer among the insane: what would have been wholly in accord with the truth was to bring out, with sharp emphasis, the physiological décadence in their type…

223.

The Jews make the attempt to assert themselves after two castes, that of the warriors and that of the tillers of the soil, have been lost to them

in this sense they are the "castrated"

— they have the priest — and then at once the Chandala…

As is only fitting, it comes among them to a rupture, to an uprising of the Chandala: the origin of *Christianity*.

Because they knew the *warrior* only as their master, they brought into their religion enmity against the *noble*, against the high-born, the proud, against power, against the *ruling* estates —: they are pessimists of *indignation*…

Thereby they created an important new position: the priest at the head of the Chandala —

against the *noble estates*…

Christianity drew the final consequence of this movement: even in the Jewish priesthood it still sensed the caste, the privileged, the noble —

it *struck out the priest* —

The Christian is the Chandala who rejects the priest… The Chandala who redeems himself…

That is why the *French Revolution* is the daughter and continuer of *Christianity*… it has the instinct against the Church, against the noble, against the last privileges — —

224.

One must not confuse this: the Sudras, a servant race: probably a lower kind of people who were found on the soil where these Aryans gained a foothold…

But the concept Chandala expresses the degenerate of all castes: the *excrement* in permanence, which in turn propagates itself among itself

against them speaks the deepest instinct of a race's health. To be hard here is synonymous with being "healthy": it is *disgust* at degeneration that finds here a multitude of moral and religious formulas…

Nothing is more instructive than the components of this refuse: — the old subtle and profound sages knew what has not been known — until today!!)

: that

vice

illness

mental derangement

hyper-nervousness of certain intellectual dispositions

are symptoms of physiological décadence.

They count the *artists* among the décadents…

225.

Supposing the reasons fall away for having to make those *metaphysical hypotheses*, supposing one no longer wishes to *rule*, to *educate*, to uphold one's type as the *highest* and *first*:

supposing one thinks about things as a Chandala, then one perhaps finds once again the whole chain of experiences and inferences that

served those ancients as the premise for making their hypotheses: I mean to say, one finds the "truth", — but precisely in the *dissolution* of all authority, of all respect for all traditions, of all moral prejudices — we *use up* our remnant of inherited morality in this work…

that which is now science is a precise gauge of the *decline* of moral and religious faith: — we are dissolved when we are at the end of our "wisdom", — we have used up all positive forces *for the sake of knowledge*… Knowledge in itself is, after all, powerless: and as regards "egoism", in an age of décadence we are by no means certain of willing our *advantage*: the impulses are far too powerful for utility to remain the guiding point of view — "Altruism", the living-with and feeling-together with every sort of feeling and condition, is in this case one great illness more: it is the Chandala conscience, a weakness that is bound up with pleasure…

226.

that which creates a morality, a law-book, the deep instinct that only *automatism* makes perfection possible in living and creating…

But now we have reached the opposite point, indeed, we have *willed* to reach it — the most extreme consciousness, man's seeing-through of himself and of history…

— with this we are, practically speaking, at the farthest remove from perfection in being, doing and willing: our desire, our will itself to knowledge is a symptom of a tremendous décadence… We strive for the opposite of what *strong races, strong natures* — will

— comprehending is an *end*…

That science is possible in this sense, as it is practised today, is the proof that all the elementary instincts, the *self-defence* and *protective* instincts of life, no longer function —

we no longer accumulate, we squander the capital of our forefathers, even in the way in which we *know* —

227.

An abuse has been practised with an arbitrary word, accidental in every respect, the word "pessimism", an abuse that spreads like a contagion: in doing so one has overlooked the problem in which we live, which we *are* —

it is not a question of who is right, — the question is where we belong, whether to the condemned, to the formations of decline… In that case we *judge* nihilistically.

Two ways of thinking have been set against each other, as though they had to quarrel with one another over the truth: whereas both are merely symptoms of conditions, whereas their *struggle* proves the existence of a cardinal problem of life — and *not* a problem of philosophers. Where do we belong? — are we — — —

Notebook 15: Spring 1888

1.

Critique of Modern Values.

The liberal institutions

the altruism of morality.

sociology.

prostitution

marriage

the criminal

2.

"Ascending" life and descending life: both formulate their highest needs into tables of values.

How does it come about that the highest values in which one believes are, one and all — — —

3.

In all cases where a child would be a crime: in the chronically sick and in neurasthenics of the third degree, where on the other hand to set a veto against the sexual drive as such would amount to no more than pious wishes (— in the ill-constituted of this kind this drive often has even a repulsive excitability), the demand must be made *that procreation be prevented*. Society knows few demands so urgent and so fundamental. Here contempt alone, the social declaration of dishonour, does not suffice as a means of keeping in check a base weakness of

character: one might proceed against crimes of this sort, without regard to station, rank and culture, with the harshest fines, in certain circumstances with the loss of "freedom", with confinement. To bring a child into a world in which one oneself has no right to be is worse than taking a life. The syphilitic who makes a child becomes the cause of a whole chain of botched lives; he creates an objection to life, he is a pessimist of the *deed*: through him the value of life is truly diminished to an indeterminate degree. —

4.

Prostitution is not to be abolished; there are reasons even to wish that it not be abolished. Consequently — one ought to *ennoble* it: — I hope this "consequently" is understood? But what is it that makes something contemptible? The fact that it has long been held in contempt. Let one cease to despise whores: then they will no longer have any reason to despise themselves. In the end, things stand better on this point everywhere than with us: prostitution throughout the whole world is something innocent and naive. There are cultures of Asia where it even enjoys high honours. The infamy lies by no means in the thing itself; it was first put into it by the anti-nature of Christianity, that religion which soiled even the sexual drive!… La fille canaille is a Christian speciality: Europe, however, is the soil favourable to its growth, and the great cities of Europe the places where its superlative thrives… — Problem: what conditions give the capital of the new German Reich a superiority in the art of encanailling the harlot?… A permissible question: but one is ashamed to answer it in German…

5.

Critique of Philosophy.

To what extent philosophy is a phenomenon of décadence: Socrates. Pyrrho.

The *idiosyncrasy* of philosophers against the senses:

their "true world"

What the fear of the senses and of passion *is*…

The philosophers as *moralists*: they undermine the naturalism of morality

Critique

of

moral *improvement*.

of remorse

of the

philosophy of pity

The philosopher and conviction.

How the true world became a fable.

Critique of Art.

Critique of Religion.

Religion.

Its origin.

The dangerous misunderstanding

On the history of the concept of God.

Paganism. Christianity.

The Christian ideal

What is dangerous in Christianity.

6.

1.

The eruption of Wagner's art: it remains our last great event in art. How volcanic everything has been everywhere since then! Very loud above all: one no longer has ears, as formerly, *in order* to understand!… One has them almost in order to understand nothing any more!… Wagner himself above all remains not understood. He is still a terra incognita. For the time being he is worshipped. Does anyone also want to understand him? The typical Wagnerian, a creature square in every respect, believes in Wagner: evidently in a square Wagner too… but Wagner was anything but square: Wagner was "Wagnerian". I have asked myself whether anyone has ever existed at all who was modern, morbid, manifold and crooked enough to count as prepared for the problem of Wagner? At most in France: Ch. Baudelaire, for instance. Perhaps also the brothers Goncourt. The authors of "Faustine" would surely divine a few things about Wagner… but they lacked music in their bodies. — Has it been grasped that musicians, one and all, are no psychologists? Not-*wanting*-to-know-here belongs with them to the craft, let us say, to the genius of their craft… they would no longer trust themselves if they understood themselves… Not for nothing does one bid concepts and words valete: one wants to enter the unconscious… From this follows something saddening: either someone is a musician: and then he does not understand the gentlemen musicians (himself included) — but he does understand music. Or else he is a psychologist: and then he probably does not understand music sufficiently, and consequently not the gentlemen musicians either… That is the *antinomy*. And that is why, about Beethoven just as about Wagner the *musician*, there has so far been nothing but chatter. —

2.

Fortunately Wagner was a musician only to a fraction: the whole Wagner was something other than a musician and even rather its opposite. In him the Germans were presented with the most extraordinary genius of acting and theatre that has ever existed. One understands nothing of Wagner if one does not understand him from this side. Whether Wagner was German precisely in these instincts?… But the opposite is obvious. The Germans receive their great men as exceptions and as opposites even to their *rule*: Beethoven, Goethe, Bismarck, Wagner — our four last great men —: from them together one can deduce with the utmost rigour what is fundamentally *not* German, un-German, anti-German…

3.

Wagner was so little a musician that he sacrificed all musical laws and, to speak more precisely, *style* in music altogether, in order to make of it a kind of rhetoric, a means of expression, of intensification, of suggestion, of the psychologically picturesque. Wagner's music, judged *not* from the optics and massiveness of the theatre but as music in itself, is simply *bad* music, un-music: I have never come to know a single person who did not know this. The naïve believe they are saying something to his honour when they decree that Wagner created the *dramatic style* of music. This "dramatic style" is, to speak without circumlocution, stylelessness, contrariness to style, impotence of style made into a principle: dramatic music, so understood, is merely a synonym for "the worst of all possible musics"… One does Wagner an injustice if one wants to make a musician of him.

4.

Wagner's music as such is unbearable: one needs the drama, as redemption from this music. And then one understands all at once the magic that can still be exercised with an art that has been, as it were, cut to pieces and reduced to the elemental! Wagner has an almost uncanny consciousness of everything elemental in the effect of music: one may without exaggeration call him the greatest master of hypnotising, even for our age of hens and sorcerers. He moves, he seeks, he strokes, he makes gestures: — he is understood… the little women are already cold… Wagner never calculates as a musician from any musician's conscience: he wants an effect, he calculates from the optics of the theatre… Nothing is more opposed to him than the monological, secret divinity of Beethoven's music, the self-resounding of solitude, the shame even in becoming audible… Wagner is unscrupulous, as Schiller was unscrupulous, as all men of the theatre are unscrupulous: under certain circumstances he needs the listener's belief that he is hearing precisely such *another* music — and he makes it. It *seems* to us that he makes it: we monsters ourselves are deceived… Afterwards we understand well enough that we have been deceived: but what does the "afterwards" matter to a theatre artist!… He has the moment on his side: Wagner persuades unconditionally. "There is no genuine counterpoint anywhere in Wagner" — so speaks the afterwards. But what would it be for! we are in the theatre, and it suffices to believe that it is there…

5.

The effect of Wagnerian art is deep, above all it is *heavy*: what is the reason for that? Not, in the first place, as has been intimated, the music: one would not even endure this music if one had not already been overpowered by something else and made, as it were, *unfree*. That something else is the Wagnerian *pathos*, to which he merely in-

vented his music in addition. It is the tremendous persuasive force of this pathos, its holding of the breath, its refusal ever again to let go of an extreme feeling, it is the terrifying *length* of this pathos with which Wagner triumphs over us and will always triumph: — so that in the end he even persuades us of his music… Whether, with such a pathos, one is a genius? Or even *can* be?… By an artist's genius one has at times understood his highest freedom under the law, his divine lightness, levity in the heaviest things. Might one say: "Wagner is heavy, heavy as a hundredweight: therefore — no genius?" But perhaps one is wrong to make light feet the type of the god. — Another question, to which a more definite answer is obvious, is this: whether Wagner, precisely with such a pathos, is *German*? is a *German*? Never, never ever! Rather an exception of all exceptions…!

6.

Wagner's sensibility is not German: all the more German is his kind of mind and spirituality. I know very well why German youths felt so incomparably at ease with him, amid the Wagnerian depth, multiplicity, fullness, arbitrariness, uncertainty in matters of the spirit: there they are at home with themselves! They listen with rapture as the great symbols and riddles become audible from a tremendous distance with gentle thunder. They do not grow indignant when things at times turn grey, gruesome and cold: are they not, one and all, kin to bad weather, to *German* weather!… They do not miss what we *others* miss: wit, fire, grace; the great logic; the high-spirited spirituality; the halcyon happiness; the gleaming sky with its constellations and shudders of light…

7.

Wagner's sensibility does not belong in Germany: one meets it again among Wagner's nearest kin, the French Romantics. Passion as Wagn-

er understands it is in any case the counterpart of the "free-thinking of passion", to speak with Schiller, of German-Romantic sensibility. Schiller is as German as Wagner is French. His heroes, his Rienzi, Tannhäuser, Lohengrin, Tristan, Parsifal — they have blood in their bodies, no doubt of it —, and certainly no German blood! And when they love, these heroes — will they love German girls?… I doubt it: but still more do I doubt that they would love precisely Wagnerian heroines: who are a poor folk and a preparation for all sorts of neurotic-hypnotic-erotic experiments by Parisian psychologists! Has anyone yet noticed that none of them ever bore a child? — They *can't*!…

8.

People today are least of all willing to admit how much Wagner owes to France, how much he himself belongs in Paris. The ambition of the grand style in an artist — even that is still French in Wagner… And grand opera! And the race with Meyerbeer! And even with Meyerbeerian means! What is German about that?… In the end let us weigh what is decisive: what characterizes Wagner's artistry? Histrionism, the putting-on-stage, the art of étalage, the will to effect for the sake of effect, the genius of delivering, presenting, imitating, representing, signifying, seeming: is that in any genre a *German* kind of talent?… Here, we know it all too well! we have hitherto had our weakness — and we do not wish to fashion ourselves any pride out of this weakness!… *But it is the genius of France!*…

7.

Romanticism

Naturalism

8.

Progress.

VI

Let us not deceive ourselves! Time runs forward — we should like to believe that everything in it runs forward too… that development is a forward development… That is the appearance by which even the most level-headed are seduced: but the nineteenth century is no progress over the sixteenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is a regression from the German spirit of 1788… "Mankind" does not advance, it does not even exist… The overall aspect is that of an enormous experimental workshop, where a few things succeed, scattered through all ages, and unspeakably much fails, where all order, logic, connection and obligation is lacking… How could we fail to recognize that the advent of Christianity is a décadence movement?… That the German Reformation is a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?… That the Revolution destroyed the instinct for great organization, the possibility of a society?… Man is no progress over the animal: the coddled creature of culture is a monstrosity compared with the Arab and the Corsican; the Chinese is a well-constituted type, namely more durable than the European…

9.

Jesus: Dostoevsky

I know only one psychologist who has lived in the world where Christianity is possible, where a Christ can arise at any moment… That is Dostoevsky. He *divined* Christ: — and instinctively he remained guarded above all against imagining this type with the vulgarity of Renan… And in Paris they believe that Renan suffers from too many finesses!… But can one go more badly astray than by making a genius

out of Christ, who was an idiot? Than by lying a hero out of Christ, who represents the opposite of a heroic feeling?

10.

What is tragic.

I have more than once laid my finger on the great misunderstanding of Aristotle, when he believed he recognized the tragic affects in two *depressing* affects, terror and pity. Were he right, tragedy would be an art dangerous to life: one would have to warn against it as against something harmful to the common good and disreputable. Art, otherwise the great stimulant of life, an intoxication with life, a will to life, would here, in the service of a downward movement, as it were as handmaid of pessimism, become *injurious to health*. (For that one "purges" oneself of these affects by arousing them, as Aristotle seems to believe, is simply not true.) Something that habitually arouses terror or pity disorganizes, weakens, discourages: — and supposing Schopenhauer were right that one should draw resignation from tragedy, i.e. a gentle renunciation of happiness, of hope, of the will to life, then an art would here be conceived in which art negates itself. Tragedy would then signify a process of dissolution, the instincts of life destroying themselves in the instinct of art. Christianity, nihilism, tragic art, physiological décadence: these would hold one another by the hand, these would gain the upper hand at the same hour, these would drive one another forward — *downward*!… Tragedy would be a symptom of decay.

One can refute this theory in the most cold-blooded fashion: namely by measuring the effect of a tragic emotion with a dynamometer. And one obtains as a result what, psychologically, in the end only the absolute mendacity of a systematizer can fail to recognize —: that tragedy is a *tonicum*. If Schopenhauer *would* not understand here, if he

posits total depression as the tragic state, if he gave the Greeks (— who to his annoyance did not "resign"…) to understand that they had not stood at the height of a world-view: then that is parti pris, the logic of the system, the counterfeiting of the systematizer: one of those wicked counterfeitings which step by step spoiled Schopenhauer's whole psychology (: he who arbitrarily and violently misunderstood genius, art itself, morality, pagan religion, beauty, knowledge and roughly everything

Aristotle

Aristotle wanted tragedy to be regarded as a purgative of pity and terror — as a useful discharge of two immoderately dammed-up morbid affects…

The other affects act tonically: but only two depressive affects — and these are consequently especially harmful and unhealthy — pity and terror, were according to Aristotle to be removed from man by tragedy as by a purgative: tragedy, by arousing these dangerous states to excess, redeems man from them — makes him better. Tragedy as a *cure* against pity.

11.

You are today the only musician who makes music after my own heart: is it not only fair that everything I have on my heart against today's music should be your due?

A taste for Wagner's music compromises. I say this as one who makes no exception of himself — I *have* compromised myself.

12.

Toward a Critique of Wagner.

Wagner's music is *anti-Goethean*.

Indeed, Goethe is missing in German music, as he is missing in German politics. On the other hand: how much Schiller, more precisely how much *Thekla* there is in Beethoven!

Much worthy philistinism, much unction:

Wagner has no thoughts, just like V. Hugo: but he knows how to terrorize us to such a degree with a sign in place of a thought — — —

I seek the causes of the *extreme exhaustion* that Wagner's art brings with it

the shifting optics:

the physiological resistance:

breath

gait

the constant exaggeration:

the tyrannical ulterior purpose:

the irritation of the morbid nerves and

of the centres by terroristic means:

his sense of *time*

13.

A Preface

I have the good fortune, and be it the honour too, after whole millennia of aberration and confusion, to have found again the way that leads to a Yes and a No.

I teach the No to everything that makes weak — that exhausts.

I teach the Yes to everything that strengthens, that stores up force, that justifies the feeling of pride — — —

Neither the one nor the other has been taught hitherto: virtue, selflessness, pity have been taught, even the negation of life has been taught… These are all values of the exhausted

Long reflection on the physiology of exhaustion compelled me to ask how far the judgments of the exhausted had penetrated into the world of values.

My result was as surprising as possible, even for me, who was already at home in many a strange world: I found all the supreme value judgments, all those that have become master over mankind, at least over mankind that has become tame, traceable back to the judgments of the exhausted.

I first have need to teach that crime, celibacy, sickness are consequences of exhaustion…

Beneath the holiest names I drew out the destructive tendencies; what weakens, what teaches weakness, what infects with weakness, has been called God… I found that "the good man" is a form of self-affirmation of décadence.

That virtue which even Schopenhauer still taught to be the highest, the only one, and the foundation of all virtues: that very pity I recognized as more dangerous than any vice. To thwart on principle the selection within the species, its purification from refuse — this has hitherto been called virtue par excellence…

The race is corrupted — not by its vices, but by its ignorance: it is corrupted because it did not understand exhaustion as exhaustion: physiological confusions are the cause of all evil because its instinct was led astray by the exhausted into concealing its best and losing its centre of gravity… To plunge downward — to deny life — that too

was supposed to be felt as an ascent, as a transfiguration, as a deification

Virtue is our great misunderstanding.

Problem: how did the exhausted come to make the laws of values?

Asked differently: how did those who are the last come to power?… Know history! How does the instinct of the animal man come to stand on its head?…

I wish to make the concept "progress" more precise and fear that to do so I must strike modern ideas in the face (— my consolation is that they have no faces, but only *masks*…

One should amputate diseased limbs: first morality of society.

A correction of the instincts: their release from ignorance

I despise those who demand of society that it secure itself against those who harm it. That is not nearly enough. Society is a body in which no limb may be diseased if it does not wish to run into danger altogether: a diseased limb that is rotting must be amputated: I shall call the *amputable types* of society by name…

One should hold *fate* in honour: the fate that says to the weak: perish…

It has been called *God* that one resisted fate — that one corrupted mankind and made it rot… Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain…

We have annulled almost all the psychological concepts on which the history of psychology hitherto — what am I saying, of philosophy! — depended

we deny that there is will (not to speak of "free will")

we deny consciousness, both as unity and as faculty

we deny that there is thinking (: for we lack the *that which* thinks and likewise that which is thought

we deny that a real causality exists between thoughts such as logic believes in

My writing turns against all natural types of décadence: I have thought through the phenomena of nihilism most comprehensively

i.e. the born annihilator — — —

14.

Forgive me! This is all the old game of 1830. Wagner believed in love, like all the Romantics of that mad and undisciplined decade. What remained of it? This senseless deification of love, and, incidentally, of debauchery too and even of crime — how false that seems to us today! How worn out above all, how superfluous! We have become stricter, harder, more impatient with such vulgar psychology, which even fancied itself "idealistic" for it — we are cynical even towards this mendacity and romanticism of "beautiful feeling" —

15.

One need only have stayed behind (or *gone* backward) to believe still today in Wagner's problems! Not to speak of Wagnerian women!

That is all sickly folk, with all its boastful musculature… Have you noticed that none of them ever bears a child?… They *cannot*… And if there is an exception, what does Wagner resort to in order to make the exception credible?… You know — — at this point alone Wagner *corrected* the old saga…

Or can you endure Wagner's heroes? all these impossible creatures, as he put them on the stage and set them to music? With muscles from

primeval times and nerves from the day after tomorrow? heroic and at the same time — *nervous*! Every physiologist says to this: that is false!

To be sure — he thereby won over the old women and the young: that sort loves such heroes — that sort perhaps also loves the impossible…

That sort at any rate loves the blond saints, the Parsifal type — everything in which there is *pre-existent* sensuality… How much tender curiosity such a case inspires! How much accommodation it *permits*!… In short, Beaumarchais made the women a present of his Cherubin, Wagner — of his Parsifal… the cleverer one —

16.

Wagner as model.

Wagner as danger.

Wagner and the *Jews*

Wagner's "woman": he knows only the hysterical female. Why is it precisely here that *illusion* becomes ever more impossible?

Wagner and the dramatic form

Wagner's relation to France — "European"

Wagner's relation to Christianity and culture: — the Romantic and the nihilist — typical transformation, with the normal final return to Christianity.

17.

Christianity…

absolute definiteness of the *No*…

That I do not forgive Wagner his Parsifal for another reason, you know. That is a question of honesty — and, if you like, of order of rank. One belongs here, one belongs there, as the case may be.

Whoever becomes ambiguous to me today in his relation to Christianity, to him I do not give so much as the last finger of my two hands. Here there is only One integrity: an unconditional No, a No of the will and of the deed… Who will show me anything more refuted, anything more definitively condemned by all higher feelings of value, than Christianity? To have recognized in it the seduction as seduction, in it the great danger, the way to nothingness which knew how to pass itself off as the way to divinity — to have recognized these eternal values as slanderer-values — what else constitutes our pride, our distinction over two millennia?…

18.

Philosopher

Seriousness.

And all great seriousness — is it not itself already sickness? And a *first* uglification?

The sense for the ugly awakens at the same time as seriousness awakens; one already *deforms* things when one takes them seriously…

Take woman seriously: how ugly the most beautiful woman forthwith becomes!…

It is hard to remain serious here. In the midst of these problems one does not become a funeral-bidder… Virtue in particular has such gestures about it that one must be dyspeptic to maintain one's dignity in spite of them.

Laughter — that is roughly, if not the cleverest, then at least the wisest answer to such questions…

19.

Christianity

Christianity has hitherto always been attacked in a false and not merely timid way. So long as one does not feel the morality of Christianity as a *capital crime against life*, its defenders have an easy game. The question of the mere "truth" of Christianity, whether with respect to the existence of its God or to the historicity of its legend of origin, not to speak of Christian astronomy and natural science — is a wholly secondary matter so long as the question of the value of Christian morality is not touched. Is the morality of Christianity *worth* anything, or is it a desecration and disgrace despite all the holiness of its arts of seduction? There are hiding places of every kind for the problem of truth; and the most believing can in the end make use of the logic of the most unbelieving in order to create for themselves a right to affirm certain things as irrefutable — namely as *beyond* all means of refutation (— this trick is called today "Kantian criticism" —

20.

On the Plan.

1.

The true and the apparent world.

2.

The philosophers as types of décadence

3.

Religion as an expression of décadence

4.

Morality as an expression of décadence.

5.

The *countermovements*: why they were defeated.

6.

Where does our modern world belong, to exhaustion or to ascent? — its multiplicity and unrest conditioned by the highest form of becoming-conscious

7.

The will to power: *becoming-conscious* of the will to life…

8.

The *healing art* of the future.

8:600

56

———

40

70 pages

On 1) “true and apparent world”

1)

such a juxtaposition degrades the “apparent world”

2)

reconsidered: it would not be necessary that the apparent world be degraded thereby.

21.

Chastity.

VII

In the case of the Indian priests, one must take into account not only the rancour against sensuality that is proper to all priests (— for in this they are of one accord: they thus take sensuality as a personal enemy.) The essential thing is that only an extreme rigour in this respect upholds the foundation of the whole order they have created, the concept of caste, the distance between the castes, the purity of the castes…

They *demand* marriage, with all severity; like the Chinese, they stand at the opposite end from European slackness: — they hold it a religious duty to have a son, they make personal salvation in the beyond depend upon one's having a son. One cannot place enough value on such a disposition, a disposition a hundred degrees more dignified and more earnest than that of, for example, Christianity. In the latter,

marriage comes into consideration as coitus and nothing further — as a concession to human weakness and as the pis aller of whoring.

22.

With this worst of all possible bad music, with this restlessness and formlessness adventuring forward from bar to bar, which would signify passion and is in truth the lowest stage of aesthetic brutalization, I have no mercy: here an end must be made.

23.

Renaissance and Reformation

What does the Renaissance *prove*? That the reign of the "individual" can only be brief. The squandering is too great; the very possibility of gathering, of capitalizing, is lacking, and exhaustion follows hard upon its heels. These are times when everything is *squandered*, when even the strength with which one gathers, capitalizes, heaps riches upon riches is squandered… Even the opponents of such movements are compelled to a senseless waste of strength; they too soon become exhausted, used up, barren.

In the Reformation we have a wild and vulgar counterpart to the Renaissance of Italy, sprung from kindred impulses, only that in the backward North, which had remained common, these had to disguise themselves religiously, — there the concept of the higher life had not yet detached itself from that of the religious life.

With the Reformation, too, the individual wants freedom; "every man his own priest" is likewise merely a formula of libertinage. In truth a single word sufficed — "evangelical freedom" — and all the instincts that had reason to remain hidden broke out like wild dogs, the most brutal needs all at once found the courage to be themselves, everything seemed justified… One took care not to grasp what free-

dom one had at bottom meant, one shut one's eyes to oneself… But that one closed one's eyes and moistened one's lips with rapturous speeches did not prevent the hands from seizing wherever there was something to seize, did not prevent the belly from becoming the god of the "free Gospel," nor all the lusts of revenge and envy from satisfying themselves in insatiable fury… This lasted a while: then came exhaustion, just as it had come in the south of Europe; and here again a *common* kind of exhaustion, a general ruere in servitium… There came the *indecent* century of Germany…

24.

A comparison of the Indian law-book with the Christian one cannot be avoided; there is no better means of bringing home to oneself the immaturity and dilettantism in the whole Christian attempt.

25.

IX

When, through practice over a whole series of generations, morality has been, as it were, stored up — that is, subtlety, caution, bravery, fairness — then the total strength of this accumulated virtue radiates out even into the sphere where integrity is rarest, into the *spiritual* sphere.

In all becoming-conscious there is expressed a discomfort of the organism: something new is to be attempted, nothing is adequately prepared for it, there is toil, tension, overstimulation — all this *is* precisely becoming-conscious… Genius resides in instinct; goodness likewise. One acts perfectly only insofar as one acts instinctively. Morally considered too, all thinking that proceeds consciously is a mere attempt, for the most part the very opposite of morality. Scientific

integrity is always suspended when the thinker begins to reason: put it to the test, lay the wisest on the gold-scales by making them talk morality…

It can be proved that all thinking which proceeds consciously will also represent a far lower degree of morality than the thinking of the same person insofar as it is guided by his *instincts*.

Nothing is rarer among philosophers than *intellectual integrity*: perhaps they say the opposite, perhaps they even believe it themselves. But their whole craft entails that they admit only certain truths; they know what they *must* prove, they recognize one another as philosophers almost by the fact that they agree about these "truths." There are, for example, the moral truths. But faith in morality is not yet a proof of morality: there are cases — and the case of the philosophers belongs here — where such a faith is simply an *immorality*.

26.

Today, when the phylloxera dwells in the vineyard of the German spirit

27.

at whose bosom the learned youth today drinks the milk of science, professors and other higher wet-nurses

28.

At all times "fine feelings" have been taken for arguments, the "heaving bosom" for the bellows of divinity, conviction as the "criterion of truth," the opponent's need as a question mark to wisdom: this falsity, this counterfeiting runs through the entire history of philosophy. Apart from the respectable but only sparse sceptics, nowhere does an instinct of intellectual integrity show itself. Last of all Kant, in all

innocence, sought to make this corruption of thinkers scientific with the concept “practical reason”: he expressly invented a reason for the purpose of determining in which cases one need not trouble oneself about reason: namely, when the need of the heart, when morality, when duty speaks

29.

Décadence X

Two types of morality are not to be confused: a morality with which the instinct that has remained healthy defends itself against incipient décadence — and another morality with which precisely this décadence formulates itself, justifies itself, and leads itself downward… The former tends to be stoic, hard, tyrannical — Stoicism itself was such a brake-shoe morality — the other is enthusiastic, sentimental, full of mysteries; it has women and “fine feelings” on its side.

30.

Décadence

“Redemption from all guilt.”

People speak of the "profound injustice" of the social pact: as though the fact that this one is born under favourable circumstances and that one under unfavourable ones were from the outset an injustice; or even that this one is born with these qualities and that one with those. From the most sincere among these opponents of society comes the decree: "we ourselves, with all our bad, morbid, criminal qualities, which we confess, are merely the inevitable *consequences* of a centuries-long oppression of the weak by the strong"; they shift their character onto the conscience of the ruling classes. And they threaten, they rage, they curse; they become virtuous out of indignation —, they do not wish to have become a bad man, a canaille, for nothing…

This attitude, an invention of our last few decades, also calls itself, so I hear, pessimism, and in fact indignation-pessimism. Here the claim is made to judge history, to strip it of its fatality, to find a responsibility behind it, *guilty parties* within it. For that is what it is about: one needs guilty parties. The ill-constituted, the décadents of every kind are in revolt against themselves and need victims, so as not to quench their thirst for destruction on themselves (which in itself might perhaps have reason on its side). For this they need a semblance of right, that is to say a theory on the strength of which they can *shift* the fact of their existence, of their being-thus-and-so, onto some scapegoat or other. This scapegoat may be God — in Russia there is no lack of such atheists out of ressentiment — or the social order, or education and schooling, or the Jews, or the noble, or in general the *well-off* of whatever kind. "It is a crime to be born under favourable conditions: for thereby one has disinherited the others, pushed them aside, condemned them to vice, even to *work*"… "How am *I* to blame for being miserable! But somebody must be to blame for it, *otherwise it would be unbearable*!"… In short, indignation-pessimism *invents* responsibilities in order to create for itself an *agreeable* feeling — revenge… "Sweeter than honey" old Homer already calls it. —

2.

That such a theory no longer meets with understanding, that is to say with contempt, is the doing of that piece of *Christianity* which still sticks in all our blood: so that we are tolerant towards things merely because they smell faintly of something Christian… The socialists appeal to the Christian instincts; that is still their subtlest cleverness… From Christianity we are accustomed to the superstitious concept of the "soul", to the "immortal soul", to the soul-monad, which really is at home somewhere quite different and has only by chance fallen, as it were, into these or those circumstances, into the

"earthly", has become "flesh": yet without its essence being touched by this, let alone *conditioned*. Social, familial, historical circumstances are for the soul mere occasions, embarrassments perhaps; in any case it is not their *work*. With this notion the individual is made transcendent; on the strength of it he may ascribe to himself a senseless importance. In fact it was Christianity that first challenged the individual to set himself up as judge over each and every thing; megalomania was made almost a duty for him: for he has *eternal* rights to assert against everything temporal and conditioned! What of the state! What of society! What of historical laws! What of physiology! Here speaks something beyond becoming, something unchangeable in all history, here speaks something immortal, something divine, a *soul*! Another Christian concept, no less mad, has been inherited still far more deeply into the flesh of modernity: the concept of the *equality of souls before God*. In it the prototype of all theories of *equal rights* is given: mankind was first taught to stammer the proposition of equality religiously; later a morality was made out of it for mankind: and what wonder that man ends by taking it seriously, by taking it *practically*! that is to say politically, democratically, socialistically, indignation-pessimistically…

Wherever responsibilities have been sought, it was the *instinct of revenge* that did the seeking. This instinct of revenge became master over mankind to such a degree over millennia that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, the conception of history, but above all *morality*, have been marked by it. As far as man has ever thought, so far has he dragged the bacillus of revenge into things. He has made God himself sick with it, he has robbed existence as such of its innocence: namely, by tracing every being-thus-and-so back to will, to intentions, to acts of responsibility. The whole doctrine of the will, this most fateful *falsification* in psychology hitherto, was essentially invented for the purpose of revenge. It was the social *utility* of punishment that guaranteed this concept its dignity, its power, its truth. The originators of

the older psychology — the psychology of will — are to be sought in the classes that held criminal law in their hands, foremost among them that of the priests at the head of the oldest communities: they wanted to create for themselves a right to take revenge — or they wanted to create for *God* a right to revenge. For this purpose man was thought of as "free"; for this purpose every action had to be thought of as willed, the origin of every action had to be thought of as lying in consciousness. In these propositions alone the old psychology is preserved. — Today, when Europe seems to have entered upon the opposite movement, when we halcyonians above all are seeking with all our strength to withdraw the *concept of guilt* and the *concept of punishment* from the world again, to take them out, to extinguish them, when our greatest earnestness is bent on cleansing psychology, morality, history, nature, social institutions and sanctions, God himself of this filth — in whom must we see our most natural antagonists? Precisely in those apostles of revenge and of ressentiment, in those indignation-pessimists par excellence, who make a mission of sanctifying their filth under the name of "indignation"… We others, who wish to win back for becoming its innocence, would like to be the missionaries of a cleaner thought: that no one has given man his qualities, neither God, nor society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself, — that no one is *to blame* for him… There is no being that could be held responsible for the fact that anyone exists at all, that anyone is thus and so, that anyone is born under these circumstances, in these surroundings. — *It is a great refreshment that such a being is lacking*… We are *not* the result of an eternal intention, of a will, of a wish: with us the attempt is *not* being made to attain an "ideal of perfection" or an "ideal of happiness" or an "ideal of virtue", — just as little are we God's blunder, before which he himself would have to grow afraid (— with which thought, as is well known, the Old Testament begins). There is no place, no purpose, no meaning onto which we could shift our being, our being-thus-and-so. Above all: no one *could* do so: one

cannot judge, measure, compare, or even deny the whole. Why not? — For five reasons, all of them accessible even to modest intelligences: for example, *because there is nothing besides the* whole. — And, to say it once more, that is a great refreshment; therein lies the innocence of all existence.

31.

XI

Fundamental insight into the nature of décadence:

what has hitherto been regarded as its causes are its consequences.

With this the whole perspective *of moral problems* changes.

Vice:

Luxury:

Crime:

even sickness:

: the whole moral struggle against vice, luxury, etc. appears as naivety, as superfluous…:

: there is no "*improvement*" — against *remorse*

Décadence itself is nothing *that ought to be combated*: it is absolutely necessary and proper to every age and every people. *What* must be combated with all one's strength is the carrying of the contagion into the healthy parts of the organism.

Is that done? What is done is the *opposite*.

Precisely this is what is striven for on the part of *humanitarianism*

How do the *highest values* hitherto stand in relation to this *biological* fundamental question?

1) Philosophy

religion

morality

art

etc.

the cure: e.g. *militarism*, from Napoleon onward, who saw in civilization his natural enemy…

32.

The question of *décadence*: to grasp which phenomena belong together and have their common seat here

Anarchism

Emancipation of women

Decrease of the defensive forces

Illness, epidemics, etc.

Preponderance of ressentiment

the pessimism of indignation

sympathy with everything that suffers

pity

the lack of inhibiting apparatuses

Vice, corruption (critique of the senses, of the passions)

the growing ugly

the increase of ugliness (beauty as something *worked for*

"tolerance"

skepsis, "objectivity"

Preponderance of the feelings of weakness

the pessimists (physiologically décadents

the *dissolving* instincts

the liberal institutions

Talent for representing several persons

Hypocrisy, play-acting:

the weakening of the *person*

the "in vain", the "senselessness"

nihilism.

excessive excitability the emancipation of women

hyperirritability

"Music"

the "artiste"

the "romancier"

Need for stimulants

Luxury as — — —

the need for narcotics, debauchery in music and alcohol (also *books*)

the tyranny of the milieu

33.

The philosophies.

The religions.

The moralities.

Sterility, celibacy (hatred of the senses: in Schopenhauer, e.g.

34.

The philosophies of pessimism:

physiologically décadents

e.g.

Baudelaire

Schopenhauer

Leopardi:

sexual aberrations at the beginning,

early impotence as a consequence

35.

the unworthy attempt has been made to see in Wagner and Schopenhauer types of the mentally deranged: an incomparably more essential insight would be gained by defining scientifically the type of décadence that both represent.

36.

Present-day Germany, which works with the straining of all its forces and counts overload and premature old age among its normal consequences, will pay for it within just 2 generations with a profound

phenomenon of degeneration… For the time being we merely ascertain the increasing de-spiritualization and vulgarization of taste — an ever more vulgar need for recreation: later ages will find in the foreground the morbid needs, the intensification of stimulants, the alcoholic and musical opiates.

37.

XII

Féré p. 89.

the incapacity for sustained work

consequence of excessive work under insufficient nourishment, namely of an ever deeper and more lasting exhaustion, which brings morbid phenomena to light in the next generation

we also know a hereditary *overwork*: chief cause of the degeneration of a race, — with it the race becomes ever more incapable of productive exertion

Laziness, as incapacity for sustained exertion, proper to degeneration. Such individuals, who need not only nourishment but special *stimulants* to heighten their declining vital force, wish to be *maintained* by the work of others. To this end they make use of cunning or of violence. (i.e. of the *one-time* exertion)

Three quarters of the degenerates come from *indigence*, half are without work. But *indigence* is already a consequence of the incapacity for work, of the typical idleness of the degenerate…

— the *one-time* exertion: symptom.

Laziness, poverty, crime, parasitism,

Instruction increases needs and covetousness without increasing the means of satisfying them.

With compulsory instruction one exhausts the *reserves* of a race.

criminality is greatest where *exhaustion* is greatest, i.e. where work is most senseless, in the sphere of commerce and industry

Overwork, *exhaustion*, need for *stimulation* (vice), intensification of irritability and of *weakness* (so that they become explosive)

The misshapen, the degenerate, and the impotent of every kind have a kind of instinct for one another: out of it grow the *antisocial* beings

(because their parents were incapable of adapting themselves to societies)

they seek one another out, the insane e.g.

in neuropathic families there is a *degenerative selection* (Goethe, "Elective Affinities")

the breed born of vice and crime is *antisocial* — the *servant-animal* too (light work and relative well-being) prepares antisocial elements (whores, thieves, criminals of every kind)

Drink and *debauchery* intensify degeneration

Increase of diseases through slowing of nutrition

Neurosis, psychosis and recrudescence of criminality

Incapacity for struggle: that is degeneration

"struggle must be abolished

the strugglers first!"

Murder and *suicide* belong together and follow one another in proportion to the ages of life and the seasons

pessimism and suicide belong together

Need for excitements and stimuli:

Luxury — one of the first steps of décadence. Stimulation produces weakness…

The degenerate feel an attraction toward a regimen that is harmful to them, that accelerates the course of degeneration (the anaemic, the hysterical, the diabetic, the dystrophic)

38.

And, in the midst of this décadence, the wars for the "fatherland", for this ridiculous afterbirth of patriotism, which, for economic reasons, will in a mere hundred years be a comedy…

this *extermination* of the best-constituted men through war —

39.

XIII

To the well-constituted, who does my heart good, carved from a wood that is hard, delicate and fragrant, — in whom even the nose still takes its delight — let this book be dedicated.

he relishes what is beneficial to him

his pleasure in something ceases where the measure of the beneficial is exceeded

he divines the remedies against partial injuries, he has illnesses as great stimulants of his life

he knows how to exploit his bad accidents

he grows stronger through the misfortunes that threaten to annihilate him

he instinctively gathers from everything he sees, hears, experiences, in favour of his main concern — he follows a *selective* principle, — he lets much fall through

he reacts with the slowness that long caution and a willed *pride* have bred into him, — he tests the stimulus, whence it comes, whither it would go, he does not submit

he is always in *his own* company, whether he associates with books, men or landscapes: he honours by *choosing*, by *admitting*, by *trusting*…

40.

That civilization brings in its train the *physiological decline of a race*.

The peasant devoured by the great cities: an unnatural overstimulation of the head and the senses. The demands on their nervous system are too great; scrofula, consumption, nervous diseases, every new *stimulant* only accelerates the rapid disappearance of the *weak*: the epidemics carry off the weak…

The unproductive

laziness is proper to the neurasthenic, the hysterical, the melancholic, the epileptic, the criminal

41.

It is not nature that is immoral when it is without pity for the degenerate: the growth of physiological and moral ills in the human race is, on the contrary, the *consequence of a morbid and unnatural morality*

the sensibility of the majority of men is morbid and unnatural

what is it due to that mankind is *corrupt* in moral and physiological respects?

The body perishes when one organ is *altered*…

one cannot trace the right of altruism back to physiology

just as little the right to help, to equality of lots: these are all premiums for the degenerate and the ill-constituted.

There is *no solidarity* in a society where there are sterile, unproductive and destructive elements, which, moreover, will have offspring still more degenerate than themselves.

42.

"*Improvement*"

Critique of the holy lie.

XIV

That the lie is permitted for pious ends belongs to the theory of all priesthoods, — how far it belongs to their practice shall be the subject of this inquiry.

But the philosophers too, as soon as they intend, with priestly ulterior motives, to take the guidance of men into their hands, have at once also fashioned for themselves a right to lie: Plato first among them. Most magnificent is the double lie developed by the typically Aryan philosophers of the Vedanta: two systems, contradictory in all main points, but for purposes of education relieving, filling out, complementing one another. The lie of the one is meant to create a state in which the truth of the other becomes *audible* at all…

How far does the pious lie of the priests and the philosophers go? — Here one must ask what presuppositions for education they have,

what dogmas they must *invent* in order to satisfy these presuppositions?

First: they must have power, authority, unconditional credibility on their side

Second: they must hold the whole course of nature in their hands, so that everything that befalls the individual appears as conditioned by their law

Third: they must also have a further-reaching domain of power, whose control escapes the eyes of those subjected to them: the measure of punishment for the beyond, the "after-death", — as also, fittingly, the means of knowing the way to blessedness

They have to remove the concept of the natural course of things: but since they are clever and thoughtful people, they can *promise* a host of effects, naturally as conditioned by prayers or by strict observance of their law…

they can likewise *ordain* a host of things that are absolutely reasonable, — only they may not name experience, the empirical, as the source of this wisdom, but rather a revelation, or the consequence of "the harshest penances"

the *holy lie* therefore relates in principle: to the *purpose* of the action (— the natural purpose, reason, is made invisible, a moral purpose, a fulfilment of the law, a service of God appears as the purpose

: to the *consequence* of the action (— the natural consequence is interpreted as supernatural, and, in order to act with certainty, other, uncontrollable supernatural consequences are held out in prospect.

in this way a concept of *good* and *evil* is created which appears utterly detached from the natural concept "useful" "harmful", life-furthering,

"life-diminishing" — insofar as *another* life has been invented, it can even become directly *hostile* to the natural concept of good and evil

in this way, finally, the famous "conscience" is created: an inner voice which, with every action, measures the value of the action *not* by its consequences, but with regard to the intention and the conformity of this intention with the "law"

The holy lie has therefore

invented a *punishing and rewarding God* who recognizes exactly the law-book of the priests and sends exactly them into the world as his mouthpieces and plenipotentiaries

a *beyond of life*, in which the great punishment-machine is first conceived as effective, — to this end the "*immortality of the soul*"

conscience in man, as the consciousness that good and evil are fixed, — that God himself speaks here when it counsels conformity with priestly prescription

morality as the *denial* of every natural course of things, as the reduction of all happening to a morally conditioned happening, the moral effect (i.e. the idea of punishment and reward) as permeating the world, as the sole power, as creator of all change

truth as given, as revealed, as coinciding with the teaching of the priests: as the condition of all salvation and happiness in this life and that

In sum: with what is moral *improvement* paid for?

The unhinging of *reason*, the reduction of all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward)

Dependence upon a priestly guardianship, upon a punctiliousness in formalities that lays claim to expressing a divine will

the implanting of a "conscience" that sets a false *knowing* in place of testing and experiment

: as if it were already settled what is to be done and what left undone — a kind of castration of the seeking and forward-striving spirit

: in sum, the worst *mutilation* of man that one can imagine, allegedly as "the good man"

In practice the whole of reason, the whole inheritance of prudence, subtlety, caution, which is the presupposition of the priestly canon, is arbitrarily reduced after the fact to a mere *mechanism*

conformity with the law already counts as the goal, as the supreme goal, — *life has no more problems* —

the whole world-conception is soiled with the *idea of punishment*…

life itself, with a view to presenting the *priestly* life as the non plus ultra of perfection, is reconceived into a slander and soiling of life…

the concept "God" represents a turning away from life, a critique, a contempt even of life…

truth is reconceived as the *priestly* lie, the striving for truth as *study of Scripture*, as a means *of becoming a theologian*…

43.

The seduction of mankind under the cloak of the holiest intention

the criminal use that has hitherto been made of the word "truth"

I have a grim and fateful story to tell, the story of the longest crime, of the most calamitous seduction, of the most deliberate poisoning, the truly *black* event of mankind, under whose spell the deepest instincts of life have been branded as heretical and called into question…

Priests:

they confuse *cause* and *effect*

Priests:

they confuse calm as *strength* and

calm as *impotence*

Would one believe it possible to spread an error about *cause* and *effect*, such that one feels the effect as the cause? It seems impossible: but under the seduction of morality it has succeeded…

At all times, on the part of the priests, the *decay* of a lineage, of a people, has been represented as punishment for its vices, for its unbelief and free-thinking; likewise sickness, plagues, mental illnesses have been represented as consequences of estrangement from the faith,

conversely, long life and the happiness of family and offspring have been held out as the reward for piety and fulfilment of the law

today we say the reverse: the soundness of a man, his "uprightness", is the consequence of long, happy marriages and the expression of a reasonable choice of those to be paired, — thereby forces can be summed up…, an *expression* of the happiness of the forebears

Vice, crime, morbidity, madness, libertinage, the spiritual kind too, are consequences of décadence, symptoms of it, — they are consequently *incurable*…

The piety of families guarantees healthy and happy offspring so little that precisely among the most pious, hereditarily most pious families in present-day Europe mental disturbances, melancholy, are hereditary… It is the expression of a suffering and oppressed type to need

piety so very much in order to endure life: our Pietists are not Christians by choice…

44.

The reversal of the order of rank:

the pious counterfeiters, the priests, become Chandala among us:

— they take the position of charlatans, of quacks, of counterfeiters, of sorcerers: we regard them as corrupters of the will, as the great slanderers of life and those vengeful against it, as the *rebels* among the ill-constituted

On the other hand, the Chandala of former times is on top: first the blasphemers, the *immoralists*, the free-roaming of every kind, the artistes, the Jews, the minstrels — at bottom all the *disreputable* classes of men —

— we have raised ourselves to *honourable* thoughts, more still, we *determine* honour on earth, "*nobility*"…

— we all today are the *advocates*

of

life —

— we *immoralists* are today the *strongest power*: the other great powers need us… we construct the world after our own image —

We have transferred the concept Chandala to the *priests*, the *teachers of the beyond*, and to that which has grown together with them, *Christian society*, adding what is of the same origin, the pessimists, nihilists, romantics of pity, criminals, the vice-ridden, — the entire sphere where the concept "God" is imagined as *saviour*…

We are proud of no longer having to be liars, slanderers, casters of suspicion on life…

NB. Even if *God* were proved to us, we would not know how to believe in him.

45.

Towards a critique of the Manu law-book. —

XV

The whole book rests on the holy lie:

— is it the welfare of mankind that inspired this whole system? this kind of man, who believes in the *self-interestedness* of every action, was he interested or not in imposing this system?

— to improve mankind — whence is this intention inspired? Whence is the concept of the better taken?

— we find a kind of man, the *priestly* kind, which feels itself to be the norm, the summit, the highest expression of the type man: it takes the concept of the "better" from itself

— it believes in its superiority, it also *wills* it in deed: the cause of the holy lie is the *will to power*…

*

Establishment of dominion: to this end the dominion of concepts which posit a non plus ultra of power in the priesthood

power through the lie, in the insight that one does not possess it physically, militarily…

the lie as a supplement to power, — a new concept of "truth"

One is mistaken if one presupposes here an *unconscious and naive* development, a kind of self-deception… Fanatics are not the inventors of such thought-out systems of oppression…

Here the most cold-blooded deliberation was at work, the same kind of deliberation that a Plato had when he devised his "Republic"

"One must will the means if one wills the end" — all lawgivers were clear in their own minds about this politician's insight

We have the classic model as specifically *Aryan*: we may therefore hold the best-endowed and most deliberate kind of man responsible for the most fundamental lie that has ever been told… It has been imitated, almost everywhere: the *Aryan influence* has corrupted all the world…

46.

That anything at all is believed - - -

XVI

Error and ignorance are fateful.

The assertion that *the truth is there* and that there is an end to ignorance and error is one of the greatest seductions there are.

Supposing it is believed, then the will to examination, investigation, caution, experiment is thereby paralysed: it can even count as sacrilegious, namely as *doubt* of the truth…

"Truth" is consequently *more* fateful than error and ignorance, because it ties down the forces with which work is done toward enlightenment and knowledge.

The affect of *laziness* now takes the side of "truth";

— "Thinking is a distress, a misery!"

likewise order, rule, the happiness of possession, the pride of wisdom — *vanity* in summa

— it is more comfortable to obey than to *examine*… it is more flattering to think "I have the truth" than to see only darkness all around…

— above all: it soothes, it gives confidence, it makes life easier — it "improves" the *character*, insofar as it *diminishes mistrust*…

"peace of soul", "tranquillity of conscience", all inventions which are possible only on the presupposition that *the truth is there*…

"By their fruits ye shall know them"… "Truth" is truth *because* it makes men *better*…

… the process continues: to put everything good, every success down to the account of "truth"…

That is the proof of strength: the happiness, the contentment, the prosperity of the commonwealth and of the individual are henceforth understood as the consequence of *faith in morality*…

— the inversion: *bad* success is to be derived from a *lack* of faith —

47.

Priestly morality

Master morality

Chandala morality

Middle-class morality ("herd animal morality")

Philosophers

Learned professions

Artists

Statesmen

48.

What is the counterfeiting in morality?

XVII

It pretends to *know* something, namely what good and evil are.

That means wanting to know what man is there for, to know his goal, his destiny.

That means wanting to know that man *has* a goal, a destiny —

49.

The victory over "truth".

What is backward: the precedence of *immoral* values over moral ones.

To prove this:

1)

moral values themselves are not "moral"

a)

neither in their origin

b)

nor in the means of power by which they prevailed

50.

Kant, a concept-machine, full 18th century, with a basement of theologians' guile and a — — —

51.

It is not the victory of science that distinguishes our 19th century, but the victory of scientific method over science

52.

Will to truth.

XVIII

Martyrs

everything that is founded on reverence requires, in order to be combated, a certain audacious, reckless, even shameless disposition on the part of the attackers… If one now considers that for millennia mankind has sanctified only errors as truths, that it even branded every critique of them as a sign of a bad disposition, then one must admit with regret that a good number of *immoralities* were needed to give the initiative for the attack, that is to say for *reason*… That these immoralists always posed as "martyrs of truth" may be forgiven them: the truth is that it was not the drive to truth, but dissolution, sacrilegious scepticism, the lust for adventure that was the drive out of which they negated — In other cases it is personal grudges that drive them into the domain of problems, — they fight against problems in order to be proved right against persons — Above all, however, it is revenge that has become scientifically useful, — the revenge of the oppressed, of those who had been pushed aside and even oppressed by the *ruling* truths…

Truth, that is to say, scientific methodology, was grasped and promoted by those who divined in it an instrument of struggle, — a weapon for *annihilation*… To bring their opposition into honour, they needed, moreover, an apparatus of the same kind as those they at-

tacked: — they paraded the concept "truth" quite as unconditionally as their opponents, — they became fanatics, at least in attitude, because no other attitude was taken seriously. Persecution did the rest, the passion and insecurity of the persecuted, — hatred grew and consequently the precondition for remaining on the ground of science diminished. In the end they all wanted to be right in just as absurd a way as their opponents… The word "*conviction*", "*faith*", the pride of martyrdom — these are all the most unfavourable conditions for knowledge. The opponents of truths in the end of their own accord accepted again the whole subjective manner of deciding about truth, namely with attitudes, sacrifices, heroic resolutions, — i.e. they *prolonged* the *dominion* of the anti-scientific method.

— as martyrs they compromised their own deed —

53.

The two most abominable monstrosities of the 18th century

the subject creates the world that concerns us —

reason creates society, in which — — —

the two fateful farces, the Revolution and the Kantian philosophy, the practice of revolutionary reason and the revolution of "practical" reason

nature denied, dualistic morality | in Kant

that a concept, supposed *knowledge*, is to take the place of nature, as a shaper, *wants to form, to build*

hatred of becoming, of the careful observation of becoming

is common to all *morality* and to the *Revolution*:

54.

The will to truth.

The philosopher as problem.

The priest: invention of morality.

The victory over "truth" (the "truths" hitherto symptoms of décadence)

The concept and extent of décadence.

55.

To think fairly of morality, we must put two *zoological* concepts in its place: *taming* of the beast and *breeding of a particular species*.

The priests have at all times pretended that they want to "*improve*"… But the rest of us laugh when an animal tamer would talk of his "improved" animals. — The taming of the beast is in most cases achieved through an impairing of the beast: the moralized man, too, is not a better man but only a weakened one, a thoroughly castrated and botched man. But he is less harmful…

56.

the struggle against *brutal* instincts is a different one from the struggle against *morbid* instincts

: it can even be a means of mastering brutality to make *sick*

: the psychological treatment in Christianity often comes down to making out of a brute a sick and *consequently* tame animal

the struggle against crude and savage natures must be a struggle with means that work upon them: the *superstitious* means are irreplaceable and indispensable…

57.

— to demand in itself that only "what is true" be said would presuppose that one possessed the truth; but if it is to mean only that one says what one holds to be true, then there are cases where it is *important* to say it in such a way that it is *held true* by *another* as well: that it *works* upon him

As soon as we ourselves take morality *absolutely*, and for instance *the prohibition of lying* in the religious sense, the whole history of morality, like that of politics, becomes an infamy. We live by *lies* and *counterfeitings* — the ruling estates have always lied…

58.

Chapter: *the will to truth*

the psychological *confusions*:

the longing for belief — confused with the "will to truth" (for instance in Carlyle)

but likewise *the longing for unbelief* has been confused with the "will to truth" (— a need to break free of a belief, for a hundred reasons, to be proved right against some "believers" or other)

what *inspires* the *skeptics*? hatred of the dogmatists — or a need for rest, a weariness as with Pyrrho

— the *advantages* one expected from truth were the advantages of believing in it: — for *in itself* truth could indeed be thoroughly painful, harmful, fateful —

one has likewise fought "truths" only when one promised oneself advantages from victory… for instance freedom from the ruling powers

the methodology of truth was *not* discovered from motives of truth, but from *motives of power, of wanting to be superior*

by what does truth *prove* itself? by the feeling of heightened power ("a belief in certainty") — by usefulness — by indispensability — *in short by advantages*, namely presuppositions as to what kind of nature truth *ought* to have in order to be recognized by us

but that is a *prejudice*: a sign that it is not a matter of *truth* at all…

what does the "will to truth" mean, for instance, in the Goncourts? in the *naturalists*? Critique of "objectivity"

why know? why not rather deceive oneself?…

what one wanted was always belief, — and *not* truth…

Belief is created by means *opposite* to the methodology of inquiry —: *it even excludes the latter* —

59.

The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely supersensible, spiritual, benevolent is an *emergency measure* in proportion as the *counter*-instincts are still all-powerful…

moderation and attained humanity show themselves precisely in the humanization of the gods: the Greeks of the strongest age, who had no fear of themselves but rather took delight in themselves, brought their gods close to all their affects —…

The spiritualization of the idea of God is therefore far from signifying *progress*: one feels this quite heartily upon contact with Goethe — how there the evaporation of God into virtue and spirit makes itself felt as a *cruder* stage…

60.

If anything signifies our *humanization*, a true, actual *progress*, it is that we no longer need excessive antitheses, indeed no antitheses at all…

we may love the senses, we have spiritualized them and made them artistic in every degree

we have a right to all those things that were hitherto most badly *ill-reputed*

61.

A. To the extent that Christianity still appears necessary today, man is still savage and fateful…

B. in another respect it is not necessary but extremely harmful, yet it works as attractive and seductive because it corresponds to the *morbid* character of whole strata, whole types of present-day humanity… they yield to their inclination when they aspire in a Christian way — the décadents of every kind —

here one must strictly distinguish between A and B. *In case A* Christianity is a remedy, at least a means of taming (— under certain circumstances it serves to make sick: which can be useful for breaking savagery and crudeness)

In case B it is a symptom of the sickness itself, it *increases* the décadence; here it works against a *corroborating* system of treatment, here it is the sick man's instinct *against* that which is salutary for him —

62.

The party of the *serious*, the *dignified*, the *reflective*

: and over against it the savage, unclean, incalculable beast

: a mere problem of *animal taming*:

— in which the animal tamer must be hard, fearsome and terror-inspiring to his beast

all essential demands must be put with a brutal distinctness, i.e., exaggerated a thousandfold

: the *fulfilment* of the demand itself must be presented in so coarsened a form that it arouses reverence

for instance the desensualization on the part of the Brahmins.

*

The struggle with the rabble and the brute: once a certain taming and order has been attained, the chasm between these *purified* and *reborn* ones and the *rest* must be torn open as terribly as possible…

this chasm increases the self-respect of the higher castes, their belief in that which is represented by them

hence the *Chandala*. Contempt and its excess are perfectly correct psychologically, namely exaggerated a hundredfold in order to be felt at all

*

In the struggle with the beast, making *sick* is often the only means of making *weak*. And just as the Brahmins defend themselves against the Chandalas (by making them sick), so too they condemn criminals and rebels of every kind to *weakenings* (— this the meaning of penances etc.)

63.

Reckoned on the large scale, an enormous quantum of *humanity* has been attained in our present-day humanity. That this is not generally

felt is itself a proof of it: we have become so sensitive to *small hardships* that we unfairly overlook what has been attained.

: here one must deduct the fact that there is much décadence: and that, seen with such eyes, our world *must look* bad and miserable. But these eyes have at all times seen the same thing…

1)

a certain overstimulation even of moral sensibility

2)

the quantum of embitterment and gloom that pessimism carries with it into judgment

: both together have helped the *opposite* notion, that things stand *badly* with our morality, to gain the upper hand.

The fact of credit, of all world trade, of the means of communication, — an enormous mild *trust* in man expresses itself in it… Contributing to this as well is

3)

the detachment of science from moral and religious aims: a very good sign, but one that is mostly misunderstood.

I attempt in my own way a justification of history

64.

Morality a useful error, more plainly, with regard to the greatest and most unprejudiced of its promoters, a lie deemed necessary

65.

What I wish to make clear with all my strength:

a) that there is no worse confusion than when one confuses *taming* with *weakening*

: which is what has been done…

Taming, as I understand it, is a means of humanity's enormous storing-up of strength, so that the generations can build further upon the work of their forebears — not only outwardly but inwardly, growing organically out of them, into the *stronger*…

b) that there is an extraordinary danger in believing that mankind as a *whole* would go on growing and grow stronger if individuals become slack, equal, average… Mankind is an abstraction: the goal of *taming*, even in the most individual case, can only ever be the *stronger* man (— the untamed one is weak, wasteful, inconstant…

66.

that the corrupt Parisian romanciers now smell of incense does not make them any more fragrant to my nose: mysticism and Catholic-holy wrinkles in the face are only one more form of sensuality

67.

What I warn against: confusing the décadence-instincts with *humanity*

: confusing the *dissolving* means of civilization, the means that *necessarily drive toward décadence*, with *culture*

: confusing libertinage, the principle of "laisser aller", with the *will to power* (— it is its *counter*-principle)

68.

The *two great attempts* that have been made to overcome the eighteenth century:

Napoleon, by reawakening the man, the soldier and the great struggle for power — conceiving Europe as a political unity

Goethe, by imagining a European culture that takes up the full inheritance of the humanity already *attained*.

69.

The German culture of this century arouses mistrust —

in the music that full, redeeming and binding element Goethe is lacking

the Austrians have remained German only through their music

70.

We somewhat mistrust all those enraptured and extreme states in which one fancies one can "grasp the truth with one's hands" —

71.

How virtue comes to power

The priests — and with them the half-priests, the philosophers — have at all times called that doctrine truth whose *educative* effect was beneficial or seemed beneficial — which "improved". In this they resemble a naive healer and miracle-man of the common people who, because he has tried a poison as a remedy, denies that it is a poison… "By their fruits ye shall know them" — namely, our "truths": that is priestly reasoning to this very day. They have themselves, fatefully enough, squandered their acumen on giving the "proof of strength" (or "from the fruits") precedence, indeed the final decision, over all forms of proof. "What makes good must be good; what is good cannot lie" — so they conclude inexorably —: "what bears good fruit must consequently be true: there is no other criterion of truth"…

But insofar as "making better" counts as an argument, making worse must count as a refutation. One proves an error to be an error by examining the life of those who advocate it: a false step, a vice refutes… This most indecent kind of opposition, the kind from behind and below, the dog's kind, has likewise never died out: the priests, insofar as they are psychologists, have never found anything more interesting than sniffing at the secrets of their opponents. — This alone makes up their optics of knowledge of the world: — they prove their Christianity by searching for filth in the "world". Above all in the foremost of the world, in the "geniuses": one recalls how at every time in Germany there has been a fight against Goethe (: Klopstock and Herder led the way here with a "good example" — like will not leave off from like.)

72.

1.

One must be very immoral in order to *make morality* by deed… The means of the moralists are the most fearful means that have ever been wielded; whoever lacks the courage for the immorality of the deed is fit for everything else, but he is not fit to be a moralist.

2.

Morality is a menagerie; its presupposition, that iron bars can be more useful than freedom, even for the one caught; its other presupposition, that there are animal-tamers who do not shrink from fearful means — who know how to wield red-hot iron. This terrible species, which takes up the fight with the wild beast, calls itself "priest".

73.

Man, locked in an iron cage of errors, become a caricature of man, sick, wretched, malicious toward himself, full of hatred for the impulses toward life, full of mistrust toward everything that is beautiful and happy in life, a walking misery: this artificial, arbitrary, *subsequent* monstrosity which the priests have raised from their soil, the "sinner": how shall we manage, in spite of all this, to *justify* this phenomenon?

74.

The means of refuting priests and religions is always only this: to show that their errors have ceased to be *beneficial* — that they do more harm, in short that their own "proof of strength" no longer holds…

75.

Niebuhr: "the moral respectability of the moderns, compared against the Greeks, is extraordinary".

"Do you not also find that nothing so readily makes a more painful impression than when a great spirit robs itself of its wings and seeks a virtuosity in something far lesser, *by renouncing what is higher*?" (With reference to Wilhelm Meister)

76.

Preface.

This book addresses itself only to a few — to those human beings who have *become free*, to whom nothing is forbidden any longer: step by step we have won back the right to everything forbidden.

To give proof of the power and self-assurance attained by having "unlearned fear"; to be permitted to exchange mistrust and suspicion for trust in one's instincts; that one loves and respects oneself in one's sense — and even in one's *nonsense* — a little buffoon, a little god; no gloomy one, no owl; no blindworm…

77.

That nothing of what formerly counted as true is true:

that what was formerly denied us as unholy, forbidden, contemptible, fateful — all these flowers grow today along the lovely path of truth

This whole old morality no longer concerns us: there is not a concept in it that still deserves respect. We have outlived it — we are no longer coarse and naïve enough to have to let ourselves be lied to in this fashion… Put more politely: we are too virtuous for it…

And if truth in the old sense was "truth" only because the old morality said Yes to it, was permitted to say Yes: then it follows that we have no truth of former times left either… Our *criterion* of truth is by no means morality: we *refute* an assertion by proving it to be dependent on morality, inspired by noble feelings.

78.

The *concept* "*strong and weak man*" reduces to this: that in the first case much strength has been inherited — he is a sum; in the other, *as yet little* —

— insufficient inheritance, fragmentation of what was inherited

weakness can be a phenomenon of the *beginning*: "*as yet little*"; or a phenomenon of the *end*: "no longer"

The point of departure, where there is great strength, where strength is to be spent: — the mass, as the sum of the *weak*, reacts *slowly*…

‚resists much for which it is too weak… from which it can derive no benefit

‚does *not* create, does *not* go ahead…

This against the theory which denies the strong individual and holds that "the mass does it"

It is the difference as between separate generations: 4, 5 generations may lie between the *active one* and the mass… a *chronological* difference…

79.

NB NB. *The values of the weak* are at the top because the strong have taken them over in order to *lead* by them…

80.

Acquired, not inherited exhaustion

insufficient *nourishment*, often from ignorance about nourishment; e.g. among scholars

erotic *precocity*: the curse above all of French youth, Parisian youth foremost: which steps into the world from the lycées already botched and soiled — and never again gets free of the chain of contemptible inclinations, ironic and disdainful toward itself — galley-slaves, with all refinement and

: in most cases, moreover, already a symptom of racial and familial décadence, like all hyper-irritability; likewise as contagion of the milieu —: to be determinable by one's surroundings also belongs to décadence —

Alcoholism, *not* instinct but habit, stupid imitation, cowardly or vain adaptation to a ruling régime: — What a blessing a Jew is among Germans! how much dullness, how flaxen the head, how blue the eye; the lack of esprit in face, word, bearing; the lazy stretching, the German need for recuperation, which comes not from overwork but from the repulsive stimulation and overstimulation by alcoholic drinks…

81.

The naïveté is that pessimism thinks it thereby grounds itself: whereas it only thereby *proves* itself…

82.

The *lack of philology*: one constantly confuses the explanation with the *text* — and what an "explanation"!

83.

Women, sturdily made, of the good old stamp, with the temperament of a cow, whom even accidents scarcely touch: but they call it their "trust in God". — They notice nothing of the fact that their "trust in God" is merely the expression of their strong and secure overall constitution — a formulation, not a cause…

84.

The *fact* is "that I am so sad"; the problem "I know not what it should mean"… "The tale from olden times"

"an old sinner" a Christian would say: in the other case, in Heine's case, "the Lorelei has done it".

85.

The "inner world" and *its famous "inner sense"*.

The inner sense confuses the consequence with the cause

the "cause" is projected after the effect has occurred: the basic fact of "inner experience".

86.

The Goncourts found Flaubert campagnardisé, too healthy, too robust for them — they remark that his talent *coarsened* for them…

How Heine's talent must have coarsened for them… Hence the hatred…

Roughly the hatred of Novalis for Goethe —

87.

Note that delicate natures *coarsen* in their aversions, while strong ones *thin out* in their aversions, become tender, become sickly — e.g. Goethe toward Kleist, toward Hölderlin

88.

The typical décadents, who feel themselves *necessary* in their corruption of style, who thereby lay claim to a higher taste and would like to

impose a law upon *others*, the Goncourts, the Richard Wagners, are to be distinguished from the décadents with a bad conscience, the *refractory* décadents —

89.

Ignorance in physiologicis — the Christian has no nervous system —; contempt for and the arbitrary will to look away from the demands of the body, from the *discovery* of the body; the presupposition that this is in keeping with the higher nature of man — *that it* necessarily *benefits the soul* — the fundamental reduction of all the body's general feelings to moral values; illness itself thought of as conditioned by morality, say as punishment, or as trial, or even as a state of salvation in which man becomes more perfect than he could be in health (— Pascal's thought), in certain circumstances the voluntary making-oneself-sick

90.

The phenomenalism of the "inner world"

the chronological reversal, so that the cause enters consciousness later than the effect.

we have learned that pain is projected to a place in the body without having its seat there

we have learned that sense-perception, which one naively supposes to be conditioned by the outer world, is rather conditioned by the inner world: that every actual action of the outer world always proceeds unconsciously… The piece of outer world that becomes conscious to us is born after the effect that has been exerted on us from outside, is projected afterwards as its "cause"…

In the phenomenalism of the "inner world" we invert the chronology of cause and effect.

The fundamental fact of "inner experience" is that the cause is imagined after the effect has occurred…

The same holds also for the sequence of thoughts… we seek the reason for a thought before it is even conscious to us: and then the reason enters consciousness first, and then its consequence…

All our dreaming is the interpretation of total feelings in terms of possible causes: and indeed in such a way that a state becomes conscious only when the chain of causality invented for it has entered consciousness…

the whole of "inner experience" rests on this: that for an excitation of the nerve centres a cause is sought and imagined — and that only the cause thus found enters *into consciousness*: this cause is absolutely not adequate to the real cause, — it is a groping on the basis of former "inner experiences" — that is, of memory. But memory also preserves the habits of the old interpretation, that is, its erroneous causalities… so that "inner experience" must still bear within itself the consequences of all former false causal fictions

our "outer world", as we project it at every moment, is shot through with and indissolubly bound to the old error of the ground: we interpret it with the schematism of the "thing"

just as little as pain in a single case represents merely the single case, but rather a long experience of the consequences of certain injuries, including the errors in estimating those consequences

"Inner experience" enters our consciousness only after it has found a language that the individual *understands*… that is, a translation of a state into states *more familiar* to him —

"to understand", naively, means merely: to be able to express something new in the language of something old and familiar

e.g. "I feel unwell" — such a judgement *presupposes a great and late neutrality on the part of the observer* —: the naive man always says: this or that makes me feel unwell — he becomes clear about his feeling unwell only when he sees a reason for feeling unwell…

This is what I call the *lack of philology*: to be able to read off a text as a text, without mixing an interpretation into it, is the latest form of "inner experience", — perhaps one that is scarcely possible…

91.

The causes of error lie just as much in man's *good will* as in his bad —: in a thousand cases he conceals reality from himself, he falsifies it, so as not to suffer in his good will

God, e.g., as the guide of human destiny: or the interpretation of one's own little lot as though everything were sent and devised for the salvation of the soul — this lack of "philology", which to a subtler intellect must count as uncleanliness and counterfeiting, is as a rule committed under the inspiration of *good will*…

Good will, the "noble feelings", the "lofty states" are in their means just such counterfeiters and deceivers as the affects that are morally rejected and called egoistic, such as love, hatred, revenge.

*

Errors are what mankind has to pay for most dearly: and, reckoned on the large scale, it is the errors of "good will" that have harmed it most deeply. The delusion that makes happy is more pernicious than the one that has directly evil consequences: the latter sharpens, makes mistrustful, purifies reason, — the former lulls it to sleep…

the beautiful feelings, the "sublime surges", belong, physiologically speaking, among the narcotics: their abuse has exactly the same consequence as the abuse of any other opium, — *nervous debility*…

92.

Critique of the subjective *feelings of value*.

Conscience. Formerly one concluded: conscience condemns this action: therefore this action is condemnable. In fact conscience condemns an action because it has long been condemned. It merely repeats: it creates no values.

What formerly determined the condemnation of certain actions was *not* conscience: but insight (or prejudice) regarding their consequences…

The approval of conscience, the pleasant feeling of "peace with oneself", is of the same rank as an artist's delight in his work — it proves nothing at all… Self-satisfaction is as little a measure of value for that to which it refers as its absence is a counter-argument against the value of a thing. We know by no means enough to be able to measure the value of our actions: what is more, we lack the possibility of standing objectively towards them: even when we condemn an action, we are not judges but a party…

The noble surges, as companions of actions, prove nothing about their value: an artist can, with the very highest pathos of the state, bring a paltry thing into the world. One should rather say that these surges are seductive: they lure our gaze, our strength away from criticism, from caution, from the suspicion that we are committing a *stupidity*… they make us stupid —

93.

Formerly those states and consequences of *physiological exhaustion*, because they are rich in the sudden, the terrible, the inexplicable and the incalculable, were taken to be more important than the healthy states and their consequences. One was afraid: one posited here a *higher* world. Sleep and dreams, shadows, night, the terrors of nature have been held responsible for the origin of second worlds: above all one ought to examine the symptoms of physiological exhaustion with this in view. The old religions quite properly discipline the pious into a state of exhaustion in which he *must* experience such things… One believed one had entered a higher order, where everything ceased to be familiar. — *The semblance* of a higher power…

94.

see in the *first large brown notebook*

to give one's life for a cause — great effect. But one gives one's life for many things: the affects one and all want their satisfaction. Whether it is pity or anger or revenge — that life is staked on it changes nothing about the value. How many have sacrificed their lives for pretty little women — and even, what is worse, their health. If one has the temperament, one instinctively chooses dangerous things: e.g. the adventures of speculation, if one is a philosopher; or of immorality, if one is virtuous. The one kind of man wants to risk nothing, the other wants to risk. Are we others despisers of life? On the contrary, we instinctively seek a *heightened* life, life in danger… by this, let it be said once more, we do not wish to be more virtuous than the others. Pascal, e.g., wanted to risk nothing and remained a Christian: that was perhaps more virtuous. — One always sacrifices…

95.

"Great thoughts come from the heart." — But one should not believe Vauvenargues on that, etc. etc.

96.

The best modern opera is the opera of my friend Heinrich Köselitz, the only one that is free of Wagner-Germany: a new setting of the "matrimonio segreto". The second-best opera is Bizet's Carmen — which is almost free of it; the third-best Wagner's Meistersinger: a masterpiece of dilettantism in music. Attempt at a revaluation of values.

97.

What was not known formerly: a *regression* is not *possible*. Yet all moralists and priests seek to bring men back to an earlier pattern and to develop in them virtues that once were virtues. Even the politicians are not free of this — the Conservatives above all. One can *inhibit* a development, and through inhibition bring about even a degeneration and annihilation — more one cannot do.

The whole romanticism of the ideal is false in this: that it holds regression to be possible. In point of fact the romantics represent a morbid form of décadence: they are very far advanced, very late, and utterly barren… The longing for bygone times is itself a testimony to a deep displeasure and futurelessness

thus the *regressive* tendencies prove the opposite: that one is very late, too late, that one is old…

98.

A capable little lad will look ironical if one asks him: do you want to become virtuous? but he opens his eyes wide if one asks him: do you want to become stronger than your comrades

How does one become stronger

decide slowly; and hold tenaciously to what one has decided. Everything else follows.

The *sudden* and the *changeable*: the two kinds of the weak. Not to confuse oneself with them, to feel the distance — in good time!

Beware of the good-natured! Association with them enervates

Every association is good in which the defences and weapons one has in one's instincts are exercised.

all one's inventiveness in putting one's willpower to the test… To see the distinguishing mark *here, not* in knowledge, acuteness, wit…

One must learn to command, in good time —, just as well as to obey.

One must learn modesty, *tact* in modesty: namely, to distinguish, to honour, where one is modest…

likewise with trust — to distinguish, to honour…

What does one pay for most dearly? One's modesty; to have given no hearing to one's very own needs; to mistake oneself; to take oneself as lowly; to lose the fineness of ear for one's instincts; — this *lack of reverence* toward oneself avenges itself through every kind of *loss*: health, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, firmness, courage, friendship. One never forgives oneself later for this lack of genuine egoism: one takes it as an objection, as a doubt about a real ego…

99.

Wagner set nothing but case histories to music, nothing but interesting cases, nothing but thoroughly modern types of degeneracy, which for that very reason are intelligible to us. Nothing has been better studied by present-day physicians and physiologists than the hysterical-hypnotic type of the Wagnerian heroine: here Wagner is a connoisseur, he is true to nature in this to the point of the repulsive — his music is above all a psychological-physiological analysis of morbid states — as such it might well retain its value even if a taste wholly [— — —] and it no longer resounded as music. That the dear Germans know how to rhapsodize, in the process, about primal feelings of Germanic sturdiness and strength belongs among the comical symptoms of the psychological culture of the Germans: — we others, with Wagner's music, are in the hospital and, to say it once more, very interested… Morbidity in Wagner is not willed, not accident, not exception — it is the essence of his art, its instinct, its "unconscious", it is its *innocence*: sensibility, the tempo of the affect, everything has its share in it, the realm of [—] is of enormous breadth

Senta, Elsa, Isolde, Brünnhilde, Kundry: a pretty gallery of clinical cases — how instinctively Wagner understands woman as sick woman is made evident by Eva of the Meistersinger, who otherwise turned out more naturally: — Wagner cannot help giving her an attitude twenty minutes long, on account of which we should infallibly place the pretty creature under psychiatric supervision. Against Wagner's heroes the first objection is that all of them have a morbid taste — they love nothing but women who ought to repel them… They love nothing but barren women — none of these "heroines" knows how to make a child — the exception is interesting enough: in order to help Sieglinde to a child, Wagner did violence to the legend — and perhaps not only to the legend: according to Wagnerian physiology only incest is a guarantee of children… Brünnhilde herself — — —

100.

The Will to Power.

Attempt

at a Revaluation of All Values.

First Book.

The Values of Decline.

Critique of the Great Words

the selfless man

Second Book.

Why only values of decline came to dominion.

"heroic"

"Pity"

on the "peace of the soul"

Third Book.

Modernity

as Ambiguity of Values.

the martyr.

Modesty (how one pays for it…)

Fourth Book.

The *Value* of the Future

(as expression of a *stronger kind of man*)

: which must first *exist*…

101.

Picture of décadence: its symptoms.

Overgrowth of the higher values by these symptoms.

Philosophy as décadence

Morality as décadence.

Religion as décadence.

Art as décadence.

Politics as décadence

102.

I.

The Values of Decline

II.

The Countermovement and Its Fate.

III.

Problem of Modernity.

IV.

The Great Noon.

103.

la méditation affaiblit comme feraient des évacuations excessives (Tissot, De la santé des gens de lettres p. 43) 1784

under the influence of difficult calculations sensibility diminishes, likewise voluntary contractility; the girth of the limbs decreases.

104.

What the spiritualization of every kind of appetite amounts to: for this a classic example is the satura Menippea of Petronius. Read it hand in hand with a Church Father and ask yourself where the *cleaner* air blows… Here there is nothing that would not drive an old priest to despair through immorality and lascivious high spirits

105.

NB NB the doctrine of *milieu* a décadence-theory, but one that has penetrated into *physiology* and become master there

106.

The theory of milieu, today the *Parisian* theory par excellence, is itself a proof of a fateful disgregation of personality: when the milieu begins to form, and when it corresponds to the facts that the foreground talents may be understood as mere concrescences of their surroundings, then the time is past in which one could still gather, accumulate, harvest — the *future* is past… The moment devours what it brings forth — and, alas, it remains hungry even so…

107.

In sum: heroism is not self-interest — for one perishes of it… Often the *employment* of force is conditioned by the accident of the age into which the great man falls: and this brings with it the superstition that he is the *expression* of that age… but the same force could spend itself in many other forms, and between him and the age there always remains the difference that "public opinion" is accustomed to worship

the instinct of the herd, i.e. of the weak, and that he is the *strong one*, *the* strong…

108.

The believers are conscious of owing infinitely much to Christianity, and conclude accordingly that its originator must be a personage of the first rank… This conclusion is false, but it is the typical conclusion of those who revere. Viewed objectively, it would be possible, *first*, that they are mistaken about the value of what they owe to Christianity: convictions prove nothing for that of which one is convinced; in the case of religions they rather ground a suspicion against it… It would be possible, *second*, that what is owed to Christianity ought not to be ascribed to its originator, but precisely to the finished structure, to the whole, to the church that came out of it. The concept "originator" is so ambiguous that it can even signify the mere occasional cause of a movement: the figure of the founder has been magnified in proportion as the church grew; but precisely this optics of reverence permits the conclusion that at some time this founder was something very uncertain and unestablished — at the beginning… Consider with what *freedom* Paul treats the personal problem of Jesus, almost conjures it away — someone who died, who was seen again after his death, someone who was delivered over to death by the Jews… A mere "motif": *he* then makes the music to it… A zero at the beginning —

109.

The master-morality

the priest-morality

the Chandala-morality

(The servant-morality)

The herd-animal morality

The décadence-morality

The morality of peoples

110.

Altruism

In having moved the doctrine of selflessness and love into the foreground, Christianity has by no means yet set the interest of the species higher in value than the interest of the individual. Its genuinely *historical* effect, the fatality of its effect, remains on the contrary precisely the *intensification of egoism*, of individual egoism, to the extreme (— to the extreme of individual immortality.) Through Christianity the single one was taken so seriously, posited so absolutely, that he could no longer be *sacrificed*: but the species endures only through human sacrifice… Before God all "souls" become *equal*: but that is precisely the most dangerous of all possible valuations! If one posits individuals as equal, one calls the species into question, one favours a practice that amounts to the ruin of the species: Christianity is the counter-principle *against selection*. If the degenerating and sick ("the Christian") is to have as much value as the healthy ("the pagan"), or even more, according to Pascal's judgment on sickness and health, then the natural course of development is thwarted and *the unnatural* is made into law… This universal love of mankind is in praxi the *preference* for everything suffering, ill-constituted, degenerate: it has in fact lowered and weakened the strength, the responsibility, the high duty of sacrificing men. According to the scheme of the Christian measure of value, there remained only to sacrifice oneself: but this *remnant* of human sacrifice which Christianity conceded and even counselled has, from the standpoint of breeding as a whole, no sense whatever. It is a matter of indifference to the flourishing of the species

whether any individuals sacrifice themselves (— be it in monkish and ascetic fashion or with the help of crosses, pyres and scaffolds, as "martyrs" of error) The species needs the destruction of the failures, the weak, the degenerate: but it was precisely to them that Christianity turned, as a *conserving* power; it intensified still further that instinct of the weak, already so powerful in itself, to spare themselves, to preserve themselves, to hold one another up. What is "virtue", what is "love of mankind" in Christianity, if not precisely this reciprocity of preservation, this solidarity of the weak, this obstruction of selection? What is Christian altruism, if not the mass-egoism of the weak, which divines that if all care for one another, each individual will be preserved the longest?… If one does not feel such a disposition to be an extreme *immorality*, a crime against life, then one belongs to the sick gang and has its instincts oneself… Genuine love of mankind demands sacrifice for the good of the species — it is hard, it is full of self-overcoming, because it needs human sacrifice. And this pseudo-humanity which is called Christianity wants precisely to establish that *no one is sacrificed*…

111.

On the Effect of Wagner's Music

A music in which one cannot breathe in time is unhealthy. When music comes along with a cheerful divinity and certainty, our muscles too celebrate a feast: — we become stronger; it is permissible even to measure this growth of strength. How does it actually come about that Wagner's music depotentiates me, that it excites in me a physiological impatience which finally makes itself known in a gentle sweat? After one, at most after two acts of Wagner, I run away. — Let it be held fast that every art which has physiology against it is a refuted art… Wagner's music can be refuted physiologically…

112.

Critique of the Modern Soul.

The Three Centuries.

113.

The good man. Or: the hemiplegia of virtue. — For every strong kind of man that has remained nature, love and hatred, gratitude and revenge, kindness and anger, Yes-doing and No-doing belong together. One is good at the price of also knowing how to be evil; one is evil because otherwise one would not understand how to be good. Whence, then, that sickness and ideological unnaturalness which rejects this doubleness —, which teaches as the higher thing to be capable on one side only? Whence the hemiplegia of virtue, the invention of the good man? The demand is that man castrate himself of those instincts with which he can be an enemy, can do harm, can be wrathful, can demand revenge… To this unnaturalness there then corresponds that dualistic conception of a merely good and a merely evil being (God, spirit, man), summing up in the former all positive, in the latter all negative forces, intentions, states. — Such a mode of valuation believes itself thereby "idealistic"; it does not doubt that it has posited a highest desirability in the conception of "the good". When it goes to its summit, it imagines a state where all evil is annulled and where in truth only the good beings have remained. It thus does not even consider it settled that that opposition of good and evil condition each other; on the contrary, the latter is to vanish and the former is to remain; the one has a right to be, the other *ought not to be there at all*… What is it, actually, that wishes here? — —

At all times, and especially in Christian times, much effort has been spent to reduce man to this *one-sided* capability, to "*the* good one": even today there is no lack of the ecclesiastically misshapen and *weakened*,

for whom this aim coincides with "humanization" in general, or with the "will of God", or with the "salvation of the soul". Here the essential demand is made that man do nothing evil; that under no circumstances he do harm, *want* to do harm… As the way to this is reckoned: the castration of all possibilities of enmity, the unhinging of all instincts of ressentiment, the "peace of the soul" as a chronic ailment.

This way of thinking, by which a particular type of man is bred, proceeds from that absurd presupposition: it takes good and evil as realities that are in contradiction with each other (*not* as complementary concepts of value, which would be the truth), it counsels taking the side of the good, it demands that the good man renounce and resist evil down to its last root, — it *thereby in fact negates life*, which in all its instincts has the Yes as well as the No. Not that it grasps this: on the contrary, it dreams of returning to wholeness, to unity, to the strength of life: it imagines it as a state of redemption when at last an end is put to one's own inner anarchy, to the unrest between two opposed value-drives. — Perhaps there has hitherto been no more dangerous ideology, no greater mischief in psychologicis, than this will to the good: the most repellent type was reared, the *unfree* man, the bigot; it was taught that only as a bigot is one on the right path to the Godhead, that only a bigot's walk of life is a godly walk…

— And even here life still keeps the upper hand — life, which does not know how to separate the Yes from the No —: what good is it to hold war to be evil with all one's might, to want not to harm, not to do No! one wages war nonetheless! one simply cannot do otherwise! The good man, who has renounced evil, afflicted, as seems desirable to him, with that hemiplegia of virtue, by no means ceases to wage war, to have enemies, to say No, to do No. The Christian, for example, hates "sin"… And what is not "sin" to him! Precisely through that belief in a moral opposition of good and evil the world has

become overfull for him with what is hateful, with what must eternally be fought. "The good man" sees himself as if surrounded by evil and under the constant onslaught of evil; he sharpens his eye, he discovers evil even beneath all his imaginings and strivings: — and so he ends, as is consistent, by understanding nature as evil, man as corrupt, being good as grace (that is, as humanly impossible). — In summa: he *negates life*, he grasps how the good as the highest value *condemns* life… Thereby his ideology of good and evil ought to count as refuted for him. But one does not refute a sickness… And so he conceives *another* life!…

114.

The typical forms of self-shaping. Or: the eight principal questions

1)

Whether one wants to be more manifold or simpler.

2)

Whether one wants to become happier or more indifferent to happiness and unhappiness.

3)

whether one wants to become more content with oneself or more demanding and more inexorable?

4)

whether one wants to become softer, more yielding, more humane, or more "inhuman".

5)

whether one wants to become cleverer or more ruthless.

6)

whether one wants to reach a goal or to evade all goals (— as, for example, the philosopher does, who smells in every goal a boundary, a corner, a prison, a stupidity…)

7)

whether one wants to become more respected or more feared? Or *more despised*!

8)

whether one wants to become tyrant or seducer or shepherd or herd animal?

115.

What is noble?

That one must constantly represent oneself. That one seeks situations in which one constantly needs gestures. That one leaves happiness to the *great number*: happiness as peace of the soul, virtue, comfort (English-angelic shopkeeperdom à la Spencer) That one instinctively seeks heavy responsibilities for oneself. That one knows how to create enemies for oneself everywhere, in the worst case even out of oneself. That one constantly contradicts the *great number* not by words but by deeds.

116.

The Warlike and the Peaceable

Are you a man who has the instincts of war in his body? And in that case a second question would remain: are you by instinct a warrior of attack or a warrior of resistance?

— The rest of mankind, everything that is *not* warlike by instinct, wants peace, wants concord, wants "freedom", wants "equal rights" —: these are only names and stages for one and the same thing.

— To go where one has no need to defend oneself. Such men become *dis*satisfied with themselves when they are compelled to offer resistance

— To create conditions in which there is no longer any war at all.

— In the worst case to submit, to obey, to fall into line. Still better than waging war. Thus, for example, his instinct counsels the Christian.

Among born warriors there is something like armament in the character, in the choice of conditions, in the cultivation of every quality: the "weapon" is best developed in the first type, the defence in the second.

The unarmed, the undefended: what expedients and virtues they need in order to endure it, — even in order to prevail.

117.

On the Asceticism of the Strong.

Task of this asceticism, which is only a transitional schooling, not a goal: to make oneself free of the old emotional impulses of the inherited values. To learn, step by step, to go one's way to "Beyond Good and Evil".

First stage:

to endure atrocities

to commit atrocities

Second stage,

the *harder* one:

to endure miserablenesses

to commit miserablenesses:

including as a preliminary exercise: becoming ridiculous, making oneself ridiculous.

— To provoke contempt and nevertheless to maintain the distance by an *(unfathomable)* smile from on high

— to take upon oneself a number of crimes that degrade, e.g. theft of money, in order to put one's equilibrium to the test

for a time to do, say, strive for nothing that does not arouse fear or contempt, that does not necessarily put the decent and the virtuous into a state of war, — that does not *exclude*…

to represent the opposite of what one is (and better still: not precisely the opposite, but merely a being-other: the latter is harder)

— to walk on every rope, to dance upon every possibility: to *get* one's genius *into one's feet*

— to disavow one's goals for a time through one's means, — even to slander them

— once and for all to represent a character that conceals the fact that one has five or six others

— not to be afraid of the five bad things: cowardice, ill repute, vice, the lie, woman —

118.

Sayings of a Hyperborean.

We Hyperboreans, we know well enough how far apart we live. "Neither by water nor by land canst thou find the way to the Hyperboreans": Pindar already knew this of us.

Beyond the North, beyond the ice, beyond death — *our* life! *our* happiness!…

Great things demand that one either keep silent about them or speak greatly: greatly, that is, cynically and with innocence.

Even the most courageous among us only rarely has the courage for what he actually — *knows*…

One recovers best from one's unnature, — from one's spirituality, in one's wild nature…

What? is man only a blunder of God? or God only a blunder of man?

We mistrust all systematizers, we get out of their way. The will to a system is, for us thinkers at least, something that compromises, a form of immorality.

Woman, the eternal-feminine: a merely imaginary value in which man alone believes.

Man created woman — out of what, though? Out of a rib of his God, of his "ideal"…

Woman is held to be deep — why? Because one never gets to the bottom of her. But woman has no bottom at all: she is the cask of the Danaids.

Woman is not even shallow.

He who laughs best also laughs last.

"To live alone one must be a beast or a god" — says Aristotle. Let us prove that one *must be both*…

Idleness is the beginning of all philosophy. Consequently — is philosophy a vice?

How little is needed for happiness! The sound of a bagpipe… Without music life would be an error.

That one commit no cowardice against one's own actions! That one not leave them in the lurch afterwards! — The pang of conscience is indecent.

For the longest time marriage has had the bad conscience against it. Would one believe it? — Yes, one should believe it.

Everything that man does not know how to cope with, everything that no man has yet digested, the *dung* of existence — has it not hitherto been our best fertilizer?…

From time to time a stupidity — oh, how one's own wisdom at once tastes good again!

One must have courage in one's body to permit oneself a wickedness. The "good" are too cowardly for it.

Man is cowardly before everything eternally-feminine: the little women know it.

What does not kill us — that *we* kill, that makes us stronger. Il faut tuer le Wagnerisme.

"Those were steps for me. I climbed up over them. For that I had to pass beyond them. But they thought I meant to settle down to rest upon them."

"All truth is simple": that is a twofold lie.

Everything that is simple is merely imaginary, is not "true."

But what is real, what is true, is neither One nor even reducible to One.

Can a pack-ass be tragic? — That one perishes under a burden one can neither carry nor throw off?…

Among women. — "The truth? Oh, you do not know the truth!… Is it not an assault upon all our pudeurs?"

"To equals, equality; to unequals, inequality — thus speaks justice to us. And what follows from it: never make unequals equal."

He who is not able to lay his will into things at least still lays a *meaning* into them: that is to say, he believes that a meaning is already in them.

The grand style arises in consequence of the great passion. It disdains to please, it forgets to persuade. It commands. It *wills*.

Artists, as they tend to be when they are genuine, modest in their needs: they really want only two things, their bread and their art — panem et *Circen*…

Posthumous men are understood worse, but heard better, than the timely ones. Or, more strictly: they are never understood — and hence precisely their *authority*!

Good taste in psychologicis: when every moral masquerade of our naturalness meets with our resistance, when in matters of the soul too only *naked nature* pleases.

One should not be immodest: if one chooses virtue and the heaving bosom, one should not at the same time want to have the advantages of the light-fingered as well.

Virtue remains the most expensive vice: it *shall* remain so!

Man is a mediocre egoist: even the cleverest takes his habit more seriously than his advantage.

Sickness is a powerful stimulant. Only one must be healthy enough for the stimulant.

Noble taste sets limits to knowledge too. It wills, once and for all, *not* to know many things.

What is chastity in a man? That his sexual taste has remained noble; that in eroticis he likes neither the brutal, nor the morbid, nor the clever.

If one has one's why? of life, one can put up with almost any how? Man does *not* strive for happiness, as the English believe. —

How could one spoil their mediocrity for the mediocre! I do, as one sees, the opposite: every step away from it leads — so I teach — into the *immoral*…

Our holiest convictions, our unchangeable regarding the highest values, are judgments of our muscles.

"Do you not yet know what one needs in order to multiply one's strength tenfold?" — Followers? — Zeros!!

— And like everyone who is too much in the right, I care nothing for being proved right. (Conclusion of the preface)

119.

biological isotherms

120.

What is good? — Everything that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.

What is bad? — Everything that stems from weakness.

What is happiness? — The feeling that power is growing again, — that a resistance has once again been overcome.

Not contentment, but more power; not peace at all, but more war; not virtue, but proficiency (virtue in the Renaissance style, virtù, moraline-free virtue).

What is weak and failed shall perish: the supreme imperative of life. And one shall not make a virtue of pity.

What is more dangerous than any vice? — Pity in deed for all the failures and the weak, — Christianity…

*

What type will one day replace mankind? But that is mere Darwinist ideology. As if a species had ever been replaced! What concerns me is the problem of order of rank within the species man, in whose progress on the whole I do not believe, the problem of order of rank between human types, which have always been there and always will be there.

I distinguish a type of ascending life and another of decay, of disintegration, of weakness.

Should one believe that the question of rank between these two types still needs to be raised at all?…

This stronger type has been there often enough already: but as a stroke of luck, as an exception, — never as *willed*. Rather it has been precisely the best combated, *prevented*, — it always had the great number against it, the instinct of every kind of mediocrity, still more it had the cunning, the subtlety, the spirit of the weak against it and — consequently — "virtue"… it has hitherto been almost *the* fearful thing: and out of fear the reverse type was willed, bred, *attained*: the domestic animal, the herd animal, the sick animal, the Christian…

*

Notebook 16: Spring–Summer 1888

1.

Turin, 21 April, on the way

"My brothers," said the eldest dwarf, "we are in danger. I understand the attitude of this giant. He is about to trickle on us. When a giant trickles, there is a deluge. We are lost if he trickles. I say nothing of the affreux element in which we should then drown."

"Problem," said the second dwarf, "how does one prevent a giant from trickling?"

"Problem," said the third dwarf, "how does one prevent a great one from doing something great *greatly*?"

"I thank you," answered the eldest dwarf with dignity. "With this the problem is taken more philosophically, its interest doubled, its solution prepared."

"One must frighten him," said the fourth dwarf.

"One must tickle him," said the fifth dwarf.

"One must bite him in the toes," said the sixth dwarf.

"Let us do everything at once," decided the eldest. "I see we are equal to this situation. This giant will not trickle."

2.

The hazardous and the phantasmal in existence —

Night, 27 April

3.

Imaginary causes

4.

To press everything fearful into service, singly, tentatively, step by step — thus the task of culture would have it. But until it is strong enough for this, it must combat it, moderate it, veil it, under certain circumstances curse and annihilate it. Wherever a culture posits its evil, it thereby gives expression to a relation of fear: its *weakness* betrays itself. In itself everything good is an evil of former times made serviceable.

5.

This furnishes a standard: the more fearful and the greater the passions that an age, a people, an individual can permit itself, because it knows how to use them as means, the higher stands its culture. Conversely: the more mediocre, weaker, more submissive and more cowardly — the more *virtuous* — a man is, the farther he will extend the realm of evil. The lowest man must see the realm of evil (that is, of what is forbidden and hostile to him) everywhere. —

6.

Upbringing: a system of means for ruining the exceptions in favour of the rule. *Education:* a system of means for turning taste *against* the exception, in favour of the average. Put thus it is harsh; but, considered economically, perfectly reasonable. At least for a long time, during which a culture still maintains itself with effort, and every exception represents a kind of squandering of force (something that distracts, seduces, sickens, isolates). A culture of the exception, of the experiment, of danger, of nuance — a *hothouse culture* for unusual

growths — first has a right to existence when there is force enough that henceforth even extravagance becomes economical.

7.

Mastery over the passions, *not* their weakening or extirpation! The greater the master-strength of our will, the more freedom may be given to the passions. The great man is great through the free play of his desires: but he is strong enough to make these monsters into his domestic animals…

8.

The "good man" at every stage of civilization is the harmless and the useful at once: a kind of middle, the expression in the common consciousness of whom one need not fear and whom one may *nonetheless* not despise…

9.

There is much reason in the fight against *great men*. They are dangerous, accidents, exceptions, tempests, strong enough to call into question what has been slowly built and founded, question-mark men with regard to what is firmly believed. Not only to discharge such explosives harmlessly but, if at all possible, to *forestall* their very emergence and accumulation: that is what the instinct of every civilized society counsels.

10.

The high points of culture and of civilization lie apart: one should not be misled about the abysmal antagonism between culture and civilization. The great moments of culture were always, morally speaking, times of corruption; and conversely the epochs of the willed and en-

forced *animal-taming* of man ("civilization" —) were times of intolerance toward the most spiritual and boldest natures. Civilization wants something other than what culture wants: perhaps something opposite…

11.

— Resoluteness and consistency: according to Goethe, what is most worthy of veneration in man —

12.

Life itself is no means to something; it is merely a form of growth of power.

13.

Modest, industrious, benevolent, temperate, full of peace and friendliness: is that how you want man? is that how you picture the *good* man? But what you attain thereby is only the Chinaman of the future, the "sheep of Christ", the perfect socialist…

14.

Whoever cannot posit himself as an end, nor posit ends of his own accord at all, pays homage to the morality of unselfing. Everything persuades him to it, his prudence, his experience, his vanity…

15.

The struggle against the "old faith", as Epicurus undertook it, was, in the strict sense, the struggle against *pre-existent* Christianity — the struggle against the old world, already darkened, moralized, soured through with feelings of guilt, grown old and sick.

Not the "moral corruption" of antiquity but precisely its moralization is the precondition under which alone Christianity could become master over it. Moral fanaticism (in short: Plato) destroyed paganism by revaluing its values and giving its innocence poison to drink. — We ought at last to grasp that what was destroyed there was the *higher*, compared with what became master! — Christianity grew out of physiological corruption, took root only in corrupted soil…

16.

We few or many who once again dare to live in a *demoralized* world, we pagans in faith: we are probably also the first to grasp what a pagan faith is: to have to imagine *higher beings* than man is, but these beings beyond good and evil; to have to appraise all being-higher also as being-immoral. We believe in Olympus — and *not* in "the Crucified"…

17.

One seems to make use of history for nothing but always the one and same false inference: "this or that form perished, *therefore* it is refuted." As if perishing were an objection, or even a *refutation*! — What is proved by the perishing of the last aristocratic social order? That we no longer *need* such an order, perhaps?…

18.

Among Germans it is not enough to have spirit: one must also take it, *take the liberty* of having spirit. Among Frenchmen one must have the courage to be German.

19.

Now be clever too, after you have become wise! A coarse affect, a vice, a madness — that is henceforth your kind of redemption!

20.

— and if my philosophy is a hell, I want at least to pave the way to it with good maxims.

21.

If the character of existence should be false, if existence had a "bad character" — and precisely that would be possible — what then would truth be, all our truth? One falsehood more?

22.

If one has committed a stupidity, one should promptly send two cleverernesses after it: thus one fetches it back again.

23.

How poor the will must have become, to misunderstand the world in Schopenhauer's manner as "will"! In the philosopher the will is *lacking*, however much is said of the will (— just as in the New Testament the *spirit* is lacking, despite even "the Holy Spirit" —)

24.

Without music life would be an error.

25.

Man, a small, overstrained species of animal which — fortunately — has its time; life on earth altogether a moment, an incident, an excep-

tion without consequence, something that remains of no account for the overall character of the earth; the earth itself, like every star, a hiatus between two nothings, an event without plan, reason, will, self-consciousness, the worst kind of necessity, *stupid* necessity… Against this view something in us rebels; the serpent vanity whispers to us: "all this must be false: *for* it is outrageous… Could all this not be mere appearance? And man, in spite of everything, to speak with Kant, — — —

26.

That "evil" should be an objection to existence! But what has caused *us* aversion longest? Is it not the aspect of "the good," is it not the impossibility of being unable to evade "the good"? Is it not the thought "God"?

27.

When one is sick, one ought to creep away and hide: that alone is philosophical, that alone is animal…

28.

There are morning thinkers, there are afternoon thinkers, there are night owls. Not to forget the noblest species: the *noontide ones*, — those in whom great Pan perpetually sleeps. There all light falls vertically…

29.

In music we lack an aesthetics that would know how to impose laws on musicians and create a conscience; we lack, as a consequence of this, a genuine struggle over "principles" — for as musicians we laugh at Herbart's velleities in this field just as much as at Schopenhauer's.

In fact a great difficulty arises from this: we no longer know how to *ground* the concepts "model," "mastery," "perfection" — we grope about blindly in the realm of values with the instinct of old love and admiration, we almost believe "good is what pleases *us*"… It arouses my mistrust when Beethoven is quite innocently called a "classic" everywhere: I would strictly maintain that in other arts one understands by a classic a type the reverse of Beethoven's. But when, on top of that, Wagner's complete and glaringly obvious dissolution of style, his so-called dramatic style, is taught and revered as "exemplar," as "mastery," as "progress," my impatience reaches its peak. The dramatic style in music, as Wagner understands it, is the renunciation of style altogether, on the presupposition that something else is a hundred times more important than music, namely the drama. Wagner can paint, he uses music not for the sake of music, he intensifies attitudes, he is a poet; finally, he has appealed to "beautiful feelings" and "heaving bosoms" like all theatrical artists — with all this he has won over the women and even those in need of culture: but what do women and those in need of culture have to do with music! None of that has any conscience for art; it does not suffer when all the first and most indispensable virtues of an art are trampled underfoot and mocked for the sake of ulterior aims, as ancilla dramaturgica. — What does all extension of the means of expression matter, if that which expresses, art itself, has lost the law for itself? The painterly splendour and power of tone, the symbolism of sound, rhythm, colour-tones of harmony and disharmony, the suggestive significance of music with regard to other arts, the whole *sensuousness* of music brought to dominion with Wagner — all this Wagner recognized in music, drew out, developed. Victor Hugo did something akin for language: but already today people in France ask themselves, in the case of Victor Hugo, whether it was not to the ruin of language… whether, with the heightening of sensuousness in language, reason, spirituality, the deep lawfulness in language have not been pressed down? That the

poets in France have become sculptors, that the musicians in Germany have become actors and daubers of culture — are these not signs of *décadence*?

Wagner does everything possible with the help of music that is not music: he gives one to understand swellings, virtues, passions.

Music is a means to him

Has it not lost all more spiritual beauty, the lofty, high-spirited perfection which even in daring still embraces grace, the ravishing leap and dance of logic, which — — —

30.

For a warrior of knowledge, who always lies in combat with ugly truths, the belief *that there is no truth at all* is a great bath and stretching of the limbs. — Nihilism is *our* kind of idleness…

31.

Virtue is under certain circumstances merely a venerable form of stupidity: who would bear it ill will on that account? And this kind of virtue has not outlived itself even today. A kind of stout peasant simplicity, which is however possible in all classes and which one can meet only with veneration and a smile, still believes even today that everything is in good hands, namely in the "hand of God": and when they uphold this proposition with that modest assurance, as though they were saying that two times two is four, we others will take care not to contradict. Why trouble *this* pure foolishness? Why darken it with our worries concerning man, people, goal, future? And even if we wanted to, we could not. They mirror their own venerable stupidity and goodness *into* things (with them, after all, the old God, deus myops, still lives!); we others — we see something else into

things: our riddle-nature, our contradictions, our deeper, more painful, more suspicious wisdom.

32.

By what I recognize my equals. — Philosophy, as I have hitherto understood and lived it, is the voluntary seeking out even of the accursed and infamous sides of existence. From the long experience which such a wandering through ice and desert gave me, I learned to view differently everything that has philosophized hitherto: — the *hidden* history of philosophy, the psychology of its great names came to light for me. "How much truth does a spirit *endure*, how much truth does it *dare*?" — this became for me the real measure of value. Error is a *cowardice*… every achievement of knowledge *follows* from courage, from hardness towards oneself, from cleanliness towards oneself… Such an experimental philosophy as I live anticipates by way of trial even the possibilities of fundamental nihilism: without this meaning that it would stop at a No, at a negation, at a will to No. It wants rather to get through to the reverse — to a *Dionysian Yea-saying* to the world as it is, without deduction, exception and selection — it wants the eternal cycle, — the same things, the same logic and illogic of the knots. The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand Dionysian towards existence —: my formula for this is amor fati…

— To this belongs grasping the hitherto denied sides of existence not only as *necessary* but as desirable: and not only as desirable with regard to the hitherto affirmed sides (say, as their complements or preconditions), but for their own sake, as the mightier, more fruitful, *truer* sides of existence, in which its will expresses itself more clearly. Likewise to this belongs appraising the side of existence hitherto alone *affirmed*; grasping whence this valuation stems and how little it is binding for a Dionysian measuring of the value of existence: I drew out and grasped *what* it actually is that says Yes here (the instinct of

the sufferers on the one hand, the instinct of the herd on the other, and that third, the *instinct of the majority*, in contradiction to the exceptions —) I thereby divined to what extent another, stronger kind of man would necessarily have to conceive the elevation and enhancement of man in another direction: *higher beings* as beyond good and evil, as beyond those values which cannot deny their origin in the sphere of suffering, of the herd, and of the majority — I searched for the beginnings of this inverted formation of ideals in history (the concepts "pagan", "classical", "noble" newly discovered and set forth —)

33.

Richard Wagner remains, appraised merely with regard to his value for Germany and German culture, a great question mark, a German misfortune perhaps, a destiny in any case: but what does that matter? Is he not very much more — than merely a German event?… It even seems to me that he belongs nowhere less than in Germany; nothing there is prepared for him, his whole type stands among Germans simply alien, strange, misunderstood, incomprehensible. But one takes care not to admit this to oneself: for that one is too good-natured, too square, too German. "Credo quia absurdus est": so the German spirit wills it and so it willed it in this case too — and so for the time being it believes everything that Wagner wanted to have believed about himself. The German spirit has at all times lacked subtlety and divination in psychologicis. Today, when it stands under the high pressure of fatherlandishness and self-admiration, it is visibly thickening and coarsening: how should it be equal to the problem of Wagner!

34.

At bottom Wagner's music too is still literature, just as the whole of French Romanticism is; the magic of exoticism, of foreign times, customs, passions, exercised upon sentimental loafers on street corners; the rapture of stepping into the immense, distant, foreign, primeval land to which books give access, whereby the whole horizon was painted with new colours and possibilities… The presentiment of still more distant, unopened worlds; the dédain for the boulevards… For nationalism, let no one be deceived, is also only a form of exoticism… The Romantic musicians recount what the exotic books have made of them: one would like to experience exotica, passions in the Florentine or Venetian taste: in the end *one contents oneself* with seeking them in the *image*… The essential thing is the kind of *new* craving, a wanting-to-imitate, wanting-to-relive, the disguise, the dissembling of the soul… Romantic art is only a makeshift for a failed "reality"…

Napoleon, the passion for new possibilities of the soul… The expansion of the soul's space…

The attempt to *do* new things: Revolution, Napoleon…

Exhaustion of the will; all the greater debauchery in the craving to feel, imagine, dream new things…

Consequence of the excessive things one had lived through: a ravenous hunger for excessive feelings… The foreign literatures offered the strongest spices…

35.

On the Future of Marriage:

an *additional tax burden* on inheritances etc., also an additional military-service burden on bachelors from a certain age onward, and increasing (within the community)

advantages of every kind for fathers who bring boys into the world in abundance: in certain circumstances a plurality of votes

a *medical record*, preceding every marriage and signed by the heads of the community: in which several specific questions must be answered by the betrothed and by the physicians ("family history" —

as a remedy against *prostitution* (or as its ennoblement): marriages for a term, legalised (for years, for months, for days), with guarantees for the children

every marriage answered for and endorsed by a certain number of trusted men of a community: as a community affair

36.

the Romantics, who all, like their German master Friedrich Schlegel, are in danger (to speak with Goethe) "of choking on the rumination of moral and religious absurdities"

the Schillerian element in Wagner: he brings "passionate eloquence, splendour of words, as the soaring of noble sentiments" — an alloy with baser metal

"Had Schiller lived longer, he would have become the idol of his contemporaries, even of those who found their feeling and thinking again in Iffland and Kotzebue, in Nikolai and Merkel, and honours and riches too would have flowed to him in abundance." Victor Hehn, Gedanken über Goethe p 109.

"the pervasive heartlessness" "the worthlessness or insignificance of the heroes" — consider Niebuhr, who with regard to Wilhelm Meister permits himself to say: "he was vexed by the menagerie of tame cattle"

in noble circles it was agreed that, to speak with Jacobi, "an unclean spirit reigns in it"

For what was Goethe grateful to Schiller? That Wilhelm Meister "carried him away and moved him deeply, indeed filled him painfully with the feeling of his own inadequacy. Thus at last, out of the very midst of the enemy camp, a spirit had met him who could climb after him up to this height".

to Körner 1796: "compared with Goethe I am and remain simply a poetic wretch".

Goethe's star paled in Schiller's eyes too in the measure that his own fame grew. He became the rival.

the typical hatred of the sick against the perfect — e.g. Novalis against Wilhelm Meister, who finds the book odious. "The garden of poetry is imitated with straw and rags." "The understanding in it is like a naive devil." "Artistic atheism is the spirit of the book." — This at a time when he was raving about Tieck, who just then seemed to be playing the part of a disciple of Jakob Böhme

37.

The effect of Wagner's art is deep, it is above all heavy, heavy as a hundredweight: what is the reason for that? Certainly not, in the first place, Wagner's music: one can even endure this music only once one has already been overpowered and, as it were, made *unfree* by something else. This something else is the Wagnerian pathos, for which he merely invented his art in addition; it is the tremendous persuasive power of this pathos, its holding of the breath, its no-longer-wanting-to-let-go of an extreme feeling; it is the terrifying *length* of this pathos with which Wagner triumphs and will triumph, so that in the end he talks us into accepting even his music… Whether one is a "genius" with such a pathos? Or can even be one? If by the genius of an artist one understands the highest freedom under the law, divine lightness, levity in what is heaviest, then Offenbach (Edmond Audran) has even

more claim to the name "genius" than Wagner. Wagner is heavy, ponderous: nothing is more alien to him than moments of the most high-spirited perfection, such as this buffoon Offenbach attains five, six times in almost every one of his bouffonneries. — But perhaps one may understand something else by genius. — Another question, which I likewise intend to answer only later: whether Wagner, precisely with *such* a pathos, is German? is a German?… Or not rather the exception of exceptions?…

Wagner is heavy, heavy as a hundredweight, consequently no genius?…

38.

Above all, cut Wagner down vigorously, so that three quarters remain: above all his recitativo, which drives even the most patient to despair… It is a mere ambition of Wagner's to *teach* that his works are necessary down to the smallest and most particular detail… the opposite is true: there is far too much that is superfluous, arbitrary, dispensable… He lacks the capacity even for necessity: how could he be *able to impose* it upon us?

39.

To what degree the incapacity of a plebeian agitator of the masses extends, when it comes to making the concept "higher nature" clear to himself, Buckle furnishes the best example. The opinion he combats so passionately — that "great men", individuals, princes, statesmen, geniuses, generals are the levers and causes of all great movements — is instinctively misunderstood by him as though it asserted that what is essential and valuable in such a "higher man" lies precisely in the capacity to set masses in motion, in short in their effect… But the "higher nature" of the great man lies in being other, in incommunicab-

ility, in distance of rank — *not* in any effects whatsoever: even if he shook the globe. —

40.

Aesthetica

Fundamental insight: what is beautiful and ugly.

Nothing is more conditional, let us say more *narrow-minded,* than our feeling for the beautiful. Whoever would think of it detached from man's delight in man would at once lose the ground beneath his feet. In the beautiful, man admires himself as a type: in extreme cases he worships himself. It belongs to the essence of a type that it is made happy only by the sight of *itself* — that it affirms itself and only itself. Man, however much he may see the world heaped with beauties, has always heaped it only with his own "beauty": that is to say, he considers everything beautiful that reminds him of the feeling of perfection with which he, as man, stands among all things. Has he really thereby *beautified* the world?… And might it not be, in the end, that in the eyes of a higher judge of taste man is perhaps not beautiful at all?… I do not mean by this unworthy, but a little comical?…

*

2

— O Dionysus, divine one, why do you pull me by the ears? I find a kind of humour in your ears, Ariadne: why are they not longer still?…

*

3.

"Nothing is beautiful: only man is beautiful" On this naïveté rests all our aesthetics: let it be its first "truth".

Let us at once add the complementary "truth"; it is no less naïve: that nothing is ugly but the *failed* man.

Where man suffers from the ugly, he suffers from the miscarriage of his type; and wherever he is reminded even in the remotest way of such a miscarriage, there he applies the predicate "ugly". Man has heaped the world with ugliness: that is to say, always only with his own ugliness… Has he really thereby *uglified* the world?…

*

4.

Everything ugly weakens and saddens man: it reminds him of decay, danger, impotence. One can measure the impression of the ugly with a dynamometer. Wherever he is depressed, something ugly is at work. The feeling of power, the will to power — it rises with the beautiful, it falls with the ugly.

5.

In instinct and memory an enormous material has been accumulated: we have a thousand kinds of signs by which the degeneration of the type betrays itself to us. Wherever exhaustion, weariness, heaviness, age, or unfreedom, cramp, dissolution, putrefaction is even alluded to, there our lowest value judgement speaks at once: *there man hates the ugly*…

What he hates there is always the *decline of his type*. In this hatred consists the whole philosophy of art.

*

6.

If my readers are sufficiently initiated into the fact that "the good man" too represents, in the great collective spectacle of life, a form of *exhaustion*: then they will do honour to the consistency of Christianity, which conceived the good man as the *ugly* one. In this Christianity was right. —

In a philosopher it is a vileness to say: the good and the beautiful are one; if he goes so far as to add "the true as well", he ought to be thrashed. Truth is ugly: *we have art* so that we do not perish of the truth.

*

7.

On the relation of art to truth I became serious earliest of all: and even now I stand before this dichotomy with a holy dread. My first book was dedicated to it; The Birth of Tragedy believes in art against the background of another faith: that it is *not possible to live with the truth*; that the "will to truth" is already a symptom of degeneration…

I set down here once more the singularly gloomy and unpleasant conception of that book. It has this advantage over other pessimistic conceptions, that it is *immoral*: — it is not, like them, inspired by the Circe of philosophers, by virtue. —

Art in "The Birth of Tragedy"

— — —

41.

Wagner is a *capital fact* in the history of the "European spirit", of the "modern soul": as Heinrich Heine was such a fact. Wagner and Heine:

the two greatest deceivers with whom Germany has presented Europe.

42.

I distanced myself from Wagner when he made his retreat to the German God, the German Church and the German Reich: by that very act he drew others to himself.

43.

NB

Beginning of the Preface

The gold-maker is the only true *benefactor* of mankind.

That one revalues values, that one makes much out of little, *gold* out of what is base: the only kind of benefactor of mankind

they are the only *enrichers*

the others are mere *money-changers*

Let us imagine an extreme case: that there were something most hated, most condemned — and that precisely this were transmuted into gold: That is my case…

44.

At times I am almost curious to *hear* what I am like. This question lies absurdly remote from my own habits

My typical experience (— one has such things — — —

In my life there really are surprises: this comes from the fact that I do not like to occupy myself with what might be possible: proof of how

much I live in thoughts… A chance occurrence brought this to my consciousness a few days ago: in me the concept "future" is lacking; I look ahead as over a smooth surface: no wish, not even a little wish, no making of plans, no wanting-things-otherwise. Rather merely that which is forbidden us by that holy Epicurean: care for the next day, for tomorrow… that is my only artifice: I know today what is to happen tomorrow.

naufragium feci: bene navigavi, — — —

45.

the rattlesnake-happiness of the great sorcerer, into whose jaws the most innocent run…

46.

the culture-cretins, the "Eternal-Feminine", — — —

47.

in Germany, where the vaporousness of the ideal does not constitute an objection to an artist but almost his justification (— it is counted to Schiller's credit!… and when one says Schiller and Goethe, one means that the former, as idealist, was the higher, the genuine one: this hero of attitudes!

48.

As for the hysterical-heroic woman whom Richard Wagner invented and set to music, a hybrid creation of the most ambiguous taste:

that this type has not entirely disgusted people even in Germany has its reason, though by no means yet its right, in the fact that a poet incomparably greater than Wagner, the noble Heinrich von Kleist, had

already given it there the advocacy of genius. I am far from thinking Wagner himself dependent on Kleist here: Elsa, Senta, Isolde, Brünnhilde, Kundry are rather children of French Romanticism and have a — — —

49.

The greatness of a musician is not measured by the beautiful feelings he arouses: that is what women believe — it is measured by the tensile strength of his will, by the sureness with which chaos obeys his artistic command and becomes form, by the necessity which his hand lays into a sequence of forms. The greatness of a musician — in a word, is measured by his capacity for the grand style.

50.

I am looking for an animal that dances after me and just a tiny little bit — loves me…

51.

Draft.

1.

The true and the apparent world.

2.

The philosopher as a type of décadence

3.

The *religious* man as a type of décadence

4.

the *good* man as a type of décadence

5.

The *countermovement*: art!

6.

The pagan in religion.

7.

Science against philosophy.

8.

The politicians against the priests — against the *loosening-out* from the instincts, the becoming-*un*homely. (People, fatherland, woman — all the concentrating powers against "being-*un*homely")

9.

Critique of the *present*: where does it belong?

10.

Nihilism and its *counterpart*: the

disciples of the "recurrence"

11.

The will to power as life: culmination of historical *self-consciousness* (the latter conditions the *sick* form of the modern world…)

12.

The will to power: as discipline.

52.

The décadents regarded as the *excrement* of society

nothing can be unhealthier than to use them as nourishment —

53.

Theory of exhaustion:

vice

the mentally ill (or rather the artists…

the criminals

the anarchists

these are not the *oppressed* races, but the refuse of previous society of all classes…

With the insight that all our estates are permeated by these elements, we have grasped that *modern society* is no "society," no "body," but a sick conglomerate of Chandala

— a society that no longer has the strength to *excrete*

To what extent, through living together for centuries, the *morbidity* goes much deeper:

modern virtue

modern spirituality

our science

as forms of illness

54.

Error is the costliest luxury man can permit himself; and if the error is actually a physiological error, then it becomes mortally dangerous. For what, consequently, has mankind hitherto paid most, atoned most grievously? For its "truths": for these were, every one of them, errors in physiologicis…

55.

Reckoned up physiologically, the "Critique of Pure Reason" is already the pre-existent form of cretinism: and Spinoza's system a phenomenology of consumption

56.

My proposition, compressed into a formula that smells antique, of Christianity, scholasticism and other musk: in the concept "God as spirit" God as perfection is *negated*…

57.

That has no children; scarcely senses.

58.

For the spider the spider is the most perfect being; for the metaphysician God is a metaphysician: that is, he spins…

59.

The people believe in apocryphal "truths" —

60.

Women, gold, precious stones, virtue, purity, science, good counsel, in short everything that is useful and beautiful, one may take, wherever it may come from.

For his respect toward his mother the disciple first casts off his earthly shell: for his respect toward his father he casts off that still subtler form which clothes him in the air; for his respect toward his teacher he becomes lighter still, purer still, and rises up to the dwelling of Brahma.

Let him never, in the silence of the forest, or at the edge of clear springs, or in the deep, deep midnight, neglect the prayer whose infinite content is comprised in the single syllable "Om"

Having completed their theological studies, the young Brahmins, the young Kshatriya and Vaishya may enter the category of fathers of families. The "twice-born" shall then take up his staff and set out in search of a woman of his caste who shines by her qualities and satisfies the precepts.

Let him beware of union with a woman from a family that does not fulfil its religious duty, or in which the number of daughters is greater than that of sons, or in which individual members have deformities, or consumption, dyspepsia, haemorrhoids and the like.

Let him flee this family, however great its power, its name, its wealth may be.

Let him seek a wife beautiful of form, whose name is pleasant to pronounce, with the gait of a young elephant, with silken-soft hair, gentle voice and small regular teeth; one whose body is as if covered with a light duvet

A beautiful woman makes the joy of a house, holds fast the love of her husband and brings him well-formed children

Let him beware of marrying a girl who has no brother or whose father is not known.

For a Brahmin who unites with a Sudra (of the servant race) and has a son by her, there is on earth no manner of atonement.

61.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, the noble flathead

62.

"Each and all, in eternal renewal and dispersal, destroying themselves."

Goethe.

63.

It will be of value to the friends of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche to hear that last winter the brilliant Dane Dr. Georg Brandes

devoted a lengthy cycle of lectures at the University of Copenhagen to this philosopher. The speaker, whose mastery in expounding difficult complexes of thought had no need first to prove itself, succeeded in arousing a lively interest in an audience of more than 300 persons for the new and daring way of thinking of the German philosopher: so that the lectures ended in a brilliant ovation in honour of the speaker and his theme.

64.

We Immoralists

Among Artists

Critique of Free-Spiritedness

The Sceptic Speaks.

65.

The Meistersinger glorify Germany's genius, which has learned nothing: except what it has learned from the little birds — genius understood as "the noble [—]", moreover "knight"

66.

For the *Preface*.

What alone can restore us? The *sight of the perfect*: I let my eye roam about drunkenly: have we not brought it gloriously far?

67.

Wagner's style has infected his disciples too: the German of the Wagnerians is the most flowery nonsense written since Schelling's. Wagner himself, as a stylist, still belongs to that movement against which

Schopenhauer vented his wrath: — and the humour reaches its peak when he poses as "saviour of the German language" against the Jews. — To sketch the taste of these disciples, I permit myself a single example. The King of Bavaria, who was a known pederast, once said to Wagner: so you don't like women either? they are so boring… Nohl (the author of a "Life of Wagner" translated into six languages) finds this opinion "youthfully embraced"

68.

A Critic

of the Modern Soul.

69.

How does it come about, in the end, that Parsifal has a son, the famous Lohengrin? Could this be the first case of the immacolata — — —

70.

What is at issue?

the religious misunderstanding.

the moral misunderstanding.

the philosophical misunderstanding.

the aesthetic misunderstanding.

71.

The Origin of Values.

I

the invented world

The Invented World

Philosophy as Décadence

Thoughts on Christianity

II

the true world

The Realities behind Morality.

On the Physiology of Art.

Why Truth?

III

Critique of Modernity.

The Eternal Recurrence.

From the Seventh Solitude.

72.

1.

Opposition of values: pessimism, nihilism, scepticism

2.

Critique of philosophy

3.

Critique of religion

4.

Critique of morality.

5.

The invented world

6.

Why truth?

7.

On the physiology of art.

8.

The problem of modernity.

9.

The eternal recurrence.

10.

From the seventh solitude.

73.

On the physiology of art

The problem of Socrates

Morality:

Taming or *breeding — The realities behind morality.*

the struggle with the passions and their spiritualization.

Naturalism of morality and denaturalization.

Time and contemporaries.

From the seventh solitude.

"Why truth?"

The will to truth.

Psychology of the philosophers

On the will to truth.

Civilization and culture: an antagonism.

74.

X — painfully pensive

1.

Bizet's music — the philosopher

ironic

2.

South, cheerfulness, Moorish dance love

strange-interesting

3.

the "Redeemer" — Schopenhauer

ironic

4.

the "Ring", Schopenhauer as Wagner's redeemer

strange-interesting

5.

the décadent — *grim*!

grim!

6.

jesting "Divining" "Overwhelming" "Elevating"

ironic

7.

"Hysterism" "Style" the little precious things

strange-interesting

8.

"prostrating effect" "the Victor Hugo of *language*"

"Talma" "alla genovese"

praising-brisk

9.

"Action" "Edda" "eternal content" "Madame Bovary" "no child"

ironic

10.

"Literature" "Idea" "Hegel" "German youth" — what we *miss*?

ironic-strange-interesting

11.

praising, strong, factual "the actor"

strong-*paying homage*

12.

three formulas

grim

on 10) Wagner is obscure, convoluted, seven-skinned

8 that remains serious even with Wagner's "counterpoint"

75.

Here are two formulas by which I comprehend the phenomenon of Wagner. The one runs:

Wagner's principles and practices are one and all traceable to physiological states of distress: they are their expression ("hysterism" as music)

The other runs:

the harmful effect of Wagnerian art *proves* its deep organic frailty, its *corruption*. The perfect makes healthy; the sick makes sick. The physiological states of distress into which Wagner puts his listeners (irregular breathing, disturbance of the circulation of the blood, extreme irritability with sudden coma) contain a *refutation* of his art

With these two formulas there is merely drawn the consequence of that general proposition which for me furnishes the foundation of all aesthetics: that aesthetic values rest upon biological values, that aesthetic feelings of well-being are biological feelings of well-being.

76.

Cases where one hears *not* the passion but the lashes of the whip which Wagner squanders with insulting cruelty upon his poor nag Pegasus

the *lashes of the whip* with which Wagner mistreats poor Pegasus (2nd act of Tristan

the *poverty*: how economical he is with ideas — a *clever* poverty: *boring*…

the *thoughts* are lacking, just as with Victor Hugo: everything is attitude, — — —

77.

1.

the actor

2.

the *corruption* of music —

music *led from outside on a little ribbon*

— "it signifies" —

extreme animation of detail

change of optics

the "grand style" — decline, *impoverishment* of the *organizing forces*. — Lack of tonality — lack of *eurhythmy* ("dance") — incapacity for *construction* ("drama") — means of *tyrannizing*

the "idée fixe" (or the leitmotif)

3.

the *harmfulness* of music

the miracle

the idiosyncrasy

4.

Value of the *subject matters*

his education "style" "Hegelry"

5.

France — Germany

6.

The rise of the *histrio*

7.

the décadent: extreme irritability —

Lack of tonality

Lack of eurhythmy

Incapacity to construct

Exaggeration of detail

Restlessness of optics.

Instability of character: change of person

Lack of pride

Debauchery and *exhaustion*

poverty, cleverly disavowed

as music

as "*mythical* interpretation"

8.

"How can one lose one's taste for this décadent?"

the *actor*

Kind of effect. History of the effect.

Music as theatrical rhetoric. V. Hugo

the "dramatist"

9.

the *harmful one*:

1. physiologically

irrational

2. intellectually (the "youths"

miracle

3. tendency of "pity"

symbolism

10.

nihilistic art:

Schopenhauer's tendency of the tragic

11.

Rise of the actor

12.

Three Demands

78.

Tristan and Isolde, truly lived through along with them, are almost a debauch.

In reality one cannot put this alternative of conscience to young women seriously enough: aut Wagner aut liberi.

79.

Wagner never learned to walk. He falls, he stumbles, he maltreats poor Pegasus with lashes of the whip. Sheer false passion, sheer false counterpoint Wagner is *incapable* of any style. —

artificial, glued together, false, botched work, monster, pasteboard.

80.

The Case of Wagner.

A Musicians' Problem

by

F. N.

Under this title there is appearing from my publishing house a brilliant pamphlet against Wagner, which will be discussed most vigorously by friend and foe alike. Prof. Nietzsche, whom everyone will concede to be the most profound connoisseur of the Bayreuth movement, here takes the *problem of value* contained in that movement by the horns; he proves *that* it has horns. The refutation of Wagner that this work provides is not merely an aesthetic one: it is above all a physiological one. Nietzsche regards Wagner as an illness, as a public danger.

81.

I have given mankind the most profound book it possesses, Zarathustra; a book that so greatly distinguishes that whoever can say "I have understood six sentences of it, that is to say, *lived* them" belongs to a higher order of men… But how one must atone for that! pay it off! it almost ruins one's character… The chasm has become too great…

82.

modern ideas as false.

"freedom"

"equal rights"

"humaneness"

"pity"

"the genius"

democratic misunderstanding (as consequence of the milieu, of the spirit of the age)

pessimistic misunderstanding (as *impoverished* life, as detachment of the "will")

the décadence misunderstanding (névrose)

"the people"

"the race"

"the nation"

"democracy"

"tolerance"

"the milieu"

"utilitarianism"

"civilization"

"emancipation of women"

"popular education"

"progress"

"sociology"

83.

The Necessity of False Values.

One can refute a judgement by demonstrating its conditionality: this does not abolish the necessity of having it. *False values* are not to be eradicated by reasons: any more than a distorted optics in the eye of a sick man. One must comprehend their necessity *to exist*: they are a *consequence* of causes that have nothing to do with reasons

84.

If, "with Christ and Moses", one does away with natural causality in the world, one needs an *anti-natural* one: the whole remainder of bigotry then follows.

85.

Psychology of Error.

1)

Confusion of cause and effect

2)

Confusion of truth with the effect of what is believed to be true.

3)

Confusion of consciousness with causality

Morality as Error.

Religion as Error.

Metaphysics as Error.

Modern Ideas as Errors.

86.

The Will to Power. Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values.

I.

Psychology of Error.

1)

Confusion of cause and effect

2)

Confusion of truth with what is believed to be true

3)

Confusion of consciousness with causality

4)

Confusion of logic with the principle of the real

II.

The False Values.

1)

2)

3)

4)

Morality as false

Religion as false

Metaphysics as false

modern ideas as false

all conditioned by the *four* kinds of error.

III.

The Criterion of Truth.

1)

the will to power

2)

Symptomatology of decline

3)

On the physiology of art

4)

on the physiology of politics

IV.

Struggle of the False and the True Values.

1)

Necessity of a double movement

2)

Usefulness of a double movement

3)

the weak

4)

the strong.

16 chapters: 37 pages each. — 16 chapters: 35 pages each.

The Criterion of Truth.

The will to power, as will to life — of ascending life.

The great errors as consequence of décadence.

On the physiology of art.

Symptomatology of decline.

The Struggle of Values

Usefulness of a double movement.

Necessity of the same.

The weak.

The strong.

87.

One should not confuse Christianity with that One root of which its name reminds us: the *other* roots from which it has grown have been far more powerful, more important than its kernel; it is an abuse without equal when such gruesome formations of decay and malformations, which are called "Christian Church", "Christian faith", "Christian life", sign themselves with that holy name. What did Christ *deny*? — Everything that today is called Christian.

88.

The worst is that everything cuts too deeply into the heart: almost every year has brought me 3 or 4 things, insignificant in themselves, from which I nearly perished.

Not that I reproach anyone for it. Healthy people simply have no notion whatever of the cases in which they wound one mortally, and of what makes one ill for a couple of months.

89.

The *modern* artist, in his physiology most closely akin to hysteria, is marked out in his character too by this morbidity. The hysteric is false: he lies for the pleasure of lying, he is admirable in every art of dissimulation — unless his morbid vanity plays a trick on him. This vanity is like a perpetual fever, which needs narcotics and shrinks from no self-deception, from no farce, that promises momentary relief. *Incapacity* for pride and the constant need for revenge on a deeply ingrained self-contempt — that is almost the definition of this kind of vanity. The absurd excitability of his system, which makes crises out of all experiences and drags "the dramatic" into the slightest accidents of life, robs him of all calculability: he is no longer a person, at most a rendezvous of persons, of whom now this one, now that one shoots forth with shameless assurance. Precisely for that reason he is great as an actor: all these poor will-less creatures whom physicians study at close quarters astonish by their virtuosity in mimicry, in transfiguration, in entering into almost any *required* character.

Notebook 17: May–June 1888

1.

Chapter One.

Concept of the *nihilistic movement* as an expression of

décadence.

— décadence everywhere

Chapter Two.

the typical forms of expression of décadence

1)

one chooses what hastens exhaustion

2)

one does not know how to resist

3)

one confuses cause and effect

4)

one longs for painlessness

(72):

to what extent "hedonism" too is a degenerating type

Chapter Three.

5)

the "true world": concept of reality by sufferers (46) *first* notebook

(72):

the opposite nature, the Dionysian values: (72) the *tragic* age

6)

the nihilistic falsification of all good things

(59)

(108) (109) love

the "will-less intellect"

the genius

art of the "will-free subject"

7)

the incapacity for power, *impotence*:

its insidious arts (98)

2.

A.

On the *corruption of those who command*.

B.

What the highest values hitherto signify.

C.

Whence the highest values hitherto originate.

D.

Why the counter-values succumbed

E.

Modernity as ambiguity of values

F.

— — —

3.

[+ + +] book considered only as different forms of the lie; with their help one *believes* in life. "Life *ought* to inspire trust: the task, so posed, is tremendous. To solve it, man must already be a liar by nature, he must be an *artist* more than anything else. And he is one, too: metaphysics, religion, morality, science — all of them merely offspring of his will to art, to the lie, to flight from "truth", to the *negation* of "truth". The very faculty thanks to which he violates reality by means of the lie, this artist-faculty of man par excellence — he still has it in common with everything that is. He himself is, after all, a piece of reality, truth, nature: how should he not also be a piece of *genius of the lie*!…

That the character of existence be *misapprehended* — the deepest and highest secret intention behind everything that is virtue, science, piety, artistry. Never to see much, to see much falsely, to add much by seeing: oh how clever one still is, in states where one is furthest from thinking oneself clever! Love, enthusiasm, "God" — nothing but subtleties of the ultimate self-deception, nothing but seductions to life, nothing but faith in life! In moments when man has become the deceived, when he has outwitted himself, when he believes in life: oh how it swells up in him then! What rapture! What feeling of power! How much artist's triumph in the feeling of power!… Man has once again become master over "*matter*" — master over truth!… And whenever man rejoices, he is always the same in his joy, he rejoices as an artist, he enjoys himself as power, he enjoys the lie as his power…

2.

Art and nothing but art! It is the great enabler of life, the great seductress to life, the great stimulant of life.

Art as the sole superior counterforce against all will to the negation of life, as the anti-Christian, anti-Buddhist, anti-nihilist par excellence.

Art as the *redemption of the one who knows*, — of him who sees, who wants to see, the terrible and questionable character of existence, of the tragic knower.

Art as the *redemption of the one who acts*, — of him who not only sees the terrible and questionable character of existence but lives it, wants to live it, of the tragic-warlike man, of the hero.

Art as the *redemption of the sufferer*, — as the way to states in which suffering is willed, transfigured, deified, in which suffering is a form of great rapture.

3.

One sees that in this book pessimism, let us say more clearly nihilism, counts as the truth. But truth does not count as the supreme measure of value, still less as the supreme power. The will to appearance, to illusion, to deception, to becoming and change (to objective deception) counts here as deeper, more original, more metaphysical than the will to truth, to reality, to being: — the latter is itself merely a form of the will to illusion. Likewise pleasure counts as more original than pain: pain only as conditioned, as a consequent phenomenon of the will to pleasure (of the will to becoming, growing, shaping, that is to say to *creating*: but in creating destroying is included) A highest state of affirmation of existence is conceived, from which even the highest pain cannot be subtracted: the tragic-Dionysian state.

4.

This book is in this way even anti-pessimistic: namely in the sense that it teaches something that is stronger than pessimism, that is "more divine" than truth. No one, it seems, would speak more earnestly in favour of a radical negation of life, of an actual No-*doing* even more than a No-saying to life, than the author of this book. Only he knows — he has experienced it, perhaps he has experienced nothing else! — that art is *worth more* than truth.

In the preface, in which Richard Wagner is invited as if to a dialogue, there appears this confession of faith, this artists' gospel: "art as the real task of life, art as its *metaphysical* activity…"

5.

— — —

4.

On the

History of the Concept of God.

1.

A people that still believes in itself also still has its own god. In him it venerates the conditions through which it is on top, — it projects its delight in itself, its feeling of power, into a being to whom one can *give thanks* for it. Religion, within such presuppositions, is a form of gratitude. Such a god must be able to help and to harm, must be able to be friend and foe: the anti-natural castration of a god into a god *of the good* would never enter the minds of these strong realists. What does a people matter that cannot be terrible? What does a god matter who knows nothing of wrath, revenge, envy, violence, and perhaps not even of the dangerous ardeurs of destruction? — When a people is perishing; when it feels its faith in its future, in freedom and supremacy, dwindling away; when submission enters its consciousness as the first utility, the virtues of the subjugated as the conditions of survival: then, to be sure, its god changes too. He becomes a sneak, timid, modest, counsels "peace of soul", no-more-hating, forbearance, even love towards friend and foe. He crawls back into the cave of private virtue, becomes the god of the little people, — he no longer represents the aggressive and power-thirsty soul of a people, its *will to power*…

2.

Wherever this will, the will to power, declines, there is invariably décadence. The deity of décadence, gelded of its most manly members and virtues, now becomes a god of the good. Its cult is called "virtue"; its adherents are "the good and the just". — One understands at which moments alone the dualistic opposition of a good and an evil god becomes possible. For with the same instinct with which the subjugated bring their god down to the "good in itself", they strike out

the good qualities from the god of their conquerors. They take revenge on their masters by *diabolizing* their god. —

3.

How can one, with the simplicity of the clever Renan, call the further development of the concept of God from the God of Israel to the God who is the epitome of all good a *progress*! As if Renan had a right to simplicity!… The opposite is plain to see. When the presuppositions of a strong, flourishing life are eliminated from the concept of God, when step by step he becomes the symbol of succour for everything weary, exhausted, merely vegetating, when he becomes the sinners' God, the sick man's God, Saviour, Redeemer par excellence: what does all this bear witness to? — To be sure, his kingdom has grown larger (— must he himself therefore have grown larger?…) Formerly he had only his people, his "chosen ones": every people, at its height, considers itself chosen. Meanwhile he took to wandering and sat still nowhere any longer, — until at last he became a cosmopolitan and won the "great number" over to his side. But the god of the "great number" remains nonetheless a nook-god, the god of all the sick corners, of all the unhealthy quarters of the whole world… His world-kingdom is an underworld-kingdom, a souterrain of hidden misery… And he himself is so weak, so sick!… Proof: even the weakest of the weak, the metaphysicians and scholastics, become master over him, — they spin around him, into him, until he becomes their likeness, a spider. Now he spins the world out of himself, now he becomes the eternal metaphysicus, now he becomes "spirit", "pure spirit"… the Christian concept of God — God as god of the sick, God as spider, God as spirit — is the lowest concept of God ever attained on earth: it represents the high-water mark of décadence in the descending development of the idea of God. God degenerated into the *contradiction of life*, instead of being its transfiguration and its eternal Yes; in God,

enmity declared against life, against nature, against the will to life; God the formula for every slander upon life, for every lie about the "beyond"; in God nothingness deified, the will to nothingness pronounced holy!… That is how far we have come!…

Does one still not know it? Christianity is a *nihilistic* religion — for the sake of its God…

4.

That the young, strong races of northern Europe did not thrust the Christian God away from them truly does no honour to their religious gifts, not to speak of their taste. They *ought* to have finished with such a morbid and decrepit monstrosity of décadence. But a curse lies upon them for not having finished with him: — they have taken sickness, contradiction, old age into all their instincts, — since then they have *created* no further god! Nearly two millennia: and not a single new god! But still, and as if by right, as if an ultimatum and maximum of the god-forming power, of the creator spiritus in man, this pitiable god of European mono-tono-theism! this hybrid structure of decay made out of zero, concept and grandpapa, in which all décadence instincts have obtained their sanction!…

5.

— And how many new gods are still possible!… To me myself, in whom the religious, that is to say god-*forming*, instinct sometimes wants to come alive again: how differently, how variously the divine has revealed itself to me each time!… So much that is strange has already passed before me, in those timeless moments that fall into life as if from the moon, when one simply no longer knows how old one already is and how young one will yet be… I would not doubt that there are many kinds of gods… There is no lack of those from whom

one may not think away a certain halcyonism and light-heartedness… Light feet perhaps even belong to the concept "god"… Is it necessary to explain that a god knows how to keep himself at all times beyond everything reasonable and respectable? beyond, too, be it said in passing, good and evil? His view is *free* — to speak with Goethe. — And to invoke for this case the never sufficiently esteemed authority of Zarathustra: Zarathustra goes so far as to testify of himself "I would believe only in a god who knew how to *dance*"…

Let it be said once more: how many new gods are still possible! — Zarathustra himself, to be sure, is merely an old atheist. Let him be rightly understood! Zarathustra does say that he *would* —; but Zarathustra *will* not…

5.

What that intoxication is capable of which is called love and which is yet something other than love! — But on this subject everyone has his own science. The muscular strength of a girl *grows* as soon as a man merely comes near her; there are instruments to measure this. With a still closer relation between the sexes, such as dancing and other social customs bring with them, this strength increases to such a degree as to make real *feats of strength* possible: in the end one does not trust one's eyes — or one's watch! Here, to be sure, one must take into account that dancing in itself, like every very rapid movement, already brings with it a kind of intoxication for the entire vascular, nervous and muscular system. In this case one has to reckon with the combined effects of a double intoxication. — And how wise it sometimes is to be a little touched!… There are realities that one must never admit to oneself; that is what one is a woman for, that is what one has all the feminine pudeurs for… These young creatures dancing over there are evidently beyond all reality: they dance only with sheer tangible ideals; what is more, they even see ideals sitting all around

them: the mothers!… Occasion to quote Faust… They look incomparably better when they are thus a little touched, these pretty creatures — oh, how well they know it, too! they even become amiable *because* they know it! — Finally they are inspired as well by their finery; their finery is their *third* little intoxication: they believe in their dressmaker as they believe in God: — and who would talk them out of this faith? this faith brings blessedness! And self-admiration is healthy! — Self-admiration protects against catching cold. Has a pretty woman who knew herself to be well dressed ever caught cold? Never, nevermore! I will even suppose the case that she was scarcely dressed at all…

6.

On the History of *Nihilism*.

Most General Types of décadence:

1)

: one chooses, in the *belief* that one is choosing remedies, that which accelerates exhaustion — to this belongs Christianity —: to name the greatest case of instinct gone astray; — to this belongs "progress" —:

2)

: one loses the power of *resistance* to stimuli, — one becomes conditioned by accidents: one coarsens and magnifies experiences into the monstrous… a "depersonalization", a disgregation of the will — — to this belongs a whole kind of morality, the altruistic one, the one that is forever talking of pity: whose essential feature is the weakness of the personality, so that it *resonates along* and constantly trembles like an overstrained string… an extreme irritability…

3)

one confuses cause and effect: one does not understand décadence as physiological and sees in its consequences the real cause of feeling unwell — to this belongs the whole of religious morality

4)

: one longs for a state in which one no longer suffers: life is actually felt to be the ground of *ills*, — one rates the *unconscious*, unfeeling states (sleep, fainting) as incomparably more valuable than the conscious ones: from this a *methodology*…

7.

It is not at all a question of the best or the worst world: No or Yes, that is the question here. The nihilistic instinct says No; its mildest assertion is that not-being is better than being, that the will to nothingness has more value than the will to life; its sternest, that if nothingness is the highest desideratum, then this life, as its opposite, is absolutely worthless — becomes reprehensible…

Inspired by such valuations, a thinker will involuntarily seek to enlist all the things to which he still instinctively attaches value in the justification of a nihilistic tendency. That is the great *counterfeiting* of Schopenhauer, who stood towards many things with deep interest: but the spirit of nihilism forbade him to count this as belonging to the will to life: and so we see a series of subtle and bold attempts to bring art, wisdom, beauty in nature, religion, morality, genius into honour on account of their apparent hostility to life, as a longing for nothingness

8.

Recently much abuse has been made of an accidental word, inapt in every respect: people speak everywhere of pessimism, they fight, strangely enough, sometimes even among reasonable people, over a

question to which there supposedly must be answers: who is right, pessimism or optimism. People have not grasped what is nevertheless palpable: that pessimism is not a problem but a symptom, — that the name must be replaced by *nihilism*, — that the question whether not-being is better than being is itself already a sickness, a decline, an idiosyncrasy…

The pessimistic movement is merely the expression of a physiological décadence; it has its two centres in those places whose sky today the symptoms of decay most [+ + +]

9.

On the Physiology of Art.

1. intoxication as precondition: causes of intoxication.

2. typical symptoms of intoxication

3. the *feeling* of strength and plenitude in intoxication: its *idealizing* effect

4. the actual *increase* of strength: its actual *embellishment*. Consideration: to what extent our value "beautiful" is completely *anthropocentric*: resting on biological presuppositions about growth and progress. The increase of strength e.g. in the *dance* of the sexes. The morbid element in intoxication; the physiological dangerousness of art —

5. the Apollinian, the Dionysian… basic types: more comprehensive, compared with our separate arts

6. Question: where architecture belongs

7. the collaboration of the artistic faculties in normal life, their exercise tonic: conversely the ugly

8. the question of epidemic and contagiousness

9. Problem of "health" and "hysteria" — genius = neurosis

10. art as suggestion, as a means of communication, as a field for the invention of induction psycho-motrice

11. The inartistic states: objectivity, mirror-mania, neutrality. The impoverished *will*; loss of capital

12. The inartistic states: abstractness. The impoverished *senses*.

13. The inartistic states: consumption, impoverishment, emptying, — will to nothingness. Christian, Buddhist, nihilist. The impoverished *body*.

14. The inartistic states: idiosyncrasy (— that of the *weak*, the *mediocre*). Fear of the senses, of power, of intoxication (instinct of those *defeated* by life)

15. How is *tragic* art possible?

16. The type of the romantic: ambiguous. Their consequence is "naturalism"…

17. Problem of the *actor* — the "dishonesty", the typical power of transformation as a *defect of character*… the lack of shame, the Hanswurst, the satyr, the buffo, the Gil Blas, the actor who plays the artist…

18. Art as *intoxication*, medically: amnesty. tonicum total and partial impotence

Notebook 18: July–August 1888

1.

From the War-School of the Soul.

dedicated to the brave, the glad-hearted, the abstinent.

I would not underestimate the amiable virtues; but greatness of soul is not compatible with them. In the arts, too, the grand style excludes the pleasing.

In times of painful tension and vulnerability, choose war: it hardens, it makes muscles.

The deeply wounded have the Olympian laughter; one has only what one needs.

It has lasted ten years already: no sound *reaches* me any more — a land without rain. One must have much humanity to spare in order not to languish in the *drought*.

Every *faith* has the instinct of the lie: it defends itself against every truth from which danger threatens its will to possess "the truth" — it shuts its eyes, it slanders…

One has a faith because it "brings blessedness": one does not hold as true what does not "bring us blessedness". A pudendum.

2.

Theory of the *misuse of logic as a*

criterion of reality. —

3.

The Chandala are on top; the Jews in the lead. In uncertain Europe the Jews are the strongest race: for they are superior to the rest through the length of their development. Their organization presupposes a richer becoming, a more dangerous career, a greater number of stages than all other peoples can show. But that is almost a formula for superiority. — A race, like any other organic formation, can only grow *or* perish; there is no standing still. A race that has not perished is a race that has grown continually. To grow means to become perfect. The duration of a race's existence decides with necessity the height of its development: the oldest *must* be the highest. — The Jews are *clever* in the unconditional sense; to meet a Jew can be a blessing. One is not, by the way, clever with impunity; one easily has the others against one for it. But the great advantage still remains with the clever. — Their cleverness prevents the Jews from becoming foolish in *our* fashion: for example, national. It seems they were once inoculated too well, even a little bloodily, and this among all nations: they no longer easily succumb to *our* rabies, the rabies nationalis. Today they are themselves an antidoton against this latest disease of European reason. — The Jews alone in modern Europe have touched upon the supremest form of spirituality: that is, buffoonery of genius. With Offenbach, with Heinrich Heine the potency of European culture is truly surpassed; in this manner the other races are not yet at liberty to have esprit. It borders on Aristophanes, on Petronius, on Hafiz. — The oldest and latest culture of Europe is now without doubt represented by Paris; l'esprit de Paris is its quintessence. But the most fastidious Parisians, such as the Goncourts, have not hesitated to recognize in Heine one of the three summits of the esprit Parisien itself: he shares the honour with the prince de Ligne and the Neapolitan Galiani. — Heine had taste enough not to be able to take the Germans seriously; in return the Germans have taken him seriously,

and Schumann set him to music — to Schumannesque music! "Du bist wie eine Blume" sing all the higher maidens. — Today in Germany Heine is accused of the crime of having had taste — of having *laughed*: for the Germans themselves nowadays take themselves desperately seriously. —

4.

I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is, for us thinkers at least, something that compromises, a form of our immorality. — Perhaps one will guess, with a glance *behind* this book, which systematizer I myself have avoided only with difficulty…

5.

I have given the Germans the deepest book they possess, my *Zarathustra*, — with this I give them the most independent. What? says my bad conscience to me, you want to cast your pearls — before the Germans?…

6.

One is an artist at the price of feeling what all non-artists call form as content, as the matter itself. With that, to be sure, one belongs to an inverted world.

7.

One should want nothing of oneself that one cannot do. Ask yourself: do you want to go *along*? Or to go *ahead*? Or to go *by yourself*? — In the second case one wants to be a shepherd: shepherd, that is, the supreme necessity of a herd.

8.

— "When, out of the instinct of community, we make rules for ourselves and forbid certain actions, we forbid, as is reasonable, not a way of 'being', not a 'disposition', but only a certain direction and practical application of this 'being', of this 'disposition'. But then along comes the ideologue of virtue, the moralist, and says 'God looketh on the heart! What does it matter that you abstain from particular actions? You are not *better* for it!' — Answer: we have no wish at all to be better, my dear Mr. Long-Ears and Virtuous, we are very content with ourselves, — we merely do not want to do one another harm, and therefore we forbid certain actions in a certain respect, namely with regard to ourselves, while those same actions, provided they concern our opponents — you, for example — we cannot honour enough. We educate our children towards them, we breed them up big. Were we of that 'God-pleasing' radicalism which your holy folly commends to us, were we mooncalves enough to forbid not only actions but their precondition, our 'disposition', then we should be cutting ourselves off from our *virtues*, from what constitutes our honour, our pride. And that is not all. By abolishing our 'disposition' we should by no means become 'better', — we should no longer exist at all, we should have abolished ourselves with it… You are merely a nihilist…"

9.

Russian music brings to light, with a touching simplicity, the soul of the moujik, of the lower people. Nothing speaks more to the heart than its cheerful melodies, which are one and all sad melodies. I would exchange the happiness of the whole West for the Russian way of being sad. — But how is it that the ruling classes of Russia are not represented in its music? Is it enough to say "wicked men have no songs"? —

10.

Where today is the lowest level of European culture, its *swamp*? — Among the Salvationists, among the anti-Semites, among the spiritualists, among the anarchists, among the Bayreuthians. That is to say, among the five specialities of European *cant*. For all of these claim that they alone are now the "higher men"…

11.

Illness is a powerful stimulans. Only one must be healthy enough for it.

12.

Great things demand that one be silent about them or speak greatly: greatly, that is, with innocence, — cynically.

13.

On: *the will to truth*

1st proposition. The *easier* way of thinking triumphs over the more difficult — as *dogma*: simplex sigillum veri. — Dico: that *clarity* should prove something to be truth is a perfect childishness…

2nd proposition. The doctrine of *being*, of the thing, of nothing but fixed unities is *a hundred times easier* than the *doctrine* of *becoming*, of development

3rd proposition. Logic was meant as a *facilitation*: as a *means of expression*, — *not* as truth… Later it *took effect* as truth…

14.

The Metaphysicians

I speak of the *greatest misfortune* of modern philosophy — of *Kant*…

Hegel: something of Swabian trust in God, of bovine optimism

Kant: way to the "old game": *to have that*

All

understood

15.

The Great Noon.

Why "Zarathustra"?

The Great Self-Overcoming of Morality

16.

On: *the metaphysicians*.

On the *psychology of metaphysics*.

The influence of *timidity*.

What has been most *feared*, the cause of the *mightiest sufferings* (lust for dominion, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated by men with the greatest hostility and eliminated from the "true" world. Thus they have step by step *struck out* the *affects*, — posited God as the opposite of evil, *i.e.* posited reality in the *negation of the desires and affects* (that is to say, precisely in *nothingness*.)

Likewise *unreason*, the arbitrary, the accidental has been hated by them (as the cause of countless physical sufferings) *Consequently* they negated this element in that which is in itself, conceived it as absolute "rationality" and "purposiveness".

Likewise *change*, *transience* feared: in this a depressed soul expresses itself, full of mistrust and bad experience (the case of Spinoza: an opposite kind of man would count this change as a *charm*)

A kind of being overladen with strength and *playful* would *approve* precisely the *affects*, *unreason* and *change* in a eudaemonistic sense, together with their consequences, danger, contrast, perishing, etc.

17.

Draft of the

Plan for:

the will to power.

Attempt

at a revaluation of all values.

— *Sils Maria*

on the last Sunday of the

month of August 1888

We Hyperboreans. — Laying the foundation stone of the problem.

First Book:

"*what is truth?*"

First Chapter.

Psychology of error.

Second Chapter.

Value of truth and error.

Third Chapter.

The will to truth (justified only in the

Yes-value of life

Second Book:

Origin of values.

First Chapter.

The metaphysicians.

Second Chapter.

The homines religiosi.

Third Chapter.

The good and the improvers.

Third Book:

Struggle of values

First Chapter.

Thoughts on Christianity.

Second Chapter.

On the physiology of art.

Third Chapter.

On the history of European nihilism.

A Psychologist's Pastime.

Fourth Book:

The Great Noon.

First Chapter.

The principle of life "order of rank".

Second Chapter.

The two ways.

Third Chapter.

The eternal recurrence.

Notebook 19: September 1888

1.

1.

People often ask me why on earth I write my books in *German*. My answer is always the same: I love the Germans, — everyone has his little bit of unreason. What does it matter to me if the Germans do not read me? All the more do I strive to be *just* to them. — And, who knows? perhaps they will read me the day after tomorrow.

2.

The new Germany represents a great quantum of inherited and schooled proficiency: so that for a while it may even spend its accumulated treasure of strength lavishly. It is *not* a high culture that has become master with it, still less a delicate taste, a noble "beauty" of the instincts; but *manlier* virtues than any other country of Europe can show. Much good courage and respect for oneself, much assurance in dealings, in the reciprocity of duties, much industriousness, much endurance — and an inherited moderation which needs the spur rather than the brake. I add that here people still obey without obedience humiliating them… And no one despises his adversary…

3.

Having in this way done justice to the Germans — for I love them, in spite of everything — I have no further reason to withhold my objection from them. They were once the "nation of thinkers": *do they still think at all today?* — They no longer have time for it… German "spirit" — I fear that is a contradictio in adjecto. — They are becoming boring, perhaps they already are; great politics swallows up the *seriousness* for all truly great things —, "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles" — a costly principle, but *not* a philosophical one. — "Are there German philosophers? Are there German poets? Are there *good* German

books?" — so I am asked abroad. I blush, but with the bravery that is mine even in desperate cases, I answer: "Yes! *Bismarck!*"… Should I confess which books are read now? — Dahn? Ebers? Ferdinand Meyer? — I have heard university professors praise this modest Bieder-Meyer at the expense of Gottfried Keller. Accursed instinct of mediocrity!

4.

I permit myself one more amusement. I shall relate what a little book related to me when it came back to me from its first journey to Germany. It is called: *Beyond Good and Evil*, — it was, between ourselves, the prelude to the very work one holds here in one's hands. The little book said to me: "I know quite well what my fault is: I am too new, too rich, too passionate, — I disturb people's night's rest. There are words in me that would break even a god's heart; I am a rendezvous of experiences that one has only 6000 feet above every human atmosphere. — Reason enough for the Germans to *understand me*…" But, I replied, my poor book, how could you cast your pearls — before the Germans? It was a folly! — And now the book told me what had befallen it.

5.

Indeed, since 1871 people in Germany have informed themselves about me only too thoroughly: the case proved it. I am *not* surprised when my Zarathustra is not understood, I see no reproach in that: a book so deep, so strange, that to have understood six sentences of it, that is to say to have *lived* them, raises one into a higher order of mortals. But *not* to understand that "Beyond" — that I almost admire… A reviewer of the Nationalzeitung understood the book as a sign of the times, as a genuine, proper Junker philosophy, for which the Kreuzzeitung merely lacked the courage. A small light of the Uni-

versity of Berlin declared in the "Rundschau", evidently with regard to his own illumination, that the book was a psychiatric case, and even cited passages in support: passages which had the misfortune to prove something. — A Hamburg paper recognized in me the old Hegelian. The Litterarisches Centralblatt confessed to having lost "the thread" with me (when did it ever have it? —) and cited, by way of justification, a few words on the "South in music": as if a music that does not go into Leipzig ears thereby ceased to be music. What I there profess in principle nonetheless remains true: il faut méditerraniser la musique. — A theological innocent gave me to understand that I cared nothing at all for logic, but solely for "fine style": how could one take seriously what I myself took so little seriously? — All this might still pass: but I have experienced cases where "understanding" exceeded the measure of the human and verged on the bestial. A Swiss editor, of the "Bund", could extract nothing else from his study of the said work than that with it I was proposing the abolition of all decent feelings: one sees he had really *thought* something at the words "Beyond Good and Evil"… But my humanity was still equal to such a case. I thanked him for it, I even gave him to understand that no one had understood me better — he believed it… A year later the same paper treated my Zarathustra as a higher exercise in style, with witty hints about the imperfection of my style —

— and I took my *pleasure* in all of it: why should I conceal it? One is not a hermit for nothing. The mountains are a mute neighbour; years pass without a word reaching one. But the sight of living things *refreshes*: in the end one suffers all the little children to come unto one, one strokes every kind of creature, even if it has horns. (I always address a cow as "my dear young lady": that flatters her old heart.) Only the hermit knows the great tolerance. *Love of animals* — in all ages hermits have been recognized by it…

2.

Revaluation of All Values.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

3.

Thoughts for the Day after Tomorrow.

Extract of my Philosophy

Wisdom for the Day after Tomorrow

My Philosophy

in Extract.

Magnum in parvo.

A Philosophy

in Extract.

4.

1.

We Hyperboreans.

2.

The Problem of Socrates.

3.

Reason in Philosophy.

4.

How the True World Finally Became a Fable

5.

Morality as Anti-Nature.

6.

The Four Great Errors.

7.

For Us — Against Us.

8.

Concept of a Décadence Religion.

9.

Buddhism and Christianity.

10.

From My Aesthetics.

11.

Among Artists and Writers.

12.

Maxims and Arrows.

5.

Multum in parvo.

My Philosophy

in Extract.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche

6.

Idle Hours

of a Psychologist.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

7.

[+ + +] There are words in me that would still rend the heart of a god; I am a rendezvous of experiences that one has only 6000 feet above every human haze: reason enough for the Germans to have un-

derstood me…" But, I answered, my poor book, how could you cast your pearls — before the Germans! It was a piece of stupidity! — And now the little book told me what had befallen it.

Indeed, since 1871 people in Germany have informed themselves about me only too thoroughly: the case proved it. I am *not* surprised when people do not understand my Zarathustra: a book so remote, so beautiful, that one must have the blood of gods in one's veins to hear its bird-voice. But not to understand that "Beyond" — that I almost admire. It is understood everywhere, best of all in France. — A reviewer for the Nationalzeitung took the book as a sign of the times, as the genuine, proper Junker philosophy, for which the Kreuzzeitung merely lacked the courage. A small light of the Berlin university, writing in the "Rundschau", declared the book — evidently with regard to his own illumination — to be a case for psychiatry, and even quoted passages to that effect, passages which had the misfortune to *prove* something. — A Hamburg paper recognized in me the old Hegelian. The Litterarisches Centralblatt confessed to having lost "the thread" with me (when did it ever have it? —) and cited, by way of justification, a few words about the "South in music": as if a music that does not go into Leipzig ears thereby ceased to be music! Nonetheless what I there profess in principle remains true: il faut méditerraniser la musique. — A theological innocent gave me to understand that I cared nothing at all for logic, but solely for "fine style": how could one take seriously what I myself took so little seriously? — All this may still pass. But I have experienced cases where understanding overstepped the measure of the human and bordered on the animal. A Swiss editor, of the "Bund", could extract nothing else from the work in question than that I was proposing in it the abolition of all decent feelings: one sees he had really *thought* something at the words "beyond good and evil"… But my humanity was still equal to such a case. I thanked him for it, I even gave him to understand that no one had

understood me better, — he believed it… A year later the same paper treated my Zarathustra, the *deepest* book of mankind, as a higher exercise in style, with witty hints about the imperfection of my style…

— And I had my *pleasure* in all of it: why should I keep silent about it? One is not a hermit for nothing. The mountains are a mute neighbour; years pass without a sound reaching one. But the sight of what is living *refreshes*: in the end one suffers all "little children" to come unto one, one still strokes every kind of creature, even when it has horns. Only the hermit knows the great tolerance. *Love of animals* — by this the hermits have been recognized in all ages…

Sils-Maria, Upper Engadine,

beginning of September 1888.

8.

Revaluation of All Values.

First Book.

The Antichrist.

Attempt at a Critique of Christianity.

Second Book.

The Free Spirit.

Critique of Philosophy as a Nihilistic

Movement.

Third Book.

The Immoralist.

Critique of the Most Fateful Kind of

Ignorance, Morality.

Fourth Book.

Dionysus.

Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence.

9.

The Immoralist

Psychology of the *errors* on which morality rests

1)

confusion of cause and effect

2)

imaginary causes for general physiological feelings

3)

causality of the will as one's own "free will"

4)

man strives for pleasure and avoids displeasure ("all evil involuntary")

5)

egoism and unegoism (false opposites)

false psychology of "devotion", "self-sacrifice", "love"

Psychology of the *means* by which morality comes

to dominion, the pia fraus.

10.

In the history of culture the "Reich" is for the time being a misfortune: Europe has grown poorer since the German spirit definitively renounced "spirit". — People know something of this abroad: may the Germans not lie to themselves about it! One asks: Have you a single spirit worth considering? Or even a three-quarter spirit?… That there are no German philosophers is an end of the first rank. No one is so unfair as to hold it against the Germans when garrulous nonentities like the Unconscious One, Herr E. von Hartmann, or a rabble full of venom and bile like the Berlin anti-Semite Herr E. Dühring misuse the word philosopher — the latter finds not one decent person among his following, the former not one decent "understanding".

11.

The state claims the right to have a say in questions of culture and even to decide them: as though the state were not merely a means, a very subordinate means of culture!… "A German Reich" — how many "German Reichs" would one reckon to one Goethe!… All great ages of culture were politically poor ages: —

Notebook 20: Summer 1888

1.

The Brazen Silence —

Five ears — and not a sound in them!

The world went dumb…

I listened with the ears of my *curiosity*

Five times I cast the line above me,

Five times I drew up no fish —

I asked — no answer ran into my net —

I listened with the ear of my *love*

2.

You ran too fast:

only now, when you are weary,

does your happiness overtake you.

3.

a snowed-in soul, to whom

a thawing wind speaks coaxingly

4.

a glittering dancing brook, which

a crooked bed

of rocks has caught:

between black stones

its impatience gleams and quivers.

5.

The reckless man

beware of warning!

For the very warning's sake

he runs into every abyss besides.

6.

Well pursued,

badly caught

7.

crooked go great men and rivers,

crooked, but to *their* goal:

that is their best courage,

they are not afraid of crooked ways.

8.

Goats, geese and other

crusaders and whatever else

the Holy Ghost

has ever led

9.

are these stilts?

or are they pride's strong feet?

10.

broken and servile,

tainted, tawdry

11.

among you I am always

like oil among water:

always on top

12.

a swill-shop beside every shop

13.

Of one's death one is certain:

why should one not be cheerful?

14.

badly married

to oneself, unpeaceable,

one's own house-dragon

15.

the sky stands in flames, the sea
spits at us

16.

the sea bares its teeth
at you.

17.

your God, you tell me,
is a God of love?
the bite of conscience
is a bite of God,
a bite out of love?

18.

below my summit
and my ice
still girded round
with all the girdles of love

19.

whom does beauty befit?
not the man:
beauty *hides* the man, —

but a hidden man is of little worth.

Step forth freely, — — —

20.

you must go back into the throng:

in the throng one grows smooth and hard.

Solitude softens…

solitude corrupts…

21.

do not mistake him!

True, he laughs

like a lightning-flash:

but after it

his long thunder rumbles wrathfully.

22.

already he imitates himself,

already he has grown weary,

already he seeks the ways he once went —

and only lately he loved all that was *untrodden*!

23.

my wisdom did as the sun does:

I wished to be light to them,

but I have blinded them;
the sun of my wisdom put out
the eyes
of these bats…

24.

his pity is hard,
his loving clasp crushes:
do not give your hand to a giant!

25.

so now it is my will:
and since this has been my will,
everything goes as I wish —
This was my final shrewdness:
I willed what I must:
thereby I compelled every "must" for myself…
since then there has been no "must" for me…

26.

Haughty towards small
advantages: where I see the shopkeepers'
long fingers,
there at once I have a craving

to draw the short straw:

so my fastidious taste would have it of me.

27.

little people,

trusting, open-hearted,

but low doors:

only what is low comes in through them.

28.

would you be merely the ape

of your God?

29.

your great thoughts,

which come from the heart,

and all your little ones

— they come from the head —

are they not all *badly* thought?

30.

beware,

do not be the drummer

of your destiny!

get out of the way

of all the boom-boom of fame!

31.

would you catch them?
speak to them coaxingly,
as to sheep gone astray:
"your way, oh your way
you have lost it"
They follow anyone
who flatters them so.
"What? did we have a way?
they say to themselves in secret:
it really seems we have a way!"

32.

do not be angry with me that I slept:
I was only tired, I was not dead.
My voice sounded wicked;
but it was merely snoring and snorting,
the song of a weary man:
no welcome to death,
no lure of the grave.

33.

helpless as a corpse,

dead already in life, buried

34.

stretch out your hand to small chances,

be gracious to the unwelcome:

Towards one's fate one should not be prickly,

unless one be a hedgehog.

35.

Are you climbing,

is it true that you are climbing,

you higher men?

Are you not, forgive me,

like a ball

pressed up into the heights

— by what is lowest in you?…

are you not *fleeing* from yourselves, you climbers?…

36.

with strangled ambition:

among such men I have a craving

to be the last —

37.

to the murderer of God
to the seducer of the purest
to the friend of evil?

38.

upright he stands there,
with more sense for what is right
in his leftmost toe
than sits in my whole head:
a monster of virtue,
white-cloaked

39.

what does it help! his heart
is narrow and all his spirit
is in this narrow cage
caught fast, clamped in

40.

you stiff sages,
to me all things became play

41.

do I love you?…

So the rider loves his horse:

it carries him to his goal.

42.

narrow souls,

shopkeeper souls!

When the money leaps into the coffer,

the soul always leaps in with it!

43.

you can no longer bear it,

your imperious fate?

Love it, you have no choice left!

44.

the will redeems.

He who has nothing to do

is troubled by a nothing.

45.

solitude

does not plant: it ripens…

And besides you must have the sun for your friend

46.

Cast your heaviness into the deep!

Man, forget! Man, forget!

Divine is the art of forgetting!

Would you fly,

would you be at home on the heights:

cast your heaviest into the sea!

Here is the sea, cast yourself into the sea!

Divine is the art of forgetting!

47.

the witch.

we thought ill of one another?…

we were too far from each other.

But now, in this smallest of huts, tethered to one fate,

how could we still be enemies?

one simply must love each other when one cannot run away from each other

48.

Truth —

a woman, nothing better:

cunning in her modesty:

what she would like most,

she will not know of it,

she holds her fingers before her face…

To whom does she yield? To force alone! —

So use force,

be hard, you wisest!

you must compel her,

bashful truth…

for her bliss

compulsion is needed —

— she is a woman, nothing better…

49.

alas, that you believed

you had to despise

where you merely renounced!…

50.

Hour of evening

when even the ice

of my summits glows!

51.

Voyage on the Water — Fame.

You waves?

You little women? You strange ones
you are angry with me?
you roar up in wrath?
With my oar I strike
your folly on the head.
This skiff —
you yourselves will yet carry it to immortality!

52.

Such a thing may not be refutable:
would it be true on that account?
oh you innocents!

53.

On the heights I am at home,
for the heights I do not yearn.
I do not lift my eyes on high;
one who looks down am I,
one who must bless:
all who bless look down…

54.

Already he grows surly,
jaggedly he juts

his elbow;

his voice turns sour,

his eye looks verdigris.

55.

a noble eye with

velvet curtains:

seldom bright, —

it honours him to whom it shows itself open.

56.

Milk flows

in her soul; but woe!

her spirit is whey-like

57.

a stranger's breath breathes and hisses at me:

am I a mirror that grows clouded by it?

58.

spare what has such tender skin!

Why would you scrape the down

from such things?

59.

Truths that no smile
has yet gilded;
green tart impatient truths
sit all around me.

60.

Oh all you glowing ices!
You summit-suns of my loneliest happiness!

61.

Slow eyes,
which seldom love:
but when they love, it flashes up
as from gold-mine shafts,
where a dragon keeps watch over the hoard of love…

62.

"to hell goes he who goes your ways?" —
Well then! to my hell
I will pave the way for myself with good sayings

63.

Would you grasp at thorns?
Your fingers pay dearly for it.

Grasp at a dagger

64.

are you fragile?

then beware of *children's hands*!

The child cannot live

unless it breaks something…

65.

even smoke is good for something:

so says the Bedouin, and I say it with him:

you smoke, do you not announce

to him who is on his way

the nearness of a hospitable hearth?

66.

he who laughs best today

also laughs last.

67.

a weary wanderer

whom with harsh barking

a dog receives

68.

milk-heart, cow-warm

69.

these are crabs, for whom I have no fellow-feeling,

grab them, and they pinch;

let them be, and it's backwards they go.

70.

too long he sat in the cage,

this runaway!

too long he feared a

jailer with a stick:

fearfully now he goes his way:

everything makes him stumble,

the very shadow of a stick makes him stumble

71.

Beyond the north, the ice, the today,

beyond death,

aside —

our life, *our* happiness!

Neither by land

nor by water

can you find the way

to us Hyperboreans:

thus of us a wise mouth prophesied.

72.

oh these poets!

There are stallions among them

who neigh in a chaste manner

73.

look outward! do not look back!

one goes to ruin

if one always goes to the root of things

74.

affable toward man and chance,

a patch of sunlight

on wintry slopes

75.

my wisdom became a lightning bolt;

with a diamond sword it cleft every darkness for me

76.

guess, friend of riddles,

where does my virtue dwell now?

it ran away from me,

it feared the cunning

of my hooks and nets

77.

my happiness pains them:

to these envy-bags my happiness becomes a shadow;

they shiver inwardly: and look green at it —

78.

lonely days,

you want to walk on brave feet!

79.

and only when I am a burden to myself

do *you* weigh heavy on me!

80.

uncomfortable

like every virtue

81.

a prisoner who drew the hardest lot:

to work bent over,

to work in the dank dark shaft:

a scholar…

82.

where did he go? who knows?

but certain it is that he went under.

A star went out in desolate space:

desolate the space became…

83.

the storm cloud still rumbles:

but already there hangs

glittering still heavy —

Zarathustra's wealth over the fields.

84.

this alone redeems from all suffering —

choose now:

swift death

or long love.

85.

for new treasures we burrow,

we new subterraneans:

("insatiables")

godless it once seemed to the ancients

to stir up the bowels of the earth for treasures;

once again there is such godlessness:

do you not hear the colicky rumbling of all the depths?

86.

you are becoming absurd,

you are becoming virtuous

87.

the holy sickness,

faith

88.

are you strong?

strong as an ass? strong as a god?

are you proud?

proud enough that you know not how to be ashamed of your vanity?

89.

they created their god out of nothing:

what wonder: now he has come to nothing for them —

90.

a scholar of *old* things

a gravedigger's trade,

a life between coffins and sawdust

91.

overhasty

like leaping spider monkeys

92.

there they stand,

the heavy granite cats,

the values from primeval times:

woe! how would you overthrow *those*?

93.

their sense is a nonsense,

their wit is a yes-but and but-then wit

94.

diligent, intimate:

golden-bright each day comes up to me

and ever the same.

95.

full of deep mistrust,

overgrown with moss,

solitary,

of long will,

a stranger to all that lusts,

a silent one

96.

he crouches, he lurks:

he can no longer stand upright.

He has grown into his grave,

this misgrown spirit:

how could he ever *rise again?*

97.

are you so curious?

can you see around the corner?

to see *that*, one must have eyes in the back of one's head as well

98.

how cold they are, these scholars!

Would that a lightning bolt struck their food!

Would that they learned to eat fire!

99.

Scratch-cats,

with bound paws,

there they sit

and glare poison.

100.

why did he cast himself down from his height?

what seduced him?

Pity for all that is lowly seduced him:

now he lies there, broken, useless, cold —

101.

paper blowfly

one-day reader

102.

a wolf himself bore witness for me

and said: "you howl even better than we wolves"

103.

Blacker and worse things you beheld than any seer:

through the voluptuousness of hell no wise man has yet passed.

104.

new nights you wrapped about you,

new deserts your lion's foot invented

105.

on this stony beauty

my hot heart cools itself

106.

by a new happiness

tortured

107.

far out, into the sea of the future,

I cast my line over my head

108.

Dig, worm!

109.

I am one to whom oaths are sworn:

swear this to me!

110.

not that you overthrew the idol:

that you overthrew the idol-worshipper in you,

that was your courage

111.

my happiness of the beyond!

what is happiness to me today

casts shadows in its light

112.

to be guilty with the greatest guilt,

— and all virtues shall yet

lie on their knees before my guilt —

113.

to deceive —

that is everything in war.

The fox's skin:

it is my secret coat of mail

114.

Fame

not recognized too early:

one who has *saved up* his renown

115.

for such ambition

is this earth not too small?

116.

is cunning better than force?

117.

Everything I gave away,
all my goods and chattels:
nothing more remains to me
but you, great hope!

118.

"one conquers in nothing without wrath"

119.

where there is danger,
there I am present,
there I grow out of the earth

120.

thus speaks every general:
"give neither the victor
nor the vanquished rest!"

121.

the great hour is coming,
the danger of dangers:
my soul grows still…

122.

who could there be that might grant you right?

Then *take* your right!

123.

not from his sins and great follies:

from his perfection I suffered, when I

suffered most from man

124.

Ruins of stars:

out of these ruins I fashion my world

125.

by this thought

I draw all the future after me

126.

what is happening? is the sea falling?

No, my land is growing!

a new blaze lifts it up!

127.

a thought,

still hot and molten now, lava:

but every lava builds
a fortress around itself,
every thought crushes
itself in the end with "laws"

128.

when no new voice spoke any longer,
you made out of old words
a law:
where life *congeals*, the law towers up.

129.

with this I began:
I unlearned fellow-feeling with *myself*!

130.

your false love
of what is past,
a gravedigger's love —
it is a robbery of life,
you steal it from the future —

131.

the worst objection
I hid it from you — life grows tedious:

throw it away, so that it may taste good to you again!

132.

this serene depth!
What once was called a star
has turned into a blot.

133.

this highest obstacle,
this thought of thoughts,
who created it for himself!
Life itself created for itself
its highest obstacle:
over its own thought it now leaps away

134.

Enthusiasts and twilight creatures,
and all that
between evening and night
creepeth, flieth, and standeth on lame legs.

135.

they chew pebbles,
they lie on their bellies
before little round things;

they worship everything that does not fall over —
these last servants of God!
Believers!

136.

what one does not have
but has need of,
that one should take:
thus I took for myself a good conscience.

137.

secretly burned,
not for his faith,
but rather because for no faith
could he find the courage any longer

138.

what dwells around you
soon dwells its way into you:
where you sit long,
there customs grow.

139.

dry riverbeds,
parched sandy souls

140.

stubborn spirits,

subtle, petty

141.

their coldness

makes my memory freeze?

Have I ever felt this heart

glow and beat within me?…

142.

(At night, starry sky)

oh this deathly-silent din!

143.

on a broad slow stairway

to climb to one's happiness

144.

by earthly lights,

by the reflected glow of others' happiness

lit up ash-grey,

a moon- and night-creeper

145.

"love the enemy,

let yourself be robbed by the robber":

the woman hears it and — does it

146.

in the twelve stars of my virtue: it has all the seasons

147.

our hunt for truth —

is it a hunt for happiness?

148.

one stays good only if one forgets.

Children who have a memory for punishments and rebukes

grow spiteful, secretive —

149.

The dawn

with brazen innocence

saw it and vanished.

Storm clouds came behind her.

150.

restless, like horses:

does not our own shadow sway

up and down?

let us be led into the sun,

against the sun —

151.

Truths for our feet,

truths one can dance to

152.

Bogeymen,

tragic grimaces,

moral gargling sounds

153.

Thunderclouds — what do you matter!

To us, the free, airy, merry spirits

154.

are you women,

that from what you love

you wish to suffer?

155.

whispered into the ears of the sloths:

"whoever has nothing to do,
is troubled by a nothing"

156.

When the solitary one
is seized by the great fear,
when he runs and runs
and does not himself know whither?
when storms roar behind him,
when the lightning bears witness against him,
when his cave with its ghosts
makes him afraid —

157.

I am only a maker of words:
what do words matter!
what do I matter!

158.

all too soon
I laugh again:
an enemy has
little to make up for with me

159.

Under an overcast sky,
when one shoots arrows
and killing thoughts
at one's enemy

160.

like stray strokes of a bell
in the forest

161.

to the brave, the glad of heart,
the abstinent
I sing this song.

162.

War Songs of the Soul.
The Victorious One
From the Seventh Solitude.

163.

The Way to Greatness
Songs
of Zarathustra

164.

The Tomb of God.

165.

The Songs

of Zarathustra.

First Part:

The Way of Greatness

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

166.

The Songs of Zarathustra.

First Part:

on the poverty of the richest

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

167.

The Eternal Recurrence.

Zarathustra's

Dances and Processions.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche

168.

The Songs

of Zarathustra

First Part:

The Way to Greatness

Notebook 21: Autumn 1888

1.

Teichmüller

Sceptiques grecs

Spir

August Müller, Islam

2.

Evenings to the Café *Livorno*

3 — 5 to the Café *Florio*

Not to Roma

not to Löscher

Do not put on spectacles in the street!

buy *no* books!

do *not* go into the crowd!

Evenings through the Valentino *Garden* as far as the *Castle*, then

back in again to the end of the *piazza*

*Vitt*orio Emanuele I and to the *Café Livorno*

in the theatre with *gall*eria *num*erata

try it!

3.

Chap. on faith

Chap. on Paul

the means of making *sick*

the means of making *mad*

4.

write *no* letters!

read *no* books!

take something to read to the *café*!

Notebook!

5.

Drink *water*.

Never spirits.

from time to time (rhubarb)

Mornings one glass of tea: let it go *cold*!

at night warm something up!

in the theatre galleria posto numerato

no spectacles in the street

do *not* go into the crowd!

not to Löscher!

not to Roma!

write *no* letters

Evenings warm clothes!

6.

Ah, what a blessing a Jew is among German horned cattle!… The gentlemen antisemites underestimate that. What, really, distinguishes a Jew from an antisemite: the Jew knows *that* he is lying *when* he lies: the antisemite does not know that he is always lying.

7.

Nowadays one not infrequently sees young men of respectable origin vanish into thoroughly equivocal movements: for a long time they have not known how to give their life any meaning, — *some* meaning or other finally becomes an almost tyrannical need for them. In the end chance decides: they fall prey to a party that has a "meaning" against which, at bottom, not only their taste but their *sense of smell* protests, —

against which, at bottom, not merely taste but smell protests, the antisemites for example: merely because the antisemites have a goal that is palpable to the point of impudence, *Jewish money*…

do not know how to give their life any meaning and who finally fall prey to a party that has a meaning, the antisemites for example, whose goal is palpable to the point of impudence: *Jewish money*

they become antisemites, for example, merely because the antisemites have a goal that is palpable to the point of impudence — *Jewish money*..

Definition of the antisemites: envy, ressentiment, impotent rage as the *leitmotif* in the instinct: the claim of the "chosen one"; the perfect moralistic self-mendacity —, which may constantly have virtue and all the great words in its mouth. But this is the *typical* sign: they do not even notice *whom* they thereby resemble to the point of being mis-

taken for him? an antisemite is an "envious", i.e. most stupid, Jew — —

8.

I venture to hint at yet another proprium of my nature, especially as it is almost *the* proprium. I have something that I call my inner nostrils. At every contact with human beings, the first thing that betrays itself to me is the degree of inner cleanliness [— — —] — it is precisely the "beautiful souls" that I smell as especially unclean. How someone stands toward himself, or how someone deceives himself, whether he insists on dealing with himself unequivocally, — whether someone *endures* himself or needs an "ideal"… The idealist smells bad to me…

I should like to be permitted to venture naming a scholar of Jewish descent who, through a noble coolness and clarity toward himself that had become instinct, has at all times given me a deep feeling of beauty, of *cleanliness* in my sense: he did not compare himself for a moment, he was never another, and concealed himself neither before witnesses nor without witnesses. This requires not only a perfect habituation to hardness and candour toward oneself; it also requires a great power of resistance not to change oneself under the impress of society or profession or chance. It is just as much a sign of strength as the so-called — — —

The opposite of the *clean* types described is given me, on average, by almost all the Germans I know; in particular by the gentlemen antisemites, whom I feel to be [—] par excellence. Bad instincts, an absurd ambition, vanity, [— — —] and along with it the attitude of "higher values", of "idealism"…

Notebook 22: September–October 1888

1.

Marginal note on an English niaiserie. — "What you would not have people do to you, do not do to them either." That passes for wisdom; that passes for prudence; that passes for the foundation of morality — for a "golden saying." John Stuart Mill and who among the English does not believe in it… But the saying does not withstand the slightest attack. The calculation "do nothing that you would not have done to yourself" forbids actions for the sake of their harmful consequences: the ulterior thought is that an action is always *repaid*. What now if someone, with the "principe" in hand, were to say: "precisely such actions *must* one do, so that others do not forestall us — so that we put others in no position to do them to *us*?" — On the other hand: let us imagine a Corsican whose honour commands the vendetta. He too wishes no musket ball in his body: but the prospect of one, the probability of a bullet, does *not* keep him from satisfying his honour… And are we not, in all *decent* actions, deliberately indifferent to what comes of them for us? To avoid an action that would have harmful consequences for us — that would be a *prohibition* of decent actions altogether…

On the other hand the saying is valuable because it betrays a *type of man*: it is the *instinct of the herd* that formulates itself in it — one is equal, one takes oneself as equal: as I to you, so you to me — Here there is real belief in an *equivalence of actions* which, in all real relations, simply does not occur. Not every action *can* be returned: between real "individuals" *there is no equal action*, and consequently no "requital" either… When I do something, the thought is utterly remote from me that anything of the kind is possible for any human being at all: it

belongs to *me*… Nothing can be paid back to me; one would always be committing an *"other"* action against me —

2.

Chapter on

Paul

the

Jewish family of the diaspora

the

"love"

the

"free" refashioning of Jesus

wholly Jewish-priestly

a)

death *for* our sin

b)

the "Redeemer" is immortal

the deep hatred of *culture* and knowledge — already Jewish (Genesis 52

the "immortal" soul

psychology of the "dying" 18

the priest as "evil angel" 10

everything that has been *spoiled* by the Church

1) asceticism

2) fasting 66

3) the "monastery"

4) the festivals

5) charity

love goodness heroism 243

psychology of the first Christians

197 63

"judge not" 11

Protestant 184

great lie of history 17

3.

Book 2

To prove that the nihilistic way of thinking is the *consequence* of faith in *morality* and *priestly values*: if one has set value falsely, then, upon insight into this falseness, the world appears *devalued*…

Book 3

morality, with regard to its origin, its means, its aim, the most immoral fact in history… its *self-refutation*, insofar as, in order to uphold its values, it must *practise* the counter-values…

4.

Paul: he seeks power *against* the ruling Judaism, — his movement is too weak… Revaluation of the concept "Jew": the "race" is set aside —: but that meant negating the *foundation*: the "martyr," the fanatic, the value of all *strong* faith…

Never concede that the *humanitarian effects* speak in favour of Christianity…

Christianity is the *form of decay* of the ancient world in its deepest impotence: so that the sickest and unhealthiest strata and needs come out on top.

5.

Consequently other instincts had to come to the fore in order to *create* a unity, a power that defends itself —, in short a kind of state of emergency was necessary, like the one from which the Jews had gained their *instinct for self-preservation*…

Invaluable for this were the persecutions of the Christians: — the community in danger, the *mass conversions* as the only means of putting an end to private persecutions (— consequently one takes the concept "conversion" as lightly as possible)

6.

Idol-Hammer.

or

Cheerfulnesses

of a Psychologist.

Idol-Hammer.

Or:

how a psychologist asks questions.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Idol-Hammer.

Idleness

of a Psychologist.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

Idol-Hammer.

Or:

how a psychologist asks questions.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche

Leipzig,

Published by C. G. Naumann

1889.

Twilight of the Idols.

Or:

how one philosophizes

with the hammer.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

7.

I feel interpreting in the Christian manner to be a *profound frivolity*. To expound one's life as Swabian Christians do seems to me thoroughly indecent, — it takes a lack of the great integrity not to discover

[— — —] to interpret something — and that it is a *paltry* trick — when scientific rigour does not lead the *conscience*, there is always a *residue* of capability left, — so as not to arrange one's life weakly, cowardly, spiritlessly, in a Christian fashion, as is possible in backward regions, e.g. in Swabia; what has stayed behind there is *integrity*… *Not* the "spirit": for it takes no acumen to see through the "swindle" that is carried on there

8.

A faith that rests on holy books which no one allows to count as books, the books communicated through revelation to those who recognize the truth as something that is given, that stands fixed, *not* as something for which [— — —] and with unspeakable self-mastery and self-discipline, a faith that never has the will to understand its holy books, which [— — —] is made secure through "revelation" its typical state

9.

The Germans should never be forgiven for having cheated the Renaissance of its goal, of its *victory*, — the victory over Christianity. The German Reformation is its *dark* curse… And three more times this race of misfortune has thrust itself in between to obstruct the course of culture — German philosophy, the Wars of Liberation, the founding of the Reich at the end of the nineteenth century — nothing but great calamities for culture!

10.

57th Chap.)

the holy end: Manu's thoughts behind his lie.

58th Chap.)

one should never concede *humanitarian* effects to Christianity, it has spoiled everything — The terrible *loss* all valuable things have suffered, in that seriousness was squandered on imaginary, on *harmful* things; that only in the *middle of this century* were the questions of *nourishment*, *dwelling*, *health* taken seriously

59th Chap.)

the great attempt at counter-values — the mission of the Germans

60th Chap. my *demands*.

1.

Let one avoid intercourse with those who remain Christians as before, — this for reasons of cleanliness.

2.

Taking into consideration the cases where Christianity is evidently merely the consequence and symptom of nervous weakness, let one prevent by every means the contagion from spreading out from such hotbeds.

3.

That the Bible is a *dangerous* book, that one must learn caution towards it, — that it may not simply be put into the hands of immature age-groups

4.

that one regard *and treat* the *priests* as a kind of Chandala

5.

Cleanse all places, institutions, education of the defilement of the priest

6.

Festivals and *Saints*, "*Redeemers*"

7.

Dating of time

11.

I have witnessed cases where young men of respectable origin, who for a long time could not manage to give their life a goal, finally disappear into downright filthy movements, — only because these give them a goal… Some, for example, even become anti-Semites…

12.

58. *What one owes to Christianity*

the terrible loss, because everything that has *value*, that is *important* of the first rank, has not been taken seriously… — *now* we are beginning to take health, clothing, nourishment, dwelling seriously… the squandering of all great passion, of all enthusiasm, of all depth and subtlety of the spirit

13.

On the Higher Man.

Or:

the temptation of Zarathustra.

Zarathustra's Temptation.

Or:

for whom pity would be a sin.

Zarathustra's Temptation.

Or:

how pity becomes a sin.

for whom pity would become a sin.

14.

Revaluation of All Values.

The Antichrist.

Attempt at a Critique of Christianity.

The Immoralist.

Critique of the most fateful kind of

ignorance, morality.

We Yea-Sayers.

Critique of Philosophy as a Nihilistic

Movement.

Dionysus.

Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence.

Zarathustra's Songs

From

Seven Solitudes.

15.

Zarathustra's Temptation.

Or:

in whom pity would become

a sin.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

16.

The Case of Wagner.

A Musician's Problem.

Twilight of the Idols. Or:

how one philosophizes with a hammer.

Zarathustra's Temptation.

Or: in whom pity would become

a sin.

17.

the *causality of action*

the *purposes* wrongly posited:

Happiness

a)

one's own

"egoistic"

b)

another's

"unegoistic"

(— Profoundest lack of self-reflection in Schopenhauer, who also

adds c) another's *suffering* d) one's own suffering: which are naturally only specifications of the concept "one's own happiness" (a)

if happiness is the purpose of action, then *dissatisfaction* must precede acting: pessimistic falsification of the facts. *Displeasure* as motive for acting.

My theory: pleasure, displeasure, "will", "purpose" entirely mere accompanying phenomena, — never *causal*. *All* so-called "spiritual" causality is a fiction

Causality of action

Displeasure and pleasure as motives

the *will* as causal in action

Presupposed: that the entire prehistory lies in the sphere of *consciousness*

that the real causality is a *spiritual* one…

that the "soul" knows what it wills and that the value of the act of will is *conditioned* by its knowing…

that the soul is free of the will and consequently — — —

18.

Bad actions, those of the décadents, are characterized precisely by *their lack* of "egoism", — they are *not* directed towards ultimate advantage

Psychology of the so-called *un*egoistic actions — in truth they are regulated most strictly towards the instinct of self-preservation

the reverse is the case with the so-called *egoistic* actions:

here precisely the directing instinct is lacking, — the deep consciousness of what is useful and what is harmful

All strength, health, vitality bears witness to the increased *tension* towards the commanding instinct of the self

all slackening is décadence

19.

Theses

:

:

:

there is no unegoistic action whatsoever

nor is there any egoistic acting

Happiness is never the purpose of acting, displeasure never the cause

(— the *displeasure* might be ever so great: were the mechanism not free, there would nonetheless be no action.

Pleasure and *displeasure* are not *causes*, they

merely set something in motion, — they accompany it…

To what extent everything *base*, *vicious*,

brutal, *cunningly refined* is merely symptomatic of

degeneration

the *herd instinct*

Critique of the *sympathetic feelings*

Critique of the *self-regarding feelings*

Why truth?

20.

False consequences of the belief in the "*ego*"

man strives after *happiness*: but in this sense there is no unity "that strives"…

and what all unities strive after is by no means *happiness* — happiness is an accompanying phenomenon — in the *release of their force*: what makes action is not need, but the *fullness* that discharges itself upon a stimulus

"displeasure" not the precondition of activity, that tension is a great *stimulus*…

against the *pessimistic* theory, as though all acting came down to wanting to be rid of a *dissatisfaction*, as though pleasure in itself were the goal of any acting whatsoever…

21.

"selfless" actions do not exist at all.

Actions in which the individual becomes unfaithful to his own instincts and chooses to his disadvantage are signs of décadence

(— a host of the most famous so-called "saints" are simply convicted by their lack of "egoism" of being décadents

the actions of love, of "heroism" are so little "unselfish" that they are precisely the *proof* of a very strong and rich self

— being able to give away is not open to the "poor"… no more than the great daring and delight in adventure that belongs to "heroism"

not "sacrificing *oneself*" as a *goal*, but carrying through goals about whose consequences one, out of high spirits and trust in oneself, is not anxious, is *indifferent*…

22.

a)

the false causality

Pleasure Displeasure Will Purpose "Spirit"

b)

the false unity "soul", "I", "person"

if possible "immortal person"

— with this a false *altruism* is given

"I" and "others"

(Egoism — Altruism)

"Subject" "Object"

c)

the complete contempt for the *body* did not allow one to see the individual person, the perfect, most minute manner of its organizational play for self-preservation and *purification* of the kind, of the species: — in other words the infinite value of the *individual person* as bearer of the life-process and, *consequently*, its supreme right to egoism, — as well as all its impossibility of *not* being so…

In fact everything "unegoistic" is a phenomenon of décadence.

23.

The Biblical prohibition "thou shalt not kill" is a naivety compared with *my* prohibition to the décadents: "ye shall not beget!" — it is something worse still, it is the contradiction of it… The highest law of life, formulated by Zarathustra, demands that one be *without pity* towards all the refuse and waste of life, — that one *annihilate* what

would be for ascending life mere hindrance, poison, conspiracy, subterranean enmity, — *Christianity*, in a word… it is *immoral* in the deepest sense to say: thou shalt not kill…

24.

I.

II.

III.

IV.

Redemption

from

from

from

from

Christianity: the Antichrist

morality: the immoralist

"*truth*": the free spirit.

nihilism:

nihilism as the *necessary* consequence of *Christianity*, *morality* and philosophy's *concept of truth*.

The *signs* of nihilism…

by "freedom of the spirit" I understand something very definite: to be a hundred times superior to the philosophers and other disciples of

"truth" through severity towards oneself, through purity and courage, through the unconditional will to say No where the No is dangerous — I treat the philosophers hitherto as *contemptible libertines* beneath the hood of the woman "Truth".

25.

The Immoralist.

according to its *origin*, *morality* is: the sum of the *conditions of preservation* of a poor, half or wholly failed kind of man: this *can* be the "great number": — hence its *danger*.

Critique of the "*improvers*"

according to its *use* it is the *chief means* of priestly parasitism in the struggle with the *strong*, the *life-affirming* — they win over "the great number" (the *lowly*, the *suffering*, in *all* classes — the unfortunate of every sort — a kind of *general uprising* against the *small number* of the *well-bred*…

Critique of the "*good*"

according to its *consequences*, the radical falseness and corruption even of those *exceptional strata*: which in the end, merely in order to *endure* themselves, may no longer be truthful towards themselves on any point: the complete *psychological corruption*, with all that follows from it: — — —

26.

The art of my life lies in *modesty*, — in the will, in the strength to make myself small… *Not* to pretend to be small: but, as it were, to forget something, to detach it from oneself, to create a distance *within* oneself — expressed otherwise: in the *consciousness* of perfect freedom [— — —] the task, the will, the merciless instinct which it requires…

The art was to take the many poor, weak, suffering things of my life to my aid, so as not to perish of a great task: — to *divide* myself, as it were — and to keep the *other* half in reserve for friendliness, kindness to men, patience, accessibility to everything small and smallest. It is also the side where I am *refined* and clever in matters of enjoyment, — a good reader, a good listener… Here I also take pleasure in things which perhaps demand a great liberality in *goodness* even more than a subtler intelligence; e.g. Petronius, Heinrich Heine too, Offenbach with his immortal tricks…

Against the fact that almost every contact with human beings gave me the concept of the animal with *involuntary* humour, there did not exactly grow up in me a contempt: in all cases where a kind of *rancour or ferocity* towards me came to light, I have endeavoured to do something [— — —] in order thereby to wipe out a memory.

27.

I have never suffered from not being honoured, — I find an advantage in it. On the other hand I have experienced so much distinction and honour in my life, from early youth on, that I — — —

28.

The art of separating myself, — of keeping apart, of forgetting one half for years…

To draw advantages from my *illness*: relief from the great tension

the loving learning-to-take-revenge for the small.

It would be impossible for me to explain what I regard as the worst accident of my life, — it would sound not only paradoxical, it would sound ungrateful, base.

The kind of benevolence I have experienced has in many cases made a worse impression on me than any kind of malice and hostility. There is so much obtrusiveness, so much lack of the feeling of distance in the belief that one can do good: I have often comprehended the will-to-do-good under the general concept of brutality

Why I have never suffered from being "unrecognized", from not being read

Even in my 45th year scholars of the University of Basel give me to understand, in all good nature, that the literary form of my writings is the reason why I am not read, and that I ought to do it differently.

29.

A feeling of distance which in the end might well be physiological I have never got rid of, from the very closest proximity [—]: I feel the distance of being different in every sense, as it were unmixable and on top in comparison with every turbid element

My privilege, my *advantage* over men in general is to have experienced an abundance of the highest and newest states, with respect to which to separate between spirit and soul would be a cynicism. Undoubtedly one must be a philosopher, deep to the point of [—], in order to step out of this abundance of light: but the rightness of feeling, the long tyranny of a great task are the still more indispensable preconditions for it.

Notebook 23: October 1888

1.

Also a Commandment of Love for Mankind. — There are cases where a child would be a crime: with the chronically sick and with neurasthenics of the third degree. What is one to do there? — To encourage such people to chastity, say with the help of Parsifal music, may at any rate be tried: Parsifal himself, that typical idiot, had only too many reasons not to propagate himself. The trouble is that a certain inability to "control" oneself (— *not* to react to stimuli, to sexual stimuli however slight) belongs precisely among the most regular consequences of general exhaustion. One would miscalculate if one imagined, for example, a Leopardi as chaste. The priest, the moralist play a lost game here; one does better still to send to the pharmacy. In the end society has a *duty* to fulfil here: there are few demands upon it so urgent and so fundamental. Society, as the great trustee of life, must answer for every failed life *before* life itself, — it must also atone for it: consequently it *ought* to prevent it. Society *ought* in numerous cases to forestall procreation: to this end it may, without regard to descent, rank and mind, hold in readiness the harshest measures of compulsion, deprivations of liberty, and in certain circumstances castrations. — The biblical prohibition "thou shalt not kill!" is a naïveté compared with the seriousness of life's prohibition to the décadents: "ye shall not beget!"… Life itself recognizes no solidarity, no "equal right" between healthy and degenerating parts of an organism: the latter one must *cut out* — or the whole perishes. — *Pity* for the décadents, *equal rights* even for the failures — that would be the most profound immorality, that would be *anti-nature* itself as morality!

2.

On the Reason of Life. — A relative chastity, a fundamental and prudent caution towards erotica even in thought, can belong to the great reason of life even in richly endowed and whole natures. The proposition holds in particular for *artists*; it belongs to their best wisdom of life. Wholly unsuspect voices have already been raised in this sense: I name Stendhal, Th. Gautier, Flaubert too. The artist is perhaps by his very kind necessarily a sensual man, excitable in general, accessible in every sense, meeting the stimulus, the suggestion of the stimulus, even from afar. Nevertheless he is on the average, under the sway of his task, of his will to mastery, in fact a temperate, often even a chaste man. His dominant instinct *wills* it so of him: it does not permit him to spend himself in this way or that. It is one and the same force that one spends in artistic conception and that one spends in the sexual act: there is only One kind of force. To succumb *here*, to squander oneself *here*, is treacherous for an artist: it betrays the lack of instinct, of will in general; it can be a sign of décadence, — at any rate it devalues his art to an incalculable degree. I take the most unpleasant case, the case of Wagner. — Wagner, under the spell of that incredibly morbid sexuality which was the curse of his life, knew only too well what an artist forfeits when he loses his freedom, his *respect*, before himself. He is condemned to be an actor. His art itself becomes for him a perpetual attempt at flight, a means of self-forgetting, of self-*narcotizing*, — this alters, this ultimately determines the character of his art. Such an "unfree" man needs a hashish world, strange, heavy, enveloping vapours, every kind of exoticism and symbolism of the ideal, merely to be rid for once of *his* reality, — he needs Wagnerian music… A certain catholicity of the ideal above all is in an artist almost the proof of self-contempt, of "swamp": the case of Baudelaire in France, the case of Edgar Allan Poe in America, the case of Wagner in Germany. — Need I still say that Wagner owes his *success* too to his

sensuality? that his music persuades the lowest instincts over to itself, over to Wagner? that that holy conceptual haze of the ideal, of three-eighths Catholicism, is *one more* art of seduction? (— it permits one, unknowingly, innocently, *Christianly*, to let "the magic" work upon one…) Who would dare the word, the *proper* word for the ardeurs of the Tristan music? — I put on gloves when I read the score of Tristan… The ever more widely spreading Wagnerism is a milder epidemic of sensuality that "does not know it"; against Wagnerian music I consider every precaution called for. —

3.

We Hyperboreans.

1.

If we are philosophers at all, we Hyperboreans, it seems at any rate that we are so otherwise than one used to be a philosopher. We are by no means moralists… We do not trust our ears when we hear them speak, all these former ones. "Here is the way to happiness" — with that each one of them springs at us, with a recipe in his hand and with unction in his hieratic mouth. "But what do we care about happiness?" — we ask, quite astonished. "Here is the way to happiness — they continue, these holy bawling devils: and this here is virtue, the new way to happiness!"… But we beg you, gentlemen! What do we care, least of all, about your virtue! Why else does one of our kind go aside, become a philosopher, become a rhinoceros, become a cave bear, become a ghost? Is it not in order to be rid of virtue and happiness? — We are by nature far too happy, far too virtuous, not to find a little temptation in becoming philosophers: that is to say, immoralists and adventurers… We have a curiosity of our own for the labyrinth, we take pains to make the acquaintance of Mr. Minotaur, of whom dangerous things are told: what do we care about your way up, about your rope that leads out? that leads to happiness and virtue? that leads to you, I fear… You want to save us with your rope? — And we, we beg you most earnestly, go hang yourselves on it!…

2.

In the end: what good does it do! There remains no other means of bringing philosophy back into honour: one must first hang the moralists. As long as these speak of happiness and virtue, they persuade only old women to philosophy. Just look them in the face, all the famous sages for thousands of years: nothing but old women, nothing but elderly women, nothing but Mothers, to speak

with Faust. “The Mothers! Mothers! — it sounds so eerie.” — We make of it a danger, we change its concept, we teach philosophy as a concept dangerous to life: how could we come to its aid better? — A concept will always be worth as much to mankind as it costs it. If no one hesitates to sacrifice hecatombs for the concept “God”, “fatherland”, “freedom”, if history is the great reek around this kind of sacrifice —, how can the precedence of the concept “philosophy” over such popular values as “God”, “fatherland”, “freedom” be proved, other than by its costing more — greater hecatombs?… Revaluation of all values: that will be costly, I promise — —

3.

This beginning is cheerful enough: I send my seriousness straight after it. With this book war is declared on morality, — and, in fact, the moralists one and all are disposed of by me first. One already knows which word I have fashioned for myself for this struggle, the word immoralist; one likewise knows my formula “Beyond Good and Evil”. I have need of these strong counter-concepts, the luminous power of these counter-concepts, in order to shine a light down into that abyss of frivolity and lie which until now was called morality. The millennia, the peoples, the first and the last, the philosophers and the old women — on this point they are all worthy of one another. Man was until now the moral being, a curiosity without equal — and as a moral being more absurd, more mendacious, vainer, more frivolous, more harmful to himself than even the greatest despiser of man could ever dream. Morality the most malignant form of the will to lie, the real Circe of mankind: that which has corrupted it. It is not error as error that fills me with horror at this sight, not the millennia-long lack of “good will”, of discipline, of

decency, of courage in matters of the spirit: it is the lack of nature, it is the dreadful factuality that anti-nature itself has been honoured with the highest honours as morality and has remained hanging over mankind as law… To go astray to this degree, — not as an individual, not as a people, but as mankind! What does that point to? — That one teaches contempt for the lowest instincts of life, that in the deepest necessity for the flourishing of life, in selfishness, one sees the evil principle: that in the typical goal of decline, of instinctual self-contradiction, in the "selfless", in the loss of the centre of gravity, in "depersonalization" and "love of one's neighbour", one sees as a matter of principle a higher value, what am I saying! value in itself!

What? Is mankind itself in décadence? Has it always been? What is certain is that only décadence-values have been taught to it as supreme values. The morality of unselfing is the typical morality of decline par excellence. — Here one possibility would remain open, that it is not mankind itself that is in décadence, but those teachers of it!… And indeed, that is my proposition: the teachers, the leaders of mankind were décadents: hence the revaluation of all values into the nihilistic ("the beyond"…)

4.

What, by contrast, might an immoralist demand of himself? What will I set myself as a task with this book? — Perhaps also to "improve" mankind, only differently, only in reverse: namely to redeem it from morality, from the moralists above all, — to push its most dangerous kind of ignorance into its consciousness, into its conscience… Restoration of the egoism of mankind! — —

4.

The Immoralist.

A. Psychology of the good man: a décadent

or the herd animal

B. his absolute harmfulness:

as a parasitic form at the expense of truth and of the future

C. the Machiavellianism of the good

their struggle for power

their means of seduction

their cleverness in submission

e.g.

before priests

before the powerful

D. “The woman” in the good man

“Goodness” as the subtlest slave-cleverness, giving consideration everywhere and consequently receiving it.

E. Physiology of the good

at what point the good man appears in families, in peoples

at the same time as the neuroses appear

Opposite type: true goodness, nobility, greatness of soul, which out of wealth, out of — — — which does not give in order to take, — which does not seek to elevate itself by being kind, — squandering as the type of true goodness, wealth of person as precondition

the concept “duty” — a submission, consequence of weakness, so as no longer to have to ask and choose

the weakness of the herd animal produces a

morality quite similar to the weakness of the décadents:

— they understand each other, they ally themselves…

the great décadence-religions always count on the support of the herd…

In itself the herd animal lacks anything morbid, it is itself invaluable; but, incapable of guiding itself, it needs a “shepherd” — the priests understand that…

the “state” is not intimate, not secret enough, the “guidance of conscience” escapes it

In what respect is the herd animal made sick by the priest?

The décadence-instinct in the good man

1)

inertia: he no longer wants to change himself, no longer to learn, he sits within himself as a “beautiful soul”…

2)

the incapacity for resistance: e.g. in pity, — he gives way (“indulgent”, “tolerant”… “he understands everything”) “peace, good will toward men”

3)

he is lured by everything suffering and ill-constituted — he likes to “help”, he is instinctively a conspiracy against the strong

4)

he needs the great narcotics, — such as “the ideal”, the “great man”, the “hero”, he enthuses…

5)

the weakness that expresses itself in fear of the affects, of strong will, of Yes and No: he is amiable so as not to have to be an enemy, — so as not to have to take sides —

6)

the weakness that betrays itself in not-wanting-to-see, wherever resistance might perhaps become necessary (“humanity”)

7)

is seduced by all the great décadents: "the Cross" "love" the "saint" *purity* at bottom nothing but concepts and persons dangerous to life

—

also the great *counterfeiting* in ideals

8)

intellectual *viciousness*

—

hatred of truth, because it brings "no beautiful feelings" with it

—

hatred of the truthful, — — —

the *self-preservation instinct of the good*, which sacrifices the *future* of mankind to itself: at bottom it already resists

politics

every *wider* perspective whatsoever

all seeking, adventuring, being-unsatisfied

it *denies* goals, tasks in which it is not the first consideration

it is *impudent* and *immodest* as the "highest" type and wants not merely to have its say about everything but to *pass judgement*.

it feels itself superior to those who have "weaknesses": these "weaknesses" are the *strengths* of instinct — to which also belongs the courage not to be ashamed of them

The good man as *parasite*. He lives at the *expense*

of life:

as one who lies reality away

as opponent of the great instinctual drives of life

as Epicurean of a small happiness, who rejects the *great* form of happiness as *immoral*

— since he does not set his hand to the work and is continually guilty of blunders and deceptions, he disturbs all real life and *poisons* it altogether through his claim to represent something *higher*

— in his conceit of being higher he does not *learn*, does not change, but takes *sides with himself*, however great the malheurs he has brought about.

5.

The Immoralist.

1. *Type* of the good man (See the page *after next*

page.)

2. the good man makes out of himself

a metaphysics

a psychology

a way to truth

a politics

a way of living and of education

3. *Result: an absolutely harmful kind of man* // with regard to truth, with regard to the future of mankind // the reason why it is only for the last 20 years that important things have been taken as important

4. *Problem: what really is the good man?*

the good man as *instinct*

first, the *weak* one: he *wants* all

men weak

second, the *narrow-minded* one: he *wants* all men narrow-minded

third, the *herd animal*, the being without rights of its own: it *wants* all men as herd animals.

5. "The good man" misused for *other* ends

he fights against evil…

pressed into service by the *priest*, against the powerful,

against the strong and the *well-constituted*

as instrument

"liberal" "equal" rights

pressed into service by the politicians of upheaval, the *socialists*, men of *ressentiment* against the *rulers*

on 3: *the most harmful kind of man*

A. He *invents* actions *that do not

exist*

the unegoistic ones, the holy ones

faculties that do not exist

"soul" "spirit" "free will"

beings *that do not exist*

"saints" "God" "angels"

an order in events *that does not exist*

the *moral* world-order, with reward and punishment

— an annihilation of natural causality

B. with these fictions he *devalues*

1)

the only actions, the egoistic ones

2)

the body

3)

the truly *valuable* kinds of men, the *valuable*

drives

4)

the whole reason in events, — he prevents learning from them, observation, science, every *advance* of life through knowledge…

6.

I.

the lack of mistrust

piety

submission to the will of God "godliness"

the "good heart", the "helping hand" — that *suffices*…

earnestness, turned towards *higher* things, — in doing so one must not take lower spheres, such as the body and its well-being, too seriously

duty: one has to do one's bounden duty, —

beyond that one should leave everything to God —

I ask in all seriousness: have I not hereby *described* the *good* man? Does one not believe that this is a *desirable* man? Would one not like to be so? Does one wish one's children otherwise? —

II. Let us see how *the good* make out of themselves

1.

a *metaphysics*

2.

a *psychology*

3.

a *politics*

4.

a *way of living and of education*

5.

a method of *truth*

7.

My proposition: good men are the *most harmful* kind of men. I am answered: "but there are only few good men"! — Thank God! It will also be said: "there are no entirely good men at all" — So much the better! Yet I would still always maintain that in the degree to which a man is good, he is *harmful*.

How is it that only for the last 20 years have the *first* questions of life been taken seriously? That *problems* are seen where formerly everything was let run its course once and for all?

:

the lack of mistrust

:

indolence, the fear of reflection

:

the subjective comfort that finds no reasons to see problems in things

:

the conviction that a *good heart*, a *helpful hand* is the most valuable thing, — that one must educate towards it

:

submission, — the belief that everything is in good hands…

:

the counterfeiting of interpretation, which finds this "Good" God again everywhere

:

the belief that the "salvation of the soul", and moral things in general, are separate from all such earthly-bodily questions: it is considered *low* to take the body and its well-being so seriously…

:

reverence for tradition: it is impious to deny, or even merely to criticize what has been handed down

Ecco! And this kind of man is the

most harmful kind of man

8.

IV.

Dionysus

Type of the lawgiver

9.

At the risk of giving the gentlemen antisemites a "well-measured" kick, I confess that the art of lying, the "unconscious" stretching out of long, all-too-long fingers, the *swallowing* of other people's property has so far appeared to me more palpable in every antisemite than in any Jew whatsoever. An antisemite always steals, always lies — he simply cannot do otherwise… *For he has* [— — —]… One ought to pity the antisemites, one ought to take up a collection for them. "— — —

10.

The Bible's prohibition "thou shalt not kill!" is a naïveté compared with *my* prohibition to the *décadents*: "ye shall not beget!" — it is something worse still, it is the contradiction of me… The highest law of life, first formulated by Zarathustra, demands that one be *without pity* towards all the refuse and waste of life, that one annihilate what would be for ascending life mere hindrance, poison, conspiracy, subterranean enmity, — *Christianity*, in a word… It is immoral, it is *anti-natural* in the deepest sense to say "thou shalt not kill!" —

The Bible's prohibition "thou shalt not kill!" is a naïveté compared with *my* prohibition to the décadents: "ye shall not beget!" — it is something worse still… Towards the refuse and waste of life there is only One duty, to *annihilate*; to be pitying here, to wish here to preserve at any price, would be the highest form of immorality, true anti-nature, mortal enmity against life itself. —

The Bible's prohibition "thou shalt not kill!" is a naïveté compared with my prohibition to the décadents: "ye shall not beget!" — It is something worse still… Towards the refuse and waste of life there is only One duty: to acknowledge no solidarity; to be "humane" here, to decree equal rights here, would be the highest form of anti-nature: anti-nature, the *negation* of life itself. — Life itself acknowledges no solidarity between the healthy and the degenerating members of an organism — the latter it must *cut out*, or the whole perishes…

The Bible's prohibition "thou shalt not kill!" is a naïveté compared with the seriousness of the prohibition to the décadents: "ye shall not beget!" — Life itself acknowledges no solidarity, no "equal right" between healthy and degenerating parts of an organism: the latter one must *cut out*, or the whole perishes. Pity for the décadents — that would be the deepest immorality, anti-nature itself as morality. —

11.

Grown far from the draughts of every scepticism, from every subtler questioning, fat, Swabian, with round eyes, round itself like an apple, this kind of virtue sits on the firmest ground there is: on that of stupidity, — on that of "faith"…

this virtue *still* believes today that all is in good hands, namely in the hands of God, when it sets down such a proposition with that modest certainty, as if it were saying that twice two is four

Stupidity has its privileges: one of them is virtue… Stupidity mirrors itself into things — it calls this happy simplification of all things to the honest worthiness of the Swabian the "good old God"… We others see something else into things — we make God *interesting*…

12.

We are immoralists: this we say with pride, as if we were saying — — — We deny that man strives for happiness, we deny that virtue is the way to happiness, — we deny that the actions which were hitherto called moral actions, the "selfless," the "unegoistic," exist at all. In all the assertions to which we oppose a brazen No there is expressed a complete, uncanny [—] regarding the previous educators of mankind:

13.

The Free Spirit

Critique of philosophy

as a nihilistic movement

The Immoralist

Critique of morality

as the most dangerous kind of ignorance

Dionysos philosophos

14.

On this perfect day, when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns golden, a glance of sunlight has just fallen upon my life — I looked backward, I looked outward, — never have I seen so many and such good things at once. Not in vain have I just buried my forty-fourth year, I was entitled to: what in it was life is saved, — *is* immortal. The first book of the Revaluation of Values; the first 6 songs of Zarathustra; the Twilight of the Idols, my attempt to philosophize with a hammer — all gifts of this year, indeed of its last quarter — how should I not be grateful to my whole life!…

And so I tell myself my life.

Whoever has the slightest notion of me guesses that I have lived through more than any man. The testimony is even written in my books: which, line for line, are lived books, born of a will to life, and thereby, as *creation*, represent a real addition, a surplus of that life itself. A feeling that comes over me often enough: just as a German scholar, with admirable innocence, said of himself and his affairs: each day brings this one more than their whole life brings to those others! *Bad things* among the rest — there is no doubt! But that is life's highest distinction, that it also sets against us its highest opposition…

Notebook 24: October–November 1888

1.

Ecce Homo

Or:

why I know a few things more.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche.

1.

— I come to a problem which, so at least it seems to me, is of a somewhat more serious nature than the problem of the "existence of God" and other Christianities — to the problem of *nutrition*. It is, in brief, the question: how must *you* nourish yourself in order to attain your maximum of strength, of virtù, of virtue in the sense of Renaissance reason? — My experiences here are as bad as they could be: I am astonished to have come "to my senses" so late, at precisely this point, too late in a certain sense: and only the utter worthlessness of our German education explains to me in some measure why I was backward precisely here to the point of "holiness". This "education", which from the very start teaches one on principle to lose sight of *realities*, in order to chase after thoroughly problematic so-called "ideal" goals, for example a so-called "classical education"! — as if it were not, from the outset, enough to make one die laughing to put "classical" and "German" into one's mouth together. Just imagine a "classically educated" Leipziger! — In truth, up to my most mature years I always ate only *badly* — in moral terms, "impersonally", "unegoistically", "altruistically": I negated, by means of Leipzig cooking, for example, my "will to life". To spoil one's stomach into the bargain for the purpose of insufficient nourishment — this problem the said cooking seems to me to solve admirably. But German cooking in general — what has it not got on its conscience since ancient times! The soup *before* the meal (— still called alla tedesca in Italian cookbooks of the 16th century); the boiled-out meats; the vegetables made fat and heavy; the indigestible species of the flour-dishes. If one adds to this the downright bestial need of the worthy German burgher to wash it all down, one understands the origin of the "German spirit" — from a spoiled stomach… But *English* diet too, which, compared with the German, is a veritable return to "nature", that is to say to roast beef, and to reason as well —

goes profoundly against my own instinct: it seems to me that it gives the spirit "*heavy* feet" — Englishwomen's feet… That alcoholic drinks are harmful to me, that one glass of wine or beer a day is quite enough to make life a "vale of tears" for me, as for Schopenhauer — this too I grasped a little too late; I had actually *experienced* it from childhood on. As a boy I believed that drinking wine, like smoking tobacco, was at first merely a vanitas of young fellows, later a bad habit. Perhaps the Naumburg wine was also to blame for this. — To believe that wine *cheers*, I would have to be a Christian, that is to say, believe what for *me* is an absurdity. Strangely enough, while I am extremely susceptible to ill-humour from strongly diluted, however small doses of alcohol, I am almost insensitive to strong doses: and a grog of seaman's calibre is least likely to knock me over. To write down a long Latin treatise in a single night's vigil, with the secret ambition of equalling my model Sallust in severity and concision — this, already when I was a pupil at venerable Pforta, was *not* in contradiction with my physiology, nor with Sallust — however much it was with venerable Pforta!… Later, towards the middle of life, I decided, to be sure, ever more strictly against every kind of "spirituous" drink. I prefer places where one has opportunity everywhere to draw from running fountains (— Nice, Turin, Sils); I do not wake at night without drinking water. In vino veritas: it seems that here too I am once again at odds with all the world about the concept "truth" — with me the spirit moves *upon the waters*…

2.

Against sickness, whose benefits I least of all should underestimate, I would have to object that it weakens the *instincts of defence and arms* in man. For many long years I did not know how to defend myself adequately either against a benevolent, importunate helpfulness, or against clumsy "admirers" bursting into the house, and other vermin;

not counting, as is only fair, those cases which no one escapes, as when young dissolute scholars, under the pretext of "admiration", burst into one's house to borrow money. A sick man has trouble getting rid of things and people, memories included: a kind of fatalism that "lies down in the snow", after the manner of a Russian soldier for whom the campaign has at last become too hard, a fatalism without revolt belongs to his instincts of self-preservation. One understands much about woman, as a being condemned to suffering and *involuntarily* fatalistic, once one grasps *this* kind of instinct of self-preservation. To spend as little strength as possible — not to *squander* oneself in reactions — a certain thriftiness born rather of poverty of strength: this is the *great* reason in fatalism. Physiologically expressed: a lowering of metabolism, a slowing of it — nothing burns one up faster than the affects. Ressentiment, vexation, the lust for revenge — these are for the sick the most harmful of all possible states: a religion such as Buddha's, which had essentially to do with the spiritually refined and the physiologically wearied, therefore turned the main weight of its teaching *against* ressentiment. "*Not* through enmity does enmity come to an end: through friendship does enmity come to an end." Buddhism was no morality — it would be a profound misunderstanding to degrade it to the level of such vulgar crudities as Christianity: it was a *hygiene*. — For years I tenaciously held fast to almost unbearable circumstances, places, lodgings, company, once they had, by chance, been given, *not* by will but out of that instinct — it was in any case wiser than to change, than to "experiment". The *experiment* goes against the instinct of the sufferer: in a lofty sense one could call it outright the proof of strength. To make an experiment out of one's very life — that alone is *freedom* of the spirit, that later became my philosophy…

3.

Boredom does not, it seems to me, exactly belong among the sufferings of those who suffer; at least I have no memory of it whatever. On the contrary, the evil time of my life was rich for me through a certain new inventiveness — the art of nuances, the fine dexterity in the handling of nuances. I would understand raffinement altogether as a refining of the *sense of touch* up into the most spiritual; that kind of loving consideration and caution in understanding, too, which is peculiar to the sick, belongs here — they shy away from all too close contact… In these states one hears even common things uncommonly, one transposes them, as it were: the everyday accident is sifted through a sublime sieve and no longer looks like itself. In the end I was at that time beyond measure grateful whenever anything free and choice in intelligence, in character, strayed into my vicinity, while a certain impatience with Germans and things German became more and more an instinct with me. With Germans I lost my good humour, my spirit — and *no less* my time… The Germans make time longer… It is otherwise when the German happens to be a Jew or a Jewess. It is curious, when I reckon it up, that between 1876 and 86 I owe almost all my pleasant moments, through the chance of acquaintance, to Jews or Jewesses. The Germans underestimate what a boon it is to meet a Jew — one no longer has any reason to be ashamed, one may even be intelligent … In France I do not see the necessity of there being Jews, still less in Germany: Meilhac and Halévy, the best poets, to whom my taste promises immortality, attain this height as Frenchmen, *not* as Jews. — I would like to claim the same of Offenbach too, that *unambiguous* musician who wanted to be nothing other than what he was — a buffo of genius, at bottom the last musician who still made music and not chords!…

4.

At bottom I belong to those involuntary educators who neither need nor have any principles of education. The one fact that in seven years of teaching the highest class of the Basel Pädagogium I never had occasion to impose a punishment, and that, as was later attested to me, even the laziest were diligent with me, bears some witness to this. One small piece of cleverness from that practice has stayed in my memory: whenever a pupil fell thoroughly short in repeating what I had expounded in the previous lesson, I always took the blame for it upon myself, — said, for instance, that it was everyone's right, if I expressed myself too briefly, too incomprehensibly, to demand of me an explanation, a repetition. A teacher, I said, has the task of making himself accessible to *every* intelligence… I have been told that this artifice worked more strongly than any reproach. — Neither in my dealings with pupils nor with students did I ever feel any difficulty, although at the start my twenty-four years did not merely *bring me close* to them. Likewise, examining at doctoral promotions gave me no occasion to learn any further arts or methods: what I handled instinctively was not only the most humane thing in such cases, — I myself first felt entirely at ease as soon as I had brought the candidate into good waters. In such cases everyone has as much wit — *or* as little — as the honourable examiner has… When I listened, it always seemed to me that at bottom it was the gentlemen examiners who were being *examined*. —

5.

I have never understood the art of prejudicing people against me, even when it seemed to me of great value to reach that goal. Turn my life this way and that as one may, one will find in it no signs that anyone ever bore ill will towards me. My experiences even with those of whom everyone has bad experiences are without exception in their fa-

vour: moreover, in my dealings with people, provided I was not ill, everyone was to me an instrument from which I drew delicate, most unaccustomed tones. How often have I come to hear this, a kind of wonderment at themselves on the part of those I conversed with: "Nothing of the sort has ever entered my mind before"… Most beautifully, perhaps, from that Heinrich von Stein who died unforgivably young, who once, after carefully obtaining permission, appeared in Sils for three days, declaring to everyone that he had *not* come for the sake of the Engadine. This excellent man, who with the whole brave simplicity of his nature had waded into the Wagnerian swamp up to his ears — "I understand nothing about music," he confessed to me — was for those three days as though transformed by a torrent of freedom, like one who suddenly finds himself in his element and gets wings. I kept telling him that it was the good air up here that did it, that it was so with everyone, but he would not believe me… If nonetheless many a misdeed, great and small, has been committed against me, it was not "will", least of all ill will, that was the cause: rather I should have to complain of the *good* will, which has done nothing but mischief in my life. My experience gives me a claim to mistrust in general with regard to helpful "love of one's neighbour", forever striding forth to counsel and to deeds —, I reproach it with easily losing its delicacy, with reaching with its helpful hands into a lofty destiny, into a solitude among wounds, into a privilege to great suffering, in a manner that under circumstances is downright destructive. — Not without reason have I composed, as "the temptation of Zarathustra", a case where a great cry of distress comes to him, where pity seeks to overwhelm him like a last sin: to remain master *here*, here to keep the *height* of his task pure of the far lower and more short-sighted impulses which are at work in so-called selfless actions, this is a test, the *last* test, which Zarathustra and whoever is of his kind must pass before himself. —

6.

Like everyone who never lives among his equals and who in the end makes of this his fate his art and his love of mankind, I resist, in cases where some small or *very great* folly has been committed against me, any countermeasure whatever, unless it be that of sending a piece of cleverness after the stupidity as quickly as possible: thus one may perhaps still catch up with it. One has only to do something bad to me, and I repay it, of that one may be sure: I find before long an occasion to express my thanks to the evildoer for something or to ask something of him (— which is more obliging than giving…) It also seems to me that the rudest letter is more good-natured than silence. Those who keep silent lack refinement and courtesy of the heart. — If one is rich enough for it, it is a good fortune to be in the wrong; one gets on with me best when one gives me from time to time an occasion to be in the wrong. Nothing improves my friendship so thoroughly, nothing gives it freshness again and again… In those not unknown cases where I profess a decided No, to the point of war to the knife, one would be drawing a grievous false conclusion to presuppose precisely there a wealth of bad experiences hidden in the background. Whoever has any notion of me may conclude the reverse. I do not permit myself hostility towards a cause so long as the slightest personal discord still has a part in it. If I wage war on Christianity, I am entitled to do so solely because I have never experienced anything gloomy or sad from that quarter, — on the contrary, the most estimable people I know have been Christians without guile; I am the last to hold against individuals what is the fatality of millennia. My ancestors themselves were Protestant clergymen: had I not received from them a high and cleanly sense, I should not know whence my right to war with Christianity derived. My formula for it: the Antichrist is himself the necessary logic in the development of a genuine Christian; in me Christianity overcomes itself. Another case: from my

relations with Wagner and with Frau Wagner I have retained only the most refreshing and uplifting memories: precisely this circumstance permitted me that neutrality of gaze, to see the problem of Wagner altogether as a problem of culture and perhaps to solve it… Even for anti-Semites, to whom, as is known, I am least well disposed, I should, according to my not inconsiderable experiences, have many a favourable thing to put forward: this does not prevent, rather it *requires*, that I wage a merciless war on anti-Semitism, — it is one of the most morbid outgrowths of that so absurd, so unjustified Reich-German self-goggling…

7.

It is *not* in my nature to love many things and many kinds of things: in my dealings with books, too, I have on the whole more of a hostility than a tolerance, a "letting-come-near", in my instinct. And that from childhood on. At bottom it is a small number of books that count in my life; the most famous are not among them. My sense for style, for the epigram as style, awoke almost at a single stroke at my first contact with Sallust: I do not forget the astonishment of my revered teacher Corssen when he had to give his worst Latinist the very highest mark, — he invited me to his home… Compressed, severe, with as much *substance* at the bottom as possible, — a cold malice towards the "beautiful word" and the "beautiful feeling": in that I divined myself. One will recognize, all the way into my Zarathustra, a very serious ambition for a *Roman* style, for the "magnum in parvo", for the "aere perennius". It went no differently with me at my first contact with *Horace*. To this day I have found in no other poet the same artistic rapture that a Horatian ode gives me. In certain languages, for example in German, what is achieved here cannot even be *willed*. This mosaic of words, where every word, as sound, as place, as concept, pours out its force to the right, to the left and over the whole, this

minimum in the extent of the signs, this maximum of energy in the signs thereby attained — all that is Roman and, if one will believe me, *noble* par excellence: all the rest of poetry becomes, by comparison, a mere garrulousness of feeling. Least of all would I forget the charm that lies in the contrast between this granite form and the most graceful libertinage: — my ear is enraptured by this contradiction of form and sense. The third incomparable impression that I owe to the Latins is Petronius. This prestissimo of high spirits in word, sentence and leap of thought, this refinement in the mixing of vulgar and "educated" Latin, this irrepressible good humour that fears nothing and leaps with grace over every kind of animality in the ancient world, this sovereign freedom before "morality", before the virtuous paltrinesses of "beautiful souls" — I could name no book that has made even remotely similar an impression upon me. That the poet is a Provençal, my most personal instinct softly tells me: one must have the devil in one's body to make such leaps. On occasion, when I needed to free myself from a base impression, for example from a speech of the Apostle Paul, a couple of pages of Petronius sufficed to make me completely well again.

8.

To the Greeks I owe absolutely no kindred impressions; for in relation to Plato I am too thorough a sceptic, and have never been able to join in the admiration of Plato the artist that is customary among scholars. He throws, as it seems to me, all forms of style into confusion: he has something similar on his conscience to the Cynics, who invented the Satura Menippea. For the Platonic dialogue, that dreadfully self-satisfied and childish dialectic, to work as a charm, one would have to have never read good Frenchmen. In the end my mistrust of Plato goes deep: I find him so strayed from all the fundamental instincts of the Hellene, so Jewified, so pre-existently Christian in his ultimate

intentions, that for the whole phenomenon of Plato I would sooner use the harsh word "higher swindle" than any other. Dearly has it been paid for that this Athenian went to school with the Egyptians (— probably with the Jews in Egypt…) In the great fatality of Christianity, Plato is one of those fateful ambiguities that made it possible for the nobler natures of antiquity to set foot upon the *bridge* that led to the "Cross"… My recreation, my predilection, my cure from all Platonism was at all times *Thucydides*. Thucydides and, perhaps, Machiavelli's principe are most akin to me myself, through the unconditional will to deceive oneself about nothing and to see reason in reality, — not in "reason", still less in "morality"… From the pitiful whitewashing that the classically educated German reaps as the reward for his "seriousness" in dealing with antiquity, nothing cures so thoroughly as Thucydides. One must turn him over line by line and read off what he has not written as clearly as his words: there are few thinkers so rich in *substance*. In him the culture of the Sophists, that is to say the *culture of the realists*, comes to its consummate expression: this priceless movement in the midst of the moral and ideal swindle of the Socratic schools that was just then breaking out everywhere. Greek philosophy as already the *décadence* of the Greek instinct: Thucydides as the great sum of all the strong, severe, hard factuality that lay in the instinct of the older Hellene. It is *courage* that distinguishes such natures as Plato and Thucydides: Plato is a coward — consequently he flees into the ideal — Thucydides has *himself* under control, consequently he also keeps things under control.

9.

To recognize in the Greeks "beautiful souls," "harmonious sculptures," and Winckelmann's "noble simplicity" — from such niaiserie allemande I was guarded by the psychologist I carried within me. I saw their strongest instinct, the will to power; I saw them tremble before

the untamable force of this drive — I saw all their institutions grow out of protective measures meant to shield them from one another against their inward *explosive*. The tremendous tension within then discharged itself in terrible hostility toward everything outside: the city-communities tore one another to pieces so that, at this price, the citizens would not tear themselves to pieces. One had need to be strong — the splendid and supple bodiliness of the Greek was a necessity, not a "nature." It *followed*: — it was by no means there from the beginning. And with festivals and arts, too, one wanted nothing other than to *feel* oneself ever stronger, more beautiful, ever more perfect —: they are means of self-glorification, means of intensifying the will to power. — To judge the Greeks by their philosophers! to use the moral wisdom of the philosophical schools to shed light on *what* was Greek! Things of this sort always counted for me merely as proof of the psychological subtlety that distinguishes the Germans… The philosophers are, after all, the décadents of Hellenism, the countermovement against *classical* taste, against *noble* taste! The Socratic virtues were preached because the Greeks had begun to lack them… I was the first who, for the understanding of the *older* Hellene, took seriously once again that wondrous phenomenon which bears the name of Dionysus. My venerable friend Jakob Burckhardt in Basel understood perfectly that something essential had thereby been done: he added to his Culture of the Greeks a section of its own on the problem. If one wants the opposite, let one look closely at the contemptible frivolity with which the famous philologist Lobeck treated these matters in his day. Lobeck, who creeps into this world of mysterious states with the venerable assurance of a worm dried out between books, and persuades himself that he is being scientific precisely by being barren and paltry here to the point of nausea, gave it to be understood, with every display of erudition, that there was really nothing to all these curiosities. In fact, he says, the priests may have imparted a few things to the participants in such orgies, for

instance that wine excites to pleasure, that man lives on fruits, that plants bloom in spring and wither in winter. As regards the wealth of rites and myths of orgiastic origin, he becomes cleverer by yet another degree. The Greeks, he says, Aglaoph. I, 672, when they had nothing else to do, laughed, leapt, and raved about, or, since man sometimes has a desire for that too, they sat down, wept, and lamented. *Others* then came along later and sought some reason or other for this striking behavior, and thus arose, to explain those customs, countless festival legends and myths… On the other hand, people believed that this *droll carrying-on*, which had once taken place on the feast days, now necessarily belonged to the celebration of the feast too, and held fast to it as an indispensable part of divine worship. — But quite apart from this contemptible nonsense, one might well point out that the Dionysian element is incompatible with the whole concept "Greek," and still more with the concept "classical," as Winckelmann and Goethe had formed it: — I fear that Goethe himself excluded something of the kind on principle from the possibilities of the Hellenic soul. And yet it is only in the Dionysian mysteries that the whole underground of the Hellenic instinct expresses itself. For *what* did the Hellene guarantee himself with these mysteries? Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the future promised and consecrated in procreation, the triumphant Yes-saying to life beyond death and change, *true* life as collective continued life in the community, the city, the bond of the sexes; the sexual symbol as the most venerable symbol of all, the very epitome of symbol for the whole of ancient piety; the deepest gratitude for every single thing in the act of procreation, of pregnancy, of birth. In the doctrine of the mysteries, pain is pronounced holy: the "pangs of the woman in labor" sanctify pain as such; all becoming, growing, all that guarantees the future *requires* pain; so that there may be the eternal joy of creating, there must eternally be the agony of the woman in labor… I know of no higher symbolism. — Only Christianity made of sexuality a *filthiness*: the concept of immaculata

conceptio was the greatest baseness of soul hitherto attained on earth, for example — it cast filth upon the origin of life…

The psychology of the orgiastic, as an overflowing feeling of life within which even pain acts only as a stimulant, gave me the key to the *tragic* feeling, which has been misunderstood both by Aristotle and, especially, by the pessimists. Tragedy is so far from proving anything for a pessimism of the Hellenes in Schopenhauer's sense that it is, on the contrary, its most extreme opposite. Yes-saying to life even in its strangest and hardest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility in the sacrifice of its highest types — that is what I called Dionysian, that is what I understood as the true bridge to a psychology of the tragic poet. Not in order to be rid of terror and pity, not to purge oneself of a dangerous emotion through its *vehement discharge* — that was Aristotle's way: but, beyond terror and pity, to enjoy the eternal joy of creating and becoming, to have its terror, its pity *beneath* oneself…

10.

The good fortune of my existence, its uniqueness perhaps, lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already dead as my father, while as my mother I still live. This double origin, as it were from the highest and the lowest rung on the ladder of life — décadent at once and *beginning* — this, if anything, explains that neutrality, that freedom from party in relation to the great total problem of life, which distinguishes me. I know both, I am both. — My father died at the age of thirty-six: he was delicate, lovable and morbid, like a being destined merely to pass by, — rather a kindly remembrance of life than life itself. In the same year in which his life went downhill, mine too went downhill: in my thirty-sixth year I reached the lowest point of my vitality, — I still lived, yet without seeing three paces ahead of me. In the year 1879 I resigned my Basel professorship, lived through

the summer like a shadow in St. Moritz, and the following winter, the most sunless of my life, in Naumburg. That was my minimum: "The Wanderer and His Shadow" came into being meanwhile. Without a doubt, I knew myself as a shadow in those days… The winter after, my first Genoese winter, that strange spiritualization which is almost conditioned by an extreme impoverishment of muscle and blood brought forth "Daybreak". Perfect brightness and cheerfulness of spirit are compatible in me not only with the deepest physiological weakness, but even with an extreme feeling of pain. In those torments of hell which an uninterrupted pain brings with it amid laborious vomiting of mucus, I possessed dialectical clarity par excellence and thought things through for which, in healthier circumstances, I am not climber enough, not refined enough. (My readers know to what extent I regard dialectic as a symptom of décadence, for example in the most famous case of all, that of Socrates.) All morbid disturbances of the intellect, even the half-stupor that follows in the train of fever, have remained to this day utterly foreign things to me, about whose frequency I first had to inform myself by way of bookish learning. My blood runs slowly, — in the years of illness I had the pulse of Napoleon — no one has ever been able to establish fever in me. A physician who treated me for a long time as a sufferer of the nerves said himself: "No! it is not your nerves, *I* myself am only nervous." Any local degeneration utterly undemonstrable; no organically conditioned stomach ailment, however much the deepest weakness of the gastric system set in as a consequence of cerebral exhaustion. The eye trouble too, coming dangerously close to blindness, a consequence, not a cause: so that with every increase in vital force the power of sight, as [— —], has increased as well. A long, all too long series of years means convalescence for me, — it means, unfortunately, also relapse, decay and the periodicity of a kind of décadence. Need I say that I am experienced in questions of décadence? I have spelled it forwards and backwards. Even that art of grasping and comprehend-

ing, those fingers for nuances, that whole psychology of "seeing around the corner" which perhaps distinguishes me, was learned at that time, is the true gift of that period in which everything became more refined, observation as well as the organs of observation. To look from the optics of the sick toward healthier concepts and values, and again conversely, from the fullness and self-assurance of abundant life, to look down into the filigree work of the décadent instinct — that has been my greatest exercise, my longest experience: if in anything, it is in this that I am a master. I have it in hand, I have the hand for it, to *reverse perspectives*: which is why for me alone a *revaluation of values* was at all possible.

11.

For, setting aside the fact that I am a décadent, I am also its opposite in the fullest sense. My proof of this is that I instinctively chose the right remedies *against* those bad conditions as well: whereas the décadent as such recognizably chooses the harmful remedies. As summa summarum I was healthy: as a nook, as a speciality I was décadent. That energy for absolute solitude and for detaching myself from accustomed circumstances and tasks, the compulsion against myself not to let myself be cared for, waited upon, *doctored* — this betrays the unconditional instinctive certainty about what is needful. I took myself in hand, I made myself healthy: the precondition for this — every physiologist will grant me this — is that one *is* fundamentally healthy. A typically morbid being does not become healthy: for one who is typically healthy, being sick can be an energetic stimulant. Thus indeed does that long period of illness appear to me now in the end: I discovered life anew, as it were, I tasted all good and even small things as another would not easily have tasted them, — I made of my will to health, to *life*, my philosophy… For let it be noted: it was the years of my lowest vitality in which I *ceased* to be a pessimist, — my

instinct of self-restoration *forbade* me a philosophy of poverty and discouragement… By what, at bottom, does one recognize well-constitutedness? A well-constituted man is carved from a wood that is hard, delicate and fragrant; he does good even to our sense of smell. He has a taste only for what is beneficial to him; his pleasure, his delight cease where the measure of the beneficial is overstepped. He divines remedies against injuries, he turns bad accidents to his own strengthening. He instinctively gathers from everything he sees, hears, experiences, *his* sum: he is a selective principle, he lets much fall through. He is always in *his own* company, whether he consorts with books, people or landscapes: he honours by *choosing*, by *admitting*, by *trusting*. He reacts slowly to every kind of stimulus, with that slowness which a long caution and a willed pride have bred into him, — he tests the stimulus that approaches, he is far from going to meet it. He believes neither in "misfortune" nor in "guilt": he is strong enough that everything must turn out for the best for him. — Well then, I am the counterpart of a décadent: for I have just described myself. —

2.

The physiological contradiction.

On the criminal.

What I owe to the ancients.

Philosophy.

Music

the books *characterized*.

In media vita.

Notes of a

Grateful One.

By

F. N.

3.

Ecce Homo

Notes

of a Manifold One.

1.

The Psychologist Speaks

2.

The Philosopher Speaks

3.

The Poet Speaks

4.

The Musician Speaks

5.

The Writer Speaks

6.

The Educator Speaks

4.

Fridericus Nietzsche

de vita sua.

Translated into German.

5.

The Mirror

Attempt

at a Self-Appraisal.

By

Friedrich Nietzsche

6.

The shrewdness of my instinct consists in feeling the real states of need and dangers for *me* as such.

likewise in divining the means by which one gets out of their way *or* fits them in to one's own advantage and, as it were, organizes them around a *higher* purpose.

The struggle

with solitude

with sickness

with the accident of origin, education, society…

with the great crushing responsibility

with the multiplicity of the conditions of one's task (— what isolation need

7.

Greatest shrewdness: to let a great destiny penetrate into consciousness as little as possible, — to preserve one's modesty toward it

to hide oneself, as it were, from it through unassumingness, wantonness, refinement of taste, even through periods of sickness and weakness…

one must only do its bidding, not want to know *what* it is, *when* it commands…

one must have no speeches, no formulas, no attitudes for it, — one must suffer without knowing, one must do one's best without understanding oneself in it…

8.

Vademecum.

On the Reason of My Life.

9.

In Converse with the Ancients.

Appendix

Ecce Homo.

10.

As regards Goethe: the first impression, a very early impression, was altogether decisive: the Novella of the Lion, strangely enough the first thing of his I came to know, gave me once and for all my concept, my *taste* "Goethe." A transfigured, pure autumnalness in enjoying and in letting things ripen, — in waiting, an October sun reaching up into the most spiritual; something golden and sweetening, something mild, *not* marble — *that* is what I call Goethean. Later, for the sake of *this* concept "Goethe," I took into myself with deep affection Adalbert Stifter's "Indian Summer": at bottom the only German book *after* Goethe that holds any enchantment for me. — *Faust* — for one who knows the earthy smell of the German language by instinct, for the poet of Zarathustra, it is a delight without equal: it is *not* so for the artist that I am, into whose hands with Faust were placed fragment upon fragment, — it is still less so for the philosopher, who is repelled by the wholly arbitrary and accidental — that is, the condition-

ing by cultural accidents — in all the types and problems of Goethe's work. One studies the eighteenth century when one reads "Faust," one studies Goethe: one is a thousand miles away from the *necessary* in type and problem. —

Notebook 25: December 1888 — Early January 1889

1.

Great Politics.

I bring war. *Not* between people and people: I have no word to express my contempt for the accursed politics of interest pursued by European dynasties, which makes of incitement to selfishness and self-exaltation of the peoples against one another a principle and almost a duty. *Not* between estates. For we have no higher estates, and consequently no lower ones either: what is on top in society today is physiologically condemned and moreover — which is the proof of it — has become so impoverished, so uncertain in its instincts, that it professes without scruple the *counter-principle* of a higher kind of man

I bring war straight across all the absurd accidents of people, estate, race, profession, upbringing, education: a war as between ascent and decline, between will to life and *vengefulness* against life, between integrity and malicious mendacity… That all the "higher estates" take the side of the lie is not a matter of their free choice — this they *must* do: it is not in one's power to keep bad instincts at bay. — Never more than in this case will it become evident how little there is to the concept "free will": one affirms what one *is*, one denies what one is *not*… Number speaks in favour of the "Christians": the *vulgarity* of number… After humanity has been treated for two millennia with physiological absurdity, decay, the contradictoriness of instinct, *must* indeed have gained the upper hand. Is it not a consideration that makes one shudder, that only for about the last 20 years have all the *next most important* questions, of nutrition, of clothing, of diet, of

health, of procreation, been treated with rigour, with seriousness, with integrity

First proposition: great politics wants to make physiology the mistress over all other questions; it wants to create a power strong enough to *breed* humanity as a whole and as something higher, with merciless hardness against what is degenerate and parasitic in life, — against what corrupts, poisons, slanders, ruins… and sees in the annihilation of life the badge of a higher kind of soul.

Second proposition: war to the death against vice; every kind of anti-nature is vicious. The Christian priest is the most vicious kind of man: for he *teaches* anti-nature.

Second proposition: to create a party of life, strong enough for *great* politics: *great* politics makes physiology the mistress over all other questions, — it wants to *breed* humanity as a whole, it measures the rank of races, of peoples, of individuals according to their future-[—], according to the guarantee of life that they carry within them, — it makes an inexorable end of everything degenerate and parasitic.

Third proposition. The rest follows from this.

2.

What I forgive the Germans least is that they do not *know* what they are doing… lying. The liar who knows that he lies is, measured against a German, virtuous…

3.

Gil Blas, a pleasant country in which no Germans occur; Prosper Mérimée, a still pleasanter one, — nowhere does one stumble over a virtue.

4.

petits faits vrais

Fromentin

De Vogüé

5.

Herr Köselitz really has a notion of me: something that still astonishes me just as much as its opposite leaves me cold. At times I look at my hand with the thought that I hold the *destiny* of *humanity* in my hand —: I break it invisibly into 2 pieces, before me, after me…

6.

1.

I know my lot. One day there will be bound up with my name the memory of something tremendous, — of a crisis such as there never was on earth, of the deepest collision of conscience, of a decision conjured up *against* everything that had been believed, demanded, hallowed. — And with all this there is nothing in me of a fanatic; whoever knows me takes me for a plain, perhaps somewhat malicious scholar who knows how to be cheerful with everyone. This book gives, as I hope, an entirely different picture than the picture of a prophet; I wrote it in order to destroy at the root every myth about me —, there is something high-spirited even in my earnestness, I love the smallest as well as the greatest, I cannot rid myself of my happiness in moments of terrible decision, I have the greatest compass of soul that any man has ever had. Fateful and — God or buffoon — that is the involuntary in me, that is what I am. — And nevertheless, or rather *not* nevertheless, for all prophets hitherto have been liars — the truth speaks out of me. — but my truth is *terrible*: for hitherto one called the *lie* truth… Revaluation of all values, that is my formula for an act of supreme self-reflection on the part of mankind: my lot wills that I must look down into the questions of all ages more deeply, more courageously, more honestly than any man hitherto has had to *discover*… I do not challenge what is now living, I challenge several millennia against me. I contradict and am nevertheless the opposite of a no-saying spirit. Only from me onward are there hopes again; I know tasks of such a height that the concept for them has hitherto been lacking, — I am the *bearer of glad tidings* par excellence, however much I must always be the man of fatality as well. — For when a volcano becomes active, we have convulsions on earth such as there never yet were. The concept of politics has been wholly absorbed into a

war of spirits, all structures of power are blown into the air, — there will be wars such as there never yet were on earth. —

2.

What is going on in the meantime is too repugnant to me even to play the spectator to it. I know nothing that more deeply resists the *sublime* sense of my task than this accursed incitement to the selfishness of peoples and of races which now lays claim to the name of „great politics"; I have no word to express my contempt for the intellectual level which now, in the shape of the German Imperial Chancellor and with the Prussian officer-attitudes of the House of Hohenzollern, believes itself called to be the steerer of the history of mankind, this lowest species of man, which has not even learned to ask questions where I need shattering thunderbolts of answers, upon which the whole labour of centuries of intellectual integrity has been in vain — that stands too far *beneath* me even to be permitted the honour of my enmity. Let them build their houses of cards! for me „empires" and „triple alliances" are houses of cards… That rests on presuppositions which *I* hold in my hand… There is more dynamite between heaven and earth than these purple-clad idiots dream of…

7.

5.

— One last point of view, the highest perhaps: I *justify* the Germans, I alone. We are in opposition, we are even untouchable for one another, — there is no bridge, no question, no glance between us. But that is precisely the condition for that utmost degree of selfhood, of self-redemption, which in me became man: I am *solitude* as a man… That no word ever reached me, that *compelled* me to reach myself… I would not be possible without an opposite kind of race, without Germans,

without *these* Germans, without Bismarck, without 1848, without the „Wars of Liberation", without Kant, without Luther himself… The great cultural crimes of the Germans justify themselves in a higher economy of culture… I want nothing otherwise, not backwards either, — I was *permitted* to want nothing otherwise… Amor fati… Even Christianity becomes necessary: the highest form, the most dangerous, the most seductive in the No to life first challenges its highest affirmation — *me*… What, in the end, are these two millennia? Our *most instructive* experiment, a vivisection upon life itself… Merely two millennia!…

8.

Stendhal came out of the service of the best *rigorous* school of philosophers in Europe, that of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, — he despised Kant…

9.

Fromentin, Feuillet, Halévi, Meilhac, les Goncourt, Gyp, Pierre Loti — — — or, to name one of the deep race, Paul Bourget, who of his own accord has come by far the closest to me — — —

10.

The old Italians with the depth and melancholy sweetness of feeling, the *noble* musicians par excellence, in whom the highest of the voice has survived as tone

The Requiem of Nicola Jommelli (1769), for example, I heard it yesterday — ah, that comes from another world than a Requiem by Mozart…

11.

A last word. From now on I shall need helping hands — immortal hands! — without number; the *Revaluation* is to appear in 2 languages. One would do well to found societies everywhere, so as to put some millions of followers into my hand at the right time. I attach importance to having first of all the officers and the Jewish bankers on my side: — the two together represent the *will to power*. —

When I ask after my natural allies, they are above all the officers; with military instincts in one's body one *cannot* be a Christian, — otherwise one would be false as a Christian and false besides as a soldier. Likewise the Jewish bankers are my natural allies, as the only international power, by their origin as by their instinct, that *binds* the peoples together again, after an accursed politics of interests has made a duty out of the selfishness and self-exaltation of the peoples.

12.

In this time everything yields that [— — —] had. I give the highest honour to him for whom it cost the greatest pains — to my maestro Peter Gast, who in the end would need no mark of honour if [— — —] — the first and most solid musician now living.

i only do what i owe him when i call him the deepest and most solid musician now living.

13.

War to the death against the House of Hohenzollern

As the one I must be, no man, a destiny, I will make an end of these criminal idiots who for more than a century have done the big talking, the biggest talking. Since the days of Frederick the Great Thief they have done nothing but lie and steal; I must make an exception of one

alone, the unforgettable Frederick the Third, as the best-hated, best-slandered of the whole race… Today, when a shameful party is on top, when a Christian gang sows the accursed dragon-seed of nationalism among the peoples and, out of love for the slaves, wants to „liberate" the black house-servants, we have to bring *mendacity* and *innocence* in the lie before a world-historical tribunal #

Their tool, Prince Bismarck, the idiot par excellence among all statesmen, never thought a hand's breadth beyond the Hohenzollern dynasty

But that has had its day: I will lace the Reich into a brazen shirt and challenge it to a struggle of despair. I shall not have my hands free until I have in my hands that Christian hussar of an emperor, that young criminal *together with* all his appurtenances — with the annihilation of the most pitiable abortion of a man that has ever yet come to power

14.

So that the house of fools and criminals may feel itself on top, Europe now pays 12 billion a year, tears open chasms between the nations in the making, has waged the most hare-brained wars that were ever waged: Prince Bismarck, for the benefit of his house politics, has destroyed with an accursed sureness of instinct all the preconditions for *great* tasks, for world-historical aims, for a nobler and subtler spirituality. And just look at the Germans themselves, the [—] lowest, most stupid, most vulgar race there probably is on earth now, *Hohenzollernized* to the point of hatred against spirit and freedom. Just look at their "genius", Prince Bismarck, the idiot among the statesmen of all times, who never thought a hand's breadth beyond the Hohenzollern dynasty. The idiot on the cross was [— — —]… And when the race had genius, it had the genius of *crime*…

In the end we could do without wars altogether; a right opinion would under certain circumstances already suffice. A wagon with iron bars for Hohenzollerns and other "Swabians"… We *others* would go unceasingly about the grand and lofty work of life — we still have everything to organize. There are more effective means of bringing physiology to honour than by military hospitals — I would know a better use to make of the 12 billion that the "armed peace" costs Europe today. And in short — — —

But that has had its day. Let this young criminal be handed over to me; I shall not hesitate to ruin him, — I myself will make the firebrand blaze in his accursed criminal mind

15.

Only by branding the criminal madness do I always brand the two most accursed institutions from which mankind has hitherto been sick, the true institutions of mortal enmity against life: the *dynastic* institution, which fattens itself on the blood of the strongest, the well-constituted and the splendid, and the *priestly* institution, which with a ghastly cunning seeks from the very outset to destroy those very same men, the strongest, the well-constituted, the splendid. I find emperor and priest at one here: here I will be judge and put an end to all the millennia of criminal madness of dynasts and priests… Mankind has grown so accustomed to this madness that today it believes it needs armies *for the purpose of wars*… I have just, it seems, uttered an absurdity… No one demands more strictly than I that everyone be a soldier: there is absolutely no other means of educating a whole people to the virtues of obeying and commanding, to tact, in bearing and gesture, to the cheerful and brave manner, [—], to freedom of spirit in the meantime — it is by far our *first* reason in education that everyone

be a soldier there is also no other means of spreading, across every chasm of rank, spirit, task, a manly mutual goodwill over an entire people. — "Service and duty" [— — —], blessing of work — so the accursed dynasty always talks when it needs men. That one afterwards places such a selection of strength and youth and power before the cannons is *madness*.

16.

I shall never admit that a canaille of a Hohenzollern can command anyone to commit crimes… There is no *right* to obedience when the one commanding is merely a Hohenzollern

17.

My friends, just take a look at a priest. That is something solemn, pale, downcast, with cowardice in the eye and with quite long pale fingers, above all in the becoming-holy there lurks a vengeful and subtle animal, which one [— — —] Let us not underestimate the priest — he is [—] He is also *holy*… *We*, with a little blood and curiosity, we for whom a little devilry in the head belongs to happiness, are *unholy*… How ashamed we are!

18.

The Reich itself is indeed a lie: no Hohenzollern, no Bismarck has ever thought of Germany… *Hence* the fury against Prof. Geffcken… Bismarck preferred to bang his fist with the word "German" in his mouth, by police statute… I think they are laughing at the courts of Vienna, of St. Petersburg; they simply know our consort of a parvenu, who so far has not uttered a clever word even by mistake. That is no man at all who stakes anything on the preservation of the Germans, as he claims.

and perhaps even more a *stupidity*!

19.

Final Consideration

If we could do without wars, so much the better. I would know a more useful way to employ the twelve billion that the armed peace costs Europe each year; there are other means of bringing physiology to honour than by military hospitals… In short, and *very* well indeed: now that the old God is abolished, I am ready *to rule the world*…

20.

Let the young criminal be delivered into my hand: I shall not hesitate to ruin him and set his criminal mind on fire…

21.

condamno te ad vitam diaboli vitae

By annihilating you, Hohenzollern, I annihilate

the lie

sun | *Intelligent Audio*



sunapp.ai/download